1983

From Realism to Rapprochement: The Autobiographical Interpretation of Collingwood's Philosophy

Glenn C. Shipley
Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation
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FROM REALISM TO RAPPROCHEMENT:
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION
OF COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY

by
Glenn C. Shipley

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May
1983
PART III

VII. ANTI-REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

1. Introduction ........................................ 320
2. Empirical Thinking and the 
   Essay on Philosophical Method ................. 328
3. Sensation, Imagination, and 
   Empirical Thought ................................ 335
4. Attention, Freedom and 
   Corrupt Consciousness .............................. 355
5. Idealism and the Limitations 
   of Phenomenology ................................... 366
6. The New Leviathan: Attention 
   as a Linguistic Act ................................ 390
7. Conclusion ............................................. 415

VIII. LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND MENTAL ACTS

1. Introduction ........................................ 423
2. Questions, Answers, and 
   Presuppositions ...................................... 427
3. Dialectical Logic and 
   Philosophical Methodology ....................... 458
4. Language and Logic in 
   The Principles of Art ................................ 518
5. Language and Mind: 
   The New Leviathan .................................. 538
6. Conclusion ............................................. 592

IX. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

1. Introduction ........................................ 607
2. Anti-Realism and History .......................... 617
   (a) The Definition of History ..................... 617
   (b) The Outside and Inside of 
       Historical Events ................................ 625
   (c) Individuality, Universality, 
       and the Subject Matter 
       of History ........................................ 636
   (d) Historical Re-enactment ....................... 645
   (e) The A-Priori Imagination ..................... 655
   (f) Re-enactment: Beyond 
       Realism and Idealism .............................. 667
3. Evidence, Inference, and Necessity ........................................ 694
   (a) Historical Evidence .................................................. 694
   (b) Historical Inference .................................................. 704
   (c) Historical Necessity .................................................. 712
4. Conclusion ............................................................................. 719

X. METAPHYSICS AND RAPPROCHEMENT

1. Introduction ............................................................................. 721
2. The Autobiographical Themes in the Essay on Metaphysics .......... 736
3. Obstacles to Understanding Collingwood's Reformed Metaphysics .... 752
4. The Unity of the Autobiographical Themes ................................. 767
5. The Rehabilitation of Reformed Metaphysics ............................... 795
   (a) From Anti-Metaphysics to Reformed Metaphysics .................. 797
   (b) Metaphysics as an Historical Science ................................. 805
   (c) The Absoluteness of Presupposing .................................... 815
   (d) Ontology and Reformed Metaphysics .................................. 825

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 836
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Interpretations of Collingwood's Philosophy</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Critique of Realism</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Question and Answer Logic-Autobiography</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Principles of History</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Rapprochement Philosophy</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Meanings of History</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Knowers-Known Relationship in Perception</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Mind</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Philosophical Method</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Language and Expression in The Principles of Art</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>The Presuppositions of the Analysis of Mental Functions</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Metaphysics and Anti-Metaphysics</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF IN-TEXT REFERENCES

In this dissertation references to Collingwood's published philosophical works are made in the fashion that has become accepted by Collingwood's interpreters. The references are made in-text, by abbreviation of the title of the work followed by the page or pages on which the reference is found. These abbreviations are as follows:


ix


In addition the following standard works on Collingwood are also given in-text references:


PART III

THE LATER WRITINGS (1933-1942)
CHAPTER VII

ANTI-REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

1. Introduction.

In Chapter I we noticed that one of the major issues of concern to Collingwood's interpreters is his position on the realism-idealism controversy. Knox argues that he vacillated from a youthful realism to a mature idealism and then back to a dogmatic and sceptical realism in his later writings. Donagan maintains that the youthful idealism propounded in Speculum Mentis, with its anti-realistic, anti-abstraction principle, was superceded by a more mature philosophy of mind in which abstraction is recognized as being essential for thought; the resulting philosophy of mind, though flawed, is compatible with realism and contemporary analytical philosophy. Rubinoff denies that Collingwood was ever anything but an idealist. And Mink argues that Collingwood's philosophy escapes both idealism and realism.

In Chapter II we found that Collingwood's self-interpretation in the Autobiography also stresses the realism-idealism controversy, but it stresses mainly his opposition to errors of realism, and only incidentally denies that his early work (Speculum Mentis) was, as one of his reviewers
called it, "the usual idealistic nonsense." On this interpretation we know only that Collingwood was opposed to the central tenet of realism, as well as to its many pernicious consequences, but not what Collingwood's commitment was to idealism. We also saw in this chapter that Collingwood framed the central tenet of realism in terms of the knower-known relationship, and not in terms of the dependency of matter on mind or even in terms of an abstraction principle. On the basis of the autobiographical interpretation, then, we concluded that an affirmation of the legitimacy of abstraction does not necessarily constitute an espousal of the doctrine of realism--not, that is, without evidence that Collingwood himself drew the inference that the central tenet of realism necessarily implies the principle of abstraction.

However in Chapter III we saw that the evidence of Speculum Mentis does seem to point to this inference, since throughout that early work Collingwood does attack realism by means of a critique of the principle of abstraction. Realism's basic error, according to Speculum Mentis, is the assumption that truth is the result of abstraction, or is contained in the abstract concept, and the correction of this error, which is the work of philosophy, is the realization that all abstraction is falsification, because "to abstract is to consider separately things that are inseparable" (SM, 160). But both in Chapter III and in Chapter VI we were at
pains to show that there is an ambiguity in the meaning of terms like "separate" and "identical" which render the formulation of the principle of abstraction, as it is expressed in Speculum Mentis, equally ambiguous. The ambiguity infects the discussion of realism itself, which on the one hand is responsible for all the root errors that consciousness makes about itself, and on the other hand is the particular form of dogmatism associated with historicism. These ambiguities remain unresolved in Speculum Mentis, which is not surprising from the point of view of the Autobiography, since his rapprochement philosophy was at this point still incomplete (cf. A, 107, 116).

But even though Speculum Mentis presumes that an attack on the principle of abstraction is an attack on realism, there is evidence that in the same book the principal doctrine of realism as described in the Autobiography is itself attacked in an argument employing the same strategy as the later work, and the argument does not depend on premises tied to a principle of abstraction. Collingwood argued that to ask what an object world is or would be apart from a mind which knows it, presupposes the false suggestion that we can describe that which by definition is also unknown (SM, 267-68). This argument does not depend on any formulation of a "principle of abstraction" as essential to realism (cf. CEPC, 9-12).
What we require at this point, if the autobiographical interpretation is to be upheld, is evidence that in his later philosophy Collingwood did not, as some of his critics have charged, surrender to the realism that he had rejected in his early writings. If we can show that throughout his later writings Collingwood continued to deny the principal doctrine of realism, we shall take it that on this issue, at least, the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated. Since this is the main concern of this chapter, we shall attempt to adhere as closely as we can to the fundamental formula of realism as Collingwood understood it: that "knowing makes no difference to the object known."¹ We shall not attempt to follow up on all the evidence that is available to show that he also sought to overcome all the mistaken consequences that follow from this premise—notably those concerning moral philosophy²—although we may make occasional note

¹As we pointed out in Chapter III, the autobiographical formula for realism is phrased in extremely abstract terms, with no differentiation made between various senses or cases of "knowing" and "object," and no exact designation of what sort of "difference" is made (or not made). Throughout this chapter we shall assume that Collingwood is talking about an epistemological doctrine, i.e. one which primarily says something about knowing rather than something about reality.

²In the bibliography of the Krausz collection of Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Collingwood there is a note that the lectures on ethics, currently being edited by Mrs. K. Collingwood in collaboration with Mr. J. Rusk, are going to be deposited in the Bodleian Library. Until they are made available, Collingwood's views on ethics will probably remain only partially revealed in the remarks in The New Leviathan.
of these consequences in passing. We shall also not be concerned with a detailed discussion of the principle of abstraction, except as it bears directly on the discussion of the central tenet of realism in the passage under discussion--our reason being that the connection of these two principles is not a direct part of the autobiographical interpretation.

But does the denial of the principal doctrine of realism necessarily imply the affirmation of an idealist thesis? Certainly to deny the proposition that "knowing does not make a difference to the object known" logically implies the affirmation that "knowing makes a difference to the object known," but is that all that it implies, and is this idealism? In an intriguing article, John F. Post suggests that Collingwood's anti-realism argument in the Autobiography not only shows that the central tenet of realism is false, but is just as effective against the idealist position that knowing does make a difference to the object known, since either premise implies the meaningless assertion that one can know what is simultaneously declared to be unknown.³ Taking our cue from

Since Collingwood's ethics is not what has caused widespread interest in his philosophy, or even widespread controversy about it, there is little problem with leaving it out of consideration here. We do this knowing full well that for Collingwood, even in the Autobiography, theory and practice cannot be fully separated from one another.

this article, we would like to propose a modification of Post's argument and use it as an abstract framework for our investigation of the realism-idealism controversy in Collingwood's later philosophy.

In order to be as clear as possible (but only as clear as necessary) about what is being affirmed by this negation, we propose the following schema:

A. (1) Knowing makes a difference to the object known.
    (2) (1) is false (realism).
    (3) (2) is false, because the denial of (1) is absurd (anti-realism).

But does A (3) then imply that A (1) is true? And is this idealism? In order to see if this is so, let us propose a more complicated version of schema A:

B. (1) Knowing makes a difference to the object known.
    (2) The object known makes a difference to knowing.
    (3) (1) is false and (2) is true (radical realism).
    (4) (1) is true and (2) is false (radical idealism).
    (5) Both (1) and (2) are false (radical scepticism).
    (6) (3), (4), and (5) are false because (1) and (2) are both true.

Whether or not there are any historically manifested representatives for the positions we are calling "radical realism," "radical idealism," and "radical scepticism," we
wish to know how Collingwood stands with respect to these fundamental options. If we can show that in his later philosophy Collingwood held to A (3) we will have shown that on this issue the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated. But we wish to know further if Collingwood held to B (4), B (5), or B (6). We do know that Collingwood claimed that he could never plead guilty to a charge of scepticism (EPM, 223), and that in some sense of the word idealism (but we do not know yet if, in the later philosophy, it is in the radical sense as we are using that term), he claimed not to be an idealist (A, 56-57). But can we really defend B (6)? Does Collingwood really hold that B (1) and B (2) are not related as disjuncts but as conjuncts?

Our strategy will be simply to take up the later writings, beginning with the Essay on Philosophical Method, continuing with The Principles of Art, and concluding with The

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4 In Chapter III we noted that in his early philosophy Collingwood rejected "subjective" and "metaphysical" idealism, and although he appeared to approve of an epistemological idealism, held that "Absolute Knowledge" was humanly possible, and ruled out a kind of objective idealism that relied on a Divine Mind as a locus for absolute knowledge, we found these passages in Speculum Mentis to be plagued with difficulties. In the present chapter where "idealism" is used without qualification, the epistemological, non-subjective variety is meant. But we must remain alert to the possibility that what he says about "idealism" may not be applicable to other forms of idealism, particularly objective idealism of an Hegelian pedigree.
New Leviathan, with side-excursions to the Essay on Metaphysics, The Idea of Nature, and The Idea of History. We shall try to find out what Collingwood means by the terms "object," "knowledge," and the relation of "making a difference." Of necessity this involves setting out in some detail Collingwood's later philosophy of mind. But in this chapter we will only be concerned with so much of it as relates to the question of the principal doctrine of realism--and consequently the discussion will center on the issue of the perception of the "real world" and the modification of the object of perception by thought. In the next chapter we will take up the "higher" functions of mind--conceptual, propositional, interrogative, and implicative thinking--and later we will be concerned with the historical imagination and the ultimate meaning of "difference" and "identity" for a rapprochement metaphysics. We refer the reader to other expositions of the levels of practical consciousness in Collingwood's later philosophy of mind: since these are peripheral to our main concern, we shall have little to say about them in this chapter. (See, e.g., Mink, MHD, 82-92, 117 figure 2).

It will help the reader to bear in mind that in this chapter we shall try to give Collingwood every opportunity to make clear what is the status of objects of perception, and whether there is any possibility for the object to make a difference to the perceptual knowledge of it. We shall therefore
ask the reader's forebearance while we examine some "circumstantial evidence" to confirm our suspicion that Collingwood was trying to escape from the idealism-realism dilemma.

Finally, it may be helpful if for orientation the reader refer occasionally to Tables 7 and 8. While these summaries do not correspond exactly to the sequence of topics in the chapter, they will give the reader an overview of the essential features of Collingwood's philosophy of mind presupposed in the discussion of this theory of perception.


Critics of Collingwood have dismissed the view of philosophy expounded in the Essay on Philosophical Method primarily because they saw it as a specimen of idealistic argument (cf. LPC, 259-60). The grounds for this assertion are primarily (a) the view of predication presented in the essay—viz. that all philosophical statements are both categorical and universal; and (b) the use to which this analysis of predication is put—viz. the defense of the Anselmian ontological argument.\(^5\) We will refrain from a full discussion of both of these issues: the former will be examined in the next chapter, insofar as it is best discussed in connection with Q-A

logic and the nature of hypothetical and categorical judgments; and the latter issue will arise again in the chapter on metaphysics and rapprochement (Chapter X), since the ontological argument seems to be the ultimate test of whether there is an upper limiting case of unity in the scale of forms of knowledge.

The question at this point is whether or not the Essay on Philosophical Method contains any statements which would substantiate, modify, or disprove the central anti-realistic thesis of the Autobiography. But it appears that in this work Collingwood intends to dodge all responsibility for dealing with such issues. Although the purpose of the essay is to describe the nature of philosophy, Collingwood announces at the outset that he will not expand the essay to include the place of philosophy among the other forms of thought, the place of thought among the other activities of the mind, and the relation of mind to the world (EPM, 7-8). For reasons of both expediency and specificity, he declines to deal with the broader issues raised by the essay: "though no doubt the thoughts here expressed have implications in metaphysics, logic, and the theory of knowledge, these implications will not be discussed" (EPM, 8).

On the other hand, Collingwood confessed at the end of the essay that his original contract with the reader (at EPM,
45) to treat the proposed characteristics of philosophical concepts, judgments, and arguments as only hypothetically or provisionally affirmed has been violated throughout the book by appeal to "experience"—that is, philosophical experience, instances in which the concepts, judgments, and arguments are displayed as having these characteristics (EPM, 223-24). Therefore the interpreter is put in the difficult position of taking the substantive remarks of the essay as in one sense true for philosophy (as Collingwood sees it) without qualification, and in another sense taking such remarks as only provisionally true. Until the actual standpoint of the essay is spelled out (and it will be to the best of our ability in the next chapter), we can only look for indirect evidence to add probability to our contention that the essay does not represent a departure from the central theses of the Autobiography.

When we turn to the Essay on Philosophical Method for evidence to determine whether or not Collingwood held to B (3), B (4), B (5), or B (6), i.e. whether the negative proposition which denies the realist's principal doctrine logically entails the positive proposition that knowing does make a difference to the object known, the closest we come to such evidence is in a passage in which Collingwood is discussing the problem of the starting point in philosophy. Philosophy can justify its own starting point, he says, "only if the arguments of philosophy, instead of having an irreversible direc-
tion from principles to conclusion, have a reversible one, the principles establishing the conclusions and the conclusions reciprocally establishing the principles" (EPM, 160). The escape from the charge of vicious circularity is premised, Collingwood says, on the realization that philosophy, unlike empirical and exact science, does not proceed from the unknown to the known: it relies on the "Socratic principle that philosophical reasoning leads to no conclusion which we did not in some sense know already" (EPM, 161).

Every school of philosophical thought has accepted this principle, recognizing that philosophy does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of which we already knew in some way; . . . for if the species of a philosophical genus overlap, the distinction between the known and the unknown, which in a non-philosophical subject-matter involves a difference between two mutually exclusive classes of truths, in a philosophical subject-matter implies that we may both know and not know the same thing; a paradox which disappears in the light of a notion of a scale of forms of knowledge, where coming to know means coming to know in a different and better way. (EPM, 161).

Here we see that Collingwood is employing the two most central doctrines of the essay--the overlap of classes and the scale of forms (the technical meanings of which will be explored in the next chapter) to justify the philosophical sense in which knowing makes a difference to the object known. For if philosophical knowledge proceeded in the manner of empirical knowledge, then it would simply be the case that the object made a difference to the subject, or to the knowing of
it, without any reciprocal co-effect of knowing on the known. But Collingwood is here asserting that "every school of philosophy" accepts the principle that in philosophy it is necessary to anticipate its conclusions "by an experience that possesses them in substance before its reasoning begins," so that "in philosophy the conclusions can be checked by comparing them with these anticipations" (EPM, 163). The object of philosophical knowledge, therefore, is not something passively given: its initial datum is always being modified in the light of its conclusions (cf. EPM, 94-97).

Collingwood spells out for his readers the ways in which this initial datum of philosophy differs from that of empirical science. It is different (1) in its relation to the process of reasoning (premises and conclusions are irreversibly related in inductive reasoning, whereas in philosophy the arguments are reversible); (2) in its own constitution (it consists not of empirical facts but of universal propositions which form the material or substance out of which the final system is constructed); and (3) in the way in which it comes to be possessed (it is apprehended not by perception but by thought--the experience of a thinker) (EPM, 166-69). (These principles will be more carefully examined in Chapter VIII). But the differences do not end there, and Collingwood spells out a further difference as (4) the principles that in philosophy knowing makes a difference to what is known:
In empirical science we begin by perceiving that the facts are so, and go on by forming a theory as to why they are so; but in adding this new theory to the old facts we do not come to know the facts in a different way, we only come to have something new in our minds . . . alongside the old knowledge. The process is a special kind of accumulation. But in philosophy the knowledge . . . why things are so makes a difference to the knowledge that they are so . . . . Our knowledge is not simply accumulating, it is developing; it is improving as well as increasing; it is widening and strengthening itself at once. There is consequently a parallel difference in the result of the process, the conclusion which the argument establishes . . . . (I)n philosophy, the theory that emerges from consideration of the facts is no mere hypothesis, it is the facts themselves more thoroughly understood. (EPM, 169-70; emphasis mine).

The incautious reader may leap to the conclusion that because Collingwood is contrasting empirical and philosophical thinking that it is only in philosophy that the proviso holds that knowing makes a difference to the object known, and that in empirical thinking perception of the facts leaves them unaltered, the process being a "kind of accumulation" rather than a kind of modification. But such a conclusion ignores Collingwood's precautionary remark at the beginning of the essay. He says there that when he talks about "empirical" or "non-philosophical" concepts he is referring not to the concepts as they are actually used in science or mathematics, but to concepts which are mistakenly thought to be philosophical: "what I am discussing, when I distinguish philosophical method from that of exact science, is not mathematics itself but a certain method, often mistakenly used in philosophy, which is believed to be that of mathematics" (EPM, 9). Collingwood's point is
that he is not primarily concerned with making statements about empirical or exact sciences, but about philosophy; and therefore it is not essential to this point that what he asserts as true for the empirical or exact sciences be true or not as they are actually employed in those fields, but only that what he is asserting as true for philosophy and philosophical concepts—empirical and exact science as alternative methods and concepts for philosophy. 6

But then does the provision that knowing makes a difference to the object known apply to the whole of the relation between knowledge and its object, or just to that relationship wherein the "object" is taken as the initial datum of philosophy, and "knowing" is understood as that special relationship to an object that is mediated by the sort of thinking called philosophy? To answer this question we clearly must broaden our discussion from its self-imposed limitations in the Essay on Philosophical Method. This broader framework is provided by the philosophy of mind he declined to deal with in the essay on method.

6 It would be a misinterpretation to take the remarks in the Essay on Philosophical Method as evidence that at this time Collingwood held to the strict autonomy of separate modes of thought—science, history, philosophy, etc.—or that he held to the existence of a metaphysics of the one, the true, and the good. The essay leaves such issues unresolved.

Since Collingwood declared in the Autobiography that The Principles of Art was the second book in his mature series, one would hope for some direct link between its contents and those of the Essay on Philosophical Method—the first book of the series of those he planned to write as of 1932. A promising case of a direct relation of subject matters might be the characterization of "empirical thinking" that appears in both (cf. PA, 221 and EPM, 164-70), were it not for the fact that the essay on method so severely limits the applicability of that characterization. The linkage between the two works is there—but it is indirect: it appears in the form of their styles of argumentation, the overlapping of concepts employed in the theory of art, the scale of forms of experience and of knowledge that appear in the central chapters of the later work, and in the overall relation of conclusions to starting point, etc. specified in the Essay on Philosophical Method and exemplified in The Principles of Art.

Even if we had already examined these methodological criteria, it is not of direct concern to us in this chapter to spell out this indirect relationship. Nor would it be to our purpose to examine in detail Collingwood's philosophy of
art. In keeping with our principle of limited objectives, we shall be looking only for evidence for or against Collingwood's judgment on the central tenet of realism.

The Principles of Art is divided into three major sections. Book I deals with the distinction between art and pseudo-art, the latter being primarily art-craft and the reflection on art based on it, this being the "technical theory of art." In this group of arts falsely so-called are all forms of what Collingwood calls representation art, amusement art, and magical art, all of which presume a distinction between means and end that is alien to true art. Book I ends with two chapters which treat of art in the correct sense of the term--as expression and as imagination. For the purpose of clarifying the meaning of the terms "expression" and "imagination," Book II begins afresh with an examination of the general characterizations of experience as a whole, based on the structure of experience as exhibited by reflection on mental functions familiar to anyone who thinks. Book II includes chapters on thinking and feeling, on sensation and imagination, on imagination and consciousness, and on language. Book III outlines a theory of art based on the distinctions and conclusions of Books I and II. The critical chapters in Book III are those which discuss art as language and art as truth.

Although our concern is not directly with the theory of art, it is noteworthy to observe at this point that the structure of argument in The Principles of Art makes little sense apart from its anti-realistic orientation. The "technical theory of art," against which the whole of Book I is a continuous argument, is based on the realist's separation of end (the work of art) from means (the artist's activity), and some of Collingwood's most acrimonious comments in this section are reserved for the "realistic aestheticians" (who, like Sam Alexander, maintain that "beauty" is a subjective feeling aroused by direct acquaintance or perception of the art-work--PA, 149). These are exceeded only by his contempt for the psychologizing art-critics (who, like I. A. Richards, attempt to account for this subjective feeling on the basis of the stimulus-response model--PA, 29-36; cf. PA, 262-64), and for the positivistic anthropologists (who, like Freud, Edward Tylor, James Frazer, and Levy-Bruhl, wind up talking like "one of Molière's prize idiots" when they attempt to derive art from magical beliefs, while utterly misconceiving the nature of myth and magic in the first place--PA, 58-64). The theory of art as expression and as imagination which Collingwood works out is also fully anti-realistic inasmuch as instead of
Interestingly enough it is in the section on empirical thinking in *The Principles of Art* that we find the clearest indication in that work of the stance that Collingwood is taking on the central tenet of realism. In developing a theory of imagination Collingwood discusses the intermediate position of imagination in the region of experience between sensation and intellect, and points out that "sensation must be regarded as a flux of activity in which . . . as soon as the art-object it makes the function of imagination and its expression in language primary and even exclusively essential to true art. Collingwood goes so far in this direction that he asserts that "a work of art may be completely created when it has been created as a thing whose only place is in the artist's mind (PA, 130)--or, as he later puts it, in his head (PA, 151). In Book II the anti-realistic orientation (one might even call it a bias) is apparent in his final analysis of art as language or as the imaginative expression of emotion---mental functions which exist even at the level of the logical and symbolic levels of thought as the "emotions of intellect" (PA, 252-69). Further indications of the anti-realism of Book II will be analyzed in the text of this section of our chapter, and in Chapter VIII. Finally, in Book III, while saying little directly against realism (as one might expect, since anti-realism is his starting point and not his ultimate conclusion), Collingwood counters the realistic esthetician's subject-object dichotomy in art by discussing the truth in art as something not in the art work only or in the subject only, but as a knowing of oneself which is also a making of oneself (PA, 291-92), and by discussing the active role of the artist's audience in the work of art itself (PA, 300-24). Even in so short a summary as this, it is apparent that to excise the anti-realistic orientation of the book is to make nonsense of its argument. That other estheticians have recognized this is indicated by the fact that they point to his "art-only-in-the-head" overstatement as representative of Collingwood's supposed over-intellectualization of the subject of esthetics as a whole: see e.g. S. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, Charles Scribner's Sons (New York, 1953), p. 382. If this is overstatement, we would like to suggest that it is due to his anti-realistic bias.
the act is over, the sensum has vanished, never to return. Its esse is sentire" (PA, 198). At this point he paraphrases the sort of criticism that someone like G. E. Moore (he cites him by name) would raise to such an overstatement, and gives his own response to it:

"Naturally," it may be said, "we cannot see a colour without seeing it. But what could be more absurd than to argue that, because we have stopped seeing it, the colour has ceased to exist? For all we know, colours may perfectly well go on existing when we are not looking at them." The objection is an excellent example of "metaphysics" in the sense in which that word has at various times become a term of merited abuse . . . . The fairy-tale about the existence of unsensed sensa, no doubt, is believed by the people who indulge in it to be a piece of philosophical thinking. . . . But even if the belief in question were true, propositions of this kind would still be nonsense unless it were true not merely that a sensum exists apart from our sensation of it, but that in this state of apartness it is open to our inspection; we have it before our mind in such a way that we can appreciate its qualities, compare them with those of other sensa, and so forth. The question is not one of metaphysics, whether colours exist or not, when we do not see them; it is a question of epistemology, whether we can "have them before our mind" in the above sense otherwise than by seeing them; and if so, how. If we cannot, propositions of the kind in question are all nonsensical . . . . (PA, 198-99; emphasis mine. Cf. PA, 170; NL, 5.31-5.39).

The argument in this passage is an application of the refutation of the central doctrine of realism as found in the Autobiography. Its thrust is to demonstrate the absurdity of the epistemological proposition that "knowing makes no difference to the object known" by showing that this entails knowing what is simultaneously declared to be unknown—in this case sensing something that is unsensed. What Collingwood is
maintaining in this passage is that either (1) what Moore and empiricists in general have been comparing is a sensum and something else like a sensum, but different from it—in fact an imaginatum\(^9\)—or (2) they have been talking complete nonsense—the nonsense of being the assertion of the existence of unsensed sensa.\(^{10}\)

\(^9\)Collingwood does not use the term "imaginatum" or even "phantasm," but on the analogy of his deliberate usage of the term "sensation" for the act of sensation and "sensum" for what is sensed in that act (PA, 173) we feel it to be justified. Collingwood's determination to "speak with the vulgar and think with the learned" causes a certain inarticulation and headache for his interpreters, as we shall see when we come to the altered terminology of The New Leviathan. Cf. PA, 174, and below.

\(^{10}\)This is the argument in support of the thesis that the esse of sensa is sentiri that Donagan claims he failed to find in Chapter VIII of The Principles of Art (LPC, 32-34, and 32 n. 1): in Chapter VIII it appears on P. 170. These pages are predictably the most confusing in all of Donagan's book. (a) Donagan first asserts that he could find no such argument, and then himself cites the argument quoted above (evidently feeling that it is a bad argument, and a bad argument is no argument at all). (b) Then Donagan proceeds to argue that "what ((Collingwood)) took for an 'obvious truth' is a howler .... (I)t is not at all obvious that being sensed may not be merely an episode in the history of a sensum, even though it is its very essence as a sensum. Collingwood seems to have confounded the obvious truth that only while it is sensed does a sensum exist as a sensum with the pleasantry that when it is not being sensed it cannot exist as anything whatever" (LPC, 33). But since Collingwood's whole point is the "obvious truth" that Donagan grants, and not the different proposition that an unsensed object cannot exist as anything whatever when it is unsensed, it appears that the howl is on Donagan: he affirms what he proposes to refute. (c) Then in addition to this supposed refutation of what is not and yet is an argument, Donagan proposes what he calls "some positive evidence" for maintaining that the esse of a sensum is not sentiri." This he finds in the following argument: "The strongest argument for asserting that most of our sensa are physical objects,
This would seem to let the empiricists off the hook by allowing them to opt for (1), but to choose this option is, for a radical empiricist, to surrender his empiricism, since the radical empiricist is one who maintains that all knowledge arises from sensation, where knowledge is not considered to be coeval with sensation as originator, but rather subsequent upon it—both temporally and logically. ¹¹ What Collingwood is proposing instead is a modified empiricism in which thought as the deliberate achievement of a thinker is present even at the level of sensation. Since radical empiricists assume that knowledge arises from the active impression of "sense data" on passive organs of sensation, it is clear that Collingwood's position would not be taken by them as a supporting modification. ¹²

and so can exist unsensed, is that every natural language in which men speak of what they see, hear, taste, and smell is a physical object language" (LPC, 34). But as Donagan himself notes (but fails to apply to his own "evidence") on such grounds as this one could justify belief in fairy-tales, for every natural language is as much a fairy-tale language as it is a physical object language. Donagan's "evidence" (or is it an argument?) is not as mute as the rock that Dr. Johnson kicked to refute Berkeley, but it is just as ineffective.


¹² Mink writes: "Collingwood is an empiricist, but one who belongs to no identifiable school . . . . As an empiricist, Collingwood is a radical empiricist, but he is also a radical idealist, for whom the originative powers of thought are coeval with the most rudimentary forms of experience" (MHD, 111). Mink rightly recognizes that Collingwood escapes the classification of both realism and idealism, that "the traditional opposition of 'empiricism' and 'idealism' is not
Nevertheless this is Collingwood's program in Book II of *The Principles of Art*, and the strategy of argument in this section makes little sense unless it is viewed as an extended argument which both (1) rejects the empiricist epistemology on which realistic esthetics is based, and (2) attempts to save whatever meaning survives this critique. The argument we have just cited, for example, appears just after a rather extensive survey of the British empiricists on the relation of sensation to imagination, during which his main concern was not with a mere refutation that there is a valid basis for the distinction between real and imaginary sensa, but with extracting whatever sense he can from the philosophical tradition on the subject. In order to understand the modification of empiricism that Collingwood is proposing we must examine this distinction more closely.

A fruitful subject for investigation or debate, and that all of the interesting problems cluster around what it means to be radical" (ibid.). Unfortunately Mink does not address himself to this question, and therefore his paradoxical assertions shed no light on how it is possible for a position to be both empirical and idealist when both are asserted in their radical forms—that is, as positions which exclude their opposites. An index of his confusion on this issue can be found in his use of the term "genetic" as it applies to the scale of forms of consciousness: Mink asserts at one point that Collingwood avoids the "genetic fallacy" of the pragmatists and the non-genetic fallacy of the empiricists (MHD, 111), but later he says that for Collingwood feeling and rationality are linked genetically (MHD, 262).
In Chapter VIII Collingwood sets up "the problem of imagination" against the background of the contrast between feeling and thought, the "problem" being that imaginary sensa seem to be neither feelings nor thoughts. The difference between these two "features of our experience" is carried out on the basis of several contrasting characteristics. (1) In terms of the acts of feeling and thinking, feeling is simple and thought bipolarly complex: thinking carries with it the sense of success or failure, truth or falsity, or in general a reference to self-imposed standards or criteria by which it judges whether what it has tried to do has been done well or ill. Feeling may have oppositions and distinctions within itself, but the sense of its having been done altogether "deliberately" or of its having succeeded or failed is absent from it (PA, 157). (2) In terms of what is felt or thought, feelings are private, and thought is public: what one feels is not open to inspection in the same way as is what one thinks (PA, 157-58). (3) Thoughts can corroborate or contradict each other, but feelings cannot (PA, 158), and the main reason for this is that (4) feelings are in perpetual flux in which nothing remains the same (what we take for permanence or recurrence is only a greater or lesser degree of resemblance between different feelings), whereas in thinking we are concerned with something that lasts, that genuinely recurs as a factor in experience (although it is not necessary
to assert the eternity of all objects of thought as such) (PA, 159). 13 Finally, (5) feeling has the character of a foundation upon which thinking is erected as a superstructure—which is why feeling appears to arise in us independently of thought, in a part of our experience which functions independently of all thinking and seems unaffected by it, a level Collingwood calls "psychical" (PA, 163-64). 14

Within feeling Collingwood distinguishes two "kinds" of experience, sensation and emotion—not as a distinction between two species of a common genus, but as two aspects of one and the same experience (like "a terrifying red") which

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13 In the subsequent analysis not all of the distinguishing criteria are given equal weight by Collingwood, but (4) is taken as essential to feeling--i.e., that it is impermanent, or in constant flux, while thought is something that recurs and lasts. In section 4 of this chapter we will see how crucial this distinction is for the characterization of attention—the major function of imagination. On the contrast between sensation (or feeling) and thought in his early writings, see SM, 188-89.

14 "I hold that the proper business of psychology is to investigate this level of experience," i.e. the psychical level, the level of experience at which we merely feel sensations together with their peculiar emotional charges, "and not the level which is characterized by thought" (PA, 164). Collingwood refers the reader to a note on p. 171 in which he states that "a science of feeling must be 'empirical' (i.e. devoted to ascertaining and classifying 'facts' or things susceptible of observation); but a science of thought must be 'normative', or (as I prefer to call it) ' criteriological', i.e. concerned not only with the 'facts' of thought but also with the 'criteria' or standards which thought imposes on itself" (PA, 171, note; cf. IH, 230-31).
can be distinguished by thought, but always occur together in experience. They are combined according to a definite structural pattern describable by saying that sensation takes precedence over emotion. The priority is not temporal, causal, or logical (as grounds and consequent), but as analyzably distinct: emotion exists as a kind of charge on a sensation, a charge which can be stripped off the sensum—a process Collingwood calls "sterilizing" the sensum by ignoring its emotional charge (PA, 162). This is accomplished, as he later explains, by an act of attention (cf. PA, 162-63, 203-11).

Thinking is also distinguished in two ways. In its primary form thought is exclusively concerned with feeling as its sole and universal subject matter. First-order thinking is the process by which we become aware, by an act of attention, of certain feelings and go on to think of these feelings as standing in certain relations to other feelings, remembered as past or imagined as possible (PA, 164-65). All empirical thought is of this sort: making empirical statements we express our thoughts about the relations between

15 The same distinction between a sensum and its emotional charge, within the experience of feeling, is made in The New Leviathan, but (1) Collingwood adds a "diffuse consciousness of feeling" between first-order thought and the purely psychical level, and (2) distinguishes feeling as an "apanage" of mind rather than a constituent (only forms of consciousness are constituents of mind) (NL, 4.1-4.31). Collingwood does not define "apanage," but it refers to the ordinary English usage: "Man as mind is consciousness . . . ; he has feelings . . . ." (NL, 4.2).
sensa, actual or possible—relations of attention to, selection of, comparison with, etc. the sensa under consideration (PA, 165-66).

Thus our experience of the world in space and time, the "world of nature" or "external" world, which means not the world external to ourselves (for we ourselves are part of it, in so far as "we" are our bodies; and if "we" are our minds, there is no sense in speaking of anything as external to them) but the world of things external to one another, the world of things scattered in space and time, is an experience partly sensuous (strictly sensuous-emotional) and partly intellectual: sense being concerned with the colours we see, and the sounds we hear, and so forth; and thought, with the relations between these things. (PA, 166)

But thought also has a secondary function, and second-order thought is thought about thought, thought concerned with the relations between one act of thinking and another, or between the contents of such acts (PA, 166-67). Collingwood does not further characterize second-order thought at this point, other than to contrast it with first-order thought as reason to understanding, or philosophy to science, and to insist that the term "experience" be used to cover not only feeling, but first and second-order thought as well (PA, 167).

The stage is now set for Collingwood's discussion of the problem of imagination. If sensa are in a state of con-

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16To take this passage as a piece of subjective idealism would be a mistake, since Collingwood's intention is not to dissolve the "external" world of nature, but to avoid an "inside-outside" dichotomy with no room for bodily overlap.
stant flux, it does not seem possible (given the characterization of thought and feeling that he had just given) that they could be the object of thought of any kind, because relations between sensa cannot be fixed if the sensa are constantly being both "given" and "taken away." The difficulty is epitomized in the empiricist formula, "sensa data," where the term "data" implies that the sensa are not only given but retained, which conflicts essentially with the term "sense" which refers to something which neither persists nor recurs (PA, 169). The term "sense datum" is therefore either absurd or refers to something like a sensum but different from it, and hence the act which grasps it is not properly termed sensation (PA, 170-71).

In order to see what the distinction actually means, Collingwood engages in an examination of the historical phase of the problem from Descartes to Kant, centering his discussion on the common-sense distinction between "real" and "imaginary" sensa as two classes of a common genus. He distinguishes three phases of the problem: (1) the identification

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17 Although there is no particular dialectical magic to the number three for Collingwood, it is interesting to note that the three phases to his historical discussion of this problem correspond to the three ways that the classes "real" and "imaginary" as species of the genus "sensa" can be related: (1) the classes can be simply identified (17th century rationalists); or (2) abstractly distinguished (English empiricists); or (3) arranged on a scale of overlapping classes (Kant). For evidence that this is not an accidental arrangement, see PA, 187, n. 1.
of sensation with imagination by the 17th century rationalists; (2) the defense of the common-sense distinction by the English empiricists; and (3) the Kantian solution to the problem (PA, 187).

(1) In the 17th century, Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza found that by direct inspection, real and imaginary sensa could not be distinguished. At bottom both were identical: both exhibit a kind of confused disorder, and it is only by reasoning that the two can be distinguished (PA, 175-76). But although Collingwood ultimately agrees with the conclusions (a) that there is no direct or internal test by which the two classes of sensa can be distinguished, and (b) that it is only on the basis of some kind of thought that the distinction can be made (PA, 194), he is not content to merely identify them. He therefore goes on to examine the defense of the common-sense distinction by the English empiricists. 18

18 CF. NL, 4.83-4.89: "For Plato, sensations and emotions cannot be knowledge because they lack the precision which knowledge must have. For Leibniz, feeling in general is confusa cognitio. I do not accept either view in its entirety. Plato thought that knowledge cannot even rest on a foundation of feeling, because feeling is too vague; knowledge must be the work of pure thought operating all by itself. But what a foundation needs is strength, and strength is what feeling has. Leibniz thought feeling was confused knowledge, and to clear up the confusion is to purge it of what makes it feeling and leave it knowledge. But feeling is not knowledge at all; it is feeling; and if you could purge it of what makes it feeling there would be no residue. Yet each was right in saying that feeling is confused or indistinct. That is why one should not try to define it or any kind or element of it; but only to give examples and say: 'This is the sort of thing to which the word refers.'"
(2) The common-sense distinction was reinstated by the English empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but each failed to adequately justify it. As if recognizing some inadequacy to the distinction, each put forward a pair of criteria for discriminating real from imaginary sensa. Locke's "real ideas" are distinguished from "fantastical" ones insofar as (a) the latter are related as ectype to the archetypal "real ideas"--these being the "original" or "real being" of the objects; and (b) by an "introspective" criteria whereby imaginary sensa are the result of a voluntary activity, whereas real sensa are not--the two cases being distinguished by simple introspection as to how the ideas arise in us (PA, 176-77). Similarly Berkeley distinguished "ideas of sense" from

\[\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\text{Cf. Donagan: "In his philosophy of mind Collingwood was fundamentally anti-Cartesian; for he . . . repudiated Descartes' doctrine that acts of consciousness are, as it were, self-illuminating. You cannot know your own mind by turning an inner eye on its operations, because introspection can do no more than to bring to mind something of which you have already become aware" (LPC, 25). "All that introspection could do would be to reproduce your visual field in a second 'inner' visual field; and there is no reason to suppose that having a second visual field or a second auditory field would make you conscious of your first one" (LPC, 41). It is clear that Donagan has a different meaning in mind for "introspection" than does Collingwood. Collingwood attributes the introspection theory to the empiricists--Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--and means it to refer to the distinction between real and imaginary sensa on the basis of the degree of control the subject has over such experiences, the former being relatively involuntary (PA, 177-79). However there is a secondary sense of the term "introspection" as used by Collingwood, this being closer to the sense that Donagan has in mind. At PA, 205 Collingwood writes that introspection as the method of putting questions to consciousness cannot tell us anything about the}
"ideas of imagination" in two ways: (a) by a restatement of Locke's introspection theory (the "strength and liveliness" criteria which, Collingwood argues, only makes sense as meaning that, e.g. "a real sound is heard whether we will or no, whereas an imaginary one can be summoned up, banished, or replaced by another at will" (PA, 178-79)); and (b) the "relation theory" which suggests that ideas of sense are subject to the laws of nature, but ideas of imagination are not (PA, 179-82). Finally, Hume dropped Berkeley's relational theory and (a) reinstated the introspection theory: "impressions" (real sensa) are distinguished from "ideas" (imaginary sensa) by the "degree of force and liveliness with which they strike the mind" -- which Collingwood once again takes to mean the intraprapical or purely sentient level of experience; the correct method for such knowledge is to be found in a well-grounded behavioral psychology. But although Collingwood is rejecting introspection here as a method for inquiring about the purely psychical level, he is not rejecting it as a method for understanding the functions of consciousness. Indeed, so far from being "anti-Cartesian" in this sense, Collingwood's mature philosophy of mind is nothing but introspective: it consists entirely of "soundings" at various levels of consciousness (NL, 9.35-9.4), made by putting questions to (conscious reflection on) lower levels (cf. PA, 205-06), and with Donagan's "Principle of Order" as a blessing on the project. It is therefore hard to see what sense it makes to assert that the introspective method was rejected by Collingwood, or how in rejecting it Collingwood was being fundamentally anti-Cartesian. To be anti-Cartesian Collingwood would have to maintain that conscious acts cannot be objects to other conscious acts, which is certainly not what Collingwood maintained. And if being anti-introspectively anti-Cartesian means rejecting that there is an "inner eye" that is something other than a conscious act, then it is probable that Descartes himself was not a Cartesian, for certainly his introspective acts were acts of consciousness.
ability of our minds to set purpose to, control, excite, suppress, or modify our sensory experience (PA, 182-83). (b) But Hume also recognized (but yet minimized) the difficulties involved in cases like dreams, hallucinations, and violent emotional upheavals, in which the criterion does not apply, since in such cases sensa are not subject to voluntary control, but are nonetheless certainly imaginary. In such cases he therefore falls back on the relational theory to account for the distinction (PA, 183-85).

Collingwood argues that none of the empiricists' criteria is successful. In Locke's representative theory the substitution of the relation of ectype to archetype for the relation of imaginary sensa to real sensa is inconsistent with his causal theory, which describes real sensa as caused by objects (PA, 177) - it assumes the untenable identification of resemblance and causation which Hume so vigorously refuted. If real sensa cannot be accounted for in this way, their distinction from imaginary sensa collapses. The introspection theory similarly fails on the grounds that the exceptional cases of hallucinations, dreams, etc. proves not the rule that real sensa, but not imaginary sensa, are involuntary, but rather that will has little to do with the distinction: imaginary sensa are often less subject to control than are real sensa (PA, 179). Finally, the relational theory fails because although imaginary sensa may not obey all the laws of nature,
they obey some, and are furthermore subject to "psychological laws" which cannot be thoroughly disentangled from laws of nature. Furthermore the relational criterion is circular: we can only know what the laws of nature are by experience, or by studying real sensa—but to distinguish real sensa by appeal to these laws presumes the distinction to be established (PA, 182).

Finally, (3) Kant corrects the relational theory by showing that first-order laws of nature imply second-order "principles of the understanding," and argues effectively that while a sensa may be "wild" in the sense of not belonging to a "family" of known natural laws of the first order, it cannot be wild in the sense of failing to belong to laws of the second order.

It is a principle of the understanding that every event must have a cause. No event that comes under our notice can escape this principle. The furthest length to which it can go towards wildness in that direction is a failure on our part to discover what, in particular, its cause is. Thus Kant's discovery of second-order laws involves the discovery that there are no wild sensa. At the same time it enables him to explain what we mean when we say that wild sensa exist. We are saying that certain sensa, though . . . we know they must admit of interpretation, have not yet been actually interpreted . . . . Instead of trying to conceive real sensa and imaginary sensa as two co-ordinate species of the same genus, . . . he conceived the difference between them as a difference of degree. For him, a real sensum can only mean one which has undergone interpretation by the understanding, which alone has the power to confer the title real; an imaginary sensum will then mean one which has not yet undergone that process. (PA, 186-87); emphasis mine).
It is noteworthy that Collingwood takes the Kantian position as the concluding phase of the controversy (PA, 187), and does not subject it to any criticism as he had the previous positions. If the reader is left in any doubt that Collingwood wishes to accept this solution to the problem as final, his footnote to this passage affixes his final seal of approval: he cites the *Essay on Philosophical Method* to the effect that what is involved in Kant's doctrine is an instance of the rule for philosophical concepts wherein differences of degree always imply difference in kind (PA, 187, n. 1).  

That Collingwood's philosophy of mind would accept as final a viewpoint that is ultimately Kantian would not be accepted by Lionel Rubinoff, who would argue that a further step is required to raise it to the "absolute standpoint" at which subject and object are identified. But there is nothing in *The Principles of Art* to indicate that Collingwood accepted anything but the Kantian viewpoint as final on the question of real and imaginary sensa, and that he looked with anything but favor upon Kant's limitation of thought to the bounds of possible experience. The Hegelian absolute standpoint is nowhere in evidence in this work, except insofar as that standpoint is implicit in the Kantian philosophy. It is therefore going beyond Collingwood's last word to assign *The Principles of Art* to the "third ontological level" at which subject and object are identified, as Rubinoff does (CRM, 373). On the other hand to classify Collingwood as a Kantian would be equally misleading, even if it would be not as misleading as assimilating him to Hegelianism. (While statistical frequency of citations of authors does not count for much in philosophical works, it is interesting to note that Hegel has only one reference in Collingwood's index to *The Principles of Art*, and this an unfavorable one, while Kant has 14, mostly favorable). Collingwood never accepted any categorial schema of logical relations as final, even though he approved of the Kantian formulation of them: see NL, 5.66-5.67, 7.34. Nor is there any hint of a "deduction of the categories" in Collingwood, either in the Kantian or the Hegelian sense of the term "deduction." And finally, Collingwood never elevated art into one of the modes of absolute experience, as Hegel does: cf. IH, 121, 311-
The Kantian solution also makes it possible to solve a long-standing problem in the traditional controversy—the problem of illusory sensa, with its two variants, the terms "appearance" and "image" as used in false theories of perception. It would seem like a development of the common-sense theory that illusions are imaginary sensa mistaken for real ones. But to assign illusion to the class of imaginary sensa is misleading, because there is no special quality that sensa can have in virtue of which they are illusory. If there were it could never be detected, since mistakes of the same general kind are made about real sensa, especially in unfamiliar circumstances (e.g. the child or savage looking at a mirror for the first time and thinking the image to be behind the plane of the mirror, so attempting to reach at it through or behind the glass). It is not a special quality of imaginary sensa, it is a mistaken interpretation.

We were wrong, therefore, to define illusory sensa as imaginary sensa which we mistake for real ones. Illusory sensa can be defined without referring to the distinction between imaginary and real. Any sensum is illusory in so far as we make an error about it. This error does not consist in mistaking it for a different sensum . . . . All that there can ever be in a sensum is directly present to us in the act of sensation. We may be mistaken in believing that another person in our circumstances would have a similar one; but we cannot, in seeing a red patch, mistake it for a blue one. The mistakes we make about our sensa are mistakes about their relations with other sensa, possible or expected. (PA, 189).

14. Cf. also Rubinoff, CRM, 210-11. For Rubinoff's interpretation of Collingwood on perception, see CRM, 107-12.
Similarly the term "appearance" is not a quality of a sensum (such as the quality that the short man has who is further away than this closer tall man, the two being "really" the same height). On the contrary the term refers to the interpretation placed on the two sensa, first of all as resembling one another (as men) and secondly the judgment that the further or future experience of these sensa will or will not continue to show the same kind of resemblance (when standing next to one another they will have the same height) (PA, 190-91).

And finally, the term "image" is used to describe the kind of relation that exists between, for example, a photograph and the scene photographed, both of which are directly inspectable and comparable by us in distinct acts of perception. But if perception itself is explained on this analogy, it presumes that we can compare our sensa (the images) with their originals (the real objects), a condition of the analogy which cannot be fulfilled (PA, 191-92).

Collingwood's concluding summary of the discussion of the common sense distinction between real and imaginary sensa is worth quoting:

Sensa cannot be divided, by any test whatever, into real and imaginary; sensations cannot be divided into real sensations and imaginations. That experience which we call sensation is of one kind only, and is not amenable to the distinction between real and unreal, true and false, viridical and illusory. That which is true or false is thought;
and our sensa are called real and illusory insofar as we think truly or falsely about them. To think about them is to interpret them, which means stating the relations in which they stand to other sensa, actual or possible. A real sensum means a sensum correctly interpreted; an illusory sensum, one falsely interpreted. And an imaginary sensum means one which has not been interpreted at all: either because we have tried to interpret it and failed, or because we have not tried . . . . They are sensa in respect of which the interpretative work of thought has been done well, or done ill, or left undone. (PA, 194).


How does this discussion of sensation and imagination stand with respect to Collingwood's refutation of the principal doctrine of realism? We stated above that this denial entails the affirmation that knowing makes a difference to the object known. We begin to see the way in which this affirmation is made in Collingwood's philosophy of mind. For first-order thinking, "knowing" is an act of interpretation, and the "difference" it makes to the object is the difference between a sensum uninterpreted, a sensum interpreted, a sensum interpreted incorrectly, and a sensum interpreted correctly. The "object" for first order thinking is sensory experience ("feeling" in Collingwood's terminology), the object insofar as it is felt. The term "real" in this context is applied or withheld as a judgment about sensa, and has a double sensa: a rainbow, for example, is "really there" in the sense that I see it--but then so is the imaginary beast in the dark corner of the room, and the snakes of delirium tremens. But in another sense the rainbow is really there as the rain and the
sunshine (which I do not see), or the things in terms of which I interpret my sensa (PA, 192-93).

And this is Collingwood's ultimate reply to the realists' assertion of an object which is unaffected by the knowing of it. Collingwood's answer, as stated in his reply to Moore, is that it must be an entity that is imaginary--i.e. the assertion of a sensum as already interpreted, or the mere assertion of the possibility of repeating the interpretation of a sensum as "the same" as a prior one, or as "unchanged" between episodes of feeling. "And it is imagination, not sensation," Collingwood writes, "to which appeal is made when empiricists appeal to 'experience'" (PA, 203). But what the radical empiricist wishes to assert by an object unaffected by the knowing of it is an object that is an uninterpreted sensum, and about this it would be ridiculous to say that it would be just the same as it is if it were not known at all.

But how does one know, on Collingwood's grounds, when a sensum is correctly interpreted? If he cannot answer this, the realists' withers remain unwrung. What the realist wishes to know is how sense-experience, if it is a pure flux of unrelated and fleeting sensa, can give us knowledge of an "external world." Merely denying that there is such a thing as

21 This is the epistemological question of perception: see E. Harris, Hypothesis and Perception (London, 1970), p. 237.
an external world (as Collingwood seems to be implying in the passage at PA, 166) does not solve the problem. It merely shifts the locus of the question from epistemology to metaphysics: for what then are the colors, sounds, etc. that constitute the objects of acts of sensation? We have seen that Berkeley's suggestion that they are mere ideas is rejected by Collingwood as is the suggestion that it is a metaphysical problem rather than an epistemological one (PA, 199). Collingwood does not mean to imply that there is no such thing as a world of objects, or that "a world of objects external to the knower and existing independently of him" is an utterly nonsensical expression. What he is denying is that "external to" and "independent of" are properties of sensa; they are actually interpretations of imaginata (i.e. what a sensum would be like as it exists in an unperceived state).

The real issue as Collingwood sees it is an epistemological one, and centers on the supposed passivity of sensation.

The thesis to be examined is that, in some way not clearly defined, imagination contrasts with sensation as something active with something passive, something we do with something we undergo, something under our control with something we cannot help, a making with a receiving . . . . (But) it is not a distinction between activity and passivity as such. Sensation is an activity. Even if we do it only because we are stimulated to it by forces outside our control, it is still something we do . . . . Nor is it a distinction among passivities (things that happen to us, as distinct from things we do) according as they are done to us by external bodies impinging on our own, or by chan-
ges arising within our own organism . . . . For sensation, as well as imagination, is on its bodily side a change arising within our own organism, and due to the energies of that organism itself . . . . Nor is it a distinction among activities (things we do) between those we do of our own choice and those we cannot help doing. It is in fact easier to stop seeing this paper, by shutting one's eyes, than to stop imagining the frightful accident which one saw yesterday. (PA, 196-97; emphasis mine).

The conclusion seems to be that if there is any distinction at all between imagination and sensation the basis for this distinction must fall altogether outside the category of activity-passivity (cf. NL, 5.4-5.49). This category may be at home in the mechanical realm of matter, where forces are exerted by pushing and pulling; but in the realm of thought it is not adequate. Thought is free as matter is not: to be a thought is to have an essential freedom to succeed or fail--to be "bipolar" as Collingwood says.

The empiricists' problem of "sense data" is therefore poorly conceived, because the assumption of sensa as "given" (from the Latin, datur) is false as a presupposition (PA, 196, 200). The empiricists (including Hume) failed to appreciate adequately the intermediating function of imagination in the sensation-intellection relation. The freedom of imagination falls between the freedom of sensation (which is the freedom of a spontaneous, living, sentient organism) and that of intellection (which is the freedom of choice between alternatives consciously conceived) (PA, 197). The freedom of imagination consists in the alternatives of recognizing a feel-
ing as belonging to oneself or in refusing to so recognize it (PA, 224). This refusal or the process of "disowning" feelings is what Collingwood calls "corrupt consciousness" (PA, 217-19).

But to understand the intermediation of imagination, its freedom, and the corruption of consciousness it is necessary to identify and characterize the function of imagination which transforms sensa into imaginata. This function is "attention" (alternatively called "awareness" or simply "consciousness"--PA, 206).

Thought . . . detects "relations between sensa" . . . . But in order that we may detect resemblances or any other relations between things, we must first identify each of them: distinguish each as a thing by itself and appreciate its qualities as those qualities we find it to possess, even though as yet (not having determined their relations to qualities found elsewhere) we are not in a position to name them . . . . This act of appreciating something, just as it stands, before I can begin to classify it is what we call attending to it. (PA, 203).

Collingwood is careful to distinguish attention from both intellecction and sensation. As distinct from intellecction, attention selects and divides, but it does not abstract: abstraction is a higher function involved in the formation of concepts ("redness" as opposed to "this red patch"), whereas attention "appreciates" a sensible quality "as it presents itself to us, a concrete individual" (PA, 204). Nonetheless attention is "thought in its absolutely fundamental and original
shape" (PA, 216). At the merely psychical level, the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not exist. But the instant there is added the activity of attention, "the block of feeling present to the mind is split in two"--the conscious part being that part of feeling attended to, the unconscious part being the ignored remainder of the field, the negative counterpart of attention, or its penumbra (PA, 204-05).

Since attention is both (a) thought in its minimal sense, and (b) not abstract, Donagan's contention that Collingwood's later philosophy of mind (which starts with The Principles of Art) is founded on the recognition that "all forms of thinking, from the highest to the lowest, are conceptual, and . . . all concepts are abstract" (LPC, 14) is obviously false. Since an essentially similar characterization of the function of attention is made in The New Leviathan (see NL, 4.18, 4.24, 4.5-4.6, 7.2-7.39) it is doubtful whether Donagan's contention holds even for The New Leviathan alone (in section 6 of this chapter we shall see that The New Leviathan poses special problems for any consistent interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy of mind). In The Principles of Art, at least, it is clear that "thinking" is a term whose extension is broader than Donagan is willing to allow: it includes imagination, which is not abstract, but concrete. In a later passage Collingwood contrasts analytic and abstract thought with imagination, and writes: "These ((i.e. analytic and abstract thought)) are not the only kinds of thought . . . . They are given merely as examples of what ((intellect)) does which imagination, never analytic and never abstract, cannot do" (PA, 254; cf. PA, 287). As we shall shortly see, attention is a function of imagination.

Collingwood recognized that there is a proper function for psychology in the study of "unconscious feeling" at the psychical level, but insisted that it still rested on a more general philosophical principle--this principle being that consciousness has a double object including not only sensation but the object of sensation (PA, 206). Collingwood's attacks on psychology all have this intent behind them as an unspoken premise: empirical psychology cannot absorb the labor of philosophical psychology because it depends for its exist-
On the other side attention is distinguished from feeling in having the bipolarity that is proper to thought: Attention . . . has a double object where sentience has a single. What we hear, for example, is a sound. What we attend to is two things at once: a sound, and our act of hearing it. The act of sensation is not present to itself, but it is present, together with its own sensum, to the act of attention. This is, in fact, the special significance of the con- in the word consciousness; it indicates the togetherness of the two things, sensation and sensum, both of which are present to the conscious mind . . . . Thus the difference between seeing and looking, or hearing and listening, is that a person who is said to be looking is described as aware of his own seeing as well as of the thing he sees. (PA, 206).

We see here a clearer statement of what Collingwood meant in Religion and Philosophy when he said that the esse of mind is not cogitare simply, but de hac re cogitare (RP, 100; FR, 172). What is essential to the act is not only sensation or its object, but both taken together. Collingwood's use of the term "consciousness" in connection with higher processes of thought indicates that the same is true for all the successive levels of thought (cf. IH, 291, 306).  

ence on the philosophical analysis of consciousness. But Collingwood's insistence on this point should not blind the reader to the complimentary affirmation that philosophical psychology cannot absorb empirical psychology, because the psychological level (at which consciousness and unconscious are not distinguished) merges with the physiological and is not directly analyzable by the phenomenological analysis of consciousness.

24 Because sensation proper (as distinct from perception, which is sensation attended to) is "not present to itself" and has a single object rather than a double, it cannot properly be called "consciousness" in the technical sense of...
Because attention is thought, and because thought is bipolar, it is possible for attention to make mistakes—and this is the sense in which it is free in the minimal sense of that term as applicable to thought. A conscious being is not free to decide what feelings he shall have, but he is free to decide what feelings he shall place in the focus of his consciousness. This is not a mere response to stimulus (which is the level of freedom of a sentient organism), but it is also not yet the freedom of choice of alternative plans of action. It is intermediate between the two (PA, 207-08). The attention to feeling modifies it by "domesticating" it, allowing the one who attends (the rudimentary self) to dominate the feeling and to perpetuate it indefinitely (PA, 206-09). But it does so only at a certain risk—the risk inherent in the freedom it possesses. The risk is the danger of becoming a corrupt consciousness:

As thought ((attention)) must have that bipolarity which belongs to thought as such. It is an activity which

the term as defined at PA, 206. Sensation proper exists at the psychical level of pure feeling, at which the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not yet exist. The objects of sensation are merely feelings present to consciousness; by attending to them, consciousness perpetuates them and thus prepares them for further acts of interpretation. However as we shall see in section 6, in The New Leviathan Collingwood introduces a "diffuse consciousness of feeling" at a level below that of attention proper, and assigns "selective attention" to the second level of thought—thought about thought—as one of its practical functions. It is clear that "consciousness" is not being used there in its technical sense.
may be well or ill done; what it thinks may be true or false. But this seems paradoxical; for since it is not concerned with the relations between things, and hence does not think in terms of concepts or generalizations, it cannot err, as intellect can, by referring things to the wrong concepts . . . But the statement "This is how I feel" does imply bipolarity. It has an opposite: "This is not how I feel;" and to assert it is to deny this opposite . . . ((Consciousness)) lives by rejecting error. A true consciousness is the confession to ourselves of our feelings; a false consciousness would be disowning them, i.e. thinking about one of them "That feeling is not mine" . . . I call this the "corruption" of consciousness, because consciousness permits itself to be bribed or corrupted in the discharge of its functions . . . (PA, 216-17).

The corruption of consciousness (also called bad-faith, insincerity, self-deception, or in psychological terms, repression, projection, dissociation, and fantasy-building) belongs to neither of the commonly recognized species of untruths--errors or lies; these belong to higher levels of thought (PA, 218-19; cf. PA, 115, 283). But it is an example of untruth in its minimal sense, and hence of evil; not exactly a crime or vice (because not fully a choice) and not exactly a disease (because not suffered passively), corrupt consciousness is "a kind of sheer or undifferentiated evil, evil in itself, as yet undifferentiated into evil suffered or misfortune and evil done or wickedness" (PA, 219-20).²⁵

²⁵It is not difficult to see why Collingwood regarded realists as arch-propagandists of a coming fascism (A, 167). Fascism is a celebration of irrationalism and is hence the result of a kind of corruption of consciousness: it disowns rationality and its attendant emotions. Realism, by dissociating theory and practice, and denying that knowledge has any effect on its object, and furthermore by treating moral sub-
We have seen the sense in which Collingwood regards the act of attention as intermediate between sensation and intellect, the extent of its freedom, and its rule in the corruption of consciousness. It remains to determine the way in which attention is to be regarded as a function of imagination. The act of attention, Collingwood has been insisting, is the act which converts "impressions" (feelings) into "ideas" (imaginationa). In so doing it modifies the feelings attended to: feeling is no longer something in complete flux, it is dominated and perpetuated by the act of attention. The modified feeling is no longer a "bare feeling" it is a feeling of which we have become conscious (PA, 209, 213). To say that a feeling is attended to is to say that it is an uninterpreted sensum that is ready for interpretation, so that "regarded as names for a certain kind or level of experience, the words consciousness ((or attention)) and imagination are synonymous" (PA, 215). But within a single experience they can be distinguished. Attention is the act which converts a bare sensum into one ready for interpretation, and imagination is the result of that conversion. "Imagination is thus the new form which feeling takes when transformed by the activity of subjects in a purely theoretical way, opens a path for disowning rationality by denying its applicability--and hence its expression in moral acts. Whatever moves passions is whatever causes acts, and rationality (ex hypothesi) does not move passions. This paves the way for a political movement which plays directly on passions without regard for reason. Cf. EM, 133-42; NL, 35.43-35.44.
consciousness" (PA, 215). 26

But once again we must raise the empiricist's question: if an imaginatum is a sensum that is ready for interpretation, is that readiness something that is found in the sensum or something given to it by an act of consciousness? It is clear that Collingwood is straining to make consciousness, or thought in its minimum sense, speak with an active voice; but it is not clear whether there is any contribution to this conversation from the side of the sensa, or from a world of nature beyond them. It is also clear that Collingwood is maintaining his assertion that imagination is indifferent to the reality or unreality of its objects (PA, 136) --an assertion that dates back to Speculum Mentis (SM, 60, 112). But if feeling is ambiguous with respect to the cate-

26 The term, "imagination," like the terms "thought" and "consciousness," has a very broad extension in Collingwood's philosophy. Although in The Principles of Art his discussion tends to confine it to a level of thought between sensation and intellection, it is capable of operating at higher-order levels of thought as well. In The Idea of History he speaks of an "a priori" imagination (and we may recall that "a priori" is a term he uses to distinguish thought from feeling). This a priori imagination (a) does the entire work of historical reconstruction, (b) operates in artistic creation, and (c) functions in perception by "supplementing and consolidating the data of perception in the way so well analyzed by Kant, by presenting to us objects of possible perception which are not actually perceived" (IH, 241-42). If a priori imagination operates even at the level of historical reconstruction, it clearly escapes confinement to a strictly intermediate level in the scale of forms of knowledge. It is simply, in Kantian terms, the faculty of re-presentation.
gory of activity-passivity (and in The New Leviathan Colling-
wood explicitly extends this ambiguity to all the other Kan-
tian categories), and if imagination is indifferent to the
distinction between real and unreal, the reader is left won-
dering how any interpretation can be lifted off the face of an
utterly indeterminate flux of sensa. And if it cannot, the
obvious question is how knowledge of an "external world" (i.e.
the world extrinsic to our organs of sense)--in Collingwood's
terms, the "not-self," is possible at all.

5. Idealism and the Limitations of Phenomenology.

In The Principles of Art (and to a lesser extent even in The New Leviathan) Collingwood seems to deliberately choose
language that refuses to take sides in the realism-idealism
controversy. As Louis O. Mink points out, there are some le-
thal booby-traps left for anyone who tries to decide the issue
from Collingwood's texts (MHD, 112). A case in point is the
following passage, in which Collingwood is trying to reconcile
the characterization of imaginata (a) as uninterpreted sensa,
and (b) as feeling dominated and perpetuated by consciousness:

Now it has already been argued . . . that the work of de-
termining relations between things must depend on some-
thing prior to it, namely having these things held before
the mind in such a way that we can compare them with one
another, and so become able to see how they resemble one
another, and so forth. We must know what each is in it-
self before we can decide how they are related. To know
what a given thing is in itself is not, of course, the
same as knowing what kind of a thing it is . . . . Our
knowledge of what it is in itself, if we try to express 
that in words, will be stated in some such phrase as "this
is what I see," or, since to call my act one of seeing is
already to distinguish, "this is how I feel." ... And we
become able to say this, not through bare sensation, but
through consciousness of sensation. What makes us able to
say it is that we have, by the work of attention, at once
selected and perpetuated some element which we find in the
field of sensation, and some corresponding element in the
sensory act. (PA, 212-13).

Collingwood apparently finds no difficulty in asserting of one
and the same sensum that it has elements which are at once se-
lected, perpetuated, and found, and that corresponding elements
exist in the sensory act. A few pages later a similar land-
mine is planted for explorers at a higher level: "The work of
intellect," Collingwood writes, "is to apprehend or construct
relations" (PA, 216, 255-56). Which is it? The reader will
not get any direct satisfaction from Collingwood in answer to
this question.27 The reason for such deliberate ambiguity may

27 Cf. Mink, MHD, 112-13: "Collingwood does not want
to decide whether thought 'apprehends' or 'constructs,' 'finds'
or 'puts.' In his view, it does both. As the activity of
converting implicit differences into explicit distinctions, it
seems to itself, at any level, to be apprehending. But as an
object of consciousness to a higher level, it seems to be con-
structing. Experience, one might say, is the realist, reflec-
tion on experience the idealist. Neither is false; what is
false is the presumption that there is irreducible logical in-
compatibility between the theories expressive of each. In the
dialectic of theories, realism states the viewpoint of any
level of consciousness from its own standpoint, idealism the
viewpoint of any level of consciousness in its reflection on
a lower level. The theory of levels accounts for each by as-
signing to each a function which cannot be usurped by the
be either that Collingwood wished to leave the question open, or else that Collingwood held to the simultaneous truths that (even at the level of perception) knowing and the known interact, each making a difference to the other.

There would be no way to decide between these two alternatives were it not for a few pieces of circumstantial evidence. We have already seen how Collingwood argues directly against the realists' thesis that knowing (in this case, consciousness) makes no difference to the object known (the sensum): it is carried out directly in his attack on Moore (in the doctrine of the unsensed sensum) as well as indirectly in his discussion of the modification of feeling by attention. We have also seen how Collingwood's attempt to save whatever sense he could from the empiricists' tradition concerning "sense data" led to his characterization of imagination (in the form of selective attention) as intermediary between sensation and intellection, and his dismissal of "sense data" as interpreted imaginata masquerading as bare sensa. We have furthermore argued that the entire discussion about empiricism would be a non-sequitur and a diversionary aside if it were not that he hoped to save something from the tradition. What he saved was not, certainly, the ambiguous phrase, "sense data." Nor was it the disjunctive proposition that either knowing affects the known or the object affects the knower (but not both): this disjunction is eliminated with the argu-
ment that activity-passivity is a category inapplicable to bare, uninterpreted sensation. What is saved is the role of thought as active down to the level of sensation, where it is present as the act of attention which alters feeling by perpetuating and dominating it. But what is it that is dominated and perpetuated? Here we must enter our circumstantial evidence.

A.--In the theory of art propounded in The Principles of Art (see notes 7 and 8 above) Collingwood directly attacks the realistic estheticians for distinguishing too sharply between what is "found" in a work of art and what is "brought" to it by an observer. The position of the realistic estheticians, who maintain that "beauty" is something subjective that is "imputed" to the art-object, is an attempt to rehabilitate an ancient technical theory of art based on the false analogy between art and craft. Collingwood describes what he takes to be their position as follows:

(T)he technical theory depends on distinguishing what we find in the work of art, its actual sensuous qualities, as put there by the artist, from something else which we do not strictly find in it, but rather import into it from our own stores of experience and powers of imagination. The first is conceived as objective, really belonging to the work of art: the second as subjective, belonging not to it but to activities which go on in us when we contemplate it. The peculiar value of this contemplation, then, is conceived as lying not in the first thing but in the second. Any one having the use of his senses could see all the colours and shapes that a picture contains . . . but ((to enjoy an esthetic experience)) he must use his imagination, and so proceed from the first part of the
experience, which is given in sensation, to the second part, which is imaginatively reconstructed. This seems to be the position of the "realistic" philosophers who maintain that what they call "beauty" is subjective. (PA, 148-49).

Such distinctions as used by realistic estheticians like Samuel Alexander do not do justice to what Collingwood thinks the true situation to be:

The distinction between what we find and what we bring is altogether too naive . . . . If ((an artist)) paints his picture in such a way that we, when we look at it using our imagination, find ourselves enjoying an imaginary experience of total activity like that which he enjoyed when painting it, there is not much sense in saying that we bring this experience with us to the picture and do not find it there . . . . No doubt there is a sense in which we bring it with us. Our finding of it is not something that merely happens to us, it is something we do . . . . The imaginary experience . . . is the kind of experience we are capable of having. Thus the two parts of the experience are not contrasted in the way in which we fancied them to be. There is no justification for saying that the sensuous part of it is something we find and the imaginary part something we bring . . . . We bring our powers of vision with us, and find what they reveal. Similarly, we bring our imaginative powers with us, and find what they reveal: namely an imaginary experience of total activity which we find in the picture because the painter has put it there. (PA, 149-51).

Now if this is true for a work of art, it must be true in some sense for perception in general, and also for scientific observation, inasmuch as the same sensation and imagination are at work—even if one does not assume that the experience of nature is like an imaginary experience of total activity which is "put" there by an artist. What Collingwood is saying is that sensation itself is an active process of an agent, and
this is what he means when he says that it "makes" its sensa. He does not mean that the objects extrinsic to our sensory organs are "created" ex nihilo by our minds. But he is also saying that our powers of vision find what they reveal—and the revelation involved is the process whereby somehow (and this is not ever specified by Collingwood) information is passed from objects within our field of experience as a presentation or uninterpreted sensum. It is the difference between "seeing" and "looking" or between "hearing" and "listening" that Collingwood is referring to when he adds the act of attention to this field of felt experience, and not the difference between a nothing and a something. Or to put it another way, the difference that knowing (as perception) makes is not the difference between there being something where there was formerly nothing at all; it is rather the difference between something present but indefinite (an uninterpreted sensum) and something present and now more definite (a sensum ready for interpretation—present and sustained). But Collingwood is not denying the presence of something—on this The Principles of Art is clear:

Theoretically, the artist is a person who comes to know himself, to know his own emotion . . . . But this knowing of himself is a making of himself . . . . Moreover, his knowing of this . . . world is also the making of the new world which he is coming to know. The world he has come to know is a world consisting of language; a world where everything has the property of expressing emotion. In so
far as this world is thus expressive or significant, it is he that has made it so. He has not, of course, made it "out of nothing." He is not God, but a finite mind still at a very elementary stage in the development of its powers. He has made it "out of" what is presented to him in the still more elementary stage of purely psychical experience: colors, sounds, and so forth. (PA, 291-92; emphasis mine).

B.--As if in confirmation of this conclusion that something must be presented to consciousness that is not created ex nihilo by that consciousness, Collingwood at one point even adopts the metaphorical terminology of matter and form to describe the levels of mental functions:

(In) in the relation between any one level of experience and the next above it . . . the higher level differs from the lower in having a new principle of organization; this does not supersede the old, it is superimposed on it. The lower type of experience is perpetuated in the higher type in a way in which a pre-existing matter is perpetuated when a new form is imposed on it . . . . In this metaphorical sense of the words, any new and higher level of experience can be described in either of two ways. Formally, it is something quite new and unique, capable of being described only in terms of itself. Materially, it is only a peculiar combination of elements already existing at the lower level, and susceptible of description in terms of these lower elements. Consciousness . . . is formally unique . . . . Materially, it is only a certain new arrangement of psychical experiences. (PA, 233).

Would Collingwood accept this metaphor as applicable at the level of sensation? Is it not possible that there is a similar relationship existing at the interface between sensation and the world of objects extrinsic to the organs of sensation, such that sensation can be regarded as formally "something quite new and unique, capable of being described
only in terms of itself," but materially it is "only a certain new arrangement" of material entities--cells composed of organic and inorganic molecules, functioning together as an organ in response to physical stimuli from the environment? (Cf. NL, 9.5-9.56).

From the point of view restricted by the self-imposed limitations of a science of mind, we must answer (as Collingwood does in The New Leviathan) that we do not know (see NL, 5.2-5.4). But before involving ourselves in a discussion of the presuppositions of a phenomenology of consciousness, we must enter further pieces of evidence from The Principles of Art in which Collingwood lets himself escape for a moment from the confines of these presuppositions.

C.--Where Collingwood is arguing that the distinction between real and imaginary sensa is not a distinction between activity and passivity, nor among passivities, nor among activities, in the passages deleted from our above quotation Collingwood argues as follows:

Response to stimulus is in some sense passive, in so far as it cannot arise without a stimulus; but it is also active, in so far as it is a response. If I am a kind of factory for converting wave-lengths into colours, air-disturbances into sounds, and so forth, as the materialists believe . . . there is work done in that conversion; the machinery is active, even if it is controlled by no manager or foreman . . . . For sensation, as well as imagination, is on its bodily side a change arising within our own organism, and due to the energies of that organism itself. The afferent nerves through whose activity we feel a pressure on a finger-tip are not solid rods con-
veying that pressure itself to the brain; they are functioning in their own way as a special kind of living tissue; if they ceased to function in that way, no amount of pressure on the finger could give rise to sensation. (PA, 196-97).

Now if Collingwood meant to come up with a radical idealist explanation for sensation, and one which hence eliminated the need for asserting that objects make a difference to the knowing of them, it is difficult to see why he would be considering such physiological mechanisms at all. No doubt, he is arguing that thought (as attention) dominates the "feeling" provided within the psychic level of experience, and that even at the psychical level the organs of senses are not utterly passive. But he is not denying that the physiological mechanisms provide something for thought to dominate, or that the organs of sensation are "stimulated" by forms of physical energy.

D.--Several pages later when Collingwood is discussing the way in which feeling modified by attention (and notice that the modification is only stated to be in terms of time and use--attention perpetuates and dominates feeling--and not in terms of content: it does not modify a red into a blue, or blue into loud, or sweet into hard; cf. PA, 189) he talks about the psychological phenomenon of color fading, which is compensated by the act of attention:

28 In The New Leviathan Collingwood uses this identical example, but gives it precisely the opposite interpretation:
In the flux of sensation, one pattern of the total sensory field is being replaced by another. Attention now focuses itself on one element in that field: for example this scarlet patch. As I look, the red is actually fading; it is being obscured by the superimposition of its own after-image, which dulls the scarlet moment by moment. But by attending to the scarlet and neglecting everything else I create a kind of compensation for this fading (By this) progressive refocusing of attention . . . we do not lift any sensa, as such, out of their native flux; but we obtain a new kind of experience by moving as it were with the flux, so that the self, and the object are (so to speak) at rest relatively to each other for an appreciable time. What we have done is . . . liberated ourselves for a moment from the flux of sensation and kept something before us long enough to get a fair sight of it. (PA, 210).

Collingwood's hesitation to accept fully these metaphors ("as it were . . . so to speak") should not blind the reader to the affirmation of the point at issue. It is a temporal modification of feeling that is being made, and by engaging in acts of attention "something" is kept before us, and for long enough time a "fair sight of it" may be gotten--not by lifting off any sensa (attention is not abstraction) but by running with it (so to speak) so that it appears stable compared to its moving background.

"colours themselves as we actually see them are vague; and so with sounds, smells, emotions, etc. We never see anything exactly any colour. However carefully we look at a colour it remains ambiguous. Indeed, looking at it carefully creates a new ambiguity; for the eye becomes fatigued and a complimentary after-image interposes itself between the eye and the colour at which one is looking, so that the mere looking at a colour dims it" (NL, 5.71). If "looking carefully" means "attending to" the colour, it seems that this process adds to the fading of it rather than compensating for it.
E.--When Collingwood raises the question about how long a period of time a sensum has to be perpetuated by attention in order to be retained, he replies that (from the perspective of The Principles of Art) no definite answer can be given (PA, 210). But The Idea of Nature provides us with the start of an answer, and at the same time suggests a reason for the use of terms which express qualified confidence in the physiological descriptions in the previously cited passages. In discussing the contemporary view of nature, Collingwood argues that when the impact of evolutionary science began to be thought out it had already, in the 19th century methodology of history, a model for dealing with a world of constant change:

History had by now established itself as a science, that is, a progressive inquiry in which conclusions are solidly and demonstratively established. It had thus been proved by experiment that scientific knowledge was possible concerning objects that were constantly changing . . . . The historical conception of scientifically knowable change or process was applied, under the name of evolution, to the natural world (IH, 13).

