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The Professionalization of the Roman Army in the Second Century B.C.

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THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE ROMAN ARMY

IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

by

Martin C. J. Miller

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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"Me quoque iuvat, velut ipse in parte laboris ac periculi fuerim, ad finem belli Punici pervenisse."

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VITA

The author, Martin C. J. Miller, was born on December 16, 1949, in Chicago, Illinois.

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III. THE ROMAN MILITARY SYSTEM FROM THE LATE-REGAL PERIOD TO THE PYRRHIC WAR................................. 63
ABBREVIATIONS

AHR = American Historical Review. Washington, American Historical Association. 1895--.

AJAH = American Journal of Ancient History. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University. 1976--.


Acme = Annali della Facoltà di Filosofia e Lettere dell' Università statale di Milano. Milan, Università degli Studi. 1948--.

Athenaeum = Athenaeum. Studi periodici di Letteratura e Storia dell' Antichità. Pavia, Università. 1913--.


BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance des Hellenique. Athens, Ecole Francaise d'Athenes. 1877--.

CAH = Cambridge Ancient History. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1928--.

CP = Classical Philology. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 1906--.

CQ = Classical Quarterly. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1907--.


CW = The Classical World. Pittsburgh, Duquense University. 1907--.

Emerita = Revista di Linguistica y Filologia clasica. Madrid, Instituto Antonio de Nebrija. 1933--.

Hermes = Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag. 1866--.
Historia = Revue d'histoire ancienne. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag. 1950--.


JRS = Journal of Roman Studies. London, Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies. 1911--.

Klio = Beiträge zu alten Geschichte. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag. 1901--.


PMAAR = Papers and Monographs of the American Academy at Rome. Rome, American Academy at Rome. 1919--.

Philologus = Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag. 1846--.


PBSR = Papers of the British School at Rome. London, MacMillan. 1946--.


RhM = Rheinisches Museum. Frankfort, Sauerlander. 1842--.
RFIC = Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica. Turin, Loescher Editore. 1873--.

SDHI = Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris. Rome, Apollinaris Editore. 1935--.
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Investigation*

The advance of Roman civilization depended upon the strength of the legions. Accordingly, the army played an integral role throughout the history of the city. Unlike any other ancient society, the development of the military organization significantly affected the nature of its political institutions. For example, the introduction of hoplite weapons and tactics at some time during the sixth century changed the social structure of the city from one based on gentilitian ties to one of wealth. Similarly, as the pool of wealthy citizens dwindled under the repeated blows of the Veian War, the sack of Rome by the Gauls, the Samnite, Pyrrhic and Punic Wars (First and Second), the State came to rely upon the induction of poorer citizens into the army for its defense. The increasing proletarianization of the legions eventually led to a soldiery which looked to and relied upon the individual army commander for their livelihood and welfare.

Most scholars have accepted the proposal of H. M. D. Parker that the legions of the Roman Republic were con-

*All dates are B. C. unless otherwise noted.

-1-
scripted militias until the Marian dilectus (ca. 107). At that time the property requirements for military service were supposedly set aside and enlistment into the army opened to any citizen who presented himself for service. He also suggested that from this particular moment the legions began to assume a professional attitude which eventually led to the Augustan reorganization and institutionalization of the structure of the Roman army. As a result of Marius' alleged innovation and the subsequent Augustan reform, it has been suggested that the individual soldier was able to look to the army to provide employment. Supposedly, the pre-Marian Republican system could not offer the individual a military career.

Military Professionalism in Antiquity

Since this study is based upon the interpretation of the literary evidence, the problem is to establish a set of criteria for the identification of military professionalism. It will be shown that even though the ancient writers at-


tempted to portray the soldiers of the pre-Marian Roman army as patriotic citizens who fought solely for love of their city, many men enlisted in the hope of personal gain.

Parker was reluctant to grant professional status to the pre-Marian legionaries as he believed that there was no requisite length of service and because he accepted the testimony of the ancient sources that the army remained "a citizen militia of peasant proprietors."4

If defined in modern terms, the Roman legionary of the pre-Marian era does not seem to fit the image of a professional soldier. During this period, an individual could not enter a school for special training, he could not serve in the same military unit for a long period of time and when he enlisted he did so without any assurances as to benefits upon discharge. Yet, there are other aspects of military service in this period which indicate that a Roman had the opportunity to develop himself into a highly trained, efficient soldier who would be able to earn his livelihood from warfare.

In this study, military professionalism will be defined as the continuous practice of the art of war by repeated enlistments into the legions. It should be noted that even though the need for employment was the driving force behind continuous service, the lure of adventure and the desire to win riches were equally as important.

4Parker, RL, 20.
There are several reasons for the reluctance of scholars to accept the definition that professional soldiers served in the pre-Marian legions: (1) the testimony of the ancient sources, (2) the belief that the legionaries served only for a brief period of time before they received their discharge and, (3) the identification of professional soldiers, that is, mercenaries, with Carthage and the Hellenistic East.

The Ancient Sources

The testimony of the ancient sources, Livy (1,43ff. and 8,8ff.), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (4,16ff.) and Polybius (6,19ff.), has perpetuated the tradition that the Republican army was solely composed of conscripts. In each instance the annalistic accounts have preserved the tradition that men were selected for the army based upon their status in the Servian census. Accordingly, those who owned little or no property were believed to have been excluded from military service. It will be demonstrated in Chapter III that although the concept of the Servian scheme was essentially correct, the census figures were a product of much later writers. Most scholars have equated a certain amount of land with these census figures. It will be shown, however, that all assets which an individual owned were included in his assessment. Nowhere in the ancient texts do the legionaries even vaguely resemble professional military men. In addition to these sources, the abundant
epigraphical testimonia of Roman veterans from the post-Marian legions has contributed to this perception.

Length of Service

The imperial requirement of a 20-year term of service is well known. Yet, Polybius also indicates that the common foot soldier could be required to perform 16 years of military duty, 20 years in an emergency.\(^5\)

In the hundred or so years which preceded the first consulship of Marius, Rome needed to raise two types of military forces: (1) those which remained under arms for a long period of time and, (2) those which were mobilized for campaigns of relatively short duration. Service in Italy, during the Hanniballic War, and in the Spains, after the expulsion of the Carthaginians, are examples of protracted military service. As will be shown later, the terms of service could easily reach 20 years in the case of the Hanniballic War and 18 years during the Numantine War. The wars against the tribes of northern Italy and the Hellenistic monarchs are examples of short campaigns. In particular, the wars of short duration presented the discharged veterans with an opportunity to select the next commander and theatre of war in which they would serve.

Paid Military Service Among the Greeks and Romans

Even though the Romans were paid a wage to serve in

\(^5\)Polyb. 6,19,2; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957, I,
the army (stipendium), the ancients tended to associate professional soldiering with the armies of Carthage and the Hellenistic East. These armies were largely composed of mercenaries. In keeping with Roman tradition, Diodorus Siculus remarked that the Romans neither employed mercenaries, nor could the city afford to do so:

'Ρωμαίοι δὲ οὔτε μισθοφόρους εἴωθασιν ἔχειν οὔτε χρημάτων εὐποροῦσιν.

Contrary to Diodorus' statement, and the attitudes of Plautus and others, Roman commanders resorted to whatever means necessary in order to ensure victory. Cato, who is the earliest Roman writer to use the term mercennarius, describes the Celtiberian mercenaries as a quarrelsome lot who were unreliable in the face of the enemy. Although his testimony is hardly a recommendation for their use, Cato himself did not hesitate to hire them while campaigning in 698.


7Plaut. mil. glor. 72ff.; 948ff.; Enn. ann. frg. 529; Non. 196L; Fest. 105L; Burchner in RE XII, s.v. latro­cinium, cols. 978ff.

8Diod. Sic. 29,6,1; Dion. Hal. 4,19,4.

Spain. The statement of Diodorus, therefore, must only refer to the hiring of foreigners to fight in the place of Romans.

Some Scholarly Opinions

A number of scholars have studied the Hellenistic mercenaries. G. T. Griffith, in an earlier work, maintained that there were three types of soldiers employed in the Greek world: (1) mercenaries on long term contracts, (2) picked citizens (ἐπιλεκτοὶ) who remained under arms only for the duration of the campaign, and (3) citizen conscripts who were rarely mustered. Although Griffith's first type of soldier has no parallel at Rome, his second example is similar to the Roman custom of conscription. The third type was also similar to the practice used at Rome when an emergency (tumultus) was declared.

Y. Garlan, commenting upon mercenary service in the Hellenistic East, proposed that a mercenary should be

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12 E. Sachers in RE VIIA, s.v. tumultus, cols. 1344ff.

defined as "...a professional soldier whose behavior is determined not by his membership in a political community, but by the lure of profit. E. Gabba, in his study on the late Republican army, defined military professionalism as: "...a carattere professionale (di cui le principali caratteristiche sono appunto la continuità del servizio e la mentalità mercenaria), ...."^14 If the definitions of these leading scholars are applied to military service at Rome, it follows that the only difference between the Roman legionaries and the Hellenistic mercenaries was that the legions were restricted to Roman citizens while the mercenary's polis of origin was of little or no consequence to himself or his employer. The definition of military professionalism used in this study reflects the criteria previously established by these scholars.

**Motivating Factors in Voluntary Enlistment**

As noted by Gabba above, the professional soldier sought continual employment in the army and desired to amass wealth ("la continuità del servizio e la mentalità mercenaria.") In this sense, the poor of Rome, rather than the wealthier elements of society, would have had the same basic needs as the Hellenistic mercenaries. It will be necessary, therefore, to examine the various sources for the second century in order to determine whether these con-

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ditions existed at Rome which would have fostered a professional attitude towards military service.

For this purpose, a comparison of civilian and military wages, as well as the cost of living, will be investigated (Chapter IV).

Summary

Although the prospects of making a career in the Roman army were enhanced by the numerous conflicts of the late third and second centuries, this is by no means to imply that the legal vehicle of legionary enlistment, the ἔλεκτος, was abandoned. The formal procedure, however, received such prominent mention by the ancient writers that most scholars have argued that the Roman legions were raised on an "as needed" basis and were entirely composed of conscripts. This arrangement supposedly continued


without any significant change until ca. 107 when Marius allegedly opened the legions to all Roman citizens regardless of their census rating (Sall. BJ 86,2).

Scholars have long analyzed the supposed Marian innovation in terms of the property requirements of the reforms ascribed to Servius. It has been held that land alone was the basis of the census.

It will be shown that contrary to the testimony of the ancient sources, other forms of wealth, such as uncoined bronze, livestock, chattel property and wages were included in the assessment of an individual's census rating.

Due to the economic distress of the Hannibalic War, an increasing number of men made soldiering a career. This group of men, by repeated enlistments, formed a core of a professionals which the Republican generals of the second and first centuries eagerly enrolled into their armies. 17 It will be shown that in times of crisis all restrictions were suspended and every citizen, even the poorest, served in the army.

CHAPTER I

ANCIENT SOURCES AND MODERN OPINIONS REGARDING THE MARIAN DILECTUS OF CA. 107

To a degree, nearly all scholars have relied upon the same ancient sources regarding the actions of Marius. The ancient sources for the Marian episode are Sallust, Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, Florus, Gellius, and Dio. These accounts contain varying amounts of information based upon each writer's interest and discretion in relating the events of that period. The central theme, however, which pervades both ancient and modern opinions is that Marius was the first commander to open the legions to all Romans who desired to enlist.

Current Opinions on the Marian 'dilectus'

The sources indicate that Marius abolished the last vestiges of conscriptional service ca. 107 B.C. After this date the legions were supposedly opened to all Roman citizens regardless of property qualification. The evidence, drawn primarily from Sallust, has credited Marius with having overturned a long-standing prohibition against

1The ancient sources for the Marian reform are as follows: Sall. BJ 86,2-3; Plut. Mar. 9,1-2; Val. Max. 2, 3,1; Gell. n.a. 16,10,14-16; Florus 1,36,13; Festus 453L., Dio 26, 89,2.
the conscription of landless citizens.\(^2\) H. M. D. Parker,\(^3\) who seemingly is the originator of this concept, summarized Marius' alleged achievement as follows:

In place of the annual levy Rome started a professional army. All citizens were liable for military service, and, although conscription thus remained the rule, it is probable, as we shall see when dealing with the Principate, that the legions were normally maintained by voluntary enlistment.

It is not surprising that Parker's view is shared by many historians. As noted below, the writings of the ancient authorities concerning the pre-Marian army imply that Rome never needed to rely upon any soldiers, other than her citizen militia, to defend her from her enemies.

In his section on the Marian reforms, Parker omitted to mention those scholarly works which had contributed to the development of his thesis. The earlier efforts of Marquardt\(^4\) and Mommsen\(^5\) on Marius seem to have been overlooked by Parker, even though the works of both scholars played a prominent role in the development of his later chapters. Although both Marquardt and Mommsen considered Marius' inclusion of the proletarii and the capite censi into the legions as innovative, neither concluded that the occurrence

\(^2\)Sall. BJ 86,2.

\(^3\)Parker, RL, 45.


\(^5\)Mommsen, RSt III, 298.
was revolutionary. In fact, Marquardt devoted considerably more attention to the changes wrought by Marius in equipping the legions, in organization and tactics, rather than in the demographic sources of legionary personnel. Although he does not specifically mention Marquardt and Mommsen, Parker may have been substantially influenced by two other contemporaries from the German school.

From the citations given in his book on the Roman legions, it is clear that the writings of Hans Delbrück and Eduard Meyer played a role in the development of Parker's theory. Delbrück was the first to notice that the legions of the post-Hannibalic War era had become increasingly professional: "Der zweite punische Krieg hat Rom virtuell das Berufsheer gegeben, aber nicht bloss formell blieb es ein Bürgerheer, sondern tatsächlich dauerte der Übergang auch noch sehr lange." Delbrück indicates that the precarious military situation prevailing during the Hannibalic War compelled the Romans to maintain an armed force unlike any of those which had been previously levied. Delbrück shows that extraordinary measures were implemented during the Hannibalic War to meet the military exigency. After the disaster at Cannae, the military situation at Rome was so

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6 Marquardt, RSt II, 435ff.

desperate that even slaves and underaged boys were enrolled into the legions.⁸ A few years later, minimum property requirements for legionary service were sharply lowered in order to enlist those who had been previously ineligible.⁹ The seemingly incessant levies to which the Roman citizenry was subject, and the unusually large numbers of legions which were required for this war, meant that the citizen soldier spent most of his time in the army and not on his farm. The prime examples of this long term service are those legions which had accompanied the Scipiones, Gnaeus and Publius, to Spain in 218,¹⁰ the legiones Cannenses of 216,¹¹ and those legions which were sent to the province with Scipio Africanus in 210.¹² Voluntary enlistment of the poorest elements of society also occurred during this period. Livy states that in 205, Scipio Africanus enlisted

⁸Livy 22,57.

⁹Polyb. 6,19,2; Walbank, Comm. I, 698.

¹⁰Livy 21,32,3. These legions remained in Spain until their separate defeats under the Scipiones in the Betic valley 211 (Livy. 25,36,14).

¹¹Livy 22,54. The survivors of Cannae were formed into two legions and sent, in disgrace, to garrison Sicily (Livy. 24,18,8f.) In 215, the survivors of the defeat at Herdonia (Livy. 27,8,13ff.) were also sent to serve in the legiones Cannenses. In the same year, those who tried to evade military service, about 2,000 men according to Livy, were enrolled in these legions. They were later taken to Africa by Scipio Africanus he was given command of that expedition.

¹²Livy 26,42.
7,000 impoverished Sabines and Umbrians for the invasion of Africa.¹³ Long term service and the acceptance of the poorest members of Roman society as volunteers preceded Marius' alleged reform by nearly a hundred years.

Several years after Delbrück's work, Eduard Meyer declared that most of the legionary personnel, after ca. 153, consisted of volunteers and not conscripts.¹⁴ Unfortunately, when Meyer presented his conclusions, he offered no corroborating evidence by which to judge his theory.

Although used Delbrück's work, and presumably was aware of Meyer's conclusion, he still maintained that the pre-Marian legions were principally drawn from the Roman middle class and were non-professional in nature. In reviewing Parker's work, we will need to examine certain areas: (1) Parker's consultation of sources other than Sallust; (2) Parker's implication that Marius' actions were in some way illegal or extraconstitutional; and, (3) Review whether the late Republican practices, such as rewards and donatives to the soldiers, originated with Marius as Parker assumed.

¹³ Liv. 28, 45.

¹⁴ E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften, 2 vols., Halle, Verlag von Max Nieyer, 1924, II, 226: "So wird denn auch die Aushebung immer undurchführbarer; seit dem Wiederausbruch der spanischen Kriege im Jahre 153 tritt immer mehr die Anwerbung von Freiwilligen an ihre Stelle. Den Abschluss bildet dann auch hier das Söldnerheer der Marius." Meyer seems to have relied upon the statement of Appian that in this year the tribes which were to provide the necessary troops were selected by lot.
In his desire to fix a definite date for the origins of a professional army at Rome, it seems that Parker relied almost exclusively upon the testimony of Sallust. It is necessary, therefore, to carefully analyze the relevant passages of Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum* if Marius' actions are to be fully understood.