One of the consequences of the evolutionary view of nature is that, as Whitehead put it, "there is no nature at an instant," and therefore the study of natural forms of motion requires a notion of "minimum space" and "minimum time." In the latter case this issues in the principle that "different orders of substances take different orders of time-lapse to exist" (IN, 22; cf. EM, 266-67). But this principle does not warrant
adoption of an idealistic stance.

The principle . . . opens no door to subjective idealism. One might express it by saying that how the world of nature appears to us depends on how long we take to observe it . . . . This, though true, would be misleading . . . . How the natural world appears to us does certainly depend on how long we take to observe it; but that is because when we observe it for a certain length of time we observe the processes which require that length of time in order to occur. (IN, 23). 29

But just as we noticed Chapter VI that historical knowledge is limited in one direction by the "facts" at the historian's disposal, so observation in science is limited in physical situations in an exactly analogous fashion:

Our experimental knowledge of the natural world is based on our acquaintance with those natural processes which we can observe experimentally. This acquaintance is limited downwards in space and time by our inability to observe any process that occupies less than a certain amount of space or a certain lapse of time, and upwards by the impossibility of observing any process that occupies more space or more time than the range of human vision or the time covered by human records . . . . These limits, upper and lower, of our observations in space and time have been greatly enlarged by the apparatus of the modern scientist, but they still exist, and are ultimately imposed on us by our constitution as animals of a definite size and living at a definite rate . . . . The natural world which human scientists can study by observation and experiment is an anthropocentric world; it consists only of those natural processes whose time-phase and space-range are within the limits of our observation. (IN, 24).

29 Cf. IN, 84: "Nature stays put, and is the same whether we understand it or not;" and IH, 133: "In science, . . . the facts are empirical facts, perceived as they occur. In history . . . fact . . . is not immediately given. It is arrived at inferentially by a process of interpreting data."
In these passages Collingwood is not writing as if the "natural world" external to our sense organs can have no effect on our knowing of it. In fact it is a presupposition of natural science that there is such a world and that it can make itself known to us (cf. IN, 175; EM, 222-23). The statement that the natural world observed by science is an anthropocentric world only echoes the Kantian restriction of scientific knowledge to the bounds of experience possible for a human being of limited capacities; it does not deny that there is something there to be known.

F.--Confirmation that we are on the right track comes, indirectly, from the Essay on Metaphysics. In a passage in which Collingwood is discussing the extent to which Aristotle's metaphysics is compatible with contemporary scientific presuppositions, Collingwood singles out as a rejected presupposition the belief that the existence of nature is an observed fact:

Aristotle thought . . . that by merely using our senses we learn that a natural world exists. He did not realize that the use of our senses can never inform us that what we perceive by using them is a world of things that happen of themselves and are not subject to control by our own art or any one else's ((but is rather)) the first and fundamental presupposition, on which alone any science of nature can arise . . . . For when we speak of the existence of natural things we mean (as Aristotle very truly says) the existence of things that move of themselves or events that happen of themselves. The idea of movement or happening . . . is contained in the idea of a natural world. The idea of motion, therefore (for if the world of nature is a world of bodies all the events in nature are motions), cannot be an idea which we obtain, as the
Greeks thought we obtained it, through the use of our senses. It is an idea which we bring with us in the shape of an absolute presupposition to the work of interpreting what we get by using our senses. The proposition that there is motion in nature is a metaphysical proposition. (EM, 215, 217).

Collingwood is not saying that we do not get something by the use of our senses, but only that through sensation we do not get the concept of motion or of an existent world of nature; what we get are uninterpreted sensa. And he is not saying that a world of nature and of natural objects does not exist, but only that assertion of its existence is not justifiable as a simple product of sensual experience, but rather through the correct interpretation of sensa. And finally, Collingwood is not ruling out the possibility that the "data" presented to us in sensation can be given and retained, but that "real, empirical knowledge" of the natural world (or of any world of fact, including the historical world of evidence) absolutely presupposes the existence of a world of nature.

G.--These passages also shed light on our problem insofar as they provide us with a clue to understanding why, in The Principles of Art, Collingwood hedges in his assent to the legitimacy of the physical basis for psychical sensa. The reason is not that he refuses to take sides on the realism-idealism debate, but rather because he is bound by his own presuppositions concerning the proper limits to the methods of mental science. In The New Leviathan this rule is stated in
negative fashion as the Fallacy of Swapping Horses:

I have mentioned two approaches to the problem of self-knowledge: the natural sciences and the sciences of man . . . . Each is valid. Each is a search for truth, and neither goes unrewarded. Each, therefore, has its own problems and must solve them by its own methods . . . . Of these two different forms of science, the one that has started a hare must catch it. The reason is plain. You can only solve a problem which you recognize to be a problem. The same methods, therefore, which led to the asking of a question must lead to the answering of it . . . . No amount of admiration for some other horse must betray you into the Fallacy of Swapping Horses. If the wretched horse called Mental Science has stuck you in mid-stream you can flog him, or you can coax him, or you can get out and lead him; or you can drown, as better men than you have drowned before. But you must not swap him even for the infinitely superior horse called Natural Science. (NL, 2.6-2.73).

As we shall see in section six of this chapter, Collingwood's efforts to stay strictly within the bounds of this rule in The New Leviathan lead him into difficulties concerning his characterization of feeling. In The Principles of Art, however, he occasionally strays across the border, as in the above passages where he appeals to physiological descriptions. But in one very important passage he gives us a glimpse of how natural science (in the form of behaviorism) and mental science are related. The passage is cryptic, shimmering with interpretative possibilities and ambiguities, and therefore we must quote it at length:

At the merely psychical level, the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not exist . . . . The mind here exists only in the shape of sentience . . . . When the light of consciousness falls on such occupations, they
change their character; what was sentience becomes imagination. Hence we cannot study psychical experience, or even assure ourselves that it exists, by inquiring of our own consciousness; that can only tell us . . . of the things to which it attends . . . . Those which are utterly outside its ken must be studied by other methods. But what are these methods to be? Behaviorism has dealt with the problem, and gone some way towards a correct solution, by dismissing "introspection," that is, inquiry made of consciousness, as futile, and identifying the psychical with the physiological. The method thus devised is perfectly sound, but for one flaw. Unless we had independent knowledge both that there is such a thing as psychical experience and what kind of thing it is, the problem which the behaviorist solves by his method could never arise. This independent knowledge is derived neither from observing bodily "behavior" nor from questioning consciousness, but from analyzing consciousness, and thus discovering its relation to a more elementary kind of experience which it presupposes. The principle of this analysis depends on the fact that attention (or as we may now indifferently call it, consciousness or awareness) has a double object where sentience has a single . . . . (A) person who is said to be looking is described as aware of his own seeing as well as of the thing he sees. (PA, 205-06).

Let us at the risk of some repetition try to be clear about what this important passage is asserting. (1) Psychical experience (the level of pure sensation) cannot be studied or shown to exist by inquiring of (putting questions to) consciousness, (2) the reason being that consciousness alters sensation. (3) Therefore "introspection" (not in the sense used in his discussion of empiricism, but as the putting of questions to consciousness) is ruled out as a method for studying psychical experience (but not as a method for studying consciousness)--some other method is required. (4) Behaviorism (a natural science) has devised a method perfectly sound for this purpose--a method which (a) rejects "introspection,"
and (b) identifies the psychical with the physiological (and therefore subject to the investigative methods of the physical sciences). (5) The only flaw with behaviorism as a method is that it fails to recognize that unless it presupposes (a) that psychical experience exists, and (b) it is a certain kind of thing (namely a physiological phenomenon but present to conscious beings), it would have nothing to investigate. (6) This knowledge is established independently of both "introspection" and behavioral study; it is established by the analysis of consciousness. (7) The principle of this analysis is that consciousness has a double object, whereas sentience has a single.

But what then is this "analysis of consciousness"? Judging by the "principle" of its analysis, it is nothing other than phenomenology: the principle cited is merely a restatement of the principle of intentionality. But then phenomenological analysis must not only be able to tell us that psychical experience exists (because sentience has an object?) but also what kind of a thing it is (something present to us as a concrete sensum, to be attended to). This passage is

30 This does not solve all the interpretative difficulties in the passage under consideration. It is not clear, for example, how the analysis of consciousness can discover the relationship of consciousness to a more elementary kind of experience (the psychical level) without altering it in the process, because analysis must itself be a kind of consciousness.
therefore isomorphic with all those other remarks about psychology scattered through his writings, from his rejection of the psychologistic reduction of religion in Religion and Philosophy to his assault on psychologism as a metaphysical pseudoscience in the Essay on Metaphysics (cf. EM, 112-42). In them he is arguing not that psychology (in this case, behaviorism) does not have a legitimate field of investigation, but that it presupposes philosophical psychology (in this case, phenomenological analysis). 31

But once the "flaw" in behaviorism is made good by acceptance of the presuppositions established by phenomenological analysis, its methods are sound for examining the psychological level of a natural phenomenon, a level at which "introspection" is futile. And in The Idea of Nature Collingwood is not bound by the limitations of the inquiry into consciousness by the methods of introspection. The Principles of Art occupies an intermediary position—but Collingwood's sense of the limitations presupposed in a given piece of thinking prevents him from giving a complete account of perception, and from giving

31 By calling Collingwood's "analysis of consciousness" phenomenological we do not mean to imply a conscious identification of Collingwood with the continental phenomenological movement begun by Husserl. If there is any such connection between Collingwood and the phenomenologists, it is nowhere explicit in his writings. Furthermore Collingwood would not accept phenomenological analysis as purely descriptive; he insisted always that it was "normative" or "criterio-logical." Cf. EM, 109; PA, 171, note.
full assent to the physiological aspects of perception--the level at which objects external to our sense organs initiate changes in those organs.

H.--We find an actual instance of an "analysis of consciousness" in one of the epilogenena to The Idea of History--"History as the Re-Enactment of Past Experience." The analysis is dialectical: it takes the form of a number of objections raised by hypothetical realists and idealists to the assertion that historical knowledge is possible only on the condition that the historian can re-enact in his own mind past acts of thought. We shall take up this argument in Chapter IX, so we shall not at this point enter into the details of this dialectical analysis. It suffices to say that in this epilogenon we have an actual case in which Collingwood argues against both the realist's view that acts of thought and their objects are independent of one another (and therefore that although two acts of thought may have the same object, they are not the same thoughts because thoughts are bound to subjects and the subjects are different persons) and the idealist's view that objects are ultimately dependent on thought (and therefore that in being thought an object becomes subjective). On either view, he argues, history is not possible (IH, 289-90).

32 Once again it is worth noting that part of this complex argument is aimed at particular idealistic views of history (Croce and Oakeshott), so the use of the term "idealism"
Collingwood's answer to these objectors is ultimately that thought is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, but always both (IH, 292). But in answering the idealist objector Collingwood goes one step further—a step that requires stating what we have just seen him call the principle of the analysis of consciousness:

Why did ((the idealist objector)) think that the act of thought, by becoming subjective, ceased to be objective? . . . It is because he understood by subjectivity not the act of thinking, but simply consciousness as a flow of immediate states. Subjectivity for him means not the subjectivity of thought but only the subjectivity of feeling or immediate experience. Even immediate experience has an object, for in every feeling there is something felt and in every sensation there is something sensed: but in seeing a colour what we see is the colour, not our act of seeing the colour . . . . The subjectivity of immediate experience is thus a pure or mere subjectivity; it is never objective to itself: the experiencing never experiences itself as experiencing. If, then, there were an experience from which all thought were excluded . . . the active or subjective element in that experience could never be an object to itself, and if all experience were of the same kind it could never be an object at all. (IH, 294-95).

In this essay the term "experience" refers to the immediacy of something to consciousness, a term consistent with his usage throughout his writings. It also provides him with a means for distinguishing three senses of the term "awareness" which here should not be understood to be applicable to all forms of it—in particular objective (Hegelian) idealism. It is possible that the argument here cited would not be felt as damaging by an objective idealist. We shall have more to say on this interesting variant of the autobiographical anti-realist argument at IH, 288, in Chapter IX.
we know to be a synonym for "attention" and for "consciousness." It means (1) the immediate experience of feeling, (2) self-consciousness, and (3) perception. Collingwood says the term should be confined to its second sense: "I am aware of my act not only as an experience but as my experience, and an experience of a determinate kind" (IH, 291).

But then if awareness is self-consciousness how can thought be anything but subjective? How can thought be an object to itself? In answering this Collingwood expands the term "awareness" even further:

((The objector)) will perhaps say that one act of thought may be an object to another act, but not to itself. But this . . . needs modification, for any object is properly the object not of an act but of an agent, the mind that performs the act. True, a mind is nothing except its own activities; but it is all these activities together, not any one separately. The question is, then, whether a person who performs an act of knowing can also know that he is performing or has performed that act. Admittedly he can, or no one would know that there were such acts, and so no one could have called them subjective; but to call them merely subjective, and not objective too, is to deny that admission while yet continuing to assume its truth. The act of thinking . . . has to be studied as it actually exists, that is to say, as an act . . . . This study . . . is self-knowledge . . ; it is the object of a self-knowledge which differs from mere consciousness in being self-consciousness or awareness, and differs from being mere self-consciousness in being self-knowledge; the critical study of one's own thought, not the mere awareness of that thought as one's own. (IH, 292).33

33 Cf. Donagan's "Principle of Order," which is one of the four major presuppositions which Donagan claims hold for Collingwood's mature philosophy of mind: "If a man is conscious of one of his own acts of consciousness, then it is not by that act itself, but by another act of consciousness which
So now it appears that the schema is complete; in addition to (1) the immediate experience of sensation, (2) mere consciousness, and (3) self-consciousness, we have also (4) critical self-consciousness or self-knowledge, the critical study of one's own thought. For an analysis of consciousness to be complete it must be carried through to this final stage, which we have often seen Collingwood call philosophy. In a later chapter we shall see that the critical study of one's own thought is the study of the presuppositions of that thought, or metaphysics, and that the methodology of metaphysics necessitates the methodology of history. But for now we wish to point out that in an actual specimen of the analysis of consciousness Collingwood has in fact appealed to the principle of intentionality in the sense that all consciousness (even consciousness of sensation or perception) implies the presence of an object.

Now if we pull these various strands of circumstantial evidence together into a final summary concerning the relation of knower to known, what emerges from the evidence of The Principles of Art, when taken in conjunction with the evidence from remarks in The Idea of Nature and The Idea of History, is this:

\[\text{may be said to be of a higher order}^\dagger \text{ (LPC, 28). Any interpretation which accepts an overly-strict adherence to this principle must ultimately come to grips with the passage just cited, which states that this principle "needs modification" and defends the thesis that at least one act of consciousness can be self-illuminating, namely self-knowledge.}\]
TABLE 7

THE KNOWER-KNOWN RELATIONSHIP IN PERCEPTION

1. The knower-known relationship as it occurs in the act of perception is not adequately described by simple assignment of activity or passivity to either knowing or its object. (PA, 196-97)
   a. Knowing does not create its object ex nihilo (i.e., knowing is not totally active with respect to an object); (PA, 291-92)
   b. nor does the object create knowledge of itself ex nihilo in the knower (knowing is not totally passive in the act of perception). (PA, 196-97)
   c. Although knowing is active (in the form of sentience) even at the level of sensation, for there to be an object of sensation something must be present to it (and therefore active in this minimal sense)--i.e. it must present itself to the knower's field of sentience. (PA, 210)

2. In perception the object affects knowledge by being present to sensation; its being an object for sensation is the same as its being present to sensation. Its esse is sentiri. (PA, 189, 8-24; PA, 198; cf. PA, 206)

3. At the level of sensation, knowing affects the object by perpetuating it and domesticating it by an act of attention. This act makes the sensum one's own (an item of our own experience) and maintains its presence in experience for sufficient time to allow further acts of thought concerning it to occur (discrimination, comparison, abstraction, measurement, etc.). (PA, 212-13)

NOTE: In this table, "object" is to be taken as "object of sensation"--i.e., whatever is sensed, or present to sensation. "Knowing" is, unless qualified, to mean "empirical knowledge"--i.e., knowledge by perception, and has the same broad extension as "thought"--including first order attention.
4. These further acts of thought are interpretations of a sensum.

5. Limitations on observation come (a) from the side of the object (how long a process takes to occur, how large or small it must be in order to exist) as well as (b) from the side of the subject (the limits of duration of attention, spatial discriminatory capacities, etc.). These are (a) the presupposition concerning minimum space and time in nature, and (b) the limits of possible experience in subjects, respectively. (IN, 23-24)

6. The assertion of the existence of a world of nature external to our organs of sensation and capable of presenting information to us by acts of these organs, is not a matter of direct perception, but the result of an interpretation of sensa. This assertion is a presupposition of natural science. (EM, 213, 217)

7. Natural science overlaps the study of mind at the psychological level, the physiological aspects of which are studied by behaviorism, using the methods of natural science, and not using the methods of conscious inquiry or introspection. (NL, 2.6-2.73; PA, 205-06)

8. That there is such a level of experience, and that it consists of concrete sensa present to sensation as something to be attended to (i.e. as uninterpreted sensa) is presupposed by behavioral psychology, but is demonstrated by the analysis of consciousness, on the basis of the principle of intentionality. (PA, 205-06)

Unfortunately we are not yet finished with our survey of Collingwood's writings on the issue of realism. We come at last to his final work, The New Leviathan—the last work published during his lifetime, and his final word on the subject of the philosophy of mind. As with The Principles of Art, we are looking for evidence concerning Collingwood's evaluation of the principle doctrine of realism, and espe-

The New Leviathan is an odd book in many ways, when compared to Collingwood's other works. It is written in a highly aphoristic and Olympian style, with the pseudo-mathematical device of numbered paragraphs and sub-numbered sentences. Its rhetoric is more hectoring and bombastic than usual, with racial slurs directed at whole nations or peoples—especially the Germans and Turks (cf. NL, 12.4-12.42, 33.47-33.75, 42.1-42.74, 44.1-44.9, and 45.1-45.96). Some of these oddities may be written off as due to the highly emotional circumstances under which the book was written (he writes that he concluded it during a Nazi bombardment of London), as well as the trials of his struggle with his rapidly failing health (cf. NL, v). Specific oddities in terms of doctrine will be dealt with directly in our discussion. But an interpreter should be cautious about the weight he puts on specific and unparalleled statements that he finds in this work—statements that do not appear supported elsewhere in Collingwood's other writings. In our own work we have therefore approached it with caution, and treat it last rather than first; to reverse this procedure (as Donagan and Mink do) and deal with The New Leviathan as a foundation for understanding his mature philosophy of mind is not, in our opinion, sound strategy (cf. Donagan, LPC, 19).

The New Leviathan is subtitled "Man, Society, Civilization, and Barbarism," and these correspond to the four parts into which the book is divided. Although there are scattered remarks about perception, thinking, and science throughout the latter three parts, our main concern will be only with the first part, in which the philosophy of mind is expounded that serves as a foundation for parts II-IV. That the argument of The New Leviathan as a whole is fundamentally
cially as that evaluation affects his analysis of perception. As it happens there is no direct argument in The New Leviathan that has the form of the autobiographical refutation of realism. But there is a discussion of the issue of empiricism that parallels (but definitely does not duplicate) that given in The Principles of Art. As in the earlier work, this discussion arises in the context of the distinction between feeling and thought (NL, 1.61, 4.13-4.19). Within feeling Collingwood distinguishes a sensuous element and an emotional charge (NL, 4.1). But unlike the earlier work he calls thought a "constituent" of mind and feeling an "apanage": feeling belongs to mind not the way a man belongs to a family or a plank to a boat (as a constituent or an element) but in the way in which an estate belongs to a family or a mooring to a boat--

anti-realistic hinges on the denial that theory and practice can be separated (or that theoretical reason can be separated from practical reason)--a denial made at the very beginning (NL, 1.66) and reinforced throughout parts I-IV in various forms (cf. NL, 7.22, 14.3-14.31, 18.13, 19.25, 20.21, 27.55, 36.25-36.7, 41.32-41.33). Since The New Leviathan is primarily an ethical treatise (or perhaps more properly a treatise on social and political philosophy) the stress on the pernicious consequences of realistic philosophy (cf. A, 47-48, 147) is quite understandable. But throughout the work there are other direct assaults on what Collingwood had recognized to be realistic doctrines: e.g. the rejection of the reduction of the term "society" to the abstract notion of class (NL, 19.37, 19.7); a defense of the notion of a common good and a rejection of the view that all "goods" are private (NL, 20.12-20.22, 21.27-21.65, 36.25-36.55); and the description of the body politic as a dialectical entity (NL, 24.52-24.75, 29.1-29.75, 39.1-39.15).
i.e. as something it has but not as something it is (NL, 4.13-4.19). With this distinction in mind, Collingwood addresses the question of radical empiricism:

There is a saying, nihil est in intellectu nisi quod prius fuerit in sensu. If this were true, the precision or definiteness which is characteristic of thought would already be characteristic of feeling. Many people try to persuade themselves that it is; but they are mistaken. They regard feeling as a constituent of knowledge; but it is only an apanage of knowledge: an indispensable apanage, but an apanage and no more. Are there objects of feeling or not? I do not know. Nobody knows. Some have said there are, some have said there are not. As the question is unanswerable on positive grounds I answer it on methodological grounds . . . . Entia non sunt multiplicanda (runs Occam's Razor) praeter necessitatem. Following this rule I answer the question: "Are there objects of feeling or not" by what I call a methodological negative. Feeling must on any view have modes . . . . The question is whether a theory of feeling needs objects as well as modes. The Lockian theory does; the Cartesian does not. By Occam's Razor the Cartesian theory is preferable. (NL, 5.19-5.2, 5.39).

Is Collingwood taking a different tack here than he did in The Principles of Art? It would certainly seem so, since on the strength of the above quotation a reader could certainly say that the "matter-form" analogy accepted in the earlier work is certainly not applicable to something that is an "apaneage" and not a "constituent." If feeling is "an apanage and no more" (and we do not ask how it can be an "indispensable apanage" and still not be a constituent) it cannot stand with respect to higher levels of experience as something capable of being perpetuated as a "certain new arrangement of psychical experiences" or as a "peculiar combination of ele-
ments" preserved by an act of consciousness (PA, 233).

But before analyzing his argument to justify this "methodological negative," we must notice that Collingwood is putting a question to consciousness, finding that it is unanswerable on "positive" grounds, and therefore answering it on methodological grounds. We recognize this to be a case of the "inquiry into consciousness" that Collingwood had said cannot tell us what sort of thing the psychical level is or even whether it exists. A non-positive answer is therefore not surprising on the grounds of the positive evidence offered by consciousness alone. It is also not surprising that methodology enters into the discussion, since Collingwood had asserted that what the method of inquiry into consciousness could not establish could be settled by the methods of behavioral psychology as corrected by the "analysis of consciousness" using the principle of intentionality. What is surprising is that the "methodological answer" to the question turns out to be negative: there are no objects of feeling. The "methodological" criteria therefore cannot refer to the methods of behavioral psychology (there is no experimental evidence cited), nor is there any "analysis of consciousness" here based on the principle that consciousness has a double object while sensation has a single. In fact it appears that the criterion being used does not allow sensation to have even a single object: it has only modes. The criterion appealed to must
therefore be the principles involved in an "inquiry into consciousness" which (as expected) cannot answer such questions.

But why then is the question answered in the negative? Should it not be simply left open (as it is at NL, 5.2, where he says that he does not know and nobody else does either)? Should it not merely be stated that feeling is ambiguous with respect to this category as it is with the other Kantian categories (NL, 5.66)? In order to get a handle on why Collingwood reaches such a conclusion, let us look at the argument offered between the question and the answer, deleted from the above-quoted passage. The passages are long and difficult, and are best dealt with by paraphrase. The argument proceeds as follows:

(1) Locke asserted that there are proper objects (colours, sounds, etc.) of acts of feeling (seeing, hearing, etc.); the general name for these objects is "sense data" (NL, 5.21-5.23). Since data are first-order objects to sensation, and hence second-order objects to simple consciousness (consciousness in its most primitive form). 36 The immediate or

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36 There is a lack of terminological uniformity between The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan which adds to the difficulty of comparing the views of mind presented in each—a confusion complicated by the alternation between the purely relative use of terms (like "first-order" and "second-order" objects, where the same object may be a first-order or immediate object to one level of consciousness and a second-order or mediated object to a second level reflecting on the first) and the use of similar terms to refer to concrete levels of
first-order object of simple consciousness is the activity of sensation itself (NL, 5.24). (2) Berkeley asked, "What is the status of objects of sense-perception?" and answered, "Their esse is percipi," meaning that the being of colour is its being seen, the being of sound its being heard, etc.—the sounds, colours, etc. being apanages of mind or products of the activities of seeing, hearing, etc. (NL, 5.27-5.29). (3) G. E. Moore and others (obviously contemporary empiricists) beginning with the same assumption (i.e. that sense-data are objects of sensation) reach the opposite conclusion, i.e. that any object is precisely what it would be if we were not aware of it (NL, 5.31; Collingwood quotes from "The Refutation of Idealism"). (4) The Cartesian answer is that there are modes of feeling (blue, hard, loud, etc.) but no objects. This does not mean that Descartes denied that there were such things as blue colours, loud sounds, etc., but that "Descartes denied the blue colour to be the object of a transitive verb to see, as a dog may be the object of a transitive verb to kick. It means that for Descartes the grammar of the sentence 'I see a blue colour' is not like the grammar of 'I kick a bad dog' but like the grammar of 'I feel a transient melancholy' or 'I go a fast walk.' The colour, the melancholy, the walk, are not objects of an action, they are modes of an action; their names have an mind (like "first-order" and "second-order" consciousness). Where there is apparent lack of synonymy we shall indicate the fact. In this case Collingwood's use of "simple consciousness" is synonymous with first-order attention from The Principles of Art.
adverbial function in the sentences in which they occur" (NL, 5.34-5.35). On the Cartesian theory feeling as sensuous or emotional has modes, but neither sensations nor emotions have objects: therefore "in neither case is there anything of which it is other than idiotic to ask whether its esse is percipi or not" (NL, 5.37). (5) If the Cartesian theory is accepted, then the question which (a) Berkeley answered one way ("sensa are mind-dependent") and Moore and others answered in the opposite way ("sensa are not mind-dependent") is a nonsense question; it is "a question to which no possible answer is right because it arises logically from an assumption that is not made" (NL, 5.36). 37 (6) By Occam's Razor, the infinity of entities required by the theory that says that feeling has objects as well as modes is ruled out as unnecessary. All one needs for an account of feeling is modes. Therefore the Car-

37 The argument here is confusing, but the following schema seems likely:

Question: Are sensa mind-dependent?
Answer (1): Sensa are mind-dependent (Berkeley).
Answer (2): Sensa are not mind-dependent (Moore).
Presupposition: Mind-dependency is something that sensa can have or be.

The implication seems to be that this presupposition (if that is indeed the presupposition that Collingwood has in mind) is not being made on the Cartesian theory because to be mind-dependent something must be a constituent of mind or of consciousness, and feelings are not constituents of mind but apanages (and apanages are not constituents). Another way of saying this is that feelings cannot have 2nd-order objects because they are not conscious acts; therefore whether apanages have 2nd-order objects (objects as well as modes) is a nonsense question.
tesian theory is preferable on methodological grounds. (NL, 5.39). (7) But either view (i.e. that there are both modes and objects of feelings or that there are only modes) fits the facts, and neither is inherently nonsensical (NL, 5.38).

We seem to be on familiar territory--this review parallels that given in *The Principles of Art* on the question of real and imaginary sensa. But there are several important differences in the two accounts. (a) Although Collingwood winds up stating, as we have already noticed, that feeling is "ambiguous" with respect to the Kantian categories (and hence have the status of uninterpreted sensa) he concludes here with a Cartesian rather than a Kantian answer to the question, "Are there objects of feelings?" (b) In opting for this answer Collingwood introduces an essentially linguistic argument (i.e. that the terms referring to sensa function as adverbs rather than as nouns) that is absent in the previous account.

38The linguistic argument, while interesting, is both (a) non-essential to the main argument, and (b) unreliable. (a) To demonstrate its inessentiality it is only necessary to read the above summary of the argument without it--it still makes perfect sense. The use of Occam's Razor does not require the adverbial function of sense-object terms; it hinges on the non-necessity of positing two sets of entities, sense-modes and sense-objects, when all one needs are modes. (b) But this highlights the unreliability of the argument, since what Descartes (and Collingwood) seem to be proposing is to substitute the term "mode" for the term "object." Now it is true that sense-modes sometimes function adverbially (e.g. "He felt the train moving, but visually nothing changed"), but then the distinction refers to the manner in which things are felt--by touch, sight, taste, etc.--rather than what is felt by these modes. For if terms like blue, sweet, loud, etc. function adverbially in a sentence, then it should be proper
(c) The Cartesian answer, which he accepts, renders it "idiotic" to assert that there is anything of which it is true to assert that its esse is percipi (which runs counter to his previous assertion that the esse of a sensum is sentiri). (d) And yet he states that neither the assertion that sensa are mind-dependent (Berkeley) nor the assertion that they are not (Moore) is inherently nonsensical, and that both fit the facts. This contradicts his earlier argument that Moore's position (or the position of any empiricist who argues that there are entities describable as "sense data" which are objects of the act of sensation) implies that something absurdly describable to say that "He tasted sweetly" or "He looked bluely" or "He heard loudly"--all of which are semantically peculiar. The more acceptable usage is not adverbial but adjectival: "He tasted a sweet pastry," or "He gazed at a blue feather," or "He heard a loud siren," etc. On the Descartes-Collingwood theory it would seem that each "object" of feeling is only another mode, so that we would have to posit separate senses for every color, taste, texture, etc.--each being a "mode" or modification of the general term, "feeling." But linguistic legislation cannot settle the problem of what it would mean if sense-data terms were made proper objects of verbs of sensation: "I see blue," "I hear loud," etc.--which appear to be truncated or incomplete sentences. Completion of their sense is made possible by intentional or sense-giving acts of interpretation. The substitution of the term "mode" for "object" merely postpones the inevitable question, are such entities present to us or do we present them to ourselves? But if Collingwood's linguistic argument is taken not as a piece of verbal legislation but as an illustration of an epistemological point he wishes to make, then his denial that there are objects of feeling may come down to nothing more than the denial of sense-data as the perception of substances rather than of processes of nature. It would thus be consistent with The Idea of Nature, which states that one of the consequences of the modern view of nature is the resolution of substance into function (IN, 16-17).
as "unsensed sensa" can exist. And finally, (e) there is no mention here, or in what follows it in The New Leviathan, of anything to do with imagination or imaginary sensa.

Some, but not all, of these discrepancies may be resolved by paying careful attention to a subtle shift of levels between the two works, The New Leviathan being strictly bound by the negative limitations of "The Fallacy of Swapping Horses," and The Principles of Art sitting a little looser in the saddle. In the later work the inquiry proceeds by putting questions to consciousness and answering them by taking "soundings" (consciously reflecting or introspecting) at various levels of consciousness. Since this is the Cartesian method, it is predictable that the same method will yield similar conclusions: consciousness does not need to assume that sensation has objects as well as modes. The methodological negative therefore merely allows the inquiry to proceed by not inhibiting it with questions that it cannot (on its presuppositions) answer. Since one of its main presuppositions is that the only constituents of mind are acts of conscious-

Collingwood's starting point in The New Leviathan is even Cartesian: "Of all the things we know or have been told about Man, which is the one thing that concerns us at the present stage of our inquiry? I answer: The division between body and Mind" (NL, 1.21). But of course, Collingwood's aim is not to construct a mathematically secure science, nor to proceed only by way of clear and distinct ideas. Nevertheless these concessions to Descartes should alone be enough to render suspect any account of Collingwood's philosophy of mind that begins with the assertion that it is fundamentally anti-Cartesian (Donagan, LPC, 25).
ness, and that with respect to these essential elements feel-
ings are merely apanages, it is not a matter for consciousness
to decide what the relationship may be between feelings and
what they are directed towards. Whatever these objects may be,
they are not first-order objects for consciousness. Therefore
when Collingwood rejects the assertion that sensation has ob-
jects he may be doing nothing more than what he does in _The
Principles of Art_ when he criticizes the notion of "sense
data": he may be rejecting the absurd notion of "unsensed sen-
sa." In other words, the terms "sense-object," "sense datum"
and "unsensed sensum" may be synonyms: all may refer to a sen-
sum as a datum—something really present only as re-presented,
an imaginatum.

But then the reader is stumped for an explanation as
to why Moore's position is not inherently nonsensical, and why
the notion of "sense-object" is not resolved into an imagina-
tum, as it is in _The Principles of Art_; in _The New Leviathan_
the entire issue of imaginative representation is never men-
tioned. Can we assume that this is because he had said all he
cared to on the subject in _The Principles of Art_ (cf. Mink,
MHD, 81)? That might be the case were it not for some remark-
able direct discrepancies between the two works on the issue
of feeling, discrepancies not easily dismissed on the above
grounds.
These discrepancies become more obvious the instant we begin to expand the discussion of feeling. In The New Leviathan Collingwood characterizes feeling and its relation to thought as follows. (1) It is an apanage of mind rather than a constituent (NL, 4.19-4.2). (2) It consists of sensible elements and emotional charges which interpenetrate all over the field of feeling (NL, 4.1, 4.4). (3) Feelings are evanescent—they begin to perish as soon as they begin to exist (NL, 5.5). (4) Feelings are indefinite (NL, 4.8) but strong (NL, 4.86). (5) The strength that feeling has is (a) vividness ("compression strength"—basically, intensity) and (b) tenacity (the quality a feeling has which makes it "linger in the mind, be slow to vanish, and be easily revived when the occasion permits") (NL, 5.14-5.17). (6) Within the here-and-now field of feeling (NL, 4.4) there are place-differences, time-differences ("it has spatial and temporal bulk"), and intensity differences (louder and softer sounds, brighter and dimmer colors, etc.) (NL, 4.4, 4.43). (7) Within this field there is also a focal region where precision and intensity are greatest, and a penumbral region where they decrease in every direction until in some outer zone precision and intensity recede into dimness and confusion (NL, 4.44).

Thus far the description of feeling is not significantly different from that given in The Principles of Art. But Collingwood adds several more statements about feeling in
relation to thought, statements that lead us into unfamiliar territory. (8) Feeling has no edges--its spatial and temporal penumbra fade away (NL, 4.45). (9) Feeling is the proper object of simple consciousness and is immediately given to that consciousness (NL, 4.19, 4.24, 4.71). Without this simple consciousness and the field of feeling present to it there could be no higher-order acts of selective attention (NL, 4.5). (10) Distinctions within the field of feeling are made by an act of selective attention--a practical act of second-order consciousness in which one's attention is turned one way or another, "creating . . . a situation in which . . . consciousness is concentrated on one object (one feeling) or another" (NL, 4.5). (11) The act of attention really makes the edges of anything distinguished within the field of feeling (NL, 4.52-4.6)--distinctions such as positional distinctions (distinctions of place and time), qualitative distinctions, distinctions between sensations and their emotional charges, between different sensings (seeing, hearing, smelling), etc. (NL, 4.61-4.63). (12) Any characteristics that feelings may have are discoverable by simply reflecting on that consciousness; to attempt to argue about it is to commit the Fallacy of Misplaced Argument (the fallacy of arguing about any object immediately given to consciousness) (NL, 4.71-4.73). (13) There is no generalizing about feelings ("that is, no framing universal propositions about them and assuring oneself that
these are true, or (alternatively) omitting to do so because one is too lazy"), although it is possible to think inductively about feeling ("to think inductively is to assume, because this x has (or some x's have) a certain characteristic, that other x's have or would have the same characteristic") (NL, 5.55-5.56). (14) Feelings have modes but not objects (NL, 5.2-5.39). (15) Feeling is ambiguous with respect to activity (something I do) or passivity (something I undergo) (NL, 5.4-5.49). (16) Feeling is ambiguous with regard to the Kantian categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality (NL, 5.6-5.66). (17) It is also ambiguous with regard to the Kantian category of quality, although this ambiguity has limits (NL, 5.67-5.72). (18) Feelings cannot be remembered, although propositions about feelings can be remembered (NL, 5.54). (19) Feelings may be preconscious until they are reflected upon by an act of consciousness (NL, 5.9-5.91), or unconscious insofar as they are repressed (NL, 5.86-5.87). (20) Feeling remains preconscious until it is named (NL, 6.28). Naming is a linguistic act of expression, which includes everything from the language of gesture (e.g. an expressive shiver to the cold) to the language of speech (saying "it is cold") (NL, 6.1, 6.25). "Language in its simplest form is the language of consciousness in its simplest form; the mere 'register' of feelings, as wild and mad as those feelings themselves; irrational, unorganized, unplanned, unconscious" (NL, 6.58). (21) A language is an abstraction from discourse, which is the activity
by which a man means anything (NL, 6.11). To discourse is to mean something by the gesture (expression) you make; a language is a system of gestures (sounds or the like) as having meanings. Discourse is the activity of meaning something (a) by something else (b), where meaning (a) is an act of theoretical consciousness, and (b) is a practical activity, the production in oneself or others of sounds, etc. which serve as the vehicle of that meaning (NL, 6.18-6.19). (22) Finally, selective attention is an act of practical thinking, at the level of conceptual thought (NL, 7.2-7.21); it is a doing of something to oneself (focusing consciousness on part of the field of feeling) and also a doing of something to the object (circumscribing it, drawing a line between it and the rest of the field) (NL, 7.3).

Leaving the higher functions of consciousness for later discussion (we will have more to say about language, logic, and conceptual and propositional thinking in Chapter VIII), we must now ask how all this stands with respect to the fundamental tenet of realism. Once again we meet with Collingwood's intransigent insistence on the activity of thinking and its role even at the primary level of perception. And once again we find Collingwood anxious to reject the view of mind that makes it a passive partner in the knower-known relationship. In his final published work, then, it is clear that Collingwood has retained his opposition to the principal doctrine of
realism that the known is unaffected by the knowing of it. To this extent the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated.

But what about our further question about whether the object has any effect on the knower? And is this description of the functions of consciousness consistent with that given in *The Principles of Art*, and how does it compare with the circumstantial evidence that we educed from that earlier work and from his other late writings? Although we would like to defend Collingwood's later philosophy of mind as a brave attempt to reconcile idealism and realism, we find instead that in *The New Leviathan* he appears to be so intent on overcoming the errors of realism that he leaves little room for interpreting the knower-known relationship in anything but idealistic terms: not only does knowing make a difference to the object known even to the level of perception, but there seems to be no way that the object can make a difference to the knowing of it.

The crux of the matter is, of course, sensation itself. If there is no way that sensation can present to us a world of sensa that is something more than in a state of constant flux, utterly diversified, and without any "edges" at all, then it is impossible to see (1) why an exercise of the "circumscribing" function of attention is not utterly free to make any sort of arbitrary pattern of fancies out of the chaos of sensa on which it operates; (2) why there should be any sort of cor-
relation between various modes of sensation with respect to
one and the same object of sensation; and (3) how it is pos-
sible to disambiguate feeling at all by any act of interpre-
tation. We will take up each of these points separately.

(1) We have seen that Collingwood described the field
of feeling as containing positional and qualitative distinc-
tions, place-differences and time-differences, intensity dif-
fferences, and even focal and penumbral regions. But then we
saw him go even further and assert that there are no edges
within the field of feeling, and that all distinctions within
it are made by acts of selective attention--an act of practi-
cal consciousness. He goes so far as to say that not even so
much as a "red patch" is immediately given to consciousness,
because "the red is actually given in feeling to consciousness
as a quality transfusing all the rest of the same field" (NL,
5.65; emphasis mine). The sensa given in feeling "interpene-
trate" all over the field of feeling (NL, 5.62), and only the
activity of consciousness as selective attention can "cut up"
such a field into distinct feelings ("sensations distinct from
emotions, visual sensations distinct from auditory sensations,
red patches distinct from green patches, and so on ad infini-
tum") (NL, 5.63). The field of sensation is utterly ambigu-
ous with regard to all the Kantian categories, and only one
small postscript indicates that this ambiguity has any limits:
with respect to the category of quality Collingwood says that
"colour may be indeterminate, but it falls between points on a colour-scale. We can always fix these limits as closely as we need . . . but the ambiguity is only restricted, it can never be removed" (NL, 5.72).

But how is it possible to "restrict" an ambiguity that (a) includes the impossibility of distinguishing even so much as a red patch on a green field, and that (2) excludes sensa from having any "edges" at all? And how is it possible for there to be differences (qualitative, quantitative, etc.) within a field if everything within that field "interpenetrates" and "transfuses" and "begins to perish as soon as it begins to exist"? And how can there be such differences present in the field if it is only consciousness that puts such distinctions there?

Lacking answers to these questions we must conclude that something has gone wrong with Collingwood's description of feeling, and especially of sensation. It is not consistent with itself within The New Leviathan, and it certainly is not consistent with his remarks in other works, about scientific observation and its presuppositions. In order that there be something "there" for perception to attend to, we must assume that edges are not only "made" by acts of selective attention, they are also "found" to be there when something is attended to--once, twice, or however many times one chooses. And although within a given field of sensation--vision, for example--
there may be ambiguities (colors at the periphery of my vision begin to interpenetrate, or even within the direct foreground of my visual field if I let my focus blur), it is nonetheless equally an item of experience that for a given position within that field something is not always red, green, blue, etc. all over at the same time, and to the same degree--this much at least he admitted in *The Principles of Art*, when he argued that "we cannot, in seeing a red patch, mistake it for a blue one" (PA, 189). It is sometimes predominately one color or another, or it is mottled, or whatever, but certainly not always totally indefinite. And if it is true that I become aware of edges by letting my focus wander back and forth from a red patch to its surrounding green field and back again, and thereby re-establishing the distinctness of the red patch from its background, it is not a matter of utterly creating this edge *ex nihilo* in the visual field, it is a matter of re-creating or re-presenting it for myself in the act of perception. If it were not then it would be nonsense to assert that observation of nature yields any information at all. Selective attention would just as surely create the patterns of nature as a painter creates a visual scene on his canvas: it is a reverse "tabula rasa" with the messages written on the blank sheet of sensation by the perceiver's consciousness rather than by natural objects.
(2) So also with the formation of percepts which the medieval scholastics would subsume under the faculty of "common sense" (not the body of assumed rules or customs or attitudes towards the world and others, but rather the result of the operation of a faculty related to imagination, and which holds together sensa from various organs of sensation--colors and shapes with sounds, textures, smells, tastes, etc.--to form a "common sensible"). Collingwood's sensuous field as he describes it cannot be distinct even with respect to modes, if he is to be consistent, since "visual sensations distinct from auditory sensations . . . and so on ad infinitum" (NL, 5.63) are only distinguished by acts of selective attention. But then it becomes utterly arbitrary whether I associate this color brown to which I am attending with this shape which I am holding, where the shape happens to be a cup I am holding under the table and color is that of the table between my eyes and the cup. Or even worse, what is to stop my act of attention from taking this loud noise for this sweet taste? Collingwood wishes us to withhold such distinctions until we reach a higher level of discrimination, but by then it is too late: no amount of discriminating is going to inform me of an error of this sort unless some original act actually grants me information on the basis of which I can correct my error. On Collingwood's grounds (at least in The New Leviathan) it is impossible, using the findings of mental science,
to ever have any such original act. Sensation as such is essentially and irretrievably ambiguous.

(3) But the problems that Collingwood gets himself into in *The New Leviathan* are not due solely to his assertion that the field of sensation is ambiguous with respect to one or another of the Kantian categories (which is true even for his position in *The Principles of Art* insofar as uninterpreted sensa are ambiguous until interpreted by application of one or more categories) but rather they are also due to the fact that he goes beyond this point and makes statements about the field of feeling that are actually interpretations of it—generalizations about feeling that his own principles do not allow him to make. Thus although he says that no generalizations can be made about feeling (which is itself a generalization about feeling) he proceeds to say that within a visual field all colors interpenetrate, that they have no edges, that within the field of feeling there are place-differences and time-differences, that they cannot be remembered, etc. What are these but generalizations about feeling? And how does a reader begin to reconcile the statement that there can be no generalization about feeling with the statement that immediately follows it, that it is possible to "think inductively" about feeling, where "to think inductively is to assume that because this x has . . . a certain characteristic, that other x's have or would have the same characteristic" (NL, 5.55-
5.66)? For what else could inductive thinking, on this description of it, be but generalization?

Now it is true that in The Principles of Art many of these same generalizations were made about feeling, but they were merely provisionally assumed as a way of distinguishing feeling from thought, and in order to establish the intermediate role of imagination. Once imagination as attention is understood as the minimum specification of the genus thought, the realm of feeling is redefined as the psychical level of experience on which attention operates, and through which attention "finds and makes" the patterns it requires of the world extrinsic to our sense organs. The methodology of mental science has not been violated, because consciousness as attention is used to define feeling (feeling is what attention is conscious of; sensa are its second-order objects).

All this is demolished by the overstatements of The New Leviathan. Does the later work then represent a change of mind in The Principles of Art? And if Collingwood is saying that the experience of distinctions as given to us in sensation is not his experience is he not "disowning" a feeling, and is this not the "corruption of consciousness" that he sought to warn us against? We cannot answer these questions on the basis of the existing evidence. We can only try to discern what Collingwood was trying to say--what he intended to mean rather than what he merely said. Now it is
clear that Collingwood wishes to say, in The New Leviathan, not only (1) that feeling prior to reflection upon it is lacking in the distinctions proper to thought alone, and hence has only a potentiality for categorial predication, but also (2) that it has place-distinctions and time-distinctions and intensity-distinctions (even in the pre-reflective state), and (3) that it nonetheless belongs to us as a field of experience --as an apanage of mind, or something we have, rather than a constituent, or something we are.

This is basically a Kantian view on the structure and function of mind, since (2) is another way of stating what Kant called the "forms of sensibility"--space and time: for anything to be an object of possible experience, according to Kant, it must be spatially extended and temporally successive. This even seems to be consistent with the view expressed in The Principles of Art, where Collingwood speaks of the function of attention as perpetuating sensa by keeping them before us long enough to get a fair sight of them; and also consistent with the view of The Idea of Nature where Collingwood talks about minimum-space and minimum-time as limiting conditions for scientific, experimental observation.

But it has the same problems that the Kantian forms of sensibility have. Sensa as placed and timed are not utterly indeterminate, but are rather determined to be someplace and sometime, and therefore bearing interpretation, in the minimal
sense, already. If they are conditions for the possibility of objects of sensation, then they must be conditions not only for the subjective act of a percipient, but also conditions true for the object as well—in Collingwood's terms, for the sensum. The sensum has to be the "kind of thing" that meets the requirements of sensation; it has to be a spatially-extended and temporally-persistent thing if perception of it is to be possible.

The question ultimately comes down to this: if distinctions, "edges," are not found but made by acts of practical consciousness, how is it possible to attend to what is not there—to something (the field of interpenetrating sensa) that is not something (nothing determinate at all)? There seems to be nothing to attend to. Collingwood would say that there is something there, only not something definite, and that once selective attention has done its job, it can find the distinctions that it put there. But the retort occurs immediately: put where? To distinguish even left and right sides of a sensory field involves a distinction, which in turn presupposes spatial distinctions with respect to one's own body within the sensory field. Are these "put" there as well?

In Collingwood's case the issue is further complicated by the addition of intensity-distinctions and even a minimal qualitative distinction, as well as a focal and penumbral
structure to the here-and-now field of sensation (which must also be a "there-and-then" if the focal-penumbral analogy is to be carried out). All of this adds up to a field of feeling that is not altogether indeterminate. But supposing that we can ignore the contradiction of a field that is determinately indeterminate, a here-and-now that is also a there-and-then, etc. we still wish to know how what remains of indeterminacy if such a field is disambiguated. On this Collingwood leaves the reader in no doubt: disambiguation of the field of feeling is the work and product of thought which, by a practical activity called language, functions as selective attention.

Unfortunately this activity is also not free of ambiguity, because "language" is not merely the practical side of second-order thought, as some passages in The New Leviathan would lead us to believe (e.g. NL, 4.33). It necessarily and essentially involves a theoretical aspect—the element not only of producing sounds or gestures or expressions, but of meaning something by them, where the meaning is an act of theoretical consciousness (NL, 6.18-6.19). But this description of language as discourse must be taken as the narrower sense of the term, "language," which does not include psychical expressions (grimaces, blushes, tears, etc.) because the latter do not include thought at all, and hence not theoretical consciousness and not meaning. How then does one import meaning into the psychical level of sensation and the chaotic world of sensa?
The disambiguation we are especially interested in is that of the much discussed red patch. If the edges of such a patch (and the color itself as distinct from its background) are made by an act of selective attention which is linguistic in the sense just stated (i.e. including the non-vocal act of meaning, where meaning is an act of theoretical consciousness), then for a portion of the field of feeling to be not only present as a "this" but as an interpreted presence, "this red," and an interpreted presence related to other such items in a field of feeling, a "this red patch in a green field," it must be related to theoretical consciousness through meaning. But once again the inevitable question arises, is this found in the sensory field or is it put there? On Collingwood's earlier account of the matter it is still possible to say, "both found and put"--leaving the details to behaviorism shored up by the analysis of consciousness. But in The New Leviathan the disambiguation of feeling by the eliciting of meaning appears to be impossible, since one is forbidden to make any generalizations about feeling. There seems to be no way to bridge the gap between meaning as an act of theoretical consciousness, and utterly ambiguous sensa.

7. Conclusion.

The only way out of these dilemmas is to return to the position of The Principles of Art, where such intemperate assertions are not made, and where there is still a possibil-
ity for a "science of feeling" to establish what a "science of mind" cannot--i.e. the manner in which objects extrinsic to our sense organs can act on them to yield information about the natural world. This does not mean that we must ignore The New Leviathan altogether: in the summary with which we shall conclude this chapter we attempt to retain from it those elements of the philosophy of mind which are consistent and compatible with the groundwork laid out in The Principles of Art. In the matter of language, for example, the later work shows a distinct improvement (as we shall see in the next chapter).

But how does it finally stand with Collingwood's view of the knower-known relationship insofar as the principal doctrine of realism is concerned? Our final conclusion must be somewhat disappointing. It is not a matter of faulting Collingwood for failing to be idealist enough to recognize that reality somehow exists "for us" and not merely "for itself;" or for not being realist enough to recognize that there is a world of objects unaffected by our knowing of them (or, as some would have it, that the natural language we use to express our thoughts is of necessity a physical-object language). It is a matter of faulting Collingwood for failing to be Collingwood enough, for failing to recognize that the "Law of Primitive Survivals"40 does not apply only to higher-order

40"(A)nother principle that I have assumed throughout . . . ((is)) the LAW OF PRIMITIVE SURVIVALS. It runs as fol-
mental functions, but (by the logic of the overlap of classes) operates even at the level of sensation, or that no matter how far one goes down the "scale of forms" one never reaches a zero-point in the scale (EPM, 31 ff., 81-82). These general principles alone should have led him to recognize that something is given in sensation other than a riotous chaos of interpenetrating and utterly ambiguous sensa; that sensation, although the activity of a not utterly passive agent, is nonetheless the working-up and further organization of elements continuous with the world of nature and of nature's energies, and not something utterly created by the agent and imposed as a form on a passive and indeterminate matter.

Why Collingwood failed to describe adequately sensation could only be settled by appeal to evidence which we do not yet have. Perhaps from the body of his unpublished manuscripts a theory of perception may yet emerge that can pull together the paradoxes that are left unresolved in his published philosophy. But we must notice that the failure is due to the espousal not of realism, but of something more akin to the radical idealism as we propositionally formulated it at the beginning of this chapter. We therefore cannot rest con-

lows. When A is modified into B there survives in any example of B, side by side with the function B which is the modified form of A, an element of A in its primitive or unmodified state" (NL, 9.5-9.51). We recognize this to be the law of dialectical relationship present in Collingwood's writings ever since Religion and Philosophy, but obviously not always followed.
tent with any interpretation that asserts that the dogmatism of Collingwood's later philosophy was a reversion to the realism of his youth. On the contrary, it was a reversion to, and ultimately the dogmatic assertion of, his youthful idealism. The application of the "Fallacy of Misplaced Argument" to rule out controversy concerning sensation is as much an expression of this dogmatism as is the removal of absolute presuppositions from the criteria of truth and falsity in the Essay on Metaphysics. But the case of sensation presents the interpreter with examples of overstatement that tend to stress the contribution to knowledge made by the knower, rather than one that stresses the contribution of the object. Therefore as we already noted, to this extent the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated.

Collingwood's position of the relationship of knower and known was from beginning to end one which is developed in direct opposition to what he understood to be the fundamental tenet of realism. He never succeeded in utterly freeing himself from this preoccupation with the errors of realism, and it was perhaps this preoccupation that ultimately drove him to overstatement. It may be unfortunate that overstatements were made at all, but it is at least consistent with the overall interpretation offered in the Autobiography.

We end this chapter with a final summary of Collingwood's core philosophy of mind.
TABLE 8
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

1. The field of human experience consists of two kinds of experience, feeling and thinking. (PA, 157).
   a. Feeling is the here-and-now presence of a field of successive sensa, each with its emotional charge. Relative to thought, feeling is simple, private, evanescent, perpetually in flux, and appears to arise in us independently of our willing it. Feeling exists at the psychical level, is rooted in our physiological processes, and is (in some sense) the foundation upon which the superstructure of thought is erected. The study of feeling is the proper domain of behavioral psychology. (PA, 157-64, 205).
   b. Thought is the deliberate act (or achievement) of an agent, and can succeed or fail. Relative to feeling, thought is bipolarly complex, public, capable of genuine recurrence and contradiction, and is somehow consequent on feeling. It exists at the mental level, and is not subject to empirical investigative methods alone, but is rather the object of criteriological sciences. All thought presupposes feeling. (PA, 157-60, 164-66, 221).
   c. A science of mind proceeds by means of inquiry into consciousness, or by putting questions to consciousness and answering them with data provided by consciousness itself. From the point of view of a science of mind, feeling is an apanage of mind (something it has), but a constituent of experience (something it is); thought is the only constituent of mind, but it is also a constituent of human experience. (PA, 205-06; NL, 1.61, 4.14-4.2; IH, 291-94).

2. Feeling has a double character, sensation and emotion, united in any given experience, but distinguishable by acts of attention. (PA, 160-62; NL, 4.1).
   a. Sensation is the activity of seeing, hearing, tasting, etc. something; and what is sensed in these acts are
sensa: colors, sounds, tastes, etc. Sensation is prior to emotion as capable of being attended to apart from emotion, but not temporally, logically, or causally prior. A sensum can be "sterilized" by ignoring its emotional charge. (PA, 160-62).

b. Emotion is the "charge" accompanying a sensum. Relative to sensation, emotion is secondary, or capable of being "stripped off" a sensum and ignored. It is likely that emotion is present in all experience, and exists in modified state up to the level of intellect. (PA, 160-62, 169-70, 221, 294).

c. All thought presupposes feeling; and thought alters feeling, which becomes by successive development due to thought, imagination, appetite, passion, desire, etc. by acts of practical thinking. (PA, 230-34; NL, 7.1-7.24, 9.55, 11.1-11.24).

3. Thought is distinguished as primary and secondary, on the basis of what is being thought about, or as practical or theoretical depending on what it affects. (PA, 164-68; NL, 1.63-1.68, 10.51).

a. 1st order thought (or empirical thinking) is concerned exclusively with feeling, relations between sensa, between sensa and sensation, between sensation and emotion, etc. (PA, 164-66; cf. NL, 4.31).

b. 2nd order thought (or intellect) is concerned with other acts of thought; it is thought about thought. Its acts may be abstract, analytical, conceptual, propositional, rational, etc. (PA, 166-68, 253-54; NL, 6.58-6.59).

c. Practical thought is making up one's mind to (do something to oneself or to one's environment). Thought is primarily and always practical, because it always has an effect on oneself or on one's environment. (NL, 1.65-1.68, 7.22, 9.35, 14.3; PA, 289; IH, 310-12).

d. Theoretical thought is making up one's mind that (such and such is the case, or is not the case, or would be the case if . . . , etc.). (NL, 1.64-1.67, 14.3, 14.35; PA, 253, 289; IH, 310-12).

4. Attention (or awareness or consciousness) is the absolutely fundamental act of thought which stabilizes and perpetuates feeling-acts long enough that they may enter into
relations with other feelings and with thought. Attention is the act of appreciating something present as a concrete individual, just as it stands, before analyzing it. (PA, 203-04).

a. 1st order attention is an act of first order thought; it divides the field of feeling into focal and penumbral regions, perpetuates and domesticates feelings -- i.e. stabilizing feelings and asserting ourselves as the owners of these feelings and able to dominate them. It is therefore the free act of an agent, an act free in a sense intermediate between the freedom of sensation (the freedom to respond in several ways to a stimulus) and the freedom of intellect (the true freedom of choice of alternative plans or courses of action). (PA, 203-08, 215-22).

b. 2nd order attention is an act of 2nd order thought; it is the practical act which isolates and identifies a re-presented imaginatum by naming it, or by performing a linguistic act of meaningful expression. As a 2nd order act of thought, attention is abstractive or conceptual. (NL, 4.3-4.68, 6.2-6.36; IH, 242, 291).

5. Imagination is feeling altered by consciousness—feeling as selected, perpetuated, and domesticated by attention. Imagination is another name for consciousness, awareness, or attention, but it is distinguished as the result of attention or the result of the conversion of a sensum uninterpreted into one ready for interpretation or into one interpreted by an act of 2nd order thought. It is an a priori function of thought which operates at the level of 1st order thought as perception, and at higher levels as artistic interpretation, scientific hypothesis formation, and historical reconstruction (PA, 209-15; IH, 242, 291).

6. There are therefore three stages logically distinguishable in the life of a feeling:

a. Bare feeling is something given in sensation, and if unattended to, is carried away in the flux of feeling. Its being is its presence to sensation, and it is related to thought as an uninterpreted sensum.

b. Conscious feeling (or feeling as the object of first-order attention or of simple consciousness) is feeling perpetuated and dominated by consciousness or imagination. Its being is its re-presentation to consciousness, and it is related to thought as a sensum ready for interpretation.
c. **Related feeling** (or feeling as the object of second-order attention, or of consciousness proper) is feeling placed in its relation to other feelings, something constructed or apprehended inferentially by the work of intellect. Its being is relational, and it is related to thought as an interpreted sensum. (PA, 213-14).

d. "**Sense datum**" refers equivocally to all or any of these above three, but it is properly speaking only (c), related feeling. (PA, 169-70).

7. The expression of feeling is a bodily act (a practical act) having levels which correspond to the stages in the life of a feeling).

a. **Psychical expression** is the involuntary muscular and glandular register of feeling, as wild and disorganized as these feelings themselves. (PA, 228-34, 266; NL, 6.58).

b. **Imaginative expression** or language in the broad sense is the activity of discourse, or of meaning something (a) by something else (b), where meaning (a) is an act of theoretical consciousness, and (b) is a practical activity, the production in oneself or others of a physical vehicle for that meaning. At its lowest level language is simple naming; this is the level of conceptual thought. (NL, 6.2-6.28).

c. **Intellectual expression** is language at the level of propositional or analytic thought and all levels beyond this (e.g. rational thought). It is thought expressed as questions, propositions, inferences, reasons why, etc. (NL, 6.1-6.29, 6.57-6.59; PA, 221, 224-54).
CHAPTER VIII

LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND MENTAL ACTS

1. Introduction.

In Chapter I we found that one of the major controversies concerning Collingwood's philosophy, as assessed by his interpreters, is his contention in the Essay on Metaphysics that metaphysics is an historical science -- i.e. that the proper occupation of the metaphysician is to detect the presuppositions being made by the scientists of a certain era. The presuppositions, insofar as they are absolute (that is, not themselves answers to questions but standing as presuppositions to all questions in a systematic inquiry), are neither true nor false, and in discovering them the metaphysician acts as an historian. His job is not to pass judgment on the truth or falsity of these absolute presuppositions, but merely to detect and report them. Since the entire controversy concerning the historical character of metaphysics turns on the role of absolute presuppositions, and since the theory of presuppositions is part of Collingwood's question-and-answer (Q-A) logic, we concluded that Q-A logic is itself one of the major concerns in the interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy.
In Chapter III we found that according to the Autobiography, Collingwood's attack on the methods of the realists entailed, for him, the rejection of propositional logic (F-logic) as an index for correct thinking, since it posited truth as a property of propositions. In direct opposition to this Collingwood proposed an alternative in the form of a Q-A logic, in which truth is taken as a property of propositions only as answers to questions. By reflecting on the sort of thinking he was accustomed to doing in his own historical work, Collingwood found that if one includes in this thought process the presuppositions on which questions are formulated and from which they arise, then the presupposition-question-answer (P-Q-A) complex is not only the unit of truth and falsity in systematic inquiry but also the index of meaning and validity. The Q-A logic that he developed from these reflections was formulated, he felt, in direct opposition to the false methods of the realistic philosophers, who ignored the necessity of reconstructing the concrete question for the propositional answer they were abstractly criticizing—an extension of their ignorance of historical matters. He went as far as to write up his Q-A logic and offer it to a publisher, but it was turned down, and he subsequently destroyed the only manuscript of it.

In Part II we found that in his early philosophy Collingwood does indeed criticize the formal logic of dogmatic realism, and in Speculum Mentis he does argue that truth is a
function of Q-A complexes. But we also found that in his ear-
liest publication, Religion and Philosophy, there is no mention
of a Q-A logic as such, but there is a good deal of discussion
about dialectic and dialectical relations. In Speculum Mentis
dialectical relations are even expanded into a logical schema,
so that the truth embodied in a system of thought which shows
development is described as dialectical in form, and dialectic
is contrasted with formal logic as the logic of the concrete
and abstract universal respectively. Since there was some evi-
dence that led us to suppose that formal logic was held to be
of limited validity in its function as the justification of
the consistency of scientific conclusions, we suggested that
although there is no mention of the fact in the Autobiography,
the early writings show evidence that when Collingwood dis-
cusses "logic" we may be dealing not with one sort of logic
but with at least three: (1) Q-A logic (discussed in Specu-
lum Mentis, partially described in the Autobiography, and re-
appearing in semi-formal attire in the Essay on Metaphysics);
(2) F-logic (the formal logic in the tradition stemming from
Aristotle--described and criticized in Speculum Mentis, called
"propositional logic" in the Autobiography and ascribed to the
realists, and discernible as the logic employed by "exact and
empirical sciences" in the Essay on Philosophical Method); and
(3) D-logic (the dialectical logic present in germ form even
in his earliest work, Religion and Philosophy; described, ex-
Our task in this chapter is minimally to examine the evidence provided by his later writings to test whether or not he remained true to his autobiographical assertions concerning his "revolutionary" logic. Since the most notorious and explicit formulation of this Q-A logic is in the fourth chapter of the Essay on Metaphysics, it is clear that we shall have to examine this chapter in some detail. But since our examination of his early writings raises questions about the relationship between Q-A logic and D-logic, and of both of these to F-logic (questions not even hinted at in the Autobiography) we shall have to expand our discussion to include these topics as well. Since the Essay on Philosophical Method describes the sort of logical relations he had in his earlier works called "dialectical," it is clear we shall have to examine the major doctrines of this important work as our primary source for what Collingwood understood by what we are calling D-logic. And finally we find that the only locus of discussion of F-logic and logical relations in the later writings is in connection with language and the higher-order functions of mental activity in The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan. This necessitates picking up the discussion of Collingwood's philosophy of mind where we left it in Chapter VII—viz. with the analysis of the functions of intellect.
Our strategy is therefore as straight-forward as it was in the last chapter. We propose to take up these topics in the order in which we have just reviewed them. In each case we shall first present a brief summary of the major theses of the texts we are considering, in tabular form. This will be followed by a critical discussion of issues relevant to the topics of this chapter. In the concluding section we shall attempt to pull the strands of the discussion together in a final evaluation of what we can reconstruct of Collingwood's thought on the subject of logic.


In Chapter IV, where we discussed the form of experience that Collingwood called "science" in *Speculum Mentis* (i.e. the form of experience that habitually takes its object to be an instance of an abstract universal), we noticed that Q-A logic was left in an incomplete state, inasmuch as the relationship of questions to presuppositions was not made explicit. This incomplete analysis led to the further difficulty of an equivocation in the use of the term "hypothesis" as he used it in his description of scientific thinking. This equivocation in turn rendered ambiguous his discussion of the hypothetical-categorical distinction on which he based his judgment of the superiority of history over science. We shall have more to say in the next section on the issue of categori-
cal and hypothetical judgments, but at this point we must make good our promise from Chapter IV to clear up the ambiguity about questions and hypotheses.

That ambiguity rested on the description of questions and hypotheses as "non-assertions," the equivocation being that questions are not merely non-assertions but proto-assertions or non-assertions which seek completion in assertion. Sentential or propositional fragments are also non-assertions, but they are not therefore either questions or hypotheses. Since we shall in all likelihood never know what the contents of his early unpublished work, "Truth and Contradiction," had to say on the subject of Q-A logic, we are left to the surviving fragments of that doctrine in his published writings as the only evidence we have for reconstructing his thought on the matter. On the evidence of Speculum Mentis we can safely assume that as of 1924 he was not employing the distinctions necessary to disentangle questions from hypotheses. We can also state that on the evidence of The Idea of Nature the distinction is being clearly utilized in his lectures of 1934 (cf. IN, v, 29-30). So on the evidence of these two works alone it appears that he had worked out the requisite distinctions sometime between 1924 and 1934.¹

¹Knox found it incredible that Collingwood had developed his position on Q-A logic and presuppositions prior to 1932, and on this ground alone he felt justified in rejecting the autobiographical interpretation (IH, x-xi). But as we have already observed, there is no such direct assertion in
But the date on which he actually worked out the necessary distinctions is not as relevant to our discussion as the fact that he ultimately did work it out to his own satisfaction, and that we have an indication of his basic ideas on the subject from the fourth chapter of the Essay on Metaphysics. Since the summary is given there in semi-formal outline already, we shall here merely summarize it in tabular form, interspersing his own notes and comments between the various definitions and propositions. (His "notes" were numbered; his comments were not.)

the Autobiography, and even if there were it is hardly grounds for rejecting the autobiographical interpretation without sufficient evidence to the contrary. We have already stated that we do not accept Knox's authority in his claim to have had access to such unambiguous and unqualified evidence in Collingwood's unpublished manuscripts, since to do so would be guilty of uncritical historiography.
TABLE 9

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER LOGIC IN THE ESSAY ON METAPHYSICS: Q-AM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 1.</th>
<th>Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question. (EM, 23).</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comment 1.</td>
<td>Statements and questions may be made to someone else or to oneself (EM, 24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment 2.</td>
<td>In proportion as a person thinks scientifically he knows that his statements are answers to questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note 1.</td>
<td>A question is logically prior to its own answer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment 3.</td>
<td>A question is also temporally prior if thinking is scientific, but the temporal priority is such that the question does not cease to be a question when the answer begins, but continues for the whole duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment 4.</td>
<td>An answered question does not cease being a question; it only ceases being an unanswered question. (EM, 24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition 1.</td>
<td>Let that which is stated (i.e. that which can be true or false) be called a proposition, and let stating it be called propounding it (EM, 25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note 2.</td>
<td>The use of the word &quot;proposition&quot; is exclusively limited to that which is stated, and &quot;propounding&quot; only for proposition. This is not ordinary usage, which would allow also that a supposition or question be propounded as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 2.</td>
<td>Every question involves a presupposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment 5.</td>
<td>Any given question directly or immediately involves only one presupposition, that being the presupposition from which it arises. Indirectly it may involve more than one. (EM, 25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment 6.</td>
<td>The answer to any question presupposes whatever the question presupposes (EM, 63).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Definition 2. To say that a question "does not arise" is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made (EM, 26).

Comment 7. One can make presuppositions without knowing it, or without knowing what presupposition one is making ((cf. comments 2 and 5)).

Definition 3. The fact that something causes a certain question to arise I call the "logical efficacy" of that thing (EM, 27).

Definition 4. To assume is to suppose by an act of free choice.

Comment 8. All assumptions are suppositions, but not all suppositions are assumptions.¹

Comment 9. Some suppositions are made without being aware that they are made, or without being aware that others might possibly be made. (EM, 27).

Proposition 3. The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed (EM, 28).

Comment 10. In scientific thinking it is possible and often profitable to argue from suppositions which we know to be false, believe to be false, or neither know nor believe to be false or true (EM, 28).

Proposition 4. A presupposition is either relative or absolute (EM, 29).

¹Collingwood does not further define "assumption" and "supposition," but from his remarks it appears that "suppositions" are presuppositions (and may therefore be either absolute or relative), and that "assumptions" are presuppositions of which we are conscious. Since we are not always conscious of our presuppositions (Definition 4 and Comment 9), it follows that not all suppositions are assumptions.
Definition 5. By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition, and relatively to another question as its answer (EM, 29).

Comment 11. To question a presupposition is to demand that it should be verified; that is, to demand that a question should be asked to which the affirmative answer would be that presupposition itself, now in the form of a proposition. Hence to speak of verifying a presupposition involves supposing that it is a relative presupposition (EM, 30).

Definition 6. An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer (EM, 31).

Comment 12. Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable (EM, 32).

Comment 13. The use of absolute presuppositions in science is their logical efficacy; it does not depend on their being true or false, but only on their being supposed.

Proposition 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

Comment 14. That is because they are never answers to questions.

Comment 15. The distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions (EM, 32).

Comment 16. Any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition is a nonsense question. This includes such questions as "Is it true?" or "What evidence is there that it is true?" (EM, 33).
Now even though, incredibly enough, Collingwood does not here define the terms "questions," and "presupposition," and although the term "hypothesis" does not appear in this outline, it is nonetheless clear that since an hypothesis is a supposition consciously made within a given inquiry, we may take it that an hypothesis is what Collingwood is calling an assumption. With the distinction between questions and assumptions made explicit, the ambiguity from Speculum Mentis concerning questions and hypotheses as non-assertions disappears.

But we are also confronted with a new problem insofar as there are several noteworthy differences between the two versions of Q-A logic, i.e. that offered by the Autobiography and by the Essay on Metaphysics (which we shall hereafter refer to as Q-AA and Q-AM respectively). (1) We notice that Q-AA stressed the fact that Q-A logic differed from propositional logic inasmuch as it took the Q-A complex as the unit of meaning, truth, and validity, rather than recognizing these to be properties of propositions as such (see above, Table 3 nos. 2, 3, and 4). In Table 9 we notice there is no mention of meaning or validity, and truth or falsity is taken as the defining characteristic of propositions as such (Def. 1).

2 We assume that from the point of view of scientific inquiry the notion of an unconscious hypothesis would not be acceptable, since one could never know when the conditions for a satisfactory demonstration of it were fulfilled. Cf. Table 9, Comment 2.
(2) The strict Q-A correlativity of Q-A_A is here universalized and stated in terms of persons (Proposition 1). (3) In connection with the function of presuppositions in "raising" questions, which is never defined in Q-A_A, Collingwood here introduces the notion of "logical efficacy," or the property of "something" (e.g. suppositions) which "causes" questions to arise (Definition 3, Proposition 3).

At first these differences seem innocuous enough. The first falls back on the ancient tradition dating back to Plato, that the minimal unit of truth or falsity is the proposition or declarative sentence. The second states the Q-A_A requirement of correlativity in terms of persons engaged in acts of questioning and answering. And the third specifies the priority relationship of presuppositions to questions and answers. The omission of the requirement that meaning and validity hold only for Q-A complexes and not for propositions by themselves might also be written off as a mere oversight of Q-A_M. But honesty requires us to admit that there are actually major problems involved in these differences between Q-A_A and Q-A_M, problems noticed (and sometimes exploited) by many of Collingwood's interpreters. For if truth or falsity is proper to propositions as such, how are we to understand the related truth-value of questions and presuppositions, not to mention the Q-A_A assertion that truth and falsity do not belong to propositions as such? And if Q-A correlativity is defined in
terms of persons, how can Q-A logic escape the charge of psychologism, which is offensive to logicians precisely because it is necessarily rooted in the subjective processes of consciousness? And how can one decide which presupposition "causes" a question to arise within such subjective states of consciousness?

Since these difficulties all turn in one way or another on the Q-A assertion of the priority of the Q-A complex over the proposition as the unit of meaning, truth, and validity, a priority inadvertently called into question by Q-AM, we shall examine each of these logical functions in turn. If the Q-A claim cannot be upheld, we shall have to ask whether Q-AM is sufficient correction of his earlier view to sustain the Q-A claim for Q-A logic as an alternative to traditional F-logic.

(1) Let us examine first the claim of the Autobiography for a Q-A meaning-priority over the meaning of a proposition as such. In Q-A Collingwood insisted that (a) in order to find out what a proposition means the question to which the proposition is an answer must be known; and also (b) since each answer is to a certain specific question in the systematic inquiry, it is possible using the same piece of evidence (presumably the textual assertion) to argue back from a propositional answer to its question (see Table 3, nos. 4 a-d, 6 a-b). But these two requirements seem impossible to fulfill, since it is difficult to see how one can ever know to which
question an answer belongs, and hence which presupposition-question (P-Q) complex is specifically prior to it, unless one had independent and prior knowledge of the meaning of the propositional answer (cf. Mink, MHD, 128). Supposing the assertion is "Eric is going to Elgin"; how is one to decide whether this assertion belongs to the question, "Where is Eric going?" or to the question "Is the moon more or less than $10^6$ kilometers distant from the earth?" Without knowing that the proposition about Eric has no evident meaning-correlation with a question concerning the distance between planetary bodies, the answer appears unassignable to one question or P-Q complex rather than another.

Collingwood might well reply that the Q-A complex we are discussing is an absurd example, because it does not meet the requirements (a) that they belong to the same systematic inquiry, and (b) that a question must be relevant to that inquiry. Therefore a question cannot be fished out of a "hyperuranian lucky bag" and stuck together with an utterly unrelated question. But absurdity is what we use as an index for the passage into incoherence, and we wish to know how Collingwood's Q-A logic prevents us from such a lapse. On his grounds such a lapse appears not only possible but inevitable, since we do not have any criteria for deciding what constitutes "sameness of inquiry." But even laying aside this important omission, if we take the case of a recognizably syste-
matic inquiry (and in so doing tacitly import requirements not specified by Collingwood), similar objections arise. Supposing the inquiry is legal, and we are trying to find out what the question was that is Q-A related, to an assertion—a slip of paper bearing the words, "Eric is going to Elgin." Is this the answer to the question, "Where is Eric going?" or "Who is going to Elgin?" or "Is anyone going to Elgin?" It appears that in even a fairly simple case with directly related questions and answers, an answer may retain its meaning while being Q-A related in several Q-A complexes. In short, it appears that the meaning of a proposition may be Q-A complex independent.

Obviously one of the other of the two Q-A\textsubscript{A} requirements must be abandoned, and since we wish to retain the notion of a systematic inquiry for Q-A\textsubscript{M}, but not necessarily the meaning requirement, it may be necessary to drop the latter and declare Q-A\textsubscript{M} to be an improved revision. If we adopted this conclusion we evade the viciously circular argument that "we cannot know what a statement means unless we know what question it answers, but we cannot decide which question it answers unless we know what it means" (Mink, MHD, 128). But we do not yet know if there is some special sense of the highly ambiguous term, "meaning" which Collingwood may have in mind, and which may escape such objections as these.
(2) But there is a second logical function attributed to the Q-A complex in the Q-A_A version, but not appearing in Q-A_M--i.e. validity. According to the Autobiography, "no two propositions can agree with or be contradictory to one another unless they are answers to the same question" (Table 3, 3). Again, even setting aside the issue of how one establishes which question corresponds to a given answer, it appears to fail to meet objections on the grounds of fairly straightforward examples. In our example from the previous section the contradictory of "Eric is going to Elgin" would be, on propositional grounds alone, "Eric is not going to Elgin," and it is capable of being constructed without any reference to a common question, whatever that might be. What is worse, we can say that these propositions are contradictory even though they may be answers to different and even opposing questions: the first may be an answer to "Is Eric going to Elgin?" and the latter to "Is Eric not going to Elgin?" They are obviously not the same question, yet they are contradictory answers (cf. Krausz, CEPC, 225). Furthermore, as we saw in the example from the previous section, one and the same answer may be the answer to several different questions, without losing its identity, i.e. its agreement with itself. It would appear, therefore, that validity and such validity relations as agreement or contradiction are also Q-A context independent.
With this line of argument Collingwood would be even less tolerant than the former. The sense of sameness he is talking about, he would reply, is not that of an abstract class or universal, or even of propositions constructed on these grounds. "Sameness of question" is determined on the basis of sameness of an historical process, the process of a concrete inquiry, where the researcher holds before his mind a question the central meaning of which is continually being modified in the light of new data or partial answers to it (cf. Table 3, 3 a-b).

Since this reply borders on the relationship of Q-A and D-logic, we shall have to postpone a more satisfactory consideration of it until we have had a chance to examine the latter more closely (which we shall do in the next section). But we may note here that it still fails to meet the objection. From the point of view of the F-logic that Q-A logic is supposed to replace, it is inadequate: F-logic makes the claim that in the case of certain propositions it is possible to decide on their validity on structural or syntactic grounds alone, i.e. on the placement and grouping of their logical constants, irrespective of its location in a Q-A complex or of the specific meaning of its terms. The assertion, "Eric is going to Elgin and it is not the case that Eric is going to Elgin" is invalid on formal grounds alone, because there is a self-contradiction involved in the statement. Such
a self-contradiction would even render a question invalid, insofar as questions of the form, "What is the A such that A and not-A?" can have no valid answer for any possible substitution for A in the question. And if Collingwood were to point out that this is what he meant when he said that a question is "right" if it enables the inquiry to proceed (Table 3 4 c), we should have to reply that a contradictory answer stops the inquiry from proceeding not because it is the "wrong" answer but because it is self-contradictory, which it would be no matter which Q-A complex it appeared in.

Perhaps we are flogging a dead horse, insofar as there is no mention of contradiction or validity relations in Q-AM. But then what sort of logical relations are there between propositions, questions, and presuppositions? We shall take this up again when we examine the consistency claims for Q-A logic. However, we have one further logical function of Q-A complexes to attend to, one which appears in both Q-AA and Q-AM.

(3) Although Collingwood states in Q-AM that the proposition is that which can be true or false (Table 9, Definition 1), he also states that every proposition is an answer to a question (Table 9, Proposition 1), so that it appears that he wishes to retain the Q-AA requirement of strict Q-A correlativity with respect to truth claims (Table 3, 4). While it is true that Q-AM does not explicitly state that the presence of a question (with or without its presupposition) is
a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of propositional answer in a P-Q-A complex, this was clearly his intention in Q-\( A_A \), so we wish to examine the sense in which a proposition is dependent for its truth on the P-Q complex antecedent to it. Now in both Q-\( A_A \) and Q-\( A_M \) Collingwood specifically states that the presupposition of a Q-A complex need not be true, but only supposed; and he never suggests that questions by themselves have any assignable truth value aside from their answers or presuppositions, so that it is not unreasonable to assume that questions are neutral with respect to truth or falsity. But then if both questions and presuppositions need not have any assignable truth value, from whence comes the truth or falsity of the answer?

Collingwood would no doubt reply that he never said that an answer is deducible from a question and its presupposition; in fact he would say that its not being deducible is essential to the relationship of presupposition. If there were no need for inquiry, then there would be no need for presuppositions, since questions would not "arise" and propositions could simply be deduced from one another as in a purely formal system. Collingwood is speaking of the sort of inquiry which is not closed or complete with respect to propositions and their relations. He is discussing on-going inquiries in which discoveries are being made, real questions are arising, answers are being verified in ways appropriate to the
systematic inquiry at hand, and assumptions are being called for as an aid to deciding alternative answers to questions.

But then the truth value of a propositional answer is being decided by verificational processes outside the Q-A complex itself, and we are faced with the alternative of adding a further requirement to the truth claim for the Q-A complex (i.e. that a Q-A complex is true or false only if the answer is verifiable or falsifiability), or dropping the claim altogether (i.e. that the truth or falsity of a proposition is dependent on its being an element in a Q-A or P-Q-A complex). But in either case it appears that truth is something that is Q-A complex independent. In our previous example, if "Eric is going to Elgin" is true only if Eric is indeed going to Elgin and false if he is not, this appears to be the case whether or not "Eric is going to Elgin" belongs to the question, "Where is Eric going?" or "Who is going to Elgin?" Unless Collingwood has some special sense in mind for the term "truth," we are forced to admit that even this requirement fails to hold for even a simple example.

But perhaps we have disproven too much. There is certainly some sort of logical connection between a proposition and its presupposition, and there is also a logical relation between a question and its presupposition. And we can say that a proposition that is a valid answer to a question presupposes whatever the question presupposes, so that there is
some sense in which answer, question, and presupposition form a logical complex. But it appears that in attempting to sort out the logical relations of the terms of this complex Collingwood conflated a number of distinct characteristics of linguistic entities—viz. meaning, truth, and validity—and then assigned them all to the Q-A complex. But (1) meaning is a linguistic function that applies minimally to terms (individual words, or phrases and propositions regarded precisely as terms, and capable of being used as the subject of an assertion—e.g. of the form, "A means B"); (2) truth is a function minimally applicable to propositions (whatever says something (a predicate) about something else (a subject)); and (3) validity is a function of complexes of propositions bound together by logical connectives. On the face of it, it appears unlikely that anything like a Q-A or P-Q-A complex can satisfy logically appropriate conditions for being the minimal unit for all three of these functions.

However it also seems unlikely that an Oxford professor of philosophy, respected enough to be named to the distinguished chair of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics, would be wholly ignorant of such an elementary logical distinction. We therefore suspect that something has escaped our notice. Perhaps Collingwood does have a special usage in mind for each of these functions (meaning, truth, and validity), so that they may after all escape some of these objections. Pursuing
this lead will take us into a discussion of Collingwood's views on language and intellectual consciousness, which will occupy us in section 4 of this chapter, immediately following our analysis (in section 3) of his Essay on Philosophical Method, the distinctions of which are required to make sense of his definitions both of language and of mind (i.e. definition by means of what he calls a "scale of forms").

But we have one last claim for Q-A logic to attend to before pursuing this line of inquiry. According to the Autobiography, Q-A logic is supposed to be an alternative to propositional F-logic, which he says it replaces. Minimally this must mean that it can do the same things that F-logic does, and satisfy the claims that F-logic makes for itself. And there is much to recommend a direct parallel between Q-A and F-logic. If we wish to understand what sort of logical relations are involved in P-Q-A complexes we must begin by assuming that it is a function more akin to validity than to truth or meaning, since it involves a relationship between elements that are on a level with propositions rather than with terms, and it relates these elements within a complex which resembles a group of propositions linked by logical connectives. Secondly one can say that there are certain truth-functional relationships that exist between the elements of a P-Q-A complex, although it is not straight-forwardly one of entail-
ment: \(^3\) questions alone nor questions with their presuppositions nor presuppositions alone do not entail their answers, even though a propositional answer alone can be shown to entail certain presuppositions (e.g. (a) "There is a noon train to Elgin," and (b) "Who is taking the noon train to Elgin?"; but (c) does entail (a)). \(^4\) Similarly within a P-Q-A complex one can say there are certain logical relationships that exist between the question and the other elements: for example that if a propositional answer and one of its direct presuppositions are known, a valid question can be reconstructed and in-

\(^3\) What the exact truth-functional relationship is between a proposition and its presupposition has been a matter of lively contemporary debate into which we shall not enter here. But we may note in passing that most of the contending definitions of presupposing take into account the difference between presupposition and entailment. For a good discussion of the subject and an excellent bibliography, see Nuel D. Belnap and Thomas B. Steel, \textit{The Logic of Questions and Answers} (New Haven, 1976).

\(^4\) Cf. P. F. Strawson, \textit{Introduction to Logical Theory} (London, 1952), pp. 174-75: "If a statement \(S\) presupposes a statement \(S'\) in the sense that the truth of \(S'\) is a precondition of the truth-or-falsity of \(S\), then of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining \(S\) with the denial of \(S'\). . . . But we must distinguish this kind of logical absurdity from straight-forward self-contradiction. It is self-contradictory to conjoin \(S\) with the denial of \(S'\) if \(S'\) is a necessary condition of the truth, simply, of \(S\). It is a different kind of logical absurdity to conjoin \(S\) with the denial of \(S'\) if \(S'\) is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of \(S\). The relation between \(S\) and \(S'\) in the first case is that \(S\) entails \(S'\). We need a different name for the relation between \(S\) and \(S'\) in the second case; let us say, as above, that \(S\) presupposes \(S'\)." Notice that Strawson's definition holds directly between statements or propositions, and does not involve questions at all. Cf. note 5, below.
terposed between them (in our above example, (b) is constructible directly from (c) and (a)—assuming that we know that (c) is an answer to a question, and that (a) is a common presupposition to both the question and its answer); that from a propositional answer and an appropriate question one or more presuppositions can be constructed; that from a question and its presupposition(s) the range of alternative possible answers is limited; etc.⁵ And finally, one can say that the terms used in any given P-Q-A complex cannot be used with shifting meanings without destroying the sense (and consequently the logical relations) of the P-Q-A complex itself (in our above example question (b) and answer (a) are compatible with presupposition (a') "There are no passengers on the noon train to Elgin," only if "taking the train" in (b) means "driving the train," and Eric is an engineer; otherwise a P-Q-A complex consisting of (a')-(b)-(c) would involve a self-contradiction, and therefore would be nonsensical).

⁵ Cf. P. T. Geach, Logic Matters (Berkeley, 1972), p. 82: "I say that P presupposes Q when, if Q is not true of an object x, the question does not arise whether or not we ought to predicate P of x, and thus neither P nor its negation is true of x . . . . This relation of presupposition is quite different from entailment . . . ." Cf. also Belnap and Steel, p. 113: "A question, q, presupposes a statement, A, if and only if the truth of A is a logically necessary condition for there being some true answer to q. Evidently it is a consequence of this definition that A is a presupposition of q, if and only if every direct answer to q logically implies A." Both of these definitions introduce the notion of a question directly into the definition of presupposition, in contrast to Strawson (above, note 4).
Thus it is not difficult to show that there are specificable logical relations involved in Q-A logic with its distinctive P-Q-A complexes; and we can also say with some confidence that meaning, truth, and validity do have a bearing on these P-Q-A complexes, inasmuch as they require an identity of meaning of their terms, have truth-functional relationships between the elements of the complex, and validity or entailment relationships between propositional answers and their presuppositions. But this seems to reverse what Collingwood was trying to say about Q-A logic (at least in Q-A$$^A$$): instead of Q-A complexes determining the meaning, truth, and validity of propositions, it appears that all three are established independently of those complexes, and have a logical priority over them. Without some sort of deductive inference structure how could one decide whether a question legitimately arises from a given presupposition, and consequently what counts for a real answer in a P-Q-A complex? And without some means of establishing the semantic identity of the terms, we have no way, within Q-A logic, to determine the limited range of answers and/or presuppositions allowable for a given question. It appears, therefore, that far from being an alternative to F-logic, Q-A logic presupposes it.

But the final blow to the thesis that Q-A and F-logic are alternative logics is that Q-A logic fails to meet the claims of consistency, completeness, and formality that F-logic
not only claims but demonstrates for itself—at least for the sort of axiomatic F-logic with which Collingwood was familiar.  

Now in some respects Q-A logic as Collingwood discusses it has the appearance of a formal system: it states some criteria for what counts as an element within that system (questions, answers, presuppositions—although as we noted, questions and presuppositions are never defined), as well as how they are to be introduced or eliminated (assumptions are made by acts of free choice, questions arise in accordance with the logical efficacy of a presupposition, questions are eliminated if their presuppositions are not made, or if they are raised with respect to absolute presuppositions, etc.). But this appearance of system breaks down when it is examined more closely for its consistency, completeness and formality.

(1) Concerning consistency we have perhaps already said more than enough. In summary we may note that if it is possible in some cases (i.e. complex propositions bound by logical connectives) to decide on the truth or falsity of a proposition on formal grounds alone, without knowing anything about the question which it answers, or without requiring that the variables within a proposition be specified semanti-

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cally, then it seems not only that the Q-\( A_A \) contention that meaning, truth, and validity are properties not of propositions alone but of Q-A (or perhaps P-Q-A) complexes is false, but so also is the Q-\( A_M \) assertion that some presuppositions (viz. absolute presuppositions) cannot be true or false because they are not (or cannot be) answers to questions. On formal grounds alone we may argue that any assertion is false if it contains a formal contradiction.

In the sequel we may find that Collingwood might have meant that the question of formal coherence belongs to a different systematic inquiry (i.e. part of a Q-A system where the questions raised are precisely about the coherence of statements). But we may still observe that formal questions cannot ever be irrelevant in any systematic inquiry to which Q-A logic is applicable: insofar as an inquiry is systematic (or claims to be so) its coherence is presumed.

(2) Concerning completeness, we must ask, first of all, what is the full set of expressions of which questions, answers, and presuppositions are members? Collingwood says that they are the elements of a systematic inquiry, but that is hardly enough: a systematic inquiry may also involve digging in the earth or flying to the moon, but these activities are not part of a P-Q-A complex. The elements of such a com-

\[7\] Bochenski, p. 33; cf. IH, 253.
plex obviously belong to a set of expressions in a language of some sort, a set at once broader than that of F-logic (because F-logic is ordinarily confined to the set of all propositions that can be true or false, whereas Q-A logic includes questions and presuppositions, which are not propositions nor proposition-fragments and yet have logical functions), and narrower than it (because Q-A logic is only concerned with those P-Q-A complexes that are part of a systematic inquiry, and not the set of all possible propositions, whether they are part of such an inquiry or not). Furthermore it can only include the set of all meaningful expressions in a systematic inquiry, since presuppositions and questions, while truth-value neutral, are nonetheless bearers of meaning at the level of complexity of a statement (to be a presupposition, for example, a statement need not be true or false, but it must be intelligible--i.e. a well-formed grammatical sentence).

It is not just a matter of having a group name for these elements of Q-A logic, it is a matter of deciding (or having grounds for deciding) what counts for a well-constructed formula (a meaningful expression) in it and ruling out all expressions that are not. It is clear that Collingwood has some such criteria in mind, because he indicates that not just any combination of terms with a question mark at the end could count as a question (cf. Table 3, 4 a), nor can any arbitrary
grouping of words count as a supposition or proposition just because it ends with a period. Candidates for membership in Q-A logic are evidently grammatically sound and formally coherent questions and assertions in a language of some sort, presumably the language accepted and employed by the inquiry in progress. But this means that Q-A logic relies on extrinsic factors for what counts for a candidate for membership in the Q-A system, and we must presume such grammatical and formal criteria as essential to it. If Collingwood presupposes all these rules in the construction of his Q-A logic, how can we concur with his suggestion in the Autobiography that Q-A logic was intended as an alternative to F-logic, or that in logic he was a revolutionary?

If there is anything revolutionary in his Q-A logic it is not that it supplants grammar and formal logic, but rather that, if anything, it extends them or adds something to them in their application within organized inquiry or knowledge-acquisition, something essential that was ignored in the reduction of knowledge to a set of propositions which merely conform to the rules of grammar and logic. (In section 4 of this chapter we shall take this matter up again in connection with Collingwood's discussion of language and logic in The Principles of Art.)

(3) Finally, concerning formality, it is clear from the very first proposition of Q-AM that Q-A logic is not stay-
ing within the bounds of a formal system: Proposition 1 appears to be stating a matter of psychological rather than purely logical fact. If proposition 1 had read: "From every statement a question can be constructed," it might have generated some interesting formal problems—e.g. what the interrogative function entails for propositions cast into this mode; how they might function in relation to declarative propositions of various sorts; etc. But instead Collingwood says that "every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question," where personal agency is brought into what might otherwise be a purely logical analysis of the relationship between questions and answers. Since the thrust of 20th century logic is precisely in the opposite, non-psychologistic direction it is clear that this way of stating the relationship of question and answer would not be regarded by formal logicians as acceptable.

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9 Even sympathetic critics have taken offence at this approach: see J. F. Post, "A Defense of Collingwood's Theory of Presuppositions," Inquiry, VIII (1965), pp. 332-54: "The reader is first struck by the psychologism of what purports to be a purely logical investigation . . . . The psychologism runs throughout" (p. 333). Post sets out to eliminate the formal absurdities from Collingwood's theory of presuppositions, as does Krausz in his article for the book of critical essays on Collingwood which he edited: see CEPC, 222-40. The reconstructions by both Post and Krausz are admirable, but fail to take into account what Collingwood had in mind for Q-A logic. He gave no indication that he ever intended it to be reducible to, or incorporatable into, a formal system of logic. A formal "erotetic logic" treats questions just as
But aside from this there is still a question of whether Proposition 1 (and notice that it is called a proposition rather than a definition) is factually true. Is it reasonable to assume that every statement that is ever made by anyone is made in answer to a question? What about commands, warnings, and exclamations; petitions filed in court; classroom lectures, declarations of religious faith, sentences read during a filibuster in Congress, etc. (cf. Mink, MHD, 127-28)? But even aside from exceptions, we are certainly not aware that this is always the case. Collingwood's assurance that this priority of questions is purely logical (Table 9, Note 1) may soften the claim a bit, but it does not render it any less uncertain. If a question is logically prior to its answer, how are we to understand this priority? Collingwood discusses it in terms of causality, since a question arises as a result of the causal operation of what he calls the "logical efficacy" of a supposition (Table 9, Definition 3). Even if we could set aside our hesitation to accept something like an efficient cause operating at the logical level of thought, we are still left wondering about formal logic treats propositions—as so many finished products. It is not concerned with the process of asking questions, but only with the formal properties of questions once they are already asked. But Collingwood was interested precisely in the process of ongoing inquiry, where questions are arising; he insisted that the process was completely reducible neither to psychological feeling states nor to the rules of formal logic, and yet had a "logic" or rationality of its own.
the priority of questions to answers. If it is a priority in thought we wish to know why it is not merely carried away in the stream of immediate consciousness, or why it is not "merely psychological" or subjective (cf. IH, 292). What is the objective dimension to a question--i.e. that aspect of it which is not carried away in the stream of subjective consciousness? Is it not merely subjective and hence merely psychological unless one can also specify this objective component?

This is where the formalist would press him hardest for an answer, and it is difficult to see how he would reply. Every time Collingwood uses the term "logical" to describe the priority of Q-A complexes, or of presuppositions to questions, or of questions to answers, he is tacitly appealing to criteria which he simultaneously appears to dismiss--i.e. to the objective aspect wherein the relationship does not depend on mere co-location in subjective consciousness. Without such objective criteria we could hardly know what assumptions were uniquely efficacious in causing a certain question to arise, since in our subjective consciousness we are seldom aware of what all the assumptions are that we are making relevant to a given situation. But to say that anyone employing Q-A logic is bound by the relationships he is describing is to say that the rules of Q-A logic hold independently of subjective thought-contexts, and are binding directly on the related ele-
ments of the P-Q-A complex. Without such an objective specification Collingwood's Q-A logic is open to the sort of criticism that one of his sympathetic critics leveled at him: "Collingwood says that 'every thought we find ourselves thinking is the answer to a question' ((EM, 36)). Surely every presupposition, whether it is an AP ((absolute presupposition)) or not, may be a thought we find ourselves thinking. Hence every presupposition may be the answer to a question, and it seems that there can be no AP's. Short of radical revision of the whole chapter, there is no way out of this contradiction."10

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From the foregoing it is clear that on the face of it there are serious difficulties with Q-A logic either in the Q-\( A_A \) or Q-\( A_M \) versions. The P-Q-A complex does not succeed in standing up to the autobiographical claim that it is the unit of meaning, truth, and validity, nor does Q-A logic meet the criteria of consistency, completeness, and formality required of it if it is to serve as an alternative to F-logic. Unless we can find mitigating arguments in the later writings to re-

10 Post, "A Defense of Collingwood's Theory of Presuppositions," p. 336. Post also raises an interesting objection to the suggestion that there is a class of assertions (absolute presuppositions) which have no truth value: "A sentence with no truth value would be implied by every statement, since there would be no way for the latter to be true and the former to be false" (ibid.).
concile some of the more glaring of these difficulties we shall find it impossible to uphold the *Autobiography* on this issue: it fails to be coherent on its own much less as an interpretation of anything else.

But perhaps misled by Collingwood's autobiographical claim that Q-A logic is to be understood as an alternative to replace F-logic, we have been asking the wrong questions about Q-A logic, expecting something more of its explicit performance than its implicit promise is capable of delivering. Rather than being a substitute for F-logic, suppose Q-A logic is regarded as complementary to it, perhaps even tacitly presupposing it? Suppose it addresses not a body of determinate propositions but rather a somewhat indeterminate situation from which definite propositions are to be extracted? In such a situation knowledge would be something yet to be achieved, and the asking of questions based on presuppositions (which may state the basic structural framework or relevant features of the situation within which such knowledge is to be determined) would be one of the means that bring determinacy to it. Questions would therefore be one of the signs of the difference which knowing introduces within the knower-known situation, signifying the presence of consciousness or awareness at the linguistic plane of knowledge. And the P-Q complexes would therefore have a *heuristic* priority.
not reducible to, but presupposing, F-logic and its relevant requirements within inquiry. 11

But if we try to interpret Collingwood's Q-A logic in strictly formal terms we are committed to ruling out any "psychologisms" that may appear in it, which threatens to gut the theory as Collingwood proposes it: he would not ultimately warrant the requirement of an F-logic which would call for the elimination of the personal dimension to inquiry precisely because that is what he claims all knowledge is for--i.e. self-knowledge. Therefore it is clear that just as in Speculum Mentis he had argued against the abstract universal, so too he presents Q-A logic as the thought of an agent employed in the acquisition of knowledge. The combined weight of the evidence we have considered thus far indicates that Collingwood would refuse to give up this requirement.

But then this involves using terms like "question," "answer," and "presupposition" and even "meaning" and "truth," in something other than a univocal, F-logical way. They may not be the merely formal entities they appear to be, but rather they may include in their meanings a reference to their entertainment within a personal consciousness. They may be, in short, epistemological entities rather than merely or purely logical ones, and as epistemological entities they

must be regarded as displaying the properties of mental ac-
tivities better expressed by the use of verb-forms rather
than noun forms: questioning, propounding, answering, pre-
supposing, etc.--the very forms that Collingwood prefers to
use.

In the next section we shall explore the requirements
that Collingwood finds necessary for dealing with the struc-
ture of concepts of this sort--concepts that we have already
witnessed him calling "dialectical."

3. Dialectical Logic and Philosophical Methodology.

The one work in which Collingwood makes the sort of
distinctions required for a logic that can serve as an al-
ternative to traditional F-logic is in the Essay on Philoso-
phical Method--a work which in his autobiographical self-
estimate he called "my best book in matter; in style, I may
call it my only book, for it is the only one I ever had the
time to finish as well as I know how" (A, 118). In the Essay
the subject matter (philosophical logic or methodology) is
distributed in a manner which corresponds to the traditional
(Aristotelian) division of logic into terms, judgments, and
inferences. Chapters II-IV deal with terms--philosophical
concepts or universals (the overlap of classes, the scale of
forms, and definition and description). These chapters also
discuss classification and division, but not extensionality
or the distinction between the denotation and connotation of terms. Chapters V and VI deal with the quantity and quality of judgments, but say nothing directly about predication, the distribution of terms, or the analytic-synthetic distinction. Chapter VIII deals with deductive and inductive inference, but not with the modes of valid or invalid deductive inference. And Chapter IX even discusses the systematic claims of completeness and consistency, but says nothing about formality (cf. Mink, MHD, 61-62). It would therefore appear that if we are ever to find a clue for understanding Collingwood's view of "logic" it would be in this work.

However we have already had occasion to note that there are formidable problems in trying to ascertain what the standpoint of the Essay is, or how the reader is supposed to take its substantive remarks about non-philosophical methods or even non-methodological philosophical issues. We may recall from that discussion that in the Essay he states that (a) the manner in which non-philosophical concepts, judgments, and forms of reasoning are characterized is not meant to say anything explicitly about mathematical or empirical science, but is rather only meant to contrast methods commonly thought to be employed by these modes of thought and mistakenly applied to philosophical subjects (EPM, 9, 151); and (b) he confesses in the final chapter that his initial agreement with the reader to treat as an hypothesis the assumption
that philosophical concepts have a peculiar logical structure, has been violated throughout by appeal to philosophical experience (EPM, 222-23). In the context of our present discussion these two difficulties put obstacles in our path to understanding Collingwood's views on logic. The first renders suspect any interpretation of the Essay which takes as literally true its remarks on subjects other than philosophy; and the second raises the issue of the circularity of the argument of the Essay insofar as the defining characteristics he proposes as applying to philosophy itself are first advanced hypothetically and then "proven" categorically by appeal to the experience of philosophers. We might get around the first obstacle by pointing out that the Essay itself argues that logic is a part of philosophy, and "what philosophy is" is the very subject of the book (EPH, 2-3, 7). But this is further complicated by the fact that Collingwood states that he will not discuss the implications of the Essay for metaphysics, logic, or the theory of knowledge (EPM, 7-8) -- a promise which is also violated throughout, e.g. by his discussion of the ontological argument and the subject matter of metaphysics in the sixth chapter, by his discussion of philosophy as a branch of literature in the tenth, as well as his use of examples from epistemology, logic, and ethics throughout the book.

Until we have had a chance to survey the key concepts
and the central argument of the *Essay* we cannot resolve these difficulties of the standpoint of the *Essay*. But from even a superficial reading of the introductory chapter one can draw several conclusions about how Collingwood intended the *Essay* to be taken. (1) The *Essay* is concerned with discussing the nature of philosophy as an activity of thought, exemplified as philosophical experience and expressed on certain occasions in characteristic or typical ways (EPM, 2-3, 7); (2) Concerning this activity certain generalizations are possible which are capable of serving as ideal principles of method, and to which we are bound when we are trying to think philosophically (EPM, 3-4). (3) The strategy of discussing is basically Kantian in the sense that (a) certain "facts" (or experiences) are brought to our attention, (b) and then described and analyzed by comparing them with similar examples from non-philosophical (or pre-philosophical) equivalents, (c) the comparison exhibiting a peculiar but typical structure to philosophical concepts, judgments, and forms of reasoning, (d) which is only possible under certain necessary conditions (EPM, 3-4, 222-23). At the very least, then, we are entitled to say that Collingwood's overriding concern in the *Essay* is to say something that is true for a certain kind of thought, namely philosophy. This will have to suffice as a provisional sense of the standpoint of the *Essay* until we examine the issue of its argumentative circularity.
As usual we will begin with a brief outline of the key concepts and conclusions of the Essay before proceeding to a discussion of them and an analysis of the main line of argument in the Essay.
1. The overlap of classes: the concepts or universals of philosophy are exemplified in overlapping classes instead of mutually exclusive classes. A universal concept is one which unites a number of different instances in a class—either a plurality of individual instances in a general concept or a plurality of specific differentiations into a generic concept. The overlap of species of a philosophical genus consists in the inclusion of part of the meaning of one of the concepts in the meaning of another (i.e. it is a relation of intension between concepts rather than a relation of extension between classes). Alternative ways of stating the overlap are: (a) two or more specifically differing concepts may be exemplified in the same in the same instances (i.e. they may be conceptually different but instantially the same), so that any distinction in philosophy may be a distinction in concepts without a difference in instances; and (b) Aristotle's formula for the overlap, i.e. that two concepts may be the same but their being is not the same (being an instance of the one is not the same as being an instance of the other). (EPM, 27, 31, 40, 50, 91). Ignoring the first rule of philosophical method (i.e. that the specific classes of a philosophical concept are always liable to overlap) leads to three related fallacies:

a. The fallacy of false disjunction (ffd) states that when a generic concept is divided into its species there is a corresponding division of its instances into mutually exclusive classes.

b. The fallacy of precarious margins (the positive application of the ffd) states that if there is a distinction between two concepts there must be a difference between their instances (or, the margins between species of a philosophical genus can be trusted not to spread to include all the instances of co-ordinate species).

c. The fallacy of identified coincidents (the negative application of the ffd) states that where there is no difference in the extension of two concepts, there is no distinction between the concepts themselves. (EPM, 48-50).
2. The scale of forms: the specification of a philosophical genus (or concept) is such that its species differ from one another both in degree and in kind, and are related to one another both by opposition and by distinction. They therefore constitute a scale of overlapping forms in which (a) whenever the variable increases or decreases, certain critical points on the scale are reached at which one specific form disappears and is replaced by another; (b) the variable of each species (its specific difference) is identified with the generic essence; (c) every species is a realization of the genus (there is no zero-point to the scale where the generic essence is altogether absent, but rather it starts with unity as the minimum realization of the genus); and (d) any point on the scale sums up (or intensionally includes) the whole scale from the minimum specification to that point. The scale of forms explains the overlap of classes (i.e. shows how it is possible) insofar as successive species of a philosophical genus intensionally include the positive content (or meshing) of all the forms preceding it in the scale. (EPM, 56-60, 81, 89, 91). Ignoring the second rule of philosophical method (i.e. that the specification of a philosophical concept constitutes a scale of forms) leads to several related fallacies, all arising from the ffd applied to differences of degree and kind and relations of opposition and distinction:

a. The fallacy of calculation assumes that because there are differences of degree in philosophical concepts they are susceptible of measurement and calculation (i.e. that they are differences of degree only and not also differences of kind).

b. The fallacy of indifference assumes that because the species of a philosophical genus differ in kind, they exhibit no differences of degree.

c. The fallacy of the false positive assumes that where terms are related in a philosophical series the relation is not of opposition but of mere distinction (so that it makes positive terms out of negative ones).

d. The fallacy of null opposition asserts that the terms related in a philosophical series are opposites but not distincts (so that the negation of positive terms have no actuality). (EPM, 80-81, 85-86).

3. Philosophical definition: the definition of a philosophical concept is by means of a scale of forms, beginning with a rudimentary minimum definition (the generic es-
sence) and adding qualitatively new determinations which gradually alter the original definition and improve it as a statement of the concept's essence. Philosophical definitions are descriptive (i.e. they aim at a complete listing of attributes, but not by mere enumeration but by exhibiting their connections); (b) are real rather than verbal (i.e. they seek to state the essence of a concept rather than the meaning of a word); and (c) are relative rather than absolute (i.e. they seek to make more precise what was to some extent definite already, rather than stating a definition which makes the difference between knowing something and not knowing it at all). (EPM, 92, 94-98, 100-01). The phases of a philosophical definition are:

a. the minimum specification of a concept--the lower end of the scale, or the necessary rudimentary expression of the genus without which it would fail to be a genus at all;

b. the intermediate specifications--later modifications of the minimum specification by adding new qualifying determinations; and

c. the final specification--the phase reached when the definition explicitly states all that can be found in the concept and is adequate to the thing defined. (EPM, 100-01).

4. The principles of concrete affirmation and negation: philosophical judgments are so related that every negation involves an affirmation, and every affirmation involves a specific (not indiscriminate) negation. Whenever a philosophical assertion is made it affirms something definite and also denies something definite. In philosophy the affirmative judgment (S is P and not Q) and the negative judgment (S is not Q but P) are equally definite and specific answers to the same question (what is S?). (EPM, 107-08, 110). Ignoring these two principles leads to two associated fallacies:

a. The fallacy of abstract negation assumes that the rejection of one account of a philosophical matter does not require giving a better account of it, or that it is possible in philosophy to negate without affirming.

b. The fallacy of abstract affirmation assumes that in philosophy it is possible to affirm (i.e. predicate a concept in a judgment) without denying anything definite. (EPM, 105-07).
5. **Philosophical judgments as universal**: philosophical judgments are universal (i.e. of the form, all $S$ is $P$), but rather than excluding this includes the subordinate forms, the particular judgment (every $S$-type is $P$) and the singular judgment (every individual $S$ is $P$) as well as the purely universal judgment ($S$ as such is $P$). All three types of structure are to be found in the philosophical judgment; what is not found is any sufficiency of one to the exclusion of the rest. (EPM, 111-12, 115).

6. **Philosophical judgments as categorical**: philosophical judgments are not merely hypothetical (i.e. of the form, if $S$ is $P$ it is $Q$) but also are essentially categorical in intention (i.e. of the form, $S$ is $P$). As categorical, philosophical judgments are never devoid of objective or ontological reference. (EPM, 121, 125).

7. **Philosophical inference as reversible**: the arguments of philosophy, instead of having an irreversible direction from principles to conclusion (as in deduction) or from data via principles to conclusion (as in induction), have a reversible direction, the principles establishing the conclusion and the conclusions reciprocally establishing the principles. Philosophical arguments escape vicious circularity insofar as the conclusions in philosophy are already something known, and establishing them by means of principles means making them known in a different and better way. Philosophical conclusions are anticipated by an experience that possesses them in substance before its reasoning begins, and its conclusions can be checked by comparing them with these anticipations. In a philosophical scale of forms, the terms "experience" and "conclusion" are applicable to any two successive stages (or levels): the higher level "explains" the lower. (EPM, 160, 163, 172).

8. **Philosophy as systematic**: it is the ideal of philosophical discourse to be constructive or systematic—that is, as final, complete, objective, and unified as it can be. Although none of these ideals can be met absolutely, in viewing philosophical science itself as a scale of forms, its topics can be arranged as a hierarchy of overlapping concepts, differing in degree and kind, and related as opposites and distincts. (EPM, 177, 186-93).
No doubt this outline does scant justice to the argumentative structure and detail of example in the Essay, and perhaps raises more questions than it resolves. We cannot deal with all of Collingwood's arguments and illustrations without duplicating in length the Essay itself. But we shall have occasion to discuss several of the examples in what follows, in connection with our examination of the structure of his main argument. But perhaps we can settle several questions with some comments about each of the key concepts we have just summarized.

(1) The first misconception to be avoided is that Collingwood's Essay is concerned with describing characteristics of philosophical concepts, judgments, and inferences that belong exclusively to philosophy. Although each of these logical units is contrasted with its non-philosophical equivalent, the contrast does not make an absolute distinction between the two sorts of usages. In each case he is careful to point out that while such characteristics are occasionally but exceptionally encountered in non-philosophical experience, in their philosophical employment they are typical, important, and essential. Thus when he discusses the overlap of classes, for example, he points out that it occurs even in empirical science: exceptional or paradoxical border-line cases provide obstacles in any attempt to carry out a schema of classification based on an arrangement of species of a genus into mu-
tually exclusive classes which exhaust the membership of the genus between them. Collingwood points out the instance of the classification of animals (a problem discussed with insight by Aristotle), in which amphibians overlap the classes of fish and reptile, having characteristics of both (i.e. they are vertebrates with lungs, like reptiles, but capable of underwater breathing, like fish) (EPM, 30). But where such an overlap is exceptional in empirical science and ruled out by the a priori divisions of exact sciences, in philosophy it is typical and essential. As examples Collingwood points out the predicability of the transcendental attributes, unity, truth, and goodness, under all the categories (EPM, 32-33); the overlap of judgment and inference as two species of the genus thought, in logic (EPM, 36); the overlap of thought and action as characteristics studied by logic and ethics respectively (EPM, 43-44); and in ethics the overlap of good acts across the divisions of goods into the species pleasant, ex-

12 Collingwood seemed to think that the difficulties of border-line cases arises only in empirical science but not exact sciences, since in the latter (i.e. in mathematics) the divisions can be carried out a priori by stipulative definitions, and hence the exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the species are assured (EPM, 30-31). But insofar as the overlap of classes is defined by the scale of forms as being a relation of overlap-by-inclusion, the system of classification of numbers seems to fit his description of an overlap of species of a genus, as Donagan points out (CEPC, 5-6).
It is interesting to note in connection with this discussion that Collingwood relates the non-philosophical and philosophical usages of a term with the pre-philosophical and philosophical phases of a concept—which is reminiscent of Q-A logic, in which the sameness of two questions is said to be the sameness of an historical process (EPM, 33; cf. above, Table 3, no. 3a). He writes:

There are words which are used in two different ways, a philosophical and a scientific; but the words are not on that account equivocal; they undergo a regular and uniform change in meaning when they pass from one sphere to the other, and this change leaves something fundamental in their meaning unaltered, so that it is more appropriate to speak of two phases of a concept then two senses of a word. For example, matter is a word used both in physics and metaphysics . . . . Such cases are common. Mind, for the scientist, in this case the psychologist, is the name of one limited class of things outside which lie things of other kinds; for the spiritualistic philosophy, it is a name . . . for all reality . . . . Even in concepts that have no strictly scientific phase, a similar distinction can often be traced between a philosophical phase and a non-philosophical. (EPM, 33-35).

13 Mink points out that it is possible and relatively easy to work out a system of mutually exclusive species for this example from ethics, simply by employing the mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes, (a) pleasant and expedient and right, (b) pleasant and expedient, but not right, (c) pleasant, but not expedient and not right, (d) expedient, but not pleasant and not right, etc. (MHD, 65). One might extend Mink's suggestion and defend the claim that by a rigorous use of stipulative definitions, a system of classification can always be constructed that employs mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes. But as Mink notes, most of the difficulties in what Collingwood says in the chapter on the overlap of classes, many of which arise from examples which seem to presume an overlap of extension between classes, are cleared up in the chapter on the scale of forms (MHD, 66, 70).
In a later chapter in which Collingwood is comparing the literary language of philosophy to the technical (i.e. artificially symbolic) language of science, he points out that the subject matter of philosophy demands a vocabulary with groups of words "nearly but not quite synonymous, differentiated by shades of meaning which for some purposes can be ignored and for others become important," and single words which have various senses according to the ways they are used, but without being utterly equivocal (EPM, 206-07). It is precisely in such a vocabulary as this, and in cases of overlapping meanings to which such a vocabulary applies, that philosophy is interested, and which gives it its typical characteristics.

But we must also notice, before passing on to consider further parallels between philosophical and non-philosophical concepts, that here as elsewhere in the Essay Collingwood does not provide us with clear guidelines for the limits of this distinction, or with any criteria for deciding when a concept is rightfully being employed in its scientific phase and when in its philosophical one. Furthermore, (as even his comment in the above quotation shows a dim awareness), lumping pre- and non-philosophical concepts together may overlook important distinctions which may turn out to be pertinent when the overlapping meanings of the term in its philosophical employment are being unpacked. Collingwood may be guilty of falling prey to the "genetic fallacy"—i.e. assuming that an earlier stage in the development of a concept
is a necessary condition for the understanding of the mature concept—in short, confusing temporal and logical priority.

(2) Another example of the manifestation of a philosophical characteristic in a non-philosophical context is the scale of forms. Collingwood points out that the "fusion" of differences of degree with differences of kind in a scale of forms is not unique to philosophy, but is also familiar to "common sense" or ordinary experience, as in social structures which distinguish between nobility and gentry, or in criminal codes which distinguish between capital and other degrees of punishment (EPM, 73). It is also familiar in empirical science, where the double criteria of degree and kind are operative in scales of forms in which different forms are modified and replaced by others: Collingwood cites the example of the states of matter, e.g. ice, water, and steam, which differ from each other in both degree (colder and hotter) and kind (solid, liquid, and gaseous states). Other examples are the periodic table of elements and the stages of organismic development (e.g. embroyogenesis) (EPM, 59). He even insists on this as a way of defining a scale of forms:

The combination of differences in degree with differences in kind implies that a generic concept is specified in a somewhat peculiar way. The species into which it is divided are so related that each not only embodies the generic essence in a specific manner, but also embodies some variable attribute in a specific degree. In respect of the variable, each specific form of the concept differs from the rest in degree; in respect of the manner in which the generic essence is specified, each differs from the
rest in kind. In such a system of specifications the two sets of differences are so connected that whenever the variable, increasing or decreasing, reaches certain critical points on the scale, one specific form disappears and is replaced by another. A breaking strain, a freezing point, a minimum taxable income, are examples of such critical points on a scale of degrees where a new specific form suddenly comes into being. A system of this kind I propose to call a scale of forms. (EPM, 57).

Just from the examples cited here it is clear that there are non-philosophical as well as philosophical scales of forms; but Collingwood remarks that it is just in such cases where differences of degree and kind exist in combination that philosophical thought is primarily interested (EPM, 56-57).

But in this case he goes one step further, and tries to distinguish philosophical from non-philosophical scales of forms. In the latter the variable is something extraneous to the generic essence (e.g. heat, which accounts for the variation of water in its transformations of state, does not enter into the generic essence of water as expressed in the formula, \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \)). But in a philosophical scale of forms the variable is identified with the generic essence itself (e.g. in Plato's forms of knowledge the variable is given as definiteness or truth, which is an essential characteristic of all knowledge as such) (EPM, 59-60).

However, since Collingwood does not specify for his readers what he means by the terms, "generic essence," "variable," and "specific forms," rather than clarifying the issue
this distinction raises a hornets nest of further difficulties. What does it mean to say that the variable is identified with the generic essence? It is not a matter of demanding technical definitions for these terms, since on Collingwood's grounds this may involve him in an infinite regress (see Table 10, 3: philosophical definitions are by means of a scale of forms, so that the concept of a scale of forms is defined by means of a scale of forms). What we wish to know is minimally how he is using these terms, even if this can be stated only in mere verbal equivalences.

From scattered remarks throughout the Essay we may offer the following as a first approximation to this requirement. (a) A generic essence is whatever is included in the definition of a genus, where (b) a definition is anything which fixes limits, discriminates, distinguishes, makes clearer or more precise, or removes ambiguities, and (c) a genus is a universal or a concept--i.e. that which unites a number of different things, either as (d) a general concept unites a plurality of individual instances into a class, or (e) a generic concept unites a plurality of specific differentiations into a universal (EPM, 26-28, 94-95, 98-100). (f) A variable is whatever is being used as the index of difference in degree, or that in respect of which each specific form (species) of a concept (genus) differs from the other specific forms in degree (EPM, 57). (g) A specific form is any further
modification, qualification, distinction or determination of a generic essence, general term, or concept (EPM, 94-95, 100).

(h) Essence and property are two species of attribute, to which correspond definitions and theorems as two species of exposition (EPM, 95). (i) An attribute is anything which serves to qualify, modify, distinguish or determine a genus.

Armed with these preliminary definitions we may now return to the distinction between a philosophical and non-philosophical scale of forms: in the former the variable was said to be identified with the generic essence, in the latter it was something extraneous. Paraphrasing this distinction using our preliminary definitions yields statements something like these: in the specification of a concept one species differs in degree from another species in virtue of some attribute which in the case of a non-philosophical concept is not included in the essential definition of the genus, whereas in a philosophical concept it is so included. In short, it turns out to greatly resemble the analytic-synthetic distinction. Is Collingwood distinguishing between a philosophical and a non-philosophical scale of forms on the grounds that judgments stating such a scale are either analytical (if philosophical) or synthetic (if non-philosophical)?

(3) Once more we are up against the problem of Collingwood's use of the term "identity," since we do not know what "identified" means in the expression "the variable is
identified with the generic essence. We may suppose that he minimally means that in philosophical genera defined by a scale of forms there are real and necessary connections between the variable attribute and the genus which is being specified in differing degrees (EPM, 100). Whether this means that philosophical assertions are analytic (in the sense of the tradition deriving from Leibniz—viz. that the predicate is "contained in" the subject) is not ever directly

14 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1929), p. 48: "Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, in the other synthetic. Analytic judgements (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic."

15 By way of explanation of what Collingwood means by the "differentiation" involved in the specification of a generic concept in a scale of forms, Mink writes: "Two things may be differentiated as distinct from each other or as opposite to each other. Opposition "is a relation subsisting between a positive term and its own mere negation or absence" (EPM, 75); distinction is, apparently, any relation of difference between two positive terms which differ in meaning" (MHD, 67). On this interpretation one might also say that 'difference in kind' is also a relation between two positive and different attributes, and 'difference in degree' is a relation between a positive term or attribute and its relative negation or absence. Unfortunately this interpretation is weakened by the qualifying preface to the remark that Mink quotes, which reads: 'In its non-philosophical phase, opposition is a relation subsisting between a positive term and its own mere negation or absence" (EPM, 75—emphasis mine).
stated in the Essay itself. But based on the discussion of philosophical judgments as categorical-universal and the controversy this generated with Gilbert Ryle, we may infer that he does not mean us to understand the scale of forms in a strictly analytical sense. To these two pieces of evidence we must now turn.

(a) Collingwood insists that philosophical judgments are universal, but also that they are not therefore merely hypothetical—they are also essentially categorical, i.e.

16 There are three unpublished letters between Collingwood and Gilbert Ryle, presently in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. CRC-I is dated 4 May, 1935, and is from Collingwood to Ryle; CRC-II is from Ryle to Collingwood, dated 21 May 1935; and CRC-III is from Collingwood to Ryle, dated 6 June 1935. All are related to the article written by Ryle, entitled "Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological Argument," Mind, Vol. XLIV, no. 174 (April, 1935), pp. 137-51--basically a discussion of Chapter VI of the Essay on Philosophical Method. In CRC-I, Collingwood takes up an objection to the view that opposition and distinction are fused in a scale of forms, so that the scale of forms explains the overlap of classes) is directed against a view of Croce. In the Idea of History Collingwood expands on this point. Croce criticized Hegel's philosophy of history for confusing opposition and distinction, since opposites refer to concepts and distinction to individuals. But Collingwood argues that both are applicable to historical events insofar as events have an inside consisting of thought, and thought is conceptual and hence oppositional. Opposition is a dialectical term, as is reconciliation or synthesis (IH, 119).

17 Cf. Bernard Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality (London, 1892), pp. 1-58. Collingwood, like Bosanquet, took issue with Bradley's use of the categorical-hypothetical distinction, which Bosanquet summarized as follows: "The universal judgement, if bona fide universal, and in sense singular or collective, cannot, so Mr. Bradley maintains ((in The Principles of Logic)), be categorical. A categorical judgement af-
the subject of the assertions being made is no mere *ens rationis* but something actually existing (EPM, 125). We shall have more to say about the categorical aspect of philosophical judgments in a moment, but we may point out that in stating it he is declaring his departure from at least the narrower versions of the analytic-synthetic distinction, since he indicates that the universal statements of philosophy have objective reference and are not merely tautologies that indicate only the equivalent use of words.

(b) This is confirmed in the second and final of his letters in his correspondence with Ryle concerning his logical views expressed in the *Essay*. In it Collingwood states that the most important difference between them is Ryle's disbelief in synthetic *a priori* propositions, a disbelief which he says he does not share, and is connected with the possibility of metaphysics (CRC-III, 1, 7). In stating his dissent from Ryle's insistence that all universal propositions are hypothetical, and hence that "no universal propositions are ca-

firms the existence of its elements, and enunciates some matters, conveyed by an idea, as true directly of Reality. But a universal or abstract judgement does not affirm the existence of its elements, and may be true though none of them exist or are even possible of Reality" (p. 5). Bosanquet insists that some judgements, like "Heat is a mode of motion," and "Gases have a spectrum consisting of lines," have subjects that "are thought generally, through abstract characteristics, and are not individually known," but are nevertheless fact: "They are universal fact, and to say this is impossible seems to me a flat denial of the commonest experience" (pp. 14-15). Cf. CRC-I, 13.
tological" is a tautology (CRC-II, 5), Collingwood replies that tautologies are always merely verbal. On his own view of logic, universal propositions deal with real propositions and not just verbal ones—that is, they deal not merely with affirmations and negations about words, but about things (CRC-II, 5-7).

In his first letter to Ryle, Collingwood located the problem at a different level:

It seems probable to me that the fundamental point at issue between us is concerned with the way in which we answer the question "what is a universal?" ... . It looks to me as if, in your logic, this question was answered by saying "a universal is a class"; i.e. that whenever we make a statement (assent to a proposition) about "all x" we are really making n statements about the n instances of x which exist. The theory of universals is thus, so to speak, resolved into the theory of classes. It seems to me that this analysis ... (following Russell) ... would represent a line of thought more or less identical with logical nominalism. In my own view, this line of thought is so far from satisfactory that it inverts the necessary order of analysis and is thus a case of obscurum per obscurius. I am disposed to think that what makes a number of things instances of a class is their common possession of some common nature, and that this common nature (the so-called "universal") is thus the ratio essendi of the class as such. Instead of resolving the theory of universals into the theory of classes, I should therefore be inclined to the opposite line, of resolving the theory of classes into the theory of universals. This is of course akin to logical realism. (CRC-I, 28).

In the conclusion of the letter Collingwood summarizes the matter in the statement that "the question which most fundamentally seems to divide us appears to me to be question: Is a universal simply a class, or is it that which makes a class
a class?—where you take the first alternative and I the second" (CRC-I, 29).

It does not take much imagination to see the connection between what Collingwood is here calling simply a "universal" and what he had called a "concrete universal" in Speculum Mentis—a similarity which is all the more striking for the absence of that small qualifier, "concrete." It will be recalled from Chapters V and VII (above, pp. 5-3, 5-16, 7-22, 7-28, 7-36, 7-39 and 7-47) that in Speculum Mentis Collingwood (a) contrasted the "concrete universal," or one to which the differences between its particulars are relevant," to the "abstract universal," which is "indifferent to the variation of its own particulars" or "to their own exemplification in this particular or that, and differentiated only in their specifications" (SM, 162-63). He also (b) contrasted the structure of a classificatory system based on abstract classes with the structure of a dialectical series of progressively inclusive ("overlapping") universals (SM, 55, 162-64, 206-07); and (c) he contrasted the formal logic built on the notion of the abstract universal, or class-concept, with the dialectical logic which employs the concrete universal (SM, 49, 195, 279). And finally, (d) he argued that a dialectical logic which employs the concrete universal "destroyed any distinction between a logic of opposition and a logic of difference" (SM, 244).
It is clear that the Essay continues and develops this line of thinking first sketched out in Speculum Mentis: (a) is another way of stating the distinction between the philosophical and the non-philosophical concept; (b) is transparently a description of a "scale of forms;" (c) is the contrast he is drawing between his own logic and that of Ryle, in his correspondence with Ryle, his own being built on the notion of a universal concept as described in the Essay; and (d) is the "fusion" of "relations of opposition and distinction" and "differences of degree and of kind" as described in the Essay concerning the scale of forms. The logic described in the Essay is therefore the dialectical logic discussed in Speculum Mentis.

If this is so there is one interesting corollary on the Essay's thesis that the "variable is identified with the generic essence"—about which we may speculate. Does Collingwood have in mind the fact that the F-logic built on the notion of a class, the substitution of one or another instance for a "variable" takes for granted that no difference occurs, as a result of the substitution, to the formula in which the variable occurs? And if so, would this situation not be drastically altered where the substitution-instances are specifications of a philosophical concept having the structure of a "scale of forms" as he describes it—i.e. one in which on instance differs from another not only in degree but also in
kind, and has relations with it not only of distinction but of opposition as well? We should like to think that this is the case, so that when Collingwood speaks of an abstract universal as being "indifferent to the variation of its particulars" we may understand him to mean that when an abstract term is being used as a simple class concept the relationship it has with its instances is a relationship of a variable with its replacement instances. But when a concept is so structured that it has a layering of overlapping meanings, such a relationship of sustitutivity or replacement is not possible without doing violence to its structure of meaning, or without reducing it to being an abstract class-concept.

Remaining alert to this possibility, but also aware that it is not explicitly warranted by any texts of the Essay, we turn to his discussion of judgments--the point of contact between D-logic and Q-A logic.

(4) As entries 4, 5, and 6 of Table 10 indicate, Collingwood maintained that all philosophical judgments are universal, categorical, and affirm or deny concretely. Collingwood nowhere insists that this characterization of the philosophical judgment is complete, but he does argue that it is minimally necessary. All three of these requirements pose difficulties for Q-A logic. The "principle of concrete affirmation and negation," for instance, applies to the class of expressions that in Q-A logic are called propositions,
namely that which can be true or false. But what about absolute presuppositions? Collingwood's formulation of the principle appears to relate it to the Q-A complex:

The affirmative judgement in philosophy runs thus: \( S \) is \( P \) and not \( Q \); the negative thus: \( S \) is not \( Q \) but \( P \); where \( P \) and \( Q \) are equally definite and specific answers to the same question: what is \( S \)? The peculiarity of the philosophical judgement in respect of quality, then, lies in the peculiar intimacy of the relation between its affirmative and negative elements, which is of such a kind that \( P \) cannot be validly affirmed while \( Q \) is left indeterminate, nor \( Q \) validly denied while \( P \) is left indeterminate. (EPM, 110-11).

But this leads to the curious result that absolute presuppositions, which are neither true nor false because not answers to questions, are not philosophical because they do not affirm or deny; either that or there are some philosophical propositions (namely absolute presuppositions) which neither affirm nor deny (or perhaps affirm without denying or deny without affirming)—which violates the principle of concrete affirmation and negation.

What we do not know is whether Collingwood would agree that whatever judgments affirm or deny must be also true or false, or whether there is a class of judgments which can affirm or deny, and do so concretely, without being either true or false. It is clear that from the point of view of Q-A logic, the latter case is clearly possible. It is also clear that D-logic makes affirmation and negation essential to judgment as such: Collingwood writes in the Essay that "Any judg-
ment predicates a concept, and whenever we affirm one specific concept we deny the other specifications of the same genus" (EPM, 107). But what of truth or falsity in D-logic?

(5) Truth and falsity in D-logic appear to have something to do with the universal-categorical aspect of philosophical judgments. We shall take up the universality aspect in this section and the categorical aspect in the next. According to the Essay just as philosophical concepts are characteristically universal, so also are philosophical judgments, but Collingwood seems to assume that his readers will understand what he means by this. (cf. EPM, 111). From his example of a universal judgment ("all men are mortal") we may assume that he means by it a judgment of the form "All $S$ is $P$," or one which affirms or denies a predicate concept of a universal subject. But after having told us that the relation between concepts in philosophy is an intensional "overlap" rather than an extensional one, he describes the universal judgments of philosophy in extensional terms:

The species universal, particular, and singular overlap; the universal judgement that all men are mortal does not exclude, it includes the particular judgement that some men are mortal and the singular judgement that this individual man Socrates is mortal. These three elements introduce differentiations into its significance, even considered as a universal judgement: as a pure universal, it means that man as such is mortal; as a universal of particulars, it means that every kind of man is mortal; as a universal of singulars it means that every individual man is mortal. These are not so much three kinds of universal judgement as three elements present in every universal judgement whether in philosophy or anywhere else. (EPM, 111).
In the ensuing discussion Collingwood tries to distinguish the universality of philosophical judgments from that of others, but in the process appears to badly conflate what is here given in extensional terms with (a) what is emphasized in a judgment, (b) the sequence in which judgments are made, and (c) the priority of meaning of judgments. Thus he says that (a) the type of judgment in which the "determining element" is the singular (in what he calls induction by simple enumeration) is such that "each individual instance of S is found on examination to be P and is called a generalization;" but (b) a second type "begins not from the singular but from the particular" and "goes on to judge" that since each particular kind of S is P, S as such is P (which he calls an empirical generalization); and (c) in the third type the universal element is taken as primary: "we begin by thinking that S as such is P, and this is seen to involve the particular, that any specific kind of S is P, and the singular, that each instance of S is P" (called the universal judgments of exact science or mathematics) (EPM, 111-12; cf. EPH, 135-36). In these cases the manner in which the universal judgment is reached, or its sequence in the way it is advanced, is taken as what determines the type or meaning of universal judgment it is, and the type of universal judgment indicates what is being emphasized in that judgment.
The compression of these three "types" into one judgment—the universal judgment of philosophy—is evidently not a source of embarrassment for Collingwood, and the best indication of this is in his response to Ryle on the matter. In the first letter of their correspondence he states that in his view logic is concerned with "real thinking" which "contains within itself every kind of proposition, simultaneously thought together and having a logically necessary structure—these forming for any universal judgment its logical context, which consists of "things which if we didn't think we couldn't think what ex hypothesi we are thinking" (CRC-I, 16-19).

Further: I believe that this logical context must have a certain logical structure. I believe, for example, that there are always in it affirmative and negative elements, . . . categorical and hypothetical elements . . . (and) propositional and inferential elements. I believe that in any example of real thinking all these elements are present; although . . . they are certainly not all ordinarily (or perhaps ever) expressed in words . . . . When I say "all," I am making a big assumption: I am assuming that there is a certain complex of element-types which forms a whole, and that every example of real thinking contains an example of every element-type contained in this whole. (CRC-I, 17-18).

Collingwood confesses that he cannot give a complete account of the whole of element-types that he is discussing, but he admits that what he has in mind is (a) "the old-fashioned formal logic" which holds that any proposition whatever must have a certain quality, quantity, relation, and modality—any complete whole consisting of these four element-types with its respective alternative variants; and (b) he says that this
"old-fashioned formal logic" was modified by Kant who distinguished three element-types within each of the four characteristics of a proposition, bringing the number of element-types to twelve. Without subscribing to this as a final number, Collingwood indicates his assent to the existence of a "good many" constant element-types found in any example of real thinking.

He then concludes this remarkable synopsis of his beliefs concerning logic with the following sketch:

I think that what . . . I have called kinds of propositions, may be one of two things. They may be what I am here calling element-types, and in that case any example of real thinking will contain within itself an example of every kind of proposition. Or they may be . . . varieties of propositions which are not element-types, but are merely variants or alternative forms of this or that one element-type. In the former case, every kind of proposition (or inference for that matter) which the logician studies must be an element-type of which an instance is present in the real thinking done by himself as a logician. In the latter case, of course, this need not happen. Lastly I believe that the main task of logical theory is to ascertain, so far as one can, what I have called the logical structure of real thinking and the element-types involved in that structure. I expect that you would entirely deny this, and maintain that when the logician speaks about kinds of propositions he means not element-types but alternative varieties. I will not go on to argue that point; I will only observe that logical atomism, although I recognize the very important work which it can do in the analysis of propositions taken singly, begins by begging the question which I am here declining to argue, in assuming that when we simultaneously assent to a number of propositions . . . we are not thinking simultaneously a complex of thoughts which must be thought together if it is to be thought at all, i.e. a complex having a logically necessary structure which is itself an important subject for logical study, but merely an assemblage of thoughts each of which presents to the logician only the problems arising out of itself taken by itself. (CRC-I, 18-20).
This very important letter is the only place, so far as I know, that we find Collingwood, as he says, "giving myself away rather completely" on the subject of his view of logic. We shall therefore be forced to rely on it heavily for an understanding of what Collingwood is attempting to say in the Essay.

But in the context of our present discussion we notice especially that it is not accidental when we find Collingwood engaged in a compression of several logical functions into one act, since "real thinking" (which must be what is being expressed in a philosophical judgment) "contains within itself" all the "element-types" on which logical judgment is based; and further that this is a complex of thoughts which "must be thought together if it is to be thought at all, i.e. a complex having a logically necessary structure." But we shall have to be on our guard against accepting any manifestation of "real thinking" as a Deus ex machina explanatory device to resolve all logical discrepancies we may encounter. "Real thinking," whatever else it may be, has a "logically necessary structure," so that wherever this structure fails to appear we may assume that real thinking has not successfully occurred. 18

18 Collingwood's first letter to Ryle also confirms from a different direction our earlier provisional characterization of the Kantian standpoint of the Essay: his own statement to Ryle that the "element-types" of "real thinking" correspond roughly to the Kantian schematized categories gives
(6) We are still on the trail of what Collingwood's view in the Essay, and hence in D-logic, of truth and falsity is, and we come now to the chapter on philosophical judgments as categorical—perhaps the most controversial chapter in the entire Essay, primarily because of the use of the ontological argument and its extension to the domains of logic and ethics. As we have already noted, it was this chapter that set off the exchange between Collingwood and Ryle.

Once again under the rubric of "categorical" Collingwood seems to be compressing into a single notion a number of functions which are logically distinct, and in Ryle's criticism of this chapter it is this compressive indistinctness that causes the greatest distress. Both in his review article and in his correspondence with Collingwood, Ryle accuses Collingwood, Ryle accuses Collingwood of saying that what Collingwood is attempting in the Essay is a brief survey of some salient features of what Kant would call "transcendental logic" (although there is not much to be gained by overemphasizing this point).

19 At various points in Chapter VI of the Essay Collingwood says about categorical philosophical judgments (a) that the subject of categorical judgments is something actually existing (EPM, 117); (b) that the subject of such judgments cannot be conceived except as actual (or its essence implies existence) (EPM, 131, 133); (c) that the subject of such judgments actually provides an instance of itself (EPM, 130); (d) that in such judgments we declare ourselves committed to believe that (a) (EPM, 127); and (e) that anything describable by such a judgment is obliged to produce an instance of itself (EPM, 130).
lingwood of failing to distinguish between propositions which assert concrete matters of fact (particular or existence propositions, which Ryle holds are the same—all existence propositions being particular propositions and vice-versa) and universal propositions which assert an abstract relationship between properties, but do not say anything about something which exists (CRC-II, 2, 4, 5; cf. MFA, 250-51). And indeed, Collingwood's formulation of the rule for categorical-universal judgments in philosophy seems to be designed to cut directly across this distinction. In discussing the Anselmian ontological argument as an instance of the rule Collingwood writes:

Divesting his argument of all specially religious or theological colouring, one might state it by saying that thought, when it follows its own bent most completely and sets itself the task of thinking out the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason, may appear to be constructing a mere ens rationis, but in fact is never devoid of objective or ontological reference . . . . (I)n effect his argument amounts to this, that in the special case of metaphysical thinking the distinction between conceiving something and thinking it to exist is a distinction without a difference . . . . Re- flexion on the history of the Ontological Proof thus offers us a view of philosophy as a form of thought in which essence and existence, however clearly distinguished, are conceived as inseparable. On this view, unlike mathematics or empirical science, philosophy stands committed to maintaining that its subject matter is no mere hypothesis, but something actually existing. (EPM, 124-25, 127).

In his response to Collingwood's Essay Ryle denied that the ontological argument proves anything because it is formally fallacious. Hence it does not prove that there is
anything about which it is true to say that its essence implies its existence, because a statement of essence is a universal proposition and hence hypothetical. From a hypothetical statement alone or in conjunction with others no concrete matter of fact or existence proposition can be inferred. In order to infer the existence of something, Ryle argues, one needs at least one genuine singular proposition, i.e. one which either (a) embodies at least one logically proper name, or (b) has at least one definite description which in fact describes something. Unless a universal proposition rests on or contains a logically genuine singular proposition, it does not successfully refer. (CRC-II, 2, 5).

In his reply to Ryle Collingwood counterattacked by denying the distinction on which Ryle based his disproof. It is, he says, fallacious: not all universal propositions are hypothetical, and it is not only singular and particular propositions that can assert existence:

You seem to me . . . to be arguing on the assumption . . . that any general proposition must belong to either one or the other of two classes . . . "any-propositions" and "every-propositions." I wish to maintain that there are also what I will call "all-propositions." (a) any-propositions. These are what you call general hypotheticals, which do not depend for their truth on the existence . . . of any of the things to which they apply . . . . (Y)ou accept my account of these and my description of arithmetical and geometrical propositions as belonging to this type. (b) every-propositions. These I think you are assuming . . . as a kind, and the only possible kind, of general categorical. They apply to every instance of a certain class, and depend for their truth upon the existence . . . of these instances . . . . (Y)ou believe . . .
that the only way in which a general proposition can be categorical is by being enumerative. With this logical doctrine is bound up a metaphysical doctrine to which . . . you also subscribe: viz. that what exists is an assemblage, or various assemblages, of "particular matters of fact." . . . But in fact I am quite consciously, in my essay, attacking these assumptions. I will admit for the sake of argument that there are any-propositions and every-propositions; but I contend that there are also all-propositions or (as some logicians have called them) "true universals" having a categorical character, i.e. they are not enumeratives, and yet they are not indifferent to the existence of the things to which they apply, but are of such a kind that their truth depends on that existence. I regard such propositions as especially characteristic of philosophy. (CRC-I, 24-25).

This is as close as we shall ever come to understanding what the doctrine on truth is in the Essay, and since this issue (at least on Collingwood's view of it--cf. CRC-I, 7) crosses over the boundary of logic and enters that of metaphysics, we must postpone further discussion of this until Chapter X.

But we must note here that in order to defend his case, Collingwood must produce at least one acceptable example of what is to count for a valid categorical universal judgment, or a synthetic a priori proposition. As we shall see in Chapter X, in the Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood provides us with several candidates for such judgments--"God exists" being one of them, but others are offered in his discussion of the transcendental analytic section of Kant's first Critique. In the present instance Collingwood sticks to existential propositions, as in his reply to Ryle:
I believe that such propositions as "God exists," "mind exists," "matter exists," and their contradictories, do not assert or deny particular matters of fact; nor do I believe that they assert or deny anything which can be adequately described as collections or classes of matters of fact. To assert or deny propositions of this kind, with reasons given for the assertion or denial, seems to me the business of constructive or destructive metaphysics . . . . I do think that a philosophical proposition may be e.g. about thought or matter; and . . . if I learnt to use your language, I could call thought or matter a designated entity; but I could never allow that it was either a particular matter of fact or a mere collection of particular matters of fact. (CRC-I, 4, 6).

But the most peculiar and idiosyncratic instance that Collingwood gives of the rule that philosophical judgments are never devoid of objective or ontological reference is not the Ontological Proof of Anselm, but his discussion of logic. He paraphrases this view in his letter to Ryle:

Logic not only discusses, it also contains reasoning: consequently, whenever a logician argues a point in the theory of inference, he is producing an instance of the thing under discussion; and, since he cannot discuss without arguing, he cannot discuss any point in the theory of inference without doing so. Consequently, in so far as it necessarily contains reasoning, the theory of reasoning (i.e. logic) cannot be indifferent to the existence of its own subject-matter; in other words, the propositions which constitute the body of that part of logic cannot be in substance hypothetical. For example, if a logician could believe that no valid reasoning anywhere existed, he would merely be disbelieving his own logical theory. (CRC-I, 11-12; cf. EPM, 130).

The logician, to paraphrase a paraphrase, not only mentions logic he also uses it in the construction of his logical system. But both this example and the example he gives from
ethics seem to illustrate a different point than the one he was making about the Ontological Proof of Anselm. Concerning logic and ethics he seems to be saying that such concepts are self-instantiating—logic being logical and ethics being ethical; and that the denial of such self-instantiating concepts leads to a different sort of absurdity—what might be called categorical nonsense (or perhaps what Austin has called "performative absurdity"—cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 184). Thus if one were to set out to formally demonstrate that there is no such thing as logical demonstration, or if one were to argue that one ought not to say what one should or should not do, he would be engaging in a categorical (or performative) absurdity: what he says he is doing is incompatible with what he is doing. But certainly the Ontological Proof does not produce or provide an instance of itself. Although it presumes a commitment to the definition of God as a being than which none greater can be conceived, if one were to deny that "a being none greater than which can be conceived" has ontological reference he would not be doing something incompatible with what

Collingwood argues that ethics cannot be merely descriptive nor merely normative any more than can logic. Ethics describes not action as opposed to ideas of action, but the moral consciousness; and this it is forced to describe as already being in some sense what it ought to be. Conversely "this in turn will affect the account which it gives of action; for no theory of moral ideals is conceivable which does not admit that to some extent moral ideas affect action" (EPM, 132). Ethics, in short, must be ethical.
he is saying he is doing. The Ontological Proof does not seem to meet the description he is offering for categorical judgments as self-instantiating, and at this point we do not have a clear idea of what Collingwood understands to be the unifying concept for these two sets of examples.

A candidate for a common concept might be "having ontological reference." But then what sort of "ontological reference" does logic have? If logic has ontological reference in the sense that it occurs as a thought-process in someone's mind who is thinking logically, then it is no less true that mathematics and empirical science have a similar reference. But the entire point of using the Ontological Proof as an example seems to indicate that the "ontological reference" that he has in mind is not merely to "second intentions" or to mental events: it is not, he says, a mere ens rationis but something actually existing. We therefore seem to be left with the suggestion that there are some judgments which necessarily imply the existence of what they describe. But then this narrows the field to the one special case being discussed in Anselm's argument, as Collingwood himself admits: "What it does prove is that essence involves existence, not always, but in one special case, the case of God in the metaphysical sense: the Deus sive natura of Spinoza, the Good of Plato, the Being of Aristotle: the object of metaphysical thought: (EPM, 127). It is true that Collingwood attempts to
extend this "object" to "philosophical thought in general" by adding that "metaphysics . . . is not unique in its objective reference or in its logical structure; all philosophical thought is of the same kind, and . . . partakes of the nature of metaphysics, which is not a separate philosophical science but a special study of the existential aspect of that same subject-matter whose aspect of truth is studied by logic, and its aspect as goodness by ethics" (EPM, 127). But the extension fails to convince the reader, for there is no good reason provided for dropping the limitation of the "essence involves existence" maxim to that "one special case" being discussed in the ontological proof.

But here we once again encounter Collingwood's advance warning that he will not pursue the consequences of his Essay into the realm of metaphysics (much as we are tempted to admit that he has already done so), and we must leave the matter in this unsatisfactory state (as he himself does) until we have an opportunity to examine his explicit views on metaphysics in greater detail. 21

21 The reader is left at this point with the very uneasy suspicion that Collingwood has stated a very important philosophical truth, but expressed it very badly, and left it in a highly ambiguous state. Everyone knows that philosophers have claimed to be stating truths that have ontological reference, and further that they have employed arguments to reinforce these truths. What is in question (at least since the time of Hume) is whether there is any necessary validity to that claim, and whether their arguments succeed in demonstrating what their authors believe they do. Collingwood seems to
(7) If the chapter on categorical thinking is the most controversial one in the Essay, the chapter on philosophical inference\textsuperscript{22} is the most axial: it is the chapter that more than any other displays what is unique in a philosophical methodology that ideally unifies the specific topics in philosophy; and it is the chapter in which Collingwood completes the discussion of the work of his predecessors on the subject.\textsuperscript{23} In Collingwood's view the development of the idea be saying that the real tradition in philosophy has always been committed to maintaining this claim to ontological reference, and that to abandon it is to abandon philosophy. But to adequately argue that the ontological reference claims of metaphysicians is successful he would have to rely on something more than the evidence provided by the ontological argument. What is required is a fully developed theory of meaning and reference. In the sequel we shall see that he did make a start on such a theory in his discussion of language and mental acts.

\textsuperscript{22}Part of the material of Chapter VIII of the Essay was presented in our own Chapter VII, Section 2. On Collingwood's view of inference, cf. IH, 253-56.

\textsuperscript{23}In the first chapter Collingwood reviewed the stages of development of the notion of philosophical method, which we saw falling into four major phases: (a) the Socratic phase, in which the function of dialectical questioning was vigorously employed to make implicit thought explicit in definitions; (b) the Platonic phase, in which dialectical method is expanded to include arguments which directionally proceed from quasi-mathematical, hypothetical definitions to non-hypothetical first principles of thought, primarily by removal of hypothetical restrictions as the argument proceeds; (c) the Cartesian phase, in which mathematics is taken as an explicit model for philosophical method (but continually violated in actual practice by Descartes and his followers by employing arguments that are not strictly speaking deductive and do not employ first principles which are self-evident); and finally, (4) the Kantian phase, in which philosophy is freed from mathematical methodology by recognizing that in philosophy there
of philosophical methodology culminates in the demand for a self-justifying kind of thinking. Justification in a philosophical context requires argument, argument means inference, and inference suggests inductive and deductive reasoning. Since Collingwood has all along been comparing philosophical method with the method of exact and empirical sciences, it is not surprising that the culmination of this comparison occurs in a chapter which deals with inference. If philosophy is to escape scepticism and dogmatism it must show how its arguments can be self-justifying without being circu-

are no definitions, no axioms, and no demonstrations of a sort essentially mathematical (EPM, 4-6, 10-25, 155-56). The first chapter ends with a critical discussion of Kantian methodology, which, Collingwood says, fails to adequately reconcile the conflicting claims of the critical method (a) as a propaedeutic to philosophy proper (i.e. to metaphysics) and (b) as philosophy itself (EPM, 20-24). In Chapter VII ("Two Sceptical Positions"--a chapter which, like Chapter X, appears to be an aside but is not) Collingwood resumes his discussion of critical philosophy which he takes to be one of two related sceptical positions (the other being analytic philosophy) which dominate the contemporary philosophical scene. In essence his reply to the attempt to reduce philosophy to the function of criticism is that it assumes positive standards of consistency from which it finds its subject diverging, and unless it undertakes to defend these standards it fails to justify itself and assumes a dogmatic stance with respect to its subject-matter (EPM, 140-41). Similarly the "analytic view" (of which he finds Moore and Russell representative) cannot exempt the positive principles it assumes as true from common sense and/or science from its analysis without self-contradiction (EPM, 143-46; cf. 138-39, 142 n. 1). The upshot of this discussion of critical and analytic philosophy is that if philosophy is to avoid both scepticism (the result of an unbridled exercise of destructive criticism) and dogmatism (the result of assuming certain principles to be true without justification), it must present positive grounds for its own activity; that is, it must be self-justifying.
lar. We might rightfully expect this to be the most crucial chapter in the Essay.

Noting that (a) "in its demand for close and cogent reasoning, philosophy resembles exact science," i.e. "each alike works on the principle that no conclusions may be asserted for which valid and sufficient reason cannot be given" (EPM, 154); but also that (b) it resembles empirical science insofar as "it is supported throughout its texture by cross-references to experience (EPM, 164), Collingwood raises the question whether and how philosophical inference can be deductive (like exact science) and/or inductive (like empirical science--EPM, 151; cf. IH, 254-55). For the purpose of distinguishing philosophical inference from both deduction and induction, Collingwood analyzes inference into three components: the data from which the argument proceeds, the principles according to which inference takes place, and the conclusions to which the argument leads (EPM, 151). It is on these three that he compares the inferences of mathematics, empirical science, and philosophy.

In exact science the data are suppositions, the principles are axioms, and the conclusions are inferred in the sense of being demonstrated or shown to follow with perfect logical rigor from the data according to the principles. The axioms are of two sorts: those of logic, which do not belong to the body of mathematics proper and are properly speaking
not suppositions but presuppositions "in the sense that unless they were true the science could not take a single step in advance;" and special axioms, which are part of exact science, but are "self-evident" or indemonstrable, and known to be true by a kind of intuition (EPM, 151-52). The arguments of exact science are therefore irreversible—that is, "the conclusions are logically dependent on the axioms; there is no reciprocal dependence of the axioms on the conclusions" (EPM, 153).

Empirical science, on the other hand, relies on a sort of inference known as inductive reasoning, in which individual facts empirically known by perception, or the historical record of perceptions in the past, are the data from which conclusions in the form of universal propositions are

24 As is clear from the example he uses, Collingwood has Euclidean geometry in mind as a model for exact science. But he covers himself from attack on the grounds that no contemporary geometrician would accept "self-evident" as descriptive of geometrical axioms. Collingwood writes that "the main lines of this view are not, for our purposes, affected if it is maintained that the special axioms are not known to be true, but only assumed .... (because) in that case we shall have to say that the entire body of the science consists of assumptions, but that these fall into two classes: primary or fundamental assumptions, the so-called special axioms, and secondary or derivative assumptions, the so-called conclusions." In either case "the logical axioms cannot be merely assumed, for .... we cannot think as if the principles of thinking were true, for if they were not we should not be thinking" (EPM, 153). The contemporary geometer would have to agree that some sort of deductive inference-structure is presupposed, and that this is not a part of the content ("body" as Collingwood puts it) of geometry itself.
to be derived (EPM, 165). The principles of induction are, like exact science, of two sorts: logical principles presumed as certain, and assumptions with the degree of certitude only that they are known not to be untrue, and that it is expedient to use them—a certitude which increases in probability as the inductive inquiry proceeds, but never reverts to deductive certitude (EPM, 165-67). Comparing deductive and inductive inference, Collingwood concludes:

The logical movement of inductive thought is therefore irreversible in the same sense as that of exact science. The principles on which induction rests receive in return no support from the inductive process itself . . . . The process of thought in exact science, though irreversible as regards its principles, may be reversible as regards its data . . . . In this respect, inductive argument is not reversible; for its data are what they are because they enjoy the status of facts vouched for by perception; and although we can infer the existence of an unobserved fact from reasons inductively established by the study of similar facts, we only infer it (where to infer, as always in the context of inductive thought, means to establish as probable) and do not perceive it. (EPM, 167).

Philosophical inference differs from both induction and deduction which as species of the philosophical genus, inference, overlap. (a) In philosophical inference there is no division of axioms into those belonging to the science and those belonging to logic, since logical principles are part of philosophical thought itself. As a consequence philosophy cannot neglect its own logical presuppositions (EPM, 154-55). (b) What appears in philosophy as an axiom or indemonstrable proposition serving as a starting point is, as philosophical
argument proceeds, justified by what follows it. In this procedure philosophical inference has the form of what Kant had called a "transcendental deduction." Thus the Cartesian cogito is neither a self-evident truth nor an assumption, but rather "in Kantian language the principle cogito ergo sum is . . . transcendentally deduced, that is, shown to be the condition on which experience as it actually exists . . . is alone possible" (EPM, 156). (c) This means that philosophy is obliged to justify its own starting point. (EPM, 159). But (d):

This can be done only if the arguments of philosophy, instead of having an irreversible direction from principles to conclusions, have a reversible one, the principles establishing the conclusion, and the conclusions reciprocally establishing the principles. But an argument of this kind . . . is a vicious circle. The solution of the dilemma lies . . . in the Socratic principle that philosophical reasoning leads to no conclusions which we did not in some sense know already . . . . Establishing a proposition in philosophy, then, means not transferring it from the class of things unknown to the class of things known, but making it known in a different and better way. (EPM, 160-61).

(e) Philosophical knowing in this way differs from that of exact science inasmuch as the conclusions are in some sense known without any proof at all: the arguments of philosophy exhibit as a reasoned and ordered whole of interconnected knowledge what was already in substance known before the work of philosophical inference occurred at all:

If philosophy differs from exact science in this way--the anticipation . . . of its conclusions by an experience
that possesses them in substance before its reasoning begins—other differences will follow, the chief being that in philosophy the conclusions can be checked by comparing them with these anticipations, and that by this checking the principles at work in the reasoning can be verified. If this is so the direction of the argument in respect of principles and conclusions is reversible, each being established by appeal to the other; but this is not a vicious circle because the word "established" here means raised to a higher grade of knowledge: what was a mere observation is now not merely observed but understood; what was merely an abstract principle is verified by appeal to facts. (EPM, 163).

(f) Philosophy differs from empirical science insofar as the initial data of philosophy does not consist of individual facts apprehended by perception, but of universal propositions apprehended in the experience of thinking; and the conclusions of philosophical inference are not something new, but are the facts themselves more thoroughly understood (EPM, 168–69).