Although Parker seems to have accepted Sallust's account of the Marian *dilectus* of ca. 107, this does not seem appropriate. Even though Sallust is generally praised for his accuracy of historical detail, his work is not without the taint of a partisan political pamphlet. It is known that he was a loyal adherent of Caesar and composed the *Bellum Jugurthinum* sometime after the dictator's death, and during the early years of the second triumvirate. Since Sallust had lived through the turbulent years of the first century, it seems only natural that as a supporter of Caesar he would seek to justify Caesar's policies by identifying the current situation with a historical trend. To this

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15 Parker, RL, 24, cites no other sources.


end, Sallust must have believed that Marius was the key figure in the *popularis* cause. Here was the man who, in Sallust's opinion, had overturned the most ancient traditions of Rome by having opened the legions to the poor. As H. J. Rose noted, "to glorify Marius was a piece of orthodox Caesarianism in Sallust's time." 19

Marius was ideally suited for Sallust's purpose. A family relationship had been established earlier by Marius' marriage to Caesar's aunt Julia. 20 It might seem that Caesar was bringing the designs of his uncle to fruition with his victory over the *optimates*. Sallust, apparently satisfied with his choice of Marius, looked no further for the origins of the professional army at Rome. And in turn, Parker, having embraced Sallust's work completely, looked no further than the conqueror of Jugurtha.

Parker 21 further attempted to support his theory by suggesting that Marius' appeal for voluntary enlistees was extra-legal, unconstitutional and without historical precedent.

Lastly, Parker has ascribed a number of late Repub-


21 Parker, RL, 45.
lican and imperial practices to the genius of Marius and his successors. It is a well known tendency of the ancients to credit one man with having accomplished sweeping military, political or social changes. The institutionalization of a twenty-year term of military enlistment, the enrollment of troops by a general on his own initiative, and the distribution of rewards to the soldiers are various aspects of military life which Marius was believed to have influenced.

As will be seen below, there is clear evidence that all of these situations had occurred earlier in Roman history.

Scholarly Opinion after H. M. D. Parker

The opinions of historians regarding the supposed Marian reforms and the professionalization of Rome's armies have settled into several different camps. There are those followers of Parker such as F. E. Adcock, A. H. M. Jones, P. A. Kildahl, F. B. Marsh and others who have strenuously argued that Marius was the first to throw enrollment in the legions open to any Roman citizen.\footnote{Adcock, Roman Art of War, 20; A. H. M. Jones, History of Rome Through the Fifth Century, London, MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1968, I, 145; P. A. Kildahl, Caius Marius, New York, Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1968, 75f; Marsh, History, 84f.} Among scholars, therefore, the actions of Marius are viewed as an innovative and revolutionary stroke which altered the nature of the Roman legion from a citizen militia to a professional
fighting force.

A more moderate position has been advanced by Emilio Gabba and has been accepted by T. F. Carney, Y. Garlan, W. G. Sinnigen and A. E. R. Boak, R. E. Smith, and G. Webster. The consensus of their opinion was that Marius' actions were not revolutionary at all, but only the final step in a long series of events of the last hundred years or so.\textsuperscript{23}

Kromayer-Veith, in the same year Parker presented his argument, proposed that Marius' main achievement was in allowing the capite censi to enroll in the legions thereby expanding the army's social base.\textsuperscript{24} J. Harmand, H. Last, C. Nicolet, A. Passerini, and Y. Shochat have all agreed with this premise in some form or another.\textsuperscript{25} Nicolet, while maintaining that Marius' alleged reform was not revolutionary, states that a professional army did not evolve until the principate of Augustus. Although Nicolet's ini-


\textsuperscript{24}Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, 411f.

tial point is acceptable, his suggestion that the professional army evolved under Augustus is not defensible. Shochat has recently added that no shortage of manpower existed and that the influx of volunteers into the legions as a result of Marius' call for volunteers amply demonstrates this point.26

The fourth and final view regarding the Marian reform is that there were volunteers and professionals in the army well before Marius won his first consulship. According to P. A. Brunt and W. V. Harris, this type of soldier was not numerous and probably represented only a small fraction of the strength of the legion's personnel.27 These scholars have rejected the suggestion made earlier by Meyer and Delbruck regarding the number and effect which volunteers had upon legionary enrollment during the second century. The position of Brunt and Harris, however, has been contradicted by Shochat as noted above.

It can be discerned from the writings of the scholars mentioned above that they have accepted the testimony of Sallust, Plutarch and others, that Marius was the first commander to enlist soldiers from the vast pool of poor citizens. Yet, upon a closer examination of the ancient accounts, it seems that neither Sallust nor Plutarch checked

26Shochat, Tiberius, 65.

the annalistic sources or private archives closely, for if they had, they would have found that at one time or another, citizens who had possessed little or no property had served in the legions. It will, therefore, be the purpose of the discussion that follows to prove that Marius' real accomplishment was that he had officially recognized a process which had originated and flourished during the hundred or so years which preceded his first consulship.

The Ancient Sources and the Marian 'dilectus'

Sallust, whose monograph is chronologically closest to the actual event, is the main source for any discussion of the Marian episode. Yet, we should note that Sallust composed his work more than sixty years after Marius held his first consulship. The events of the first century, through which Sallust lived, civil wars and proscriptions, may have had a profound affect upon him. It seems that Sallust must have considered Marius as the progenitor of this century of social unrest. Therefore, he looked no further for the cause of the chaos.

The passage from Sallust's Bellum Jugurthinum which concerns Marius' reform has undergone extensive scrutiny by modern scholars. There are, however, certain elements of the account which seemingly have been ignored. For the most part, Sallust\(^\text{28}\) states that Marius allowed anyone to

\(^{28}\)Sall. BJ 86,2; Gell. n.a. 16,10,16.
volunteer, even the *capite censi*, a procedure considered not to have been a regular practice in the past:

Ipse interea milites scribere, non more maiorum neque ex classibus, sed uti cuiusque lubido erat, capite censos plerosque.

Plutarch, who seems to have followed the contemporary account of Posidonius, confirms this opinion of the measure's usefulness in his *Life* of Marius:

...παρὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν...;

In two earlier passages, however, Sallust demonstrates that Marius was simply calling upon his countrymen to come to the aid of their country. The appeal of Marius was to the patriotic sentiments of his fellow-citizens. Viewed in this manner, Marius' call to arms was no different from that of Siccius Dentatus many centuries earlier, or even that of Scipio Nasica during the first Gracchan crisis.

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29 Plut. Mar. 9,1. Although the sources for Plutarch's *Lives* are not easily discernible, there are several chapters of the *Life* of Marius which seem to have been derived from Posidonius. Cf. F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1961, Vol. IIA, s.v. "Poseidonios von Apameia," frgs. 7 (Mar. 45), 37 (Mar. 45,3), 60 (Mar. 1) and 113 (Mar. 21,7); von Fritz, "Sallust," 166f.

30 Sall. BJ 85,47: "Quam ob rem vos, quibus militaris aetas est, adni†imini mecum et capessite rem publicam neque quemquam ex calamitate aliorum aut imperatorum superbia metus ceperit;" 85,48: "...tamen omnis bonos rei publicae subvenire decebat."

31 Dion. Hal. 10,43; Donat. ad Ter. Eunuch. 4,7,2; cf. Serv. ad Aen. 2,157; 7,614; Isid. orig. 9,3,52-55: "qui rem publicam salvam vult sequimini;" Márquardt, RSt II, 387. Livy (3,31,2-4) does not mention this episode.

Marius' recourse to the enrollment of volunteers is also reminiscent of Scipio Africanus' enlistment of 7,000 impoverished Umbrians and Sabines in 205, T. Flamininus' enrollment of 3,000 Scipionic veterans in 198, the voluntary enlistment of Scipio Aemilianus for the last war against Carthage, and Aemilianus' call to his friends and clients to serve with him in the war against Numantia.

Although it is not known whether Marius was aware of the enlistment of volunteers under Scipio Africanus or Flamininus, he certainly had first-hand knowledge of this practice from his acquaintance with Scipio Aemilianus. It seems that before his connection with the Metellan family, there had been a long-standing association of the Mariani from Arpinum with that of the Scipiones. In fact when Aemilianus rallied his supporters for service in Spain, Marius was among those who accompanied him and served as a member of the cavalry. The relationship seems to have

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33 Liv. 28,45.
34 Plut. Flam. 3,3.
35 App. Lib. 75.
been of a personal nature in that Plutarch implies that Marius was a contubernalis of the general.\textsuperscript{39} The Scipionic connection continued well after Aemilianus' death. For in ca. 121 Marius is known to have accompanied Q. Fabius Maximus, the adopted son of Aemilianus, on his campaign in Transalpine Gaul.\textsuperscript{40} The relationship with the Scipiones may have been severed shortly thereafter as Plutarch indicates that Marius attached himself to the Caecilii Metelli.\textsuperscript{41} The connection with the Scipiones, however, had proved useful to Marius. His call for volunteers mirrored the earlier public appeals of Africanus and Aemilianus. In this sense, therefore, his actions cannot be construed as extralegal or unconstitutional.

\textbf{Marius and the 'populares' }

Since it is known that Marius' call for volunteers was in complete accord with traditional methods of recruitment, the question arises as to the cause of the hostile literary tradition surrounding the events of his first consulship. The ancient sources are critical of the social status of the political constituency of Marius. The imperial writers, and even the republican Sallust, have depicted the hero of the populares as having sought and obtained the political support of the poorest, and, in their opinion,

\textsuperscript{39} Plut. Mar. 3,2-4; Val. Max. 8,15,7.

\textsuperscript{40} Val. Max. 6,9,4 and 14.

\textsuperscript{41} Plut. Mar. 4,1.
the worst, elements of Roman society. Much of this tradition was developed during the early years of the Principate. As a reaction to the chaos of the first century, the literary works which were composed contain a considerable amount of an anti-*popularis* sentiment. The writers of the imperial era were unwilling to see, and less likely to admit, the connection between the *princeps* and the plebians. In this context the *princeps* was considered to have been just the leading member of the aristocracy and not the champion of the commons. Thus, we must conclude that modern opinions regarding the Marian episode have been influenced by the hostile literary tradition.

A close scrutiny of the sources reveals that the constituency of Marius was composed of those same groups which had recently supported the Gracchi. The urban and rural plebeians, the equestrian class, and certain *popularis* elements of the nobility supported the candidacies of

\[\text{Sall. BJ 86,3: "Id factum alii inopia bonorum, alii per ambitionem consulis memorabant, quod ab eo genere celebratus auctusque erat, et homini potentiam quaerenti egentissumus quisque opportunissumus, cui neque sua cara, quippe quae nulla sunt, et omnia cum pretio honesta videntur."}
\[\text{Val. Max. 2,3,1: "Sed hanc diutina usurpatione formam consuetudinem C. Marius capite censum legendo militem abruptit, civis alioqui magnificus, sed novitatis suae scientia vetustati non sana propitius memorque, si militaria signa humilitatem spernere perseverarent, se a maligno virtutum interprete velut capite censum imperatorem concellari posse."}
\[\text{Flor. 1, 36,13: "Postremo Marius auctis admodum copiis, cum pro obscuritate generis sui capite censos sacramento adegisset,..."}
\[\text{Dio 26,89,2: "Hv μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἄλλως καὶ στασιάδος καὶ ταραχῆς, καὶ πάντως μὲν τοῦ συμφετέρου, ἀφ' οὗπερ καὶ ἐπεφύκει, φίλος, παντὸς δὲ τοῦ γενναίου καθαιρέτης."}
these men. In the years between the election victories of the Gracchi and Marius, it must be assumed that the populares were either unable to present candidates who could command strong, popular support or had been sufficiently cowed by the force of a resurgent optimate faction.

The timing in the upturn of the fortunes of the populares faction is worth mention. In ca. 122 Gaius Gracchus had been able to pass the lex Sempronia militaris which prohibited the enlistment into the army of boys under seventeen years of age. These boys probably possessed little or no property of their own as they were still subject to their fathers' potestas. The prohibition of this practice by the legislation of Gaius indicates that the enlistment of underaged recruits must have been common at this time. In ca. 109, however, the lex Iunia militaris nullified the earlier Gracchan legislation. The lex Iunia allowed commanders to resume the enrollment of those who had been recently prohibited under the lex Sempronia from serving in legions.

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43 For Tiberius Gracchus, see Plut. Ti.G. 16; App. BC 1,14; Diod. Sic. 34/35,24-25; Dio 24,83,3; Liv. Epit. 58; for Gaius Gracchus, see Plut. G.G. 3;5; App. BC 1,22; Dio 25,85,3; Liv. Epit. 61; for Marius, see Dio 26,89,2.


45 Ps.-Ascon. in Corneliam 60; Rotondi, Leges, 324.
When war was declared on Jugurtha, it had been believed that the contest could be brought to a relatively quick resolution. The methodical conduct of the war by Metellus, however, frustrated the hopes of the soldiers for an early end to the war. As a result public sentiment turned against the optimates and revived the hopes of the populares. Marius, the champion of the populares, was elected consul and assigned Africa as his province. Although he had been allowed to raise additional troops through the dilectus, Marius must have felt the need to increase his force beyond the limit set by the senate. In order to circumvent the recruitment restrictions set by the senate, he called upon all citizens to come to the aid of the city. His call for volunteers resembles the actions of Aemilianus in ca. 134 when he was placed in a similar position by the senate. It is likely that Marius' call to arms appealed to those men who did not have a permanent means of earning a living: namely, the underaged who owned little or nothing, the impoverished urban dwellers and dispossessed farmers who worked as day-laborers and those who sought adventure in foreign lands. Sallust explicitly states that each man envisioned himself as returning home laden with spoils:

Sese quisque praeda locupletem fore, victorem domum redditurum alia huiuscemodi animis trahebant, et eos non paulum oratione sua Marius arrexerat.

Therefore, contrary to the opinions expressed by the an-

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46 Sall. BJ 84,4.
cient sources, Marius did not over-turn the manner in which troops were levied for the legions through illegal means. He simply continued a practice which had been employed by previous commanders when the occasion demanded more or experienced soldiers.

The chapters which follow will demonstrate the problems which the Romans encountered in levying a sufficient number of troops for the legions and how these difficulties were eventually resolved. In order to appreciate fully the manner in which a professional fighting force developed at Rome, however, it will be necessary to examine the system which had preceded it.
CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE ANNALISTIC TRADITION REGARDING MILITARY SERVICE IN THE REGAL PERIOD

It has been noted that modern scholars have maintained that the organization of the Roman Republican army which preceded Marius was a citizen militia. The testimony of the annalists has promoted the notion that military service at Rome was restricted to a conscriptional system known as the *dilectus*, through which qualified men were selected from the various property classes until the requisite number of soldiers was levied. The sources credit the genius of Servius Tullius in the almost legendary regal period with the institution of this type of military levy. The *opinio communis* about the veracity of these sources, and especially as to the historical existence of the Etruscan kings of Rome, have differed over the years. Despite the best efforts of some of the leading scholars on early Rome

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1 Varro 1.1. 5, 87; 6, 66; Polyb. 6, 19ff.; Walbank, Comm. I, 697ff.; W. Liebenam in RE V, s.v. *dilectus*, cols. 591-609; Brunt, IM, Appendix XIX, 625-34; Toynbee, HL I, 505-18.

2 Liv. 1, 43; Dion. Hal. 4, 16ff.; Ogilvie, Comm., 166ff. In addition to the military reforms, Servius was also credited with innovations in the political, monetary and legal aspects of Roman life.

3 U. Coli, "Regnum," SDHI XVII, 1951, 50f.; P. De
to relegate the Etruscan kings to the realm of legend, there still remains sufficient evidence, as of yet unsatisfactorily explained, to continue the debate on the authenticity of the regal period.\(^4\) At present, however, it will be


necessary to confront the literary evidence of annalistic sources with their intensely nationalistic tradition pervading the descriptions of the regal period. The annalistic accounts of regal Rome imply that nearly all social institutions originated and were refined during this period and that seldom, if ever, were any adjustments required for changes in the social condition. This optimistic picture is certainly false. It is equally erroneous to conclude, as some historians have done, that the entire episode of pre-Republican Rome is nothing more than myth-making by the later annalists.

In order to discern the method of selecting men for the army during the Republic, it is necessary to review the annalistic tradition and to attempt to determine those aspects of the tradition which apparently emanate from the regal and post-regal periods, and seem to be acceptable as a foundation for the development and eventual institutionalization of the Roman military system. In this effort, therefore, the conditions at Rome before the Servian reform, the reform itself in all its aspects, and its effect upon Roman society will be discussed.

The Servian Reforms

Any discussion of the early military system at Rome
invariably turns to the vitality of the city under the Etruscan kings and the institutionalization of society, including the introduction of the hoplite panoply and accompanying tactics among the wealthier elements of the population. Although the ancient sources have described Rome of the late regal period as of a highly centralized urban center, the accomplishments ascribed to the kings must be viewed with considerable caution. Some scholars of Rome's regal period have become so cautious that they have adopted a sceptical view towards the entire annalistic tradition. It is not sufficient, however, simply to dismiss or ignore all or most of the reports in the literary sources as anachronistic or false. It is important to realize the possibility that some changes or developments in the Roman lifestyle did occur during this period. The annalists, and others who relied upon them as sources, generally assumed that the institutions with which they were familiar originated in the misty past, amidst which they interjected the sweeping military and political reforms of a king known as Servius Tullius. Even though Servius has been credited with originating institutions which could not have possibly existed in their described form until centuries after his

5 Pais, Ancient Legends, 142; Pallottino, "Servius Tullius," 433.

assigned time, one should not discuss all the "reforms" attributed to Servius as anachronisms or fanciful legends. The tradition which surrounds the accomplishments of a king Servius was so strongly imbedded in the Roman mind that even a man of Cicero's considerable talents accepted the military, political and legal innovations which were attributed to the king.

Since the so-called Servian reforms were considered by the ancient Romans to have been the basis for military conscription, it will need to be more closely examined. The following description is offered by Livy:

Ex iis qui centum milium aeris aut maiorem censum haberent octoginta confecit centurias, quadragenas seniorum ac iuniorum; prima classis omnes appellati; seniores ad urbis custodiam ut praesto essent, iuvenes ut foris bella gererent; arma his imperata galea, clipeum, ocraea, lorica, omnia ex aere; haec ut tegumenta corporis huic classi duae fabrum centuriae quae sine armis stipendia facerent; datum munus ut machinas in bello ferent. Secunda classis intra centum usque ad quinque et septuaginta milium censum instituta, et ex iis, senoribus iunioribusque, viginti conscriptae centuriae; arma imperata scutum pro clipeo et praeter loricam omnia eadem. Tertiae classis in quinquaginta milium censum esse voluit; totidem centuriae et hae eodemque discrimine aetatum factae; nec de armis quicquam mutatum, ocraea tantum ademptae. In quarta classe census quinque et viginti milium, totidem centuriae factae, arma mutata: nihil praeter hastam et verutum datum. Quinta classis aucta; centuriae triginta factae; fundas lapidesque missiles hi secum gerebant; in his accensi cornices tubicinesque in duas centurias distributi; undecim milibus haec classis

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censebatur. Hoc minor census reliquam multitudinem habuit; inde una centuria facta est, immunis militia.

The most striking aspect of the Servian reform is its connection with a social order based upon wealth. This has led some scholars to claim that the reforms were timocratic in nature. One thing is certain, as in the case of archaic Greece, an increase in the amount of wealth owned by certain segments of society led to the adoption of hoplite armor and tactics at Rome.

The conflict with the Etruscans seems to have led to the use of more sophisticated weapons and tactics by the Romans. It is likely that before the intervention of the elder Tarquin into the affairs of Rome, the primitive Roman levy consisted of all adult males who could furnish themselves with any type of weapon. At the first encounter against the Etruscan hoplites, it must have become clear that the Romans were no match for an enemy armed with superior weapons. Roman literary tradition has held that during the period of Etruscan domination, the primitive levy

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and tactics were abandoned in favor of the Etruscan mode of fighting.\textsuperscript{12}

The much maligned literary testimony has received needed support from the less frequently consulted archaeological evidence. Tamborini, in an earlier work, examined the weapons attributed to the Romans in the mid-sixth century and found them to have compared favorably to those which had been discovered in Etruria.\textsuperscript{13} The weaponry of both peoples seems to have been nearly identical at this time. This evidence has undergone a recent re-examination by Saulnier with no substantial change in the original interpretation of the material by Tamborini.\textsuperscript{14} Bloch used the same archaeological evidence to suggest that the city had achieved a certain degree of economic prosperity under

\textsuperscript{12}Diod. Sic. 23,2,2: "Ὅτι ἡμαῖοι πρῶτον ἀσπίδας τε-πραγώνοις ἔχον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. Ὑστερον ἵδοντες Τυρρηνοὺς χαλκᾶς ἀσπίδας ἔχοντας, ποιήσαντες οὕτως ἐνίκησαν αὐτούς." Athen. 6,273: "Ελαβον δὲ καὶ παρὰ Τυρρηνῶν τὴν σταδίαν μα-χην φαλαγγῆδον ἐπιοντῶν,..." H. von Arnim, "Ineditum Vatic-anum," Hermes 27, 1892, 121: "Τυρρηνοὶ γὰρ ἤμισυ ἐπολέμουν χαλκασπίδες καὶ φαλαγγῆδον, οὐ κατὰ σπείρας μαχόμενοι. καὶ ἡμεῖς μεθοπλοθέντες καὶ τὸν ἑκείνων ὀπλίσμον μεταλαβόντες παρετατόμεθα αὐτοῖς." Liv. 8,8,3: "Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt, dein, postquam stipendarii facti sunt, scuta pro clipeis fecere; et quod antea phalanges similes Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa acies coepit esse...."

\textsuperscript{13}F. Tamborini, "La vita economica nella Roma degli ultimi re," Athenaeum N. S. xviii, 1930, 299-328 and 452-87.

\textsuperscript{14}C. Saulnier, L'Armée et la Guerre dans le Monde Étrusco-Romain (VIIe-IVe s.), Paris, Diffusion de Boccard, 1980, 105ff. This same material was examined earlier by P. Couissin, Les Armes Romaines, Paris, Librairie Ancienne Hon-oré Champion, Editeur, 1926, 119ff.
the Etruscans. As a result of its economic good fortune, Rome boasted a number of citizens who owned sufficient property which enabled them to provide themselves with the hoplite panoply. Thus, the archaeological evidence indicates that a fundamental change must have occurred in Roman society.

Unfortunately, the scope and limitations of the reform in weaponry and tactics cannot be defined, but literary evidence, in accord with archaeological finds, indicates that Servius introduced hoplite-style equipment to the army. Livy, upon closing his description of the Servian classes, states that the burden of military service fell upon the rich, while the poor were relieved from that task. After Livy completed his report on the infantry, he offered some brief comments on the role of the cavalry (equites). Although the equites are not the primary con-


16 Liv. 1,43,9: "Haec omnia in dites a pauperibus inclinata onera." Although it is often unwise to compare the events in one society with those of another, the testimony of Aristotle in regards to the economic status of hoplites deserves comment. In the Politics (4,3,1), Aristotle stated that in general the rich and not the poor were hoplites. In the Athenaion Politeia (4,2) Aristotle further notes that citizenship devolved upon those who provided themselves with hoplite arms (απεδέχοτο μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τῶν ὀπλά παρεχουμένων). P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Athenaion Politeia, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1981, 113.

cern of this discussion, Livy has offered some interesting points about this socio-economic group. As noted, the testimony of Aristotle might also provide some insight to the social standing of horsemen, albeit in Greece. If that Aristotle's description of the general characteristics of those individuals who comprised the cavalry is accepted and comparable to the Roman experience, then the equites must have consisted of the wealthiest members of the First Class. This is likely from the fact that every one of them had to provide his own equipment. According to Livy, an eques received a stipend from the state treasury in order to maintain the animal for his own use and that of the state. The annual stipend was 2,000 asses.

Since it is commonly accepted that the wealthiest individuals had to provide their own arms in both Greece and Rome, as well as their own horse in Greece, it seems


19 Liv. 1,43,8-9; 3,27; Dion. Hal. 4,18; 6,44; Cic. de rep. 2,39; Polyb. 6,20,9; Plin. n.h. 33,43; Hill, Roman Middle Class, 8f.

likely that Livy's example of a state stipend for the upkeep of the horse is misplaced here. In fact Livy may have transferred, in part, the Polybian account regarding the period of the Hanniballic War to that of the Servian episode. It seems likely, therefore, that Livy's account for the regal period deals with the *eques publicus* and not the *eques privatus* which was supposedly introduced in ca. 403.

The Nature of the Reforms

The abolition of the old tribal system of the Ramnes, Tities and Luceres and the creation of the new tribes, Suburana, Palatina, Esquilina and Collina, marked the end of the gentilitian social system characteristic of the early archaic age. Territory and wealth were the basis of the new tribal organization. Under this system, the role of the *curiae* was substantially diminished.

Tactical Relationship of the Servian Tribes to the Legion

It is widely accepted that during the late-regal and

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23 Mommsen, *RSt* III, 256.

24 Ogilvie, *Early Rome*, 54; Richard, *Les Origines*, 397. Gjerstad (ER VI, 135) considers the "timocratic" constitution as not having been adopted earlier that the beginning of the fifth century.
early Republican periods, the number of tribes, military tribunes and troops were coordinated in some manner for purposes of the levy.25 Each of the three primitive tribes provided a contingent of 1,000 men from the ten curiae of the tribe.26 From each tribe, a military leader, known as a tribune, was selected to command the tribal contingent.27 Thereafter, it became customary to charge a tribune with command of 1,000 men.28 Although Varro used the term tribunus militum, it is impossible to determine the exact designation of the leader of the tribal contingent. If it can


26 Varro 1.1. 5,55; 81; 89: "Milites, quod trium milium primo legio fiebat ac singulae tribus Titiensium, Rammium, Lucerum milia militum mittebant;" 91; Fest. 484L; Varro's etymology, however, is incorrect. Cf. Walde-Hofmann, LEW, s.v. mille II, 88. At one time even Mommsen (RSt III, 105) had accepted Varro's interpretation.

27 Dion. Hal. 2,7,3.

28 J. Lengle in RE VI, s.v. tribunus, cols. 2439f.; Meyer, Kleine Schriften II, 280; Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, 268; J. Suolahti, The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period, A Study on Social Structure, Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1955, 36f. Suolahti noted that as the number of legions increased and, consequently, the number of military tribunes, the socio-political importance of the office declined. The change in the importance of the office may have occurred with the introduction of manipular tactics. The phalanx, as previously noted, was divided into lines of 1,000 men each, whereas the manipular army consisted of three lines of companies. The maniples, in turn, were led by their centurions while the administrative duties of the army passed to the tribunes. Only on occasion do the sources mention tribunes as being in command of segments of the legion or the legion itself after the manipular reform.
be considered that the information from the sources is correct, then the number of tribunes would have increased from three to six when Tarquinius Priscus allegedly doubled the size of the army. As no doubling of the tribunes is recorded, the account of the actions of Priscus should be doubted. Also, if each tribe continued to supply one military tribune, then there should have been some mention in the sources of an immediate, corresponding increase in the number of tribes. Yet, the only increase mentioned is the statement of Livy that Servius replaced the primitive tribes with four new territorial ones. If Varro's calculations are correct, then the additional tribe would have resulted in an increase of legionary strength by 1,000. The legion, after Servius, therefore, would have numbered 4,000 hoplites.

Scholarly opinion is divided on the issue of the number of troops levied under the Servian system. The nature of this controversy revolves around the acceptance or rejection of the Servian system as reported by the annalistic writers. Much of the recent theorizing is based upon the work of Plinio Fraccaro who suggested that the regal legion was increased to 6,000 heavy-armed troops. This particular notion was derived from the testimony of L. Cincius Ali-

29 Dion. Hal. 2,35,6; Dio frg. 5,8; Plut. Rom. 13,1; Gjerstad, ER V, 156.
30 Fraccaro, Opuscula II, 287ff.
mentus ("in the legion there are 60 centuries, 30 maniples and 10 cohorts.") 31 Fraccaro asserted that this arrangement pre-dated the inception of the Republic and probably occurred during the reign of Servius. Unfortunately, Cincius is contemporary with the period of the Hannibalic War and not with the early Republic. Fraccaro's approach, attractive as it might seem, does not take into consideration any variation in the fortunes of the city and the effect which a significant victory or defeat might have had upon the demographic composition of the army.

Much of the annalistic tradition about the Servian reforms stems from Fabius Pictor who, in all likelihood, was describing the centuriate organization as it existed in his own time. Information from the Latin grammarians, on the other hand, indicates that the *classis*, those who were armed in the hoplite fashion, were the only soldiers who fought in the legion as organized by Servius. 32 This suggests that the whole army, therefore, numbered 3,000 men under the curiate system and was probably increased to 4,000 hoplites during the time of Servius. 33

30 Gell. n.a. 16,4,6: "in legione sunt centuriae sexaginta, manipuli triginta, cohortes decem."

32 Fest. 48L, s.v. *classes clipeatos*; 100L, s.v. *infra classem*.

Military Considerations of the Servian Census

From the military point of view the real purpose of the Servian census was the assessment of the military capability of the community and the imposition of the war-tax (tributum) according to wealth. 34

The form of the initial census is not known. It is likely that the king summoned all of the adult males in their full military outfit. From this assemblage, he, or his officials, selected only those individuals who had conspicuously presented themselves armed in the hoplite fashion. 35 The remainder of the armed host was simply dismissed to their homes. The picked warriors who remained identification of a contemporary nature is lacking on the numerical strength of the Servian legion, scholars have continued to attempt to discern this figure. The work of Plinio Fraccaro on this aspect of the Roman military system has won wide acceptance from the academic community. Accordingly, Fraccaro accepted the annalistic tradition regarding the Servian military reforms, but suggested that in addition to the 4,000 hoplites of Class I, the heavy-armed soldiers of Classes II and III (1,000 men per Class) were also included in the Servian legion. The addition of men from these census classes would have brought the total legionary levy to 6,000 men. Although the 40 centuries of the First Class were equipped in the hoplite fashion, the 20 centuries of Classes II and III were armed with the scutum instead of the cîpeus and could not afford the lorica. As the hoplite's heavy thrusting spear was used by all three classes, Fraccaro included the soldiers from Classes II and III in the hoplite levy (classis).


35 F. Altheim, Römische Geschichte, 2 vols., Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1953, II, 166f.
were then assigned to specific units in groups of a hundred (centuriae) which, when massed into the phalanx, represented the entire heavy-armed strength of the city. The individuals who were enrolled into the phalanx were known as the classis. Pieri has noted that a form of the Servian assembly still existed in the time of Polybius. The levy continued to be held in the Campus Martius and the qualification of each individual was examined by the military tribunes.

The Servian census figures

A preliminary step in the process of forming a hoplite army was the conduct of a census which determined which citizens, and how many, could afford the equipment. The political assembly which resulted from the census was arranged to favor those who were enrolled among the hoplites while the rest of the citizenry was effectively excluded from the decision-making process. Although some 19th

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36 Kübler in RE III, s.v. classis, cols. 2630f.; Mommsen, RSt III, 263; Altheim, RG II, 165: "Nur die erste Klasse setzte sich aus wirklichen Hoplitten zusammen."

37 G. Piéri, L'histoire du cens jusqu'à la fin de la république romaine, Paris, Publications de l'institut de Droit Romain de l'Université de Paris, XXV, 1968, 62: "un vestige d'une forme archaïque du Census dont l'aspect aurait été essentiellement celui d'un acte de caractère militaire plus semblable a une sorte de revue des guerriers qu'a un releve de la fortune des citoyens."

38 Polyb. 6,20; Walbank, Comm. I, 700f.

39 Liv. 1,43,8; Dion. Hal. 4,18; Cic. de rep. 2,39: "...ita disparavit, ut suffragia non in multitudinis, sed
century historians, like Huschke\textsuperscript{40} and Belot,\textsuperscript{41} accepted the Servian census figures as accurate, it is prudent to suspect the validity of these figures.

The institution of the census would have resulted in the counting of the Roman population. Livy (1,44,2) reports that "milia octaginta eo lustro civium censa dicuntur; adicit scriptorum antiquissimus Fabius Pictor eorum qui arma ferre possent eum numerumuisse." Dionysius (4, 22,2) states that 84,700 Romans were registered: "...εν τοῖς τιμητικῶς φέρεται γράμμασιν,..." Eutropius (1,7) gives the number of citizens as "capita LXXXIII milia civium Romanorum." The common source of this information seems to be Fabius Pictor.\textsuperscript{42} The veracity of Fabius, however, is a legitimate concern. If it can be considered that only the adult males were listed among the 80,000 plus citizens, then the total population of the city would have needed to be in

\begin{quote}
\textit{in locupletium potestate essent, curavitque, quod semper in re publica tenendum est, ne plurimum valeant plurimi.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{40}Ph. E. Huschke, \textit{Die Verfassung des Königs Servius Tullius als Grundlage zu einer römischen Verfassungsgeschichte}, 1838, 382ff.


\textsuperscript{42}Ogilvie, \textit{Comm.} 178 (Liv. 1,44,2) doubts whether Livy was able to consult Fabius' writings first hand. Dionysius gives Fabius (Pictor), Cato and Vennonius in 4,15,1 and L. Piso in 4,15,5 as his sources for the Servian episode. Mommsen \textit{RSt} I, 783ff.; Pais, \textit{Ancient Legends}, 140.
excess of 200,000 inhabitants. Niebuhr\textsuperscript{43} followed by other scholars\textsuperscript{44} rejected this theory outright on the basis that the area of the regal city could not have possibly supported a population of this size. Recently Toynbee\textsuperscript{45} and Brunt\textsuperscript{46} have argued that since it was not the purpose of the Servian census to enumerate every adult male citizen, the census must have been concerned only with that segment of the population which qualified as hoplite warriors. Alfoldi\textsuperscript{47} has dismissed the Servian census figures given in the sources as nothing more than a fabrication.

Wealth as the Basis of the Reform

As previously demonstrated by the testimony of the


\textsuperscript{45} Toynbee, HL I, 445f.

\textsuperscript{46} Brunt, IM, 27.

\textsuperscript{47} Alfoldi, Early Rome, 130.
Roman annalistic sources, and also from the Greek parallels as cited by Aristotle, the introduction of hoplite tactics depended upon the existence of a segment of the population which had accumulated a sufficient amount of wealth to provide itself with the expensive panoply. The question here is whether land alone qualified as the basis of wealth or if other articles of value were included in determining an individual's census rating.

Cicero\textsuperscript{48} indicates that certain wealth in the time of Romulus was measured in terms of cattle, sheep and land. The use of bronze as a medium of exchange is not mentioned. Land, at this time, was probably held as the common tenancy of the community.\textsuperscript{49} Dionysius\textsuperscript{50} further states that during the reigns of Romulus and Numa a general distribution, or more properly assignation, of land occurred. The distribu-

\textsuperscript{48}Cic. de rep. 2,16: "...et habuit plebem im clientelas principum discriptum (quod quantae fuerit utilitati, post video) multaque dictione ovium et bovum (quod tum erat res in pecore et locorum possessionibus, ex quo pecuniosi et locutes vocabantur), non vi et suppliciis coercebant."

\textsuperscript{49}G. Ðiosdi, Ownership in Ancient and Preclassical Roman Law, Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1970, 35.