"(I)n philosophy the knowledge . . . why things are so makes a difference to the knowledge that they are so" (EPM, 169).

(g) The "experience" on which "conclusions" are philosophically based, and by appeal to which they are checked, is only "non-philosophical" or "pre-philosophical" in a relative sense:

These two phrases ((i.e. experience and conclusions)) are names for any two successive stages in the scale of forms of philosophical knowledge. What is called experience may be any stage in this scale; in itself, as all human experience must be, permeated through and through by philosophical elements; but relatively crude and irrational as compared with the next stage above it, in which these philosophical elements are more fully developed . . . . But what is asked of the higher is not simply that it should agree with the lower, but rather that it should explain
The accomplishment of this task is only the continuation of a process already begun; it was only by thinking that we reached the point at which we stand, for the experience upon which we philosophize is already a rational experience . . . . But the new and intenser thinking must be thinking of a new kind; new principles are appearing in it, and these give a criterion by which the principles involved in the last step are superceded. (EPM, 172-73).

The ultimate response to the charge of vicious circularity in philosophical reasoning is therefore that, since all experience is already somewhat systematic and rational, whenever its systematic connections are exhibited, the experience is "established" in a higher sense of the term. (In the language of The Principles of Art, one might say that it is not merely a datum but an interpreted datum.) The "reciprocal" establishment in philosophical inference is therefore not truly reciprocal or circular, but more like the coiled meanings in a scale of forms. (h) But this response seems to get us out of the Charybdis of vicious circularity only by dashing us against the Scylla of vacuous philosophical inference: for did Collingwood not just tell us that the distinguishing mark of philosophical inference was that it is reversible as deductive and inductive inference are not? Collingwood's reply is that philosophical inference is always deductive and inductive, just as it is always critical and analytical, but always with a difference. As deductive it is a complete system based on principles and connected throughout by strictly logical bonds; but as such its principles are open to criticism on the
grounds that they must succeed in explaining our experience. As inductive it seeks rational universality; but only by finding it already present in the activity of philosophizing which is already occurring. As critical it always seeks to refute theory; but only in order to leave an experience standing which can be interpreted in the light of the principles implied in the critical process itself. And as analytical it begins with a knowledge-datum and seeks to explain what this knowledge means; but in so doing we come to know that datum in a different way, and therefore as modified in the knowing of it. (EPM, 173-75).

There is much left unexplained in this account of philosophical inference. For example we would like to know precisely how philosophy employs the logical principles which are a part of it, as stated in (a); and we would like to know more about what the conditional possibility in a "transcendental deduction" in (b) consists of, and in what sense necessity is involved in such a deduction, and if this is the same as "justification" in (c); and we would like to know how it is possible to "know already" in (c) an experience which in (f) is called universal and non-perceptual, and in (g) is called rational; and most of all we would like to know what it means for this experience, and indeed all experience, to be permeated through and through with philosophical elements as stated in (g).
What appears to be presupposed in all this is a full-blown epistemology that is only hinted at rather than explicitly stated. Some of the outlines of this epistemology will appear in the next and succeeding section of this chapter when we come to examine the intellectual functions of mind and the analysis of language, where we shall find some hints towards the resolution of several of these problems (e.g. in the notion of a pre-reflective act of meaning at the first level of consciousness, and in the view that rationality itself--including rational inference--is an extension of consciousness' demand for meaning, in this case what might be called "rational meaning" at the level of reasoned discourse). But before coming to this discussion and the implications for Q-A logic, we have one more "key concept" from the Essay to deal with.

(8) It is in Chapter IX that Collingwood comes closest to evaluating the dialectical logic of the Essay in terms of the criteria of consistency, completeness, and formality which we discussed in connection with Q-A logic in the preceding section. In this chapter Collingwood examines the claim of philosophy to be systematic and constructive rather than piecemeal and analytic--a claim that has been assaulted since the 19th century on the grounds that a system of thought claims for itself finality, completeness, objectivity, and unity, and philosophy has none of these. Our philosophical
knowledge is always open to future developments, is beyond the terminable survey of any individual, is the expression of a personal and private point of view, and effectively solves its problems not by mass generalities, but by handling each problem individually (EPM, 176-78).

Collingwood's reply in essence is that even if one concedes each of these points to the critic, the ideal of a system remains undaunted. (a) While not absolutely final, all knowledge in order to advance must take account of where it presently stands, and therefore retains a synoptic or summarizing element. In philosophy this record of progress is intensified insofar as any new development does not merely add to permanent and unaltered assets, but requires that previous conclusions be re-examined in the light of new developments (EPM, 179-81). And (b) while not absolutely complete, every philosophy is a borrowing from past philosophies and a collaboration with present philosophical thought, so that there is not and never has been any such thing as a private, personal, self-contained system of philosophy (EPM, 181-82). And (c) although each philosopher contributes only a part of a total

25 This obviously does not answer the objection: something may be no less incomplete for having taken account of previous and contemporary discussion of an issue, or even for having taken into account all such discussion, since all previous discussion may have missed the essential point. What must be shown is that all the relevant or pertinent issues are dealt with satisfactorily.
system, and hence his work is not that system but only a portion of it, in philosophy that contribution includes a theory of the whole of what philosophy is, and thus anticipates its objective conclusions (EPM, 182-84). And finally, (d) only an "anarchist of the mind" would fail to see that even a methodical avoidance of rigidity is itself a system or method, and although a philosopher should avoid bondage to any ready-made or rigid formula, a willingness to revise one's principles in the light of one's conclusions does not necessitate the rejection of all principles or of all conclusions (EPM, 184-85).

But Collingwood feels that the real answer to all these objections to systematic philosophy is made possible by regarding the topics or constituents of philosophy as comprising a scale of overlapping forms, wherein each topic differs from the rest not only in kind but also in degree. The universal subject-matter of philosophy differs intensively and specifically whether the genus is divided into the species of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc.; or in the division of the subject into historical phases (ancient, medieval, modern); or at the contemporaneous level in the division between what may minimally pass for philosophy, what retains its coherence in being grouped into one or more schools of thought, and the final "common spirit" of the present age; or finally in one's own philosophy, in the division
between unexamined opinions, criticized and defined assertions held with greater conviction, and a fully articulated and systematic whole of philosophical judgments (EPM, 194-98). In any of these arrangements of philosophical topics a systematic ideal is present as a scale of forms, which at each point sums up the scale to that point, showing how subordinate positions are opposed to and distinct from that point, and in error by comparison to a higher point on the scale (EPM, 190). In a scale of forms of philosophical knowledge any particular position is a non-final summary, an incomplete termination, a subjective necessity, and uniformly or methodically flexible (EPM, 191-92). Each approximates to an ideal of a perfectly philosophical subject matter treated by a perfectly philosophical method (EPM, 192).

Now although in this discussion of system in Chapter IX of the Essay there is no clear correspondence with the criteria for systematicity which we examined under the titles of consistency, completeness, and formality, in connection with our comparison of Q-A and F-logics, we can nevertheless see a rough correspondence between the description of a system which Collingwood here employs and those used to evaluate formal axiomatic systems in F-logic. Thus the criterion of consistency (that within the system propositions containing formal contradictions are not provable) roughly corresponds to the claim of unity in a philosophical system; completeness
(that all true statements within the system are derivable from the axioms and rules of method within the system) correspond roughly (but with considerable overlap) to Collingwood's terms "finality" and "completeness"; and formality (that the construction of well-formed statements within a system is carried out by the strict application of its rules, and not by the interpretation of specific meanings of the terms within the statement--i.e. that there be a purely formal way to decide which statements are well formed within the system) roughly corresponds to what Collingwood is calling "objectivity."26

But the points of difference are more striking than the points of superficial similarity. It is obvious from the discussion of philosophical inference in Chapter VIII of the Essay that, as Collingwood conceives it, D-logic is not simply a deductive system, and therefore to apply axiomatic criteria for evaluating it as a formal, consistent, and complete system would not be altogether appropriate. A system in which principles are revisable in the light of conclusions obviously transgresses the requirements of an axiomatic system of F-logic, in which the axioms or principles are stated in an object-language and the rules in a meta-language, in which the rules and principles are never revisable in the light of

conclusions. For (a) if the meaning of terms within the sys-
tem can form scales of overlapping forms, it is difficult to see how a criterion of strict consistency can be upheld, since the prerequisite of semantic identity of terms is vi-
olated every times such a term definable by a scale of forms is introduced. And (b) if the highest term in a dialectical system is summational or synoptic but not final, it is clear that a higher term (a statement that first appears as a de-
nial but implies the positive principles on which the criti-
cism is based) can always be introduced which is not strict-
ly inferable from within the system (since its positive prin-
ciples do not yet lie within the system)--in short, the sys-
tem is always incomplete. And (c) if experience is the touch-
stone of a revision (or reversal) of an argument from conclu-
sions to principles, even if this experience is that of a thinker, it is clear that the ideal of a purely formal valid-
ity cannot be maintained.

This brings us back to the question of circularity, which is all the more vicious in that it appears to escape ob-
jectivity altogether: for whatever "experience" is appealed to, it will always be merely someone's property unless what it means can be communicated in objective form. Collingwood's appeal to experience in both the discussion of philosophical inference in Chapter VIII and in his discussion of systematic philosophy in Chapter IX casts a suspicion of radical subjec-
tivity on the whole enterprise of the Essay. The issue raised by the entire argument of the Essay is this: if philosophical arguments are reversible on the basis of experience (and therefore its principles are corrigible), how does one know when one has successfully inferred in a philosophical sense? Collingwood wants to say that a successful philosophical inference is one which increases our understanding of experience at the same time it changes it (or makes a difference to it).

But if the criterion of success appealed to here is the fact of "philosophical experience" or "the experience of a thinker," then the argument of Chapter VIII is truly and merely circular: we know that philosophical inference is successful because we know we draw successful philosophical inferences. But the appeal to experience is inadequate as a criterion of success, since not all or just any philosophical inference will do. Some are better than others, some contradict others, some (as in Plato's dialogues) are meant to be understood as logically fallacious.

Another way of stating the problem is that if the criterion of successful philosophical inference is epistemological (one form of knowledge explaining another), how are we to decide what is good epistemology? Will any old theory of knowledge do? What about a realist's epistemology? We have seen that Collingwood argues that a realist epistemology is unsuccessful, but he argues that it fails not because it is
not epistemology (which it is: it purports to explain what occurs in knowing—that is, it makes knowing an object of knowledge), nor because it does not explain experience (which it does: it puts forward a theory of how objects are known), but because it fails to be good epistemology. It contradicts itself by talking formal nonsense about unsensed sensa, knowing what is simultaneously declared to be unknown, etc. On the "experience" of realist epistemology alone, on Collingwood's grounds, we could not say that we have successfully inferred in a philosophical sense.

But if we take seriously Collingwood's remark that when we talk about "establishing principles" it is in a different and higher sense of the term "establish" than when we talk about "establishing experience," then we may have a way out of this vicious circularity while retaining a legitimate sense of philosophical inference—and this is the only hope that the entire argument of the Essay has. Collingwood's commitment to the assertion that philosophical concepts are arranged as a scale of overlapping forms, also commits him to the conclusion that the principles employed in philosophical argument are increasing both in generality (taking in more of our experience) and in intensional reference (stating more of what is in that experience in terms of significance). This "higher knowledge" is systematic knowledge as articulated and related in a system of discourse bound by logical relations.
and (inasmuch as it is not merely formal) categorically referential. If this "higher knowledge" is the same thing as what he meant by "real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle, then it is possible that the criterion of success in philosophical inference may be the same as the criterion of a successful epistemology; it is the articulation of our own knowledge as a system of discourse, logically related and categorically referential. In the next section we shall pursue this lead into Collingwood's philosophy of mind and his analysis of language, and in so doing catch sight of logic as an extension of meaning at the rational level.

But before proceeding with this analysis we must make good a previous promise. We are now in as good a position as we shall ever be to evaluate the standpoint of the Essay. We noted in a previous chapter and also at the beginning of this section that (a) the Essay claims both conditional and unconditional validity for itself, and (b) that its treatment of pre- and non-philosophical methods cannot be taken as literally true for mathematics and empirical science. But within this present section we have also seen that Collingwood (c) extended philosophical concepts to include all experience (all human experience is "permeated through and through by philosophical elements" (EPM, 172); (d) declared that philosophical thought is never devoid of ontological reference (EPM, 125); (e) criticized analytical and critical philosophy for failing
to justify themselves by presenting the positive principles from which their critical and analytical methods proceed (EPM, 145, 148-49); (f) insisted that philosophy is obliged to produce a theory of itself and to be constructive and systematic (EPM, 1, 198); and finally, (g) stated that what he is doing in the Essay is to discuss the nature of philosophy by discussing not only what it is or has been, but also what it is trying to or ought to be (EPM, 2, 4, 7).

From (e), (f), and (g) it follows that the Essay is stating a theory of philosophy that is nonetheless itself philosophy, and is stating what philosophy is and what it ought to be by presenting its positive principles. From these and (d) it follows that, ideally speaking, what is true of philosophy must also be true to some extent for reality (i.e. philosophy cannot be content with constructing a mere ens rationis or formal system, but must have ontological reference). And from these together with (c) it follows that (once more within unspecified bounds) what is true for philosophy is true to some extent for all experience.

Now the reason that we must hedge these conclusions with qualifiers like "to some extent" and "ideally speaking" is that we cannot simply apply the concepts of the Essay in a wholesale manner either to experience in general or to reality. Obviously not all concepts overlap in a scale of forms, nor is everything in reality arranged in hierarchical fashion.
Furthermore if the classificatory ideal of exact and empirical science is retained as a legitimate way to organize experience (which is never denied in the Essay), then either one must deny to it the title of true experience, which is then reserved for philosophy alone, or else state that there are valid experiences not subject to the characteristics of philosophical experience.

But if we approach the Essay from the perspective provided by Speculum Mentis we can say that Collingwood would choose the first alternative: although it is quite possible to adopt the scientific point of view on experience, such a viewpoint cannot be ultimately and finally true (i.e. true unconditionally or absolutely), but only true in an abstract way. If, as Speculum Mentis proposes, all knowledge is truly organized in a scale of forms, and if the doctrine of the Essay concerning the relative standing of successive terms in this scale as "experience" and "conclusion" be taken seriously, then it follows that the relative position of empirical science and philosophy are such that empirical science is "experience" to philosophy's "conclusion." Furthermore if this conclusion is already present as an experience which "anticipates" its conclusion before reasoning about it begins, then empirical science is an experience which anticipates the conclusions that are first stated explicitly by philosophy. Philosophy "explains" science only by incorporating its posi-
tive content, and rejecting its negative aspect (i.e. its abstractness). From the point of view of Speculum Mentis, then, the closest that we can come to saying what the Essay's evaluation of exact and empirical science is, is that they are not what philosophy explicitly states itself to be. Philosophy is self-justifying; exact and empirical sciences are not. (Cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 26-27).

Unfortunately this gets us into difficulties concerning our original statement that the Essay utilizes an essentially Kantian strategy--i.e. it assumes the fact of certain experiences and goes on to ask on what necessary and sufficient conditions such an experience is alone possible. We are left, as we were in Chapter VII above, confronting something resembling the "absolute knowledge" of an Hegelian sort rather than confronting conditional schematized categories without which experience would not be intelligible. The Essay leaves us in unresolved puzzlement about this matter, except to the extent that Collingwood makes it clear that he is not content with leaving philosophical method where Kant had left it in the Critique of Pure Reason: philosophy cannot be content with viewing itself as merely critical--it must go further and state what the positive grounds are from which criticism proceeds. But the positive grounds that he provides, as we shall see in a moment, are not a repetition of his conflicting remarks about "absolute knowledge" in Speculum Mentis.
but a development of the theme of language that we first dis­
covered in germ in Speculum Mentis.

But where does all this leave us in our discussion of Q-A logic? In the previous section of this chapter we found that although Collingwood proposed Q-A logic as an alternative to F-logic, on examination it turns out either to presuppose it or to presuppose what F-logic presupposes; meaning, vali-
dity, and truth appear to be establishable independently of Q-A or P-Q-A complexes, and Q-A logic (either as Q-A_A or Q-A_M) fails to meet criteria of consistency, completeness, or formality. In this section we have been primarily concerned with discussing D-logic and its relationship to F-logic, from which it differs in a number of important ways (employing overlapping classes, reversible inferences, etc.). Q-A logic has hardly entered into the discussion. In the next section we shall see that rather than being an oversight on Colling­woold's part, it is an indication that in his view these three logics are related primarily by locating them in an epistemo-
logical context--i.e. through the intellective, linguistic functions of mind.

As we noted above, the clue to the discovery of the nature of philosophical thinking in the Essay is the overlap of classes, and this is described in essentially semantic terms: it is an overlap of intensional meaning, and meaning is a function of mind at the linguistic level of conscious-
ness. The final step in our analysis of Collingwood's views on logic must therefore take us back to the philosophy of mind in *The Principles of Art* and *The New Leviathan*. After surveying the functions of intellect and reason in these two works, we shall attempt a final evaluation of the roles of the three logics we have been discussing.

4. **Language and Logic in *The Principles of Art***.

In our exploration of Collingwood's views on logic we have noted not only a certain informality to his presentation of both Q-A and D-logics, but also a tendency to describe these logics in epistemological terms--concepts, judgments, suppositions made by acts of choice, Q-A correlativity defined in terms of persons, etc.--in short, terms which retain a reference to mental activities as part of their essential meaning. While any practitioner of contemporary formal logic would find this to be archaic flaw, we find Collingwood in his correspondence with Ryle insisting on the propriety of this epistemological informality, and even suggesting (as in the passage where he states that he understands the universal to be that which makes a class a class) that there is somehow a priority of the epistemological to the formal: that there can be an F-logic depends on the fact that there are certain "element-types" of which thought is capable, and it is on the basis of these that F-logical systems are constructable.
Now all this leans heavily on a philosophy of language and mind for its justification, and we left our examination of Collingwood's philosophy of mind at exactly the point where we now wish to resume the discussion. Whatever else Q-A logic, F-logic, and D-logic may have in common, they are varieties of discourse, and hence linguistic functions of mind at the level of intellect. Consequently we must return to The Principles of Art (and in the next section to The New Leviathan) to examine as best we can the functions of mind at the conceptual, propositional, and rational levels, in order to see if we can find a clue to unscrambling some of the puzzles we have thus far encountered in our examination of the three logics with which we are presently concerned. This will eventually lead us into a discussion of Collingwood's views on abstraction, which has been such a sensitive issue for Collingwood's interpreters, and which we have thus far avoided.

Once more, at the risk of oversimplification, we shall first present an outline of Collingwood's major conclusions on language in The Principles of Art.
TABLE 11

LANGUAGE AND EXPRESSION IN THE PRINCIPLES OF ART

1. Expression is the fundamental practical act of mind in which emotions are manifested by bodily acts. It is by the same act that we express an emotion and become conscious of it. When a man expresses an emotion what is meant is that he finds himself in a feeling-situation of emotional excitement from which he attempts to extricate himself by doing something, where that doing is both a conscious activity and a linguistic act. Expression in its primitive state is non-descriptive because it is not a process of conceptualization or classification: it is completely individualized and oriented to the felt situation. It is also primarily addressed by the person to himself, and secondarily to an audience of persons like himself, and in both cases the expression is intended to make his audience (including himself) understand how he feels. (PA, 109-14).

2. Psychical expression (e.g. grimacing, blushing, cringings) are primitive expressions at the psychical level. It consists in the doing of involuntary and perhaps even totally unconscious bodily acts, related in a single experience but analyzable into the elements of a sensum, its emotional charge, and the expression of that emotion. There are no unexpressed emotions, because every kind and shade of emotion at this level of experience has its expression in some change of the muscular or circulatory or glandular system of the organism. (PA, 228-30, 238).

3. Language in its wider sense, or imaginative expression, consists of bodily actions expressing certain emotions insofar as we are conscious that controlling them is our way of expressing these emotions. These emotions are minimal-ly those which arise only through the consciousness of self (e.g. hatred, love, anger, shame). Language in its widest sense is the bodily expression of emotion dominated by thought in its primitive form as consciousness. Within such a system there is a synthesis of material elements consisting of psychical expressions, but organized according to a formal principle provided by the corresponding mode of consciousness (i.e. primitive consciousness of self). (PA, 231-35).
4. **Speech** (vocal language or language proper) is a system of gestures having the peculiarity that each gesture produces a characteristic sound. Every kind or order of speech is an offshoot from an original language of total bodily gesture, that is, a language in which every movement and stationary poise of every part of the body has the same kind of significance which movements of the vocal organs possess in a spoken language. This total bodily gesture is the one and only real language: it is the motor side of our total imaginative experience (or total activity of imaginative consciousness). Speech is a function of self-consciousness: the discovery of myself as a person is the discovery that I can speak. But this self-discovery is also the experience of myself as a listener, and the consciousness of our own existence is also the consciousness of the existence of other persons as speakers in the community of language. Understanding the speech of others involves an act of imaginative, reconstructive consciousness in which mistakes can occur, both in expressing one's own emotions (the corruption of consciousness) or in mistaking the speech of others (misunderstanding or misinterpretation). (PA, 242-51).

5. Intellectualized speech is language specifically suited to expressing thought and its attendant intellectual emotions. It differs from imaginative expression in the same way that the object of imagination differs from that of intellect, i.e. as something presented as one, indivisible, self-contained and complete in itself (imagination) and as a manifold of such objects with determinate relations between them (analytic thought), or again as a relation between something determinate and something indeterminate (abstract thought). Intellectualized language, even when modified by the grammatical and logical analysis of language, never loses its emotive expressiveness. In its final form as artificial symbolism invented for a purely scientific purpose, it has both expressiveness and meaning, whereas in its imaginative form it has expressiveness but not meaning. (PA, 252-61, 268-69).
As in the previous sections of this chapter, we will group our comments around these summarized topics.

(1) We notice first that in his discussion, language is located on a scale of forms, the minimal form of which is what he calls "expression," and which consists of species that are themselves concrete (i.e. having their own form or principle of organization) but are further determined by successive forms (i.e. are "matter" or "experience" for the "synthesis" of their elementary parts by a higher mental act) (PA, 230-34). Collingwood even calls attention to this sort of structure when he insists that "each level must organize itself according to its own principles before a transition can be made to the next, for until that has been done, the raw material needed for the creation of the next is not forthcoming" (PA, 234). Thus the emotions of consciousness (emotions that presuppose a consciousness of self) must be formally or linguistically expressed before a transition can be made to the level of intellect.

One consequence of defining language by means of a scale of forms is that successive levels incorporate the positive content of all that precedes them in the scale--each is a summary of what went before it. Consequently, true to his description of such a scale in the Essay, Collingwood insists that the element of expressiveness is never lost when
language develops into the forms expressive of intellectual functions. Consistent with his Law of Primitive Survivals, Collingwood therefore insists that there exists something he wishes to call "emotions of intellect," which intellectualized language, even in its symbolic form as mathematics or logic, continues to express: intellectualized language has both expressiveness and meaning, whereas imaginative language has expressiveness, but not meaning as distinct from it. Unfortunately, aside from his brief suggestions that this is what is involved in the excitement of intellectual discovery, and that it is intellectual emotions that are involved when one values a thought to the point that he feels it important enough to utter in a given situation (PA, 164, 267), Collingwood does not develop this interesting suggestion in The Principles of Art--at least not beyond the point necessary for the elaboration of his esthetic theory (it plays an important role in his discussion of esthetic truth--cf. PA, 282-88). 27 As we shall see in the conclusion to this chapter, 27 This is not the only frustration for an interpreter seeking to understand Collingwood's idea of language in The Principles of Art: the chapter on language is the most exasperating chapter in the whole book. While it is the apex of the entire argument of his esthetics (art is ultimately defined as imaginative expression or language) and laced with pregnant suggestions, it never fulfills its promise in a satisfying analysis of the phenomenon of language. And what is worse is that it presents examples which are not only misleading but downright abusive. As an example of the emotive expressiveness of intellectualized language Collingwood conjures up for his readers the image of the "fastidious Cambridge mouth" of I. A. Richards (whose theory of language in art he
there is concealed in the vagaries of this discussion an im-
portant clue to the understanding of his Q-A logic and its
relation to F-logic and D-logic--i.e. the heuristic intellec-
tive function of questions as **anticipations** of answers.

(2) A second consequence of defining language by
means of a scale of forms is that each level presupposes the
materials presented to it by a lower level: psychical expres-
sion is presupposed by language as imaginative expression;
the language of imaginative gesture is presupposed by speech;

clearly opposes); and he compares grammarians to primitive
African butchers who slice steaks from living animals (PA, 259, 264). Worst of all, he relies for many of his major
conclusions on arguments that are utterly contingent, gra-
tuitous, and unconvincing. The most notable instance of this
is his argument in support of the thesis that all language,
even in the symbolic, intellectualized language of the mathe-
matician, is emotively expressive. He states baldly that
"every mathematician knows" that a symbolism re-acquires the
emotional expressiveness of language proper. He then goes as
far as to say that in expressing a perfectly definite in-
tellectual emotion a perfectly definite act of thought is ex-
pressed too, so that a visiting physicist seeing Archimedes
racing naked from his bath down the streets of Syracuse shout-
ing "Eureka!" would, if he had himself made Archimedes' dis-
covered and knew how to read this expression of intellectual-
ized emotion, be able to understand the whole scene, even
that it was the discovery of specific gravity that caused
Archimedes' excitement (PA, 267-68). It is no wonder that
intelligent readers like Susanne Langer accuse him of "philos-
sophical malpractice" (Feeling and Form, p. 384), since ar-
guments like these are utterly unconvincing. On such grounds
as these one might prove that the earth is flat and that pre-
cise scientific information may be passed from mind to mind
by mental telepathy. Unfortunately such diversions as these
may also distract the reader from supplying his own convinc-
ing examples and arguments for the serious suggestions and
principles he is advocating.
and, speech is presupposed by symbolic language. It is therefore just a consequence of defining language by a scale of forms when Collingwood states that one of the presuppositions of F-logic (which occurs at the level of symbolic expression) is the "propositional assumption" which presupposes the grammatical and lexicographical units (words, phrases, sentences) constructed at the level of speech: propositions or statements (that which can be true or false) are isolated from a group of expressions called sentences which are presumed to be already grammatically well-formed. (Cf. PA, 260).

Unfortunately, for his readers, Collingwood appears so bent upon emphasizing the artificiality of forcing the living language of imaginative expression into the categories devised by the grammatical and logical analysis of language that the positive point that he is making is submerged under what appears to be an abusive assault on grammarians and logicians for doing what he admits to be their proper jobs. But if Collingwood's description of grammarians as "butchers" is meant to be merely abusive, why would he bother analyzing this abusiveness any further? But he does, distinguishing between the grammatical functions of lexicography (the cataloguing of recurrent units of speech, called words, and the listing of their respective meanings as relations of synonymy), accidence (rules governing word inflection), and syntax (rules governing words as functional units in sentences) (PA, 256-
57)? And further, why would he feel obliged to describe the three stages (actually three presuppositions) in the grammatical analysis of speech, viz. (a) the reduction of language as an activity to the product of this activity, "speech" or "discourse"; (b) the division of this product into units (words, idioms, phrases, sentences, etc.); and (c) the dividing of a schema of relations between these units (syntax or the rules of grammar)--these presupposing respectively the belief in a "metaphysical fiction" of the finished product of speech-language, the existence of self-sustaining atomic word-units that comprise this product, and fictional rules governing their relationships (PA, 254-56)? May we not safely assume that having taught himself half a dozen languages and demonstrated his proficiency both as a translator and as a celebrated user of English, that he was well aware of the importance of such grammatical analysis and of lexicography and the science of linguistics in general, but that he felt constrained to warn his readers against a certain reductionistic tendency which results from an overtly idolatrous attitude towards the teachings of such sciences? And are his remarks in opposition to this attitude not indicative of his continuing struggle against what he understood to be the realistic thesis? In this case, the treatment of language as

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28 This is clear from a passage in which he first describes the activity of the grammarian as a cutting up of a presumed "thing" called language into pieces called words.
(3) Of more direct concern to this chapter is his discussion of "the logical analysis of language"—by which he understands "a certain technique, first systematically expounded ... in Aristotle's *Organon*" and subsequently developed by a long line of logicians culminating in "the logical analysts and positivists of the present day" (PA, 259). The aim of this technique, he says, is to make language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of thought—that is, to remove the

"Some readers will object to this phrase on the ground that I have used a verb of acting when I ought to have used a verb of thinking; a dangerous habit, they will remind me, because when you get to the point of saying 'thought constructs the world' when you mean 'some one thinks how the world is constructed,' you have slipped into idealism through mere looseness of language; and that, they will add, is the way idealists are made. There is much that might be said in answer to this objection; as, that philosophical controversies are not to be settled by a kind of police-regulation governing people's choice of words, and that a school of thought . . . which depends for its existence on enforcing a particular jargon is a school which I neither respect nor fear. But I prefer to reply merely that I said cut because I meant cut. The division of the 'thing' known as language into words is a division not discovered, but devised, in the process of analyzing it" (PA, 255). In the immediately succeeding passage, Collingwood also declares his refusal "to be frightened by the bogy of idealism" when he states that grammatical rules are devised rather than discovered (PA, 256). We might add that the reason that Collingwood meant to say "cut" when he could have said "dissect," and "butcher" when he could have said "anatomist" (for after all, grammarians do cut up language "at its joints" as Aristotle would say, rather than hacking them across muscle bundles for sale as steaks at a market), is that his intention was polemical as well as analytical. He wished to warn us of what he regarded as a dangerous tendency. What else would this be but realism?
frustrations of expressions due to the inaccuracies and ambiguities in speech, and to do so by replacing them with logical forms (either of the subject-predicate form of Aristotelian logic or the propositional forms of what Collingwood calls the "modern analytic school" of logic) (PA, 259-60).

Once again Collingwood distracts the reader from his positive treatment of the subject by his emphasis on the artificiality of the logician's project, i.e. proposing a modification of language rather than a theory of it. What a contemporary logician would be surprised at is not the accusation that he is proposing a modification of language (for after all, most contemporary logicians would agree that what they are doing is constructing formal systems, which may or may not have a similarity or applicability to natural languages). On the contrary he would be surprised by the suggestion that what he might be mistaken to be doing is the construction of a theory of any natural language (which is taken to be the province of a science of linguistics).

But he might further not only be surprised by, but also take issue with, Collingwood's list of the "assumptions" of the logical analysis of language. In addition to assuming that the grammatical transformation of language has been successfully accomplished, the logician, Collingwood says, makes three further assumptions:
First comes what I shall call the propositional assumption. This is the assumption that, among the various "sentences" already distinguished by grammarians, there are some which, instead of expressing emotions, make statements. It is to these that the logician confines his attention. Second, the principle of homolingual translation. This is an assumption about sentences corresponding to the lexicographer's assumptions about words (or ... lexicographical units) when he "defines the meaning" of a given word by equating it with that of another, or of a group of words taken together. According to the principle of homolingual translation, one sentence may have precisely the same meaning as another single sentence, or group of sentences taken together, in the same language, so that one may be substituted for the other without change of meaning. The third assumption is that of logical preferability: namely that, of two sentences or sentence-groups having the same meaning, one may be preferable, from a logician's point of view, to the other ... . The preferred version is preferred because it is one which the rules of the logician's technique enable him to manipulate. (PA, 260-61; cf. A, 35-36).

We suspect that a contemporary logician would object to this description of the assumptions he makes in his logical inquiries: (a) he would object to the confinement of his attention to statements alone, and worse still to statements as sentences already distinguished by grammarians; (b) he would say that homolingual translation or substitutability is not dependent on identity of meaning alone, but on the logical form or structure of language as well; and (c) he would argue that logical preferability is not something dependent solely on the logician's point of view, but rather is presupposed by the logical employment of sentences in a language and merely displayed by translation into formal structures. But rather than presuming to speak for contemporary logicians,
we are more interested in what Collingwood has to say about these assumptions, and in this connection it is noteworthy that he never denies that they are valid assumptions. He says only that as proposals for the modification of language, they can never be carried out in their entirety. Language proper, even as an artificial symbolism, can never lose its emotive-expressive aspect. Once mastered, a symbolic language, invented to serve a technical purpose, reacquires the emotional expressiveness of language proper (PA, 262, 268).

The principles of homolingual translation and logical preferability provide us with some supporting evidence for the suggestion we made in considering the "variable" (which the Essay on Philosophical Method declared to be extrinsic to the generic essence in non-philosophical concepts, but identical with it in philosophical concepts) in terms of the substitution-relations of a logic based on abstract class concepts. As we noted in our discussion of the Essay, when Speculum Mentis described the abstract universal of logic as one which is "indifferent" to the variation of its instances, and when the Essay described the classes of F-logic as one in which the variable is not identified with the generic essence, what he seems to have in mind is the fact that in F-logic replacement instances of a class (whether this be of terms or propositions) are indifferent to whatever other properties these instances may have: their identity is based solely on the criteria for
their membership in the class. They are therefore substitutable one for the other. In Speculum Mentis and in the Essay Collingwood deliberately contrasted this sort of replacement-relation with another in which the differences of the instances of a class are relevant to the class itself. In Speculum Mentis this was called a "concrete universal," or one in which the variable element between the instances of the universal is not ignored, but makes a difference to the generic universal itself; in the Essay this was expressed by saying that for philosophical concepts, the variable (presumably what allows one instance of a concept to differ from another instance of the same concept) is identified with the generic essence (i.e. is related to the meaning of the concept in a necessary and essential manner). We suggested that if such differences between individual instances of a universal are essential to the identity of the concept as such, then they must be regarded as part of that concept's meaning--which brought us to the brink of a discussion of the analytic-synthetic distinction.

What we wish to point out here is that in an explicit discussion of the assumptions of what is undoubtedly F-logic, Collingwood states the replacement-relation of substitutability of instances for one another in a class as essential to the F-logical analysis of language.

(4) Another interesting corollary of the definition of language by means of a scale of forms is that in the speci-
fication of the genus "expression" into the species "symbolic language," the essential functions of emotive expression and intentional meaning are both retained in the same act. This has a peculiar outcome: since no matter how artifactual a symbolic language becomes it retains or "reacquires" the emotional expressiveness of language proper, in Collingwood's view it never loses contact with the emotional life of the speaker. 29

As his remarks about interpersonal self-consciousness and the community of speakers and hearers indicates (PA, 247-52), he does not believe that such an admission leads to a form of linguistic solipsism in which a "private language" is employed which no one can understand but the speaker (since no one can "read" the emotional life internal to a user of a pri-

Computer analysis and programmers reading this today might be startled by such a conclusion, since machine-communication languages like COBAL seem to work quite effectively for the tasks which they are designed to perform. What Collingwood might say about the development of such languages as these is hard to say, since it would be peculiar to predicate "emotional expressiveness" to a computer print-out, while one would also be forced to admit that there is some sort of communication occurring between man and machine by means of such languages. Our guess is that Collingwood would not take computer-language to be language at all, but a sort of book-keeping aided by mechanical and electronic devices, not any more expressive of thought than the noises emitted from a tape-recorder or the typescript emerging from a typewriter. The computer operator is still engaging in linguistic expression at the input and interpretation ends of the process of machine communication: the rest is automatic book-keeping, not thought.
vate language). On the contrary Collingwood goes to the opposite extreme and declares that at a primitive level total communication can and does occur—as in the spread of emotion like a kind of contagion from person to person, e.g. panic in a crowd. Although this occurs directly only at the psychical level (and this is the level at which even animals can be said to communicate), at levels above this, in which emotions require consciousness of self, such communications occur usually only through "language" in its broadest sense (as totally bodily gesture—cf. PA, 238, where Collingwood baldly states that there are no unexpressed emotions).

Collingwood does not spell out in detail how the intentional meanings of a speaker are bound to his expression of emotion, but it is clear that he wishes to retain both functions in all levels of linguistic activity. For Collingwood

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30 In speaking of psychical emotions which are always expressed as some change in the muscular or circulatory or glandular system, Collingwood writes that "nothing but lack of skill ((in observing such changes and correctly interpreting them)) prevents us from reading like an open book the psychical emotions of every one with whom we have to do. But observing and interpreting is an intellectual process; and this is not the only way in which psychical expression conveys a meaning. There is a kind of emotional contagion which takes effect without any intellectual activity; without the presence even of consciousness" (PA, 230). Collingwood cites, in addition to the spread of panic through a crowd, the examples of the sympathetic feeling of pain or joy, and the terror transmitted from prey to predator.
meaning never loses its aspect of being something that a speaker does (where "speech," of course, is taken in a broad sense to include not only vocal utterance but any suitable substitute for it--e.g. the sign language of mutes; it includes anything in which a physical gesture can be tied to a meaning). Meanings are bound to what have more recently been called "illocutionary acts," or what a speaker intends to convey by what he says. They are not something contained in a dictionary, with fixed relations of synonymy, but are part of a living process linked to the emotional life of speakers, whose intentions to convey meanings have a career in which meanings are born, develop in a context of relations, and may even die. Meanings, on Collingwood's view, are not something words have, but something that speakers do with words. (cf. PA, 269).

This is as far as Collingwood takes us on the path to language. Whether or not a case can be made for a language that is purely symbolic or has meaning without being expressive, such a thing would not be regarded as a true language by Collingwood.

(5) One final aspect of Collingwood's discussion of language needs to be mentioned before going on to relate language to the levels of consciousness, and that is the global or comprehensive aspect of each level of the linguistic scale of forms. Each has what Collingwood calls its own principle
of organization or form, although he is not always careful to make explicit what that principle is. In the final analysis it might not be possible to do so, since any one level may be capable of a virtual infinity of forms with no apparent unifying communality between them: imaginative expression in art, for example, encompasses everything from dancing (Collingwood calls dance the mother of language) to drama to painting—the list is only arbitrarily broken off, every work of art being a "monad" and even the everyday acts of human life being to some extent works of art.

But in attempting to characterize them as essential structures, Collingwood points continually toward a completed, global activity—in the case under discussion, the "language of total bodily gesture," which he calls the only real (imaginative) language (PA, 246-47). He correlates this "total bodily gesture" language with the corresponding mental function of "total imaginative activity" (AP, 247). There is a similarity here to what we have seen Collingwood advocating concerning the organizational unity of the "logical structure of real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle: in any example of real thinking there is contained an example of every kind of proposition as so many "element-types" (CRC-I, 18). If any level of consciousness has its own organizational unity, and if this unity must be complete before a transition to a higher level of consciousness may occur (cf. PA, 233-34), then
the explicit articulation of the "logic" or coherence of any level of consciousness is a matter of making explicit or expressing what is already a completed whole, insofar as that unity is viewed from a higher level.

We may speculate, in terms of our discussion of logic, that the systematic unity of F-logic (or what we may now call a symbolic language in which what we say can be distinguished--but not separated--from what we mean, and artificial symbols can be devised and stipulated for a particular meaning) is exhibited only by the assumption of a higher viewpoint (what might be called today a "meta-language") for which F-logic is an object. In Speculum Mentis we observed Collingwood making just such an argument: F-logic is the unifying principle of a form of experience which he called "scientific thinking," in which the distinction between what we say and what we mean is first made manifest (SM, 128-30, 154-57; cf. PA, 269); but if the principle of organization of such an activity is not already somehow complete, the transition could not be made to a higher viewpoint for which the lower is regarded as an object. Philosophy is such a higher viewpoint, according to Speculum Mentis, and its logic is dialectical. Can we conclude for Collingwood that D-logic is a meta-language for the discussion of objects that have F-logic as their unifying principle?
Perhaps. But once more we must point out where Collingwood leaves the discussion and where we resume it. He never called D-logic a metalanguage, nor did he ever explicitly work out the relationship between D-logic and F-logic other than to point out in the essay the salient ways in which D-logic differs from F-logic in their respective ideals. We have also tried to remain alert to the fact that the existence of something which meets the description Collingwood gives of D-logic depends on his ability to provide us with concrete, irreducible, and convincing instances of such a logic. So far the instances of D-logic that we have encountered are those which stress the overlapping layers of meaning in certain terms used by philosophers, the unity of meaning and reference in universal categorical philosophical judgments, and the reversible inference structures employed in typical philosophical arguments. But in the final analysis the issue of whether there is anything which meets the criteria for D-logic described by the essay rests, as we saw in our analysis of the essay, on whether or not there can be a kind of knowledge which is self-justifying.

But in the meantime we have already seen that for Collingwood the issue of logic is always bound to that of language, and language is a function of a conscious mind. Before concluding our survey of the topic we therefore must attend to final discussion of logical mental functions in The New Leviathan.

We are now in as good a position as we shall ever be to mount a final assault on the heights of Collingwood's philosophy of mind--i.e. the functions of intellect and reason. We must remind ourselves once again of the difficulties we encountered in Chapter VIII in reconciling the conflicting terminology between The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan. Some of these terminological ambiguities, we noted, can be cleared up by recognizing wider and narrower senses that Collingwood allows for terms like "consciousness" and "thought;" and some of them can be reconciled by paying careful attention to the differing approaches of the two works, which helps put such unannounced shifts in the comprehension of its terms in their methodological contexts.

Although we did not call attention to this fact in the immediately preceding section of this present chapter, this shift in approach between the two works is even apparent in the discussion of language in each of the two works. The Principles of Art considers language in terms of the dialec-

31 The principal discrepancy is that in The Principles of Art consciousness, even in its most primitive form, is called thought, and its function as attention is selective without being abstractive; in The New Leviathan "simple consciousness of feeling" is not considered to be thought, and selective attention functions only at the secondary level of consciousness and is abstractive (cf. PA, 204-06, 215-17; NL, 4.13-4.5).
tical array of forms of expressiveness from psychical expression in physiological changes to symbolic language; The New Leviathan considers language as an abstraction from, or restriction of, "discourse" or "the activity by which a man means anything" (NL, 6.1-6.11). An unwary interpreter might conclude from a superficial comparison of these two treatments of language that Collingwood had "changed his mind" or "repudiated" his earlier treatment of the subject. Our own inclination is to see the later work in the light of the earlier one, and hence as an analytic discussion, from a restricted point of view, of a topic which has a broader context and represents one portion of a "scale of forms"—in this case, the scale of forms of expression.

However this does not resolve all the interpretative difficulties posed by The New Leviathan on the issue of language and logic. We shall attend to some of the more important of these problems after our summary of the doctrines of The New Leviathan on language and the levels of mental functions.
TABLE 12

LANGUAGE, LOGIC, AND MENTAL ACTS IN THE NEW LEVIATHAN

1. Discourse is the activity by which a man means anything: it is the activity of meaning something (a) by something else (b), where meaning (a) is an act of theoretical consciousness, and (b) is a practical activity, the production in oneself or others of a flow of sounds or the like which serve as the vehicle of that meaning. Discourse is continuous, so that even the rests or pauses of silence, immobility, or the like which punctuate it are significant parts of it, not interruptions of it. But selective attention breaks it up into words; vocal words if it is speech, gesture-words if in gesture, etc. Once discourse is broken up into units it is the lexicographer's business to determine the meaning or various meanings which a given word bears whenever it is used. The phonetic or other vehicle of discourse is physical in the sense of being a succession of feelings or sensations with their emotional charges produced by the activity of speech or the like. (NL, 6.1-6.19).

2. Language is an abstraction from discourse: it is the system adopted, the means employed, the rules followed in the activity of discourse. It is a system of sounds or the like as having meanings, these meanings being what a person using that word means by making that sound or gesture. Language is not a device whereby knowledge already existing in one man's mind is communicated to another's, but an activity prior to knowledge itself, without which knowledge could never come into existence. As consciousness develops, language develops with it. (NL, 6.11, 6.18, 6.41, 6.58).

a. Language in its simplest form is the language of consciousness in its simplest form; the mere register of feelings, irrational, unplanned, unorganized, unconscious. At this level of consciousness thought is merely apprehensive, or capable of taking what is "given" to it. (NL, 6.53, 10.51).

b. When consciousness becomes conceptual thought, language develops abstract terms. At this level of consciousness thought is capable of framing abstractions from what is given. Selective attention breaks up continuous discourse into words. A word is a ling-
uistic habit of the community using it; the habit of conveying a special meaning by using any member of a certain class of auditory and visual vehicles, of which any member is an example of that word. (NL, 6.12, 6.17, 6.58, 10.52, 34.12).

c. When consciousness becomes propositional thought, language develops the indicative sentence as the standard verbal form in which to state the proposition. At this level of consciousness thought is capable of discriminating truth from error. (NL, 6.59, 10.51).

d. When consciousness becomes reason language becomes demonstrative discourse wherein sentences are so linked together as to state verbally the consequences of one proposition in relation to another. At this level of consciousness thought is capable of understanding both itself and other things. (NL, 6.59, 10.51).

3. Conceptual thinking or selective attention is an act of practical consciousness by which a man emerges from the state of feeling and simple consciousness of feeling. A man makes himself conscious of his feelings by naming them, either by the language of gesture (e.g. by an expressive shiver) or by the language of speech (saying "cold"). To name the feeling awakens consciousness of the feeling: until it is named, the feeling is preconscious; when it is named it becomes conscious. (NL, 6.2-6.28, 7.2-7.23).

a. Selective attention is the act in which a person attends to some element or group of elements within the simple consciousness of a confused mass of feeling. The act of attending is doing something to oneself as well as doing something to the object being attended to; it is focusing one's own consciousness on a certain part of the field of feeling and repressing the rest; but it is also circumscribing it, drawing a line between it and the rest of the field (NL, 7.23-7.24).

b. The act of classifying is the practical activity of consciousness involved in "drawing the line" between objects (sensa) in a field of feeling, i.e. the point at which one decides to stop calling the color seen "red" and begin calling it "purple" or whatever. On acts like this classes depend for their existence; all classes being artifacts, depending on practical activities for their existence and depending for their publicity as between various persons on these persons performing practical activities of similar kinds; for
many classes are private to the persons who made them. A class is a collection of many things into one, in virtue of their resemblance. The distinguishing mark of a class is that it is a whole whose parts, its "members," are mutually related by way of resemblance. Membership in a given class demands a certain kind and degree of resemblance. The settlement of what the degree and kind of resemblance is for membership in a class is an act of practical consciousness called classifying. (NL, 19.22-19.35).

c. Evocative thinking is the act of arousing in oneself by the work of thought feelings not found as given in oneself; it is an act which goes with the act of selective attention. Feelings thus aroused, called evocations, form a context inseparable from any selection, and are connected with it by logical relations. Evocations are feelings felt but not given, produced by the same act of practical consciousness that produced the selection or abstraction from the given field of conscious feeling. (NL, 7.32-7.38).

d. A concept (notion) is a selection together with its context of evocations. Any logical relation may preside over the birth, from a given selection, of an evocation forming part of its context. It is not possible to compile a list of such logical relations, although contrast and comparison are two such relations. (NL, 7.34-7.36, 7.39).

e. Abstractions are determinate in some ways, indeterminate in others (as in a triangle, which is determinate in having three sides, but except for what is implied in this, it is indeterminate in everything else). Abstractions are only second-order objects made by the mind out of its immediate or first-order objects. Abstraction is a necessary part of thought; an abstraction is false if the elements abstracted are judged to be mutually independent entities. (NL, 7.56-7.57, 7.67, 26.18-26.19).

4. Propositional thinking is the set of mental acts that are involved in asking and answering questions, and distinguishing truth from error (and good from evil). Asking a question implies contemplating alternatives. A question that offers no alternatives is a bogus question, from the point of view of knowledge proper. The technique of knowing proper or scientific method depends on replacing vague or confused questions, which are unanswerable, with real questions which have a precise answer. (NL, 4.34-4.35, 11.12).
a. Let a man have a certain form of consciousness, C1. To that form of consciousness let x, y, z be immediate objects. Let him call into being in himself another form of consciousness, C2, the consciousness of C1. Then to C2, C1 is a first-order object, and x, y, z are second-order objects. For the form of consciousness, C2, the second-order objects x, y, z, are abstractions from the first-order object C1 made by C2, and the knowledge of these abstractions is mediated by C1. (NL, 5.26, 11.34).

b. The subject of a proposition or what the proposition is about is never a first-order object. (NL, 11.34).

c. The predicate of a proposition is never a first-order object, but always a concept (NL, 11.35).

d. Logic applies to propositions because the predicate of a proposition is a concept, and logic applies to concepts. Because the predicate of a proposition is a concept, any proposition may theoretically involve a mistake, though there are mistakes that people do not make. (NL, 11.35).

5. Rational thinking, or reason as a mental function or form of consciousness, is thinking one thing x because you think another thing y, where y is your reason or ground for thinking x. A piece of rational thinking involves at least two propositions standing to each other as ground and consequent. Rational thinking begins when a man accustomed to propositional thinking starts making a distinction not made in propositional thinking as such: the distinction between "the that" and "the why." The distinction is preconscious until it is reflected upon. (NL, 14.1-14.2).

a. Simple knowledge is the knowledge that arises when a man reflects upon a piece of propositional thinking and asks himself whether he has really done it, and answers in the affirmative. Such a judgment is fallible, i.e. errors can be made about it. (NL, 14.21-14.25).

b. Reflection on the fallibility of such a "that" judgment prompts one to seek out a second proposition which offers reassurance of the trustworthiness of the first. It is the practical act of trying to alleviate the distress caused me by the untrustworthiness of my knowledge that gives rise to the distinction between "the that" and "the why." (NL, 14.25-14.29).
c. **Practical reason** (making up one's mind to, or forming what a moralist calls reasons for an intention) comes into existence when a man forms an intention, reflects on it, and asks himself whether he really means it. In this reflection he seeks another intention \( y \) to confirm the original intention \( x \), something from which the \( x \) may follow as a necessary consequence, or stands in relation to it as ground to consequent. Reason is essentially practical and hence prior to theoretical reason, because to be reasonable means to be interested in questions beginning with "why"; and this happens because people crave for reassurance against the fallibility of their knowledge. (NL, 14.31-14.5).

d. **Theoretical reason** (making up one's mind that, or seeking reasons for a proposition) comes into existence when a man first, by propositional thinking, makes up his mind that something is so, and then, seeking to confirm this piece of propositional thinking, looks for a reason why he should think so. Theoretical reason is based on the presupposition that a certain kind of propositional thinking, viz. that about which questions beginning with "why" can be legitimately asked, is a matter of free will (i.e. it is not the mere acceptance of something as given, but is a voluntary decision to think this and not that). (NL, 14.35-14.37).

e. Questions beginning with "why" cannot be legitimately asked about first-order objects, but only about objects of the second and higher orders (i.e. abstractions). If \( x \) is an intention, any ground for it, \( y \), must be another intention. One intention supporting another both form part of the same intention, which includes them both and perhaps other things. Let us call this larger intention \( I \). Similarly if \( s \) is a proposition about whose truth someone desires reassurance, it follows that \( t \), the ground of that reassurance, must be a proposition of whose truth he is satisfied; and \( s \) and \( t \) are here abstractions from a first-order proposition \( P \) which includes them both and perhaps other things as well. As long as \( I \) and \( P \) are first-order objects they are matters of immediate conviction or resolution. To demand confirmation of either would be to place it in a context of other intentions or other propositions that might afford grounds for it; that is, to reduce it to the level of, or to make of it, an abstraction. An intention is made into an abstraction by surrounding it with a context of other intentions; a proposition by surrounding it with a context of other propositions. (NL, 14.39-14.44).
With the advance warning that this section will contain, of necessity, some rather thorny exegetical discussion, which we shall try to confine so far as possible to the doctrines summarized in this table, we shall again group our comments around these topics.

(1) Coming to The New Leviathan fresh from the discussion of language in The Principles of Art, one cannot help but notice some evident similarities which render the apparent differences in the discussion of consciousness in the later work less paradoxical. (a) In both works we find a field of feeling at which a primary consciousness (called "simple consciousness" in the earlier work and "diffuse consciousness" in the later) is directed. In this "first state of mental life" consciousness is merely "apprehensive" (NL, 10.51) or "appreciates" (PA, 203) what is presented to it in feeling. The expression of this level of consciousness is loosely called "language" but it is of an illogical, ejaculatory sort of gesture language and not yet speech. (b) The second stage of mental life begins with selective attention, an act of second-order consciousness (i.e. the consciousness of first-order consciousness) in which attention is directed towards some sensa and away from others in a field of first-order, conscious feelings. Second-order consciousness is expressed in an act (pointing, speaking, making designating gestures, etc.) which is the same as the act of consciousness
by which he makes himself aware of some designated entity or feeling as that which he is conscious of, or what he "means" (in the widest sense of the term "meaning" which includes the most rudimentary act of reference). This is the level of conceptual thought. (c) At higher stages of mental life the expression of conscious functions include what we know as language proper--indicative and interrogative sentences at the level of propositional thought, demonstrative discourse for rational consciousness. The terms "intellect" and "knowledge" generally apply to the second level of consciousness and the mental functions above it, which as forms of reflective consciousness presuppose primary consciousness without which it would have nothing to reflect on (NL, 9.54).

In all this we seem to be on familiar territory, just as we are in the discussion of discourse as a continuous system of bodily movements, only later broken up by "selective attention" and made into words that are subsequently catalogued by a lexicographer (NL, 6.1-6.18). Is this not what we have become acquainted with in The Principles of Art as the "one real language of total bodily gesture" which is transformed into speech and then "cut up" by the "butchers" who practice lexicography and grammar? Even Collingwood's penchant to phrase all his definitions in terms of conscious acts of human agents (especially noteworthy in his description of reasoning, where the terms "inference" and "implica-
tion" are conspicuous by their absence) takes us back to the beginning of the present chapter, where we found his definition of "logical efficacy" and Q-A correlativity formally objectionable precisely because they introduce this personal and epistemological dimension.

But there are also some important differences which cannot be overlooked, these tending to group themselves around the three major intellective functions of conceptual, propositional, and rational thinking. Leaving aside the latter two for a moment, we notice first that there is no precise analog in *The Principles of Art* to correspond to the discussion of "naming" in *The New Leviathan*. In fact in the later work Collingwood appears to be putting forward a radical linguistic thesis that it is by naming something that we become selectively aware of it: language is "prior to knowledge itself" and knowledge could not come into existence without it. How are we to reconcile this with *The Principles of Art*, where Collingwood says that simple or first-order attention is the "act of appreciating something, just as it stands, before I can begin to classify it," and that this is done by "identifying" something as having just the qualities we find it to possess before naming it (PA, 203)? And what of the passage from the *Essay on Philosophical Method* where he writes:

> It is only in some dark and half-conscious way that we know our thoughts before we come to express them. Yet in that obscure fashion they are already within us; and,
rising into full consciousness as we find the words to utter them, it is they that determine the words, not vice-versa. (EPM, 200).

The astute reader will note that if indeed what he calls the "diffuse consciousness" of feeling in The New Leviathan is the same mental function as "simple consciousness" and first-order attention in The Principles of Art, then there is no insoluble conflict: first-order attention divides a field of feeling into focal and penumbral regions, but it does not abstract (PA, 204). Therefore second-order attention could be abstractive and denominative, without violating first-order functions of consciousness. And surely this parallel is indicated when Collingwood writes that "thought is at first merely apprehensive, capable of taking what is 'given' to it, and then merely conceptual, capable of framing abstractions from what is 'given'" (NL, 10.51). Similar discrepancies in the use of the term "attention" in The New Leviathan can often be resolved by adding appropriate qualifiers in passages where the unqualified term "attention" is used without specifying whether it is referring to the first-order function of consciousness (which divides without abstracting) or second-order consciousness (which is selective and abstractive). Thus when he writes (in a passage which is directly preceded by a discussion of selective attention) that "The act of attending is not merely a doing something to yourself, focusing your consciousness . . . it is also a doing some-
thing to the object: circumscribing it, drawing a line be-
tween it and the rest of the field" (NL, 7.3; cf. 4.51), he
appears to be locating both division and selective abstrac-
tion in the attentive act of second-order consciousness, but
"act of attending" here may be referring to both levels, just
as "consciousness" may refer to a given level or to that level
and all below it.

(2) Unfortunately sorting out labels for levels of
consciousness and adding qualifiers for functions of conscious-
ness does not settle the issue of how it is possible to "di-
vide" a field of feeling or to "circumscribe" something with-
in it without being "selective" about it, or contrariwise how
first-order consciousness if it is not selective, can divide
without abstracting. Granted that Collingwood's stated in-
tention in The New Leviathan is to take successive "sound-
ings" at various levels of consciousness (NL, 9.4-9.42), and
that he is therefore not committed to stating why one level
gives rise to the next, or how they come into existence, or
even how certain mental functions are possible at all; none-
theless difficulties like these pose problems for the reader
even in understanding the descriptive sense of these "sound-
ings." In this case the problem is one of understanding the
functions of division and abstraction in discourse, and es-
pecially as these pertain to the process of "naming."
Particularly confusing is Collingwood's discussion of naming as a mediating act of consciousness, which view he rejects with the following argument:

Until you name it, the feeling is preconscious. When you name it, it becomes conscious. This does not mean that the act of naming it becomes conscious; it does not, either as an act of your own or even merely as the sound of your voice or the like. It remains preconscious until you reflect upon it. . . . "If a man becomes conscious of a feeling only through finding a name for it, is not that a way of saying that his consciousness of the feeling is not immediate, as you said (4.22), but mediated through language?" The consciousness of B is mediate if you can only be conscious of B as an abstraction from something else, A, of which you are conscious. Let A be something of which you are immediately conscious; then A is a first-order object and B, the abstraction from it, a second-order object (5.25), and the consciousness of B is mediated through the consciousness of A . . . . But the feeling is not an abstraction from the name of the feeling. The man who names his feeling thereby becomes immediately conscious of it; he is not conscious of his name for it until he reflects on the act of naming it, and he proceeds to think of the name he has uttered in abstraction from that act. (NL, 6.28-6.39).

It would appear from this passage that either (a) there is absolutely no function to the "diffuse consciousness" of feeling (since feeling presents itself directly to second-order consciousness and its function of selective attention by naming), or (b) naming it (a second-order function) makes us directly conscious not of the feeling but of the first-order consciousness of a feeling (that is, a feeling as "apprehended" by first-order consciousness--or, as The Principles of Art puts it, a feeling as "appreciated" by being perpetuated and and domesticated by first-order attention). But if (b) is the
case, then what are we to make of the remark that feeling is not an abstraction from the name of the feeling—and especially when he defines abstraction in this context as the attainment of a second-order object by means of a first-order object, where the first-order object is what is immediately given to consciousness?

Since (b) is the most likely alternative for making sense of both The New Leviathan and The Principles of Art on the issue of first and second-order consciousness, we must settle the problem of the peculiar usage of the term "abstraction"—which we shall in a moment. At this point we shall make two observations. First, it may be possible (although this possibility is not made explicit in The New Leviathan) that this may not be an "either-or" situation; i.e. it may be possible that even though second-order consciousness is consciousness of first-order consciousness, it may also be directly conscious of the object of first-order consciousness as well, that object being feeling. This would be consistent with his remark in The Principles of Art that "attention (or . . . consciousness or awareness) has a double object where sentience has a single," that is, "a person who is said to be looking is described as aware of his own seeing as well as of the thing he sees," or again "(w)hat we attend to is two things at once: a sound, and our act of hearing it" (PA, 206). It is also consistent with his "Law of Primitive Survivals"
(which we will also deal with in a moment) in The New Leviathan, which states that in any higher form of consciousness there must survive elements of a previous function in its primitive or unmodified state (NL, 6.52); in this case we suggest that what he may be saying is that feeling is still directly present in first-order consciousness as a "primitive survival," and hence still an immediate object to second-order consciousness (the distinction between "apanage" and "constituent" to the contrary notwithstanding).

Secondly we wish to call attention to the fact that at the very lowest level of consciousness "meaning" is introduced: at the "first state of mental life" a man is said to be conscious of a confused mass of feeling because he has found a language of some kind by which he can "mean" it, albeit a very primitive, illogical, ejaculatory sort of language (NL, 7.24). Therefore abstractive or selective attention, the "second stage of mental life," presupposes the presence of some primitive, pre-reflective "meaning" on which the naming function operates. But if "meaning" here refers to the level of gesture-language (which is included in what Collingwood calls "discourse"), i.e. the "system of bodily movements, not necessarily vocal, whereby the men who make them mean or signify anything" (NL, 6.1), then in its primitive function consciousness can mean something without naming it. Using "discursive" as an adjective for Collingwood's use of "discourse"
in this broad sense, we can say that such pre-reflective "meaning" in first-order consciousness is discursive without being properly speaking linguistic (cf. NL, 6.11). The conscious cry of a distressed infant (recognizably distinct from the random cries of the newborn—cf. PA, 235-37) might be an example of an expression that means something (the infant is consciously signaling his distress) without naming it; it is an act that is discursive (carries meaning) without being linguistic (using designated words in a spoken language). But such meanings are individualized expressions, and not generalized descriptions: the infant's cry of distress is an expression of his present emotional state, and not in any way a descriptive generalization about a feeling or feelings not present, or involving relations with these other feelings (PA, 112; cf. IH, 314, 330).

If we are on the right track, then when Collingwood writes that a man makes himself conscious of a feeling by naming it (NL, 6.25), and adds that this is an act of conceptual thought (NL, 7.23), and adds further that with this act goes an act of evocative thinking (defined as "the act of arousing in yourself by the work of thought feelings you do not find as 'given' in yourself"—NL, 7.32), he is not by-passing or revising the function of first-order consciousness and its primitive, discursive meaning-act, but rather he is presup-
The very first act of consciousness (and it must be remembered that it is only second-order consciousness that is reflective and hence properly speaking thought) is an act of designating meaning, and this assignment of meaning is co-extensive (and one might even say cointensive) with consciousness itself. If the question were put to Collingwood, "Can an analysis of mind and consciousness get beyond or behind language?" we suggest that he would answer, "Yes, but not by language proper; and if you were to succeed in getting there, what you would find would be meanings too primitive to express in words." But as Collingwood pointed out, reaching this primitive level is an experiment not easily made (NL, 6.56), so the function of assigning meaning is mostly unreflective.

The interpretation we are offering of Collingwood's description of the functions of first- and second-order consciousness differs sharply with that offered by Alan Donagan. Donagan argues for a reversal between The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan on the issue of selective attention, and postulates that between the writing of the earlier and the latter works Collingwood changed his mind: he came to hold that all thinking is conceptual and all concepts are abstract (LPC, pp. 14, 48-49). We have already argued that this view fails to hold without qualification for The Principles of Art, and we are now arguing that it does not hold even for The New Leviathan. We maintain that Donagan failed to appreciate the function of first-order consciousness, and relies uncritically on what he (but not Collingwood) calls "The Principle of Order (LPC, 28, 52, 93, 105, 167-68). Cf. W. von Leyden in Krausz, CEPC, 27-29.
and pre-conscious (cf. IH, 330; Donagan, LPC, 43) 33

Obviously this account is very vague, and leaves much to be said about the fundamental relations of language and consciousness. We do not know how to characterize this primitive sort of pre-reflective, discursive meaning-act, or how language proper with its highly inflective, highly differen-

33 Collingwood's remarks in The New Leviathan on first- and second-order consciousness pose as many problems for an interpreter as do his remarks on feeling. Our own interpretation can make sense of many passages, but then others pose problems. For example, Collingwood writes that Hobbes was right when he said that experience teaches us that it is a vulgar error to believe that you must first be conscious of a feeling before you can fit it with a name (NL, 6.56). Unless he means something idiosyncratic by "naming," this passage (as well as the discussion surrounding it--NL, 6.42-6.57) appears to support a radical linguistic thesis like the one Donagan proposes. But Collingwood provides us with enough clues to overcome his overstatement. He points out (a) that language is not always rational (NL, 6.57), and (b) that Hobbes' doctrine is that "language has become the pre-condition and foundation of knowledge so far as knowledge is scientific" (NL, 6.47; emphasis mine). In The Principles of Art, where Collingwood was more careful in distinguishing symbolic or intellectualized language from its more primitive variety, he had pointed out this restriction on Hobbes' discussion of language: "When Hobbes . . . says that the primary use of speech is for 'acquisition of science,' for which purpose 'the right definition of names' is the first requisite, clearly, he is identifying language in general with intellectualized language or symbolism" (PA, 226). Therefore if one supplies the qualifier "intellectualized" before "language," in the passage under discussion from The New Leviathan (NL, 6.56), and "second-order" before "conscious," the passage can be brought into conformity to our own interpretation. Cf. IH, 314, 330, where Collingwood speaks of artistic expression and "unreflective experience."
tiated grouping of sounds and meanings can arise from it, even though he leaves us with the hint that it has something to do with presis or "art" (NL, 6.29). We have already noted that Collingwood's program of "taking soundings" of consciousness at various depths does not commit him to any genetic explanation of how one level of consciousness gives rise to another. In fact in an important chapter he insists that there can be no laws for the progressive development of mind. This is stated in the chapter entitled "Retrospect" (Chapter IX), in which Collingwood sets forth the four principles that he says he has assumed throughout his discussion of mental functions, one of which (the "Law of Primitive Survivals") we have already encountered. Before continuing our discussion it would be best to summarize these principles.
TABLE 13

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS

1. The Law of Contingency: the earlier terms in a series of mental functions do not determine the later. The terms in this case are mental functions called first-order consciousness, second-order consciousness, etc. "Mental function: means not a single act but a type of activity, and "series" means an arrangement in which each term is a modification of the one before it. (NL, 9.3, 9.36, 9.48).

((This law can be restated and clarified in two variant forms:))

a. The series of mental functions is an irregular series, i.e. it is not one in which the development of its terms is governed by a rule. All mental processes have an asymptotic or approximative character; they do not have real initial and terminal points, but always begin with a first term with a mixture of the second, and end at a second term qualified by the first. Every case of mental "being" turns out on examination to be a case of mental "becoming". (NL, 9.4, 34.58, 34.63).

b. The development of mind is not predictable. The logical development of a series of mental functions is independent of its temporal development. In the logical development of the series of mental functions ABCD (for first-order consciousness, second-order consciousness, etc.), the relation between any two successive terms A and B is such that B renders A necessary or "presupposes" A as that out of which it develops, while A does not render B necessary. In a temporal development of such a series A comes into existence at one time and its modification B at a subsequent time. But while the existence of the series ABCD presupposes

NOTE: We take the liberty of assuming that the comments from Chapter XXXIV cited in 1a are a clarification of the expression, "irregular series," which cannot consistently mean "not governed by any rule whatsoever," since at least one rule is applicable to it, namely that each term is a modification of the one before.
the existence of each of its terms, and each successor presupposes its predecessor, it is not the case that given the successor B, A must have come to exist before it in time, since A and B may have come to exist together or coexist in the same act. But whether mind develops from function A to B, or from AB to C, or ABC to D (a progressive development), or whether it degenerates from ABCD to ABC, etc. (called regression) is not predictable; it depends on the practical energy available to a mind at any given time. (NL, 9.43-9.48).

2. The Law of Primitive Survivals: When ((a mental function)) A is modified into B there survives in any example of B, side by side with the function B which is the modified form of A, an element of A in its primitive or unmodified state. If A be consciousness and B second-order consciousness or reflection, then reflection is a modification of consciousness, and unless there were a primitive survival of mere consciousness there would be nothing to reflect on, and no reflection would occur. (NL, 9.5, 9.51, 9.54).

Notice that in this summary of the principles stated in Collingwood's "Retrospect" there is nothing to correspond with Donagan's "Principle of Order"; in fact one might argue that Collingwood's explicit statement that a series of mental functions can coexist in a single act (NL, 9.48) essentially conflicts with it. The best evidence that Donagan can cite in support of his "Principle of Order" is NL, 5.91-5.92, which is extracted from a discussion of Freud on whether feelings can be unconscious (NL, 5.8), and is an account of the extent to which Collingwood agrees with Freud's usage of the terms "conscious" and "preconscious." Collingwood writes that "no man is conscious of any given form of consciousness, even though it is operating in him, until he 'reflects' on it or 'calls into being in himself another form of consciousness, C2, the consciousness of C1' ((NL, 1.73)) the form of consciousness with which we started. Any form of consciousness, practical or theoretical, call it Cx, exists in what Freud calls a preconscious condition unless and until it has been reflected upon by the operation of a form Cx+1" (NL, 5.91-5.92), cited by Donagan by references at LPC, 28 and 108). Notice that Collingwood says "form of consciousness." Now compare this with Donagan's formulation of this subsidiary principle, which he elevates into one of the four main presuppositions underlying Collingwood's entire philosophy of
mind (LPC), 27): "if a man is conscious of one of his own acts of consciousness, then it is not by that act itself, but by another act of consciousness which may be said to be of a higher order" (LPC, 28). Notice that Donagan has substituted "act of consciousness" for "form of consciousness." In our view this is not a legitimate substitution; what may be true for a relation between forms or whole orders of consciousness (first-order, second-order, etc.) may not be true for individual acts of consciousness which may be at the same level. On Donagan's "Principle of Order" it is difficult if not impossible to see how there might be a concept of a concept, or a proposition about a proposition, or inference about inference; and certainly not without one of them being reduced to preconsciousness. But Donagan might have referred to IH, 292, where Collingwood does say an act of thought may be an object to another act but not to itself. This might lend support to his "Principle of Order" were it not that Collingwood explicitly denies it in the next sentence.
It takes no great interpretative powers to recognize that this description of the relations of the series of mental functions is a direct application of the "scale of forms" described in the *Essay on Philosophical Method*, and a fairly clear echo of the description of the dialectical relations between the "forms of experience" in *Speculum Mentis*. With this discussion of the dialectical structure of mind as a scale of forms of mental functions we find ourselves again confronting the relationship between F-logic, with its abstract class-concepts, and D-logic with its overlapping universals. From Table 12, 3 a-b, we see that the abstract class-concept involved in second-order attention and naming is the sort that is used in classifying—the practical activity of "drawing the line" between objects in a field of feeling (or presumably that field as prepared by first-order consciousness). From Table 13 we see that the level of mental

34 It is interesting to note that Collingwood positions this "retrospective" chapter in the midst of his analysis of the level of mind he calls "conceptual thinking." Why did he place it here and not after his chapters on propositional and rational thinking (i.e. between Part I on Man and Part II on Society)? Is it not because the "scale of forms" is a discussion of the relations of concepts in D-logic, and he felt obliged to call attention to the fact that the series of mental functions (and notice that first-order consciousness, second-order consciousness, etc. are concepts or "names" and not judgments, propositions, or inferences) are dialectically related as a scale of forms and not merely as abstract class-concepts?
function at which F-logical class-concepts operate is a whole
(i.e. taken as an order or form of consciousness) related to
other levels of mental functioning as one element in a scale
of forms, where each term is a modification of the one before
it, but contains a "primitive survival" of that previous form.

Since Collingwood indicates that he is not restricting
his discussion to mind only in its capacity as philosophi-
cal thinking, but rather states directly that he is talking
about "the modern European mind" or the mind of a European man
(or that which "has produced in itself the thing called mo-
dern European civilization"), we may finally offer a general
answer to a long-standing question concerning the applicabil-
ity of what we have been calling the D-logic of the Essay on
Philosophical Method. Insofar as the several orders of func-
tioning of the human, civilized mind are arranged in a scale
of forms, D-logic is applicable to the relations between these
levels. Since Collingwood asserts in no uncertain terms both

35 Presumably Collingwood would regard other civiliza-
tions (e.g. American and some Far Eastern countries) as exten-
sions of "the modern European mind," since in the later parts
of The New Leviathan he extends the term "civilization" to in-
clude any manifestation of civil behavior or what he calls
"civility" (NL, 35.63; cf. 34.4-34.51, 34.7-34.79, and 35.22-
35.44)—essentially, the approximation to the ideal of re-
fraining from the use of force in relations with one's fellow
man, and the spirit of agreement to teach and be taught (NL,
35.44, 36.46-36.51). Therefore whatever civilization strives
for such an ideal would be classifiable as possessing what
Collingwood is calling the "modern European mind," which is
not meant to be a primarily geographical epithet.
in *The Principles of Art* and *The New Leviathan* that the series of mental functions are so arranged, he would not regard this assertion as a tautology (i.e. that something having the structure of a scale of forms has the logical relations of a scale of forms). It is what he would call a universal categorical judgment (in this case, this means that it is self-instantiating).

What we do not know is what Collingwood would accept as adequate restrictive conditions for the applicability of D-logic and F-logic respectively. That there are such restrictions is evident from the recognition that within a given level of mental functioning (e.g. propositional thinking) rules which would not be applicable for the relationship between that global level and its successor would be applicable for the elements within that level. Propositional logic and grammatical rules do not employ the rules of dialectical logic per se, and yet the former are legitimate and applicable within certain levels of consciousness (cf. NL, 11.35).

(3) But we are not yet finished with the issue of "naming," and we must now come to terms with the major difference between the analysis of mind offered in *The New Leviathan* and all his previous writings on the subject. The major focus of this apparent reversal of opinion is what we may call the "linguistic-abstraction" thesis, i.e. that at
the second level of consciousness and above (everything included by the term "reflective consciousness") all thought is the result or product of linguistic activity, and that all linguistic activity is necessarily abstract.

We have already had to qualify a more radical version of this thesis (viz. one which extends the linguistic-abstraction thesis to all consciousness) by pointing out that at the level of first-order consciousness there is a pre-reflective, discursive, meaning-function, so that second-order "naming" does not create meaning ex nihilo, it identifies them by means of denoting gestures of some sort (speech or the like)—gestures that call attention (one's own as well as that of one's audience) to some specifically meant feeling. Compared to second-order selective attention, first order consciousness is not a function in which one act is compared or contrasted with another as a present one compared to one not present, or as two presented feelings which are compared as what one means as opposed to what one does not mean by a given expression. And we have also had occasion to note that Collingwood's account of language in The Principles of Art leads one to conclude that for him all meaning is intentional, whereas all symbolic meaning is both intentional and conventional. But in The New Leviathan we find him adding that all meaningful language (i.e. speech) is abstract, and so are also all the expressions of consciousness which are founded on it.
At issue here is what appears to be a major reversal in Collingwood's final estimate of the nature of thought. In *Speculum Mentis*, it may be recalled, Collingwood made abstraction to be the ultimate source of all the errors that the mind makes about itself, and consequently also about its relation to the world: to abstract is to falsify (SM, 160, 288). But in *The New Leviathan* abstraction is seemingly elevated to the highest rank of thought: conceptual thinking and all thought above it (viz. propositional and rational thinking) is abstractive (NL, 7.63). In confronting this pair of claims it appears that the only two alternatives are either total scepticism concerning knowledge claims (if all abstraction is falsification and all intellectual thinking is abstract, then all intellectual thinking is falsification), or a complete reversal in Collingwood's mature philosophy (rejection of the claim that all abstraction is falsification). Since Collingwood was steadfastly non-sceptical, the latter is the most obvious alternative (cf. Donagan in Krausz, CEPC, 9-13).

But as we have seen several times over in the course of our examination of Collingwood's philosophy, the easy and obvious interpretation is not always the correct one. The evidence we are confronted with is an apparent contradiction, not a documented "repudiation"; and an escape from the contradiction may be found, as in other such cases, by a careful
analysis of the meaning of the mediating term--in this case, "abstraction." Our experience thus far in interpreting Collingwood would support our anticipation that the term is not being used univocally, and that it has a layering of overlapping meanings not always specified explicitly, but discernible from careful comparison of the opposing uses of the term.

In Speculum Mentis a concept is called abstract if it is used as a class-unifying term, and if it only defines membership in the class on the basis of a specifying criterion (the determining element) but leaves out of consideration all other qualifying characteristics of the members themselves (the indeterminate elements)---and this is the sense in which Collingwood means that something is abstract if it is thought as "separate" from its members and their individuating differences. It is the unity of identity of a class "in spite of" (or indifferent to) the differences of its members. "Physical object", for example, includes rocks, fish, birds, men, planets, stars, etc. indifferently, and laws governing the motion of "physical objects" takes such a disparate and differently organized group in their most general, generic aspect--as dead things, pushed and pulled by mechanical forces. But a live bird dropped from a leaning tower will not behave as a dead rock dropped from the same height. But for the purpose of the abstract statement of the law which governs the free fall of physical objects, the differences between the
bird and the rock are ignored: the self-moving capacities involved in the flight of a bird are not taken into account in the law.

This is not to say that such a motion cannot be "explained" in a much more complicated treatment of this situation (e.g. one which balances the forces exerted by the flying activities of the bird, generated by biochemical energies released and used by the mechanical movements of muscles and bones, etc., against the forces of gravity); but the closer one gets to an adequate explanation of the differences between the linear downward acceleration of the rock and the curvilinear deceleration of the bird, the closer one gets to taking into account the specific differences between the "dead" rock and the living bird—and thus approximating to the ideal of a non-abstract or "concrete" universal, i.e. one in which differences are essential.

But consider now Collingwood's use of the term "abstract" in The New Leviathan—in this case in reference to concepts:

The act of attending is not merely a doing something to yourself, focusing your consciousness on a certain part of the field and repressing . . . the rest; it is also a doing something to the object: circumscribing it, drawing a line between it and the rest of the field . . . . With the delimiting of the patch or other selection . . . goes the act of evocative thinking: the act of arousing in yourself by the work of thought feelings you do not find as "given" in yourself. These I call evocations:
they form a context inseparable from any selection and are connected with it by logical relations, logic being the science which studies the structure of concepts or, which is the same thing, the relations between them. As not given but abstracted from the given, a selection is a product of practical consciousness; is nothing found, it is something made. A selection together with its context of evocations is a concept (notion) or a number of them. (NL, 7.3-7.39).