\textsuperscript{50}Dion. Hal. 2,7,4: "διελὼν τὴν γῆν εἰς τρίλοις κλήροις ἱσούς ἐκάστη φράτα κλήρον ἀπέδωκεν ἕνα, εξελὼν τὴν ἀφικοῦσαν εἰς ἵππα καὶ τεμένη καὶ τινά καὶ τῷ κοίνῳ γῆν καταλίπων." Later, Dionysius states that Numa also made a general distribution of land 2,62,4: "...διανείμας αὐτοῖς ἀφ' ἴῃ, ῥωμύλος ἐκείνητο χώρας καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δημοσίας μοιράν τινα ὀλίγην." P. Bonfante, "Forme primitivo ed evoluzione della proprietà romana. Res mancipi e res nec mancipi," Scritti giuridici varii, II. Proprietà e servitù, Torino, 1926, 12. Bonfante dismisses these distributions as anachronistic accounts of the later plebeian assignationes.
tion to each citizen represented only a partial assignation of the common land, the rest continued to be publicly held (fundus/ager publicus). A review of additional sources demonstrates that political rights as well as military obligations at Rome hinged upon the ownership of a heredium of land:

Varro, de re rustica 1,10,2: "bina iugera, quot a Romulo primum divisa dicebantur viritim, quae heredem sequentur, heredium appellantur: haec postea centum centuria;"

Pliny, n.h. 13,2,7: "bina tum iugera populo Romano satis erant nullique maiorum attribuit Romulus;"

Festus 47L: "centuriatus ager in ducena iugera definitus, quia Romulus centenis civibus ducena iugera tribuit;"

Plutarch, Poplicola 21,6: "καὶ χώραν ἀπένειμεν ἐκάστῳ δυστὶν πλέθρων περὶ τὸν Αὐρωπὰ ποταμὸν,..."

Livy 4,47,7: "(labici) coloni ab urbe mille et quingenti missi bina iugera acceperunt;"

6,16,6: "bina iugera et semisses agri adsignati;"

6,36,11: "cum bina iugera agri plebi dividerentur,..."

8,11,14: "bine in Latino iugera, ita ut dodrante ex Privernati complement, data, terna in Falerno quadratibus etiam pro longinquitate adiectis;"

8,21,11: "eodem anno Anxur trecenti in coloniam missi sunt; bina iugera agri acceperunt;"

31,49,5: "et de agris militum eius decretum ut, quot quisque eorum annos in Hispania aut in Africa militasset, in singulos annos bina iugera agri acciperet;..."

Mommsen (RSt III, 24f.) advanced the argument that the common land originally belonged to the gentes and that only some of it was used to make the distributions of heredia to the Roman plebeians. M. Kaser, Eigentum und Besitz im alteren römischen Recht, Gottingen, Vandehoeck und Ruprecht, 2nd ed., 1982, 233.
Juvenal 14,163: "tandem pro multis vix iugera bina dabantur vulneribus;..."

The testimony of the ancient sources overwhelmingly stressed the ownership of land in conjunction with the exercise of political rights and military service. Rostovtzeff was so strongly influenced by this evidence that he declared that "only landowners were obliged to serve in the Roman army." It will be shown later (pp. 48ff.) that this assumption is incorrect.

The source material which has been presented above indicates that at least 2 iugera of land needed to be owned in order for an individual to qualify as a citizen. The relationship between the heredium and the Servian constitution, however, is not clear. The conclusions reached by previous scholars attempted to reconcile the Servian census ratings with land ownership by fixing the number of iugera which an individual needed to own in order to be enrolled in a particular class. Unfortunately, the efforts of


53 Cic. de off. 1,12; Gai. inst. 2,40, frg. 234; M. Voigt, "Über die bina iugera," RhM 24, 1869, 53f.

54 Huschke, Verfassung Servius Tullius, 643f.; Th. Mommsen, Die römischen Tribus in administrativer Beziehung, Altona, J. F. Hammerich, 1844, 111; RSt III, 247ff.; Kübler in RE III, s.v. classis, col. 2631; Rosenberg, Untersuchungen, 6ff.; Nilsson, "Introduction of Hoplite Tactics," 6, valued the heredium at 11,000 asses in ca. 269 while Mattingly ("Property Qualifications," 106) argued for the figure of 12½ minae per heredium in ca. 169 as given by Diony-
these scholars have excluded, for all practical purposes, the possibility that other forms of wealth might have been considered when the census rating of the citizens was determined.

Mommsen, in his discussion of regal Rome, states that movable and immovable articles of property existed. Yet, he concludes that only the ownership of intangible property, that is, land, made a citizen liable to military service.\(^{55}\) This seems to be inconsistent with the theory expounded by Mommsen himself, and others, that regal Rome was a commercial center of some significance.\(^{56}\) If it can be assumed, as archaeological evidence seems to indicate, that Rome was an important commercial center, then there must have been some people who were able to accumulate wealth from means other than agriculture. As Crawford has recently pointed out, these wealthy individuals would have been required to own at least a heredium of land in order to obtain Roman citizenship.\(^{57}\) Pliny states that horti and

\(^{55}\)Mommsen, RSt III, 22f.

\(^{56}\)Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Vienna and Leipzig, Phaidon Verlag, 1932, 34ff. Dyer, History, 360; Bloch, "Rome de 509 a 475 avant J.-C.,” 118ff.; Gjerstad, ER V, 156-68; Cornelius, Untersuchungen, 80 has held that Servian Rome was not a thriving commercial center.

\(^{57}\)M. Crawford, "The Early Roman Economy, 753-280
heredia must have existed in the regal city as they still abounded in his time.\textsuperscript{58} As citizens all their property, movable and immovable, would have been included into their net worth when their wealth was assessed for purposes of the census. Hence, it is possible that an individual's rating in the Servian census took into account all his assets and not land alone.

The Constituency of the Urban Tribes

Crawford's theory contrasts with the ancient, and now modern, concept of the constituency of the urban tribes. Even a sources as late as Vegetius (late fourth century A.D.), states that the Romans customarily preferred to enroll into the legions men from the rural countryside as opposed to city dwellers.\textsuperscript{59} The usual rationalization given for this practice was that the hardships of rustic life better prepared the recruit to endure the toils of a soldier. The testimony of the ancient writers, followed by


\textsuperscript{58} Plin. n.h. 19,50: "Romani quidem reges ipsi coluere; quippe etiam Superbus nuntium illum saevum atque sanguinarium filio remisit ex horto;" K. D. White, Roman Farming, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970, 49.

\textsuperscript{59} Veget. epit. 1,3: "De qua parte numquam credo potuisse dubitasse aptiorem armis rusticam plebem, quae sub divo et in labore nutritur, solis patiens, umbrae neglegens, balnearum nescia, deliciarum ignara, simplicis animi, parvo contenta, duratis ad omnem laborum tolerantiam membris, cui gestare ferrum, fossam ducere, onus ferre consuetudo de rure est." Vegetius' work must be used with caution as his account is full of archaizing anachronisms.
modern scholars, was that the urban poor and freedmen (libertini) were assigned exclusively to the urban tribes.\textsuperscript{60}

According to Livy ca. 340, the censor Q. Fabius Maximus removed all the libertini from the then existing rural tribes and transferred them to the urban tribes.\textsuperscript{61} After this date, it seems to have become customary to restrict libertini to enrollment into the urban tribes. Since these citizens are believed to have owned only a modest amount of property, and possibly a heredium or less of land, both ancient and modern opinions have held that libertini were exempt from the annual dilectus.\textsuperscript{62} The assumptions about the urban tribes have been anachronistically attached by the annalists and modern scholars to the tradition surrounding the creation of the four territorial tribes by Servius. It is likely that the Servian tribes, because they were restricted to the immediate environs of the city, were urban and not rural in nature, urban in the sense that Rome controlled no large tracts of land with which a vast agrarian system could be associated.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{60} L. R. Taylor, "The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic: The Thirty-Five Urban and Rural Tribes," PMAAR XX, 1960, 134ff.; RVA, 64ff. Livy, or his source, is responsible for this misconception.

\textsuperscript{61} Liv. 9, 46, 10-15.

\textsuperscript{62} Hemina, frg. 21, in HRR\textsuperscript{2} I, 105; Non. 94L; \underline{\textsuperscript{3}} Enn. ann. frgs. 183-5; Gell. n.a. \underline{\textsuperscript{4}} 16, 10, 1 and 11-13; \underline{\textsuperscript{5}} Oros. 4, 1, 3; Gabba, Esercito, 11.

\textsuperscript{63} Liv. 1, 44, 3: "aggere et fossis et muro circumdat
the time of Servius, therefore, the urban tribes consisted of men who owned land, a heredium of which entitled the owner to all rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and of those who were landless. 64

Although Mommsen acknowledged that livestock, in the form of cattle and sheep, and uncoined bronze represented additional forms of wealth in archaic Rome, he concluded that land alone determined a citizen's property rating. According to Mommsen, and successive scholars, only land served as the basis of the Servian census. This restric-

64 Pais, Ancient Legends, 140. Cf. his own Storia di Roma, 5 vols., Rome, Casa Editrice "Optima", 1926, I, 320. Last, "The Servian Reforms," 41; Mommsen, RSt II 3, 392ff. and 402, n. 2, had argued earlier that citizenship was restricted to landowners.
tive theory cannot be accepted, as the archaeological evidence which we have previously examined, but which was not available to Mommsen, indicates that Rome was a commercial center of some importance during the period of Etruscan domination.

The Earliest Laws

The earliest evidence of property, movable and immovable, representing a form of wealth in regal Rome can be deduced from the text of the lapis niger. Palmer has reconstructed the text of the stone from similar laws which protected the inviolability of holy groves by the imposition of fines upon transgressors.\(^\text{65}\) The restored text mentions that cattle were to be rendered by the offender as satisfaction for his offense (11. 6-7):

\[
\text{[moltatod moltam pr]evam.}
\text{quos rex moltasit, boves dantod.}
\]

"[Let him fine] one [fine] for each [offense]. Whom the king [will fine, let them give cows.]",

Columella and Varro also testify that values were given in terms of oxen.\(^\text{66}\) The testimony of these ancient writers

\(^\text{65}\) R. E. A. Palmer, "The King and the Comitium. A Study of Rome's Oldest Public Document," Historia Einzel­schriften Heft 11, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969, 49f. Although the stone and its inscription remain open to further study, Palmer has presented a strong case for his view by introducing as a parallel example the testimony of two laws on sacred groves. One law was found at the Roman colony at Luceria (ca. 315), cf. CIL 11, 4766=ILS 4911=FIRA III, no. 71a=ILLRP 505; G. Dumézil, "Remarque sur la stèle archaïque du Forum," Coll. Latomus 70, 1964, 172-79.

\(^\text{66}\) Col. de re rust. 6 (preface): "nomina quoque et
probably refers to the regal period. Gaius, although a late source of information, clarifies this matter by indicating that the original pecuniary terminology connected a certain amount of weight with a certain amount of property:

Ideo autem aes et libra adhibetur quia olim aereis tantum nummis utebantur; et erant asses, dipundii, semisses, quadrantes, nec ullus aureus vel arguenteus nummus in usu erat, sed in pondere; asses librales erant, et dipondi unde etiam dupondius dictus [est, qua]si duo pondo: quod nomen adhuc in usu retinetur. semiss[es quo]que et quadrantes pro rata scilicet portione ad pondus examinati erant. [tunc igitur et q]ui dab[at alicui[ pecuniam, non numerabat eam, sed appendebat; unde serui, quibus permittitur administratio pecuniae, dispensatores appel­lati sunt;

Legislation of the mid-fifth century followed along similar lines. The provisions of the lex Aternia Tarpeia (ca. 454) and the lex Iulia Papiria (ca. 430) assessed fines not only in terms of cattle and sheep, but in the bronze equivalents of these fines. This is the earliest evidence to indicate that bronze. Land is not mentioned. Although the text of the lex Aternia Tarpeia is not extant, Gellius and Festus have preserved the essentials of the law. The text of Gellius reads as follows:

...quae appellatur suprema institutam in dies singulos pecuniae et peculi tracta videntur a pecore;" 2,19: "multa etiam nunc ex vetere instituto bubus et ovibus dicitur." Varro, 1.1. 5,95: "pecus, a quo pecunia universa, quod in pecore pecunia tum consistebat pastoribus."

duarum ovium, boum triginta, pro copia scilicet boum proque ovium penuria. Sed cum eiusmodi multa pecoris armentique a magistratibus dicta erat, adigeabenatur boves ovesque alias pretii parvi, alias maioris, eaque res faciebat inaequalem multae poenitionem. Idcirco postes lege Aternia constituti sunt in oves singulas aeris deni, in boves aeris centeni. Minima autem multa est ovis unius. (68)

Festus is the main source of the lex Iulia Papiria which reads as follows:

Ovibus duabus multabantur apud antiquos [in] minoribus delictis, ut in maioribus ambubus; nec hunc ultra nume­rum excedebat multatio, quae postea quam aere signato uti civitas coe­pit, pecoraque mul­[ta]ticia incurr­a­rum­peban­tur, unde etiam peculatus crimen usurpari coeptum est, facta est aestimatio pecoralis multae et boves centenis assibus, oves denis aestimatae. Inde suprema multa, id est maxima, appellatur tria millia aeris. (69)

A statute from the Twelve Tables regarding personal injury against both citizen and slave dropped any reference to chattel property as compensation and quoted the fines specifically in terms of bronze asses, VIII,3-4:

Manu fustive si os fugit [collisitve] libero CCC, si servo CL poenam subito [ ]. Si inuriam [alteri] faxsit, XXV [aeris] poenae sunto. (70)

It can be safely assumed that these laws did not represent an innovation in compensating the community or the offended individual by means of bronze rather than livestock, but that the various laws are evidence of the institutionali-

68 Gell. n.a. 11,1,2-3; Fest. 268-70L. Dionysius (10, 50,2) and Cicero (de rep. 2,60) imply that the law simply fixed the multa suprema for which each citizen could be liable in cattle and sheep.

69 Fest. 220L; Cic. de rep. 2,60; Liv. 4,30,3.

70 Gai. inst. 3,233; Gell. n.a. 16,10,8 and 20,1,12; Fest. 508L.
zation of a long-since accepted common practice. According to Mattingly, the private practice of settling debts by means of uncoined bronze was given official sanction by the decemviral legislation of ca. 451-449. 71

There are several additional notices of the imposition of fines during the post-Servian period which merit consideration. Plutarch reports that the consul L. Valerius Poplicola imposed a fine of five oxen and two sheep upon citizens who showed disobedience towards the consuls. 72 T. Menenius, who was accused by the plebeian tribunes for having caused the defeat of the Fabian clan at Cremera, was fined 2,000 bronze pounds (asses). 73 Whether or not the details of these ancient accounts are accurate in every way, the fact remains that in the regal period, property was valued in terms of cattle, sheep, iugerum and raw bronze which, for our purposes, is very important.

In reviewing the ancient texts concerning the Servian census ratings, it is noticeable that the property values were listed in terms of bronze asses. It seems that the value of iugera of land, livestock and miscellaneous chattel property was converted into bronze asses. It is

72 Plut. Pop. 11,4. Gjerstad (ER V, 321), however, believes the account to have been fictitious.
73 Liv. 2,52,5; Dion. Hal. 9,27; Gjerstad (ER V, 320) assigns this episode to ca. 476, while Mattingly ("Aes and Pecunia," 25) dates the account to ca. 440. Ogilvie, Comm. 369.
the common opinion of most scholars, however, that the Servian census ratings were assigned values in terms of asses at a later date and do not, therefore, reflect the values in effect during the period assumed to be the reign of king Servius. Modern scholars have rejected the ancient testimony regarding the Servian census ratings because the assessments were given in terms of bronze asses which were associated with the small coin of the later Republic. Mattingly has been most critical of the ancient testimony, especially Pliny's statement that Servius introduced bronze coinage at Rome. He has argued convincingly that bronze coinage, the aes signatum, could not have been introduced earlier than the first half of the mid-third century. The conflict between the ancient testimony and modern scholarship revolves around the transmission of the tradition regarding the use of bronze as a medium of exchange. As the early laws indicate, bronze was

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75 The basis for this criticism is the testimony of the elder Pliny that Servius introduced bronze coinage at Rome. Cf. Plin. n.h. 33,43; (cf. 18,12): "Servius rex primus signavit aes. Antea rudi usos Romae Timaeus tradit." Cass. variae 7,32,4; M. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, 2 vols., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, I, 35-37; "Early Roman Economy," 198-200. Pliny's account of Servius is not unlike that of Plutarch's account of Theseus (25,3).

used in regal Rome in uncoined form.

As it has been shown, the annalistic sources, beginning with Fabius Pictor, were probably accurate in their reports that each citizen was required to own certain amounts of property in order to be enrolled in a certain class. Pliny, however, corrupted this tradition by assuming that the *asses* about which the annalists wrote meant the bronze coin known as the *as* and not a measure of weight or value. Livy's account of the introduction of *stipendium* ca. 406, however, confirms that part of this property included uncoined bronze. Livy reports that in that year the censors ordered the citizens to present themselves with their property in order to be properly assessed:

> conferre ipsi praei; et quia nondum argentum signatum erat, aes grave plaustris quidam ad aerarium convenientes speciosam etiam conlationem faciebant.

This passage proves that an asset namely other than land was included in an individual's property rating. After concluding a review of each citizen's wealth, the censors assigned each qualified individual to the *classis*, now extended to Classes II and III, which subjected him to the levy and the payment of taxes (*tributum*) or, continued his

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77 The word *as* could be used to mean a unit of weight, a bronze coin or even an amount of land (cf. Varro 1.1. 5, 169; 174; 180; 8,83; Gell. n.a. 20,1,31; Col. 5,1,12; OLD 1, 179 s.v. *as*; Kubitschek in RE s.v. *As*, cols. 1507f.; Walde-Hofmann, LEW, 71, s.v. *as*; Ernout-Meillet, DE, 50, s.v. *as*.

78 Liv. 4,60,6; F. Lammert in RE III, s.v. *stipendium*, col. 2536.
enrollment among the non-warriors, that is, the \textit{infra classe}. The question which must be resolved is the origin and nature of the social division between the \textit{classis} and the \textit{infra classe}. The Social Division as a Result of the Servian Reform

Sources for the regal period divide the Roman community into two social groups, the \textit{classis} and the \textit{infra classe}.\textsuperscript{79} The problem which has confronted scholars about this division is the interpretation of the term "rich" (\textit{dites} in Livy, \textit{locupletii} in Cicero) and its significance during the regal and early Republican periods.

\textsuperscript{79}A theme which is consistently present in all of the texts relates that an individual needed to own at least 100,000 asses in order to be listed among the census of the \textit{prima classis}. Polybius, in a reference to the legionary armament during the Hannibalic War, also noted that only those soldiers who owned at least 10,000 drachmas (100,000 asses) were able to provide themselves with a breastplate \textit{lorica}. It may be reasonably concluded that at least some time around the beginning of the second century, the property qualification for the First Class was 100,000 asses. The sources for the \textit{classici} and the \textit{infra classe} are as follows: Gell. \textit{n.a.} 6,13,1f.; Cic. \textit{de rep.} 2,40; Fest. 48L, s.v. \textit{classis clipeatos}; 100L, s.v. \textit{infra classe}; M. Porcius Cato, \textit{de lege Voconia} in ORF, frg. 160, 61; Marquardt, \textit{RSt} II, 326; Küber in \textit{RE} III, s.v. \textit{classis}, cols. 2631ff.; Herzog, \textit{System}, I, 101ff.; Mommsen, \textit{RSt} III, 263; K. J. Beloch, \textit{Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der punischen Kriege}, Berlin and Leipzig, Walter de Gruyter \& Co., 1926, 291; Bernardi, "ausiliari," 22; Crawford, "Early Roman Economy," 46; Richard, \textit{Les Origines}, 385. The various census figures of the \textit{prima classis} include Gellius (\textit{n.a.} 6,13,1: 125,000 asses), Gaius (inst. 2,274: 100,000 asses), pseudo-Asconius (on Cicero in \textit{Verr.} 2,1,41: 100,000 sestertii), Dio (56,10: 25,000 drachmas) and Pliny (\textit{n.h.} 33,43: 120,000 asses). Polyb. 6,23,15: "οι δ' υπέρ τοις μυρίων τιμώμενοι δραχμας αντί του \textit{lorica}. ούν τοις άλλοις αλυσιδωτοις περιτίθεσται θώρακας." Walbank, \textit{Comm.} I, 706.
Although specific amounts for the census rating of the classis have been provided by late Republican sources, any monetary figure for the regal or early Republican period is mere conjecture.  

Bernardi, following the earlier works of Beloch and Momigliano, has accepted the ancient accounts that early Roman society contained only classici and these infra classem. Ogilvie has recently renewed Bernardi's arguments. Although later than the assumed period of Servius, the early Roman law code, the Twelve Tables, indicates that Roman society was divided into two distinct groups. The recorded division, however, was between adsidui and proletarii:

Adsidui vindex adsiduus esto, proletario iam civi cui quis volet vindex esto. (83)

Apparently, the adsidui were landowners, while the proletarii were not. Cicero, although a late source of inform-

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82 Ogilvie, Early Rome, 45ff.
83 XII Tab. 1,4; Gell. n.a. 16,10,5; H. Keil, Grammatici Latini, 7 vols., 1 supplement, Leipzig, 1855-80; reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1961, VII, 108, 5; Mommsen (RSt II³, 392ff. and 402, n. 2) believed that citizenship was restricted to men who were landowners. Consequently, only landowners would have been enrolled in the tribes. Last ("The Servian Reforms," 41), however, has argued convincingly that the tribes contained both landed and non-landed citizens.
84 Cic. de rep. 2,40: "qui cum locupletaeis...nominavit,...;" Fest. 8L: "Adsiduus dicitur, qui in ea re, quam
formation, further identifies the *adsidui* with the rich. What the term *locupletes* meant at Servian Rome is impossible to ascertain from the available evidence. It appears, however, that in the early Republic, the terms *classicus* and *adsiduus* may have been interchangeable. A landowner, therefore, could be defined as an *adsiduus*, while a *classicus* would be construed as an *adsiduus* who had the means to furnish himself with the hoplite panoply. In this sense, the class which was to become known in later times as the *prima classis* was actually the *classis* during the regal period of the city. All other citizens were simply *infra classem*. The importance of this description in the development of the Republican army will be an issue shall be discussed in the following chapter.

In this chapter, it has been shown that the monetary values assigned by the annalistic writers to the Servian classes could not have been accurate for the period of the mid or late-sixth century. These values represented amounts which were usually contemporary with the period of the particular writer himself. The property values given by Livy, Dionysius, Festus, Cicero and others, therefore, are much later than the period to which Servius' kingship has been assigned.

Citizenship and inclusion into the hoplite levy

*Cf.*; Rosenberg, *Untersuchungen*, 6 and 23.
(classis) were determined by the amount or value of the property an individual owned. Contrary to the opinio communis however, property was not limited to land, but included all articles of value. While the rights of citizenship were bestowed only upon those who owned at least a heredium of land, membership in the classis was restricted to those citizens who could provide themselves with the hoplite panoply.
CHAPTER III

THE ROMAN MILITARY SYSTEM FROM THE LATE-REGAL PERIOD TO THE PYRRHIC WAR

As has been shown, the available evidence indicates that enrollment into the early Republican legion as a *clasicsus* depended upon the amount of bronze *asses*, *iugera*, livestock and miscellaneous property an individual owned. Those below the requisite rating were assigned to the *infra classem*. This was a slow and laborious process brought about by military exigencies and not at one stroke as the annalists seem to suggest in their accounts of the Servian episode.

In the discussion which follows, the effects of such exigencies as the Veian War, the Gallic invasion, the Camillan reforms, the Samnite Wars and the struggle with Pyrrhus upon the standards required for legionary enrollment will be considered.

The Post-Servian Army

Under the system ascribed to Servius, the old tribal arrangement was replaced by the creation of four new tribes\(^1\).

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\(^1\)Liv. 1,43,13: "Quadrifariam enim urbe divisa regionibus collibus qui habitabantur, partes eas tribus appellavit, ut ego arbitror, ab tributo; nam eius quoque aequaliter ex censu conferendi ab eodem inita ratio est; necque eae tribus ad centuriam distributionem numerumque quic-
Registration into these tribes was based upon wealth and territorial residency. Despite the innovations wrought by Servius, the new social order, which affected the political and military aspects of Roman life, may not have been much different from the old. It may be properly assumed that the patres, their family members and clients were joined in the new order by the wealthier elements of the city which supposedly had been previously excluded from the franchise, and, consequently, from service in the army. Since hoplite tactics required that the soldiers be equipped with expensive weapons and armor, it might further be assumed that some of the citizens who were liable for military service under the tribal/curial organization would not have been able to meet the financial obligations imposed by the new military system. As noted in the previous chapter, the Servian census determined those citizens who could afford the hoplite panoply and those who could not. It has been demonstrated that despite the annalistic tradition, wealth in Servian Rome was not restricted to land but also included uncoined bronze and livestock. Thus, the Servian census, and therefore, the post-Servian army, included all Romans who owned at least a heredium of land and other valuable articles. The value of this property had to be

quam pertinuere." Fest. 506L: "Urbanas tribus appellabant, in quas Urbs erat dispertita a Servio Tullio rege: id est Suburana, Palatina, Aesquilina, Collina."

2Ogilvie, Early Rome, 54; Richard, Les Origines, 397.
sufficient for an individual to equip himself with the hoplite panoply. Again, all those below this census rating were relegated to the infra classem.

'Classis' and 'infra classem'

Accordingly, a Roman became a classicus by being able to afford the hoplite panoply. Although no contemporary source indicates the financial standing of a classicus at the time of the Servian reforms, the annalistic sources indicate that an individual needed to own a considerable amount of wealth in order to be able to afford the hoplite equipment. All others were classified as infra classem. According to Plutarch's account of the Sabine Clausus, 25 iugera seem to have been the amount of land needed for enrollment among the patres and for inclusion into the sen-

3Liv. 1,43,2: "prima classis omnes appellati; seniores ad urbis custodiam ut praesto essent, iuvenes ut foris bella gererent; arma his imperata galea, clipeum, ocreae, lorica, omnia ex aere: haec ut tegumenta corporis essent: tela in hostem hastaque et gladius." Ogilvie, Comm. 168f.; Dion. Hal. 4,16,2: "όπλα φερειν ἐπέταξεν ἀσπίδας ἄργολιμάς καὶ δόρατα καὶ κράνη χάλκεα καὶ θώρακας καὶ κνημίδας καὶ ἔι-φή." Festus continues this tradition (48L, 100L). E. Peruzzi, Origini di Roma, 2 vols., Bologna, Patron Editrice, 1973, II, 60ff.; Altheim, RG, II, 165; Richard, Les Origines, 385. In the accounts of Livy and Dionysius, regarding the Servian census, the classis is referred to as the prima classis. This special designation is a result of the information utilized by both writers from the account of Fabius Pictor. Cf. Liv. 1,44,2: "adicit scriptorum antiquissimus Fabius Pictor...;" Ogilvie, Comm. 178. The sources, therefore, reflect a tradition in which the five census classes within the comitia centuriata had reached their full development within the framework of the thirty-five tribes. The matured political system was then grafted by Fabius onto the reforms which had been attributed to Servius.
Thus a somewhat lesser amount was required for the status of a *classicus*. Relying upon the annalistic tradition which restricted wealth to the ownership of land, Nilsson proposed that 20 iugera were sufficient to include an individual in the *classis*.\(^5\) Plutarch further states that in order to qualify for the basic rights of Roman citizenship the members of Clausus' household (the later *gens Claudia*) were each granted a *heredium* of land.

Scholarly opinion differs as to which elements of Roman society formed the *classis*. According to the Fabian tradition, the Servian *classis* consisted of all Roman citizens who served in the army, that is, Classes I through V. This organization comprised 193/4 centuries. The five Classes themselves consisted of 80 centuries of *iuniores* and 80 centuries of *seniores*. Schonbauer, has argued that the *classis* included all centuries, both *seniores* and *iuniores*, of the *comitia centuriata*.\(^6\) Staveley has rejected this theory and offered that the *classis* included only the active members of the army, that is, the *iuniores*.\(^7\) Archaeological results, however, have demonstrated that the regal city did

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\(^4\) Plut. *Pop.* 21,6: "τῶ δὲ Κλαύσῳ πλεύρα πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι γῆς ἔδωκεν, αὐτὸν δὲ τῇ βουλῇ πρόσεγραψεν,...."  

\(^5\) Nilsson, "Introduction of Hoplite Tactics," 6; Rosenberg, Untersuchungen, 23.  

\(^6\) Schönbauer, "römrische Centurien-Verfassung," 28f.  

\(^7\) Staveley, "Constitution," 78.
not have the capacity to field an army which consisted of 193/4 centuries.\(^8\) A less radical approach was introduced by Nilsson,\(^9\) who proposed that inclusion into the classis was a gradual process by which the less wealthy citizens of Classes II through V were eventually included. This extension, according to Nilsson, occurred in ca. 444/3 when the office of censor was created. The sources, however, are silent as to how or when the reordering of the infra classissem was effected. Although the specific date of ca. 444/3 may be wrong, Nilsson's theory should not be discarded in its entirety. The expansion of the classis may not have been concluded at the midpoint of the fifth century as Nilsson has contended. Rather it is likely that the classis may have begun to include more of the Roman citizenry at this time because of the military needs of the city. It should noted that it had become easier to extend membership in the classis to less wealthy citizens as the gentilitian ties among the warrior class in regal Rome had been set a-


side by Servius. Any citizen who could meet the financial requirements of a hoplite warrior could be included in the so-called Servian classis.

EXCURSUS

In time, the property qualifications became sufficiently flexible to include any citizen. The expansion of the classis from its narrow definition of the hoplite levy to the military class system which was based upon set amounts of wealth, has been a topic of considerable debate among scholars. While some scholars have accepted the ancient tradition that Servius created the centuriate army system, others have placed this development during the formative years of the early Republic. Scullard has suggested that the classis was expanded in ca. 443 in order to include those citizens, later known as Classes II through V, who owned less property that the hoplite warriors. (10) Scullard has based his premise upon the creation of the office of censor. It is his belief that the new office demonstrates that the Roman government decided to assess the wealth of its citizenry in order to determine their social, political and military status in society. It is quite possible, however, that the duties of the censors were limited to a scrutiny of the standard of eligibility for senators and that of the classis. All other Romans were relegated to the mass of citizens known as the infra classem, that is, the non-hoplites. Neither the fasti nor the literary sources record any increase in the strength of the legionary personnel or their officers, that is, the military tribunes, during this period.

The Early Republican Army

The paucity of information which can be gleaned from Livy and Dionysius regarding the military organization of the newly established Republic precludes any cogent discussion of the topic. The lack of any description of the tactical structure of the legion on the part of Livy and Dionysius probably reflects a void in the annalistic ac-

counts available to them. There are only two possible reasons for the silence of the sources on this matter: (1) either the formal organization of the army was commonly known to all Romans and therefore required no description, or (2) the details of the early system were unknown even to the earliest of the annalistic writers. The latter possibility is the more likely.

A number of theories have been advanced as to the strength of the early Republican legion and its demographic composition. A problem, not satisfactorily resolved, is the relation between the tribes and the centuries of the Servian comitia. Although Livy ascribed the creation of four new tribes to Servius, he also added a caveat that "the tribes and the centuries were not coordinated." The confusion of this passage may be the result of Livy's own investigation into his sources and the apparent incongruity among several different traditions.

Some scholars, led by Beloch and supported by Ernst Meyer and L. Pareti, advanced the notion that each of the 20 tribes contained a proportionate number of centuries from each of the Servian classes. Beloch's premise was

11 Liv. 1,43,13: "neque eae tribus ad centuriam distributionem numerumque quicquam pertinuere;" Ogilvie, Comm. 175f.; Païs, Ancient Legends, 140.

based upon the supposition that Servius had added 16 rural tribes to the 4 urban ones and that each of the 20 tribes contained at least 2 centuries of *iuniores* of Class I. Thus, the centuries of Class I were distributed equally among all of the tribes. The 40 centuries of Class I would have formed a hoplite army of 4,000 troops. Toynbee, following Beloch, suggested that when the *tribus Clustumina* was created as the twenty-first tribe ca. 495, another 2 centuries of Class I hoplites were added to the legion.\(^\text{13}\) The strength of the legion was supposedly increased to 4,200 men which accords with the later Polybian figure.\(^\text{14}\)

Other scholars follow Pl. Fraccaro who proposed that the Servian legion numbered 6,000 hoplites and was halved at the inception of the Republic (ca. 509) in order to provide each consul with an armed force.\(^\text{15}\) Gjerstad, following Fraccaro, concluded that the late-regal legion actually numbered 6,000 heavy-armed and 2,500 light-armed troops from the 85 centuries of *iuniores* which were drawn from the five Servian classes.\(^\text{16}\) The new centuriate army, in Gjerstad's opinion, was formed ca. 495 and reflected the recent

\(^{13}\) Toynbee, *HL* I, 511ff.

\(^{14}\) Polyb. 6,21,6-10; Parker, *RL*, 14.


\(^{16}\) Gjerstad, *ER* V, 168ff.
increase in tribal districts from 4 to 21. The 170 centuries of the rural tribes supposedly formed the legion and could have supplied two large legions of 85 centuries, one for each consul. Since Roman tradition regarding the late-regal and early Republican period never mentions the levying of two legions in the same year, Gjerstad circumvented this problem by stating that the two legions were levied in alternate years in order to free half of the population to tend to their civilian duties while one force remained in the field. According to Gjerstad, the two large legions of 85 centuries each were re-divided later in the century in order to provide four legions of 42 centuries each. Gjerstad, like Toynbee, has attempted to identify the late-regal legion with the more familiar legionary organization of Polybius's era.

In their attempts to justify Cincius' testimony, Fraccaro and Gjerstad proposed that the legion was halved at the inception of the Republic as a constitutional check against the domination of one magistrate over his colleague. Both scholars, however, ignored the possibility that the consuls might have alternated the exercise of their imperium as Varro and Paullus did in 216 at Cannae. 18

17 Gjerstad, ER V, 169.

The 'fasti' and the Early Republican Army

Although Fraccaro (see above p. 69) proposed that each consul received a half-strength legion to command, he seems to have ignored the relation between the number of military tribunes assigned to the army and the number of troops levied. As previously noted, Varro maintained that one military tribune was assigned to each tribal contingent of 1,000 men. If this is correct, then the fasti should have recorded the names of at least six military tribunes from the inception of the Republic. Yet, the fasti reveal that six posts became available only ca. 444. 19 Thus, Fraccaro's proposal that two legions of 3,000 men each existed during the early Republic should be rejected.

In the post-decemviral period the fasti indicate that three, or sometimes four, military tribunes with consular power were elected in place of consuls. The numerical strength of the army, therefore, would have varied between 3,000 and 4,000 men depending upon the number of military tribunes elected. 20 These figures probably represent

19 E. S. Staveley, "The Significance of the Consular Tribunate," JRS 43, 1953, 32, cf. Liv. 4,16,6; Dion. Hal. 11,60,5; Zon. 7,19.

the entire hoplite levy (classis). Livy, for the year ca. 426, relates an episode in which the classis is specifically mentioned during a battle.\textsuperscript{21} Unfortunately, Livy or his emendator seems to have confused the usage of this term for the early Republican era with that of the later Republic. Livy uses the term classis in its Augustan context and subsequently recounts the details of a naval battle on the Tiber river near Fidenae. Since Rome does not seem to have had need of a naval squadron at this time, it is likely that the facts of the event have been corrupted beyond recognition. The original passage may have related a clash between the Roman legion and the Veientes.