What sort of "concept" meets the description here given—the "abstract concept" of Speculum Mentis or something closer to the "concrete universal"? Is it not the latter that is thought to be "inseparable" from the context from which it is selected and bound to it by logical relations? And is it not the abstract class-concept which is thought of as "separate" or "indifferent" to its contextual circumstances?

It is possible, if a bit muddle-headed, to decide as an interpretative comment on this passage that in The New Leviathan Collingwood had broken with his earlier views on abstraction and conceptualization, and then foolishly allowed himself to backslide into "associationism" by defining a concept as "a selection together with its context of evocations" --which is associationism insofar as it confuses what is selected with the concept by which it is selected (Donagan, LPC, 54-55). But this is no different than assuming that all planetary motion is circular and then inventing "epicycles" to explain away retrograde orbits. Not only would the ordinary association psychologist not say that a selection is con-
nected with an evoked context by means of logical relations which preside over the birth of a concept; he would on the contrary tend to derive all logical relations from the purely external and coincidental "constant conjunction" between a selected item and another, and to reduce logical relations to this constant conjunction. Quite the contrary, by defining "concept" in the way he does, Collingwood is stating as clearly as he can, without using the term (and hence avoiding calling attention to its previous use by Bradley, Bosanquet, and other idealists), that the concept he had in mind was one in which a universal is bound to a context by logical relations of necessity, or one to which differences are essential, or in short the concrete universal.

But even if this were a "lapse" on Collingwood's part, one would have several other similar regressions to explain

36 Cf. Howard C. Warren, A History of Association Psychology (New York, 1921), pp. 6-7: "All the writers belonging to the association school admit the rise of ideas following sensations, according to the same laws of association that hold where the antecedent is an idea. Some go further and regard as a form of association the simultaneous presence of two or more sensations in consciousness, such as occurs in the act of perception. Others merely assume a nexus in such experiences without explicitly classing them as instances of association. On the other hand, all agree in denying that one sensation can bring up another sensation by association; it is generally admitted that the rise of sensations depends on something outside of consciousness, or at least on something apart from the individual human experience."
in his discussion of the terms "abstract" and "abstraction" in The New Leviathan. In his discussion of rational thinking, for example, he states that to place an intention in a context of other intentions that afford grounds for it (where "grounds" are taken as an intention from which a consequence follows by necessity) is to make of that intention an abstraction (NL, 14.32, 14.43). And what holds for abstraction at the conceptual and rational levels also holds for the proposition level: "An intention is made into an abstraction by surrounding it with a context of other intentions; a proposition by surrounding it with a context of other propositions" (NL, 14.44). Concepts, propositions, and intentions that are bound by logical relations to contexts of other concepts, propositions and intentions surely cannot be "abstract" in the sense that Collingwood had condemned as falsification in Speculum Mentis.

Unfortunately rejecting one erroneous interpretation of these passages on abstraction does not mean that we have successfully resolved all the interpretative difficulties, nor that we can even be satisfied that we have understood

37 Cf. IN, 130: "By a real abstraction I mean a real phase in a real process, in itself, and apart from the subsequent phase to which it is leading . . . . Bud and leaf are thus phases of one process, and the bud in itself is an abstraction from that process, but an abstraction made by nature, which everywhere works in this way through successive phases of the process, doing one thing before it goes on to the next."
(much less confirmed) what Collingwood means by these dark sayings. We suspect that all of this has something to do with what Collingwood called "real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle, as well as the "total imaginative activity" and "language of total bodily gesture" in *The Principles of Art*: all of these are various systematic wholes presupposed by the elements or "element-types" that go to make them up. But as with the earlier instances we found of these systematic wholes, we do not know in anything more than a vague and abstract way what the relations are between their elements, how many such elements there are, if they are just variations of a single form, etc.

In particular we do not know what the limits of determinacy are for abstractions at any given intellectual level. Collingwood tells us in *The New Leviathan* that abstractions (by which we may understand him to mean the result of acts of selective attention) (a) are determinate in some ways and indeterminate in others (NL, 7.56, 10.16; cf. PA, 254); (b) are always indeterminate—i.e. are never wholly determined (NL, 11.54); and (c) are essential for thought beyond the primary level of consciousness (NL, 7.63). 38 Unfortunately he also

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38Cf. Mink, MHD, 108: "Now the characteristics of 'abstraction' which Collingwood refers to in different places are three: selectivity, indeterminacy, and self-determination. As a process, abstraction is the activity of consciousness (also called 'attention') directed on an object in such a way as to spot-light some features of the object and neglect oth-
adds that (d) "abstractions are only second-order objects made by the mind out of its immediate or first-order objects as naturally and as unconsciously as bees make honey out of flowers" (NL, 7.67). What can "naturally and unconsciously" mean here? Collingwood would probably answer that we cannot know what an abstraction is until we have made it, and then we can examine the product of the practical activity which produced it, but only be engaging in another conscious act (e.g. examining a concept by formulating propositions about it, and therefore engaging in an act of third-order consciousness).

But isn't "selective attention" a deliberate act of consciousness, and is it not selective attention that is the very process by which abstraction is achieved? How can it then be "unconsciously" done? And if "classifying" is the practical activity of consciousness involved in "drawing the line" in

ers; these features are thus 'abstracted' from the object, and they can be named and themselves made the objects of other and repeated acts of consciousness without the repeated presentation of the object . . . However because second-order objects have been selectively abstracted from the totality of activity, they are indeterminate in all respects except those by which they have been constituted . . . Finally, . . . the activity of consciousness in abstracting is a free activity, determined by nothing except . . . by itself in abstracting these features rather than those from its object . . . ((But)) it might be said that the very existence of a verbal language determines the limits of abstraction: we can attend only to those distinguishable features of experience for which we have names." Mink fails to see any paradox in saying that abstraction can be free and indeterminate and yet determined and limited by names in language.
abstraction, did he not tell us that all classes are artifacts (NL, 19.22-19.35; see above, Table 12, 3 b)? How then can abstractions be made as "naturally . . . as bees make honey"?

The difficulty that dogs Collingwood's heels is the same as the difficulty that plagues any of the usual accounts of abstraction: as a theory of how we arrive at concepts, it appears to presuppose what it attempts to explain. Ordinarily abstraction is described as a process of "leaving out" incidental or extraneous elements in a field of what is being attended to, until only what is "essential" remains, this being the abstracted concept. Whether this "leaving out" be regarded as extracting "form" from its original mixture with "matter," or a process of "separating in knowledge what is inseparable in fact," the essential act is still a negative or eliminative one and this raises serious difficulties. What allows the process to come to a halt at a certain point? Does this not presuppose that one already has the concept by

39 Peter Geach, Mental Acts (London, 1957), p. 18: "I shall use 'abstraction' as a name for the doctrine that a concept is acquired by a process of singling out in attention some one feature given in direct experience--abstracting it--and ignoring the other features simultaneously given--abstracting from them. The abstractionist would wish to maintain that all acts of judgment are to be accounted for as exercises of concepts got by abstraction . . . . My own view is that abstractionism is wholly mistaken; that no concept at all is acquired by the supposed process of abstraction."
comparison to which the one emerging from this eliminative process is recognized as comparable and equivalent? And lacking this prior concept, what is to stop the eliminative process at anything short of pure nothingness? Do we not have to distinguish the selected item from the criterion by which it is selected (Donagan, LPC, 54-55)? Or to press the juice out of the matter-form metaphor, if we are "given" something in sensation or feeling, do we not have to possess something by which we can accept or apprehend or take hold of the gift?

The closest that Collingwood comes to meeting these objections is when he engages in what appears to be a frankly pragmatic maneuver. His basic response to the charge of eliminative abstractionism would be to point out that concepts are not "found" (as naive empiricists might say), they are "made" (as subjective idealists say), but only by an act of practical consciousness prior to theoretical consciousness, and based on interest or practical concern with the object attended to (as pragmatists modify idealism) (cf. NL, 7.22, 18.13). 40 In taking a basically pragmatic view of the purposive character of concepts, Collingwood reaps the benefit

40 Cf. H. S. Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (New York, 1968), pp. 429-31; and Mink, MHD, 7-8, 12, 111, 138. Collingwood would probably not be flattered by the comparison with pragmatism, but in later years he appears to be less hostile to this line of thought: cf. IH, 300.
of the pragmatic maneuver, which is precisely to eliminate the need to posit theoretical and fictitious extramental entities with which the mind is supposed to conform, on intramental entities with which it is supposed to be innately furnished. But in contrast to the pragmatists Collingwood appears to be saying that even though concepts are made for practical purposes, they nonetheless have logical relations which preside over their birth within their "context of evocations"; and he nowhere says that such logical relations are matters of scientific expediency or economic utility (cf. SM, 182).

This is as far as Collingwood takes us, and we must note that it may put us down the road a bit from naive empiricism, but it does not take us the whole way towards a satisfactory account of abstraction. Saying that concepts are made is well-tailored to the need--or why one concept "works" while another does not. And we are still not enlightened as to what these "logical relations" are that preside over the birth of concepts (although we are told that "resemblance" is one, and "contrast" and "comparison" are others (cf. NL, 7.34-7.36), which bodes ill for our defense of Collingwood against the charge of associationism).

But as we pursue the development of meaning through the higher levels of consciousness, we shall try to watch for the way in which a relatively indeterminate meaning is modi-
fied by conceptual, propositional, and rational thinking— or the way in which a meaning becomes more determinate as it becomes more "abstract," just as in The Principles of Art the uninterpreted sensum becomes ready for interpretation by being perpetuated and domesticated by imaginative consciousness, and finally fully interpreted by acts of intellectual consciousness. We do not know, on the basis of The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan, if Collingwood would accept that there could be any such thing as a concept that is totally determinate, but if there could be it would not be something abstract, because something abstract always has an element of indeterminacy (NL, 11.54).

Finally, we shall use the expression "real abstraction" to refer to Collingwood's description of abstraction in The New Leviathan, in order to distinguish it from other theories of abstraction, including the "false abstraction" he condemned in Speculum Mentis. By "real abstraction" we shall understand the doctrine that abstraction is the process of consciousness by which a selection is located in its "context of evocations," or a proposition in a context of

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41 There is an echo of Speculum Mentis in a later chapter of The New Leviathan, where Collingwood writes: "Abstraction is a necessary part of thought. In thinking of a process of change you must think of its positive and negative elements in abstraction from the process. False abstraction is the same thing complicated by a falsehood, namely, that these two opposite elements are mutually independent and hostile entities" (NL, 26.18-26.19).
other propositions, an intention in a context of other grounding intentions, etc. Having little to go on from Collingwood's cryptic remarks about this process, we cannot, except by employing inventive energies, amplify this weak signal concerning abstraction into a more articulate program for public broadcast. We are particularly annoyed by the distortion in the original signal insofar as relating a concept or selection to other concepts or feelings, a proposition to other propositions, etc. is not straightforwardly the same process as subsuming concrete instances under a universal, or relating a proposition to its referrent, etc. We still have no adequate criteria for distinguishing between the referring and meaning functions of language and consciousness. But even lacking such criteria for this distinction we are still forced to recognize a significant difference between the simple or "false" abstraction rejected in Speculum Mentis, and the contextual or "real" abstraction advocated in The New Leviathan.

(4) Collingwood also provides us with very few informative statements about what he means by "propositional thinking" in The New Leviathan. We are told (a) that it is at this level that truth and error are distinguished; (b) that in engaging in it we are involved in asking and answering questions; (c) that asking questions implies contemplating alternatives; (d) that the subject of a proposition is never a
first-order object, and (e) neither is the predicate, which is always a concept. Since Collingwood's primary concern in The New Leviathan is with the emotional and practical sides of this level of thinking, it is not too surprising that the theoretical aspects of this order of consciousness are somewhat neglected. But for our purposes we cannot ignore it, and therefore we are obliged to flesh-out this skeleton to the best of our ability.

The way this can be done is to make use of three clues which he has provided for us: the discussion of the levels of consciousness as a scale of forms in the "retrospective" chapter; his discussion of "emotions of intellect" in The Principles of Art; and the placement of both of these in the context of language as expressive discourse. Making use of these three clues we may reconstruct what we believe to be a modest version of what he intended us to understand about this level of consciousness.

If we begin with the "first stage of mental life" in which a presented feeling is "apprehended" by a pre-reflective act of first-order consciousness, the "Law of Primitive Survivals" allows us to conclude that the primitive act of "meaning" that is involved (what he might have described in Art as a "sensum prepared for interpretation") is preserved and modified by second-order consciousness by its act of selective
(abstractive) attention. In its modified form, first-order meaning is a designated and named entity (the first state of reflective consciousness, or what might be called the first stage in the actual interpretation of a sensum). At the propositional level meaning is again modified to include the unity of meaning in an assertion, i.e. the unity of meaning of a subject and its predicate, where both parts of the assertion are assumed to be themselves meanings derived from second-order consciousness. Hence the subject of a proposition or what it is about is not merely an object as presented to first-order consciousness, but that object as modified by first- and second-order consciousness, and now further determined as the subject of a third-order propositional act.\footnote{To the great dismay of the reader of The New Leviathan, Collingwood is not always as careful as he might be to indicate exactly what he means when he uses terms like "object" in "object of consciousness." In the present instance concerning propositional thought, this leads to considerable unnecessary confusion. (a) Collingwood first described each level of reflective consciousness as being conscious of its immediately lower form, so that first-order consciousness, \(C_1\), is the "object" of second-order consciousness, \(C_2\), just as \(C_2\) is to \(C_3\), etc. (NL, 1.73, 5.91). Furthermore, (b) he defined "first-order object" and "second-order object" in purely relative terms, so that \(C_1\) is a "first-order object" to \(C_2\), as \(C_2\) is to \(C_3\); and \(C_1\) is a "second-order object" to \(C_3\) (NL, 5.26, 5.91); and (c) he defined the terms "mediation" and "abstraction" (in one of its senses) in terms of this relative schema, insofar as the consciousness of a second-order object is mediated by the consciousness of a first-order object (NL, 6.31-6.34). But then he muddies the waters when he discusses each successive level of consciousness. (d) At the level of second-order (conceptual) consciousness he says that feeling is not an abstraction from the name of the feeling (NL, 6.35). (e) At the level of third-order (propositional) consciousness he states that the subject and the predicate of a proposition are never first-order objects, the predicate (at}
least) always being a concept. And (f) for fourth-order (ra-
tional) consciousness, first-order objects are things about
which questions beginning "why" must not be asked, since
questions beginning "why" are legitimately asked only about
objects of the second and higher orders, or abstractions (NL,
14.39). In each of the cases (d) through (f) Collingwood seems
to be saying that the immediately lower level of consciousnes
is not the immediate or first-order object to its successor--
which contradicts (a). Driven by such paradoxical statements
the reader may not be blamed for deciding that Collingwood is
making one of his unannounced shifts of meaning between his
defined, relative sense of the terms "first- and second-order
objects" (b), and what we may call (g) the absolute sense of
these terms, i.e. the sense in which a "first-order object"
would be the object of first-order consciousness, a "second-
order object" for second-order consciousness, etc. But even
if the absolute sense of these terms may make passing sense
of several confusing passages (e.g. the misleading examples
offered at NL, 11.34), we think it would be a mistake. A bet-
ter interpretation, in our estimation, would be to recall that
in The Principles of Art Collingwood told us that conscious-
ness has a double object, both of which are "present" to the
conscious mind (PA, 206). Thus it is possible that a form of
consciousness, say C₃ (propositional thinking) may be con-
scious both of a lower form C₂ (conceptual thinking) and of
what he is calling its "first-order object"--in this case a
proposition. Thus when he writes that the subject of a pro-
position is never a first-order object, the reason is that the
first-order object of an act of propositional thought is a
whole proposition, and not its subject. The subject of a
proposition is, like the predicate, a concept, the product of
a practical act of second-order consciousness, and hence a
second-order object for third-order (propositional) conscious-
ness. Finally, it is important to point out once again that
there is a difference between a "form of consciousness" like
propositional thought, and an "act of consciousness," like
the practical act of putting together a particular sentence.
Having said all this, honesty requires that we admit that we
find difficulties on any interpretation of these difficult
passages from The New Leviathan; e.g. if we invoke the prin-
ciple of the double object of consciousness, both of which are
present to it, then we are faced with difficulties in under-
standing not only what "abstraction" means (e.g. at NL, 14.2-
14.27) but also our earlier use of the "double object of con-
sciousness" principle to account for the radical linguistic
claim that naming a feeling makes us directly conscious of the
feeling. If it is possible for a higher-order consciousness
(say C₃ to be directly and immediately conscious not only of
On this line of thinking a sentence would be the expression of the unity of meaning of an act of propositional thought, and truth and falsity apply minimally to this level of propositional meaning.

Unfortunately this leaves us without any way to account for the presence of questions at this level, since questions do not assert a predicate of a subject, nor are they true or false. But if questions are interrogative sentences and have something of a subject-predicate form, should they not belong to the level of propositional thought? Here we must take up our second clue from _The Principles of Art_. Just as we found that there are broader and narrower senses of the terms "thought" and "language" for Collingwood, so also we are now obliged to recognize broader and narrower senses for the terms "truth" and "falsity," the narrower sense being confined to the level of propositional thinking and those above it, and the broader sense extending not only to the level of conceptual thought (second-order consciousness) but even to the first stage of mental life, "apprehension" or simple attention. And here we note that Collingwood not only breaks with the traditional logic on the subject of truth and falsity, but even from his own earlier doctrine in _Speculum_ its own object (for C3, propositions), but also of a lower level of consciousness and its object (C2 and its concepts), then how can there be a second-order objects (abstractions) at all?
that art as imaginative expression has nothing to do with truth (or is "indifferent" to the distinction between truth and falsehood):

This utterance ((of an artist)), so far from being indifferent to the distinction between truth and falsehood, is necessarily an attempt to state the truth . . . . Now, if any one thinks . . . . that intellect is the only possible form of thought, he will think that whatever does not contain arguments cannot be a form of thought, and therefore cannot be concerned with truth. Observing that art does not argue, he will infer that art has nothing to do with the truth . . . . It is hardly worth while to refute this argument, by pointing out that truthfulness about one's emotions is still truthfulness . . . . Art is not indifferent to truth; it is essentially the pursuit of truth. But the truth it pursues is not a truth of relation, it is a truth of individual fact. The truths art discovers are those single and self-contained individualities which from the intellectual point of view become the "terms" between which it is the business of intellect to establish or apprehend relations. Each of these individualities, as art discovers it, is a perfectly concrete individual, one from which nothing has yet been abstracted by the work of intellect. Each is an experience in which the distinction between what is due to myself and what is due to my world has not yet been made. (PA, 287-88).

In a footnote to this passage Collingwood adds that "I am not so much criticizing anybody else, as doing penance for youthful follies of my own," and informs the reader to see his Outline of a Philosophy of Art and Speculum Mentis.

Now even bearing in mind that in The New Leviathan Collingwood distinguishes between "linguistic activity in general" and "literature or poetry or in general art" (NL, 6.29), where the latter is conscious not only of names for feelings but of
the act of naming them, we are still obliged to recognize that there is a legitimate extension of the term "truth" below the level of propositional consciousness. If we recall his discussion of "corrupt consciousness" at this point it is not difficult to see that "truthfulness" at the first level of consciousness consists of apprehending feelings as one's own, rather than "disowning" them, the habit of which is the corruption of consciousness. At the second level of consciousness, at which "naming" occurs, truth is conceptual but non-relational; it is concerned with "the 'terms' between which it is the business of intellect to establish or apprehend relations."

If truth has, as it appears from *The Principles of Art*, the structure of a scale of forms, then we may say that truth, like meaning, appears in the expression of all higher-order functions of consciousness, so that there are pre-reflective, conceptual, propositional and rational truths.

But then what sort of a "truth" does a question have? We suspect that it is something between the fully propositional and conceptual levels of truth, but here we are forced to engage in a bit of reconstructive speculation. Collingwood tells us that "real" questions are those which offer alternatives, and "bogus" questions are those which do not; he also tells us that scientific method depends on replacing unanswerable vague or confused questions with real questions which can have a precise answer (NL, 11.12). The "real-bogus" dis-
tinction for questions is something like the "true-false" distinc-
tinction for propositions, but with obvious differences which
Collingwood does not specify. "Offering alternatives" is
something that propositions may do as well as questions, but
the proposition "X is either Y or Z" expresses something quite
different than the question "Is X Y or is it Z?" The alterna-
tives offered in a question are not offered as affirmatively
or negatively stated, but rather as alternatives demanding or
requesting or looking forward to some further linguistic or
mental act which chooses between them—something that will sa-
tisfy the question or complete it in a propositional sense.
With a question one is conscious of the fact that something is
being left unresolved, and a completing act is being called
for.

But just as propositions, like "real" questions, may
offer alternatives, 43 so also propositions may be incomplete
or call for resolution: "Eric is going to . . ." is an in-
complete sentence, since the proposition "(x) is going to

43 What Collingwood also desperately needs to make
sense of questions, but steadfastly refuses to provide, is
some sort of categorial schema, or categorial designators,
to set the limits of sense and nonsense for alternatives at
the propositional level. "Which of the following two alterna-
tives is true, A, B, or C?" is a nonsense question, as is
"What sort of train is this, red, yesterday, or singing 'Ce-
leste Aida'?" but not for the same reasons. Both appear to
be well-formed interrogative English sentences, but the alter-
 natives offered in the first case conflict with the conditions
presupposed by the question, and in the latter case conflict
with categorial schema ordinarily presupposed in ordinary
English usage.
contains a predicate which calls for the presence of some value for the second variable (y) in order to make sense of the whole propositional sentence. But an incomplete sentence is not a question—it may merely be a sentence fragment. An incomplete sentence does not express the speaker's intention to put an interrogative sentence. What is required is some syntactic and/or semantic function which allows the incomplete proposition to be a completed interrogative sentence, so that a hearer (who may be the speaker himself) may know that completion is not only lacking but known to be lacking--i.e. that he has expressed his intended meaning in the form of a question. In a natural language like English such completing interrogative functions are available either by the use of "token" pronouns (who, what, how, when, whether, etc.) or by alternations in word order, as when we put a verb in the first position in a sentence ("Is x y?" "Does x y?" "Can x y?" etc.)

There may ultimately be no foolproof way of designating linguistic structures which unequivocally indicate a questioning intention. "What fools are these mortals?" does not require an answer, and neither does "How many have fallen in this battle" when uttered in a circumstance which makes it clear that no answer is being sought (e.g. in a funeral oration). Furthermore a questioning intention may be indicated by nothing more than an alteration in tone of voice, or by stressing certain words or syllables: "These apples are fifty cents each?" Of course we have no way of knowing, but it may be considerations like these that inclined Collingwood to emphasize questioning as an intentional or conscious act rather than a linguistic entity in his Q-A logic.
Although such considerations as these are essential to the description of interrogative sentences in a language (which some may find to be a more fruitful line of inquiry), Collingwood would probably relegate it to the "grammatical analysis of language" about which he had such unflattering things to say in *The Principles of Art*. That his concern was not in this direction is indicated by the fact that he says nothing about such syntactical and semantical requirements in any of his writings. His interest was in what we might call the heuristic aspect of questioning as an intellectual function of consciousness. In this respect his main concern was to show that questions have not only a logical relation to assertions, presuppositions, and other questions in a systematic inquiry (explored by Q-A logic) but that the reason questions can stand in such logical relations is that they are expressions of a certain level of consciousness, and therefore "constituents" of mind, achievements of thinking agents, and part of the emotional life of persons.

Therefore when he says that "real" questions are those which offer alternatives, this is not the entire story. A "real" question is also a "truthful" question which truly expresses the intellectual emotions of a conscious agent—emotions like curiosity, wonder, interest, etc.; the emotions of inquiry. A question therefore stands not as an atomic entity, but in a multiplicity of relations—logical, epistemolo-
gical, emotional, and perhaps others. Its "truth" or truthfulness is a complex function depending on which context it is seen to belong in. Q-A logic is an exploration of questions in the context of other questions, presuppositions, and answers as employed in systematic inquiry. The requirement of offering alternatives therefore merely states what a question must be to be fully determinate at the level of propositional thought--i.e. for a question regarded as an epistemological entity. Other requirements may appear from the grammatical analysis of language, and still more from the logical analysis of language, the latter governed by the rules which preside (to extend Collingwood's metaphor) over the birth of questions and propositions by selection from a context of propositional evocations--P-Q-A complexes bound together in a systematic inquiry.45 (Cf. NL, 4.3-4.36).

(5) If this reconstruction of Collingwood's intended analysis of third-order consciousness is correct, there is nothing to prevent us from extending it to fourth-order consciousness as well. By the "Law of Primitive Survivals" meaning survives even at the level of rational discourse, but at this level the meaning-seeking function of consciousness is

45 In Q-AM Collingwood is careful to point out that in scientific inquiry when a question is answered it does not cease to be a question, but only an unanswered question (EM, 24; see above, Table 9, Comment 4). We might add here that an intellectual emotion expressed in a question does not cease to be an emotion once the question is answered, but rather ceases only to be an unsatisfied emotion.
transformed into a unifying act in which one propositional meaning is related to another as ground to consequent--i.e. validity in inference. And since questioning survives at this level also, the questioning function at the level of rational discourse is the expression of the anticipation of meaning fulfilment in a validity relationship, i.e. that one propositional meaning actually will be related to another as ground and consequent.

Fortunately we do not have to rely quite so heavily on our own reconstruction at this level, since Collingwood provides us with a few more informative remarks than he does for propositional thinking. Even a cursory reading of his discussion (Table 12, 5) makes clear that Collingwood is not reducing rational discourse to the F-logical functions of implication: it is not a "truth-functional" relation that exists between propositional forms that he is concerned with, but rather the reason or reasons for thinking that something is the case or that something should be done--i.e. intentional inference rather than strictly formal implication. Collingwood unmistakably makes the point when he insists that "reason is always essentially practical; because to be reasonable means to be interested in questions beginning with 'why'; and this happens because people crave reassurance against the fal-
libility of their knowledge" (NL, 14.31).

But how do we know when one proposition or intention is the ground for another, or that one is a consequence of the other? Collingwood's answer brings us once again before his idiosyncratic usage of "abstraction." "One intention supporting another both form part of the same intention, which includes them both, and perhaps other things" (NL, 14.4). The relation of ground to consequent for Collingwood therefore appears to be the relation of part to whole, and is a relation

46 In the passage just preceding the one cited Collingwood asserts that "first-order objects are things about which questions beginning 'why?' must not be asked," since "such questions are legitimately asked only about objects of the second and higher orders (abstractions)" (NL, 14.39). Once again we are up against the application of his "Fallacy of Misplaced Argument" (NL, 4.73) which forbids us from arguing about any object immediately given to consciousness. Unless we bear in mind that the "first-order object" of fourth-order (rational) consciousness is a complex intention or proposition containing at least two intentions or propositions, one being the ground and the other its consequent, the proscription about why-questions seems paradoxical; since fourth-order consciousness is reflection on third-order (propositional) consciousness, it seems that it would be perfectly legitimate to ask why-questions concerning first-order objects of this sort--e.g. "Why should I mow the lawn?" is a question about the proposition "I should mow the lawn." But a proposition is a first-order object for third-order consciousness, and a second-order object for fourth-order consciousness, so the rule holds. But notice that the "objects of the second and higher orders" puts "abstraction" in a downward occurring attitude ("higher" merely indicating the numerical ordinals for orders of conscious objects--second-order object, third, etc.). For fourth-order consciousness, therefore, a proposition is an abstraction from (or second-order object to) its first-order object, which is a ground-consequent complex proposition, just as for third-order consciousness a concept is an abstraction from its first-order object, a (simple) proposition. (Cf. NL, 7.67).
of inclusion (cf. NL, 14.41). To demand confirmation of a larger, inclusive intention or proposition would be, he says, "to place it in a context of other intentions or other propositions that might afford grounds for it; that is, to reduce it to the level of an abstraction," or in other words, "to make it an abstraction" (NL, 14.43). It would be, to extend the terminology drawn from the level of conceptual thinking, to place an intention or proposition in a "context of evocations" of other grounding intentions or propositions within which it is included and to which it is related as part to whole.

And here once again we touch on not only what Collingwood had called, in his correspondence with Ryle, "real thinking," in any example of which would be included all the "element-types" on which logical relations are founded, but also the pragmatic aspect we have already noticed in his analysis of the functions of mind (e.g. when concepts are "made" by an act of practical consciousness). For fourth-order consciousness both of these features are brought into play in a chapter on "Theoretical Reason":

In all forms of rational thinking a distinction is made between the self and the not-self. Such thinking is primarily practical; its first function is to ask and answer the question: "Why am I doing this?" It has, however, a secondary function, to ask and answer questions about what is not myself. These may be called "theoretical" questions; but they are never purely theoretical . . . . They arise out of practical problems concerning the self and other things . . . . Consider the place of experiment in
natural science. An experiment means an interference by a natural scientist with some process of nature. The "experimental method" in natural science is the method wherein a scientist comes to understand a natural process by interfering with it . . . . Is there nowhere such a thing as "purely theoretical thinking"? There is; but it is not real thinking, and it does not lead to real knowing . . . . Real thinking is always to some extent experimental in its method; it always starts from practice and returns to practice; for it is based on "interest" in the thing thought about; that is, on a practical concern with it . . . . A man will have a different theoretical attitude towards things other than himself according as his practical attitude towards them is different; and his practical attitude towards them will be different according to differences in his attitude towards his own actions. (NL, 18.1-18.2).

There are many avenues to explore in this extremely interesting passage and the chapter from which it is drawn--e.g. the "experimental" aspect to all rational thought and its aspect of "interference," which reminds us of his remark from the Autobiography concerning his interest in "obscure provinces" because of the challenge to invent new methods for studying them (A, 86). But we wish to note here that we have a new dimension to add to the logical aspect of "real thinking" that Collingwood had divulged in his letter to Ryle: in addition to (a) containing in any example of itself all the "element-types" on which logical relations are founded, real thinking (b) is always to some extent experimental in its method, (c) starts from practice and returns to practice, and (d) is based on interest or practical concern with the thing thought about. Furthermore one can dimly discern that (e) it depends on differences in "attitude" towards one's own actions
--such differences as are involved in the three different ways that a modern European answers the question, "Why am I doing this?"—viz. because it is useful, right, or my duty (NL, 14.65-14.69). Since each of these gives rise to a particular world view (utilitarian thinking giving rise to teleological Greek science, regularian thinking to classical modern science with its laws of nature, and duty to historical consciousness and its transformation of contemporary science (NL, 18.3-18.92), it is not difficult to see that such "attitudes" are what Collingwood calls "absolute presuppositions" in the Essay on Metaphysics.

Since this gets us beyond logic and into Collingwood's views on metaphysics, we must stop at this point, with the promise that we shall resume the discussion in Chapter X, where we shall do our best to clarify these views. But we must make one final remark before bringing this section, and chapter, to a close. We wish to call attention to the fact that questioning functions at both the third- and fourth-order levels of consciousness, and that at the fourth level (as might be expected, given the Law of Contingency for mental functions) it becomes a why-question which presupposes both that there is a level of propositional thinking (and all that this presupposes), and also that there is a relation of ground to consequent that can be established for propositions within this level. This is an important observation for any
evaluation of Q-A logic, since questioning traverses the distinction between simple propositions (minimal units of truth and falsity in the narrower sense) and complex propositions (propositions related by logical connectives, and minimal units of truth-functional validity).

6. Conclusion.

We have come a long way since initiating our discussion of Q-A logic at the beginning of this chapter, and it is now time to try to pull the strands of our investigation together. Unfortunately to try to summarize further what is already a summary would be to virtually repeat the chapter, so instead we shall limit our remarks to several observations on what we think are the more important central features of Collingwood's discussion of logic.

(1) In the introductory section we recalled the work of previous chapters in which we showed that Q-A logic is recognized not only by Collingwood but also by his principal interpreters to be one of the major features of his overall philosophical outlook. This is explicitly stated by Collingwood in his Autobiography, and in subsequent interpretation of his thought one of the major controversies concerning his philosophy concerns the role of absolute presuppositions in metaphysics—presuppositions being part of the unique P-Q-A complex defined in Q-A logic.
We also recalled that in previous chapters we found that although in the Autobiography Collingwood presented Q-A logic as an alternative to F-logic and fails to mention D-logic at all, his early writings contrast F-logic not with Q-A logic but with D-logic. In this chapter we proposed to examine the later writings to see not only if there is evidence supporting Q-A logic as described in the Autobiography, but also to find whatever enlightenment we could about the relationship between these three logics in Collingwood's philosophy.

(2) When we took a close look at Q-A logic as it appears in the Essay on Metaphysics (Q-AM) we noticed that the P-Q-A complex remained central to his observations about logic, and that the elements of this complex retained a logical relationship to each other that is not merely reducible to a relationship of more co-location in subjective consciousness. However we noticed also that there were several differences between Q-A_A and Q-A_M, the most notable being the fact that Q-A_A described the Q-A complex (or perhaps that complex as extended to include presuppositions, since every question has at least one presupposition) is the unit of meaning, truth, and validity, but in Q-A_M meaning and validity are not discussed, and truth or falsity is assigned primarily to propositions (a point which seems to directly contradict Q-A_A, which denies that truth or falsity is a property of propo-
Using this shift as a starting point for our subsequent investigation, we set out to examine the extent to which Q-A logic in either of its versions could meet the $Q-A_A$ claim to be an alternative to F-logic. We found that when analyzed with this claim in mind, far from being an alternative to F-logic, Q-A logic seems on the contrary to presuppose it, or to presuppose whatever F-logic presupposes; meaning, truth, and validity are establishable independently of the P-Q-A complex, and this independence is a necessary condition for deciding what counts for something to be a meaningful element in that complex, what can be true or false in it, and whether its elements are related in a valid or invalid way. Since from a logical point of view meaning is minimally a function of terms, truth a function of propositions, and validity a function of complex propositions linked by logical connectives, we deemed it unlikely that the P-Q-A complex could minimally meet the specifications of all three as $Q-A_A$ claimed it could. Furthermore Q-A logic fails to sustain itself as a systematic structure (at least in its $Q-A_A$ and $Q-A_M$ versions) since it fails to meet the requirements for such a system—viz. consistency, completeness, and formality.

But if Q-A logic fails as an alternative to F-logic, and can never hope to replace it as Collingwood proposes it,
we find that it has nevertheless a unique logical structure of its own, something we barely began to explore rather than conclusively demonstrated. Since Collingwood recognized at least a significant part of this structure (the central P-Q-A complex, the non-deductive relationship existing between presuppositions and their questions and answers, etc.) we speculated that perhaps the comparison with F-logic was misleading, and that he had a different intention in mind in describing it as an alternative logic. Since so much of it is described in epistemological terms, we proposed to explore Q-A logic in its relationship to mental acts as described in his later philosophy of mind—the three acts involved in grasping the meaning of terms, the truth or falsity of propositions, and the validity of inferences.

(2) The first step in this direction was the examination of D-logic as explicated in the Essay on Philosophical Method—which in its format suggested itself to us as a better candidate than Q-A logic for being an alternative to F-logic. We found that the Essay described characteristics of the philosophical concept, judgment, and inference vis-a-vis the non-philosophical concept, judgment and inference, and in so doing it described the structure of a D-logic as opposed to what we recognized to be an F-logic of an Aristotellean pedigree. With its overlapping classes, related in a scale of forms in which there is a "fusion" of differences of de-
gree, differences of kind, relations of opposition and relations of distinction, the philosophical concept of universal differs from the class-concept employed by "exact and empirical sciences," or from that concept in its non- or pre-philosophical employment. We noted that Collingwood makes a point of not stating this distinction in a way which excludes alternative presence of concepts which meet D-logical requirements, e.g. scalar overlap: concepts with such a structure appear in ordinary experience as well as exceptionally in science. So also with philosophical judgments which, like those of science, are universal, but are also "categorical" (or have objective reference) rather than being merely hypothetical, and inferences, which are "reversible" rather than being merely deductive or inductive.

Unfortunately we found several obstacles in the way of understanding Collingwood's discussion of universal categorical judgments and reversible inferences, and as an aid to understanding the views of the Essay on these matters we turned to the letters between Collingwood and Ryle on the subject of logic, and made some remarkable discoveries. We found Collingwood confessing to a view of logic that sets it in a frankly epistemological context, so that the deductive structures of F-logic are dependent upon or presuppose what he calls "real thinking," in any example of which is contained all the "element-types" of logical relations explored by F-logic, and which the class-concepts of F-logic presuppose.
In the Essay and the ensuing correspondence with Ryle, then, we found Collingwood arguing in something of the fashion of a later-day Kantian, defending "transcendental deduction" in arguments, judgments that are synthetic and a priori without being merely hypothetically true, and universal concepts that appear to be similar to Kant's schematized categories.

Noting that to pursue this discussion further would take us into Collingwood's views on metaphysics, we observed that the argument of the Essay culminates in a crucial chapter on philosophical inference, which maintains that philosophical arguments can be reversible without being viciously circular—a view which puts great pressure on the assertion that philosophy is a "self-justifying" enterprise. But this is only possible insofar as the conclusions of philosophy are "established" by an experience that anticipates them beforehand, so that the anticipating experience establishes the principles used to draw such conclusions, and the principles reciprocally "establish" the conclusions. The non-circularity of philosophical inference depends on the fact that the "establishing" of conclusions by principles is done by a higher form of thinking, one for which the lower states of thinking are "experience" to its "conclusion." Philosophy (which must be one form of what he had called "real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle) presupposes that experience is already somewhat systematic, and it is only because of this that its
arguments (and the argument of the Essay as a whole) escapes vacuous circularity.

Furthermore we noticed that although D-logic in the Essay has the appearance of meeting the systematic requirements of F-logic for consistency, and completeness (discussed in the Essay under the rubric of "system") but not formality, the claims of consistency and completeness are premissed on Collingwood's providing convincing and unambiguous instances of D-logical analysis. And once again we noted that D-logic, just as had Q-A logic (and we can now say, on the strength of the Essay and the Collingwood-Ryle correspondence, F-logic as well) depends on a full-blown epistemology which is not provided by the Essay itself. This we proposed to examine in the next two sections in connection with the higher functions of consciousness in the philosophy of mind as discussed in The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan.

(3) Taking up The Principles of Art first, we noted that in his discussion of levels of consciousness, the function of expression is minimally essential, and language, discourse, and the grammatical and logical analysis of language are all located on a "scale of forms" of expression. Now although there is nothing in The Principles of Art that could pass for a thoroughgoing examination of the relation of language and logic, and although the higher regions of intellectual consciousness remain in this work largely unexplored, we
found that defining language by means of a scale of forms of expression has important consequences for Collingwood's view of logic.

The first of these consequences is that Collingwood insists that the minimum specification of the genus, i.e. expression of emotion, is never entirely lost when it reaches the level of symbolic language. Unfortunately Collingwood does not support this point with convincing evidence or argument, and does not develop it very far. But we recognize that Collingwood struck a rich vein when he proposed that there are "emotions of intellect" which are expressed by intellectualized language--emotions which we recognized (through his example of Archimedes--improbably as he stated it) to be those involved in intellectual activities involved in the process of discovery, for example--emotions like curiosity, interest, wonder, etc. And we suggested that the "anticipation" of answers in question is an expression of an intellectual emotion, but that this also remains unspecified by Collingwood. Even though this theme remains undeveloped in his writings, we noted that even at the highest level of language (which would have to include the grammatical analysis and F-logical extension of language) it retains its continuity with the emotional life of a conscious agent--a thesis which appears to run directly counter to the formalistic claims to autonomy by most contemporary logicians.
We also examined several other secondary consequences of defining language within a scale of forms of expressiveness. One is the location of the grammatical and logical analysis of language in a context which renders the more extreme forms of their claims less credible. The belief that language is a completed "thing" which can be cut up into self-sustaining pieces (words, phrases, sentences, etc.), i.e. the assumption made in the "grammatical analysis of language," is a mythical claim that is discredited when it is recognized that the "language of total bodily gesture" escapes grammatical reduction to lexicographical entries and grammatical rules. Similarly the "logical analysis of language" relies on certain presuppositions (the propositional assumption, the principle of homolinguual translation, and the principle of logical preferability), which may suit the logician's purpose to transform language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of thought, but must be recognized as actually a proposal for the modification of language rather than a statement of what language actually is. In this context F-logic appears in the guise of what might be called today an "ideal language" constructed for the purpose of modifying a natural language to rule out the frustrations of its obstructing and misleading meanings.

Finally, we noticed that there is a global or comprehensive aspect to each level of the scale of forms of expres-
sion as Collingwood describes it in The Principles of Art, so that each has its own principle of organization which is presupposed by its successor on the scale. We saw a connection between this global or summarizing aspect and what he had called the "logical structure of real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle, as well as with the "total imaginative activity" he discussed in connection with the mental life of the artist—in each of which there is a "whole-part:" dialectical relationship. We suggested that perhaps logic is a systematic study of the relations existing within a given level of this scale, so that there is a logic of concepts, propositions, and inferences, which is nonetheless distinct from the logic of the overall relationships between these levels themselves—the former explored by F-logic, the latter by D-logic. (In a later section we noted that Q-A logic may transect both F-logic and D-logic—but about this Collingwood says nothing.)

(4) The last phase of our examination of Collingwood's views on logic brought us to The New Leviathan, where we pursued the relationship between language and logic into Collingwood's analysis of the levels of mental functions. In so doing we found that here too a "scale of forms" appears in which various orders of consciousness are related in the manner that the forms of expressiveness had been in The Principles of Art, and the division of these levels (conceptual, propositional, and rational thinking) parallels the division
of the subject-matter in the Essay on Philosophical Method. Logic, language, and consciousness appeared, therefore, each to have a parallel structure that meets the D-logical description of a "scale of overlapping forms" described in the Essay.

But we also found certain obstacles and peculiarities which make an exact parallel problematic. The most noteworthy of these obstacles is what we called the radical linguistic thesis—that from the level of conceptual thought and above all thinking is a linguistic function, so that language determines thought and not vice versa. Some of the more glaring contradictions on this issue between the assertions of The New Leviathan and his previous writings can be cleared up, we found, by careful attention to functions of consciousness which are more fully described in his earlier writings—e.g. the function of first-order consciousness in "apprehending" or "appreciating" feelings before naming or classifying them. Still other discrepancies concerning language are similarly softened by attention to broader and narrower senses of terms like "language," "thought," "knowledge," etc., each of which appears at various levels in a scale of forms in which it appears. In passing we noted that even "truth" and "meaning" are defined by scales of forms, and consequently some of the apparent discrepancy between Q-A_A and Q-A_M can be cleared up by recognizing that there is "truth" even in concepts, so that it is the narrower sense of the term that applies to proposi-
tions alone (as in \(Q-A_M\)); and there is some sense even in the \(Q-A_A\) assignment of meaning and truth to \(Q-A\) complexes (for even questions have their "truthfulness").

Other problems are less easily resolved, and in discussing them we found several novel concepts in *The New Leviathan* which are revealing, but remain, like some other themes we have turned up on this chapter, undeveloped. Two of these were (a) the relationship between what we called pre-reflective "meanings" at the level of first-order consciousness, and the function of naming at the second level; and (b) the paradoxical notion which we took the liberty of calling real (or concrete) abstraction which appears at the second and all higher levels of consciousness. What emerges from this discussion is an idiosyncratic but interesting view of the relationship between the various levels of consciousness which his "Retrospect" chapter explicitly relates to the D-logical structure of a scale of overlapping forms. Therefore rather than "repudiating" his earlier views on the subject of ming, consciousness, and abstraction in *Speculum Mentis* (as Donagan maintains) we find that much of his later work is an expansion and further examination of the dialectical views expressed in that earlier work (as Rubinoff and Mink have argued). Everywhere we find D-logical structures and arguments, and everywhere we find Collingwood pointing out the limitations of an abstract, class-concept oriented F-logic in the analysis of
language and conscious mental acts. Even his discussion of
the linguistic aspect of the analysis of mind is the develop­
ment of a hint we found him (in Chapter VI) making as early
as Speculum Mentis, where philosophy is viewed as "transla­
tion" into a language where error is not eliminated, but re­
duced by recognizing the metaphorical nature of language.

But in the final reckoning, what can we say about the
autobiographical interpretation on the issue of Q-A logic?
We have found much that supports Collingwood's claim that
from an early date he argued that Q-A logic is a necessary
antidote to the tendency of realists to interpret everything
in the F-logical terms of what he calls the abstract class­
concept, and in this sense he sought even in his later writ­
ings to defend an "alternative" point of view, one which em­
ployed the principles of Q-A logic with its characteristic
P-Q-A complex. But we have also found that he modified his
logic as he developed his thinking, and the guiding princi­
ples shaping the major lines of this development were not
those of Q-A logic either in its Q-A_A or final Q-A_M version,
but rather those spelled out as D-logic in the Essay on Phil­
osophical Method.

Does this mean that we must admit that the Autobiog­
raphy on this issue fails to be vindicated as an interpreta­
tion of his later philosophy? Our answer in all honesty must
be ambiguous: yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the Autobiography fails to provide us with a clear sense of the actual relationship in Collingwood's thought and writings between what we have been calling Q-A logic, F-logic, and D-logic, all of which appear to operate in his thinking and are, in one way or another, legitimate logics (in some sense of that abused word, logic). But also no, in the sense that in the Autobiography Collingwood (a) pointed to the Essay on Philosophical Method as his "best work in matter" (a clear indication that even at the time of writing of the Autobiography he felt that the D-logical structures described in the Essay were sound), and (b) related F-logic to realism, against which a good part of his thinking was directed.

Thus although we cannot reasonably expect that the Autobiography should say everything that could or should be said about his views on logic and their role in his own philosophical development, we believe that in the matter of Q-A logic it remains in general (if not in every detail) a valid interpretation of what he subsequently achieved, and certainly more faithful to that achievement than any of the non-autobiographical interpretations that have been offered thus far. We suspect that if he had lived longer he may have pursued a resolution of the remaining ambiguities about meaning, truth, and validity; he may have developed the notion of the "categorical" or referential aspect of judgment more fully,
perhaps distinguishing it from the meaning function of language; and he may have written a more detailed epistemology to provide us with a key to unlocking the Pandora's box of element-types contained in his "real thinking." These themes and more remain dangling threads in the unfinished carpet in which interpreters like Mink and Rubinoff see a common figure.

But as we have not yet exhausted all that Collingwood has said of significance on these topics in his later writings, we may yet find more light shed on what sort of thinking he accepts as "real." One candidate may be provided from the writings that resulted from his lifelong defense of history as a philosophical subject matter; a second from his heretical views on metaphysics. The first is involved in his rapprochement between history and philosophy which in the Autobiography he claimed to be his major goal as a philosopher-historian; the second is the extension of this endeavor at reconciliation to the central battleground of philosophy--metaphysics. In Chapter IX we shall examine the first, in Chapter X, the second.
CHAPTER IX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

1. Introduction.

In our traversal of the later writings we come now to the third great theme of the Autobiography, and the pattern of the last six chapters indicates sufficiently what our next general tasks must be. First, we seek evidence that Collingwood's autobiographical interpretation of his development is in its main lines carried out in his later writings on the issue of the relationship of philosophy and history. Secondly, we must take account of the major developments of his later thought insofar as these impinge on our present subject—i.e. the positions on logic and mind that we have been examining in the previous chapters of Part III. Thirdly we must take up the problems left unresolved on this subject from his earlier and later writings, paying special attention to those aspects of it which give the appearance of major reversal of opinion either in conclusions or presuppositions, but especially the latter. We may expect that in pursuing these general goals we shall see how Collingwood responds to some of the classical issues that arise in any discussion of the philosophy of history.
But in carrying out these tasks we encounter a special textual problem which does not arise prior to this point in our investigation. When it comes to the philosophy of history we cannot rely on simply outlining the conclusions provided by the evidence of his later published writings and then comparing them to those of the Autobiography. The problem is the nature of the evidence. Collingwood did not live long enough to complete The Principles of History, which he had hoped to be his major contribution to philosophy (IH, v-vi). What we inherit instead is the posthumous publication, The Idea of History, which is the result of the editorial labors of T. M. Knox. In his preface to that work Knox states that he assembled the resulting manuscript out of materials from three sources: (a) a set of thirty-two lectures on the philosophy of history, written during the first six months of 1936 and revised in 1940 in preparation for publication (note that this revision is after he wrote the Autobiography); (b) various lectures and essays written by Collingwood between 1934 and 1939; and (c) a 1939 manuscript consisting of roughly the first third only of his incomplete work, The Principles of History. As this material is passed to us through Knox in the form of The Idea of History, from (a) we are left with an Introduction and Parts I-IV, which consists of the revised 1936 lecture survey of historiography from ancient times to the early 20th century; and from (b) and (c) and some material from (a) we get Part V, the "Epilegomena," a set of terminal
essays outlining Collingwood's own philosophy of history. What remains is Collingwood's work, but as arranged and selected by Knox. The question arises, does this editorial arrangement reflect Collingwood's autobiographical interpretation or Knox's editorial reinterpretation?

Our problem is that we do not have access to the same material as did both Knox when he wrote his preface and Collingwood when he wrote the Autobiography. Although Collingwood had authorized publication of the whole of (c), Knox saw fit to include only those three excerpts that appear in The Idea of History (IH, vi), along with a few very controversial quotes from it in Knox's preface. The rest is now lost. We have already found Knox's judgment faulty on this matter, not only because it is inconsistent with his own editorial policy in publishing the companion volume, The Idea of Nature, but also because it conflicts with Collingwood's explicit statements in the Autobiography. Critical historiography would demand that when two authorities with access to the same materials disagree, one is obliged to suspend judgment until further evidence or convincing argument can be found to resolve the dispute. On these grounds alone it seems we are forced to fall back on more probable narrative arguments to reconstruct his thinking on the matter.
But we are not obliged to remain at this impasse, and this is precisely where our first general task blends with our second and third. In our own survey of Collingwood's development we have found ample indication to support his thesis in the Autobiography that his starting point was located in his criticism of the errors of realism. In Chapter III we found Collingwood linking the errors of realists to the neglect of history. These errors involved (among others) (a) the view of the past as so many dead, atomic events--the "data" of history; (b) a positivistic application of the methods of natural science to history, based on the false analogy between historical and physical events; (c) the assimilation of historical knowledge to natural science (culminating in historical positivism and philosophical psychologism); and (d) an abstract separation of knowledge of fact from knowledge of self. The correction of these erroneous views involved developing his thinking to embrace (a) the notion of the past as a living process of becoming, leading to the present and surviving as elements in that present (ultimately becoming his doctrines of re-enactment, encapsulation, and historical evidence); (b) the concept of history as the science of human affairs, (c) with methods of its own not reducible to abstract deductive logic, but rather employing a Baconian Q-A logic for testing evidence; and (d) a philosophical rapprochement with historical understanding insofar as knowledge achieved by historical inquiry is knowledge of the historian's
own situation which is at the same time knowledge of himself, i.e. philosophy. In this issue we therefore find joined together all of the principle themes we have found to be the guiding ideas in the autobiographical interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy--themes which we have thus far confirmed to be the leading ideas in all his early and later published writings. ¹

In criticizing the errors of realism concerning history we also noticed at least one of the major issues from his later philosophy beginning to emerge. In Chapter VI we saw a

¹If we can ever expect to find a suitable instance of a form of thought displaying the "real thinking" which binds together in a single example all that Collingwood leads us to expect of it, we have good reason to suspect that it will be found minimally exemplified at the historical level in the scale of forms of knowledge. Cf. per contra, Mink and Rubinoff. Mink's "figure in the carpet" (roughly the overall point of view which unites Collingwood's philosophy) is first encountered in art, which is "the basic form of the figure in the carpet to which every part of the rest of the design is related" (MHD, 237). For Rubinoff this would probably not be art but religion, because it is only with religion and especially the Christian religion with its doctrine of redemption, that theory and practice are unified and the theme of reconciliation appears explicitly (CEPC, 106; cf. IH, 314-15). While each of them makes an impressive case in defense of their own interpretation, we wish to note that (a) art and religion hardly come in for mention in the Autobiography, whereas there is a sizable discussion of the rapprochement of history and philosophy; (b) even in the early writings like Speculum Mentis, "concrete thought" (thought dealing with individual facts and employing the concrete universal) does not occur prior to historical thinking; and (c) in his later writings the most noteworthy exercise of Q-A logic and the use of philosophical method of the sort he described as "real thinking" takes place in his discussion of history.
gradual refinement of the concept of history from its more realistic form in Religion and Philosophy (history dealing with "facts" independent of anyone's understanding of them) to the sort of view he sketched in the Autobiography. We noted that in his early writings we could find direct evidence that the principles of history we called LG and ARCH 1, 2, and 3 are actually formulated in his essays on the philosophy of history. But although some of the principles we called HIST 1-4 were indirectly detectable or exemplified in his earlier writings, they are explicit and literal only in his 1936 British Academy lecture, "Human Nature and Human History," at which point the development of his thought on the subject as outlined in the Autobiography may be said to be complete. Between these two points we noted that there was a gradual refinement of the concept of the object of history from one which (a) (in Religion and Philosophy) merely identified its object with factual becoming or the whole of changing reality (hence identifying history and philosophy as "the same thing"), to (b) (in Speculum Mentis) a form of knowledge directed on an object grasped as "the concrete universal," expressed in categorical sincular judgments, but limited insofar as it sought to grasp an infinite world of fact which lies outside the consciousness of the historian; and finally, to (c) (in the Essays on the Philosophy of History written between 1921 and 1930) a concept of history as a multi-levelled struc-
ture in which, in its most precise form, its object is specified as the deeds of men, done in the past, known by critical evaluation of present evidence, and limited only by the historian's own understanding of this evidence. Our question from Chapter VI is whether there is any room in this final concept of history as a scale of forms for the earliest stage in this development, i.e. the realistic element of "fact" as something which exists independently of anyone's knowledge of it (RP, 49; FR, 83).

But if the work of reconciliation of philosophy and history is complete when we have shown that the object of history displays the structure of a philosophical scale of forms, why did Collingwood proceed, after his essays of the twenties, to think and write on the subject? Obviously he had something further to say, and we assume that this must have involved not only the question of the multiple layers of meaning to the philosophical concept of history, but also the question of the sort of truths that are embodied in history and the form of inference that historical thinking employs. In pursuing our third general task we therefore contact Collingwood's handling of the classic contemporary issues in the philosophy of history, viz. issues concerning (a) the meaning of history, (b) historical truth, and (c) the nature of historical explana-
We have already met with Collingwood's response to the first issue, and we shall have more to say about it in a moment. We know at least that whatever else history might be, if it is a philosophical concept its meaning has the structure of a scale of overlapping forms. But thus far we have not found Collingwood saying much about the nature of historical truth and inference, and we anticipate that in The Idea of History these will be the issues that occupy the foreground of his concern. Therefore we expect to see that the task of reconciling history and philosophy is carried forward in his later writings by extending the dialectical logic of his Essay on Philosophical Method to history at the propositional and inferential levels of thought.

These considerations provide some substance to the general tasks we have set for ourselves in this chapter. Our immediate concern in the next section will be to show, first, that in his overall reflection on the nature of historical

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2 Cf. W. H. Dray, "Philosophy of History," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), VI, 247-54. In his article Dray distinguishes between speculative and critical philosophies of history, and within the latter identifies the three major problem areas as those dealing with historical explanation, the historical individual, and historical objectivity. Since historical objectivity is basically the question of the nature of historical truth, two of the three of these issues in the critical philosophy of history are directly addressed by Collingwood; the third is present, but in slightly altered form. As we shall see Collingwood takes as his historical individual the meaning of an historical act, so that in this issue are bound both the speculative and critical aspects of the philosophy of history.
thinking Collingwood's orientation is always displayed by a critique of the fundamental presupposition which he called "realism." This critique depends on a definition of history as a philosophical rather than a formal-logical concept--i.e. one having the structure of a scale of forms rather than that of a formally abstract class-concept. Secondly, this critique leads directly to the formulation of his famous "inside-outside" theory of historical events, i.e. that historical events differ from physical events insofar as they are essentially expressions of thought which the latter are not. Thirdly, since the subject matter of history is thought, Collingwood develops a minimal notion of what is to be included in that concept and, fourthly, how it is grasped by an of historical re-enactment. Fifthly, re-enactment presupposes the activity of an a priori imagination, the functions of which he sketches. And finally, this excursion from historical meaning to mental functions climaxes in a remarkable debate in which Collingwood's critique is extended beyond realism to the errors of idealism as well, showing how on either presupposition historical thinking, and hence historical truth, is not possible at all.

It is at this point that we begin to see how Collingwood's later philosophy of history moves beyond the essays of the twenties. We encounter arguments that exhibit the sort of structure that he had described in the Essay on Philosophi-
The logical Method as peculiarly philosophical--arguments that are reversible and conclusions that are reciprocally established. We also are made increasingly aware of the degree of his reliance on the theory of mental functions that we were at pains to describe in the previous chapter. And we see how, as might be expected, the issue of historical truth leads directly to the problem of historical inference. In section three we shall take up the topics of historical methodology, Q-A logic, and historical inference, trying once again to watch for hints that will help us to get a clearer idea of what Collingwood understood by "real thinking" and the relationship between Q-A, F-, and D-logics.

Textually, what we are attempting is a reconstruction of The idea of History. In section two we will take up the Introduction to The idea of History and the first, second, fourth and fifth of the seven Epilegomena--all of these being works dating from around 1934-36 and preceeding his work on the unfinished Principles of History. In section three we shall be concerned with the remaining Epilegomena, but primarily the third (which deals with historical inference)--all of these being extracts from the 1939 draft of the Principles of History. Our survey thus will have the effect of a counter-balance to Knox's editorial arrangement of these essays,
since it approximates their actual chronological order. Whether it also establishes their logical order as well we leave to the judgment of the reader.

2. Anti-Realism and History: (a) The Definition of History.

The Introduction to The Idea of History presents, in admirably concise language, a sketch of the nature, subject matter, method, and aim of the philosophy of history—an exposition of which any scholastic philosopher would be proud. Collingwood sets out to answer the questions, what is history? what is it about? how does it proceed? and what is it for? (or alternately, what is its value?)—and his answers are as follows. (1) History is a kind of research or inquiry belonging to the sciences, that is, "the forms of thought whereby we ask questions and try to answer them"—an activity of "fastening upon something we do not know and trying to discover it." (2) The object of history or the kind of thing it finds out is "res gestae: actions of human beings that have been done in the past." (3) History proceeds by the interpretation of evidence, where evidence is a collective name for things existing here and now and of such a kind

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3 It is interesting to note that in spite of Collingwood's assertion in the Autobiography that in his early years as a tutor and lecturer at Oxford he became something of a specialist in Aristotle (the first lectures he gave were on De Anima) (A, 27), few of his interpreters have followed up on this lead. A case in point is the characterization of history as a science, given in the Introduction, and another Aristotelianism appears in his use of the potency-act distinction in connection with historical evidence.
that the historian, by thinking about it, can get answers to the questions he asks about past events. And (4) the aim of history, its value, is human self-knowledge, where knowing oneself means "knowing, first, what it is to be a man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; and thirdly, knowing what it is to be man you are and nobody else is"--a knowledge achieved by knowing what one can do. (IH, 9-10). History is, to put it shortly, scientific, humanistic, rational, and self-revelatory (IH, 18).

Here in brief form is the sum, if not the entire substance, of Collingwood's philosophy of history, and the remainder of The Idea of History consists of first a description of how this complete idea came to take shape in the minds of working historians (Parts I-IV), and secondly a commentary on what each of these points means (Part V-The Epilegomena). Coming to these four characteristics from the viewpoint of our recent study of Collingwood's development to this point it is not difficult to interpolate for ourselves how they are formulated in opposition to realism. (a) When Collingwood calls history a science and then describes science as "asking questions and seeking answers" we recognize behind this assertion Collingwood's assault on formal logic as a static relationship between a completed set of propositions, and his "alternative" proposal for a Q-A logic of discovery as the true instrument of historical science. (b)
When Collingwood says that the object of history is res gestae, we recognize that he is calling attention not only to the fact that it is not knowable by direct observation or "acquaintance" (on which realist epistemology is based), but also that it requires a different description of knowing with an epistemology of its own, one for which the basic model of "explanation" by subsumption of particulars under a universal law is inappropriate. (c) When Collingwood states that history proceeds by the interpretation of evidence we cannot help recalling the critique of "sense-datum" empiricism in The Principles of Art. The way in which historical events of the past are present to us requires the conscious act of interpretation even more necessarily than does the perception of objects which are immediately present before us. Although in perception we can apprehend or appreciate something just as it stands, before beginning to classify it (PA, 203), historical evidence is only actual evidence insofar as it is known to be what it is, i.e. insofar as it is historically interpreted (IH, 247, 280). And (d) when Collingwood insists that the aim of history is for human self-knowledge, we hear the refrain of his lifelong theme of reconciliation between the ancient philosophical imperative to "know thyself" and the contemporary view of history as the critical knowledge of human events. In Collingwood's view the only way to effect this rapprochement is by ridding
philosophy of the notion that it can live up to the sort of objectivity proposed for it by the analogy with exact or empirical sciences. The reconciliation is complete when both these errors are corrected, and both philosophy and history are understood to be forms of self-knowledge.

Lest we be accused of reading too much into The Idea of History we hasten to add that this aspect of rapprochement is explicit in the Introduction where Collingwood writes that a subject matter is philosophical insofar as it deals with "the organized and scientific development of self-consciousness" (IH, 4), and adds that it is history rather than other forms of knowledge that raises the peculiarly modern problems that shed new light on this development.

The past, consisting of particular events in space and time which are no longer happening, cannot be apprehended by mathematical thinking, because mathematical thinking apprehends objects that have no special location in space and time. Nor can the past be apprehended by theological thinking, because the object of that thinking is a single infinite object, and historical events are finite and plural. Nor by (empirical) scientific thinking, because the truths which science discovers are known to be true by being found through observation and experiment exemplified in what we actually perceive, whereas the past has vanished and our ideas about it can never be verified as we verify our scientific hypotheses. Theories of knowledge designed to account for mathematical and theological and scientific knowledge thus do not touch on the special problems of historical knowledge; and if they offer themselves as complete accounts of knowledge they actually imply that historical knowledge is impossible. (IH, 5).
It is noteworthy that although there is an indistinct echo of the various forms of knowledge from Speculum Mentis, there is no explicit connection made between history as itself a philosophical scale of forms and as a form of self-knowledge along with others (art, science, etc.). Thus we are faced from the outset with a dilemma, if not an outright reversal from the standpoint of his earlier writings: it appears that one can either effect a rapprochement by pointing to a common element of self-knowledge in both history and philosophy, thereby defining both in terms of a universal and ignoring their structure as a scale of forms, or define history in terms of its object as part of a scale of forms of knowledge and lose its rapprochement with philosophy as both forms of self-knowledge.

But this is less a problem than it appears. Collingwood has not abandoned his requirement from the Essay on Philosophical Method of defining a philosophical concept by means of overlapping forms. In the Introduction he has merely given us a brief sketch of the highest exemplification of the concept (viz. scientific history) prior to showing how this concept has developed to this point from its prior stages. It is the burden of Parts I-IV of The Idea of History to trace this development through its manifestations in historiography--a remarkable overview which we shall not attempt to examine here in detail. We wish to point out only that both
in Parts I-IV and in the Epilegomena of Part V, Collingwood's strategy is to show that history, in its development and in its present state, is the expression of mind in its several overlapping functions--presentative perception, re-presentative imagination, critical understanding and reconciling reason. Each of these functions gives rise to a form of historiography in which they form the guiding idea. Thus Collingwood traces the idea of history (a) from its pre-historic beginnings in mythology and sacred literature, through (b) its first concrete manifestations in Greek histories with their emphasis on eyewitness accounts, (c) subsequently developed in the Christian era as "scissors and paste" history which relies uncritically on "authorities" who in turn rest on eyewitness accounts; then (d) to critical historiography originating in the Renaissance but coming into its own in the 18th century with philosophers like Vico who recognized that the historian can and must employ his own reasoning to adjudicate conflicting accounts of historical authorities; and finally (e) to the present era of scientific historiography, in which the active role of the historian is thoroughly recognized as essential to the very process of historical thinking. It is not difficult to recognize in these stages of the concept of history a schema we have already encountered in *The Principles of Art* and *The New Leviathan* in the process of thought in general. Thus we have (a) history as the confused potential for bearing meaning (mythical and theological his-
tory), (b) as events perpetuated and domesticated in perception by eye-witnesses (early Greco-Roman historiography), (c) as chronicles represented in imagination and memory ("scissors and past"—e.g. Medieval historiography), (d) as critically constructed into coherent narratives by judgmental understanding (critical historiography), and (e) as fully related to self-conscious reason by recognizing and integrating the active role of the historian in the construction of his narrative account (scientific historiography). It is in this way that he offers recompense for the neglect of history by the realists, and it is in this way that he shows that history is a form of self-knowledge.

This overview of the argument of Part I is not totally free of the inaccuracies that arise whenever oversimplification occurs. Greco-Roman history, for example, is not completely or even primarily based on eye-witness accounts: much of it is mixed with legend, myth, and even outright inventions by the historian (orations in Thucydides, for example). In *Speculum Mentis* Collingwood made a point of describing how early historiography is mixed with dramatic and religious elements, so that there is some confusion in the mind of an historian like Herodotus between the ideals of factual history *per se* and the artistic ideals of drama (SM, 211-16). Collingwood was no less aware of such an overlap when he wrote Part I of *The Idea of History*: but he was not
concerned with showing the relation of history to other forms of experience (e.g. art), but rather with showing how the clear idea of scientific history grew out of a confused idea of it. Our point in bringing out the analogy between the development of scientific history and the levels of mental functions is meant to call attention to the shift in ideals of historiography, and to show how in that shift a scale of forms is generated.

If the four elements of Collingwood's definition of history are formulated in opposition to realism, how do they form a challenge to the central realistic dogma on the relationship of knower and known? If the object known is not affected by the knowing of it, then it appears that objectivity is retained for history, but self-knowledge is not; but if the events of history are altered in the process of coming to know them, then historical objectivity is itself threatened. In showing how the concept of history is preserved in the truths of history, Collingwood will argue, as he already had in The Principles of Art for perception, that historical events are not created ex nihilo by historical imagination, but they are preserved and prolonged by historical consciousness, and this is based on the historian's operating presuppositions. As a first step in showing how he works this out in detail in the Epilegomena essays, we must clarify the notion of an historical event, the minimum exemplifica-
tion of the concept of history, and the res gestae of his definition in the Introduction.

(b) The Outside and Inside of Historical Events.--It is interesting to note that the first two of these Epilegomena, both lectures, are directed against views of history by realists and idealists respectively. The first is Collingwood's 1936 British Academy lecture, "Human Nature and Human History," and it packs a double anti-realistic punch. It makes as its major thesis that "the science of human nature was a false attempt—falsified by the analogy of natural science—to understand the mind itself, and that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by the methods called scientific, the right way of investigating the mind is by the methods of history" (IH, 209). But rather than remaining content to refute an 18th century error, Collingwood carries the argument forward from empiricism to contemporary realism. He takes as his proximate target the essay "The Historicity of Things" by the avowed realist, Samuel Alexander. 4 Alexander's essay identifies historicity with the universal "timefulness" of things, a tactic which results in resolving all knowledge to history (IH, 210). In order to preserve the autonomy of both history and science, Collingwood makes it a point to distinguish history not only from physical change

but also from "timefulness"—both resulting from the confusion of the scientific conception of nature and the historical conception of mind.

First he tackles an older concept:

Since the time of Heraclitus and Plato, it has been a commonplace that things natural, no less than things human, are in constant change, and that the entire world of nature is a world of "process" or "becoming." But this is not what is meant by the historicity of things; for change and history are not at all the same. According to this old-established conception, the specific forms of natural things constitute a changeless repertory of fixed types, and the process of nature is a process by which instances of these forms . . . come into existence and pass out of it again. Now in human affairs . . . there is no such fixed repertory of specific forms . . . . (H)uman history shows a change not only in the individual cases in which these ideals are realized or partially realized, but in the ideals themselves. (IH, 210-11).

Collingwood recognized that the evolutionary conception of nature has replaced the older concept of a physical universe of unaltered species, so that in the newer view, as expressed by Whitehead, "the very possession of its attributes by a natural thing takes time" and "the historicity of things" is proven by the fact that there can be no such thing as nature at an instant (IH, 212). But this presents an even subtler danger, since history is still not reducible to science nor historical events to scientific ones:

These modern views of nature do, no doubt, "take time seriously." But just as history is not the same thing as change, so it is not the same thing as "timefulness," whether that means evolution or an existence which takes time
According to him ((i.e. the historian)), all history properly so called is the history of human affairs. There is a certain analogy between the archeologist's interpretation of a stratified site and the geologist's interpretation of rock-horizons with their associated fossils; but the difference is no less clear than the similarity. The archeologist's use of his stratified relics depends on his conceiving them as artifacts serving human purposes and thus expressing a particular way in which men have thought about their own life; and from his point of view the paleontologist, arranging his fossils in a time-series, is not working as an historian, but only as a scientist thinking in a way which can at most be described as quasi-historical. (IH, 212).

It is in order to distinguish these two classes of events and these two sorts of thinking activities that Collingwood introduces his "inside-outside" theory of human acts.

He distinguishes between physical events and human acts on the basis that physical events have only an "outside" consisting of "everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements," whereas human acts have in addition an "inside" or "that which can only be described in terms of thought" (IH, 213). If this appears to be a mere restatement of a kind of Cartesian dualism, Collingwood is anxious to add that it is not the dualism of a pair of mutually exclusive classes. The historian, he insists, is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the other. "He is investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event" (ibid.). While it is true that the
natural scientist goes beyond the immediate event by observing its relations to others and bringing them under a general formula or law of nature, to the scientist nature is always merely a "phenomenon" or spectacle presented to his intelligent observation. But the events of history are never mere phenomena or spectacles, but "things which the historian looks, not at, but through, to discern the thought within them" (IH, 214).

This last remark underscores the importance of viewing Collingwood's inside-outside theory in the light of his philosophy of mind. When he says that the historian looks "not at but through" the outside of an event he is saying that the historian takes such acts as expressions of thoughts, i.e. as conveyers of meaning exactly like language (where language is taken in its extended sense as including that "gesture language" that Collingwood recognized as more basic than spoken language). Acts, like sounds, ink-marks, gesture-signs, etc. are physical "bearers of meaning"--they express the intentions of an historical agent in acts as his words do in sounds. It is because they have this character that they have the capacity or potential to be evidence to the historian; but it is also the reason that they require interpretation by an historian. To paraphrase the situation for Collingwood, a physical event may or may not be whatever it is without human interpretation; but an historical event cannot. Sounds may or
may not be bearers of meanings, but human actions, like words, do not have this alternative.

Unfortunately Collingwood's inside-outside doctrine has generated a fair amount of misunderstanding, even among his more sympathetic interpreters. Some of this appears to be the result of his own overstatement—as when he writes that "the processes of events which constitute the world of nature are altogether different in kind from the processes of thought which constitute the world of history" (IH, 217). It has led to the charges both that he over-intellectualizes history and that he draws an overly strict distinction between history and nature. Once again the first charge seems to be directly supported by Collingwood. Having said that history is not the same as change, natural process or timefulness, he further limits the range of historical research by insisting that it does not even include all human activities:

It does not follow that all human actions are subject-matter for history; and indeed historians are agreed that they are not. But when they are asked how the distinction is to be made between historical and non-historical human actions, they are at a loss how to reply. From our present point of view we can offer an answer; so far as man's conduct is determined by what may be called his animal nature, his impulses and appetites, it is non-historical; the process of these activities is a natural process. Thus, the historian is not interested in the fact that men eat and sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; but he is interested in the social customs which they create by their thought as a framework within which these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention and morality. (IH, 216; cf. IH, 315).
The question immediately arises, does this not rule out a
great deal of what is usually taken to be the subject-matter
of history? What about the rages of Ivan the Terrible, Na-
poleon, or Hitler, or natural disasters like the Lisbon and
San Francisco earthquakes? We shall see in the next section
what Collingwood takes to be the true subject-matter of his-
tory, but we see from the above quote what his general answer
to the objection is. Natural events are of interest to the
historian only to the extent that they impinge on human events
in the proper sense, or are incorporated into them as an as-
pect of thought. Passions, natural disasters and other physi-
cal phenomena are historical only to the extent that people
thinkingly react to them—Hitler's rages as instrumental or
obstructive to the discharge of Nazi warplans, the Lisbon
earthquake causing decisions on relocation of populations or
influencing government financial policies, etc. But regarded
as entities in themselves, i.e. as not the expression of human
thought, passions and feelings are the subject-matter for psy-
chology, land-mass shifts for geology, etc.

The second objection is more serious, and takes a bit
of sleuthing to uncover Collingwood's thought on the matter.
We have already suggested that while historical events neces-
sarily involve thought, since they express human intentions
in purposive acts, natural events do not. Does this mean they
do not as a matter of fact, or as a matter of necessity? Col-
lingwood appears to leave the question open, commenting only that "The only condition on which there could be a history of nature is ((on the assumption)) that the events of nature are actions on the part of some thinking being or beings, and that by studying these actions we could discover what were the thoughts which they expressed and think these thoughts for ourselves. This is a condition," he adds cryptically, "which probably no one will claim is fulfilled" (IH, 302). 5

5Collingwood could not have anticipated that someone after his death would, in fact, make such a claim--but such is the argument of J. Blachowicz in "History and Nature in Collingwood's Dialectic," Idealistic Studies, VI, 2 (January, 1976), pp. 49-61. Although sympathetic to Collingwood's overall aims, Blachowicz finds that Collingwood failed to extend his dialectical analysis to nature itself, and is therefore guilty of drawing an overly strict distinction between events of nature and those of history--thus being open to an accusation of falling prey to his own "Fallacy of False Disjunction." Blachowicz argues that in order to extend his dialectical analysis to nature Collingwood merely had to see that the "presuppositions of nature ((may)) be disclosed by way of access into its 'inside' as well" (p. 56). But for Blachowicz the "inside" of physical events consist of their teleological aspect, which is contained in the fundamental parameter of complexity or organization. "As the variable of internal organization assumes different values, the generic essence is qualitatively altered, generating the scale of forms which is the scale of nature," so that "the presuppositional logic is fully applicable" to development in nature" (p. 57). Now while we agree with Blachowicz in bemoaning Collingwood's failure to achieve a clearer rapprochement between Q-A and D-logics, we think it is alien to Collingwood's purpose to attribute thoughts to physical, non-human events. Presuppositions, whatever else they may be, are essentially a part of a P-Q-A complex and essentially "linguistic" in the sense of expressing the thoughts of persons. Physical events do not ask questions (although they may, on human interpretation, "raise" questions in the minds of observers); therefore they do not "have presuppositions in Collingwood's sense. But Blachowicz is right to point out Collingwood's curious neglect of the applicability of the scale of forms to nature--a deficiency not shared by some other contemporary cosmologies.
sort of "thinking" Collingwood has in mind in the expression "thinking beings" we shall see in a moment, but we have already seen that he has in mind the sort of problem-solving choices that embody the unification of theoretical and practical activities—what he has elsewhere called "real thinking" or "concrete thought." The outside and inside of an historical act are not themselves two separate events, but two sides to the same act—exactly like expressive language and thought. Thus when the historical agent is mistaken in his theoretical assessment of the situation in which he finds himself called upon to act, this mistaken thought cannot be ignored by the historian who attempts to understand the act: his mistaken thought is essential to understanding the significance of the agent's act (IH, 316-17).

Now this point is crucial in understanding the inside-outside theory: while Collingwood is willing to use the term "event" for both history and nature, he is not able to bring himself to do so for the term "action" because the latter term requires the essential element of self-consciousness in the awareness of alternative possibilities (IH, 215). Collingwood finds it highly questionable, if not downright repugnant, to predicate this state of affairs of nature. This becomes apparent in an earlier portion of The Idea of History, in a discussion of teleology—that aspect of "acting for an end" that is teetering on the brink of the distinction between history
and nature. The issue arises in Collingwood's discussion of Kant's distinction between natural and human affairs, viz. that nature acts in accordance with law, but only man acts in accordance with the concept or consciousness of law. Nature, therefore, is the sum of processes governed by laws blindly obeyed, but the world of human affairs is governed not simply by law but by the consciousness of law (IH, 92). He then cites with apparent approval Kant's demonstration of why there should be such a thing as history.

Nature's purpose in creating any of her creatures is, of course, the existence of that creature, the realization of its essence. The teleology of nature is an internal teleology, not an external: she does not make grass to feed cows, and cows to feed men; she makes grass in order that there would be grass, and so on. Man's essence is his reason; therefore she makes men in order that they should be rational . . . . Man is an animal that has the peculiar faculty of profiting by the experience of others; and he has this faculty because he is rational, for reason is a kind of experience in which this is possible. . . . Consequently the purpose of nature for the development of man's reason is a purpose that can be fully realized only in the history of the human race and not in an individual life. (IH, 98).