The Introduction of 'stipendium' and the Veian War

Rome's problems with the Etruscan city of Veii did not end ca. 426. In fact, owing to continuous pressure from the Volscians, the Veian question was postponed by the conclusion of a truce. Livy gives no details of the truce, but remarks that it expired in ca. 406.\textsuperscript{22} At that time the senate sent legati and fetials to Veii to demand retribution for the attack of ca. 426. After the Veientes reject-

\textsuperscript{21} Liv. 4,34,6-7: "Classi quoque ad Fidenas pugnatum Veientibus quidam in annales rettulere, rem aequo difficilem atque incredibilem nec nunc lato satis ad hoc amne et tum aliquanto, ut a veteribus accepimus, artiore, nisi in traiectu forte fluminis prohibendo aliquidum navium concursum in maius, ut fit, celebrantes navalis victoriae vanum titulum appetivere." Ogilvie, \textit{Comm.} 588f.

\textsuperscript{22} Liv. 4,58,1; Ogilvie, \textit{Comm.} 620ff.
ed these demands, the senate decreed that the military tribunes should propose to the People a resolution of war against Veii.\textsuperscript{23} Those of military age, however, complained that the Volscian War had not yet been completed and that all Etruria might come to the aid of Veii.\textsuperscript{24} It is likely that at this point the Servian levy could not provide the number of troops needed for two simultaneous wars. For the time being, the Veian War was postponed.\textsuperscript{25}

The effort against the Volsci proceeded as planned. Livy remarks that the army was commanded by three military tribunes who led separate contingents against different targets, Antium, Ecetrae and Anxur.\textsuperscript{26} At the successful conclusion of this war, the senate decreed that the soldiers were to be paid from the public treasury.\textsuperscript{27} As Livy notes later, the payment was intended to defray the individual's personal expense of going to war and to ensure that his property would not be diminished by his absence on military service.\textsuperscript{28} The payment was made in the form of uncoined

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23}Livy 4,58,6-9; Rotondi, \textit{Leges}, 214.
\item \textsuperscript{24}Livy 4,58,9-11.
\item \textsuperscript{25}Livy 4,58,14.
\item \textsuperscript{26}Livy 4,59,1ff.; Ogilvie, \textit{Comm.} 622.
\item \textsuperscript{27}Livy 4,59,11: "...ut ante mentionem ullam plebis tribunorumve decerneret senatus ut stipendium miles de publico acciperet, cum ante id tempus de suo quisque functus eo munere esset." F. Lammert in \textit{RE} III, s.v. \textit{stipendium}, cols. 2536ff.; Marquardt, \textit{RSt} II, 92ff.
\item \textsuperscript{28}Livy 4,60,2: "Cum commoditas iuvaret rem familiarem
The effect of the introduction of paid military service can be readily discerned. After the funds had been contributed and the hesitancy of the People overcome, the war against Veii commenced. The army which marched out against the Veientes consisted in large part of volunteers. This is in contrast to the difficulty which the State experienced in obtaining troops for the recently concluded Volscian War. Livy, however, does not attempt to identify the social origin of these additional soldiers. If the entire hoplite levy had formerly been led out against Rome's enemies, then it seems likely that a certain segment of the *infra classem* must have been elevated and incorporated into the *classis*. From the eligible manpower which had been made available for military service an additional 40 centuries, 20 centuries of *juniores* and a like number of *seniores*, were created. The new centuries were probably apportioned among the then existing tribes in

29 Liv. 4,60,6.


31 Ogilvie, *Early Rome*, 151f., demonstrates that the 2,000 additional troops were raised in order to strengthen the legion for the siege of Veii. Cf. Liv. 4,61,ff.; Ogilvie, Comm. 623; A. Drummond, "Consular Tribunes in Livy and Diodorus," *Athenaeum* N. S. lvi, 1980, 57; Pinsent, "Military Tribunes," 29 and 57-61; Sumner, "Legion and Centuriate Organization," 72ff.
the same manner in which the centuries of Class I had been assigned. As corroborative evidence for the date of this innovation, the fasti record an increase in the number of military tribunes from four to six.\textsuperscript{32} If Varro's ratio of military tribunes to tribal contingents is correct, then the strength of the legion should have been increased from 4,000 to 6,000 men. The introduction of paid military service would have provided the wherewithal to the wealthier men of the infra classem to join the classis. The new centuries which were created, Classes II and III, were able to arm themselves in an appropriate manner. The pay also supplemented the loss of their civilian incomes.\textsuperscript{33} This was the first break with the system established by Servius.

The End of the Hoplite Levy

As seen above, the long struggle with Veii required more troops than Rome's hoplite levy could furnish. In order to increase the number of available troops, the Roman government was forced to open the ranks of the army to some citizens who were less wealthy than the hoplites themselves.

The period between the introduction of stipendium in ca. 406 and the military reforms attributed to Camillus was

\textsuperscript{32}Broughton, MRR I, 80, states that the six consular tribunes were elected in ca. 405, not ca. 406; G. Niccolini, I Fasti dei Tribuni della Plebe, Milano, dott. A. Giuffre, Fondazione Guglielmo Castelli Pubblicazioni, No. 7, 1934, 46.

\textsuperscript{33}Liv. 4,59,11; Ogilvie, Comm. 622; Diod. Sic. 14, 16,5; F. Lammert in RE III, s.v. stipendium, cols. 2536f.
a transitional stage in the final phase of development between the late-regal and the early Republican army. On the eve of the Gallic disaster, the legions seem to have been composed of six lines of 1,000 men each which were arranged in the phalanx formation. The officers of the legion were the six consular tribunes who either rotated the command of the legion among themselves when it was kept intact or selected one of their number who possessed the necessary military expertise as permanent commander.

The Gallic Disaster

The newly expanded classis received no respite from military duty. Immediately following the Veian War, the Romans were confronted by the irruption of the Gauls into Italy. The sources for the Roman disaster at the Allia (ca.390) are Livy, Dionysius, Diodorus and Plutarch. In addition to rendering a full account of the battle, Livy states that the army was mustered by declaring a state of emergency (tumultus).34 Both Dionysius and Diodorus agree with Livy on this point.35 When the tumultus was declared, all male citizens of military age, including the infra classem, were required to enroll into the army. By the declaration of a tumultus the Romans returned to the most

34 Liv. 5,37,7: "...plurimum terroris Romam celeritas hostium tirit, quippe quibus velut tumultuario exercitu raptim ducto aegere ad undecimum lapidem occursum est,..." Earlier Livy (5,37,3) stated that a normal levy had been conducted.

35 Dion. Hal. 13,12,2; Diod. Sic. 14,114,1.
primitive form of military levy. Yet, according to the sources, the legion was tactically deployed in the type of phalanx formation which had been adopted with the reform of ca. 406. The prima classis formed the front ranks of the legion while the newly introduced heavy-armed, but not hoplite equipped, soldiers of Classes II and III were deployed behind them. The rest of the citizens (infra classem) who were mustered into the army because of the emergency probably armed themselves with whatever weapons they could find and were placed in the rearmost ranks as make-weights for the phalanx. Thus, the so-called Servian system was again superseded. This time all citizens were enrolled and a stipend was paid.

Livy states that the Gallic horde had so greatly outnumbered the Romans that Q. Sulpicius, the commanding consular tribune, was forced to widen the breadth of his line. This action resulted in a weakened phalanx which was pene-


37 Veget. epit. 1,20,12-14; 2,15,1ff.; 15f. and 3,14, 10-14, refers to a time when the principes were frontline troops. Ernout-Meillet, DE, s.v. princeps, 535; Walde-Hofman, LEW, s.v. deinceps, I, 535; O. Weise, Language and Character of the Roman People, translated from the German edition by H. A. Strong and A. Y. Campbell, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Limited, 1909, 16; McCartney, "Rome's Military Indebtedness," 132; Sumner, "Legion and the Centuriate Organization," 68.

38 Liv. 5,38,2: "Nec tamen aequari frontes poterant cum extenuando infirmam et vix cohaerentem medium aciem haberent."
trated at the first assault. It seems logical that the particular segment of the legion which suffered the heaviest casualties during the battle and in the retreat was the prima classis. When the Roman phalanx broke and fled, the lighter-armed troops who were the furthest from the fighting were able to escape while the brunt of the Gallic onslaught fell upon the fleeing hoplites. Livy especially notes that many of those who drowned in the river did so because of their exhaustion and the weight of their lorica. And as it has been shown above, only the prima classis was equipped with this particular device.

The importance of the Gallic episode is the report of the near annihilation of the Roman hoplites. The damage which was inflicted upon the social fabric of Rome can only be imagined. It is likely that after the catastrophe the city could no longer field a sufficient number of hoplites.

39 Liv. 5,38,5-6; Ogilvie, Comm. 719; Diod. Sic. 14, 114,4; Onosander, a Greek military tactician, warned against the danger of a thinly-manned, over-extended phalanx in his treatise (21,1).


41 Liv. 5,38,8: "Circa ripam Tiberis, quo armis abiec-tis totum sinistrum cornu defugit, magna strages facta est, multosque imperitos nandi aut invalidos, graves loricis alisque tegminibus, hausere gurgites;" Diod. Sic. 14,114, 6-7.

according to the Servian system of enrollment. It should not be surprising that one of the results of the defeat was an immediate reform of the military system which has been ascribed to Camillus.

The Camillan Reforms

Although Plutarch and Dionysius⁴³ offer detailed accounts of the reforms which have been ascribed to Camillus, some scholars have remained skeptical of their validity.⁴⁴ It should be noted that although the ancient sources give a thoroughly descriptive account of the innovations in weaponry and tactics, they are silent as to the effect upon the demographic composition of the army. Accordingly, one might assume that the reform was carried out with the sole purpose of providing better arms for the soldiers.⁴⁵ Despite the silence of the sources on the social aspect of the Camillan reforms, they provide some information from which an interesting conclusion can be deduced.

The new weapons which Camillus is credited with having introduced lacked a considerable amount of bronze.

⁴³ Plut. Cam. 40,3-4; Dion. Hal. 14,9,1-2.

⁴⁴ Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 24.

⁴⁵ Dion. Hal. 14,9,2; Plut. Cam. 40,4; Polyaeus, strat. 8,7,2. The same tactics were employed by the tribunes of Flamininus in the battle against the Gallic Insubres (Polyb. 2,33,14). The triarii, who continued to use the hoplite heavy-thrusting spear and were formed in a phalanx, were ordered to the front line in order to take the slashing strokes of the Insubres on their hastae. The Gallic swords became unserviceable because of this maneuver.
There are two reasons for this development. First, if the ancient writers are correct about the devastation inflicted by the Gauls, then a considerable amount of Rome's movable wealth, probably in the form of bronze, left the city when the Gauls departed. Second, it is likely, as has been shown, that the ranks of the hoplites, that is, the prima classis, had been so depleted by the ill-fated contest that it was left to the poorer citizens to provide the bulk of the troops for the defense of the city. The Servian hoplite levy was completely overturned by the defeat at the Allia river. An indication of the growing political power of this segment of the population can be seen in the public debate as to whether the site of Rome should remain as the mother city or if the people should transfer themselves to the site where Veii once stood. The elements in Roman society which would have favored such a move would have been those who had no long-standing tie to the city whether agricultural, commercial or even ancestral. It is also significant, from a socio-political view, that during the twenty years following the sack of Rome, the plebeians agitated for, and eventually gained, equal representation with

46 Liv. 5,48,8-9; Ogilvie, Comm. 738. Although Livy states that gold was paid to ransom the city, the passages concerning the assessment of wealth in the time of Servius and in ca. 406 never mention precious metals. The laws of the XII Tables also quote fines in terms of bronze, not silver or gold.

47 Liv. 5,49,8; 50,8; 51,1ff.; Ogilvie, Comm. 739ff.
the patricians in the office of consul.\textsuperscript{48} It is obvious that the wealthiest elements of the Roman community had lost some of their political power.

The Origin of the Manipular Legion

After the Gauls sacked Rome, the Romans concentrated their efforts on restoring their position in central Italy and especially in the Latin League. Although Plutarch and Dionysius indicate that Camillus instituted reforms which changed the tactics of the legion from phalanx to maniple, the evidence from Livy would seem to indicate otherwise. In the campaign against the Etruscan town of Contenebra (ca. 388), Livy describes the legion as deployed in the phalanx formation.\textsuperscript{49} As most of the fighting in which the Romans engaged after the Gallic invasion was located on rather level land, it is likely that they continued to use the same tactics that had been previously employed with success against familiar foes. It was not until the phalanx was deployed on terrain which was unfavorable to hoplite tactics that the manipular formation was introduced. Livy,\textsuperscript{50} however, suggests that by the time of the Latin War

\textsuperscript{48}Liv. 6,35,5; 7,1,1ff (ca. 367). As part of the \textit{leges Liciniae Sextiae}, the \textit{lex de consule plebio} was enacted.

\textsuperscript{49}Liv. 6,4,10: "Cum in sex partes divisus exercitus Romanos senis horis in orbem succederet proelio, oppidanos eosdem integro semper certamini paucitas fessos obiceret, cessere tandem, locusque invadendi urbem Romanis datus est."

\textsuperscript{50}Liv. 8,8,3; Plut. \textit{Cam.} 19,5; Diod. Sic. 16,86.
the maniple was the basic unit of the legion. Although Livy's account may not be accurate for the period to which it was assigned, it is possible that it contains some elements of truth.

Livy, in his account of the Latin War, states that the Romans had previously discarded the clipeus for the scutum, just as the phalanx had been replaced by the maniple, and in a lengthy digression describes the personnel strength and organization of the manipular legion. The new formation was divided into three lines (ordines) called hastati, principes and triarii. The principes, under this arrangement, were relegated to the second line of the formation instead of the front rank as in the phalanx. Each of Livy's ordines contained 15 maniples for a total legionary complement of 45 maniples. Walters and Conway have attempted to legitimatize Livy's description by restructuring the passage to coincide with the narrative of Polybius (6, 19ff.).

It seems therefore that in the army which Livy was des-

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Livy's comment comparing the Roman maniple and the Macedonian phalanx displays a lack of tactical knowledge. The Macedonian phalanx was formed by companies (τάγματα) which were not unlike the maniples of the Roman legion. The early Roman phalanx more closely resembled the Greek hoplite formation.

51 Parker, RL, 12; Sumner, "Legion and Centuriate Organization," 68.

cribing there were only 10 maniples of Hastati, 10 of Principes, and 10 ordines of the third division (Triarii + Rorarii + Accensi). Then the numeration becomes clear; the third division has 3 times 600, i.e. 1800; each of the first two has 1600, each maniple running to 160. This gives $1800 + 2(1600) = 5000$, Livy’s total.

Conway’s result is a hybrid legion which bears the characteristics of both the Livian and Polybian accounts, but does not reflect legionary development for any period in the history of the Roman army.

The best possible date for the introduction of manipular tactics to the army should be associated with the Samnite wars of the latter part of the fourth century. The campaigns themselves would have required the deployment of the phalanx over rough and hilly terrain. Phalanx tactics were not effective on this type of topography. The Roman surrender at Caudine Forks (ca. 321) is an example of a defeat inflicted by the use of a superior strategical position. Toynbee has attributed the defeat to the inflexible nature of hoplite tactics.

54 Parker, RL, 19.
55 Toynbee, HL I, 518. Cf. Liv. 9,3,2. Livy tried to save Roman face by introducing an episode regarding the camp talk which preceded the battle. The Romans boasted that they would fight the Samnites on any terms, "...omnia aequa et plana erunt Romano in perfidem Samnitem pugnanti;" In this passage Livy tried to emphasize that the present good fortune of the Samnites was due largely to their treachery, rather than their valor. Livy is understandably silent on the question of the poor generalship which led the legions into the untenable position.
The sources note that on many occasions the Samnites brought the legions to near destruction on the battlefield. Frontinus states that the Samnites were most dangerous in their initial charge. An adage preserved by Livy ("...rem ad triarios rediisse,..."), in his preliminary discussion of the outbreak of the Latin War, has been assigned by Salmon to the conflict with the Samnites.

The sources provide strong evidence that the Romans borrowed manipular tactics from these highland warriors. Sallust believed that the Romans had obtained their present weapons from them: "Maiores nostri...arma atque tela militaria ab Samnitibus...sumpserunt." Diodorus also

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56 Front. strat. 2,1,8: "Fabius Maximus non ignarus, Gallos et Samnites primo impetu praevalere, suorum autem infatigabiles spiritus inter moras decertandi etiam incalescere, imperavit militibus, contenti primo congressu sustinere hostem mora fatigarent;" Liv. 10,28,3: "...et Samnitiem animos,..."

57 Liv. 8,8,11: "Inde rem ad triarios redisse, cum laboratur, proverbio increbruit." Salmon, Samnium, 102. Salmon attempts to rely upon the evidence on Cicero (de Or. 2, 80,325) in order to prove that the Samnites fought in a flexible, open order. Yet, if the passage is properly analyzed, no reference can be found regarding the battle formation of the Samnite tribes. The allegory to which Cicero was alluding was the tactics used by particular gladiators who, because of their accoutrements, were known as Samnites. The text of Cicero is as follows: "Atque eiusmodi illa prulsio debet esse, non ut Samnitium, qui vibrant hastas ante pugnem quibus in pugnando nihil utuntur,..."

58 Polyb. 18,30,6-7; Walbank, Comm. II, 590; Parker, RL, 16; Meyer, Kleine Schriften II, 203.

59 Sall. Cat. 51,37f.

60 Diod. Sic. 23,2,1.
connects the use or re-introduction of the scutum with the maniple:

Lastly, the unknown author of the Ineditum Vaticanum confirms the statements made by both Sallust and Diodorus.\textsuperscript{61}

The testimony just reviewed indicates that the Samnite terrain was responsible for compelling the Romans to abandon their inflexible hoplite formation in favor of the maniple. The attribution of these tactics to Camillus during the Gallic invasion of ca. 390 as well as the Latin War of ca. 340 must be reconsidered. It seems that the annalistic tradition could not distinguish between the use of the scutum and the maniple. In all likelihood, Camillus' reform reflected a change in weaponry due to the modest means of the impoverished city, but did not entail a change in tactics. From the time of Camillus until the defeat at Caudine Forks, it is likely that the army continued to be deployed as a phalanx while armed with the scutum.

The Introduction of 'proletarii' during the Pyrrhic War

By the end of the fourth century, the city had sufficiently recovered from the Gallic debacle to be able to increase its legions from two to four.\textsuperscript{62} Although this

\textsuperscript{61}von Arnim, "Ineditum Vaticanum," 121.

\textsuperscript{62}Salmon, Samnium, 232, cf. Liv. 9,30,3; C. P. Bur-
doubling occurred during the Second Samnite War (ca. 326-304), there is no mention of any emergency by Livy or by any of the other writers to indicate that the increase was motivated by desperation. There must have been a sufficient number of eligible citizens to make possible the doubling of the army. Yet, in ca. 296, Livy states that a rumored mobilization of the Etruscans, the Samnites and their Umbrian allies, and of a possible revolt of the Gauls led the senate to order the induction of all male citizens into the army. As soon as the threat passed, however, the preparations were halted. The declared tumultus of this year may have served to ease the inclusion of proletarii into the army several years later.

Although the Samnite wars must have claimed a substantial number of casualties, it was not until the Pyrrhic War (ca. 281) that there is clear evidence that Rome resumed the enrollment of proletarii into the legions. A fragment of Ennius is the source of this information:

proletarius publicitus scutisque feroque ornatur fero, muros urbemque forumque excubiis curant.

Ger, Jr., Der Kampf zwischen Rom und Samnium, Amsterdam, Johannes Muller, 1898, 58ff.

Liv. 10,21,3f.: "His nuntiis senatus conterritus iustitium indici, dilectum omnis generis hominum haberi iussit. Nec ingenui modo aut iuniores sacramento adacti sed seniorum etiam cohortes factae libertinique centuriati;"

Enn. ann. frg. 183; Hemina frg. 21, in HRR² 1, 105: "Tunc Marcius praeco primum proletarios armavit;" Gell. n.a. 16,10,1; Oros. 4,1,1: "Romanos, qui quantique
As noted by Ennius, however, the *proletarii* served in the capacity of a home guard. This is in contrast to the active role which they played when the Gauls had invaded Italy earlier. Since the Romans resorted to the enrollment of *proletarii*, they must have suffered severe manpower losses in this particular war. In fact, Ennius' account states that the *proletarii* served at public expense.

**Conclusion**

As shown, the post-Servian army underwent significant changes in its composition because of the city's military needs. The stress of the Veian War was responsible for the introduction of paid military service and the elevation of a segment of the *infra classem* to the *classis*. The new centuries formed the classes later known as II and III. With this event, the army began a process of proletarianization. Some years later, the Roman government was again forced to open the ranks of the legion under the pressure of the Gallic invasion. All male citizens, including the *infra classem*, the latter-day *proletarii*, were enrolled into the army in order to confront the Gauls. As a result of the defeat at the river Allia, the Roman government was compelled to rely upon those citizens who were of modest means for the defense of the city. This development...
is reflected in the innovation in military accoutrements which has been credited to Camillus. Whether Camillus introduced manipular tactics after the Allia cannot be determined with any certainty. The description offered by Plutarch and Dionysius regarding the new tactics indicates that this was the case. Livy, as noted, mentions that the phalanx continued in use in the period following the departure of the Gauls. Because of the contradictory evidence, the date of the introduction of manipular tactics should be assigned to a period not earlier than the late fourth century.

The documented use of proletarii during the Gallic invasion of ca. 390, the development of manipular tactics and the Pyrrhic War contradicts the Servian prohibition against the enrollment into the army of non-propertied citizens.65

In light of this evidence, Sallust's alarm that Marius was acting contrary to tradition seems to be unfounded. It seems likely, however, that Roman pragmatism prevailed when desperate circumstances demanded untraditional solu-

65 Liv. 1,43,8: "Hoc minor census reliquam multitudinem habuit; inde una centuria facta est immunis militia;" Dion. Hal. 4,18,2: "τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πολίτας, οἱ τίμησιν έλαττον εδέχεται δώδεκα καὶ ήμίοιος μνόν, πλείους τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὄντας τῶν προτέρων, ἀπαντάς εἰς ἕνα συντάξας λόχον στρατείας τ' ἀπέλυσε καὶ πάσης εἰσφορᾶς ἐποίησεν ἀτελεῖς." Cic. de rep. 2,40: "...qui aut non plus mille quingentos aeris aut omnino nihil in suum censum praeter caput attulissent, proletarios nominavit, ut ex iis quasi proles, id est, quasi progenies civitatis, expectari videretur."
tions. The use of proletarii established the historical precedents which may have been invoked by later Roman commanders in order to justify the enrollment of technically unqualified citizens into their armies.

The chapters which follow will show that the testimony of the sources on the Hannibalic War and the wars of the second century indicate there was an increasing willingness to enroll citizens who owned little or no property.
CHAPTER IV

ROMAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE SECOND CENTURY

AND THE EFFECT UPON LEGIONARY RECRUITMENT

As demonstrated, military necessity compelled the Romans to enroll into the army citizens who had not attained the requisite census rating as prescribed by Servius. The property standards recorded by the ancient sources were, of course, artificial ratings which could not have been in effect during the mid-sixth century. As noted, the first divergence from the Servian scheme occurred during the Veian War when the government elevated the wealthier segment of the infra classem into the classis. Also it has been demonstrated that under the extreme conditions of the Gallic invasion and the Pyrrhic War even the poorest citizens, the proletarii, were mustered into the army. In the case of the Pyrrhic War, the proletarii were armed at public expense. Although the information for the First Punic War and the succeeding campaigns in the Po Valley and Illyria is insufficient, it is possible that the process of enlisting into the army citizens who possessed less than the required property standard continued.

During the early years of the Hannibalic War, especially after the defeats at Ticinus, Trasimenus, Trebia and Cannae, the Romans must have found it difficult to obtain a
sufficient number of eligible citizens to form the needed legions.\(^1\) At this juncture in the Hannibalic War, the Romans enrolled two legions which consisted of the underaged and slaves.\(^2\) Since even slaves were enrolled, it is likely that *proletarii* were also taken into the army.

Thus, this chapter is intended to demonstrate that the last decades of the third century and the early years of the second century were the formative years for the development of that military professionalism among the Romans which is usually held to be a result of the Marian reform. In order to understand the impact of the lowered property requirements on legionary recruitment, it will be necessary to review certain evidence concerning the Roman army during this period: (1) to examine the testimony of the ancient sources, (2) to determine the date of the introduction of *proletarii* into the legions on a regular basis, (3) to discern the assessment of military eligibility, and (4) to ascertain the ability of the average Roman to earn a living in the civilian as well as the military sectors of the Ro-

\(^1\)In the early years of the Hannibalic War, the Romans and their allies suffered severe manpower losses. At the Trebia river about 36,000 men were lost (cf. Liv. 21,17, 5ff., the original force numbered 46,000 men while only 10,000 are reported to have survived, Liv. 21,56,2). At Lake Trasimenes, 15,000 soldiers died (cf. Liv. 22,7,2). The disaster at Cannae cost between 47,700 (Liv. 22,49,15) and 70,000 lives (Polyb. 3,117,4).

\(^2\)Liv. 22,57,11f. The dictator M. Junius Pera also enrolled 6,000 debtor-slaves and criminals in 216, cf. Liv. 23,14,3f.
Roman economy, by comparing the wage of the Roman legionary to his counterpart in the Hellenistic East and by investigating whether or not the assumed property reduction to 1,500 asses later in the second century actually affected enrollment into the army.

Second Century Sources for the Study of the Roman Army

For the period of the Hannibalic War and the second century, there are several sources. The principal writer of this period is Polybius. Although Walbank has criticized the narrative as over-schematic, there is no good reason to doubt that the account is an accurate report on the annual dilectus. The treatise does not record, however, the manner in which a special or emergency levy was conducted. Therefore, we must assume that Polybius was describing the operation of the dilectus under ideal conditions. For this reason, it is advisable that Polybius’ view on the organization of the Roman army be evaluated.

His nearly extant account covers the period under consideration here to the year ca. 135. The balance of the work has survived in a collection of fragments, the latest

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4 Brunt, IM, Appendix XIX, 625 and E. Rawson, "The Literary Sources for the Pre-Marian Army," PBSR xxxix N. S. xxvi, 1971, 13ff., have especially objected to the accuracy of Polybius' account of the dilectus. There is little reason to doubt that Polybius was providing a most rudimentary report to an audience, primarily in Greece, who had no knowledge of the Roman military system. Meyer, Kleine Schriften I, 225; Walbank, Comm. I, 698; Toynbee, HL I, 505.
of which has been dated to ca. 120. Fortunately, Polybius considered it necessary to describe the Roman military system to his Greek audience. His special treatment of this subject has been preserved with most of its essential information intact. The account is located in Book VI of the narrative, and is the only contemporary description of the Republican army which has survived. The treatise purports to describe the organization of the Roman army and the condition of legionary service during the Hannibalic War.

Polybius opens by stating that the common foot soldier was liable to a minimum of 16 years of military service, 20 years in an emergency. The age at which young men were initially inducted into the legions was 17, while retirement from active service occurred when the citizen reached the age of 46. Unlike the accounts of Livy and Dionysius which purport to give the property values in the

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5 Walbank, Comm. I, 373; Polybius, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972, 12f.
7 Brunt, IM, Appendix XIX, 627, argues that the account is not credible even for the period of the Hannibalic War because Polybius relied upon antiquarian material for his information.
8 Polyb. 6,19,2; Walbank, Comm. I, 698.
9 Polyb. 6,19,2; Walbank, Comm. I, 698; Nepos, Cato 1,2: "primum stipendium meruit annorum decem septemque;" Liv. 27,11,14f.; Gell. n.a. 10,28.
time of Servius, at 12,500 and 11,000 asses respectively, Polybius states that those citizens who owned at least 400 drachmas (4,000 asses) worth of property were subject to military service. Those citizens who owned property which had been valued at less than the minimum were technically exempt from military service. This particular group of citizens was known as the proletariat and was relegated to voting in the last century of the comitia centuriata. As in the annalistic descriptions of the Servian "constitution", Polybius makes no mention of the type of property which an individual needed to own in order to qualify for the dilectus. Most scholars, however, have assumed that Polybius was quoting the value of land. As previously demonstrated, it is likely that the minimum census rating included non-landed property as well. Some part of this non-landed property consisted of the military stipend which

10 Dion. Hal. 4,18,2; 19,2; Livy (1,43,7f.), however, gives the figure as 11,000 asses; Marquardt, RSt II, 324.

11 G. Wesenberg in RE XXIII, s.v. proletariat, col. 631f.; Fest. 184L: "Niquis scivit centuria est, quae dictur a Servio Tullio rege constituata, in qua liceret eius suffragium ferre, qui non tulisset in sua, nequis civis suffragii iure privaretur: nam sciscito significat sententiam dicit, ac suffragium ferto, unde scita plebis. Sed in ea centuria, neque censetur quisquam, neque centurio praefit tur, neque centurialis potest esse, quia nemo certus est centuriae."

had been paid to the soldiers since it was introduced ca. 406/5.

Additional Sources

Although Posidonius of Apameia attempted to complete the narrative begun by Polybius, his account has survived only in fragments. The annalistic tradition was continued in the work of Livy who provides a full account of the Hannibalic War and the events of the second century until the fall of the Macedonian monarchy at the battle of Pydna ca. 168. Appian is the only other writer to provide a substantial amount of information the foreign wars of Rome in the second century and the domestic strife of the Gracchan era.

13 The text which is available has been preserved as brief notices in the works of other writers. It can be discerned that Posidonius' history was consulted by Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch in their own compositions. The fragments which are of particular interest are those which relate to events in the Gracchan episode and the minor wars of the late second century. Of the two summaries, the periochae contain more detailed information but suffer from occasional chronological errors. Cf. A. Klotz, "Zu den Periochae des Livius," Philologus 91, 1936, 67-88; C. M. Begbie, "The Epitome of Livy," CQ 17, 1967, 332-338. The Oxyrhynchus epitome, on the other hand, is quite brief and does not provide the same amount of information as can be found in the periochae. Cf. P. Oxy. no. 668 which contains the text of the papyrus with comments by the editors (Oxy. Epit.). E. Kornemann, Die Neue Livius-Epitome aus Oxyrhynchus: Text und Untersuchungen, Klio Beiheft 2, Leipzig, 1904, reprinted Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1965; M. Stuart, "P. Oxyrhynchus 668, 188-90," CP 39, 1944, 40f. After Pydna, the text breaks off abruptly and is available only in the summaries which have been preserved by Livy's epitomators.

14 Although he wrote several centuries after the
The Date and Consequence of the Reduction of the Minimum Property Requirement to 4,000 Asses

The Polybian narrative on the Roman army is the only description of the amount or type of property which an individual needed to own in order to be listed on the tabulae iuniorum. However, if Livy's figure of 11,000 asses is accepted as correct, then a significant reduction on the minimum property requirement must have occurred at some time before the composition of Polybius' treatise. The exact date for the reduction, and whether it was gradual or immediate, is unknown. Kübler suggested a rather early date for the reduction of the minimum census rating to 4,000 asses. His proposition was based upon a passage from Livy. Livy recounts that Appius Claudius, during his censorship (ca. 311), enrolled libertini into the senate. Kübler, however, seems to have identified Livy's use of the term libertini with Polybius' statement that those under the minimum property rating of 4,000 asses were obliged to serve in the Roman navy. Livy's passage, however, is con- 

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15 Kübler in RE III, s.v. capite censi, cols. 1521ff.
16 Liv. 9,29,7; Per. 9: "libertinorum filios in senatum legit."
cerned with enrollment into the senate and not into the ranks of the navales. Kübler's conclusion that proletarii must have seen military duty since libertini might have been drafted into the fleet since the time of App. Claudius is spurious at best.\textsuperscript{18}

With the proposal of this very early date for the property reduction, Kübler was able to conclude that the 1,500-\textit{As} census rating might have been introduced during the Pyrrhic War in 281. Kübler's theory that the Pyrrhic War witnessed the induction of poor citizens whose property rating was only 1,500 \textit{asses} into the army was taken from the testimony of Nonius (93L) and Orosius (4,1,3). Unfortunately for Kübler's proposal, while Nonius and Orosius com-

\textsuperscript{18}No fleet probably existed ca. 311. The naval detachment which the Romans may have had available numbered only 20 ships. Cf. O. Fiebiger in \textit{RE} III, s.v. \textit{classis}, no. 3, cols. 2632f.; H. A. Ormerod, \textit{Piracy in the Ancient World}, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1924, 161. Livy (9, 30,4) notes that the squadron was under the command of duoviri navales who manned the ships with socii navales. The Romans, at this time, were content to establish \textit{coloniae maritmae} to defend the sea-coast, instead of creating a strong navy. At this stage in her history, Rome's naval force had only recently been created and numbered a mere 20 ships. The literary tradition concerning this episode mentions neither a great naval victory, nor an extraordinary effort on the part of the ships' crews which would have benefited the State. There seems to be no reason, therefore, to honor the libertini with enrollment into the senate. The freedmen noted by Livy may reflect an attempt by Claudius to pack the senate with his own clients or supporters in order to obtain a favorable attitude towards his policies. W. L. Rodgers, \textit{Greek and Roman Naval Warfare}, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1937, 270f.; W. W. Tarn, "The Fleets of the First Punic War," \textit{JHS} 27, 1907, 49; J. H. Thiel, \textit{A History of Roman Sea-power before the Second Punic War}, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1954, 9ff.; 41ff.
ment upon the pauperes, the plebei, and the proletarii, they make no mention of a monetary figure. It is likely that Kubler was relying upon the census ratings of the proletarii as given by Cicero (de rep. 2,40) and Gellius (n.a. 16,10,10) and connected those amounts to the accounts of Nonius and Orosius. Since these sources are considerably later than the period of the Pyrrhic War, it is likely that while the general context of the ancient reports might be correct, the exact monetary figure, as in the case of the census ratings which have been ascribed to Servius, are anachronistic. Kübler's suggestion, therefore, runs counter to the testimony of Polybius (6,19ff.), Cicero (de rep. 2,40) and Gellius (n.a. 16,10,10) that these two reductions, first to 4,000 asses and then later to 1,500 asses, occurred during the Hannibalic War and the last years of the life of Scipio Aemilianus, respectively.

EXCURSUS

'Proletarii' as Light-Armed Troops

The legionary recruits who owned only 4,000 asses of property have been identified by Gabba with the velites or light-armed troops.(19) Polybius describes the velites as the νεωτάρτου καὶ πευχοπάτου. (20) These particular troops were equipped with a sword, javelins and a small shield.(21) This was not, however, their initial appearance as part of the Roman legion. Polybius records the existence of these troops during the First Punic War.(22)

19 Gabba, Esercito, 12f.
20 Polyb. 6,21,7; Walbank, Comm. I, 701f.
21 Polyb. 6,22,1; Walbank, Comm. I, 703.
22 Polyb. 1,33,9; Walbank, Comm. I, 92.
Some scholars (23), such as Frohlich, Kromayer-Veith, Fiebiger, Lammert, and Fraccaro, identified the velites with the rorarii of the manipular legion which has been described earlier by Livy.(24) In fact, if the account of Livy regarding the rorarii is compared to Polybius' description of the velites, it is apparent that there is little difference between the two corps of troops. It should be noted that the soldiers of Class IV in the Servian system, as described by Dionysius and Livy, were armed in a fashion which was similar to the rorarii of the manipular legion of ca. 340 and the velites (γυροσφάνταξον) as described by Polybius.(25)

Kübier's theory has been rejected by Gabba who suggests that the introduction of the velites signaled the creation of a new legionary corps which coincided with the reduction of the minimum property requirement to 4,000 asses.26 In formulating his theory, Gabba examined certain chronological events which suggest that proletarii were introduced into the legion as velites during the Hannibalic War. The following events were cited by Gabba:

1. ca. 217-libertini and proletarii were drafted into the navalia as crew. Cf. Liv. 22,11,8 and 57,7.