Now it is worth noting that while Collingwood faults Kant for locating the activating force for the plan of human history, i.e. progress in rationality in human irrationality, i.e. passion, ignorance, and selfishness (IH, 103), he does not fault him for the basic distinction between nature and the world of human affairs. Such is not the case with his discussion of Croce, whom he charges with blurring the distinction completely.
Collingwood quotes a passage in which Croce challenges his reader to an experiment: if you wish to understand the true history of a neolithic man, become a neolithic in your mind; and if you wish to understand the true history of a blade of grass, become that grass in your mind--but if you cannot, content yourself with describing and arranging artifacts or mechanisms in an external way. Then Collingwood responds to Croce's challenge:

As concerns neolithic man, the advice is obviously good. If you can enter into his mind and make his thoughts your own, you can write his history, and not otherwise . . . . When he made a certain implement, he had a purpose in mind; the implement came into being as an expression of his spirit, and if you treat it as non-spiritual that is only because of the failure of your historical insight. But is this true of a blade of grass? Is its articulation and growth an expression of its own spiritual life? I am not so sure. And when we come to a crystal, or a stalactite, my skepticism reaches the point of rebellion. The process by which these things form themselves appears to me to be a process in which, through no lack of our own historical sympathy, we look in vain for any expression of thought. It is an event; it has individuality; but it seems to lack that inwardness which, according to . . . Croce, is made (and I think, rightly made) the criterion of historicity. (IH, 199-200).

The upshot of this discussion is that while Collingwood is willing to grant an "internal teleology" to nature, he is not willing to abandon the distinction between natural and historical events, because the latter cannot be understood except as the expression of human thought. It is less a matter of necessity than it is one of fact that nature is not so constituted; but it is a matter of necessity that history is, since,
on Collingwood's view, an historical event necessarily is an action of a human agent (one is tempted to say "by definition"), and this requires awareness of alternatives, or reflective thought. And it is this difference in essential constitution that he has in mind when he says that they are "altogether different in kind" (IH, 217--notice the wording: the processes of events which constitute the world of nature are altogether different in kind from the processes of thought which constitute the world of history).

The "inside-outside" terminology is therefore a metaphorical expression which Collingwood finds useful for describing what he takes to be an essential difference between historical and physical events--a distinction that he maintains both against positivistic historians who assimilate history to science as if the nature of the "facts" or events were basically the same (IH, 132-33), and against the idealistic historians who assimilate nature to history by assuming that one can re-think a physical event in the same way that one can

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6 The successors to the English empiricist tradition in history are the positivistic historians, just as the successors to that tradition in philosophy are the realists of Oxford and Cambridge (IH, 126-33, 142, 163-64, 173-74). As we have already noted, empiricism, naturalism, realism, positivism, and even psychologism are products of the same frame of mind, and Collingwood often uses the terms synonymously. He recognized in all the root error of realism, i.e. the assumption that knowledge consists of the confrontation of a mind with an object outside the mind, where the latter remains unaffected by the knowing of it.
re-enact an historical one. The philosophy of history which is argued in the Epilegomena is hardly intelligible unless it is understood against the background of this opposition between realistic or positivistic history and its idealistic counterpart—a theme we shall encounter again in the discussion of historical re-enactment.

(c) Individuality, Universality, and the Subject Matter of History. In analyzing the res gestae of history Collingwood has been more concerned with the differences between historical acts and physical events than with the positive characteristics of the acts themselves. Thus far we know minimally that history is concerned with acts of men done in the past, acts which have an "inside" consisting of thought. We know also that these acts are done self-consciously or "on purpose," and that they involve the practical resolution of situational problems expressing a thoughtful choice between alternatives (IH, 215, 283). And finally, they are experiential—they are, as he phrases it, "not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through" (IH, 218).

In the fifth Epilegomenon, "The Subject Matter of History," Collingwood reiterates these characteristics and adds another which sheds some light not only on the minimal unit presupposed for understanding historical processes, but also on our previous discussion of universal concepts and abstract classes. Reversing the order of the approach taken in the
first Epilegomenon, Collingwood this time proceeds from the subjective to the objective. The subject matter of history must first of all be experience and not the mere object of experience, i.e. the processes of nature that are the subject matter for natural science. But it is not even experience as such that the historian seeks, since immediate experience is a "mere flow of consciousness consisting of sensations, feelings and the like" which are carried away in the flux of sensuous experience (cf. IH, 233). Nor is it even thought in its immediacy, i.e. "the unique act of thought with its unique context in the life of an individual thinker," since if this were so, in thinking an historical subject matter "the historian would be the person about whom he thinks, living over again ((acts)) in all respects the same" (IH, 302-03). What the historian apprehends is not the individual in all its individuality, but something essentially universal:

The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of thought in its individuality, just as it actually happened ((or in Ranke's words, wie es eigentlich gewesen--IH, 130)). What he apprehends of that individual is only something that it might have shared with other acts of thought and actually has shared with his own. But this something is not an abstraction, in the sense of a common characteristic shared by different individuals and considered apart from the individuals that share it. It is the act of thought itself, in its survival and revival at different times and in different persons; once in the historian's own life, once in the life of the person whose history he is narrating. (IH, 303).

Thus far we recognize Collingwood's epistemological setting for the notion of a universal concept which "survives and re-
vives" in mental activities; but he here goes on to give it a different perspective than we have heretofore encountered.

The passage continues:

Thus the vague phrase ((of Croce--IH, 199)) that history is knowledge of the individual claims for it a field at once too wide and too narrow: too wide, because the individuality of perceived objects and natural facts and immediate experience falls outside its sphere . . . ; too narrow, because it would exclude universality, and it is just the universality of an event or character that makes it a proper and possible object of historical study, if by universality we mean something that oversteps the limits of merely local and temporal existence and possesses a significance valid for all men at all times . . . . (T)hought, transcending its own immediacy, survives and revives in other contexts; and . . . individual acts and persons appear in history not in virtue of their individuality as such, but because that individuality is the vehicle of a thought which, because it was actually theirs, is potentially everyone's. (IH, 303; cf. IH, 247, 280).

In this subtle and neglected theme we find Collingwood's understanding of universal concepts lit up from several directions simultaneously. (a) Not only does it contrast the individual (what he had called, in Speculum Mentis, the concrete universal) with the abstract universal (or the class-concept of F-logic); and (b) not only does this universality take part in the survival and revival of a concept in the context of different mental acts, thus transcending the local and temporal limits of immediate feelings; (c) but also it binds the universality of a concept to the individuality of the meaning of an historical act which expresses a thought which, as he says, is potentially everyone's because it was actually theirs. The universality of historical thinking is bound by Colling-
wood to the notion of meaning expressed in historical acts, and this is the individuality with which history is minimally concerned. This theme will be renewed when we come to Collingwood's treatment of re-enactment, where it re-appears in the critique of the distinction between acts of thought and their objects.

It is also here that we encounter the self-consciousness that is essential not only to historical understanding but in the historical act of an agent in the first place. Both in his definition of history as consisting of acts of historical agents with their inside consisting of thought, and in his definition of historical re-enactment on the part of the historian, the key term is, of course, "thought." Collingwood does not back away from stating what is included in this term.

How much or how little is meant to be included under the term "thought"? The term "thought" . . . has stood for a certain form of experience or mental activity whose peculiarity may be negatively described by saying that it is not merely immediate, and therefore is not carried away by the flow of consciousness. The positive peculiarity which distinguishes thought from mere consciousness is its power of recognizing the activity of the self as a single activity persisting through the diversity of its own acts . . . . The peculiarity of thought, then, is that it is not mere consciousness but self-consciousness. The self, as merely conscious, is a flow of consciousness, a series of immediate sensations and feelings; but as merely conscious it is not aware of itself as such a flow; it is ignorant of its own continuity through the succession of experiences. The activity of becoming aware of this continuity is what is called thinking. (IH, 306; cf. IH, 222).
Collingwood follows this continuity-achieving activity briefly through its manifestations in perception, memory, and imagination—the stages of recognizing feelings as "mine," prolonging them, etc. The account is a brief tour of the stages of mental functions that we have already encountered in The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan. As before, it emphasizes the active role of thought at all levels of mental activity. But in this case Collingwood is anxious to draw the distinction between reflectively self-conscious thought and non-reflective or "unconscious" thinking, and in so doing we again see it from a new angle than we have previously.

(The thinking which we do in memory or perception as such may be called unconscious thinking, not because we can do it without being conscious, for in order to do it we must be not only conscious but self-conscious, but because we do it without being conscious that we are doing it. To be conscious that I am thinking is to think in a new way, which may be called reflecting. Historical thinking is always reflection; for reflection is thinking about the act of thinking . . . . But what kind of thinking can be its object? . . . In order . . . that any particular act of thought should become subject-matter for history, it must be an act not only of thought but of reflective thought, that is, one which is performed in the consciousness that it is being performed, and is constituted by that consciousness. (IH, 307-08).

Notice that Collingwood does not find the expression "unconscious thinking" self-contradictory (cf. per contra, Donagan, LPC, 271) and that he accepts without hesitation the presence of the activity of self-consciousness even at the level of perception—a point to which we called attention earlier. Nor is it a great surprise that he finds historical thinking
to be self-consciously reflective, although we find him for the first time stating that it is "constituted" by that consciousness. But then he continues:

The effort to do it (i.e. think reflectively)) must be more than a merely conscious effort...; it must be a reflective effort, the effort to do something of which we have a conception before we do it. A reflective activity is one in which we know what it is that we are trying to do, so that when it is done we know that it is done by seeing that it has conformed to the standard or criterion which was our initial conception of it. It is therefore an act which are enabled to perform by knowing in advance how to perform it. (IH, 308).

At this point it should be perfectly obvious why, on Collingwood's grounds, physical events cannot be regarded as historical actions: they are not acts performed with the foreknowledge of a "standard or criterion" which is their initial conception of it. To use Collingwood's lowly example, the blade of grass grows not in order that the cow should eat it, or with the conception of being food for herbivorous animals, but that there should be grass. But even that is not correct, for it has no conception at all of what it is to be grass rather than some alternative. But historical acts cannot be thus regarded; their universal character is part of their essential constitution:

An act is more than a mere unique individual; it is something having a universal character; and in the case of a reflective or deliberate act (an act which we not only do, but intend to do before doing it) this universal character is the plan or idea of the act which we conceive in our thought before doing the act itself, and the criterion by reference to which, when we have done it, we know that
we have done what we meant to do . . . Reflective acts may be roughly described as the acts which we do on purpose, and these are the only acts which can become the subject matter of history. (IH, 309).

Now although Collingwood has phrased the distinction in temporal terms, ("an act which we . . . intend to do before doing it . . .") it is clear enough from the rest of the paragraph that what he has in mind is what is also reflected in the basic Kantian distinction between actions done in accordance with a law and actions done in accordance with the concept of a law; historical acts fall into the latter category, physical events in the former. What Collingwood has added is the observation that all such deliberate reflective acts are historical, that they involve criteria by which success or failure may be assessed, and that therefore these acts have aspects that are both individual (as experientially one's own) and universal (as reflectively intended).

Here we encounter a problem. In historical thinking (in this case we mean the thinking of agents involved in the doing of historical deeds) we find the sort of thinking Collingwood called "concrete" in Speculum Mentis and "real thinking" in The New Leviathan and his correspondence with Ryle concerning the Essay on Philosophical Method. We recall from our discussion of his philosophy of mind that all real thinking has both theoretical and practical dimensions, and that the latter is foundational to the former. In saying that his-
Historical acts are those which we plan to do before doing them. Collingwood appears to be reversing this priority—conceiving a plan being a theoretical activity and executing it a practical one. Collingwood anticipated this objection and even drew from it the logical conclusion that acting is the only thing one can do on purpose, since thinking on purpose would involve conceiving your own act of thought before executing it, and having done so you would have executed it already. Theoretical activities, it follows, can only be non-purposive or, as he puts it, "done in the dark, with no conception of what is to come from engaging in them" (IH, 311). The reader familiar with the debate concerning Collingwood's views on absolute presuppositions (i.e. that they are not propositions, that one can make them without knowing that they are being made, etc.) will realize that we are on the verge of a crucial issue not only in his philosophy of history, but in his view of metaphysics.

We know already what part of his answer to this objection is: any theoretical activity is already practical insofar as it employs concepts that are made by acts of selective attention. But his actual reply is interesting insofar as it suggests a connection with Q-A logic which we shall have to bear in mind when we come to examine his thesis that metaphysics is an historical science.
Today it is no longer necessary to argue that art, science, religion, philosophy, and so forth are proper subjects of historical study; the fact of their being studied historically is too familiar. But it is necessary to ask why this is so . . . . In the first place, it is not true that a person engaged in purely theoretical thinking is acting without a purpose . . . . (E)very actual inquiry starts from a certain problem, and the purpose of the inquiry is to solve that problem; the plan of the discovery, therefore, is already known and formulated by saying that, whatever the discovery may be, it must be such as to satisfy the terms of the problem . . . . In the second place, the difference between conceiving and executing a purpose was not correctly described as the difference between a theoretical act and a practical one. To conceive a purpose or form an intention is already a practical activity. It is not thought forming an anteroom to action; it is action itself in its initial stage. (IH, 311-12).

Collingwood's reply, therefore, is based on his Q-A logic as grounded in his epistemology: thinking on purpose does involve conceiving one's own act of thought before executing it, but as a plan of inquiry based on the presence of a problem-situation or a question, whereas the execution of the plan involves answering the question, solving the problem, or satisfying the terms of the inquiry-initiator.

It is not difficult to make the application to historical inquiry. In order for an event to be of interest to a historian it must be one which expresses the thought of an historical agent in a situation in which alternative courses of action are open to him, and in which he is responsible for determining the event by acting according to his consciousness of a "plan" or "idea"--the alternative meanings he not only finds in the event-situation but gives to it by his cho-
sen actions. It will be helpful to keep this in mind as a sort of archetype of what an historical event is—candidates for such events occurring in politics, warfare, economics, morals, art, science, religion, and philosophy (IH, 309-15)—the list is stated as exemplary rather than exhaustive. The difficulty for the historian in each of these cases is to identify the problem from which the act proceeded, and to reconstruct the steps by which its solution was attempted (IH, 312-13)—and not merely to repeat the conclusion. Until this step has been taken the historian cannot be sure that he has grasped the past at all—that is, he cannot be certain that historical thinking in the form of re-enactment or re-thinking has occurred at all.

But re-enactment raises us to a new level of thinking, and to this issue we must now turn.

(d) **Historical Re-enactment.**—The deeds of men which form the subject-matter of history must not only be known by seeing them to be expressions of thought, or seeing "through" them, they must be known as *past* deeds. The historian must therefore be aware of himself as distinct from the past he studies, while he is yet able to revive that past as thought in his own mind (cf. IH, 174). In order to meet this requirement Collingwood introduces his widely misunderstood doctrine of historical re-enactment. The choice of the term "re-enactment" to describe the relationship between a historical
event and a historiographical reconstruction of that event appears to be deliberate; it calls attention to the central concept of a purposive act as the irreducible unit of history, while yet locating it in an epistemological structure similar to the presentation-representation schema of perception (the difference being, of course, that the act of an historical agent can only be re-presented through the intermediation of evidence and interpretative argument). Collingwood is even careful to vary his terms to bring out various aspects of re-enactment, using synonyms like re-create (IH, 97), reconstruct (IH, 65), relive (IH, 172, 175), re-think (IH, 215), and re-vive (IH, 164)—an assortment of expressions which can hardly be accidental (cf. EPM, 205-07 on the inappropriateness of technical terminology in philosophy).

In this classic statement of re-enactment Collingwood's approach is via the inside-outside doctrine:

The processes of nature can therefore be properly described as sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. They are not processes of mere events, but processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of process of thought . . . . All history is the history

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Collingwood's first use of the term "re-enactment" in The Idea of History occurs in Part I during his criticism of Tacitus, where it is also linked to the discussion of the outside and inside of an event (IH, 39). It reappears in his discussions of Vico (IH, 65) and Hegel (IH, 97), both of whom are praised for recognizing the principle. In Part V it is re-introduced in the first Epilegomenon along with the inside-outside theory of human acts (IH, 215).
of thought. But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own mind. The historian of philosophy, reading Plato, is trying to know what Plato thought when he expressed himself in certain words. The only way in which he can do this is by thinking it for himself. This, in fact, is what we mean when we speak of "understanding" the words. So the historian of politics or warfare, presented with an account of certain actions of Julius Caesar, tries to understand these actions, that is, to discover what thoughts in Caesar's mind determined him to do them. This implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it. The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind. This re-enactment . . . is not a passive surrender . . . ; it is a labour of active and therefore critical thinking. The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it (IH, 215; emphasis mine)

The lines to which we have called attention in the above passage are the principles of history cited in the Autobiography and outlined in our chapter on Collingwood's autobiographical interpretation as HIST -1, -2, and -3 (Table 4 ). Since these principles are explicitly stated in this essay, and the fourth (HIST-4) is the major thesis of the first Epilegomenon itself, it is clear that when Collingwood wrote that portion of the Autobiography he had these essays before him.

But as if anticipating that his doctrine of re-enactment would be misconstrued by assimilating it to an overly concrete meaning of one of its secondary senses, Collingwood takes pains to state what re-enactment is not before trying
to exhibit what it is. (1) We have already quoted the passage from "The Subject Matter of History" where he rejects a dramatic view of history in which "the historian would be the person about whom he thinks, living over again in all respects the same" (IH, 303). The historian in re-enacting the event is not restaging it by repeating its outside motions; he re-enacts it by re-thinking that universal element that constitutes its inside meaning. (2) But he is also not advocating an intuitionist view of history which relies on a mysterious union between the mind of an historian and that of the agent he is studying. In spite of contrary appearances, as when Collingwood uses expressions like "reliving" past experiences and "plunging below the surface" of our minds where we "become" the person whose acts we are discovering (A, 113), Collingwood has something more direct in mind than what these dramatic expressions might lead one to believe. Whatever else re-enactment might involve, it is not concerned with immediate experiences, nor is it a "passive surrender" but rather a "labour of active and therefore critical thinking," which entails envisioning for oneself the situation in which the agent is called upon to act (IH, 215, 316; cf. A, 100). (3) This is also the reason that re-enactment is not a simple exercise of the memory. The past with which the historian is concerned is not simply recalled, since there is an essential difference between memory and the exercise of historical thinking. What Caesar's memory may provide for him are a series of outstand-
ing images, but these he must present in a coherent account, which involves not just the images but reconstruction of the events. History is "a wholly reasoned knowledge of what is transient and concrete" (IH, 234), whereas "memory is not history, because history is a certain kind of organized or inferential knowledge, and memory is not organized, not inferential at all" (IH, 252).

But if re-enactment is neither a dramatic restaging of past events (1), nor an uncritical passive intuition of past thinking (2), nor a replay of the graphic record of the remembered past on the blank screen of the historian's mind (3), it is also not (4) the creation ex nihilo of a fictitious past. In the third Epilegomenon ("Historical Evidence"--a fragment from The Principles of History) he writes that the business of the historian is not to invent anything, it is to discover something (IH, 251); and in the second Epilegomenon ("The Historical Imagination") he writes:

As works of imagination, the historian's work and the novelist's do not differ. Where they do differ is that the historian's picture is meant to be true. The novelist has a single task only: to construct a coherent picture, one that makes sense. The historian has a double task: he has both to do this, and to construct a picture of things as they really were and of events as they really happened. (IH, 246).

Just as, in The Principles of Art, Collingwood rejected any radical theory of sensation which would allow for a creation
ex nihilo of sensa, so in The Idea of History he stops short of a creationist view of historical events. Re-enactment presupposes that something remains of the original event, and this something (we have already identified it as the universal meaning of an individual act) is not simply created by an historian's re-enactment. Historical reference to past events presupposes an object that retains some identity in both contexts, the original situation in which it occurred, and the historian's re-enactment of that event in the context of his own thoughts.

The question is, is anything important altered by re-enactment, and if so, how is historical objectivity possible? Since the issue is crucial not only for Collingwood's philosophy of history, but also for rapprochement in general and his view of metaphysics in particular, 8 we must take care to present the issue carefully and completely. We must go beyond saying what re-enactment is not by giving a preliminary sketch of what it is (which we are about to do), and then showing both that it exercises some of the functions of a priori ima-

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8 It is crucial not only because re-enactment is the central thesis of his philosophy of history as described both in the Autobiography and in The Idea of History, but also because it is the key to unscrambling the central dilemma of the Essay on Metaphysics. If metaphysics is an historical science, and if history is the re-enactment of past thought, then metaphysics is the re-enactment of past thought. But then, "re-enactment" must be taken in the sense that Collingwood meant for it, which does not rule out critical thinking, as we have already seen.
gination and that it rests on the central insight of his entire philosophy of mind as a resolution of the realist-idealist dilemma (this will occupy us in the two succeeding sections).

The preliminary sketch is presented as much by example as by general description. The historian who sets himself the task of understanding the Theodosian Code not only undertakes to understand the document that he has inherited from the past, i.e. the written words, but also to discover what the person who wrote them meant by them, where the latter task also entails envisaging for oneself the situation with which the emperor was trying to deal: "he must see for himself, just as if the emperor's situation were his own, how such a situation might be dealt with; he must see the possible alternatives, and the reasons for choosing one rather than another; and thus he must go through the process which the emperor went through in deciding this particular course" (IH, 283). Until he is able to do this Collingwood insists that he cannot say that he has any historical knowledge of the meaning of the edict.

In this description we have all the elements with which we have become familiar--the original historical event with its outside (the written code) and inside (the emperor's intentional meanings), the representation of this event in
the historian's understanding by re-thinking the universal element (the meaning of the code as understood by its author), and the necessity of reconstructing that thought by understanding the context in which it occurred (the emperor's situation with its possible alternatives) and the agent's reasons for choosing this mode of action rather than another (the emperor's choice of a legal code to establish order rather than the use of military force under his direct command, for example). Notice that this sort of thinking is concrete (it never loses sight of its point of reference—the decision of the emperor expressed in the written code) at the same time that it is universal (it is concerned throughout with the meaning of the code as a work of human intelligence and purpose). Notice also that it proceeds by locating its universal elements (the array of alternative meaningful acts available in the situation the emperor was facing). Are these not the embodiment of what we have encountered in previous chapters as the "concrete universal" (Speculum Mentis) or "categorical universal" (Essay on Philosophical Method) in the first case, and the doctrine we called "concrete abstraction" (from The New Leviathan) in the second?

Although we have not yet examined the grounds for Collingwood's remark that it is only on the condition that history is the re-enactment of past thought that historical understanding is possible, we get a glimmering of his meaning
in this brief description. When he writes that unless and until the event can be reconstructed, it cannot be said to be historically understood at all, he is saying that re-enactment is the necessary and sufficient condition for thinking historically: necessary because without thinking out the meaning of the event in its context of situational alternatives, the significance of the event as historical (i.e. as the action expressing the intentions of an agent) is impossible to grasp; and sufficient because once that is done nothing further is necessary—so that "historical explanation" by subsumption of the event under a law governing other similar events, as if it were a natural occurrence abstractly like others of a class, marks the point at which the event loses both its individuality as this event at this time (viz. the emperor's situation) and its concrete significance (why the emperor chose this course of action rather than another).

No doubt this leaves many loose ends, only some of which we shall gather together in succeeding sections. Although we have not yet seen how Collingwood avoids the errors of the idealist's view of history as he moves in his accustomed way within the realism-idealism polarity, we foresee that unless he expands on the role of the historian in viewing events a tergo, and therefore capable of seeing more in them than did the historical agent himself, his doctrine of re-enactment is in danger of appearing as nothing more than
a repetition of the thoughts of historical protagonists. In emphasizing the role of thought in both the historical event and the historiographical re-enactment Collingwood may have succeeded in damaging the realist's notion of events unaffected by thinking, but he has done this by emphasizing the way in which thoughts of agents and historians are the same, which leaves the serious problem of how they differ. This difference is apparent in their respective linguistic modes of address: Caesar says, "I shall cross the Rubicon;" the historian writes, "Caesar said that he would cross the Rubicon." He is aware of his own thought as distinct from that of Caesar.

What is required is the doctrine of "incapsulation" which the Autobiography would have us believe he had worked out as the third "proposition" concerning history (A, 114), but which is not mentioned by that name at all in The Idea of History. If encapsulation refers to the manner in which the historian preserves a past thought within his own consciousness without losing its aspect as past, and if this re-

9 J. B. Bury could retrospectively see, for example, that the Theodosian code and the founding of a university at Constantinople were the two most important acts of Theodosius II, because Bury saw in them the foundation that held civilization together in the Eastern empire, while the Western fell under successive invasions by barbarian tribes (A History of the Later Roman Empire, quoted in The Historian's History of the World, ed. Hentry Smith Williams (New York, 1907), vol. VII, p. 45). It is unlikely that such an event was anticipated by Theodosius, who nevertheless did not write the code—it was the work of a committee of nine named by him for the purpose.
quires initial self-awareness, then it is clearly a function of what he calls the a priori historical imagination, the notion of which we must therefore consider next, bearing in mind that what Collingwood must do is define the sense in which the historian's thought retains its autonomy vis-a-vis the object of his historical consciousness.

(e) The A-Priori Imagination.--Just as in the Kantian critical philosophy, Collingwood felt that the first phase in answering the question, "How is historical knowledge possible?" is to show that there is a form of consciousness able to re-present or re-think past thoughts, but not as simple perception nor as memory nor even as abstract reasoning. From our survey of Collingwood's philosophy of mind we know that any sort of conscious re-presentation requires the functioning of imagination. The topic of the historical imagination was chosen by Collingwood as the subject of his Inaugural Lecture on being appointed to the post of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics in 1935, the text of that lecture being published by Knox as the second Epilegomenon in The Idea of History.

We have already pointed out that while the first Epilegomenon (also a public lecture) is aimed at rejecting the errors of contemporary realists concerning a "science of human nature" on the natural model; the second is just as concerned with correcting the errors of idealists on the subject--notably those of Bradley. Collingwood praised Bradley
as the leader of the movement in England away from the positivistic accumulation of facts and towards "scientific history," i.e. history as a form of knowledge aware of itself as distinct from natural science and yet valid in its own right (IH, 134-35). But in his essay, The Presuppositions of Critical History\textsuperscript{10} Bradley mistakenly assumed that the criterion of history is experience as informed by the knowledge of the laws of nature--a relic of the positivism he sought to overcome. Induction of laws of nature from observation can never give anything more than probable laws, which fails to serve as a universal criterion for what can or cannot happen in history, since much of history deals with improbabilities (IH, 139). Collingwood points out that Bradley's proposed criterion (a) does not adequately distinguish history from fiction, since it claims to decide not what did happen but only what could happen--which applies equally well to fictitious narratives. (b) It leaves the historian completely reliant on authorities, so long as their accounts satisfy the negative criterion of being possible, which hence leaves critical historiography unachieved. Finally, (c) it leaves the historian unable to accept any unusual or improbable experience not consistent with his own--e.g. odd social customs, heroic deeds, improbable events, etc. (IH, 239-40; cf. IH, 139).

\textsuperscript{10}Recently reissued with introduction and commentary by Lionel Rubinoff: Quadrangle Books (Chicago, 1968).
The thrust of Collingwood's Waynflete Inaugural Lecture is therefore to propose an alternative criterion to that offered by Bradley. It takes the form of an autonomous activity of historical imagination different from perception (aisthesis) on the one hand and scientific understanding (noesis) on the other, and yet not reducible to the sort of history proposed by "common sense" realists. Collingwood begins by distinguishing history from perception, primarily to show that accounts of knowledge that are based on the model of perception (e.g. the acquaintance theory) make history impossible.

No doubt, historical thought is in one way like perception. Each has for its proper object something individual . . . . But what I perceive is always the this, the here, the now . . . . Historical thought is of something which can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. Its objects are events which have finished happening, and conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no longer perceptible to they become objects for historical thought. Hence all theories of knowledge that conceive it as a transaction or relation between a subject and an object both actually existing, and confronting or compresent to one another, theories that take acquaintance as the essence of knowledge, make history impossible. (IH, 233).

We have been told in Part IV of The Idea of History that the acquaintance theory of knowledge accepted one horn of the dilemma that Bradley bequeathed to his English successors:

"either reality is the immediate flow of subjective life, in which case it is subjective but not objective, it is enjoyed but cannot be known, or else it is that which we know, in which case it is objective and not subjective, it is a world of real things outside the subjective life of our mind and
outside each other" (IH, 141). Bradley accepted the former horn and realists (Cook Wilson and Oxford realism on the one hand and Bertrand Russell and Cambridge realism on the other) embraced the latter (IH, 141-42). Collingwood writes that Samuel Alexander admirably expressed the acquaintance theory when he wrote that knowledge is a relation between two things, a mind and its object, and the mind therefore does not know itself, it only enjoys itself. Collingwood hastens to add that such a view makes history as the self-knowledge of mind (i.e. the philosophical concept of history) impossible (IH, 142).

But notice that while he rejects this view he does not deny that the object of history is something individual; he merely neglects to tell us what that individuality is. We have already found this designated as the individual meaning of an historical event expressive of the thought of an agent. He is also not denying that there is some sense in which the objects of history are events which are present, viz. as evidence. To adopt a terminology that is not Collingwood's, evidence is not something in itself, it is only evidence for another, i.e. for an historian who recognizes it as such, so in this sense historical evidence is not something co-present with a mind, but is rather something dependent on it.

If it is not "aisthesis" historical knowledge is also not "noesis," and in countering the latter Collingwood opposes
another tendency, one more prevalent today, in the guise of the "covering law model" of Popper and Hempel,\(^{11}\) than it was even in Collingwood's day. Collingwood rejects the thesis that historical events are "explained" like natural events by deducing them from antecedent conditions and general laws.

In another way history resembles science: for in each of them knowledge is inferential or reasoned. But whereas science lives in a world of abstract universals, which are in one sense everywhere and in another nowhere, in one sense everywhere and in another nowhere, in one sense at all times and in another at no time, the things about which the historian reasons are not abstract but concrete, not universal but individual, not indifferent to space and time but having a where and when of their own, though the where need not be here and the when cannot be now. History, therefore, cannot be made to square with theories according to which the object of knowledge is abstract and changeless, a logical entity towards which the mind may take up various attitudes. (IH, 234).

Notice again that Collingwood is not saying that history is not reasoned or inferential, but that its subject matter is not something abstract: it is something concrete and individual, an act performed at a certain time and place. Later in this chapter we shall examine what Collingwood understands by both historical evidence and historical inference, but here we need to recognize only that historical understanding is neither "aisthesis" nor "noesis" nor a combination of the two, but rather "a third thing," i.e. "wholly reasoned knowledge of what is transient and concrete" (IH, 234).

Such a view of historical thinking also breaks with the "common sense" view of history, in which memory and belief in authoritative testimony are taken as the essential functions of the historian's thought. The scientific historian does not merely repeat his acquaintance with the events first perceived by a witness, then remembered, recollected, and repeated to someone else and believed to be true. The contemporary historian is aware that he must tamper with his authorities by selecting what he considers important in the accounts of his authorities, by interpolating in them things which are not explicitly said, and by criticizing, rejecting, or amending what he recognizes to be misinformation or outright falsehood (IH, 235). In this work of selection, construction, and criticism the historian exhibits his own autonomy, showing that his thought possesses "a criterion to which his so-called authorities must conform and by reference to which they are criticized" (IH, 236). And in all three of these functions he gives evidence of the working of an autonomous or a priori imagination—that is, a form of consciousness that is a priori in the Kantian sense of being indispensable or necessary (IH, 240).

Collingwood's portrait of the functions of the a priori imagination is interesting for the light it sheds on the critical aspects of historical re-enactment. He points out that historical imagination differs from two other functions of
a priori imagination, namely artistic and perceptual imagination, not in being a priori, since the artist's work has its own inner necessity, and in perception one cannot help supplementing the "data" of perception by presenting objects of possible perception which are not actually perceived (e.g. the underside of a table, the back of a cube, the inside of an unopened egg--imaginative functions well analyzed by Kant), but "in having as its special task to imagine the past: not an object of our thought" (IH, 242).

In this exercise the historian stretches his web of imaginative re-construction between points which are at first assumed to be fixed--the statements of "authorities" he uses as his sources (IH, 242). But on analysis these fixed points also resolve themselves into achievements of historical thinking itself; statements first accepted as settled for the purposes of a given inquiry are themselves called into question in other contexts (IH, 244). It then appears that the fixed points are not accepted facts or authoritative statements but criteria used to justify the use of such authorities. But Collingwood insists that these criteria are also provided by the a priori historical imagination.

The a priori imagination which does the work of historical construction supplies the means of historical criticism as well. Freed from its dependence on fixed points supplied from without, the historian's picture of the past is thus in every detail an imaginary picture, and its necessity is at every point the necessity of the a priori imagination. Whatever goes into it, goes into it not be-
cause his imagination passively accepts it, but because it actively demands it. The resemblance here between the historian and the novelist . . . here reaches its culmination. Each of them makes it his business to construct a picture which is partly a narrative of events, partly a description of situations, exhibition of motives, analysis of characters. Each aims at making his picture a coherent whole . . . . The novel and the history must both of them make sense; nothing is admissible in either except what is necessary, and the judge of this necessity is in both cases the imagination . . . . Where they differ is that the historian's picture is meant to be true. (IH, 245-46).

With the raising of the issues of historical coherence and truth it is clear that we have passed beyond discussing the concept of history as a scale of forms. Collingwood immediately points out that "being true" in this context means that the historian abides by three "rules of method" in the construction of his historical narrative: (1) his picture of the past must be localized in space and time (i.e. it must re-

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12 Collingwood has been accused of emphasizing the active role of the historian to the neglect of his passive function of relating received narratives--see W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York, 1964), pp. 18-19. But Collingwood anticipated this objection. "The historian, generally speaking, works at a subject which others have studied before him. In proportion as he is more of a novice, either in this particular subject or in history as a whole, his forerunners are, relatively to his incompetence, authorities; and in the limiting case where his incompetence and ignorance were absolute, they could be called authorities without qualification. As he becomes more and more master of his craft and his subject, they become less and less his authorities, more and more his fellow students, to be treated with respect or contempt according to their deserts" (IH, 238). As the above passage also makes clear, Collingwood's use of the term "picture" of the past (part of which consists in a narrative of events) is obviously a synonym for Gallie's "narrative;" cf. IH, 242, 245.
fer to a particular time and place); (2) it must be consistent with itself; and (3) it must stand in a relation to evidence such that the evidence, consisting of something here and now perceptible (written documents, artifacts, ruins, etc.), can be bound to the events by chains of historical inference (IH, 246-47). All three of these are rules to which the novelist need not subscribe, and all three are criteria which are nowhere "given" to the historian along with his "facts." They are not among the statements of his authorities, but are rather criteria for accepting such statements as "historical" in the first place. They are, like Kantian categories, conditions for the possibility of there being historical data at all.

Several comments are in order here. First, Collingwood calls these three statements "rules of method," but it is clear that they are presuppositions of historical inquiry rather than procedural imperatives. They stand, relative to all progressive questions in an historical inquiry, as their ultimate presuppositions, and they are revealed only when the direction of the inquiry is reversed. The question of who was the victor of the battle of Waterloo arises only on the presupposition (among others) that there was such a battle at a certain time and place, as indicated by interpretation of certain evidence. But if the historian were challenged (perhaps by a novelist who is free to cancel the event in his imagination and pursue the dramatic consequences) to state his rea-
sons for assuming that there was such a battle he would haul
out his evidence and begin constructing an elaborate argument
aimed at the conclusion that it did indeed occur. Now it
would take considerable Socratic cheek to force out the further
question about why he presumes that a battle must either have
occurred or not occurred, but if the interlocutor managed to
do so, and in the process completely reversing the direction
of the inquiry, the historian would (if he replied at all) say
that history must after all make "sense" (i.e. be consistent
with itself). He would, in short, be driven to display his
presuppositions.

Secondly, it is noteworthy that these presuppositions
occur in a discussion of the autonomous a priori imagination,
even though it involves the relationship between propositions,
questions, and presuppositions, and involves the necessary re-
lations between them. This is not accidental; it is what he
means when he says that "the a priori imagination which does
the work of historical construction supplies the means of his-
torical criticism itself" (IH, 245), and it is what is in-
volved when he insists that in his thought the historian is
engaging in an autonomous activity of a priori imagination
(IH, 249). This confirms what we suggested earlier, that the
functions of imagination are not limited to the conceptual
level of mental acts, or to the pre-propositional level of
linguistic expression, but extend to higher intellectual func-
tions as well.
Thirdly, they are a priori criteria, and this term appears to encompass a number of meanings. Insofar as historical imagination is a priori it is said to be something not empirically received (IH, 248) but rather "innate" or original to the mind (IH, 247); it is not arbitrary, but necessary—something clear, rational, and universal (IH, 240, 242, 248-49); it is a criterion brought to bear in judgments concerning matters of fact or evidence, and is used in interpolations and constructions about these matters of fact (IH, 138, 240-41, 248); it is an original and fundamental activity of mind itself, and is therefore a self-determining, self-justifying, self-dependent form of thought (IH, 247, 249); and yet the principles it employs are not finally fixed, but are capable of change (IH, 248).

Finally, we must note that in The Idea of History we are left largely unenlightened about the exact relationship between historical presuppositions and the a priori imagination. We do not know if the presuppositions of history can be regarded as a priori in the same sense that historical imagination is, or if on the contrary they can be regarded as products of the latter (and hence at least in this sense posterior to its activity). It is not difficult to see that if history is to be an autonomous science, its presuppositions must be clear and rational, universal and necessary (in some senses of these terms acceptable to Collingwood). It is also
clear that they are not empirically received and that they are used as criteria in the judgments of history concerning matters of fact. But we do not know in what sense Collingwood sees them as "innate" or original to the mind, or how they are part of a self-determining, self-justifying, self-dependent form of thought.

Nor is this an extraneous issue for Collingwood's philosophy of history. We noted at the beginning of this section that in this essay one of Collingwood's major goals was to state the "criteria" of history alternative to those proposed by Bradley (IH, 238-89). The criteria he proposes turn out to be strangely enigmatic. On the one hand he says that the criterion of historical truth is "the idea of history itself: the idea of an imaginary picture of the past," which he calls innate in the Cartesian sense and a priori in the Kantian sense (IH, 248). But as if he knew that this idea was insufficient to say not only how that idea differed from that of the novelist (who also has an "imaginary picture of the past"), but how one uses such an idea to judge historical evidence, he also proposes his three "rules of method" or presuppositions of history as a science. It is only the latter that serves to correct Bradley's earlier attempt to state such a criterion, and it is only such presuppositions which can in any real sense be said to "change." Once again, Collingwood seems to stop just short of the sort of questions that are
"metaphysical" in the sense of being ultimate: how are activities of imagination responsible for presuppositions or vice versa? How can presuppositions be both necessary and changeable? Why are facts and evidence necessary for an "imaginary picture of the past"?

(f) Re-enactment: Beyond Realism and Idealism.--Although in Knox's editorialized version of The Idea of History we are left at this point without direct answers to these questions, there is an heroic assault on the question that Collingwood regarded as the ultimate task of a philosophy of history to answer. Just as Kant in his Prolegomenon assumes that a certain kind or kinds of knowledge exists and goes on to ask the further question how it is possible, Collingwood in his Epilegomena assumes that his survey of historiography in Parts I-IV has sufficiently demonstrated that historical knowledge exists, and goes on to ask how it is possible. Hence the fourth Epilegomenon, entitled "History as Re-enactment of Past Experience," begins with the question, "How, or on what conditions, can the historian know the past?" (IH, 282). His answer to this question is his reasoned justification of historical thinking. In the fourth Epilegomenon this takes the form of a series of arguments put forward as answers to objections about re-enactment from realistic and idealistic standpoints.
In preceding sections and chapters we have tried to indicate why Collingwood believed that historical thinking is not possible on realistic presuppositions. From his earliest publications Collingwood maintained that any epistemology which tried to justify historical knowledge by assimilating it to perception, as if historical events were present to consciousness in the same manner as perceived objects, overly concretizes the past and is therefore utterly misleading. In the second sentence of the present essay he calls our attention once again to the fact that the past as past simply does not exist--its events are not present but past: "the past is never a given fact which we can apprehend empirically by perception" (IH, 282). Nor does the historian merely repeat what is said by an eyewitness of the facts, since the facts he is concerned with are past events mediated by critical evaluation of evidence, involving inference on the part of the historian--inference about the value and reliability of his evidence. His knowledge is not direct or immediate in an empirical or perceptual sense, but rather is mediated or inferential.

But if the past known by an historian is mediated by historical thinking, it is not simply absorbed by that thinking, and in the attempt to preserve historical objectivity we find Collingwood taking the unusual tack of granting the realistic devil his due. Collingwood agrees that the past must be preserved in its aspect as past, and not utterly assimilated
into the present. He therefore finds it necessary to take a stand opposed to views of history offered by some of his idealistic contemporaries. Although he agrees that a more fruitful line of inquiry is initiated when it is recognized that our imaginary picture of the past is an a priori idea, so that justification of historical thinking takes the form of showing on what grounds such an idea is possible, he finds himself unable to accept those proposed by some idealists. We have just seen why Collingwood rejected Bradley's presuppositions of critical history as inadequate for grounding scientific history. In his review of historiography in Parts I-IV Collingwood also criticized idealistic philosophers of history like Croce and Oakeshott for absorbing the past into the present: by overemphasizing the role of historical thinking in the construction of historical narratives they made the past merely an aspect of the present thinking of the historian (IH, 154-55, 202, 289).

So where the realist is forced, by his assumption that all true knowledge is based on immediately perceived objects, to overly concretize the past and underplay the role of historical thought in re-creating that past, the idealist makes the complementary error of dissolving the past altogether by reducing it to an aspect of present consciousness. What makes the essay we are presently concerned with such a remarkable piece of thinking is Collingwood's care to avoid both of these
errors. The key to understanding the complex argument of this essay is to bear in mind that in it he is trying to overcome the dilemma that Bradley bequeathed to his successors and which, in his treatment of scientific history in Part IV, Collingwood had singled out as crucial (IH, 141). His escape from this dilemma takes the form of three arguments in the fourth Epilegomenon—one overall argument aimed at overcoming Bradley's dilemma, and two subsidiary arguments aimed at refuting objections to re-enactment by realists and idealists respectively. All three arguments draw on Collingwood's theory of mind and his analysis of acts of consciousness, and brilliantly illuminate its central insight.

Since the arguments are complex, and since in the essay the main argument is reserved until the end, we shall give here a brief synopsis of all three arguments, and then take them up again in the order that Collingwood gives them in the text.

Bradley's dilemma, as Collingwood states it, is that reality is either the flow of subjective life, in which case it is subjective but not objective, or else it is that which we know, in which case it is objective but not subjective, a world of real things outside the subjective life of our minds. Collingwood answers that historical reality escapes this disjunctive description because it is both subjective and objective. This is so because the object of history is itself
thought, i.e. the intentional meaning of an historical agent expressed as an event localized in space and time (its "outside") and having an "inside" consisting of thought. Because this object is thought it can be re-thought or revived or re-enacted in further acts of thought by the agent himself or by another, e.g. by an historian critically interpreting evidence.

But to be truly historical a re-enacted thought must be known to be both the same thought as that of the historical agent, and yet distinguishable from that of the historian; for if it were not the same then the historian could never be sure that he has grasped his object (and hence historical objectivity would be sacrificed), and if it were not different he could not distinguish it from his own thought (and the past would be absorbed into the present thought of the historian). The realist denies that two acts of thought can be the same (for no two acts of thought can be literally identical) and the idealist denies that they can be different. On either premise historical thinking is impossible.

But an act of thought is not something wholly immediate, like the flow of consciousness involved in mere feeling. Our experience as thinkers shows us that an act of thought is inseparable from its object, i.e. meanings as expressed in physical acts, statements, arguments, etc. An act of thought is something someone does deliberately, and it is not irretrievably carried off in the flow of feelings; on the contrary
it is that which has the power to survive and revive over
time (two characteristics of all thought from his philosophy
of mind), and in various contexts. Nor is an act of thought
something wholly mediate, totally dependent on its context
for its meaning. An act of thought is capable of retaining
its identity of meaning in various contexts. Therefore
thought is both mediate and immediate. Historical thought
as re-enactment is thus possible because the historian is con­
cerned with an object which has the power to revive in other
contexts, and the historian has the power to re-think that
thought in the context of his own thoughts. Historical
thinking is therefore both objective (the historian can dis­
stinguish himself from his object because the object can re­
tain its identity in various thought-contexts) and subjective
(the historian's re-enactment occurs in the context of his
own thinking and he knows it as his own experience). History
is possible because re-enactment of thought is possible, and
re-enactment presupposes an object that is both mediate and
immediate, objective and subjective. Such an object is with­
in our own experience as thinkers, and such a reality escapes
Bradley's dilemma.

Now one cannot help but notice from this synopsis
that there are several key concepts on which the whole argu­
ment is hinged, and that the success of the argument depends
on how Collingwood handles these concepts. Ultimately, as we
shall see, they depend on his description of the several functions of mental activity.

(1) In particular the success of the argument depends on the meaning of the expression, "act of thought," and in the first objection to re-enactment Collingwood calls attention to the controversy surrounding this phrase. The first objector (invented by Collingwood, but evidently a realist) assaults re-enactment as an ambiguous concept which ignores the act-object distinction:

To re-enact an experience or re-think a thought, he might argue, may mean either of two things. Either it means enacting an experience or performing an act of thought resembling the first, or it means enacting an experience or performing an act of thought literally identical with the first. But no one experience can be literally identical with another, therefore presumably the relation intended is one of resemblance only. But in that case the doctrine that we know the past by re-enacting it is only a version of the familiar and discredited copy theory of knowledge. In every experience, at any rate so far as it is cognitive, there is an act and an object; and two different acts may have the same object. The two acts are different acts but acts of the same kind. They thus resemble one another, and hence the conclusion that the doctrine we are considering is a case of the copy theory of knowledge. (IH, 283–85).

As an example of a thought that can be re-enacted Collingwood suggests Euclid's proposition that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal—which we shall abbreviate

Collingwood's examples are not always felicitous, and in this case one might, with some justice, accuse him of choosing a judgment that prejudices the argument by dealing with mathematical entities. Why not a more typical case like Caesar's decision to cross the Rubicon? In Collingwood's de-
as EP. An objector upholding the act-object distinction, he argues, would naturally enough understand re-enactment as a case of a relation between two thoughts such that the enacted thought and its re-enactment are numerically different but specifically identical. Since they have the same object in mind (EP) they are instances of a single species or class (the class of all instances of EP); but since they occurred at two different times or to two different persons, they are numerically different. But this is not the only sort of identity-in-difference relation that can exist between mental acts, and in order to demonstrate another variety of this relation Collingwood suggests considering three cases:

Case 1: I think EP for five seconds continuously.

Case 2: I think EP for five seconds continuously, then cease thinking about it for three seconds, then think EP.

Case 3: Euclid thinks EP and after a lapse of several centuries I think EP.

Collingwood argues on the basis of the first case that the sense it might be pointed out that the case is not exceptional, since an historian of geometry could very well be re-thinking EP in rethinking Euclid's contribution, and in Collingwood's view, intellectual history is just what history is—all history is the history of thought. Furthermore the example is chosen for its appeal to just those who regard mathematical propositions as exemplary of the act-object distinction (Frege, Russell, etc.). Finally, it would not be difficult to rephrase the argument using an example of a more recognizably typical historical act instead of EP, as he does in the fourth Epilegomenon, where he uses the example of the Theodosian Code.
unity of the act of thinking EP is not dependent on the duration of time during which it is thought. "There is no more reason to correlate the unity of a single act of thought with the time-lapse of one second, or a quarter of a second, than with any other. The only possible answer is that the act of thought is one sustained through five seconds"—that is, it has the "identity of a continuant" (IH, 286). From the second case Collingwood concludes that if one is to say that EP is the same act of thought then one is forced to say that the act of thought is not merely sustained, but revived after an interval. (Presumably, to deny this would involve one in an infinite regress similar to Plato's "third man" argument.)

Now where the act-object distinction fails adequately to describe the sort of experiences we have as thinkers in the first two cases, its defenders would argue that the third differs significantly from the previous two, and for this case Collingwood puts forward his anti-realist argument in the modified form in which we stated it in Chapter VII:

The objector . . . maintains that although the object of two people's acts of thought may be the same, the acts themselves are different. But in order that this should be said, it is necessary to know "what someone else is thinking" not only in the sense of knowing the same object that he knows, but in the further sense of knowing the act by which he knows it: for the statement rests on a claim to know not only my own act of knowing but someone else's also, and compare them. But what makes such comparison possible? Anyone who can perform the comparison must be able to reflect "my act of knowledge is this"—and then he repeats it: "from the way he talks, I can see
that his act is this:--and then he repeats it. Unless that can be done, the comparison can never be made. But to do this involves the repetition by one mind of another's act of thought: not one like it (that would be the copy-theory of knowledge with a vengeance) but the act itself. (IH, 288).

Therefore in order to affirm that the third case is not like the first two, one would have to presuppose that one simultaneously claimed to deny, i.e. that one act of thought can be shared by two different people separated by a span of time. Collingwood concludes that thought can never be a mere object, since to know what someone is thinking or has thought involves thinking it for oneself, and to deny that this is possible is to back oneself into a solipsistic corner in which it only possible to think one's own thoughts (IH, 288-89). Collingwood is content to leave his realistic objector parked in this corner.

Before taking up the objection to re-enactment by the idealist, we would like to pause for several observations about the course of this argument so far.

Notice first that Collingwood does not further pursue the issue of abstract universality (specific identity with numerical difference), nor does the argument based on the three cases of re-enacting acts of thought really depend for its conclusion on this incomplete discussion. What Collingwood left unsaid was that the kind of identity-in-difference that is involved in re-enactment is a case wherein the second
thought is not merely a copy of the first, nor is it another replacement instance of the class of thoughts that includes the first, but rather the second includes the first as part of its content. It is almost trivially true to note that when as an historian I assert "Euclid thought that EP" the second proposition (HP) includes the first (EP) as part of its content. What Collingwood is trying non-trivially to point out is that when someone asks how this expression is possible and answers it, as the realist does, by denying that the EP used in the first assertion can be identical to the EP mentioned in HP, he has explicitly contradicted himself. 14

But of course the realist does not assert that they are unqualifiedly not identical, but only that they are not identical acts of thought; they are identical in having identical objects. Therefore Collingwood bears down on the phrase "set of thought," and our second observation pertains to this phrase. When the realist insists on the abstract distinction between an act of thought and its object he opens himself to the criticism that the act of thought as a mere event has no direct relationship to the object of the act, and Collingwood's

14 Collingwood gives no indication that he is cognizant of the use-mention distinction as such, but the argument addressed to the realist objector presumes that the historian thinking HP does not merely mention EP but also uses it in the sense of enacting the proposition for himself. Although the historian is not using EP to make a geometrical point as part of a systematic inquiry in that subject, he must understand it sufficiently to grasp its meaning for the development of geometry, the history of which he is narrating.
strategy is to call attention to this epistemic gap and its necessary presupposition that somehow the event and the object both belong to the same thought. In the ensuing argument with the idealist objector Collingwood will make an equivalent and complimentary point about the object of an act of thought, and displaying the unity of these two sides to thought—as an act and as an object—is the way in which he resolves the Bradleyan dilemma.

Thirdly, we wish to note in passing that Collingwood appears to be employing the sort of argument that he had characterized as philosophical in the Essay on Philosophical Method. Even though the argument is incomplete at this point we are aware that, for example in the three cases of a re-enacted thought, a conclusion (the impossibility of re-enactment) is being checked by comparing it to experiences that should anticipate it (the three cases of our experience as thinkers); and the principle from which the conclusion is drawn (the act-object distinction) is as a premise being revised (it is not, as an abstractly universal principle, defensible vis-a-vis our actual or concrete thinking, and is in need therefore of revision). We are witnessing an argument in the process of reversing itself (revision of the act-object distinction)—not an abstract reductio ad absurdum that merely negates a premise, but one which aims at revising a starting point in the light of its conclusions so that it can explain
how experience as it actually exists is alone possible (EPM, 156). How the premise is revised we are about to see.

Finally we have to call attention to Collingwood's phrasing of the anti-realist argument in the quotation above, where he says that the assumption that two acts of thought cannot be the same rests on the ability of the objector to perform a comparison which involves asserting in addition to one's own act the further one, that "from the way he talks, I can see that his act is this" which he then repeats (IH, 288). Is there not some significant qualification overlooked in this deceptively simple argument, and is this not disguised under the simple phrase, "from the way he talks I can see that . . ."? It appears that I can know what I mean by an act of thought, my own thought, by simply repeating it and examining it; calling it an "act of thought" in the context of Collingwood's philosophy of mind precisely means that it is something that I can do on purpose--it is an achievement. But how is it possible to achieve someone else's act of thought, or do his thinking "on purpose"? It seems I can only know what someone else means by his act of thought by interpreting what he says he means, and in that interpretation I may be mistaken, since meaning for Collingwood is intentional. Can I miss another's intention in a way that I cannot miss my own?

We must keep this in mind as we proceed, but if there is an assumption here it is the same assumption that is made,
Collingwood would surely say, in re-thinking my own thoughts, since I may be mistaken in interpreting my present intentional meaning as the same one I had several moments ago. Collingwood's point is that to say that it is not the same is to presume that one knows what that act was, i.e. "not this," and for that difference to be sustainable one must see it as a meaning difference, one graspable by a comparing act of thought which holds both together and declares them to be non-identical or different in some discernible or meaningful fashion. The mere temporal counting is not a meaningful difference between EP as thought by Euclid and as re-thought by me. To say it is the same meaning is to say something essential about the act of thought, not its accidental temporal correlation.

Nonetheless, one wishes to persist against Collingwood, is there not some significant difference in the fact that Euclid thinks EP and I think EP? For this we turn to the next phase of the argument.

(2) Having disposed of one aspect of the act-object distinction, Collingwood proceeds to take up the cudgels against the idealist objector to re-enactment. Where the realist would claim that re-enactment proved too little (because it failed to show how two acts of thought can be identical), the idealist would claim that it proved too much.
It has shown that an act of thought can be not only performed at an instant but sustained over a lapse of time; not only sustained but revived; not only revived in the experience of the same mind but (on pain of solipsism) re-enacted in another's. But this does not prove the possibility of history. For that, we must be able not only to re-enact another's thought but also to know that the thought we are re-enacting is his. But so far as we re-enact it, it becomes our own; it is merely as our own that we perform it and are aware of it in the performance; it has become subjective, but for that very reason it has ceased to be objective; become present, and therefore ceased to be past. (IH, 289).

In order to leave no doubt in the reader's mind that this is an idealistic objection, Collingwood points out that this is just what leading idealistic philosophers of history were maintaining when they asserted that history is one's own experience arranged sub specie praeteritorum (Oakeshott) and that all history is contemporary history (Croce) (cf. IH, 151-59, 190-204).

What is at issue here is the very pastness of the past. Collingwood is willing to grant the idealist's demand that in order for a re-enacted thought to be historical it must be known that it was thought not only by myself but originally by the historical agent. Propositionally this is the demand that the difference between the assertions of EP and HP must be preserved, since merely to re-think EP would be to think geometrically rather than historically. Collingwood goes even further down the path toward idealism insofar as he affirms that thinking historically is a self-conscious process: "unless he knows that he is thinking historically,
he is not thinking historically. Historical thinking is an activity . . . which is a function of self-consciousness, a form of thought possible only to a mind which knows itself to be thinking in that way" (IH, 289). This much he had to admit on the grounds of his own philosophy of mind, which argued that reflective thought is criteriological, i.e. contains within itself the criterion for judging itself to be a successful or unsuccessful piece of thinking.

But Collingwood insists that the idealist objector is making a second point, that this necessary condition for historical knowledge cannot be fulfilled if historical thinking is re-enactment because re-thinking a thought for oneself prevents one from recognizing it as another's. On the basis of our abbreviated propositions, the idealist appears to be saying that because one asserts EP one cannot also assert HP, because thinking EP prevents one from doing so (in becoming my thought it becomes subjective and therefore ceases to be objective or something shared with someone else). Collingwood adds that if the idealist were maintaining that one of the conditions for historical knowledge to occur is that the historian first mistakes his agent's thinking for his own and then overcomes this error by recognizing that his own thought is distinguished from that of Euclid's, then it might be of interest as showing one way that re-enactment could be a pre-condition for historical thought. "But the re-enactment
of past thought is not a pre-condition of historical knowledge, but an integral element in it; the effect of the ((idealist's)) contention, therefore, is to make such knowledge impossible" (IH, 290). 15 If we cannot know ourselves to be engaged in re-enacting the thought of historical agents, we cannot be said to be thinking historically, and the idealist's contention is that we cannot have such knowledge.

Collingwood sees the objection as hinging on the impossibility of an act of thought being both subjective and objective. Being subjective means being aware of an experience as my own; therefore, since "experience" may mean several

15 Collingwood is here tacitly rejecting the view he held in Speculum Mentis concerning the way in which the mind attains to truth. In the earlier work he argued that history, like all other forms of experience, proceeds through the via dolorosa of error to truth. "The progressive alienation of the mind from its object is in history complete. The world is triumphantly unified as ((an individual, concrete, infinite)) object, only to find itself separated from the mind by a gulf which no thought can traverse. But in this process, which seems to travel at every step further from that intimacy of subject with object which constitutes knowledge, the indispensable condition of knowledge is progressively and inversely realized . . . . For an infinite given whole of fact cannot at any point be grasped by the mind." (SM, 238-39). Although he adds that this gulf is bridged from both sides (which foreshadows a doctrine about evidence in The Idea of History, as we shall see), these passages seem to point to the zero-line of complete scepticism, saved only (so the early Collingwood thinks) by the existence of absolute knowledge. But in the present essay, and in The Idea of History in general, Collingwood gives not the slightest indication that re-enactment is an exercise of the "absolute standpoint," or that absolute idealism had found the solution to the problem of necessary historical error. Cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 292-306.
things, "being aware of an experience" is also an equivocal expression. It may mean (1) the immediate feeling of something such as a pain; or (2) the perception of objects; or (3) the self-conscious awareness that is involved in acts like being aware of losing one's temper—the third sense being the most proper English use of the term (IH, 291). We here recognize Collingwood's analysis of consciousness as a scale of forms of mental acts. In this case he is interested in the sense of the term "awareness" as it applies to historical knowledge, where at least that degree of self-consciousness must be present which allows the historian to distinguish his own thought from that of the historical agent he is studying. Historical thought must have at least that degree of subjectivity that allows one to recognize an act of thought as not merely an experience, but my experience; and it must have that degree of objectivity that allows one to recognize this same act of thought as having a certain cognitive character, a determinate meaning, etc. (IH, 291). Collingwood's justification of this kind of thinking takes the form of exploring the contradictions that arise from attempting to deny that a thought can be both subjective and objective.

Indeed to say that would be to contradict oneself. (1) To say that an act of thought cannot be objective is to say that it cannot be known; but anyone who said this would be claiming thereby to state his knowledge of such acts. (2) He must therefore modify it, and will perhaps say that one act of thought may be an object to another act, but not to itself. But this again needs modification, for any object is properly the object not of an act but of
an agent, the mind that performs the act. True, a mind is nothing except its own activities, but it is all these activities together, not any one separately. (3) The question is, then, whether a person who performs an act of knowing can also know that he is performing or has performed that act. Admittedly he can, or no one would know that there were such acts, and so no one could have called them subjective; but to call them merely subjective, and not objective too, is to deny that admission while yet continuing to assume its truth. (IH, 291-92).

Notice that in both (1) and (3) Collingwood tacitly appeals to his anti-realism argument and uses it against an idealist objector--thus supporting Post's suggestion that the argument cuts both ways. But the "together" in (2) calls for special comment, since it is revealing about Collingwood's grasp of the relationship between individual acts of consciousness and the contexts in which they occur. In Collingwood's philosophy of mind it is axiomatic that "thought is not mere immediate experience but always reflection or self-knowledge, the knowledge of oneself as living in these activities" (IH, 297)--a principle quite contrary to any view of conscious acts which attempts to analyze them as atomically distinct from one another. Nevertheless, Collingwood insists, they do retain a certain identity. Although an act of thought occurs at a given time, and in a context of certain other acts of thought, of emotions and sensations and memories, etc., the peculiarity of thought is that it can sustain itself through a change of context and revive in a different one. As true as it may be that the immediacy of thought in its given context cannot be re-enacted, the self-identity of an act of thinking is in-
dependent not only of its context of feelings and emotions but also its context of other thoughts.

This has sometimes been denied. It has been said that anything torn from its context is thereby mutilated and falsified . . . . Others . . . have embraced the opposite doctrine that makes it both easy and legitimate to detach them from their context; for there is no context; there is only a juxtaposition of things standing to one another in merely external relations. On this view, the unity of a body of knowledge is only that kind of unity which belongs to a collection: and this is true both of science, or system of things known, and of a mind, or system of acts of knowing. (IH, 298-99).

We do not have to be told that the view that holds that "anything torn from its context is thereby mutilated and falsified" is that of the idealists from which Collingwood wishes to distinguish himself. In criticizing this view he indicates as plainly as one might expect that he could no longer affirm a view accepted in unregenerate days by himself (cf. IH, 299)--for this in fact is the position he maintained in Speculum Mentis, where abstraction and falsification are identified. 16 But notice that he immediately castigates the

16 Cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 112-13, 147-49, 297-99. Rubinoff recognizes the problem of the difference between Speculum Mentis, in which history is a knowledge of facts independent of mind and therefore abstract and false, and The Idea of History, in which history is the "knowledge of a part of mind itself" (CRM, 297). But Rubinoff's solution strikes us as fantastic and ungrounded: he sees both works as part of his grand scheme of the "three ontological levels of consciousness" and therefore bound together in the necessity of "the dialectic." He writes: "This dialectical requirement is a result of the inherent contradiction which . . . pervades the whole of Speculum Mentis, between the presuppositions of realism (for which there is a distinction between subject and object) and the presuppositions of idealism (for which this distinction
opposite view that all acts of thought are atomically distinct from one another. He writes that such a view "by substituting logical analysis for attention to experience . . . overlooks the immediacy of thought, and converts the act of thinking, from a subjective experience, into an objective spectacle" (IH, 299). 17 Whatever Collingwood's familiarity was with lo-

is overcome. When this conflict is dialectically resolved, consciousness elevates itself to the third ontological level of existence. Once having arrived at this level, history reconstitutes itself, this time under the influence of philosophy which is the final consummation of the rapprochement between subject and object" (CRM, 298). Aside from the unrestricted use of the misleadingly florid language of Hegelianism in passages like this one (in talk about the dialectic, consciousness elevating itself or arriving somewhere where history reconstitutes itself and reaches its final consummation--metaphors inadequately resolved by Rubinoff and nowhere found in The Idea of History), one wonders why, if Collingwood had such a scheme in mind, he nowhere said so explicitly--a remark which Knox, himself a Hegel scholar, would certainly have passed on to us. We find it more likely that the reconciliation between idealism and realism which Collingwood, judging from the essay we are considering, surely aimed to achieve, did not occur by absorbing the one into the other or both into the "absolute standpoint" (itself an abstraction) or a "third ontological level" but rather by the correct analysis of historical thought as the re-enactment of expressions of acts of thought in which meaning grounds both its subjective and objective dimensions--its aspects as my experience and as universally comprehensible language. In fairness to Rubinoff we must add that on occasion he makes it clear that his "transition" resolving the "dialectical opposition" between Speculum Mentis and The Idea of History is his own reconstruction (as at CRM, 297), but the distinction between Collingwood's assertions and Rubinoff's reconstruction is not always clearly maintained.

17 Donagan's "Principle of Order" (LPC, 28) commits him, in our opinion, to interpreting Collingwood's philosophy of mind in an atomistic fashion, since Donagan appears to take an act of thought as an event occurring in the mind: in order that it be an object of consciousness (on Donagan's "Principle of Order") it requires another act--a second event--of a higher order, for no act of consciousness is self-illuminating.
gical atomism and its successor, logical positivism (and the Essay on Metaphysics indicates that he was at least knowledgeable with Ayer's version of the latter, which he traced to its pedigree in John Stuart Mill—see EM, 143, 163), we know he rejected its approach not only to historical experience but to the reductionistic analysis of mental acts as well.

Collingwood's rejection of rigid adherence to either an atomistic or an equally untenable context-bound view of mental acts raises once again the problem of "incapsulation" from the Autobiography. For it appears that not only is the term not used in The Idea of History, but on the present account of re-enactment there appears to be no need for a critique (or any other argument) to "incapsulate" or confine the historical past from the superficial or obvious present of the

A literal adherence to this principle would render re-enactment impossible; it is simply epistemological atomism. We have already argued that Donagan's "Principle of Order" as he phrases it (a) is an illegitimate modification of what Collingwood has said about the hierarchy of forms of mental acts, and (b) that it is not itself a tenable principle concerning mental acts, because it appears to rule out the possibility of having a concept about concepts, propositions about propositions (since the act which reflects must be of a higher order). We wish to add now that (c) it cannot be regarded as a presupposition of Collingwood's entire philosophy of mind, because it ignores the sort of knowledge Collingwood calls self-knowledge, the "knowledge of oneself as living in these activities" of thought (IH, 297), as well as his explicit assertion that it is by that act itself that one knows that he is performing it (IH, 292). Although Collingwood is saying that it is the person who knows it, he has stated plainly that the mind of that person is all the acts of thought together, not separately. Such a holistic assertion is incompatible with epistemological atomism.
the historian (what might be called by other philosophers the
world of the historian's lived experience or his Lebenswelt).
This would be the attempt to mediate an immediacy, the immedi­
acy of experience as one's own, or subjective. It appears,
in short, to be an example of what Collingwood called the Fal­
lacy of Misplaced Argument, since there is no initial confu­
sion between one's own experience and that of another in the
first place, nor is there any initial loss of identity of the
enacted meaning or the re-enacted thought in its several con­
texts.

But as Collingwood stated in the Autobiography, incapsula­
tion is not an occult entity; it refers to the reten­
tion of an identity of meaning (or what he calls an "uncon­
verted residue") in more inclusive acts (A, 141)--in our mo­
del, the unaltered presence of EP in HP. Therefore incapsula­
tion is not excluded from the theory or re-enactment, but is
rather its negative side. It is merely a short-hand way of
calling attention to the necessary bi-valence of all thought
(a) as acts of meaning embedded in the immediate experience
of one's own life and forming part of the continuity of the
personal consciousness of that life, and (b) as capable of re­
taining an identity of meaning in other contexts, and especial­
ly in the thoughts of historians. To press the juice from the
metaphor, the "capsule" is the preservation of the objective
identity of meaning (usually the plan of the historical agent
in its context of alternatives) from being simply absorbed into the subjective life of the historian by an awareness that that meaning as historically re-enacted is not merely the solution to a problem in the personal life of the historian.

(3) Several pages later Collingwood sums up his major argument against both realists and idealists and relates them to Bradley's dilemma:

To disentangle ourselves from these two complimentary errors, we must attack the false dilemma from which they both spring. That dilemma rests on the disjunction that thought is either pure immediacy, in which case it is inextricably involved in the flow of consciousness, or pure mediation, in which case it is utterly detached from that flow. Actually it is both immediacy and mediation. Every act of thought, as it actually happens, happens in a context out of which it arises and in which it lives, like any other experience, as an organic part of the thinker's life. Its relations with its context are not those of an item in a collection, but those of a special function in the total activity of an organism. So far not only is the doctrine of the so-called idealists correct, but even that of the pragmatists who have developed that side of it to an extreme. But an act of thought, in addition to actually happening, is capable of sustaining itself and being revived or repeated without loss of identity. So far, those who have opposed the "idealists" are in the right, when they maintain that what we think is not altered by alterations of the context in which we think it . . . . Because it is a thought and not a mere feeling or sensation, it can exist in both these contexts ((i.e. the context of my own thoughts and those of another)) without losing its identity, although without some appropriate context it could never exist. (IH, 300-01).

The example that Collingwood uses for a thought that is both mediate and immediate is Plato's argument in the Theatetus against the view that knowledge is merely sensation (a pregnant example, incidentally). The argument as it can be de-
veloped either in Plato's mind or mine or anyone's is what he calls thought in its mediation; the argument in the context of discussion and theory as Plato placed it in his own thinking is the thought in its immediacy--i.e. the immediate thought-context in which Plato conceived it as part of his own project of thinking out the problem (IH, 301). We assume for Collingwood that it is possible to re-enact a proposition or a concept as well as an argument, so that the meaning being re-enacted extends not only to the inferential but also to the propositional and conceptual levels of thought as well.

Here we have Collingwood's final reply to both realists and idealists on the act-object distinction. It rests firmly on an insight foundational not only to his philosophy of history but his entire philosophy of mind, the insight that meaning is the irreducible and indivisible unity of an act of thought, and that both an act of consciousness and the object of the act are two aspects to, or contexts for, one and the same entity. Calling the enactment or re-enactment of a meaning an "act" means calling attention to its personal, experiential, immediate presence in the mental life of a person (something that someone does "on purpose"), whereas calling attention to this same meaning as social, communicable, and mediate means calling it an "object" of consciousness. It is not a matter of trying to find a way of putting together an "event" occurring in the mind, an event called an "act of con-
sciousness," and an object of such a point-occurrence; they are two sides to one and the same reality—a meaning whose identity survives alteration in context and is capable of being revived (or re-enacted) after a lapse of time. Collingwood's rejection of both an atomistic realism and an absolute idealism, as we have just encountered it, does not display any need for an absolute identity of subject and object, nor does it retreat into an endless order of acts of consciousness external to and atomically distinct from one another—neither an absolute experience nor a schizophrenic hall of mirrors. On the contrary it takes its stand on the unity of meaning of singular acts of consciousness, and its ability to survive and revive in various contexts, so long as that context is part of the life of thought of someone capable of doing things "on purpose."

But successfully defending re-enactment against attacks from hypothetical objectors is not the same as demonstrating that it is the necessary and sufficient condition for historical thinking, and therefore we have not finished with Collingwood's demonstration of how history as a science is possible. Suppose we accept his argument that for history to be possible as knowledge the past must be capable of being re-thought or re-enacted, and that re-enactment presupposes an invariance of meaning in several contexts without loss of experiential immediacy. Is this sufficient to show that historical knowledge
is reliable? Obviously not, since we do not yet know under what conditions we can say that a re-enactment has been successfully carried out, historical error being, we presume, possible.

If we return to Collingwood's three presuppositions for historical thought, we appear to have three candidates for a possible sufficiency criterion. A historical account may thus be said to be a successful re-enactment (a) when it refers to human acts localized in space and time; (b) when it is a coherent narrative; and (c) when it stands in a relation to evidence such that it can be bound to historical events by chains of historical inference. Both (a) and (b) have been more or less specified by Collingwood: (a) refers to the res gestae that form the subject matter of history as distinct from the study of merely physical events in nature; and (b) is a restatement of the requirement that the subject matter of (a) be handled as part of a systematic inquiry. But these alone would fail to distinguish history from good fiction. In order that there be that degree of certitude necessary to call historical narrative knowledge, and not the literary expression of someone's artistic fantasy, there must be a way to decide when (a) succeeds in actually referring to a publicly accessible past. What distinguishes history from romance is (c), and to this double issue of historical evidence and historical inference we must now turn.
3. Evidence, Inference, and Necessity: (a) Historical Evidence.

Why is it a double issue? From our present perspective this should not be a difficult question to answer. It depends on the view of history that it being presupposed by someone for whom evidence is one thing and thought about it is another, and their conjunction requires an argument. It is the sort of question which assumes that historical thinking occurs when a mass of facts, contained in documents called "testimony" (ultimately resting on eyewitness accounts) is examined with a view to constructing a written history of the period or event under consideration. The work of the historian would then be one of selecting relevant testimonial assertions, arranging these propositions into a coherent narrative, and engaging in reasoning only when there is a break in the continuity of the narrative—conflicting testimony, gaps to be filled, or historical peculiarities which require the intervention of the narrator to "explain" something unusual to the reader.

This is the historiography that Collingwood disparagingly calls "scissors and paste" (IH, 257), and "evidence" on this view of history is merely the mass of records or "sources" pertaining to the period the historian is considering (IH, 278). In this sort of historical thinking the "data" are thus external to the mind itself: they are contained in the set of all relevant documents preserved in archives, libraries, and museums. The need for inference arises only when various
authorities disagree, and the only issue is whether to accept or reject a piece of evidence as a true account of what happened. But even though the audience to which Collingwood's remarks are addressed is one which assumes that historical thinking and its object are independent of one another--hence exhibiting the realistic outlook on the relation of mental acts to their objects--it is also an audience Collingwood hopes to convince that the role of historical reasoning is far more intimate and interdependent than is being presumed.

We can therefore anticipate that in the essay entitled "Historical Evidence" (a fragment from The Principles of History and the longest of the seven Epilegomena) his strategy will be to propose an alternative account of historical reasoning, and this in fact is what he does. Instead of beginning with a definition and classification of historical evidence--i.e. starting out as if one began with a ready-made object--Collingwood first characterizes scientific historical thinking and then describes its special relation to evidence, where evidence is decidedly the derivative concept. The thrust of his argument in this essay is to show that history is a science in the sense of being an organized body of knowledge. But it is organized in a way different from the exact or empirical sciences, insofar as it approaches its data and constructs its conclusions using a kind of inference that is unique to history and different from that of the other scien-
ces, while yet being compelling in its conclusions and having a necessity of its own. Evidence in this schema of historical inference is correlative to the historian's questioning activity and is not simply a property of certain sets of propositions. Evidence is not the set of "facts" which verify or falsify our historical propositions by "corresponding" to them; it is whatever serves as a locus for the historian to answer the questions which allow him to re-enact past acts of thought.

Now although we have made the case in previous chapters that Collingwood's use of Q-A logic suggests that it is more favorably compared to a logic of discovery than to a formal deductive system (in spite of his own misleading rhetoric that Q-A logic is an "alternative" to F-logic), it is noteworthy that in the Introduction to The Idea of History when he asks how history proceeds or what its method is, his answer is not "by the application of Q-A logic" but rather "by the interpretation of evidence" (IH, 9-10). Q-A logic appears in the answer to the first question he asks, i.e. "What is the nature of history?" the answer to which is "a kind of research or inquiry"--a form of thought whereby we ask questions and try to answer them (IH, 9). What any science does is to employ Q-A logic; what historical science does is answer questions by the interpretation of evidence.
Since we already have some idea of what he takes historical thinking to be, it may be well briefly to characterize what Collingwood has to say about evidence in this and the other Epilegomena. We recall that the universality of an historical event is an act expressing an intentional meaning in the context of an array of situational alternatives confronting an historical agent, and that this universal meaning is the individuality sought by the historian who would re-enact the event. Furthermore in describing the process of re-thinking the past Collingwood leaves room for a contribution made by the object—in this case the past thought. In discussing history as re-enactment in the fourth Epilegomenon, for example, he writes that "historical knowledge is that special case of memory where the object of present thought is past thought, the gap between present and past being bridged not only by the power of present thought to think of the past, but also by the power of past thought to reawaken itself in the present" (IH, 294). Nor is this an isolated remark; it is a recurrent theme in The Idea of History. In discussing the subject matter of history in the fifth Epilegomenon we have already quoted the striking passage where he speaks of the individuality of a particular historical act being something that "eversteps the limits of merely local and temporal existence and possesses a significance valid for all men at all times," and adds that this act transcends its immediacy because "that individuality
is the vehicle of a thought which, because it was actually theirs, is potentially everyone's" (IH, 303). And in the second Epilegomenon Collingwood expands further on this "potential-actual" distinction as it pertains to evidence:

Everything is evidence which the historian can use as evidence. But what can he so use? It must be something here and now perceptible to him: this written page, this spoken utterance, this building, this fingerprint. . . . The whole perceptible world, then, is potentially and in principle evidence to the historian. It becomes actual evidence in so far as he can use it ((as evidence on some question)) . . . . Evidence is evidence only when someone contemplates it historically. Otherwise it is merely perceived fact, historically dumb. (IH, 247; cf. 203).

It should be clear at this point why Collingwood begins a discussion on evidence with a discussion of the nature of historical thinking: it is the thinking that determines what is evidence, and not the other way around. It should also be clear that while historical thinking makes the difference between a perceived fact being merely that or historical evidence, there is a contribution being made by the "perceived fact" inasmuch as it has a "power to re-awaken itself" in the present. Once again the difference that historical thinking makes to its object is not creational but constitutional; it does not create the fact but determines it as evidence. "His business is not to invent anything, it is to discover something" (IH, 251).

In the third Epilegomenon this useful distinction between actual and potential evidence is redefined in terms of
If history means scissors-and-paste history . . . a source is a text containing a statement or statements about the subject . . . . If history means scientific history, for "source" we must read "evidence." And when we try to define evidence in the same spirit in which we defined "sources," we find it very difficult . . . . In scientific history anything is evidence which is used as evidence . . . . Let us put this by saying that in scissors-and-paste history, if we allow ourselves to describe testimony—loosely, I admit—by the name of evidence, there is potential evidence and there is actual evidence. The potential evidence about a subject is all the extant statements about it. The actual evidence is that part of these statements which we decide to accept. But in scientific history the idea of potential evidence disappears; . . . everything in the world is potential evidence for any subject whatever. (IH, 278-80).

The obvious question is, how does the historian manage to restrict this infinite domain? Once again Collingwood seems to be overstating his case. It is clear that his intention is to display the active role of the thinking historian in constructing his narrative. To this extent there is an exact parallel between Collingwood's historian, whose task is to re-enact past acts of thought in his own mind, and Collingwood's artist, for whom the act of expressive imagination takes place "in his head." But just as the latter tends to render art inaccessible to public examination (how do you examine the inside of someone else's head?), so also the scientific historian's "evidence" appears to be not only thought-dependent but inseparable from the infinite array of everyday artifacts.
Collingwood's reply is that this is only a problem for the scissors-and-paste historian, who relies on there being a manageably small amount of testimony (IH, 278). For the scientific historian evidence is strictly correlative to the questioning activity, and it is his arrangement of questions that guides what the historian chooses to consider as evidence. In an extended example (one that has often been excerpted in collections of essays on the philosophy of history) Collingwood uses the fictional example of an inspector investigating a murder ("Who Killed John Doe?") as a paradigm for what a scientific historian does. The example is too familiar to require repeating here, but it is important to note the lessons that Collingwood derives from it. (1) Each step of the investigation is dependent on the asking of a question, and each question is asked in the right order (IH, 273). One assumes that "the right order" here, based on the example, is one in which the answer to one question is the presumed basis for the next question, and that the whole series is governed by the intention to solve a single problem. (2) The questions are put by the investigator to himself--a process which calls attention to the autonomy of the historian's inquiry, "where by autonomy I mean the condition of being one's own authority, making statements or taking action on one's own initiative and not because these statements or actions are authorized or prescribed by anyone else" (IH, 274-75).
What distinguishes the scientific historian from his predecessors is precisely this ability to act on his own without waiting for statements to be made to him. In this the historian is in the position of a Baconian cross-examiner, who puts evidence to the test (IH, 269), and it is this activity which determines what actual evidence is.

Question and evidence, in ((scientific)) history, are correlative. Anything is evidence which enables you to answer your question—the question you are asking now. A sensible question (the only kind of question that a scientifically competent man will ask) is a question which you think you have or are going to have the evidence for answering. If you think you have it here and now, the question is an actual question . . . . If you think you are going to have it the question is a deferred question . . . . (IH, 281).

One might say for Collingwood that in this context actual evidence is determined by actual questions, potential evidence by deferred questions.

Once again, this account leaves serious questions unanswered. What counts for a relevant question in this series, and what dictates the choice of observable evidence? Collingwood's response tends to be circular: the historian chooses those questions which his evidence permits him to answer (IH, 281). But since the evidence is chosen on the basis of the questions, the process seems to be one of chasing one's own tail. What makes the circularity all the more glaring is that two pages previous to this discussion of the correlative of question and evidence Collingwood had charged that the scis-
sors-and-paste man, like the nineteenth century landscape painter, protects himself by choosing subjects that he is able to "get away with" (IH, 279). In either case--Collingwood's or the sub-scientific scissors-and-paste man--one chooses one's questions to suit the evidence, and the evidence to suit the question.

In his zeal to put forward his thesis that scientific thinking is more of a question and answer process than it is one of deriving logical inferences from ready-made statements, has Collingwood failed to make important distinctions--e.g. between the way a piece of evidence first presents itself and the way it is subsequently treated in an investigation? Has Collingwood once again lost sight of the real contribution of the object in his efforts to counteract the presumed realistic bias of his readers? Or have we overlooked something?

Now it is in a section entitled "Statement and Evidence" that Collingwood provides us with a hint of a missing element in this entire discussion. The way out of the circularity of the correlativity of evidence and question has to do with the sort of question that the scientific historian asks as opposed to that of the scissors-and-paste man.

Confronted with a ready-made statement about the subject he is studying, the scientific historian never asks himself: "Is this statement true or false?" . . . The question he asks himself is: "What does this statement mean?" And this is not equivalent to the question "What did the person who made it mean by it?" although that is doubtless
a question that the historian must ask, and must be able
to answer. It is equivalent rather to the question "What
light is thrown on the subject in which I am interested
by the fact that this person made this statement, meaning
by it what he did mean?" This might be expressed by say­
ing that the scientific historian does not treat state­
ments as statements but as evidence: not as true or false
accounts of the facts of which they profess to be accounts,
but as other facts which, if he knows the right questions
to ask about them, may throw light on those facts. (IH,
275).

When Collingwood writes that the historian treats
statements as other facts the reader is obliged to recall that
the irreducible datum of history is the universal meaning of
an intended event--the "inside" of an action. If the histori­
an is limited by the truthfulness of the statements of his
sources, then his efforts to construct a coherent narrative
by stringing together true propositions about the past are
seriously threatened by testimony which contains conflicting
accounts of the same event (IH, 257). What Collingwood is ar­
guing is that if history is not bound by this presupposition
it is not in danger of such a loss of coherence. By treating
testimony as factual in the sense of seeking interpretation
of it just as one does of all evidence, i.e. by asking what it
historically means, the historian may preserve the coherence
of his inquiry while at the same time preserving evidence as
evidence rather than simply discarding it as useless. In Col­
ingwood's view this is precisely what makes history scienti­
fic: instead of being the passive spectator--a condition in
which thought is barely occurring, as Collingwood often says
--the historian is providing a measure of control over his
subject matter. The historian's laboratory is his own a priori imagination, and he is only limited by his ability to exercise that imagination in the form of revealing questions aimed at eliciting meaning from present evidence.

(b) Historical Inference.--If historical thinking occurs by means of an ordered sequence of questions, what is the role of inferential reasoning? If we were correct in our reconstruction of Collingwood's functions of higher-order consciousness in the last chapter, then can we find confirmation here that by an application of the Law of Primitive Survivals the meaning-seeking function of consciousness is extended to the level of inferential thought in the form in which one propositional meaning is related to another as ground to consequent?

At first glance this does not seem to be the function that Collingwood assigns to it. What historical inference does is to form a bridge between present evidence and past events--the former being question-correlative and perceptible, the latter being answer-correlative and imperceptible, but re-thinkable (IH, 251-52). But at the same time that he is preoccupied with saying what historical inference is not, he lets slip the opportunity to say more explicitly what it is. We shall first let Collingwood tell us what it is not, and then try to reconstruct what it is.
History has this in common with every other science: that the historian is not allowed to claim any single piece of knowledge, except where he can justify his claim by exhibiting . . . the grounds upon which it is based. This is what was meant . . . by describing history as inferential. . . . Different kinds of science are organized in different ways; and it should follow . . . that different kinds of science are characterized by different kinds of inference. The way in which knowledge is related to the grounds upon which it is based is in fact not one and the same for all kinds of knowledge. That . . . a person who has studied the nature of inference as such--let us call him a logician--can correctly judge the validity of an inference purely by attending to its form, although he has no special knowledge of its subject-matter, is a doctrine of Aristotle; but it is a delusion, although it is still believed by many very able persons who have been trained exclusively in the Aristotellean logic and the logics that depend upon it for their chief doctrines. (IH, 252-53).

What is worth noting in this passage is the positive assertion disguised as a negative one, i.e. Collingwood's insistence that it is a delusion that knowledge of the subject-matter has no bearing on the validity of scientific inference and that it depends solely on its form. Positively stated this means that the subject-matter does have a bearing on determining the validity of inference. It is also worth noting that throughout this and the subsequent discussion of inference, everything is phrased in epistemological terms; inference is a kind of thinking rather than a formal relationship between propositions, assertions, or the like. Finally it must be recalled that when Collingwood refers to the logic of Aristotle "and the logics that depend upon it for their chief doctrines" he has in mind all F-logics of a propositional pedigree, as we noted in the previous chapter.
Now in this inferential process of justifying knowledge by exhibiting the grounds upon which it is based, Collingwood contrasts historical inference to deductive and inductive inference in a manner very reminiscent of the Essay on Philosophical Method, but this time with emphasis on the "compulsion" with which the conclusion follows from the premisses. Proof, he writes,

might be either compulsive, as in exact science, where the nature of inference is such that nobody can affirm the premisses without being obliged to affirm the conclusion also, or permissive, as in "inductive" science, where all a proof can do is to justify the thinker in affirming its conclusion, granted that he wishes to do so. An inductive argument with a negative conclusion is compulsive, that is to say it absolutely forbids the thinker from affirming what he wishes to affirm; with a positive conclusion it is never more than permissive. If history means scissors-and-paste history, the only kind of proof known to the historian is of this latter kind . . . . If criticism leads him to a negative conclusion, viz. that the statement of its author is untrustworthy, this forbids him to accept it, just as a negative result in an "inductive" argument . . . forbids the inductive scientist to affirm the view he hoped to affirm. If criticism leads him to a positive conclusion, the most it gives him is a nihil obstat. (IH, 261).

One has to wince at calling a conclusion to a proof a view someone "hoped to affirm," for why could a proof not be one that concludes to a view that the author either has no hope for whatever, or even is one he hopes to deny? Yet with some correction (e.g. replacing dispositional terms like "hoping" with logically relational or at least more neutral terms) the line of thought is clear enough, and poses no particular problem to the reader. Since he has just been told what consti-
tutes subscientific historical inference, he is led to ex-
pect that he will next be enlightened about actual scientific
inference. What he gets instead are more dispositional terms
--the "compulsion" that is contrasted with "permissive" in-
ductive arguments.

One hears it said that history is "not an exact science."
The meaning of this I take to be that no historical argu-
ment ever proves its conclusion with that compulsive force
which is characteristic of exact science. Historical in-
ference, the saying seems to mean, is never compulsive,
it is at best permissive; or . . . it never leads to cer-
tainty, only to probability. Many historians . . . must
be able to recollect their excitement on first discovering
that it was wholly untrue, and that they were actually
holding in their hands an historical argument which left
nothing to caprice, and admitted of no alternative conclu-
sion, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstra-
tion in mathematics. (IH, 262).

An argument that admits of no alternative conclusion and proves
its point conclusively is one whose compulsive force must be
that of necessity. Once again the reader anticipates that he
will be enlightened about the special nature of the necessity
involved in historical inference. What follows next is utter-
ly astonishing.

If any reader wishes to rise here on a point of order and
protest that a philosophical question, which ought there-
fore to be settled by reasoning, is being illegitimately
disposed of by reference to the authority of historians,
and quote against me the good old story about the man who
said "I'm not arguing, I'm telling you," I can only admit
that the cap fits. I am not arguing; I am telling him.
Is this wrong of me? The question I want settled is whe-
ther an inference of the kind used in scientific history,
as distinct from scissors-and-paste history, yields compul-
sion or only permission to embrace its conclusion . . .
(T)he only way of knowing whether a given type of argument
is cogent or not is to learn how to argue that way, and find out. Meanwhile, the second best thing is to take the word of people who have done so for themselves. (IH, 263).

If this is the manner in which the historian exhibits the grounds upon which his knowledge is based, then surely one may be excused from affirming the claim that history is a science. For how can it provide anything but an authoritative criterion for successful historical inference? On such grounds as these one could excuse anything that even pretends to be an inference; if it is true that whatever I do is historically valid inference, then any inference is valid so long as it is what I do. One could hardly ask for a more blatant example of what Knox called Collingwood's dogmatism.

What has happened to the role of philosophy which, in Speculum Mentis, judges whether a particular form of knowledge explicitly lives up to its implicit promise? Do we not rather appear to be in the full grip of a form of thought that is attempting to justify itself from within--what he had once himself called historical dogmatism? Has Collingwood abandoned the role of philosophy as outlined in the Essay on Philosophical Method of being a self-justifying form of thought which avoids dogmatism or assuming certain principles to be true without justification? Are we not now in the more cloistered atmosphere of The New Leviathan, where the "Fallacy of Misplaced Argument" forbids us to argue about objects given directly to consciousness?
If we try again to look past what Collingwood said to what he meant, where that meaning is informed by what is undeniably his overall intention in these essays, a mitigating argument can be put forward to soften the apparent intransience of this remark. We have noted in passing the epistemological orientation of the entire discussion of inference—just as in the Essay on Philosophical Method. When Collingwood calls history a science and then defines science as an organized body of knowledge, and finally states that knowledge is organized when it can exhibit the grounds on which it is based, one cannot expect that a formal account of historical inference is what will follow. If one were to succeed in formalizing an historical inference Collingwood would surely say that not only was it historically unenlightening to focus on the function of logical connectives and their formal meanings (if-then, and, or, all, some, etc.) rather than the content of the expressions being linked together, but also that what was peculiarly historical about it would be completely left out in the interest of showing how it was isomorphic with other forms of inference. The sort of coherence aimed at in historical thinking is not formal validity but narrative continuity. This continuity is demonstrated when the meaning of an act is related to the meaning of another act as historical ground and consequent.
Furthermore Collingwood often repeats the point that in order to be history it is a necessary condition that particular events be related in a coherent fashion, and not as instances of a class of similar events. If this requirement is added to the previous observation it follows that an historical inference is the establishment of coherence in the form of narrative continuity between the meaning of one particular historical act and another such that the one is the historical ground and the other its consequence. What Collingwood's dogmatic assertion amounts to is a statement of an historian's autonomy in this context, so that in order to find out if such a narrative has a coherent continuity one has to repeat the process of re-thinking it for oneself, which necessitates re-thinking the meaning of this act as grounds for the meaning of another particular act, not another like it in its class. Rehearsing another argument like it will not do either, for the argument is meaning-dependent. If a would-be historian is unable or unwilling to re-enact the argument for himself, he can only rely on the testimony of another (which means that he ceases to be a scientific historian at this point), in which case Collingwood, the Roman-British historian, announces that his testimony is as good as any other, and he finds that such narrative coherence does exist, and is compelling.
There are many difficulties with this reconstruction, as well as with Collingwood's entire handling of the question of historical inference. For starters there is the need for a clearer distinction between the kind of inference that the historian uses to link evidence to his proposed or received narrative events, and the inference that occurs when the historian links events to other events within his narrative. All of this borders on a discussion of the issue of historical explanation, around which has grown an extensive secondary literature for the last thirty years (cf. CEPC, 331-48). To deal with this in even a cursory way would require a separate treatise. Our concern here is first with evaluating the philosophy of history expressed in The Idea of History as legitimately interpreted in the Autobiography; and secondly understanding this philosophy of history in the light of developments of his ideas in the other later writings, especially concerning epistemological logic and the philosophy of mind.

But it is precisely here that our major difficulty with Collingwood's handling of the issue of historical inference arises. For just as the Essay on Philosophical Method leaves us wondering when a philosophical inference is unsuccessful, so The Idea of History does not provide us with grounds for determining when historical inference fails to achieve coherent narrative continuity. For if, lacking Collingwood's assurance on any particular historical inference, we decided to be scientific historians ourselves, what assur-
ance do we have that the "compulsion" to a given conclusion is not an utterly subjective conviction that is merely shored up by the evidence we choose to consider as governed by the questions we ask, which are in turn based on our own presuppositions? And if the shade of Collingwood were to retort, "what assurance do you require?" the reply is the quite Collingwoodean requirement that it be first and foremost a self-assurance. How is that achieved?

(c) Historical Necessity.---The issue is one of valid vs. invalid historical inference, and such a de jure issue is not settled by a de facto exemplification or description (we are not asking Collingwood, we are telling him). The answer that seems appropriate to the argument as Collingwood has been developing it is that historical inference succeeds when it is grounded in evidence. But we have just seen that there is an apparent circularity here inasmuch as evidence and questions are, in Collingwood's view, strictly correlative. It simply postpones the inevitable need to state the missing criteria, since not just any sequence of completed questions and answers nor any haphazard choice of evidence will satisfy an intelligent historian.

Although the challenge may seem unfair, it would be enlightening in this regard to conduct a thought-experiment in which Collingwood's canons of scientific history would be applied to an outrageously bad piece of historiography, such
as Erich von Däniken's *Chariots of the Gods*?\(^{18}\) Von Däniken exasperates the learned and delights the ignorant by declaring that he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate that ancient astronauts visited the earth in prehistoric times, and that the legends of gods descending from the skies in fiery chariots are merely a dim memory of these events. Von Däniken plies himself and his readers with hundreds of questions, constructs historical arguments linking his evidence to these astronautical events, and uses his *a priori* historical imagination to construct a narrative of events which refer to deeds of men (?) done in the past—events he is trying to re-enact in his own mind. He engages in this historical reconstruction for the purpose of self-knowledge, and especially in the light of pre-suppositions drawn from 20th century science and its expansion by space exploration. He even appears to cross-examine evidence by putting questions to it, and chooses evidence that he thinks will allow him to answer the questions to it, and chooses evidence that he thinks will allow him to answer the questions that he has. And some—presumably himself included—would say that his historical arguments are compelling and admit of no other rational conclusion.

What is missing here? It appears that Collingwood's criteria of scientific history is superficially well suited to

\(^{18}\) Translated by Michael Heron (New York, 1969).
justify the work of both respectably orthodox practitioners and disreputably heretical dilettantes. In order to demonstrate that "history" like that of Erich von Däniken is spurious and fantastic it would be necessary to take into account the reaction of the community of historians and their own work interpreting the same evidence pertaining to the same "events." Collingwood, of course, know this quite well, as indicated by his requirement that second-order history, the history of historiography, is itself an integral part of the historian's task. He would also have found Von Däniken's books beneath contempt and quite acceptably dismissed by equally amateurish rebuttals like that of the Christian fundamentalist, Clifford Wilson. Nevertheless the serious question remains: on Collingwood's grounds, how is bad history--history that fails to be scientific--eliminated?

Evidently by critical historiography. But then scientific history presupposes critical history rather than replacing it, just as critical history builds on scissors-and-paste while yet modifying and correcting it. Collingwood's efforts to proclaim a historian's version of the Copernican revolution may have led him to express himself in a way that misleads the reader into overlooking Collingwood's discovery that history is a philosophical concept and therefore defined as a scale of forms in which two successive stages in the scale are

19 Crash Go the Chariots (New York, 1972).
related by opposition and distinction, and have differences of both degree and kind. Scientific history may be opposed to critical history in the sense that it rejects any attempt to make historical objects independent of the historian's questioning thought (therefore ignoring the essential ideality of the past); but it is also distinct from critical history insofar as it is self-consciously aware that when it replaces the concept of "evidence" for the critical historian's "sources" and the scissors-and-paste historian's "testimony" the concept of evidence includes the lesser forms in its meaning. It is therefore not only a different kind of history but is a more perfect embodiment of the generic concept than is critical history, just as critical history is a more perfect form than scissors-and-paste. 20

But it is not obvious that the same can be said for the necessity that Collingwood claims for historical inference. Since Hume it has been natural to suppose that the only sort of necessity admissible in inference is strict logical neces-

20 What is the minimum specification of the scale of forms of the concept of history? It cannot be direct observation, because to be history at all it must deal with res gestae incapable of present perception. Can it be memory? While Collingwood rejects memory as grounds for history because history is organized and memory is not (IH, 252), this is from the point of view of scientific history--the highest point on the scale of forms of history. The generic concept must be minimally specified by an act that re-enacts, and by a thought about thought. Minimally what else can this be but an act of memory? That an act of memory is not organized and not inferential means only that it has the status of a confused potential for interpretative acts of meaning.
sity--what Collingwood is calling deductive compulsion, with some allowance made for inductive inference (yielding the "virtual compulsion" due to preponderant probability). But in the strict sense, when the meaning of an event is related to the meaning of another event as ground to consequent, how can this be a necessary relation? In the realm of human affairs it is always possible that the outcome could be otherwise than the way it was. And if the historian's work of exhibiting the evidence as grounds for the coherence of his narrative of these events is also an inferential process, in what sense is the conclusion--the particular narrative of events--a necessary conclusion from the evidence? It is clearly this latter question that occupies the foreground of Collingwood's concern in The Idea of History, and our question at this point concerns the nature of a "compulsion" which is neither deductively necessary nor inductively permissive, but is yet just as binding in its conclusion as is a mathematical proof. It is also clearly not Collingwood's intention to reduce this compulsion to a subjective or psychological state. He means to assert that historical inference compels like all scientific inference compels--i.e. with necessity.

When historical inference refers to the ground-consequent relation between narrated events there is a sense of necessity in which it is understandable to say that past events cannot be other than the way they are. Necessity has a human-
based usage wherein some event or state of affairs is said to be necessary if it cannot be made by me or anyone else to be other than the way it is. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is the way Collingwood analyzes the term "cause" in the Essay on Metaphysics. In this sense the past is beyond human causality: it cannot now be made by me or by anyone else to be other than the way it is. But this is not the interesting sense of the term so far as the argument of The Idea of History is concerned. We are interested in the relation of evidence to reconstructed events of the past, and reconstructing or re-enacting that past is within the non-necessary realm of causable or alterable events.

But there is one way that I can see to salvage Collingwood's treatment of historical inference. When the question-evidence correlation came up for discussion in the previous section we noted that the kind of question that the historian asks aims not at "the truth" but at the meaning of the evidence. It is this hermeneutical preoccupation that provides us with a way of understanding a non-deductive but necessary inferential compulsion.

The missing link in this entire discussion is a proper elucidation of the term "interpretation"--an axial process since it is by means of the interpretation of evidence that the historian draws his inference about the meaning of past events. It follows that the correctness of the infer-
ence is dependent on the correctness of the interpreting process. Now in the interpretative process there is one sense of "necessity" that is both legitimate and appropriate for Collingwood's use in this connection. Collingwood seems to have in mind a view of inferential necessity that is parallel to his notion of conceptual truth. Just as truth is not only a property of judgments or propositions but extends to concepts as well in the sense that a concept may truly or falsely express an intended meaning, so also necessity extends to concepts, statements, and inferences in the sense of "fitness" (like the elements in a Gestalt are seen as necessary to the interpretation of the pattern). In the hermeneutical sense something is said to be necessary when it cannot be other than the way it is without losing its identity of meaning. In the historical sense the hermeneutical demand for meaning proposes an a priori necessity in the sort of fitness that makes a conclusion necessary only when it makes both narrative and evidential sense, so that the meaning of both the evidence and the event are fused together so tightly that nothing essential is left out of account. The necessity is one of referential narrative meaning, i.e. by means of this argument (a set of well interpreted pieces of evidence) such a conclusion (the re-enacted event) makes historical sense.

This is what Collingwood seems to mean when he says that the necessity of the historian's picture of the past
(i.e. his narrative account) "is at every point the necessity of the a priori imagination" (IH, 245-46) whose functions are selection, construction, and criticism (IH, 236).

4. Conclusion.

In this chapter we have had the opportunity to examine how Collingwood carried out the rapprochement between philosophy and history, and although we were left with several unanswered questions and some serious problems in understanding what Collingwood meant us to understand by historical inference, it is clear enough that the autobiographical interpretation in its main lines is carried forward into The Idea of History, even though it is a posthumous publication and is the product of the editorial re-arrangement in its present form. We saw that in Part I of The Idea of History the scale of forms of mental functions is reflected in the development of the concept of history as it is expressed in historiography. We also saw that the Epilegomena provide some striking illustrations not only of Collingwood's mature philosophy of mind, but also of the kinds of judgments and arguments that were described, but not exemplified, in the Essay on Philosophical Method. And finally we saw how Collingwood attempted to free himself not only from the errors of realism but from those of idealism as well. And in the process we had a glimpse of Collingwood's use of a basically interpretative approach to his subject matter, an approach that allowed for the self-conscious
control by the historian of his narrative by means of inference based on the interpretation of evidence. The reconciliation of history and philosophy does not merely take the form of a reduction of both to forms of self-consciousness—although that is, in Collingwood's view, generically the case. It takes the form of a demonstration that self-knowledge (the goal of philosophy) is possible only on condition that meanings can be re-enacted in such a way that they retain both their objectivity (their identity as meanings) and their subjectivity (as experience).

What we have not shown is what the limitations of this reconciliational process are. Does history simply absorb philosophy without remainder in this re-enactment? What is the independent role of philosophy?
CHAPTER X

METAPHYSICS AND RAPPROCHEMENT

1. Introduction.

With this chapter we come to the end of our journey through the published writings of R. G. Collingwood, and to the central paradox of the Essay on Metaphysics, which has been the cause of so much critical discussion among the students of Collingwood's philosophy.

In Chapter I we noted that it was this work (and those portions of the Autobiography that support it) which so scandalized Knox, who argued that at the end of his life Collingwood "turned traitor" to his philosophical profession by absorbing philosophy into history. According to Knox, until 1936 Collingwood still held that metaphysics as a separate study of the One, the True, and the Good, a study distinct from history, was still possible; but after 1938 he did not, as evidenced by the historicism of the Essay on Metaphysics and the Autobiography. Knox concluded that sometime between 1936 and 1938 Collingwood's philosophical standpoint radically changed, and while the major evidence for this change is taken by Knox from unpublished manuscripts, he makes an impressive case for it from the published writings themselves (IH, x-xi).
The fact that there is no mention of a major reversal of opinion in the Autobiography is one of the main reasons Knox rejects it as a legitimate interpretation of the development of Collingwood's philosophy.

In Chapter I we also noted that this is the major difficulty to which most of Collingwood's subsequent interpreters addressed themselves. Donagan grounds his interpretation of Collingwood's later philosophy on the disparity that he finds between the earlier idealistic philosophy, in which all abstraction is rejected as falsification, and the later analytic philosophy of mind which "repudiates" this position by recognizing that all thinking is conceptual and that all concepts are abstract (LPC, 14, 18). While we have had occasion to question Donagan's analysis of the abstractness of thought in Collingwood's later philosophy, it is difficult to escape his conclusion that the Essay on Metaphysics represents an abandonment of views expressed earlier, in which philosophy is said to consist of universal judgments: for if historical statements concern particular matters of fact, how can metaphysics as an historical science preserve its universal aspect as philosophy? Donagan argues that Collingwood came to think that it was impossible to have a non-abstract idea of pure being, and therefore attempted to save metaphysics by giving it an orientation away from ontology and towards the history of science. But what he proposed was a contradictory
and indefensible science of truth-neutral absolute presuppositions, which is incompatible with his later philosophy of mind (CEPC, 15).

It is this reformed metaphysics which Walsh, Rotenstreich and others have also found to be neither conceptually justifiable nor historically accurate, representing what Walsh has called "metaphysical neutralism"—the refusal to take a metaphysical position (CEPC, 149, 197). The attempt to extricate Collingwood from this blind alley has led at least two of Collingwood's gifted defenders—Mink and Rubinoff—to engage in feats of interpretative excess, which we spent part of Chapter I examining. While we have learned more from these studies of Collingwood than we can accurately and adequately acknowledge, we decided that there was still room for a study of Collingwood's public philosophy based on the guidelines provided by the autobiographical interpretation.

In Chapter II we laid the groundwork for this self-interpretative study by locating the four major themes around which Collingwood organized his Autobiography: his opposition to realism, Q-A logic, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of rapprochement. In Parts II and III we have verified that the autobiographical interpretation is a remarkably concise overview of themes that recur constantly throughout Collingwood's early and later writings, and often enlightens the strategy of argumentation in these works. We have
had occasion to find fault with what Collingwood maintained at one place or another; we have witnessed apparent contradictions not only between one publication and another but within the same treatise; and we have found themes latent in these writings that help to overcome puzzling and frustrating obscurities in some difficult passages—themes that were not explicitly discussed in the Autobiography. But we have found no evidence thus far of a major reversal on any of the central issues of the autobiographical interpretation.

But with the Essay on Metaphysics we face our greatest challenge. Approaching this work from the background of our survey of the other published writings we find both striking parallels and equally striking reversals. We observed in Chapter III that even before Collingwood's opposition to realism hardened during World War I, his outlook on many substantial philosophical issues was already formulated. Thus it is noteworthy that seven of the ten chapters of Religion and Philosophy are assembled under the sub-headings, "Religion and Metaphysics" (Part II) and "From Metaphysics to Theology" (Part III), and contain discussions about proofs for the existence of God, materialism and idealism, personality, identity and difference, the Absolute, the problem of evil, and God's self-expression in man (RP, viii-xii). In this earliest work Collingwood writes as if there is a legitimate function of metaphysical analysis not merely in locating and propound-
ing absolute presuppositions, but in deciding which of them are acceptable and which are not. For example, when he examines the three presuppositions (he calls them "hypotheses") that "(e)ither the world is entirely material, or it is entirely spiritual, or it is a compound of the two" (RP, 73), he reaches some conclusion concerning the issue: he rejects both materialism and a crude idealism in favor of a modified form of idealism which accepts "mind as the one reality" in the sense that "the world is the place of freedom and consciousness, not of blind determinism" (RP, 94-95).

Surely "the world is entirely material" is as much a metaphysical presupposition as "all events have causes" (EM, 51), and in rejecting this "hypothesis" Collingwood is not merely stating that it is no longer an absolute presupposition of science (although he does indicate that this is the case--cf. RP, 82), but is deciding the issue in favor of idealism--which is hardly remaining neutral on its truth or falsity. Nor is this an isolated case. When he analyzes the immanence-transcendence dualism with respect to God's identity in the universe, he does not leave the matter in unresolved conflict, but reconciles them through the "concrete identity of activity"--i.e. "the identity of two minds which think the same thing" in the sense of sharing the same thoughts and volitions: "so far, that is, as they know any truth or will any good" (RP, 117-18). Thus in stating that God cannot be simply
immanent in the world or transcendent to it, but rather present in it in the same sense that personality is self-identical and yet inter-personal in action, he is not merely stating what thinking Christians believe, he is affirming the truth of a theological presupposition and rejecting two heretical versions.

But it is also in this early work that we found the following passage in which there is a striking anticipation of the rejection of metaphysical ontology in the *Essay on Metaphysics*:

> It is often maintained that ultimate truths are incapable of proof, and that the existence of God is such an ultimate truth. But I venture to suggest that the impossibility of proof attaches not to ultimate truths as such, but only to the truths of "metaphysics" in the depreciatory sense of the word; to truths, that is, which have no definite meaning. We cannot prove that Reality exists, not because the question is too ultimate (that is, because too much depends on it), but because it is too empty. Tell us what you mean by Reality, and we can offer an alternative meaning and try to discover which is the right one. No one can prove that God exists, if no definite significance is attached to the words; not because . . . the reality of God transcends human knowledge, but because the idea of God which we claim to have is as yet entirely indeterminate. (RP, 64).

This is essentially the same argument that we find Collingwood making in the *Essay on Metaphysics* to reject an ontology of "pure being," and the existence of "truths" which are incapable of proof is remarkably close to the later concept of absolute presuppositions. It is clear from this early work that at this time Collingwood accepted a legitimate function to me-
taphysics and rejected some metaphysical arguments as vacuous and therefore illegitimate.

Eight years later Collingwood appears to have less hope for the legitimacy of the enterprise of metaphysical analysis. In Speculum Mentis metaphysics is described as the scientific form of experience abstractly (and therefore falsely) extended into philosophy: it is that form of dogmatic philosophy in which scientific thinking justifies its objective validity "by showing that the real world is constructed in such a way that, in thinking it scientifically, we are thinking of it as it really is" (SM, 272). But this involves showing that the laws of thought (logic) are really the laws of being (metaphysics), and this cannot be done.

Metaphysics is impossible; for its task is to vindicate the objective validity of the ways in which we think, and if there are any flaws in our methods of thought, these will affect our metaphysical theory of reality and introduce into it the very mistakes which by its help we had hoped to eradicate. Hence the theory of being as distinct from thinking (metaphysics) will only be the theory of thinking as distinct from being (logic) expressed in a different terminology but subject to the same fatal weakness, namely that just as logic can never analyze real thinking--the thinking that, going on in the logician's mind, always lies behind his analysis--so metaphysics can never analyze real being, being as it is in itself untainted by thought. (SM, 274).

Thus as we have seen in these two early works, Collingwood's antipathy to metaphysics defined as a science of "pure being" has its origin in his early philosophy, and the Essay on Metaphysics does not represent a departure from this tendency.
Where they part company appears to be over the reconciling role of philosophical thought. *Speculum Mentis* leaves open the possibility that as the exercise of "absolute knowledge" philosophy can achieve, by unification of subject and object, what cannot be achieved by scientific metaphysics. In the *Essay on Metaphysics* the role of philosophy seems to be restricted to the discovery and analysis of absolute presuppositions by historical means, and the gap between the metaphysical subject and his historical object is measureable by the attitude of natural piety or even numinous terror that surrounds absolute presuppositions. From Part II we are therefore left with the problem of trying to understand how history can establish what science cannot, and how philosophy can be content with leaving absolute presuppositions in an unreconcilably truth-neutral state.

Part III has provided us with the means for resolving this issue at the same time it deepens our understanding of the problem. On the one hand our view of history from Collingwood's analysis of it, as we reviewed that analysis in *The Idea of History*, helps us to understand why the obstacle of infinite factuality, which wrecked the historical enterprise in *Speculum Mentis*, is no longer a difficulty for the scientific historian. On the other hand, the scale of forms of conscious acts that provides the foundation for historical thought seems to leave no place for the absoluteness of pre-
suppositions. Not only is there no upper limit to the levels of consciousness to correspond to the "absolute knowledge" of Speculum Mentis, but the very facticity of evidence is generated by the questioning activity of the historian--so that absolute presuppositions appear to be neither absolute nor, from an historical perspective, truly pre-supposed.

To add to this distressing situation we are confronted with a statement from the Essay on Philosophical Method, which has the highest blessings from Collingwood in his Autobiography, about the nature of metaphysics--a statement which seems to run directly counter to the rejection of metaphysical ontology both in the earlier works and in the Essay on Metaphysics. He writes:

metaphysics, even if it is regarded as only one among the philosophical sciences, is not unique in its objective reference or in its logical structure; all philosophical thought is of the same kind, and every philosophical science partakes of the nature of metaphysics, which is not a separate philosophical science but a special study of the existential aspect of that same subject-matter whose aspect as truth is studied by logic, and its aspect as goodness by ethics. (EPM, 127).

It is also in the Essay on Philosophical Method that the distinction is made between "the categorical singular judgement which composes the body of historical thought and the categorical universal of philosophy" (EPM, 136), where categorical thinking means thought which "in fact is never devoid of objective or ontological reference" (EPM, 125). It appears that
the Autobiography overlooks this distinction and that it is denied altogether in the Essay on Metaphysics.

Is it possible that Knox was correct on this matter, and that it was only in his mature middle period that Collingwood succeeded in freeing himself from the scepticism and dogmatism of his earlier and later periods? In the light of the evidence we called forth in Part III this seems hardly credible. On all the major autobiographical themes that we have examined thus far Collingwood shows a steady and continuous development. Nevertheless we cannot easily integrate the positions expressed in the Essay on Metaphysics with the rest of Collingwood's philosophy as we have investigated it thus far, nor can we simply refuse to consider it or relegate it to a lower status than the rest of his published writings— and especially not in the light of the agreement between this essay and the Autobiography. For when we read in the former that "All metaphysical questions are historical questions, and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions" (EM, 49), and that "The problems of metaphysics are historical problems; its methods are historical methods" (EM, 62), and even that "Metaphysics has always been an historical science" (EM, 58), we are certainly inclined to the opinion that Collingwood has reduced, if not all of philosophy, at least all of metaphysics to history. And when one considers that it was Collingwood's judgment that metaphysics is the very
heart of science and civilization, which stand or fall with it (EM, 22, 46, 103, 224, 233), it is difficult not to draw the conclusion that history has replaced philosophy as the central reconciling force, and that therefore the role of philosophy has indeed been "liquidated by being converted into history" (IH, x).

Even if we were to accept this as Collingwood's complete and final judgment on metaphysics, our thesis concerning the autobiographical interpretation as we developed it in Chapter II would not be entirely wrecked, because the Autobiography largely agrees with the Essay on Metaphysics on this matter:

This was my answer to the rather threadbare question "how can metaphysics become a science?" If science means naturalistic science, the answer is that it had better not try. If science means an organized body of knowledge, the answer is: by becoming what is always has been; that is, frankly claiming its proper status as an historical inquiry . . . (A, 67; cf. EM, 77).

What seems to be called into question is rather the role of philosophical rapprochement, which plays a large part in the Autobiography, but is not even mentioned in the Essay on Metaphysics. It is for this reason that we have chosen to consider both of these issues in our final chapter: it is our belief that when examined together these two issues--rapprochement and metaphysics--will illuminate one another in a way that examining either alone will not.
But in pursuing our inquiry to this final point we will be, in our own way, undergoing an experience not unlike one which Collingwood describes in the Autobiography. For it was in our second chapter that we encountered those peculiar passages in which Collingwood described the turning point in his early thinking—the closest thing to a "conversion" that is even hinted at in the Autobiography. In two crucial chapters—the ones in which Collingwood writes about his discovery of Q-A logic and his rejection of the realist philosophy he had been taught at Oxford—he writes about his experience of the Albert Memorial which, though he describes it in grotesque terms, became an event the assimilation of which reshaped the direction of all his future thought.

A year or two after the outbreak of war, I was living in London and working with a section of the Admiralty Intelligence Division in the rooms of the Royal Geographical Society. Every day I walked across Kensington Gardens and past the Albert Memorial. The Albert Memorial began by degrees to obsess me. Like Wordsworth's Leech-Gatherer, it took on a strange air of significance; it seemed

Like one whom I had met with in a dream;
Or like a man from some far region sent,
To give me human strength, by apt admonishment.
Everything about it was visibly mis-shapen, corrupt, crawling, verminous; for a time I could not bear to look at it, and passed with averted eyes; recovering from this weakness, I forced myself to look, and to face day by day the question: a thing so obviously, so incontrovertibly, so indefensibly bad, why had Scott done it? . . . What relation was there, I began to ask myself, between what he had done and what he had tried to do? . . . If I found the monument merely loathsome, was that perhaps my fault? Was I looking in it for qualities it did not possess, and either ignoring or despising those it did? (A, 29-30).
In a later passage Collingwood relates this experience to his rejection of the realists' attitude toward the history of philosophy, leading to his rejection of the view that there are "eternal problems" in philosophy (A, 60). It led to the discovery that every philosophical problem has its history in which the sameness of an issue is not the sameness of a universal but that of an historical process, and the difference that between two phases of this process (A, 62). Two pages later Collingwood writes about his reform of metaphysics based on both the non-existence of eternal problems and the uncovering of the absolute presuppositions of science (A, 66-67).

Collingwood's *Essay on Metaphysics* is our Albert Memorial. It is a grotesque piece of work, and like the young Collingwood we must force ourselves not to avert our gaze from it, and to ask ourselves what relation there is between what he did and what he was trying to achieve. For one cannot avoid the embarassment that arises when faced with its seemingly intemperate and radically simplistic assertions. It seems to be a work that is indefensibly and incontrovertibly bad, unworthy of the subtle and sometimes vigorous mind of the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics, the archeologist of Hadrian's Wall, and the author of the *Essay on Philosophical Method*. 
But it is here that we must also take our cue from Collingwood's reflections on the Albert Memorial, for we must ask ourselves if we are looking in it for qualities it does not possess, and either ignoring or despising those it has. Thus we will be wary of accepting even Collingwood's own assessment of what he is doing in this essay. Our examination of the Essay on Philosophical Method forewarns us against accepting at face value any advance disclaimer at the beginning of a work of what he is not going to do; so when he writes in the Preface to the Essay on Metaphysics that "This is not so much a book of metaphysics as a book about metaphysics," and adds that it does not expound his own metaphysical ideas nor criticize those of others (EM, vii), we can be reasonably sure that he will violate this contract with the reader just as he did in his essay on method. To talk about philosophy in any meaningful way is to philosophize, and this is no less true of metaphysics, as the examples in Part III of the book make clear.

Nevertheless to a degree not necessary up to this point we must rely on the latent principles that we have found coming to light in our survey of the later writings thus far in Part III. These themes may yet provide us with a means for uncovering the consistent core of meaning underlying the paradox of metaphysics as an historical science. For we may anticipate that metaphysics, like history, is a phil-
osophical concept and therefore is defined by a scale of forms in which occur oppositions such as those between a science consisting of categorical universal statements and the same science defined as dealing with individual matters of fact. In a scale of forms such an opposition is reconciled when it is shown that the two forms are phases of the same generic concept, one being a more perfect embodiment or expression of the other. Furthermore our analysis of the functions of consciousness and language in Collingwood's philosophy of mind leads us to suspect that the priority and irreducibility of the meaning-seeking role of unifying consciousness will have considerable impact on any discussion of absolute presuppositions. And finally, as we saw the concept of history being refined and re-shaped in the last chapter, we could not help but recognize the profound importance of understanding what Collingwood means by "historical thinking" when considering what it means to say that metaphysics is an historical science. For if at the heart of historical thinking is re-enactment, then calling metaphysics an historical science means calling it a re-enactment with all that that implies--especially the recasting of the act-object distinction as Collingwood envisions it.

This provides us with our strategy for the rest of this chapter. In the next section we will attempt a brief outline of the Essay on Metaphysics, especially attending to
the way in which it reflects the four major themes of the Autobiography. In section three we shall continue this "forced look" at the essay by analyzing the obstacles that Collingwood has placed in the path of first philosophy in the first two parts of the Essay on Metaphysics. In section four we shall attempt to reconstruct the unity of the four autobiographical themes prefatory to returning to the obstacles to first philosophy, the overcoming of which is the aim of our fifth and final section.

We must add a final word on the limitations of this chapter. Our program necessitates restricting our discussion to the four major autobiographical themes. For this reason we are not attempting a complete discussion of the contents of the Essay on Metaphysics, which involves passing over a good deal of interesting and perhaps even relevant material. A complete treatment of Collingwood's metaphysics will only be possible after a thorough study of the unpublished manuscripts, especially those on cosmology, epistemology, logic, and, of course, metaphysics itself. This chapter is to be regarded as a prolegomenon to such a study--as is the entire dissertation.


If we are to accomplish even the first stages of this "forced look" at Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics we must
disabuse ourselves of several pre-conceptions that we may bring to the discussion--some of which arise from our own previous investigation. It is only in this way that we will prevent ourselves from looking in it for qualities it does not possess. For if we are expecting that the Essay on Metaphysics will place a capstone on the arch of thought that we have seen Collingwood erecting for the last eight chapters, we will be sadly disappointed. Ontology is dismissed. There is no discussion of the nature of categorical universal propositions, no analysis of the nature of "real thinking," and no final synthesis of formal, dialectical, and Q-A logics. Realism and idealism are left in a state of unresolved opposition. And while some of the traditional concepts of metaphysics come up for discussion, others are ignored altogether. Thus the existence of God is discussed, but in a way which orthodox Christians would find alien at best and heretical at worst; and while various senses of the term "cause" are examined, other concepts like substance, matter, activity, process, etc. are not. And where we might have wished for clarification, in "first philosophy" that explicates the presuppositions of historical science, of terms like event, evidence, reference, inference and necessity (cf. A, 77), such hopes are left unfulfilled. In short, the Essay on Metaphysics is not the First Philosophy of Collingwood we might have hoped for, and to this extent his warning in the first sentence of the Preface is precise: it is not a book of metaphysics.
As we have already noted, where the lack is most sorely felt is in the area of **rapprochement**. Where we might be led to expect that a work on metaphysics by the author of the *Autobiography* might have important things to say about the identity that is sought by a reconciliational philosophy—what in another context he might have called an object that would completely satisfy the mind—there is not a word on such a desperately needed topic to complete the recapitulation and form an apotheosis of the four autobiographical themes in the later writings. A glance at the contents of the essay tends to confirm this observation insofar as there is considerably reflection of the other three autobiographical themes—which makes **rapprochement** conspicuous by its absence.

The first three chapters are devoted to examining several senses of the term "metaphysics" as indicated by the three names that Aristotle gives to "first philosophy" in the collection of treatises following the physics (τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ). In these chapters Collingwood rejects the Aristotelian proposal for metaphysics as ontology on the grounds that a science of pure being would be so general that it would be lacking in any determinate subject matter. But Aristotle's description of metaphysics as a science of the first principles of physics is defended by Collingwood as the true subject matter of metaphysics, which is a study of the absolute presuppositions of science. Chapters IV and V present the
version of Q-\text{AM}_M logic which we examined in detail in our chapter on logic, language, and mental acts, in which absolute presuppositions (APs) are located at the apex of P-Q-A complexes in a systematic inquiry. Chapters VI and VII develop the concept of metaphysics as an historical science of absolute presuppositions—the radical thesis of the Essay on Metaphysics. Chapters VIII through XVII are devoted to what Collingwood calls anti-metaphysics. Chapter VIII defines anti-metaphysics as metaphysics done out of a motive of either resentment or fear, by an amateur thinker whose attitude toward actual metaphysics appears as hostility to it. Chapters IX through XVI examine two versions of anti-metaphysics—psychology as the pseudo-science of mind, and positivism from J. S. Mill to A. J. Ayer. Chapter XVII, which concludes Part II, contrasts Collingwood's view on absolute presuppositions with those of the modern realist, Samuel Alexander, whose attitude of "natural piety" or unquestioning acceptance toward APs Collingwood approved, but whose epistemology failed to appreciate the degree to which APs are historically grounded.

Part III is a collection of examples of metaphysical analysis of the sort that Collingwood proposes as acceptable, and presumably illustrating the principles of metaphysical analysis as he outlined them in Part I. Chapters XVIII through XXI take up the problem of the existence of God, especially as the statement "God exists" is analyzed by the logical positi-
vists. Collingwood analyzes the statement not as a verifiable or falsifiable proposition, but as an absolute presupposition of 20th Century science, which could not exist without the AP that there is one God or "in other words, that there is one world of nature with one system of laws running all through it, and one natural science which investigates it" (EM, 213). Chapters XXII through XXVIII set forth a radical re-interpretation of Kant's metaphysics as contained in the Transcendental Analytic section of the Critique of Pure Reason. According to Collingwood this is "an historical study of the absolute presuppositions generally recognized by natural scientists in Kant's own time" and for some time afterwards (EM, 245). And finally, Chapters XXIX through XXXIV are a slightly altered version of the article on causation that he had published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1939. In it Collingwood distinguishes three developing senses of the term "cause": as a motive for the free and deliberate act of a conscious agent (the historical sense); as the way in which a natural event can be produced or prevented by human intervention (the engineering science sense), and as the relation between two events or states such that one is related causally to another called its effect (the theoretical science sense) (EM, 285-87). Collingwood argues that the first is the true sense, the second a legitimate but restricted extension of the first, and the third an abandoned presupposition of natural science (EM, 289, 327).
From this bird's eye view it is an easy matter to locate three of the four autobiographical themes. The chapters rejecting metaphysics as ontology as well as the whole of the section on anti-metaphysics are directed against current forms of realism. Ontology as Collingwood describes it is the ultimate product of universal abstraction—the limiting case when everything determinate that can be said of an object is left out of account and a subject matter is reached which is totally lacking in any distinctions whatever—"pure being." There being no definite subject matter, there is consequently nothing for science to investigate (EM, 13-14). We recognize the view of abstraction here that Collingwood attributes to the realists, and "pure being" is an object so unaffected by the knowing of it that it remains entirely indeterminate and hence unknowable. Similarly the sort of psychology that Collingwood takes to be anti-metaphysical is the behavioristic attempt to reduce mental processes to mechanical events—a "pseudo-science of mind" which adopts a materialistic and mechanistic attitude towards thought and deliberately ignores its "criteriological" aspect (generally its truth or falsity)—in short, treating thought as an inert object (EM, 114-15). And the logical positivism of Ayer is faulted for its simplistic and erroneous description of observation in science, which assumes that "facts" are simply observed without recognizing that observation itself presupposes interpretation (EM, 143-46, 163). Positivism is guilty of the error of assuming, as does Samuel
Alexander, that the process of knowing is a simple apprehension of "compresence" of two things, one of which happens to be a mind (EM, 170, 177)—the root error of realistic epistemology.

It is also not difficult to find many of the pernicious consequences of realism cited in the Autobiography also represented in the Essay on Metaphysics. In the form of antimetaphysics, realism provides the propaganda for the spread of irrationalism in science, religion, and civilization (EM, 133-42, 234). Where the survival of each of these requires the responsible agency of human intelligence—the belief that a person's knowing can have an effect on the outcome of a systematic inquiry or a series of actions—anti-metaphysics denies such agency, and therefore threatens the survival of the sort of civilization that Collingwood portrayed in The New Leviathan.

Similarly Q-A logic—the second major autobiographical theme—is not only made the groundwork for the revision of metaphysics as a science of absolute presuppositions, but is formulated in conscious opposition to the pronouncements of the logical positivists, whose acceptance of an F-logical criterion for deciding truth claims (at least for analytical statements) is well recognized. In fact it is apparent that the peculiar form that Q-A logic takes in the Essay on Metaphysics is due to the fact that it is being formulated with
one eye fixed on the pronouncements of logical positivism, and if it were not for this polemical tendency we might have been offered a Q-A logic better able to stand on its own merits rather than those it has by not being some other unacceptable thing. Therefore Collingwood tells us only enough about absolute presuppositions to allow us to escape the trap laid for metaphysical statements by the logical positivists--that they are neither tautologous (F-logically analytical statements) nor empirically verifiably/falsifiable, and are therefore meaningless. Collingwood charges them with failing to ask the further question of what else they might be before declaring them to be meaningless (EM, 162-65), and when he asks the question for them he concludes that while it is true that they are not verifiable or falsifiable propositions, they nonetheless retain an inquiry-dependent function as the grounds from which questions proceed--the function he calls presupposition (EM, 29-31). But were it not for this preoccupation with escaping from the positivistic trap Collingwood might well have gone on to say in what sense absolute presuppositions can be said to be true or false in a way which does not mean verifiable or falsifiable in the empirical sense. Instead we are left with metaphysical statements that are not propositions (as the term is understood by positivists), not tautologous, but yet not meaningless--all negative characteristics. All that is left of a positive nature to absolute presuppositions is their role in logically grounding questions
in a systematic inquiry. This is precisely the role assigned to them in the Autobiography.

Of course it is the third autobiographical theme that is dominant in the Essay on Metaphysics, since the reconciliation of history and philosophy is made the template upon which is forged a reformed metaphysics. When the questions, propositions, problems and methods of metaphysics are said to be those of history, the identification of the two is as plainly stated as one can expect. In fact the identity is so lacking in qualification that the reader is obliged to think as far back as Religion and Philosophy to find a reconciliational identity of equivalent unsophistication. But if what is overlooked in the reconciliational identity is, like the earlier identities of religion, philosophy, and history, the sense of how they are related in a process of development or in a scale of forms, is it not the logical outcome of the line of thought in the Autobiography whereby Collingwood decided that there are no eternal problems? For if it is true that there are no timeless truths, then all truths are indeed historically relative, and the Essay on Metaphysics is an attempt to explore what that would mean for scientific inquiry.

Nevertheless we cannot be content with this state of affairs. In Part II and Part III we have observed how the earlier version of reconciliation, based on the rather sim-
plastic orientation of religion, science, history, etc. to a common object ("all of reality"), gave way to the more sophisticated but unstable dialectical scale of forms of knowledge which distortedly approximated to an ideal of Absolute Knowledge, expressed as philosophy. We followed this progression to the Essay on Philosophical Method, where opposition and distinction are relations accepted as normal staging between two phases of a developing concept, one being not merely different from the other but also a more perfect embodiment of it. And finally we found that such hierarchical scales were found exemplified in Collingwood's analysis of mental functions and expressive linguistic acts. In the last chapter we found that the concept of history exhibited this structure, and in reconciling conflicting historiographical traditions Collingwood locates them on a developing scale culminating in scientific history.

It was when Collingwood sought to go beyond reconciliation by means of a scale of forms, and to explore the senses in which higher levels of mental activity were expressed in historical thinking that he reached both the high and low points of his philosophical career: the high point being the demonstration that history is possible only on the basis of re-enactment--an argument which balances realism and idealism in a remarkable re-interpretation of the act-object distinction; and the low point being the collapse of his defense of
scientific history as a separate discipline for lack of a sufficiently unique characterization of "historical inference." It is exactly at this critical juncture that we must pick up the thread of our interpretative reconstruction once again.

Before doing so we must press our "forced look" to its final stage by extracting the discomfitting features of the Essay on Metaphysics and confronting the obstacles to first philosophy which these features present for us. To help us with this task we end this section with a tabulated synopsis of the principal ideas of Parts I and II of the essay.
TABLE 14

METAPHYSICS AND ANTI-METAPHYSICS

1. A metaphysics of the sort indicated by Aristotle in the treatises by that name may be regarded either as ontology, i.e. the science of pure being, or as the organized knowledge of the presuppositions underlying ordinary science, where science is a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject matter (EM, 11).

a. But it cannot be ontology, since there cannot be orderly thinking about an indeterminate subject matter, and pure being is a completely indeterminate subject matter because it represents the limiting case of the abstractive process, where abstraction is the ignoring of differences between individual things and the attending only to what they have in common. When abstraction is pushed to the limiting case in which everything determinate is left out, there is nothing left for science to investigate. (EM, 12-15).

b. Metaphysics may therefore be the science of the presuppositions that are logically prior to, or form the underlying ground for, ordinary science, where ordinary means not a constituent part of metaphysics (EM, 11-12, 20).

2. To think scientifically is to be aware that every statement made is in answer to a question which is logically prior to its own answer. What is stated is a proposition which can be either true or false. Every question involves a presupposition. To say that a question "does not arise" is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made, and the fact that something causes a certain question to arise is the logical efficacy of that thing. The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend on the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed. To assume is to suppose by an act of free choice. A presupposition is either relative or absolute. A relative presupposition is one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another question as its answer. An ab-
solute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions; the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all. (EM, 21-32).

3. The discovery of presuppositions and the distinction between relative and absolute presuppositions is not accomplished by low-grade thinking, such as apprehension or intuition (as in realist theories of knowledge), nor by simple introspection. It is accomplished by high-grade thinking, a skillful mental effort which brings about not only a difference of degree in the intensity of thinking, but also a difference of kind in its quality. Instead of passive apprehension, high-grade thinking is an active process of asking questions in a systematic and orderly fashion. The thinking that is involved in the disentangling and arranging of questions is called analysis, and the analysis which detects absolute presuppositions is called metaphysical analysis. Since analysis is what gives science its scientific character, and since in their method of operation science and metaphysics are the same (i.e. insofar as they both distinguish between relative and absolute presuppositions), science and metaphysics stand or fall together. (EM, 34-41, 170-71).

4. All metaphysical questions are historical questions, and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions. The problems of metaphysics are historical problems; its methods are historical methods. Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking. The metaphysical rubric preceding an absolute presupposition is: "In such and such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) absolutely presupposed that . . . ." (EM, 47, 49, 55, 62).

5. The historian makes his own statements on his own authority according to what he finds the evidence in his possession to prove when he analyzes it with a certain question in mind. The subject matter of metaphysics is about a certain class of historical facts, namely absolute presuppositions. Its methods are the methods of history, i.e. to get at the facts by the interpretation of evidence. In its form metaphysics is systematic in the sense in which all historical thought is systematic, i.e. as ex-
hibited in the clear and orderly manner in which it states its problems and marshals and interprets evidence for their solution; but it is not systematic in the sense of being a deductive science. As an historical science, metaphysics shares the presuppositions of all history. (EM, 59-65).

6. Absolute presuppositions, like historical facts, do not occur singly, but in sets or constellations. The presuppositions in a constellation are logically related as a single fact; they are made at once in one and the same piece of thinking, and each is consupponible with all the others. To be consupponible means that it must be logically possible for a person who supposes any one of them to suppose concurrently all the rest. Within the constellation each presupposition taken separately is also a single historical fact, and is not deductively related to the others. The metaphysician's business is not only to study the likenesses and unlikenesses of several different constellations of absolute presuppositions but also to find out on what occasions and by what processes one of them has turned into another. One phase changes into another because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium in which its fabric was under strain, and the historian analyzes the internal strains to which a given constellation is subjected, and the means by which it takes up these strains or prevents them from breaking into pieces. (EM, 66-67, 72-74).

7. Anti-metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken by an amateur who does not consider it his proper job, but is impelled to do so for various motives. It takes three forms. (a) Progressive anti-metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken by someone whose proper job (science) demands it, but because it has been neglected by the professionals he has to undertake it, and his resentment makes him feel himself to be the professional metaphysician's enemy, and his own work as an attack on their work. (b) Reactionary anti-metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken because one wishes to do metaphysics consistent with the principles of obsolete pseudo-metaphysical doctrines, but inconsistent with contemporary metaphysics, which he fears as a danger to his own work, and therefore his fear of this inconsistency makes him regard his own work as an attack on metaphysics in the contemporary sense. (c) Irrationalist anti-metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken because one wishes to abolish scientific thinking itself in order to bring into existence a form of life in which all the determining factors should be emotional. (EM, 82-83, 88, 99-100).
8. Positivistic (progressive) anti-metaphysics fails because it presupposes what it simultaneously denies. What it denies is that metaphysics is possible, because the statements of metaphysics are actually propositions which are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, and are therefore pseudo-propositions. But the position which states that metaphysical assertions are true or false propositions is not the true science of metaphysics (i.e. the historical science of absolute presuppositions) but pseudo-metaphysics, and is the result of the logical mistake of confusing presuppositions with propositions, and of assuming that it is only propositions that can have logical efficacy in causing questions to arise in scientific inquiry. What positivistic anti-metaphysics presupposes is that scientific thinking is possible and legitimate, which means that thinking which makes absolute presuppositions (science) is possible. But since absolute presuppositions are the assertions that are truly metaphysical, the denial of metaphysics is the denial of scientific thinking. Therefore the only way that positivistic metaphysics can survive its own criticism is by confusing true metaphysics with pseudo-metaphysics. (EM, 148-49, 162-64, 169-71).

9. Reactionary anti-metaphysics (Samuel Alexander's realism) fails because it does not recognize that absolute presuppositions are not timeless truths, but have a history of their own. This position recognizes both that the subject matter of metaphysics is absolute presuppositions and that these are not proven but recognized as facts and held with an attitude of unquestioning acceptance. But what it fails to acknowledge is that absolute presuppositions are not facts apprehended by compresence of a mind with an object, or even perceived as a pervasive set of characteristics of everything that exists. They are arrived at by analytical questioning aimed at discovering what is presupposed in a particular case of scientific thinking. These presuppositions are not truths recognized semper, ubique, ab omnibus, but are presupposed by scientific thinking at a particular time, and are themselves subject to change and development. (EM, 172-80).

10. Irrationalist anti-metaphysics (psychology as the pseudo-science of mine) fails because it confuses thinking with feeling, and refuses to recognize that all thought is criteriological. Metaphysics is one branch of the science of thought, because it aims at discovering absolute presuppositions, which are thoughts. If psychology is the science which tells us how we think, its claim to be the science of absolute presuppositions appears to be legitimate.
But psychology treats thought not as criteriological (i.e. as including as an integral part of itself the thought of a standard or criterion by reference to which it is judged to be a successful or unsuccessful, or true or false, piece of thinking), but as an empirical (non-criteriological) feeling—a relic of 18th century materialistic epistemology. But to treat thought without regard to its truth is to treat scientific thought in the same way, which makes science itself a meaningless word. Since the conclusions of empirical psychology with respect to thought are not established by its methods (experimental observation of feelings), they must arise elsewhere, and such prejudice that teaches by precept that thought is only feeling serves as the propaganda of irrationalism. (EM, 101-03, 107, 111-14, 117, 120, 129, 142).
3. Obstacles to Understanding Collingwood's Reformed Metaphysics.

If the architecture of the Essay on Metaphysics presents us with a design that is at least three-quarters familiar, the interior is an alienating nightmare. The reader encounters difficulties understanding the strategy of arguments, the absence of satisfying conclusions to a line of thought, what appears as abusive insults rather than convincing critical elenchí, and failure to define adequately key concepts in a way that alleviates the reader's growing sense of puzzlement.

(a) The first obstacle one encounters is Collingwood's unhistorical and unscholarly treatment of Aristotle's metaphysics, which is misrepresented as a science of "pure being" --a term that Aristotle did not use, and would not be acceptable to him as an equivalent to his own expression, "being as being" (τὸ ὄν ὀν). As a prologue to a study of metaphysics as an historical science it is startling to find Collingwood ignoring the obvious orientation of Aristotle's metaphysics towards individual substance (ὁσικ or τὸ ὄν) that has a separate existence as opposed to an attribute (πάθος κατὰ συμβεβρικος) which can only exist secondary to, or dependent upon, a substance.¹ Furthermore it is axiomatic with Aristo-

¹Hippocrates G. Apostle, tr., Aristotle's Metaphysics (Bloomington, 1966), 1017b 23-26, p. 83; cf. 1003b 5-10, p. 54.
tle that universals are incapable of separate existence, and
Collingwood need not have read far into Aristotle's treatise
to find it stated as a major obstacle (ἀπορώ) and a defini-
tive objection to Plato's theory of forms that being cannot
be a genus, because to be is to be a this or something partic-
ular but something general. In fact what Collingwood is de-
scribing when he writes of pure being is what Aristotle would
recognize as matter--its only characteristic being its com-
plete indeterminacy.

The reader is also puzzled when Collingwood, with
slightly more accuracy, cites the three titles Aristotle gave
to the kind of inquiry presented in the collection of treatis-
es known as the metaphysics, i.e. First Science, Wisdom, and
Theology, and then, after paraphrasing what these terms mean
(presumably for Aristotle), ignores or slightly glosses over
the reasons why Aristotle considered these different names
for one and the same science with the same object. Instead
he arbitrarily chooses to consider only two definitions of

2 Ibid, 998b15-35, p. 45: "Thus if 'unity' or 'being'
is indeed a genus, no differentia will be either a being or
one." Cf. 1038a1-30, p. 128: definition by downward division,
i.e. by differentiae, leads to substance.

3 In fairness to Collingwood it must be added that the
triple orientation of Aristotle's Metaphysics has proven re-
sistant to two millenia of attempts at unification until Fr.
Joseph Owens' monumental study, The Doctrine of Being in the
Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto, 1951).
metaphysics: as the science of pure being, and as the science of the presuppositions underlying ordinary science (EM, 11). Since it is not transparent that these two senses are mutually exclusive alternatives, why does Collingwood assume that rejecting the one, i.e. metaphysics as ontology, necessarily affirms the other? In fact they seem to overlap, since it is an absolute presupposition of ordinary science that its objects exist, and conversely an absolute presupposition must exist to be a fact. And what of metaphysics as theology, which is not further discussed in Parts I and II, but appears again as the first example in Part III ("The Existence of God")?

(b) Of course Collingwood can be forgiven for what might turn out to be a creative misinterpretation of Aristotle, as well as for an arbitrary starting point for his essay, if they were justified by subsequent maneuvers. If metaphysics is not the ontological analysis of pure being, perhaps it can still survive as the grounding science of first principles that Aristotle thought it could be (EM, 19-20). Unfortunately this presents us with a second set of obstacles. For Aristotle such a First Philosophy was grounded on an analytic of scientific knowledge in general (ἐπιστήμη) as presented in the Organon. For Collingwood this involves first redefining science as a Q-A process of on-going inquiry rather than a deductive system of propositions (EM, 22-24), and then identifying the first principles for such a system as
the absolute presuppositions which underly all its questions (EM, 25-28). The third stage is to distinguish between relative and absolute presuppositions, where the former are themselves answers to questions and the latter are not (EM, 29-33). The province of metaphysics is the discovery, comparison, and organizational structure of absolute presuppositions (EM, 37-40).

The force of this argument for a science of metaphysics depends on Collingwood's ability to maintain successfully the distinction between relative and absolute presuppositions, for without it there is only an arbitrary stopping point for a regressive inquiry from answer to question to presupposition to question to presupposition . . . (etc.). But if an absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition and never as an answer (EM, 31), and if every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question (EM, 23), then how can absolute presuppositions ever be discovered? For surely discoveries are made by asking questions, in this case of the form, "What is the absolute presupposition of this and all other questions in this inquiry?"

Perhaps Collingwood meant us to understand that an absolute presupposition is never the answer to a question in a progressive inquiry—something one comes upon along with other answers to questions in a systematic inquiry. Thus the
absolute presupposition that "every event has a cause" (EM, 50, 52, 179) is not something a scientist discovers while pursuing the answer to a question about the cause, for example, of an eclipse. It occurs when he leaves off investigating particular causes and asks the metaphysical question, "Why do I assume that there is a cause of this or that or any event?" This is a retrogressive question--one which is not progressing toward an answer but retrogressing from a question to its presupposition. There would thus be two inquiries, one being that of progressive ordinary science and the other the retrogressive metaphysical science, and the restrictions concerning absolute presuppositions would refer to questions in the former inquiry, not the latter.

If this is what Collingwood meant us to understand, then we might say that once again he has expressed himself in an unfortunate manner, and this failure is not mitigated by his poor choice of examples to illustrate his reformed metaphysics. The issue of causality, for example, is a metaphysical issue of great antiquity, yet still a contemporary problem and suitably general enough to be a subject for reformed metaphysical analysis. But as an example of an absolute presupposition, as Collingwood presents it, it creates more problems that it solves. In Chapter VI Collingwood gives the following three versions of the principle of causality as exemplary of Newtonian, Kantian, and Einsteinian sciences respec-
tively: (i) some events have causes; (ii) all events have causes; and (iii) no events have causes (EM, 51-52). Setting aside difficulties with accepting this as an historically accurate assessment of the principle of causality for the phases of physical science mentioned, the reader is still puzzled by the apparent non-absoluteness of these presuppositions. Surely any one of them is an answer to the question, "Do all, some, or no events have causes?"--a question which Aristotle may well have pondered. And are there not questions of even greater priority, which Aristotle definitely did ponder, viz. "What is a cause?" and "Are there any causes?" Is not Collingwood's analysis of causality in the final example of the Essay on Metaphysics itself an examination of these two questions, insofar as (in Chapter XXIX) he discusses the three meanings of the term "cause" and rejects the third as an abandoned AP of contemporary (Einsteinian) science?

And even these three senses of "cause" as Collingwood defines them are not primary, since they can themselves be the answer to further questions. For example in Sense I, "that which is 'caused' is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent, and 'causing' him to do it means affording him a motive for doing it" (EM, 285). If a cause is a kind of motive, what is a motive? Are there various motives, of which cause is but one, or are cause and motive equivalent terms in every sense? Are there free but not
deliberate acts of agents, or not-free but deliberate acts? Etc. If to have an attitude of unquestioning acceptance toward APs is to stifle as illegitimate questions such as these, then Collingwood's reform of metaphysics takes on the appearance of an intellectual purge, an example of an anti-metaphysics which inhibits scientific inquiry rather than promoting it. And if it is possible for an historian as acute as Collingwood to be mistaken about the absoluteness of presuppositions in a case as relatively simple as this one, what about more complex and subtle systems of APs in science? What is the measure of the absoluteness of presuppositions?

But even accepting some friendly modifications of his Q-A logic as applied to his metaphysical program, there are further difficulties with the doctrine of absolute presuppositions. The problems start with the fact that Collingwood never says what an absolute presupposition is. Is it at least a statement? One assumes it must be, since it has a sentential form, and is made in answer to a metaphysical question, or during a metaphysical analysis. But why does Collingwood then forbid us, on penalty of lapsing into metaphysical absurdity, from asking the further question, "Is this statement (we do not call it a proposition, since propositions are statements made only in answer to progressive questions in an inquiry) true or false?" For if it is not true or false in the same sense that a proposition in the progressive inquiry
is, does that mean that it is not true or false in any sense whatever?

The problem becomes acute when it comes to constellations of presuppositions, since Collingwood allows that metaphysical analysis can uncover absolute presuppositions in groups called constellations, and can furthermore determine if within that constellation one or more presuppositions can be "con-supponible" with the others (EM, 66, 76, 287). If not, then there will be "strains" in the constellation, which will make it "unstable" and therefore eligible for the process of transformation into another constellation (EM, 48 n.1; 74, 76). But how is it possible to recognize that one AP is not con-supponible with another without deciding which APs within the constellation are more stable, or at least less stressful, than the others? Does that not assume that because one group of APs are what they are, a given AP or group of APs cannot consistently be included in the con-supponible group? And is not consistency one acceptable sense of the term, "true" and inconsistency of "false"?

And even if we ignore Collingwood's own statement that the "strains" in a constellation of APs is due to their "mutual incompatibility" (EM, 287) and suggest that such strains be analyzed solely on the grounds of their decreased adequacy or efficacy in causing questions to arise, the problem is not resolved--only shifted to even more obscure territory. Cer-
tainly a presupposition such as the perfection of circular celestial orbits was "efficacious" in causing questions to arise, and that is not the sense in which it caused "strains" in the constellation of presuppositions which led to the passage from Ptolemaic to Keplerian astronomy.

What we are left with is a situation in which the metaphysician-historian, lacking adequate definitions of terms like "absolute presupposition," "constellation," "con-supponible," "strain" etc., is set a seemingly impossible task. Lacking any clear idea of his subject matter, we must ask, like Plato's Socrates, how he is to know when he has succeeded in finding an instance of what he is looking for?

(c) Which brings us to our third set of problems. Even if we could accept a non-ontological metaphysics of absolute presuppositions, the announcement that these are discovered by historical methods, and that all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions is an expression of historicism extreme enough to warrant assigning Collingwood a paradigmatic position in the checkered career of the subject or radical revisions of traditional metaphysics. As we have already pointed out, the doctrine that metaphysics is an historical science is the positive version of the principle stated negatively in the Autobiography that in philosophy there are no eternal problems (A, 60; cf. EM, 64-65). But when coupled with the remarkable statement that metaphysics
has always been an historical science (albeit not fully conscious of the fact and for that reason never fully scientific) it appears to be a revision not compatible with even the acceptable version of Aristotle's metaphysics. For it certainly cannot be denied that when Aristotle tried to uncover the first principles of physics he did not have in mind a science bound to 4th century B.C. Greek culture, but one which would achieve the status of ἐπιστήμη --science as a stable understanding of change based on unchanging first principles. And when Kant set himself the task of discovering how metaphysics as a science is possible, he did not think its possibility rested on truth-neutral presuppositions which would change with time (CEPC, 137). On the contrary, every indication is that he thought himself to have discovered all the true principles of scientific thought, and that synthetic a priori judgments have a necessity that is not historically contingent but is rooted in the structure of the knowing mind.

Of course, Collingwood was aware that his predecessors did not explicitly say that what they were doing was history, and he merely chides them for not understanding what they were in fact doing (EM, 18-20, 58). Our difficulty with Collingwood's historical metaphysics is deeper than a factual error on the matter of what metaphysics has "always" been. It has to do with the sort of "facts" that the metaphysician is setting out to discover. In the last chapter we found
Collingwood arguing that what makes history scientific is precisely the degree to which the historian decides what is to be accepted as a fact, and that this is dependent on the historian's questioning activity. Now we find Collingwood taking just the reverse position: it is a certain kind of fact (AP) that determines what questions are asked. Approaching the Essay on Metaphysics from this perspective we are forced to conclude that as a fact to be discovered, an AP must be the answer to a question. Collingwood appears to acknowledge this himself when he indicates that the "metaphysical rubric" (i.e. "In this or that piece of scientific thinking by this person or group of persons at such and such a time it was absolutely presupposed that . . . ") is necessary for the factuality of an AP to be established.

But this appears to involve Collingwood in a contradiction: if it is an historical fact, an absolute presupposition is determined by questions; and if it is metaphysically absolute, a presupposition is not determined by any question, but is that which specifies which questions sensibly arise in a systematic inquiry. This time the avenue of escape by postulating the bi-directionality of inquiry has been cut off by the fusion of both routes: the methods of metaphysics are the methods of history, and the presuppositions of metaphysics are those of history. Therefore if history has presuppositions (and Collingwood admits that it does), there is at least
one case where absolute presuppositions are the answers to questions in a progressive inquiry, namely the case of history. Is Collingwood prepared to defend the thesis that the absolute presuppositions of history are determined to be facts by the questions of history? Can the serpent swallow its own tail?

The issue of the presuppositions of history brings us up before another aspect of the obstacle, and this one joins with the first to form the beginning of a barricade. In the Autobiography Collingwood has told us that the re-enacted historical event is prevented from becoming confused with the present thinking of the historian by being "incapsulated in a context of present thoughts." In the last chapter we found Collingwood arguing that the historian is able to keep his own a priori imagination from becoming unglued, so that the historian is prevented from confusing himself with Admiral Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar. But to deny ontology its day runs the risk of being incapable of distinguishing such realms as these in anything but a hypothetical way. By what presuppositions does the historian distinguish between his own "real" life (the ordinary world of lived experience or lebenswelt) and the "real" world of his historical protagonists? Aside from the practical observation that any bonafide confusion between these realms may make life-sustaining decisions rather poorly grounded, the theoretical implications for Collingwood's
reformed metaphysics threaten to be equally tragic. For it will not do to define the domain of history as the "deeds of men done in the past," and then refuse to deal with the ontological question of how past and present are distinguished in one's "real" situation. Somehow the presuppositions of what we are calling ordinary experience are the ground from which and within which the presuppositions of history are located. That distinction and that relationship are not well served by the simple identification of history and metaphysics.

(d) Having raised the spectre of an a priori imagination run amuck, we turn to our final group of obstacles, those centering on his discussion of anti-metaphysics, and especially his vituperation on psychology. For while he castigates psychology as the pseudo-science of thought, in the entire section on anti-metaphysics he himself engages in the crassest kind of popular psychologizing. When he describes those philosophical "amateurs" who are thrust into doing metaphysics in the guise of anti-metaphysics, he says that they take an attitude opposed to metaphysics because they either fear or resent the subject matter. On what grounds does he make this assertion? In this imputation of motives, is not Collingwood out-psychologizing the psychologists? Completely ignoring any positive benefit which behavioral science has had on civilization, Collingwood's assault appears to itself contribute to the "propaganda of irrationalism" that he attributes to psychologists: for certainly there is a kind of
irrationalism to rationalism--i.e. reason which fails to provide reason with respect to un-reason or sub-reason--and this is where psychology has made its greatest inroads, racing in where philosophy feared to tread. But at best Collingwood's diatribe is anti-metaphysics in the sense that it not only discovers an absolute presupposition of what is generally accepted to be a contemporary science (psychology) but also declares this presupposition to be false; for what else would it mean to call psychology a "pseudo-science" of thought? Does the Greek prefix succeed in disguising the fact that a false-science is one which proceeds from a false absolute presupposition?

What is worse, the criticism that Collingwood levels at psychology appears to be equally applicable to his own reformed metaphysics--i.e. that it fails to treat though as criteriological, meaning that it ignores the aspect of thought as true or false (EM, 107, 115). For are not absolute pre-

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4 Is there any place in Collingwood's version of civilization, or in his philosophy of mind, for the less-than-fully rational man? Surely children have a place, according to The New Leviathan, since they are in process of becoming fully rational. But what about those who never will--the mentally handicapped and the mentally ill? Collingwood comes close to aristocratic arrogance when he sets standards below which what is occurring does not deserve the name of thought. Psychology, whatever its faults, has made advances in the understanding and treatment of sub-rational behavior, and Collingwood's failure to acknowledge this progress in the Essay on Metaphysics is not to his credit.
suppositions thoughts? And treating them as true/false neutr­al--does this not mean treating them as "data" or facts on a par with feeling and its objects? To say that they may be something of which one may not be aware either dodges the question or severs absolute presuppositions from their logical function--their efficacy in causing questions to arise, a function that Collingwood is anxious to maintain. Once an ab­solute presupposition is discovered it is invalid to ask if it is true, or on what evidence it is accepted, or how it is to be demonstrated, or by what right it is presupposed (EM, 47). In short, the acceptance of an absolute presupposition as a truth-neutral fact precludes any question of treating it as a thought, and therefore renders it on a par with objects of feeling. It reduces a thought (an absolute presupposition) to something that is not thought (something that is not cri­teriological) and is therefore as much a pseudo-science of thought as psychology. By what right does Collingwood then declare that metaphysics is one branch of the science of thought (EM, 101)?

And while he appears to be less vulnerable in his as­sault on A. J. Ayer and logical positivism, one still cannot help but notice that Collingwood is guilty of some of the same charges that he levels against them. The most serious is that after conceding the victory to them by admitting that absolute presuppositions are not verifiable or falsifiable,
he then counterattacks with the weaker charge that they did not ask what metaphysical assertions are before declaring them to be either tautologous or meaningless (EM, 165). But has Collingwood not made the same mistake? Instead of asking what absolute presuppositions are if they are not true or false as answers to questions, he leads the reader to believe that they are not true or false in any other sense either. He never really tells us what absolute presuppositions are.

4. The Unity of the Autobiographical Themes.

Is there some standpoint from within the framework provided by the autobiographical interpretation that will allow us to overcome these obstacles, or at least to soften some of these harsh features of the Essay on Metaphysics? Having forced ourselves to face the paradoxes of Collingwood's reformed metaphysics, if we are determined to assimilate our experience of this grotesque memorial we must ask ourselves what relation there is between what Collingwood did and what he was trying to achieve. But this requires understanding it not just in the negative and partial sense in which it is an expression of his opposition to "realism" as a philosophical movement that (arguably) threatened to disrupt science and civilization, but in the positive sense of a work that issued from the unified center of his thought.
For another thinker this might not be necessary or even possible, since it might not be considered an ideal worth striving for. A philosopher who conceives of his role in a more analytic or critical vein, for example, might be content to put forth his thought in a series of vignettes on various subjects, and it may be of no concern to him what the relationships are not only between the subjects chosen but even among the conclusions reached by his analysis—so long as it was done in a craftsmanly manner. But for the Collingwood of the Autobiography, for whom the goal of philosophy is rapprochement, this is not a satisfactory state of affairs. To this extent Collingwood was never an analytic philosopher.

Nor did he set out to be. One of Collingwood's first public addresses was delivered at the 1919 Ruskin Centenary Conference held near his home in Coniston—where he also spent his final days. In this address, given at the beginning of his intellectual career, Collingwood laid out, with his characteristic self-assurance, what is to be expected of a philosopher. Speaking of Ruskin's failure to achieve a fully philosophical outlook (and bear in mind that Collingwood's father was Ruskin's biographer and close friend), he then distinguished between "having a philosophy" and "being a philosopher." Ruskin had a philosophy, but he was not a philosopher (EPA, 11). What does this mean?
When I speak of a man's philosophy, I mean something of this sort. I see a man living a long and busy life; I see him doing a large number of different things, or writing a large number of different books. And I ask myself, do these actions, or these books, hang together? Is there any reason why the man who wrote this book should have gone on to write that one, or is it pure chance? Is there anything like a constant purpose, or a consistent point of view, running through all the man's work? Now if you ask these questions about a particular man, you will generally find that there are certain central principles which the man takes as fundamental and incontrovertible, which he assumes as true in all his thinking and acting. These principles form, as it were, the nucleus of his whole mental life: they are the centre from which all his activities radiate. You may think of them as a kind of ring of solid thought--something infinitely tough and hard and resistent--to which everything the man does is attached. The ring is formed of a number of different ideas or principles, welded together by some force of mutual cohesion. This ring of thought . . . is what I mean by a man's philosophy . . . . The fact seems to be that a man's deepest convictions are precisely those he never puts into words . . . . (E)verybody has a philosophy, but only the philosopher makes it is his business to probe into the mind and lay bare that recess in which the ultimate beliefs lie hidden. (EPA, 9-11).

Here we have the basic program for the discovery of absolute presuppositions that only came to fruition twenty years later in the Essay on Metaphysics. But can we apply this standard to Collingwood himself? Are there certain central principles which he takes as fundamental and incontrovertible, and which he assumes as true in all his thinking?

Throughout both cycles of our carrousel excursion through Collingwood's published writings we have repeatedly tried to catch hold of this "ring of thought" and to measure the degree to which it conforms to the autobiographical in-
terpretation. We have examined the four autobiographical themes as they occur and re-occur in the earlier and later writings. But we have examined them separately rather than as a coherent system, and the weakness of this strategy is now apparent; for as we confront the obstacles to first philosophy in the Essay on Metaphysics it is not clear how the four themes form a "consistent point of view" from which vantage point we can measure the strength of his self-interpretation by its ability to aid us in untying the knots and laying claim to Collingwood's metaphysical inheritance for ourselves.

In particular it is not apparent why an anti-realist position necessarily implies an anti-F-logic, or why the latter gives rise to either the Q-A logic of the Autobiography and the Essay on Metaphysics, or the D-logic of Speculum Mentis and the Essay on Philosophical Method. Nor is it evident how either of these themes is related to an ideal of rapprochement, which seems to have more to do with resolving experiential alienation than with formal contradiction or dialectical opposition. Nor again is it clear how a reconciliation between history and philosophy can be regarded as a paradigmatic for rapprochement philosophy in all its forms, or finally how such a philosophy can remain opposed to realism root and branch, given its orientation toward unification of opposing viewpoints like that of realism and idealism. So while we
have steadfastly resisted the temptation to provide the missing "figure in the carpet" where Collingwood has not done so himself, this unfortunately leaves us with a badly fractured Collingwood who remains for the most part true to the autobiographical self-interpretation, but at the expense of a clear understanding of the unity of his thought, by which standard he would surely wish his own philosophy to be judged.

Therefore we pause at this point to take a final overall look at Collingwood's philosophy as we have examined it to this point, trusting that by compressing it into the span of a few pages we can reveal its architectural strengths and shed its decorative weaknesses.

We began our survey with his earliest published book, Religion and Philosophy, the highlight of which, Collingwood recalled (some twenty-two years later in the Autobiography), was a passage in which he criticized psychological studies of religion for their treatment of mind as an external phenomenon or thing. Such an approach to mind renders religious consciousness opaque, because it refuses to participate in the thought processes it claims to be studying, which leaves "the cold unreality of thought which is the thought of nothing, action with no purpose, and fact with no meaning" (RP, 42; FR, 77). With the unbalanced negativism typical of much of his later philosophy, he failed to tell his readers in the Autobiography what the positive phase to this criticism was. This
we found for ourselves by examining the argument of Religion and Philosophy, which pivots on the reality of communication and inter-personal identity: for it was in this earliest work that we found Collingwood already arguing that the starting point of any investigation of mind or any theory of knowledge is the fact that persons do communicate their knowledge, and this means that two or more persons can actually share the same knowledge (RP, 98-99; FR, 170-71). He goes so far as to say that since the esse of mind is de hac re cogitare, when two minds think the same thought they become actually one mind, sharing between them the unity of consciousness which is the mark of the individual (RP, 101; FR, 173), and by de hac re it is clear that he did not mean primarily a material entity but a meaning. His argument about re-enactment in The Idea of History is the final refinement of this very same line of thought: re-enacting someone else's act of thought means thinking that same thought for oneself, not one like it (IH, 286-92). The proper context for his early rapprochement philosophy is therefore to be found in the communicative relationship of minds with one another, the failure of which (as error) calls forth the effort of reconciliation.

But so much cannot be said without saying more, since it is evident that a mind can communicate with itself—or fail to do so. This becomes the overall concern of his second philosophical work, Speculum Mentis, which expands the ideal
of **rapprochement** to include the overcoming not only of the
communication gaps in meaning between persons but also the
same kind of disunity within oneself. The forms under which
we interpret our own experience—-as imagined, believed, ob­
served, inferred, etc.--are in the modern world alienated
from one another, which tends to render the unity of self­
consciousness in need of internal **rapprochement** (SM, 30, 41­
42). The basis for achieving this inner reconciliation is
modelled on the same process that occurs when failure to com­
municate makes the reconciliation between persons necessary.
This cannot be by the kind of knowing that occurs in art,
where the mind contemplates monadic imaginary objects (SM, 
60-61); nor by religious consciousness, where the mind asserts
as true a sacred object (God) as a symbol, the meaning of
which it can never literally translate (SM, 119, 128-29); nor
yet by scientific thinking, which leaves its object always
separated from mind by the distance measurable by the differ­
ce between universal and particular, law and instance (SM, 
185-86). The kind of reconciling knowledge we seek to repair
the torn fabric of self-consciousness is first fully exempli­
fied in historical thinking, which is the first truly non­
abstract or concrete knowledge, because it is the first form
of experience in which the object is individually recognizable
as something wholly the same as the mind which seeks it--i.e.
thought as an active agency.
While the concept of history and its philosophy has a long and complex development in Collingwood's career, he never abandoned this insight. He always returned to the historical act of an agent as the model for sense-location in thinking, the active dimension of mind stressed by the Italian and other post-Kantian idealists, with whom he felt a spiritual kinship.\(^5\) With historical thinking there is no feature of experience, no attitude of mind towards its object which is alien (SM, 218), because it is all the work of mind itself. And where history appears to set itself the impossible task of understanding the infinite whole of fact (SM, 239), it is relieved from this impossible burden by the limiting reflection of itself in each of its objects, each being a "mirror of the mind." This is where historical thought provides a challenge to typically sensation-bound empiricist epistemologies. Where the "plain man's metaphysic" places mind and matter outside one another, and then finds itself unable to bridge the gap that it has postulated (RP, 73), empiricist epistemology provides an intermediary in the form of sensation, but is equally baffled by the lack of unifying meaning in the flux of sensation (SM, 188). In both cases that which is known is an object presumed to be indifferent to the act which seeks

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\(^5\) Cf. "The Present Need of a Philosophy," Philosophy, 9 (1934), 262-65: "What is needed to-day is . . . a philosophy showing that the human will is of a piece with nature in being genuinely creative, a \textit{vera causa}, though singular in being consciously creative."
to grasp it. But in the case of history the object is itself a thought which seeks understanding (IH, 294). Historical thought is saved from the ultimate frustration of trying to penetrate the infinite and unknowable realm of the "thing in itself" by the recognition of itself in each of the objects it studies, each of these being a "concrete universal" or individual meaning expressed as a deliberate act—a "part" in which the whole mind is present and in which the whole agent is reflected (SM, 218-19). With historical understanding the gap between mind and its object is bridged from both sides, the object reaching out to be understood (as evidence), and consciousness reaching to grasp the same act in its aspect as past thought (as historical interpretation) (IH, 304). Reconciliation at this point is successful because the mind has found something wholly intelligible: that which is object is also subject (SM, 242-45, 249).

In the essays on the philosophy of history which Collingwood wrote in the decade of the twenties we find him continually trying to reverse the naturalistic or empiricistic bias of his readers, including that of some of his idealistic

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6 Caesar's crossing the Rubicon was not the mere physical passage of a body across water, nor was it the mere act of his legs. It was also not an imaginary or hypothetical crossing. It was an expression of the reality that was Caesar, and expressed that which Caesar represents in history. But it also is only a "part" of Caesar's life—-but a significant part, a part that reflected the whole of it: his courage and daring, his foresight and confidence in risking the fortunes of Rome.
contemporaries (like Croce, whose work he admired). In these essays it becomes increasingly more obvious that in making the history-philosophy reconciliation paradigmatic for all other kinds of rapprochement between forms of experience, he is suggesting that rather than using the mind-thing or mind-object polarity as the primary instance of knowing and then extending this to historical events (which tends to render events thing-like or objective, but at the expense of always remaining distanced from the event by the same attitude of abstract objectivity) the exact reverse of this situation is what is called for in 20th Century thought. In historical thinking the mind-mind polarity is regarded as primary, and as paradigmatic for thinking; the mind-object situation is secondary or derivative. Collingwood's entire philosophical development is an attempt to carry out the program implicit in this paradigm shift.

But if the mind-object dichotomy is overcome by taking the mind-mind identity exemplified in historical understanding as the primary instance of what it is to successfully know something, and if Collingwood found himself allied with the Italian idealists in such a fundamental standpoint, his articulation of this conviction took a direction all its own. It has both realistic and idealistic dimensions. Its realistic moment is in the recognition of the factuality of history and its bonds with evidence; its idealistic moment is in an-
alysis of the thought processes that are involved in interpreting that evidence, and the criteria for deciding when the interpretative effort results in the unification of thought that is being sought. As we traced his thought through its development in the essays of the twenties into the period during which he composed the Essay on Philosophical Method, we found Collingwood showing a growing awareness of the levels of meaning to the concept of history, and an increasing sensitivity to the criteria whereby one can decide not only when minds are reconciled, or even when forms of consciousness within a mind have attained rapprochement, but when individual acts of consciousness are unified as an achievement of the overall nisus of consciousness toward meaning at all levels of thought. (a) In Religion and Philosophy reconciliation is regarded as complete when it is shown that two forms of thought (such as religion and philosophy) intend the same object, or mutually co-imply (or presuppose) one another—without recognizing any difference of degree or kind in the resulting identification (RP, 107-19; FR, 178-88). (b) In Speculum Mentis this "concrete identity of cooperation" becomes a reconciliation by means of a developing "dialectical series" in which each of the reconciliata is a modification of its predecessor, but in which relations of opposition and differences of kind do not yet entail relations of distinction and differences of degree (SM, 55, 206-208). (c) In the Essay on Philosophical Method Collingwood completed this line of thought in his
"scale of forms" in which the rapprochement (or "overlap") of concepts entails that between the reconciliata are relations of both opposition and distinction, and differences of both degree and kind (EPM, 73-76). The ultimate grounding of rapprochement at this point is dependent on the inclusive and exclusive relationships that are involved in the intensional structures of meaning.

But while we have found that there is an increasingly more prominent awareness of the meaning-component to knowledge in Collingwood's later philosophy we have been careful to note in our survey of the earlier works that this is neither an unheralded arrival nor a novel idea. Thus in addition to being his point in common with the Italian idealists, before that alliance became explicit we find Collingwood (in Religion and Philosophy) arguing that the true task of historical theology is to find out not only what was said by the historical Jesus, but what was meant (RP, 43; FR, 78), and that proving the existence of matter or of God requires understanding first what meanings are attached to the words (RP, 62-63). And in Speculum Mentis Collingwood carries this thought one step further by arguing that each of the forms of experience is characterized not only as a form of consciousness but by its typical form of expression in language--questioning, asserting, generalizing, referring, inferring, etc. He went as far as to say that the (unifying) activity of philosophy is its "trans-
lation" of various forms of experience into language literally true—an activity which is called forth especially where there is a fusion of symbol and meaning, as in art and religion (SM, 128-30). The process of translating, interpreting, or developing truth out of the partiality and abstractness of error is the dialectical self-criticism of thought, and the task of philosophy as absolute knowledge (SM, 252-53).

Of course it was only in the Essay on Philosophical Method that the idea of dialectical development is made explicit, and rapprochement is linked to the overlap of concepts and their relationship in a developing scale of forms. Here we found Collingwood contrasting philosophical and non-philosophical concepts as two phases in the development of an idea, and stressing how one can recognize when the concept has been typically worked out philosophically (EPM, 59-61, 73). This rapprochement of the inner alienation between concepts is now made the basis for deciding how and when the process of reconciliation is complete, and carries the unity of philosophical meaning forward from the conceptual to the propositional and inferential levels of thought (EPM, 100-101, 161-63). It was the closest that Collingwood would be able to come to developing a complete philosophical logic based on the ideal of rapprochement, and the key to understanding it is to fully grasp the clue that he himself provided at the beginning of the investigation: philosophical reconciliation
is recognized by the overlap of concepts, which is an overlap of intension between meanings rather than an overlap of extension between classes.

The Essay on Philosophical Method called attention to the characteristic way in which a philosophical concept is defined by means of a scale of overlapping forms, in which any point on the scale intensionally includes all the meanings in the scale up to that point (EPM, 90, 101). It also pointed to the peculiarity that in such a scale there is no zero-point—no point at which a concept's meaning vanishes altogether (EPM, 81). In Part III we have encountered both of these principles—definition by means of a scale of forms and the irreducibility of meaning structures—exemplified in his philosophy of mind at all levels of consciousness. In The Principles of Art the development of feeling is described first as the uninterpreted flux of sensa, then as prepared for interpretation by being perpetuated and domesticated by consciousness or attention, and then finally as explicit thought, where thinking about a sensum means interpreting it (PA, 194, 212-13). And in that same work language is defined as a scale of forms of expression, where psychical expression, gestures, speech, and intellectualized or symbolic language form a developing series in which each term sums up and intensionally includes those which precede it (PA, 228-61). In The New Leviathan the fundamental parameter of meaning is re-
affirmed when language is defined as any system of bodily movements whereby the men who make them mean or signify something (NL, 6.1), and is described as an abstraction from discourse—a system of sounds or the like as having meanings (NL, 6.11, 6.18). The ensuing scale of forms of consciousness is the product of language (NL, 6.4-6.41). And finally in The Idea of History the meaning of an historical act is the individuality aimed at in historical understanding (IH, 303), and is at the center of his radical re-interpretation of the act-object distinction on the grounds of which he showed how history as re-enactment is alone possible (IH, 282-302).

However it is the realistic moment to this process of thought that has haunted our reflections on Collingwood's thought, and this is the ghost that confronts us once again as we approach the central paradox of historical metaphysics. For in the previous chapter we wondered if the essential ideality of the past left any room for factuality as something not only made but also found, not only accepted but also given. But the factuality of history is not an abstract, brute givenness, it is itself a thought and therefore mediated by meaning. The reconciliation between ideality and factuality is an extension of the rapprochement between persons and concepts: it is carried out by an act of interpretation. Just as the reconciliation between persons is premissed on the fact of communication, the rapprochement between the historian
and the thoughts which constitute his subject matter is mediated by historical inference, which takes the form of critical reflection on evidence (IH, 133). It is by the interpretation of evidence that we communicate with the past: history is the knowledge of a significant present (evidence) by means of acts of interpretative thought informed by principles which govern all evidence as such (philosophical principles, such as the distinction between universal judgments of the form, "All S is P," particular judgments of the form, "Some S is P," and individual judgments "This S is P," this last being the interpretative judgment of history (EPH, 136)), and principles which govern specific groups of evidence (scientific principles, such as this historical presupposition that events of the past are localized in space and time, and that historical narrative must be consistent with itself (IH, 246-47)) (EPH, 136-37). The act of interpretation is not a process extrinsic to the fact itself: interpretation is only the historical fact further specified (RP, 46; FR, 80; EPM, 170), because a common meaning is the irreducible basis of them both. In this the process of historical interpretation is not different from the general interpretative processes of all perception and thought. Perception is nothing other than the interpretation of sensa (SM, 204-05), and to think a concept is to interpret a fact in terms of it (EPH, 28-29; PA, 194). Therefore it is but an extension of the reconciliational process of interpretation when from potential historical evidence (the
whole perceptible world) actual evidence is selected and perpetuated by means of historical inference based on the exercise of a priori historical imagination (IH, 246-47, 280-81).

But how is such knowledge achieved? How is evidence interpreted and individual narrative judgments formulated? Here again we must return to Collingwood's paradigm for reconciliational thinking, the mind-mind polarity and the fact of inter-personal communication—-but this time the trail of evidence is less distinct. Closest to us are the unmistakable assertions in The Idea of History that evidence is interpreted by the systematic placement of intelligent and informed questions (IH, 273-75), and in the Essay on Metaphysics and the Autobiography that all scientific knowledge is an application of Q-A logic (EM, 22-24, 38; A, 30-37). But as we traced this evidence into Collingwood's earlier philosophy, in the direction indicated in the Autobiography, we were startled by several unexpected (and autobiographically unindicated) developments. Where the Autobiography leads us to believe that Q-A logic was meant to be an alternative to F-logic, the latter being the only methodic tool of the realists, our own findings indicated not only that in his early writings the alternative to F-logic is not Q-A logic, but dialectic or D-logic, but also that Q-A logic is not a defensible substitute for F-logic. In the case of dialectic, the appearance of deliberate concealment in the Autobiography was dispelled by
the recognition of D-logic as the final form of the criteria for reconciliational completion in the *Essay on Philosophical Method*. But what of the indistinctness of Q-A logic in the early phases of his thought, and how does Q-A logic relate to the unity of that thought as we have been developing it in the last few pages?

Part of the answer to these questions is available to us from the published writings, but part of it remains for us to reconstruct for ourselves. In our examination of the early works in Part II we found Collingwood identifying logic with the theory of knowledge: abstract logic deals with processes of the subject and does not consider differences of the object (RP, 15; FR, 53). It is contrasted with concrete or dialectical logic, which considers thought in its relation to its object (SM, 274-77), and it is the latter that is the true instrument of philosophy. However if thought is regarded as a process rather than as a product, the way in which it comes to be is by questioning or supposal—the process whereby assertion develops from non-assertive (hypothesetical or questioning) thought (SM, 186-89). In Part III we traced this argument forward into the Q-A logic of the *Autobiography* and the *Essay on Metaphysics* (Q-\(A_a\) and Q-\(A_m\) respectively), where the ambiguity of hypothesis as non-assertive and as pre-assertive is resolved by the distinction between supposing and questioning, which ultimately issued in the distinction
between presuppositions and questions (A, 30-39; EM, 27-29). In Part III we also found that when taken as a whole his views on logic indicate that Q-A logic is not a competitor to, or substitute for, F-logic, but is rather an informal presentation of some of the rules that pertain to the elements of rational inquiry as an application of the reconciliational process of interpretation. We thus found ourselves with a striking example of Collingwood's irony: a philosophical logic posing as a work on philosophical method, and a philosophical methodology described as Q-A logic. But if we resist the temptation to be misled by such labels, it is clear (a) that for Collingwood all logic pertains primarily to the meaning-dimension of thought rather than to any sort of meaning-independent formal system; (b) that the criteria for deciding when thought has become philosophically consistent or reconciled with self-knowledge are presented by the D-logic of the Essay on Philosophical Method; and (c) that Q-A logic is the methodology for acquiring knowledge, and the means by which the interpretative processes of thought are directed at achieving unified meanings.

The part of this process that remains indistinct, and which we are left to reconstruct for ourselves, is the logical genesis of these ideas within Collingwood's overall plan for rapprochement philosophy. Here we have only a few scant hints from the Autobiography to guide us. We are told there
that Q-A logic, the primacy of historical thought as the rapprochement paradigm for all forms of experience, and the rejection of realist epistemology are all recalled by him as having occurred during the period, and as an outcome, of his reflections on the Albert Memorial (A, 30, 60, 67). But we are not told how the monument served to focus these lines of thought, how the coalesced to form a pattern, or what central idea allowed him to think that the solution to one of these problems is tied to the solution of all of them. The only clues he leaves for us are the questions that he began to put to himself during his daily communings with the Albert Memorial—why Scott had created such an aesthetically offensive monstrosity, if its true purpose is masked by asking the wrong questions about it, and if such questions arise due to false expectations which prevented him from appreciating its true worth.

Unless there are, in the unpublished writings and diaries, indications of how these ideas evolved, we shall probably never know what went through Collingwood's mind during these encounters. Without knowing what particular features of the monument he found offensive, or what his expectations were, or the insights that he had that allowed him to overcome his revulsion, we can only surmise a framework for this intellectual and personal event. But we do know what feelings the Albert Memorial invoked in him, and we believe
we are in possession of the general way in which he overcame these feelings. The monument not only was a representation of the alienating distance that collingwood felt between himself and Scott, it was also the only piece of evidence that could serve as a bridge by means of which Collingwood could recon­cile himself with Scott by re-enacting the thoughts which are embodied in the monument itself. Were the architect a con­temporary the question might be addressed to him, since (short of third party intermediation) the ordinary way to overcome the space between estranged people is for them to converse, to put questions to each other, to elicit answers. But in this case, as in the case of all historical artifacts, direct di­alogue was not possible, and intermediation is necessary. Collingwood's reflections on the Albert Memorial must have focused on this acute problem: how does one communicate with the past? For the living, traces of the past surviving in the present are the only expressions by means of which his­torical conversation can continue, and in this process of inter­pretation it is the historical understanding which asks questions, and it is present evidence--like the mute yet im­mensely expressive Albert Memorial--which the only source of assuring ourselves that our answers and our interpretative efforts have been successfully carried out. Somehow the gap is bridged: the memorial speaks, the observer is moved, the dialogue takes place.
How is this possible? On what model of thought can such an event occur? Collingwood was convinced that it was not possible on the grounds of empirical or realistic premisses (IH, 208-209), nor even by the principles of subjective idealism. It is not accomplished by using the tools of objective thinking employed in the natural sciences, nor by disregarding such methods altogether and adopting an intuitive or subjective approach, which still assumes the mind-object polarity, but opts for the primacy of the subjective pole over the objective one (IH, 124, 292-97). It is accomplished by adapting for history the usual method employed to cross the gap between persons in the mind-mind situation, i.e. questions and answers eliciting unification through shared meanings. If I wish to learn something about someone it is not achieved by inventing him like a character in a novel, nor by observing him like a bug on a pin, nor by experimenting with him like a ball on an inclined plane, nor even by seeing in him the symbol of the creator. While all these approaches may be helpful in one way or another, they tend to make something of the person that he is not—an imagined entity, an abstraction, a thing, a creature. And the same is true in learning about oneself—this much we take to be the final message of Speculum Mentis. If I wish to find out what a man is, I have to do so by finding out what he thinks, for this is what he is (IH, 10, 218-20; NL, 1.61); and the ordinary way to do this is by asking him questions aimed at responses which will help to find
out what he means, where he stands, what he stands for, what he means to do, what he means for us to do, etc. And if one wishes to find out what a man was, one has to do so by asking questions aimed at eliciting responses from existing evidence which will help to find out what his intentions were, how he perceived his situation, what he stood for, what he meant to accomplish, etc. In the latter case one must overcome the distance of historical time, and the way this is done is by examining and cross-examining present evidence. The scientific historian is an intelligent, inquisitive interpreter of evidence.

And just as a person may minimally be said to be acting rationally not when he can show that his actions follow deductively from some general principle, nor when he can relate it to some other act as a reaction, but when he can intelligently answer questions about why he did one thing rather than another, so also one may minimally be said to know something not when he can show that it is the conclusion of a deductive inference, nor when he can show that it is distinguishable from its opposite, but when he can intelligently answer questions about it (NL, 4.31-4.35, 11.1-11.12, 14.1-14.37). Q-A logic, as Collingwood informally schematizes it, is the linquistic expression of the living process of seeking out and establishing meaning, exhibiting both phases in the discovery of meaning--as consciously known to be incomplete
(the question) and as having sense-completion (the answer). To ignore the aspect of the conscious nisus for meaning by presenting answers as propositions, as if they were only related by formally explicit logical connectives, is a falsification of the true, humanly grounded process of inquiry. In this sense Q-A logic is the true logic of thought, and "replaces" F-logic, which does not recognize the process of passing from incomplete to completed meaning. It is only Q-A logic which calls attention to the active role of the conscious agent in the process of inquiry, for it is only persons who ask questions and seek meaningful answers. Q-A logic is the logic of interpretative inquiry, and as a meaning-seeking function cuts across all levels of consciousness; it is not bound to the conceptual, propositional, or inferential levels of thought.

Finally, historical events themselves have a Q-A logical structure: in the world of practical affairs the paradigm for sense-location is the historical act of an agent, in which a questionable situation is resolved by the answering act of a protagonist aware of alternatives and conscious of the possible consequences of his acts. To act is to endow a gesture with meaning and at the same time to express that meaning as an act (cf. IH, 212). Because such an act is actually the agent's (his experience) it is potentially everyone's (a shared experience)--that is, it is capable of being
re-enacted (IH, 247, 280, 303). That which can be re-enacted is an historical event, so that the historian, in discovering what it is to think historically (to re-enact a meaning) realizes at the same time, and by this act, what it is to be a man. It achieves the philosophical mandate given by the oracle at Delphi: it is knowing himself, i.e. knowing what it is to be a man (an enactor of meaning), to be the kind of man he is (the enactor of meaning in the context of his own experience) and to be the kind of man he is and no one else is (the enactor of meaning in this situation with these perceived alternatives). Historical action therefore constitutes meaning by bringing it into the world—a primacy that precedes the merely theoretical sense of meaning as something latent in the world (e.g. verbal or lexicographical meaning). A historian re-enacts this primal activity, and the coherence of his narrative is built upon the historical meaning which is both found by the historian in the evidence of the act, and made by the historian through interpretation of that evidence.

If history is a kind of understanding in which no product of human action is foreign, and if it is posited as the science of human nature and therefore as a model for reconciliation of all alienation situations in which understanding is called forth to mediate between self and not-self, it does not appear to be alone in this effort. Behavioral science makes
the same claim, and from his earliest writings Collingwood recognized it to be his natural enemy (RP, 40-42; FR, 75-77; SM, 274-78; A, 92-95). It claimed to deal with the same subject, but employed a methodology drawn from an empiricistic epistemology which takes the mind-object polarity as primary. This is a vestige of the "naturalistic" viewpoint, which he recognized in historical positivism, and from which he struggled to free both himself and his readers (cf. EPH, 12-20, 25, 31; IH, 126-33). It is characteristic of this viewpoint that facts are independent of anyone's knowledge of them; that objects are active and mind is plastic and passive; that in the act of knowing the object is therefore unaffected by the knowing of it; and that individual acts of knowledge are both atomically distinct from one another and capable of being analyzed like objects in the perceptible world. Collingwood denied all of these assertions, and did so on the strength of the mind-mind paradigm for reconciliational philosophy: for historical thinking provides an instance of successful understanding in which the object is another thought. It exemplifies a case in which, without the activity of thought, the object would cease to be what it is—instead of being a metal arrowhead, a Greek shard, or an Egyptian manuscript, without historical interpretation it becomes a piece of metal, a chunk of clay, black marks on flattened papyrus. The past is therefore so far from being indifferent to its being known that it would cease to be past at all if it were not for the exercise of
the historical a priori imagination.

But Collingwood did not stop there, and in generalizing this principle he came to regard all knowing as entailing an act of interpretation not basically different from that which is involved in historical thought. He came to realize that meaning is never something merely found, it is something made by the act of attention (PA, 213-16; NL, 4.5, 6.1-6.21, 7.2-7.22). Just as an ambiguous historical situation is resolved by the decisive act of an agent, the field of sensual flux is stabilized by acts of attention which domesticate and perpetuate sensa, allowing them to survive and revive in other contexts (PA, 209-10; IH, 303). Meaning is an achievement of personal consciousness, the means whereby a person appropriates not only his own experience but that of others. It is also the source not only of all perceptual and imaginative unity, but of the continuity of all unified acts of thought (IH, 306).

The deliberate effort to achieve reconciliation by the act of interpretation aimed at the unity of meaning, therefore, runs contrary to the effort to define by atomic dissolution into non-meaning elements, or by subsumption of such elements into arbitrary sets or classes viewed as collections of inter-changeable terms indifferent to their generic essence. It presupposes that the object of knowledge (meaning) cannot be unaffected by the knowing of it, because
it is only human knowing that seeks and creates meaning in the world through intentional acts, without which there is nothing definite to be known. It has, therefore, an opposite orientation to any philosophy which makes as its fundamental presupposition the assumption that the object of knowledge is unaffected by, or indifferent to, the knowing of it. Such a presupposition has been made by some philosophers who have been known as realists (Cook Wilson, Samuel Alexander, G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell being some examples). Whatever places the object of consciousness over against it as something beyond its ability to absorb creatively by the medium of meaning, is the natural enemy of that consciousness: it is the originator of non-meaning not as that from which meaning arises, but as that which is forever beyond meaning, unassimilable, the "thing-in-itself" which is not a thing, not an it, and not a self. It is the "pure being" which Collingwood rejected as a subject matter unsuitable for any science, because it is utterly undifferentiated and lacking in all specification, and hence indistinguishable from nothing.

And at this point we arrive where we set out from--with the critique of realistic epistemology. We also find ourselves at the doorstep of the Essay on Metaphysics.
5. The Rehabilitation of Reformed Metaphysics.

We should now be in a position to clear the obstacles to first philosophy that we presented in Section three. If our reconstruction of the unity of Collingwood's thought is correct, it should remain as a solid ring of thought when brought up against the barriers that are presented in the Essay on Metaphysics.

But to begin we must ask ourselves why Collingwood undertook to write on metaphysics at all, for as we have seen he certainly gives indication in the early writings of a typically British antipathy to the subject. It appears to be just as accidental that Collingwood should find himself named to the chair of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in 1935 as it was that he should have worked for the British Admiralty Intelligence in World War I and found himself walking past the Albert Memorial. Are his reflections on metaphysics as much the result of a coincidence as his reflections on logic? What is required is not to account for an accidental feature of his biography but an essential feature of his thought. The situation in which any philosopher is placed is always to some extent fortuitous. But as Collingwood notes, it is not so much what happens to a figure in history but what he does with what happens to him that creates historical interest. Collingwood chose to reflect on the Albert Memorial, and he chose to reflect on metaphysics, and
our question is how that reflection is a product of the unity of this thought rather than a response to something that is thrust upon it, as it were, from without.

For someone committed to the primacy of historical thinking and the mind-mind paradigm in epistemology, which is it to do metaphysics? Traditionally metaphysics has always been thought directed at uncovering the stable basis for change—not only that which "follows the physics" in the literary sense of a set of treatises attributed to Aristotle, but also that which seeks to discover the principles which lie beyond the changing physical world. Very early in his career Collingwood decided, with the Italian idealists, that change is a realistic concept and history an idealistic one, since what changes is a material thing, but that which historically develops is a mind. If a philosopher with a strong inclination toward epistemology were to begin, like Kant did, with the assumption that the mind has a definite structure which determines its active construction or synthesis of the world of experience, metaphysics would take the form of discovering what that unchanging structure of mind is. But Collingwood also decided early in his career that a mind is what it does, and therefore that there is no such thing as a fixed "human nature" for all time and all men, so far as mind is concerned—so this is not a promising direction in which to find the object of metaphysics. And finally, we have
seen that Collingwood ruled out an ontology of pure being not only because it is arrived at by abstraction from the mind-object situation, but also because in his study of cosmology he found that modern physics had abandoned the notion of substance altogether, replacing it with the concepts of function, process, and motion.

What is left? For Collingwood what remains is precisely the fact of interpersonal communication within the field of mental phenomena. What grounds change within this domain of reality is whatever provides the basis for reconciliational identity between minds, or within mind, and that is whatever is being presupposed. What grounds change in a world of developing thought is the assumed shared meanings that make diachronic and synchronic communication possible, and the reestablishment of significance by a question-and-answer process is the work of reconciliational philosophy. A metaphysics of rapprochement is therefore an inquiry into the presuppositions of questions on the basis of which inquiry proceeds: metaphysics is the science of absolute presuppositions.

(a) From Anti-Metaphysics to Reformed Metaphysics.---Collingwood makes it easy for his readers to grasp the negative element in his critique of anti-metaphysics (itself a negation of a negation), but difficult to get beyond that to what the positive basis is for this critique. It is therefore
quite possible to overlook the fact that his elenchus may be an utter failure without touching the positive thought from which it springs, and which it ultimately disguises. From the perspective of rapprochement philosophy we may now be able to see past the disguise.

Collingwood examined in detail two forms of anti-metaphysics: psychologism and logical positivism. His objection to psychologism is basically that as "materialistic epistemology" it treats all thought as if it were a datum--i.e. as if it were a feeling or an aggregate of feelings, and consequently as non-criteriological (EM, 109, 114-15); and his objection to positivism is that it refuses to recognize that

Collingwood distinguished three forms of anti-metaphysics, which he called progressive, reactionary, and irrationalist (EM, 82-84). If we are correct in assuming that positivism is the progressive form of anti-metaphysics, and psychology is the irrationalist form, what is the reactionary form? Probably the sort of philosophy represented by Samuel Alexander's realism, examined in Chapter XVII of the Essay on Metaphysics, since he accuses Alexander of being "influenced by the quaint, characteristic eighteenth-century dogma" that there is an underlying or pervasive character of everything which exists--expressively as the law of universal causation (EM, 175, 179). This is the way he described reactionary anti-metaphysics (EM, 93-94). But both of these sections are excessively vague, full of broad historical generalizations, and fail to satisfy the reader's desire for a clear presentation of the viewpoint being opposed. A perfect candidate for reactionary metaphysics would be twentieth-century Thomism (cf. EM, 91, where the reactionary anti-metaphysician "embraces x as his own 'doctrine,' claims X was 'right,' and professes himself an 'Xist'""). But astonishingly, Collingwood does not draw a bead on this elephantine target, but instead takes pot-shots at Watt's steam engine and Locke's political views in the 19th century.
thinking rests on presuppositions, and assumes that all generalization is based on observation of matters of fact (EM, 146-47). What are the positive equivalents to these critical remarks? In the matter of thought, it is clear that Collingwood wishes to maintain that all thought is "criteriological," meaning that in every act of thought it is necessary that the thinker himself should judge its success or failure—a self-critical judgment that Collingwood distinguishes from the (real but irrelevant) possibility that one man's thought may be judged successful or unsuccessful by someone else (EM, 109, 115). In the matter of presuppositions, it is clear that Collingwood wishes to maintain that there are such thoughts, and that they are to be distinguished from empirical generalizations which are verifiable or falsifiable by induction from observable facts (EM, 147). Our difficulty arose from trying to conjoin these two ideas: for if presuppositions are neither true nor false, they do not appear to be able to retain their criteriological aspect—i.e. the use of "a criterion, the double notion of truth or falsehood, by reference to which he judges a thought" (DM, 115); and if all thought is based on presuppositions, then thinking is based on that which is non-criteriological, i.e. that which is not thought.

The first step toward resolving this difficulty is one which we have already suggested: to expand the notion of truth so that it is not bound by the propositional criterion,
i.e. by that which is verifiably true in answer to a question. Now in Chapters VII and VIII we took considerable effort to demonstrate that Collingwood recognized levels of mental functioning that could definitely be called thought, and were not yet at the propositional level of truth. While the early Collingwood recognized that questions themselves were non-assertions, he failed to distinguish various kinds and degrees of non-assertive thought—a deficiency that was remedied in his later writings, where concepts are described as the entertainment of meanings in imagination, having the status of thoughts which are non-assertive and pre-propositional in the logical sense. One function of conceptual imagination is precisely to consider a meaning in isolation from, or indifferent to, any reference to anything else (i.e. any predication): 8

8To consider a meaning in isolation from, or indifferent to, any reference to anything else is to consider it abstractly. Since all thinking is based on pre-suppositions, does this mean that Collingwood had come to believe that all thinking is conceptual and hence abstract? Was Donagan right after all? We think there are several decisive reasons for believing that this is not the case. (1) Collingwood never denied that it is possible to think abstractly: he merely argued that such abstract thinking cannot bear the weight of unconditional truth that we wish to place on it (SM, 252-53; NL, 26.18). (2) He also argued that it is only a phase in our thinking (like the bud is an abstraction of the flower), and that in thinking abstractly we are not condemned to remain at this point—or as he says, to live in Ezekial's Valley of Dry Bones (NL, 7.65). Our release from such confinement occurs in the form of further acts of propositional thinking, where a proposition is an answer to a question, and a question offers alternatives (NL, 11.22, 11.34-11.35). (3) Abstraction always occurs in what Collingwood calls a "context of evocations," over which preside acts of evocative thinking governed by logical relations (NL, 7.32-7.39). As we have pointed out in previous chapters, this is a very different description of ab-
Imagination is essentially the "suspension of the activity of asserting" (SM, 78), and in this activity it "is indifferent to the distinction between the real and the unreal" (PA, 136). Yet there is a kind of truth that is involved in the act of imagination, and this pertains to its expressiveness—the very function which relates imagination in an essential way to art. The truth of art is not a truth of relation but a truth of fact: its truths are concrete individual experiences, and the truth of art is the truth of its expressiveness of these experiences (PA, 288). Its opposite—its untruth—is the "corruption of consciousness" which disowns a feeling by expressing it misleadingly or self-deceptively (PA, 219-20). The function of imagination is the perpetuation and domestication of meaning as the ground or material out of which further acts of consciousness will shape questions, propositions, inferences, and other expressions of higher-order thought.

Here we have a relation of presupposition which fits the description Collingwood has for it in the Essay on Metaphysics. It is thought, but in the form of imagination; it is criteriological in the sense that it has its own standard of success or failure, as the true expression of a felt meaning,9 but not in the sense of true or false propositions; and abstraction than the one he had condemned as falsification in Speculum Mentis.

9 It should be recalled that Collingwood found nothing absurd about there being such things as "emotions of intel-
it is a function prior to, and the logical ground of, further acts of higher-order thinking--e.g. the verificational acts involved in scientific inquiry, within which absolute presuppositions are embedded as primitive survivals. Absolute presuppositions are \textit{a priori}, concrete meaning-concepts of imagination, not unlike the Kantian categories.\footnote{On the interpretation of absolute presuppositions as \textit{a priori} concepts there is considerable agreement by Collingwood's commentators: cf. Mink, MHD, 144-48; Rubinoff, CRM, 234-35; and Toulmin, CEPC, 205-08. With respect to their similarity to the Kantian categories, we suspect that not all would agree--particularly Rubinoff, who adopts a basically Hegelian interpretation of Collingwood. Our own reading is that Collingwood had more Kantian leanings: in spite of such passages as that in The New Leviathan, where he denies the "German" believe that it is possible to compile a list of the logical relations which govern conceptualization (NL, 7.34), what he is describing in that process is the Kantian schematism of the categories. His rejection of any categorical compilation os consistent with the passages in the Essay on Metaphysics, where Kant's transcendental analytic is treated as an attempt to state what the presuppositions of physics were in Kant's own time (EM, 231-81). Collingwood is not denying that there are such relations (as even his remarks about the "element types" of logical thought, in his correspondence with Ryle, would indicate), but only that Kant's list is not definitive, exhaustive, or independent of the state of thinking on physics at that time. On absolute presuppositions as \textit{a priori} concepts, see also David Rynin, "Donagan on Collingwood: Absolute Presuppositions, Truth, and Metaphysics," The Review of Metaphysics, XVIII (December, 1964), 301-33. It is interesting that Rynin, who claimed to be the last living logical positivist (ibid., 331), would undertake a defense of Colling-}
sion evidently relies on the theory of meaning that we have extracted from Collingwood's writings only in bits and pieces, an incomplete but pervasive view of inter-relating acts of consciousness and linguistic expressions, some of which we explored in Chapter VIII. At this point we only claim to have indicated enough of this theory to show that the relationship of presupposing is one that is not unheralded in Collingwood's philosophy of mind, nor does it defy the demand that thought be regarded as "criteriological"—so long as the definition of "criteriology" be wide enough to include the double aspect of truth as the truthful expression of meaning and falsity as the corruption of consciousness.

But is we can congratulate ourselves for having cleared the main difficulty of our fourth obstacle,¹¹ can we say that we have resolved all our problems about anti-metaphysics? Not quite. The psychologizing in which Collingwood engages in this portion of the Essay on Metaphysics remains for us an unresolved embarrassment, but one which should not obstruct our wood's view of metaphysics as a science of absolute presuppositions, and to mount a scalding attack on Donagan for treating Collingwood as "a very third rate thinker, struggling without success under a burden of ineptitude that would be a source of concern in a not very promising undergraduate" (ibid., 332). Rynin's own estimate of Collingwood is considerably higher.

¹¹ We are approaching the obstacles from Section 3 in reverse order, for reasons that will become obvious as we continue: the main reason is that we wish to reserve the question of ontology until last.
passage toward the positive aspects of his reformed metaphysics. As universal as were Collingwood's interests, we cannot expect him to have accurately evaluated every major scientific development of the last century, and his failure to appreciate the true worth and benefits of behavioral sciences should not deter us from recognizing in his own work an equally important observation: that historical thinking can contribute an essential dimension to the self-understanding of man. From this point of view his warnings to us about the pretensions to wisdom of some who look to behavioral science as a "guide to life" are only a counsel to beware of such a one-sided prejudice about the nature of thought. It is a warning that he first issued in Religion and Philosophy and is repeated in no less than six of his other mature works. And while Collingwood seems less concerned about the ill effects of logical positivism (he did not seem to be convinced that they would be taken with much seriousness by the scientific community), the danger here is that in attacking metaphysics the positivists would unwittingly contribute to the attack on reason in the contemporary world, because an attack on the doctrine that thought has presuppositions is an attack on the foundations of science, and an attack on science is an attack on rationality and therefore on civilization. Collingwood's fear is that we would fall victim to a kind of belief about our own abilities to think that would paralyze us by convincing us that we are not able to think for ourselves, to judge
if the products of our own thought are well or ill done, and to behave in general as if our thinking would not make any difference to what we are trying to achieve. A belief about our own minds is one that is reflected in the way we behave, and therefore if we believe that we are a conglomerate of feelings, we shall surrender the imperative to know ourselves by giving up the effort that consciousness must put forward to achieve continuity in experience. In Collingwood's estimation this is tantamount to giving up on rationality and on civilization altogether. Considering what was happening in Europe at the time he was writing, he did not care if he was regarded as a cackling goose.

(b) Metaphysics as an Historical Science.--If we can say that an absolute presupposition as an a priori concept of imagination is a kind of thought (but not propositional thought), we can also say that it is minimally eligible for being a subject matter for historical re-enactment. But there is much that we still do not know about it. We are not yet in a position to overcome our third obstacle, the unlikely match of a science traditionally oriented towards universal and timeless truths, and a kind of research concerned only with particular and spatio-temporally localized matters of fact. This is the central paradox of the Essay on Metaphysics with its thesis that metaphysics is an historical science. In fact it appears to be doubly paradoxical, because it is
puzzling when approached from either direction. For if the methods of history are designed to "get at the facts" by the interpretation of observable evidence, why should a science of absolute presuppositions, for which there can be no directly observable evidence (not being propositional, and therefore neither verifiable or falsifiable), be interested in adopting the methods of history? What sort of a fact is an a priori concept? And contrariwise, if historical truth is always ad hoc and is therefore only true for a particular time and place, of what interest is it to an historian to deal with matters that are a priori and conceptual? What light is thrown on the relationship of presupposing by saying that it is brought into awareness by a kind of analysis which is drawn from the science of history?

To begin with we must first find out why Collingwood believes that absolute presuppositions constitute an appropriate subject matter for historical thought. Then we must approach the other side of the question by asking why the presuppositions, questions, propositions, problems and methods of metaphysics are the same as those of history. Now we have already suggested that absolute presuppositions are thoughts, but on the criteria offered in The Idea of History, this is not enough. In Chapter IX we found Collingwood telling us that to be a proper subject matter for history, an act must not only be an act of thought but of reflective thought, where
reflective thought means an act done in the consciousness that it is being done (IH, 307-08). While it is possible for a concept to be the object of an act that is "conscious of . . .," what is required for an act that is "conscious that . . ." is a proposition. But then does this not imply that to be an object of history an absolute presupposition must be a propositional act of thought, and therefore that it cannot be simply a concept? And does it not further imply that as an act of reflective thought an absolute presupposition cannot be unconsciously presupposed in any sense that is historically relevant?

These are difficult questions, and have wrecked the efforts of more than one of Collingwood's interpreters to salvage sense from the Essay on Metaphysics. But if we are to test the strength of our reconstruction of Collingwood's central "ring of thought," we must risk the same fate. In that reconstruction we noted that at the center of the object of historical interest is the resolution of an indeterminate situation by the act of an historical agent. This is an act made consciously, in the face of perceived alternatives, and having consequences beyond the act itself--consequences which the act brings about, but not with apodictic necessity. One phase of Collingwood's reform of metaphysics is carried out by drawing out the implications from the insight that the same sort of process is operative in the acts of thought that bring
science into being. In spite of what positivists and other formalists may believe, a science like physics does not spring like Athena fully armed from the head of Zeus; it grows in human fashion by the deliberate process of inquiry, the processes he informally described under the title of Q-A logic. It grows by putting questions in an orderly sequence and marshaling intelligence at all levels of consciousness in the effort to answer them. The sequence of thoughts in a scientific inquiry therefore parallels the sequence of thoughts which constitute the significant "inside" of historical events. And if one wishes to understand a scientific event, one must re-enact the sequence of thoughts which brought the scientist to draw the conclusions he did, just as one understands an historical event by re-enacting the thought processes involved in it.

Such understanding is, like all thinking, an interpretative process, and requires that the re-enactor be adept at forging questions which can overcome the discontinuities that he encounters. As an historian Collingwood was aware that there are many of these--that scientific thinking is a discontinuous process with interruptions, detours, inconsistencies, even revolutions; and that the manner in which these are reconciled is not the same for different subjects, different people, even different places and times. Therefore while the way rapprochement occurs is by achieving common understanding of shared meaning, Collingwood's historical experi-
ence convinced him that true meaning is always individuated and concrete, and the way in which shared meaning is achieved is not the same for all inquiry situations. The kind of answer that will satisfy a physicist is not the sort of answer that will satisfy an artist or theologian; and the sort of answer that would satisfy a classical Greek physicist would not be the same as an answer that would satisfy his medieval, renaissance, or modern counterpart—not because the phenomena have changed, but because the expectations of what the phenomena can mean have shifted, and this represents a change in the heuristic presuppositions which ground the questions. This is no less true at the personal level, for even within the consciousness of a single individual the questions asked at one point in a person's lifetime will have a different basis than those asked after his thought has developed beyond that point.

Therefore one cannot begin by assuming that there is an unchanging, generic sense of "knowing," and an equally univocal meaning for the answers, questions, and presuppositions of all inquiry per se. An inquiry about inquiry is an ad hoc affair, and one should not expect to find the common and unchanging ground of all possible inquiries, semper, ubique, ab omnibus, for this would be the epistemological equivalent of a search for an unchanging substance. Like all efforts of rapprochement, the way in which continuity of meaning is established in a given context is by showing how thought devel-
ops in that context, i.e. by showing how particular meanings
become progressively more inclusive, how the variable (know-
ing in this particular situation) modifies the generic essence
(inquiry) and becomes identified with it. Rapprochement is
complete when that development can be demonstrated as a scale
of forms. In the case of science such a scale takes the form
of a conceptual system, i.e. a nexus of meanings produced by
the exercise of an act of real (or "concrete) abstraction by
which a concept is located in a context of other concepts.

But while these comments may help us to understand
how an absolute presupposition can be cogently interpreted as
an a priori concept compatible with Collingwood's philosophy
of mind, we do not seem to be much closer to an understanding
of how it can be both a priori and factual, conceptual and re-
flexive. For this we need to turn to the other aspect of the
process of re-enactment, the thought of the historian. For
just as in the process of discourse by which reconciliation
is achieved between minds there are moments of listening but
also moments of questioning, so also in historical thinking
there is a kind of discourse in which the historian reaches
beyond being a passive listener and takes charge of his sub-
ject matter by cross-examining it. In re-enacting the se-
quence of thoughts which form the body of some piece of sci-
ettificate inquiry the historian may well ask questions that the
scientists never asked. He may thus ask why the initial sci-
entific question arose--a questions which (if the historian does not want to distort the nature of thinking itself) is directed at the objective or logical (rather than subjective or psychological) basis from which the question arose, i.e. its relation to meanings already established and unquestioned. It seeks to uncover what the scientist is assuming that allowed him to ask the question he did. In pressing this process or cross-examination to its conclusion the historian reaches a point where he recognizes that all the questions of a given systematic inquiry on a particular occasion presuppose a meaning or set of meanings not given as a result of any prior and similar questions in the inquiry, but forming the necessary condition for all questions to arise within that inquiry. But in stating what those absolute presuppositions are, the re-enactor of the inquiry sequence is doing something that the original agent, the scientist, may never have done, i.e. to express an a priori concept in the form of a statement.

Only someone who expects history to be a scissors-and-paste affair, a mere reportage, would be put off by this expansion of the historian's role. For Collingwood it was of the essence of scientific history that it be autonomous, which means that the active processes of the historian's thought are always involved. Such is the active nature of historical re-enactment that it is not bound by the requirement that only
what occurred in an historical sequence is what can re-appear in the continuity of past events, of reconciling himself or his thought to the thinking of the scientist, he may put questions that may never have occurred to his protagonist, and he does so on his own initiative, because he is the only one who can know what he expects to find out, or when he has achieved that rapprochement that his narrative seeks to achieve. But in this autonomous placement of questions we begin to get the sense of how Collingwood sees a way to overcome what appears to be a fundamental and irreconcilable difference between two traditional ways to approach factuality--the diachronic narrative approach of the historian and the synchronic logical approach of the metaphysician. If the scientific inquirer had to think some thoughts (absolute presuppositions) in order to think others (the questions and answers that form the body of his inquiry), and if the first thoughts are concepts embedded in the meaning of all the questions of the inquiry itself, then they can be said to be thoughts which occurred simultaneously (synchronously) with that inquiry. But this does not mean that they suddenly drop out of historical interest and become the province of the metaphysician-as-logician. It is what is involved in understanding the scientific event itself. In re-enacting that event historical thinking brings a latent thought (an a priori concept) into explicit consciousness (an act of propositional thought) in the form of an absolute presupposition, something that is therefore both found and made
by the act of historical understanding.

It is in this sense that absolute presuppositions are factual, and can be both the result of a question (the active question of the historian rather than those he receives from the historian in his inquiry) while yet remaining, as definitions of a priori concepts, pre-varificationally truth-neutral. Where such thoughts do not necessarily form a temporal sequence, the historian puts them into such a sequence (diachronically) through his narrative reasoning. He is expressing a ground-consequent relationship in narrative form. Nevertheless this is not mere invention on his part, on pain of ceasing to think historically: it must be rooted in evidence, such evidence being, of course, the documentary materials of the scientific inquiry articulated in language--with all that that implies.

We cannot claim to have accounted for all the problems that we have raised concerning the historical re-enactment of absolute presuppositions. Some of these issues shall be dealt with further in subsequent sections; others are obscured by shadows we have never succeeded in penetrating with light--the nature of historical inference, the relationship between Q-A logic and formal structures in language and thought; and still others seem both to retain striking echoes from his early reconciliational philosophy, and to suggest further thought which never had the opportunity to take place. What we are left with is a very general argument for reconciling history
and metaphysics—an argument that shows how it is possible to employ the methods (the interpretation of evidence by the active and systematic process of questioning), the presuppositions (that thought is capable of being re-enacted due to the invariance of meaning in different contexts), and the propositions (the *ad hoc* nature of inquiry about inquiry, the use of evidence, etc.) of history to do the work of metaphysical analysis (bringing to consciousness, or expressing in statements, *a priori* concepts, in the form of absolute presuppositions, incorporated in acts of scientific inquiry).

But this sort of argument employs *rapprochement* only at the level that it had reached in the earliest phases of Collingwood's development: the identification of metaphysics and history is an abstract *rapprochement* identity of the sort that we originally encountered in *Religion and Philosophy*. Obviously not all of history is metaphysics, because not all of history is concerned with the absolute presuppositions of scientific inquiry; and it would appear that not all of metaphysics is history, because the logical analysis in which a given constellation of metaphysical presuppositions is shown to display incompatibilities is not part of the usual business of construction of coherent narrative, or at least not to the extent that it is not a thing of the past. The next step in the reconciliational process would be to show the way in which history and metaphysics are defined by a scale of forms. In
The Essay on Metaphysics we find not the slightest gesture in this direction.

(c) The Absoluteness of Presupposing.--So far we have argued that by making use of our reconstructed "ring of thought" in our approach to the major obstacles to Collingwood's reformed metaphysics, it is possible to make limited sense of The Essay on Metaphysics. We may summarize this argument thus far as follows. (1) As an application of rapprochement philosophy, metaphysics seeks to overcome failures in the continuity of scientific inquiry by establishing the unified ground of shared meaning upon which systematic inquiry is based. (2) The way this is done is by applying the interpretative methodology of Q-A logic to concrete examples of scientific thinking, not in the forward idirection of the inquiry itself, but in the retrogressive direction--i.e. towards the presuppositions of the inquiry's questions. (3) When this retrogressive inquiry is pushed to the limit, what is uncovered are the a priori concepts which form the logically connected system (or constellation) on the basis of which all the questions of the inquiry are possible (i.e. make unified sense), and from which they all arise. (4) Metaphysical reconciliation is complete when the system of such concepts is made explicit (or is brought into consciousness) and articulated in the form of a conceptual framework (a constellation of absolute presuppositions) having the structure of a philosoph-
ical scale of forms. (5) Such a system of concepts linked by intensionally more inclusive meanings becomes expressed by acts of interpretative thought which bring absolutely presupposed concepts into consciousness in the form of definitions. (6) Such interpretative acts are historical insofar as history is the sequence of past acts of reflective thought, reenacted in the context of present thought by the intelligent cross-examination of evidence—the evidence in this case being concrete instances of scientific inquiry. (7) In such a re-enactment historical thinking affects its objects (a priori concepts) by locating them in a context of other concepts, i.e. by putting them in propositional form.

We are thus now in a position to understand how someone could mistake an absolute presupposition for a proposition. While an absolute presupposition is an act of a priori imagination at the conceptual level of thought, it is expressed in a form that appears like a proposition: it is expressed in a sentence, having the apparent unity of a judgment, and therefore posing as a candidate for that level of consciousness. But it is only in the retrogressive, metaphysical inquiry that it takes such a form, and we now understand that it is actually put there by the active process of historical thinking, and as a result of deliberate interpretative questioning.
But this glosses over difficulties to which we must now attend, not the least of which is the problem of the distinction between absolute and relative presuppositions. We recall that this distinction is made on the basis of the fact that there are some presuppositions which are not themselves the answer to any higher-order question in the progressive systematic inquiry. On our present line of thinking this is no longer a tenable distinction; it must be the answer to a question in some inquiry or it cannot be said to be a thought, or at least not a reflective thought (which it must be to be of interest to the historian)—i.e. one made in the consciousness that it is being made. And if it is the answer to a question in the retrogressive metaphysical inquiry, how are we to understand the way in which such a question arises? For to say that it "arises," on Collingwood's view of the matter, is to say that it has a logical connection with our previous thought and does not arise by capricious curiosity. But that would mean that it arises due to the causal efficacy of another presupposition, in which case it is no longer absolute but relative.

How can our "ring of thought" get us out of this maze? Surely the very concept of rapprochement presupposes that there is something to be reconciled, i.e. two thoughts which do not share the continuity typical of self-consciousness. The kind of consciousness employed to achieve the first stage
of reconciliation is questioning—that expression of the acknowledged incompleteness of an act of propositional consciousness which anticipates its requisite completion in an act of assertion. Where the discontinuity occurs in a systematic scientific inquiry, which represents the articulation of a single question or set of related questions, it indicates a failure to grasp a prior step in the inquiry, which leads to a regressive type of question and reverses the direction of the primary inquiry. Such a reversal and its resultant questions are the result of a higher stage of consciousness which Collingwood described as "reason" in The New Leviathan, namely "thinking one thing, \( x \), because you think another thing, \( y \); where \( y \) is your 'reason' or, as it is sometimes called, your 'ground' for thinking \( x \)" (NL, 14.1). It is a kind of thinking that arises as a "practical act of trying to alleviate the distress caused me by the untrustworthiness of my knowledge" (NL, 14.3), and never loses this practical aspect. In the case of a scientific inquiry the "distress" is due to the discontinuity in the inquiry, and the historical, retrogressive question is an exercise of the rationality of the historian, the absolute presupposition being the "ground" or "reason" which will reassure him of the trustworthiness of a certain line of questioning.

Now such a reflective reversal may be part of the inquiry process itself (regression to an hypothesis—e.g. one which requires further definition) or it may be one which
arises when the entire inquiry itself is called into question. Once again in the latter case this may occur in the process of normal scientific inquiry (as in the early stages of scientific revolution), or it may occur due to failure in the process of trying to re-enact a piece of science. In the latter case the historian may actually invent the question for the purpose of eliciting from the inquiry its presupposed concepts, or its conceptual framework. But these two cases seem to be very different: if the historian, in exercising his autonomy in raising questions on his own initiative, is free to invent a metaphysical question, it is clear he is creating the discontinuity that the absolute presupposition is meant to repair; but the scientist in a period of scientific crisis perceives or feels the discontinuity in the experience of his own scientific consciousness, and therefore does not create it but finds it. Once again we find ourselves confronting the idealistic dimension of Collingwood's philosophy, and uneasy about what to make of it. If we define the "idealistic turn" as that point at which a philosopher decides that meaning is something not found but made, then there can be little doubt that Collingwood made that turn early in his career, and never went back on it. But we have repeatedly witnessed Collingwood arguing that meaning is something both found and made: this is the celebrated "unity of act and fact" of Gentile and the Italian idealists, and the basis of Collingwood's later re-interpretation of the act-object distinction.
The distinction between relative and absolute presuppositions is our present case in point, and we wish to understand if an absolute presupposition is something found or made or both. Clearly Collingwood wants to say both, but can he do so consistently? For if it is both, then the absoluteness of presuppositions threatens to vanish altogether: as something found its reality is affirmed, but only as contingent to an act of historical interpretation which establishes its factuality; and as something made its independence is surrendered to that which is responsible for its creation. In either case it turns out that an absolute presupposition is something that is always dependent on something else, and is therefore only relatively absolute—a paradoxical conclusion to be sure.

The relativization of absolute presuppositions also bears down on us from a different direction, for we are forced to recognize that in calling absolute presuppositions a priori concepts we have vastly oversimplified the logic of presupposing. The deciding factor in considering whether a thought is a concept, a proposition, or an inference is not the form that one or the other takes when it is expressed in words, but the way it functions in the process of thinking. Thus one and the same linguistic entity—the indicative sentence—may express a concept in the form of a definition, or may predicate one concept of another in the form of a proposition, or may re-
late one concept to another as ground and consequent in the
form of an inference. While we have argued that a presupposed
concept may appear in indicative sentential form because we
typically express ourselves in sentences in order to communi-
cate a complete thought, this does not tell the whole story.
For in much of what Collingwood says about it, presupposing is
treated as a complex realtionship rather than as a simple ling-
ugistic or formally logical entity. He would say, for example,
that one form of experience presupposes another (as science
presupposes religion in Speculum Mentis, where "science" and
"religion" are concepts representing whole regions of experi-
ence)--indicating that the relationship was one of logical de-
pendency but not of deductive entailment. Such a usage is
virtually repeated when he writes in the Essay on Metaphysics
that contemporary science is "monotheistic" in that it presup-
poses that God exists. And again in the "retrospect" chapter
of The New Leviathan he writes that each of the levels of con-
sciousness presupposes its predecessor as that out of which it
develops, while the successor is not rendered necessary by the
form of consciousenss which preceeded it (NL, 9.43). In fact
it is this section of The New Leviathan that comes closest to
defining the relationship of presupposing than any other place
in his published works, since it is set in the context of a
description of development which he defines as "a logical pro-
cess in which B 'presupposes' A, C 'presupposes' B, and D 'pre-
supposes' C" without the earlier terms necessitating the later
ones (NL, 9.47-9.48).

This clarifies the relationship at the same time that it complicates and relativizes it. For if the scale of forms of consciousness is such that any point on the scale not only summarizes and completes the terms below it but also presupposes them, then in what sense can we say that absolute presuppositions are confined to the conceptual level (or should we say "located" at the conceptual level?) of consciousness? We are at a loss to say what the criterion is for the absoluteness of presuppositions. While it would appear that the minimum determination of meaning is at the conceptual level of thought, that would seem to leave us with as many absolute presuppositions as there are conceptual meanings, a situation which achieves ultimacy at the expense of complete dissipation.

What we seem to be left with is a glimpse into an epistemological concept of remarkable complexity—one which has yet to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner by anyone with whom this author is familiar.\(^\text{12}\) We know that Collingwood understood an absolute presupposition to be pre-propositional and also pre-interrogative (both in the logical rather than temporal sense), and that it has efficacy in causing questions

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\(^{12}\)However the issue of conceptual change in constellations of presuppositions has been recognized and discussed with considerable insight by Stephen Toulmin, who acknowledges his debt to Collingwood on this subject. See his Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton, 1972), pp. 52-85.
to arise--these being epistemic functions. We also know that it has certain logical properties which tend to apply to presuppositions regardless of their semantic content--that a presupposition acts as a unifier in a systematic inquiry; that its relationship to questions and propositions resembles inference, but yet is not deductively or inductively related to questions and answers in the P-Q-A complex; that it has relations of consupponibility with other presuppositions, and with these others forms a constellation or synthesis which, like a deductive system, is subject to conflicts or strains due to inconsistencies. But yet it has some of the properties of religious belief: it has the character of a decision with practical consequences; it is held with an attitude of unquestioning acceptance or natural piety; it can be embraced or abandoned, but never verified or falsified; and it is sometimes surrounded by a kind of "numinous terror" ordinarily evoked by sacred objects. And finally Collingwood called attention to its historical dimension: the establishment of its factuality by cross-examination and interpretation of evidence, its development to full consciousness by rational acts of metaphysical analysis which shares the premise of historical understanding that acts of thought are capable of re-enactment without essential loss of universal meaning.

Even a cursory examination of this set of properties could well keep us busy for several more chapters, raising as
they do questions which touch not only on epistemology, but also on logic and the philosophy of religion. At this point we can only admit that it does not seem possible to maintain the unconditional distinction between absolute and relative presuppositions, where that distinction pertains to all possible inquiries. but in any given inquiry such a distinction is not only possible, it is essential: for without the presuppositions that ground the entire set of questions, no scientific inquiry can achieve its objectives--i.e. to fulfill the intention to answer the questions that arise only due to the causal efficacy of these presuppositions, and ultimately to be grounded in these presuppositions as their rational justification. It is not a complete disaster for rapprochement philosophy, therefore, to argue that absolute presuppositions are inquiry-dependent meanings and therefore only relatively absolute. They are at least inquiry-constant within that inquiry, and this suffices for Collingwood's purposes, since it is consistent with the ad hoc character of all historical interpretation.

Our disappointment at Collingwood's failure to satisfy us on the nature of the relationship of presupposing should not prevent us from acknowledging our debt to him for what he did achieve in this area. In marking out the realm of absolute presuppositions he pointed the way beyond the empiricistic and positivistic attempts to eliminate general metaphysics.
Like Caesar, he crossed the river even if he did not totally succeed in subduing the territory on the other side. He showed us a way in which a science of metaphysics is possible, without actually accomplishing the construction of that science. Others who have followed him—men like Errol Harris and Stephen Toulmin—have since taken the banner to higher ground. It is still a territory left largely unexplored.

(d) **Ontology and Reformed Metaphysics.**—We come now to the final obstacle, Collingwood's rejection of ontology as a fitting subject-matter for metaphysical analysis. Of all our obstacles, this is the most difficult for us to surmount, not only because Collingwood was so perfunctory and uncompromising about it, and not only because it represents an unhistorical and unscholarly dismissal of a subject matter of great antiquity and coeval with philosophy itself, but also because it runs contrary to attitudes that he espoused from an early date, and defended for many years. For while the rejection of a science of abstract being is a recurrent theme, so also is the requirement that the object of philosophy is no mere ens rationis, but one which has ontological reference (EPM, 125); "philosophy is the theory of existence; not of existence in the abstract, but of existence in the concrete; the theory of all that exists" (RP, 16; FR, 54). Such is also the significance of Anselm's ontological argument, which is defended in works from all stages in his philosophical career (RP, 66;
EPM, 124-25; EM, 189-90), and such is the essential nature of all philosophical judgment: it is always both universal and categorical, stating what is both common and essential in that which exists (EPM, 127, 136). To abandon this requirement is not merely to reject one erroneous form of metaphysics, it is to strip philosophy of its distinguishing feature. To fail to overcome this obstacle is therefore to fail to defend the role of philosophy as Collingwood had defined it in the Essay on Philosophical Method, which the Autobiography singled out as his best and "only" book.

Is there any way that our reconstructed "ring of thought" can aid us in adopting a viewpoint that will allow us to see our way beyond this final obstacle? After providing us with a means to understand how metaphysics is possible as a science of absolute presuppositions re-enacted by a form of thought using the methods of historical interpretation, can we now find a way to re-establish the continuity between reformed and traditional metaphysics, between scientific history and Aristotle's metaphysics? For rapprochement philosophy, what is the meaning shared by a science of absolute presuppositions and a science of being as being? To reconcile ontology and reformed historical metaphysics would require redefining ontology in a way which would allow for a non-abstract concept of being, one which does not arise at the limit of the abstractive process by leaving out determining characteristics, but
rather takes such individuating marks as essential to it. This would be a science of "concrete being"--a reformed ontology that would be a part of reformed metaphysics.

Collingwood himself leaves open the possibility that rejecting one sense of "ontology" leaves other senses of the term untouched by the criticism (EM, 16). But our concern is less with his rejection of the title than it is with his rejection of the concept which the title represents. For in spite of his claims about what philosophy should be, in most of what he writes he refuses to entertain any questions concerning ontological reference in the sense of a science which says something directly about reality rather than something about knowledge of that reality. In *Speculum Mentis* this refusal takes the form of a denial that metaphysics can ever analyze real being, being as it is in itself untainted by thought (SM, 274); and in the theory of perception offered in *The New Leviathan* it is expressed in the denial that feelings have objects as well as modes (NL, 5.39). In such places as these it has been hard for us to defend Collingwood against the charge of radical subjective idealism. But in other passages in his works it is possible to see a different thought process at work, a process which allows him (for example in his correspondence with Ryle) to recognize the metaphysical legitimacy of such statements as "mind exists," "matter exists," and "God exists"--statements which are both categorical
(or referential) and universal. Can we leap to the conclusion that such statements of ontological commitment form the body of absolute presuppositions that we have found so elusive throughout this chapter? They certainly appear to be ultimate and primitive enough to present themselves as candidates for inclusion in reformed metaphysics, and the only sort of question to which they could be the answer would be equally primitive, viz. what exists? But then why is it not legitimate for reason to press this retrogressive inquiry one step further by asking for reassurance for these assertions? Why should reason be prevented from asking the ontological question, "why is there something rather than nothing?"

Perhaps we are once again asking more of the Essay on Metaphysics than it was intended to achieve. It is nonetheless not unreasonable to put such questions to Collingwood, since metaphysics is one branch of the science of thought (EM, 101), and therefore seeks meaning just as all science and all thought does; and if it is an absolute presupposition of science not only that reality is intelligible or conforms to law, but also that there is a reality to investigate (EM, 213, 222-27), then it seems that on either view of metaphysics--Collingwood's or Aristotle's--the examination of the meaning of being is a legitimate enterprise. Surely we must assume that Collingwood's intention was not primarily to write a treatise on Aristotle or his metaphysics, but to write an essay or series
of essays showing how a conception of metaphysics on the mind-mind model is still possible, and in doing so he found sufficient basis in Aristotle for making the points he had to make to the audience he presumed he had. Collingwood's rejection of Aristotle's ontology is not so much an attempt to re-write Aristotle as it is an attempt to show that he was in basic agreement with those critics of Aristotle who rejected a science of pure being, and to indicate that such a fruitless inquiry had its roots in some of the ideas put forward in the treatises on metaphysics attributed to Aristotle. Presumably his readership included some of the same critics who found A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic* of some interest, and at the beginning of an essay which by its title threatened to raise again the metaphysical spectre he was anxious to show this audience that he was not about to revive this long-dead topic. But for such a presumed, postivistically influenced audience he was equally anxious to show that in rejecting one meaning of metaphysics one has not demonstrated the impossi-bility of metaphysics in any sense whatever, and metaphysics as a science of first principles also has its pedigree in Ar-isotle's treatises.

But having said this there is the additional problem that Collingwood is sidestepping a discussion of what we have demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt to be one of the most important issues in his own philosophy--its basic opposition
to realism. Even if "pure being" is the metaphysical counterpart of an object unaffected by the knowing of it, it is also the generic concept of a scale of forms of being that Collingwood could hardly refuse to investigate as one of the absolute presuppositions of science. For on his own grounds, he not only accepted in his philosophy of mind the precepts that the \textit{esse} of mind is \textit{de hac re cogitare} (RP, 100; FR, 172), and in his theory of perception that the \textit{esse} of a sensum is \textit{sentiri} (PA, 198), but also in cosmology that the modern conception of nature presupposes that being is becoming. "For an evolutionary science of nature, the \textit{esse} of anything in nature is its \textit{fieri}," which requires that the old conception of substance that grounded mechanistic physics (and before that the animistic physics of the Greeks) is resolved into the concept of function (IN, 15-16). With these clues in mind, can anything be legitimately said about the meaning of being that would be acceptable to Collingwood in his role as metaphysical reformer?

Surely Collingwood would continue to argue that there can be no science of something as lacking in distinction as pure abstract being. But at the lowest level of consciousness something present but indeterminate must survive and be perpetuated long enough for sensation to occur at all (PA, 212-13). The first specification of the generic essence of being is therefore minimally the indeterminate presence of something to sensation. As this is perpetuated and domesticated in con-
sciousness the meaning of being of the object is refined and modified: from being an indeterminate presence it becomes a sustained object for perception, an imagined whole, a coherent imagined whole, a referred-to imagined whole, etc.—in accordance with the progressively higher activities of consciousness. At each stage the meaning of the object's being is determined by the form of consciousness, and the unique stage of the demand for meaning made by that form of consciousness on the object.

Is there anything that lies at the summit of this scale? Is there an object so rich in meaning, so determinate in its being, that it utterly satisfies the highest demands of the mind for significance? We have very little to build upon in the published writings to reconstruct an answer to this question, since the entire question of concrete ontology is left unresolved in the Essay on Metaphysics. What we are lacking is any adequate idea of Collingwood's cosmology—something he lectured on repeatedly, and which he declared to be one of the most pressing needs in contemporary philosophy. There is some indication in The Idea of Nature that Collingwood supported Hegel's division of reality into the realms of matter, life, and mind, where each is in the process of turning into the next higher form, and each is a more perfect embodiment of the Absolute Idea (IN, 159). But he is also critical of the residue of mechanism and logicism in Hegel's
philosophy of nature (IN, 121-32). The modern idea of nature, Collingwood argues, recognizes not only that there is no nature at an instant (as Whitehead phrases it), but also that a thing is what it does, so that there is no distinction between motion and that which moves: "modern physical theory regards matter as possessing its own characteristics, whether chemical or physical, only because it moves; time is therefore a factor in its very being, and that being is fundamentally motion: (IN, 151-52). Furthermore the older conceptions of space and time--postulated as infinite extension and succession--"seem to be nothing but abstractions from the idea of movement" on the one hand, or logical presuppositions of that idea on the other. But then one encounters this remarkable passage:

This at any rate seems clear: that since modern science is now committed to a view of the physical universe as finite, certainly in space and probably in time, the activity which this same science identifies with matter cannot be a self-created or ultimately self-dependent activity. The world of nature or physical world as a whole, on any such view, must ultimately depend for its existence on something other than itself . . . . (M)odern science, after an experiment with materialism, has come back into line with the main tradition of European thought, which has always ascribed to nature an essentially derivative or dependent status in the general scheme of things. It is true that the most varied proofs have been offered as to why nature must be dependent, and the most varied theories as to what it depended on; but in general, with strikingly few exceptions, scientists and philosophers have agreed that the world of nature forms only one part or aspect of all being, and that in this total realm its place is a secondary one, one of dependence on something prior to itself. (IN, 155).
But while Collingwood points out that many contemporary cosmologists argue, as did their classical and medieval predecessors, that what nature depends upon is God, Collingwood comes up with a less traditional solution:

Throughout the long tradition of European thought it has been said . . . that nature, though it is a thing that really exists, is not a thing that exists in itself or in its own right, but a thing which depends for its existence upon something else. I take this to imply that natural science . . . is not, as the positivists imagined, the only department or form of human thought . . . and is not even a self-contained or self-sufficient form of thought, but depends for its very existence upon some other form of thought which is different from it and cannot be reduced to it . . . . What is this other form of thought? I answer, "History." (IH, 175-76).

What can this mean? What sense of "History" (with a capital "H") can he have in mind? This brings us face to face once again with the central paradox of the Essay on Metaphysics, for while Collingwood has made a fairly convincing case in The Idea of Nature that the modern idea of nature is modelled on evolution, and evolution is modelled on the idea of history (IN, 9, 132), at precisely the point where we expect him to complete the argument on the ontological side he appears to swap horses and ride out on an epistemological charger, a kind of equus ex machina. If natural science is dependent upon something else because nature is dependent on something else, then by force of the same analogy if what natural science depends upon is history (in the sense of a kind of knowledge), what nature depends upon is the ontological refer-
ent of historical knowledge. What can this be? Certainly not the deeds of men done in the past. Is "History" (with a capital "H") to be taken in the sense of cosmic development, in spite of the fact that there is nothing in the development of Collingwood's thought to prepare us for this sudden expansion of the idea of history, and everything to indicate that it was moving in just the opposite direction?

Or is there some reality that grounds both nature and history? Such would seem to be the sense of those early passages in his writings such as that in Speculum Mentis in which Descartes' cogito ergo sum is interpreted to mean that "the concrete historical fact, the fact of my actual present awareness, (is) the root of science," and consequently that "Science presupposes history and can never go behind history" (SM, 202). Such is the idealistic strand in Collingwood's braided ring of thought. But opposed to this is the realistic counter-tendency:

modern thought is disentangling itself from the cobwebs of subjective idealism . . . . Kant would suggest a very different conclusion: namely that if nature bears on its face the marks of dependency for its existence on something else, that something is the human mind . . . . This is bad philosophy . . . . The most rigorous thought of our own time, scientific and philosophic alike, has turned resolutely away from these subjectivist or phenomenalist doctrines, and agrees that whatever nature depends upon it does not depend on the human mind. (IN, 156).
What is left? Could Collingwood, whose respect for religious consciousness remained unquestioned throughout all his published writings, fail to see that a mind unreconciled to the mind of God has failed in its primary metaphysical obligation? It would not seem so, judging solely from the following passage from Chapter XXI of the *Essay on Metaphysics*, "Quicunque Vult," which may well be taken as Collingwood's final offering of rapprochement philosophy:

If metaphysics is our name for the statement of absolute presuppositions, and if metaphysics and theology are the same, there are three ways in which the existence of a world of nature might be made to figure among the doctrines of theology. 1. It might be a proposition in metaphysics, as it is for Spinoza, that God and nature are the same. But this would entail the consequence that natural science is the same thing as metaphysics: which cannot be right if the business of metaphysics is to state the absolute presuppositions of natural science. 2. It might be a proposition in metaphysics that the world of nature exists, but this proposition might be left wholly unrelated to the proposition that God exists. But then it would not be a proposition in theology; and therefore, if theology and metaphysics are the same, not a proposition in metaphysics. And what about the presupposition of which it was the statement? The act by which we hold such presuppositions, I have said elsewhere, is religious faith; and God is that in which we believe by faith; therefore all our absolute presuppositions must be presuppositions in holding which we believe something about God. 3. It might be a proposition in which the existence of the world of nature was stated in the form of an attribute or activity of God; and this seems the only possible alternative. (EM, 215-16).


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APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Glenn C. Shipley has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Edward A Maziarz, Director
Professor, Philosophy, Loyola University

Dr. James Blachowicz
Associate Professor, Philosophy, Loyola University

Dr. Peter Maxwell
Assistant Professor, Philosophy, Loyola University

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

June 2, 1983

Director's Signature