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24 Liv. 8,8,5: "leves autem qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent vocabantur."

25 Dion. Hal. 4,17,2; Liv. 1,43,6; Polyb. 6,22,1ff.

2) *ca.* 214-slaves were drafted into the fleet as crew. Cf. Liv. 24,11,7-9.

3) *ca.* 212/11-*proletarii* were serving in the legions at Capua. Cf. Liv. 23,14,2.

If the evidence from Polybius regarding the *velites* is closely examined, it is easily seen that no special treatment was given to the description of the corps. The military treatise simply states that the *velites* had two qualities which differentiated them from the rest of the legionary recruits: they were the youngest and the poorest members of the legion. The notice by Livy on the *velites*, upon which Gabba has placed so much importance, only indicates that the light-armed troops, which previously had served as an auxiliary arm of the legion, were made a part of the tactical structure of the army. There is no indication from the sources that an administrative or tactical change in the daily routine of the *velites* was considered to have been an extraordinary development warranting special treatment. Thus, despite the earlier suggestion of Kubler, it might be assumed, as Gabba has, that by the time of the Hanniballic War, the poor were regularly enrolled into the legions.

It is likely, as Gabba has shown, that the reduction of the property qualification caused a substantial number of *proletarii* to be elevated to the status of *adsidui* and, therefore, had made available to the city more men for the
dilectus. If the youngest and the poorest recruits were those citizens who owned 4,000 asses of property and had been formed into the velites, then it seems that the strength of the heavy-armed contingents of the legion must not have benefitted from the reduction. In the section which follows the type and value of property which was assessed in determining the Polybian standard for military eligibility will be ascertained.

The Assessment of Military Eligibility

Scholars have usually interpreted the references of the ancient sources to the poor as meaning the non-landed urban masses. As previously discussed, however, many of the urban dwellers probably owned plots of land within Rome itself or within the confines of their own towns. It is also known that Romans owned land which they farmed outside of the immediate environs of the municipality. Therefore, the inhabitants of Rome or any other Roman town should not be considered to have been relegated to the civil status of proletariat simply because of their place of residence.

27 Cincinnatus' land was located across the Tiber in modern-day Trastevere. Cf. Liv. 3,26,1ff.; Ogilvie, Comm. 442; Dion. Hal. 10,8,17; Plin. n.h. 18,20; Val. Max. 4,1,4; Fest. 306L, s.v. quinctia prata. During the middle years of the Republic the farm was still within walking distance of the city. Cf. Ter. Adelph. 949f.; Dion. Hal. 19,15. In Pliny's time (n.h. 19,51) regular farms existed in the city: "iam quidem hortorum nomine in ipsa urbe delicias agros villasque possident."

28 A popular misconception among modern scholars has
An interesting development during the course of the Hannibalic War was the assessment of the small farmer who had abandoned his lands in the face of the advancing enemy and who may have remained within the protective walls of a city or town for the duration of the conflict. Much of the farmland must have remained vacant throughout the war as Livy states that land within the fiftieth milestone of Rome was still uninhabited after the war was concluded.²⁹ It is likely that the censors continued to include these refugee farmers among the list of adsidui on the technicality that these citizens continued to hold title to the temporarily vacated lands.

Although it seems likely that Polybius' figure of a 400-drachma property requirement is appropriate for the time of the Hannibalic War, no direct evidence exists as to the

nature of the property which was included in this assess-
ment. As noted by the earliest laws, by the time of the
mid or late fifth century, bronze had been introduced as a
medium of exchange, especially in the assessment of fines.
It is likely that other types of property, movable and im-
movable, were also valued in terms of bronze. After the
introduction of coinage at Rome (ca. 269), it would have
been considerably easier for property to assume an identi-
fiable standard of value and, therefore, to facilitate its
commercial exchange.

Land Values in the Time of Polybius

The property value required for military service, as
noted by Polybius, marks a divergence from the assumed use
of landed property as the sole means of determining an in-
dividual's wealth. Unfortunately, the sources provide only
isolated examples of the cost or value of various items of
property such as land, wages, chattels or staples.

All figures which have been suggested by modern schol-
ars for land values in Republican Rome are little more than
well conceived estimates with no basis in the writings of
the ancient authorities. Much of this work has centered
around the Servian census ratings and the interpretation as
to the date of the figures and the number of iugera invol-
ved. Nilsson proposed that before the outbreak of the
First Punic War, the Livian figure for the lowest census
rating (11,000 asses) reflected the value of a heredium of
land.\textsuperscript{30} Tenney Frank, however, suggested that a \textit{iugerum} of land was valued at around 100 \textit{denarii} in \textit{ca.} 200 and increased in value to about 250 \textit{denarii} \textit{ca.} 150.\textsuperscript{31} Mattingly, on the other hand, proposed that Dionysius' minimum census figure of 12½ \textit{minae} (12,500 \textit{asses}) represented the value of a \textit{heredium} at the time of the \textit{lex Voconia} (ca. 169).\textsuperscript{32} The figures for land values, however, are not based upon any contemporary literary or epigraphical testimony.

If Frank's figure of 100 \textit{denarii} per \textit{iugerum} \textit{ca.} 200 is accepted, then a \textit{heredium} of land would have been valued at 2,000 \textit{asses} or half of the amount required for legionary eligibility according to Polybius. The subsistence farmer and the urban dweller who owned a small plot of land would have been ineligible for military service through the normal method of legionary enrollment, that is, the \textit{dilectus}.

During the period described by Polybius, Pliny and Festus indicate that there was a significant change in the value of the \textit{denarius}. Pliny has dated the sextantal reform to the early years of the Hannibalic War, specifically during the dictatorship of Q. Fabius Maximus (217):

\begin{quote}
postea Hannibale urguente Q. Fabio Maximo dictatore as-
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] Frank, \textit{ESAR} I, 125.
\end{footnotes}
Festus seems to have consulted the same source as Pliny:

sextantari asses in usu esse coeperum ex eo tempore, quo propter bellum Punicum secundum, quod cum Hannibale gestum est, decreverum patres, ut ex assibus qui tum erant librari, fienter sextantari; per quos cum solvi coeptum esset, et populus aere alieno liberaretur, et privati, quibus debitum publice solvi oportebet, non magno detimento adficerentur; and grave aes dictum a pondere, quia deni asses, singuli pondo libras, efficiebant denarium, ab hoc ipso numero dictum. Sed bello Punico populus Romanus, pressus aere alieno, ex singulis assibus librariis senos fecit, qui tantundem, ut illi, valerent.(34)

The unit was retariffed at 16 asses instead of the previous 10 asses. It is not certain, however, whether Polybius' 400-drachma requirement was based upon the libral or sextantal standard. Since Polybius' military treatise is placed in the midst of the description of the battle of Cannae (216), it is likely that Polybius was writing in terms of the sextantal As.\(^{35}\)

If this assumption is correct, then the pre-reform

\(^{33}\)Plin. n.h. 33,45.  
\(^{34}\)Fest. 468L, s.v. sextantari asses; 87L, s.v. grave aes. Crawford (RRC II, 613ff.) has suggested that a fragmentary passage from Festus (470L, s.v. sestertius notam) which mentions a Q. Fabius Maximus actually refers to the mid-second century (ca. 141) and not the Hannibalic War.  
\(^{35}\)Polyb. 2,15ff.; Walbank, Comm. I, 176f.; Cato de agr. 136: "In agro Casinate et Venafro in loco boni parti octava corbi dividat, satis bono septime, terto loco sexta;" Varro r.r. 1,44,1: "...quod tantum valet regio ac genus terrae, ut ex eodem semine aliiubi cum decimo redeat, aliubi cum quinto decimo, ut in Etruria locis aliquot." Cic. in Verr. 2,3,47,112: "ager efficit cum octavo, bene ut agatur; verum ut omnes di adiuvent, cum decimo."
property standard of Polybius may have been only 250 libral
\textit{denarii} or 2,500 libral \textit{asses} (250 lib. den. x 16 asses =
4,000 sex. den. = 400 sex. den. or 400 dr.). The land val-
ues suggested by Frank make little sense in and of them-
selves if the sextantal reform of the \textit{denarius} is ignored.
The value of a \textit{heredium} of land as proposed by Frank, with-
out adjustment for the sextantal reform, would seem to in-
dicate that there should have been a severe deficiency in
the number of citizens who were eligible for legionary ser-
vice during the Hannibalic War. Furthermore, Frank's pro-
positon that a \textit{heredium} of land appreciated in value to 500
denarii ca. 150 would seem to suggest that the number of
citizens who qualified for military service would have in-
creased correspondingly. The testimony of the ancient
sources regarding the manpower available for the \textit{dilectus},
however, indicates that the opposite was true in each in-
stance.

The ancient sources do not provide a comprehensive
account of the number of \textit{iugera} needed to support a family.
The small plot or subsistence farm was not treated by the
agricultural writers to any significant degree. But, draw-
ing upon annalistic sources, possibly as a reflection of
his own times, Pliny\textsuperscript{36} stated that the two-\textit{iugera} plot was
probably sufficient to feed an average family. It is not

\textsuperscript{36} Plin. n.h. 19,52: "Romae quidem per se hortus ager
pauperis erat; ex horto plebei macellum, quanto innocenti-
ore victu;" 19,57.
likely however, that a *heredium* could have produced a surplus which would have enriched its owner. The owner of a subsistence farm, who owned little or no other property regardless of whether he lived during the archaic period or during the middle years of the Republic, probably was not eligible to serve as a hoplite warrior or even as a heavily-armed legionary until the desperate struggle with Hannibal.  

**Wages and the Cost of Living in the Time of Polybius**

Evidence for the daily cost of living and for the means which were available to the average citizen in order to obtain a living wage is limited to isolated examples cited in the literary sources. Although there is no epigraphical and papyrological evidence for Roman society of the late third and second centuries, there is abundant documentary testimony for the Hellenistic world. This evidence might be used profitably to compare trends in the Greek East with those random examples cited by Roman literary sources. Although the testimony from the Hellenistic sources cannot represent the actual situation at Rome, since in antiquity, the cost of goods and services as well as the prevailing wage scale were subject to local conditions which varied from place to place.

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Civilian Wages

The wage scale for day-labor in this period is not particularly well attested. Although the few examples which have survived do not deal directly with the wages paid to the average plebeian, the information may be used to propose a workable estimate. As the number of slaves rose between the years 200 and 146, we have reliable information from Cato regarding slave wages. As slaves were the primary competition of the free-born day-laborers, the daily rate of pay for each group was probably comparable.

In his treatise on Roman farming, Cato\(^38\) states that 72 sestertii was sufficient to pay six adult male slaves and six boys to fetch and haul an olive crusher to his villa. The work took six days to complete, for a daily wage of 2 sestertii (8 asses) per man. Apparently, the boys received no pay.\(^39\) Heichelheim, from contemporary records for slave labor on the island of Delos (ca. 170), noted that a slave was paid two obols per day which was equivalent to a third of the rate which free labor could expect to earn.\(^40\) A freeborn commoner, therefore, could

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\(^{38}\) Cato de agr. 22,3: "Trapetus emptus est in Suessano HS CCC et olei P. L. Conposturae HS LX; vecturam boum, operas VI, homines VI cum bubulcis HS LXXII;...."

\(^{39}\) Frank, ESAR I, 165f.

hope to earn at least a drachma per day. A skilled artisan, however, could demand as much as five times the daily rate of a freeborn laborer. In Ptolemaic Egypt, wages were kept to about a third or a fourth of that which was paid to the average worker on Delos.

Although definitive information is lacking for Roman prices and wages during the second century, it is necessary to attempt to calculate the cost of basic commodities and to determine the quantity needed for the average plebeian family on the subsistence wage level. Briefly, Tenney Frank calculated that the cost of wheat was about 3 sestertii per modius while barley was sold for 1\frac{1}{2} to 2 sestertii per modius. It is known, however, that the price of a modius of wheat at Rome fluctuated widely from 1 to 6 1/3 asses during the second century. If the dis-

41 Frank, ESAR I, 188.
44 Frank, ESAR I, 77; 200.
45 Rostovtzeff in RE VII, s.v. frumentum, cols. 143ff.; 173. The price of wheat in the time of Polybius depended upon the market location. For the most part, a medimnus (6 modii) of wheat cost about 4 asses. Prices, however, of 1 to 2 asses per modius are commonly attested. A high side of the price range was the price fixed by the lex Sempronia frumentaria which fixed the State subsidized price at 6 1/3 asses per modius. Walbank, Comm. I, 176; cf. Polyb. 2,15.
tribution of free or low priced grain is considered, then Frank's figures may be too high. An average price of 1 to 2 sestertii seems more acceptable.

In estimating the amount of grain consumed by the average plebeian family, Frank allowed 10 modii of wheat at a price of 3 sestertii per modius.\(^4^6\) If the average price, including free grain, was closer to 4 asses per modius, then the plebeian family would have spent only about 30 denarii per year. The cost of fresh vegetables, salt, oil, wine and the like would have increased the family's budget by another 30 denarii per year. If the plebeian owned his own hortus or heredium in or near the city as indicated by Pliny, then the expenditure for fresh staples would be practically eliminated. The expense for wine, oil and the like might amount to 20 denarii or so per year, while clothing might add another 20 denarii to the budgetary expense.\(^4^7\) The annual budget for the average plebeian family might have totalled only about 70 denarii per year excluding rent. The information supplied by Cato seems

\(^{46}\) Frank, ESAR I, 189. As Polybius (6,39,13) gives the allotment of 2/3's of an Attic medimnus per month for each soldier (4 modii), a laborer and his wife would need 7/8 modii per month. An additional 2/3's of a modius would be needed for minor children.

\(^{47}\) Although Cato (Plut. Cato Mai. 4,4) claimed that he never spent more than 100 denarii for his own clothes, he allowed his slaves a new pair of shoes, a tunic and a blanket every other year (Cato de agr. 59). Frank (ESAR I, 194) indicates that this would be equivalent to the same amount a wealthy Roman would pay. The average laborer (ESAR I, 189) would have paid about 20 denarii per year.
to indicate that he alloted about 78 denarii per year for the basic needs of each slave.\(^{48}\) This amount, however, did not include rent. If rent had been paid at a daily rate of 2 asses, then it seems that another 45 to 50 denarii would be added to the annual expense. From the estimates proposed above, the average plebeian family should have been able to support itself on about 120 denarii per year. Frank's proposed budget of about 200 denarii may be excessive.\(^{49}\) In light of this information, the military stipendium of 120 denarii per year (192 denarii after the sextantial reform) seems to have been adequate to support a family. The significance of the rate of civilian wages in light of the military stipend will be more closely examined in the subsequent section.

'Stipendium'

When the Roman government introduced pay for military service ca. 406/5 in conjunction with the Veian War, it was intended that the stipend would serve to reimburse the citizen-soldier for the loss of income incurred while he was on active campaign.\(^{50}\) As previously noted, the offer

\(^{48}\) Cato de agr. 56.

\(^{49}\) Frank, ESAR I, 189.

\(^{50}\) Liv. 4,59,11; 5,4,4; Ogilvie, Comm. 622; Fest. 379L, s.v. stipem; C. Gatti, "Reflessioni sull'istituzione dello stipendium per i legionari romani," Acme xxiii, 1970, 131-35; Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, 329; F. Lammert in RE IIIA, s.v. stipendium, cols. 2536ff.; G. R. Watson, "The Pay of the Roman Army," Historia 7, 1958, 114ff.
of payment for military service was probably available to all Roman citizens regardless of their present census rating. Only the *classici* and the wealthier members of the *infra classem*, however, were able to avail themselves of the *stipendium*. By adding the military stipend to their other assets, the wealthiest members of the *infra classem* were able to attain the status of *classici* and, therefore, serve in the legion. Thus, the strength of the legion could have been increased by 2,000 heavy-armed men.

According to Polybius, the Roman soldier would have received 120 *denarii* per year as compensation for his service. This amount was calculated in bronze *asses*. F. W. Walbank has suggested that the foot soldier did not receive his wage on a daily basis, but drew a *denarius* every third day.51 R. Fink, however, has proposed that the method of paying the legionaries during the Principate must not have differed significantly from that which was employed during the Republic.52 It seems that the quaestor maintained an account for each soldier which was credited with the appropriate amount of pay. Against this account, deductions were made for food, clothing, arms and spending

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51 Walbank, Comm. I, 722: "This meant that in effect a cavalryman drew a *denarius* a day, a centurion 2 *denarii* every three days, and a *legionary* a *denarius* every three days;"

money.  Although it is not certain whether the enlistee was credited with a full year's pay upon his enrollment into the legion, it seems likely that this would have been the practice. For, in this manner, the recruit would have had a sum readily available to pay for his arms and food as well as adding to his property qualification as a legionary. Thus, the stipendium must have been calculated in the assessment which made him eligible for legionary service.

Based upon the calculations of living expenses, the annual military wage of 120 denarii seems to be sufficient to maintain the average soldier if that amount was calculated in terms of sextantal asses. It is important to note that according to Pliny the soldier's pay was not to be devalued as a result of the retariffing of the denarius. The military stipend continued to be calculated in terms of libral asses: "in militari tamen stipendium semper denarii pro x assibus datus est." The effect of this dual standard was an extremely advantageous increase in legionary pay, while prices for goods and services fell. In real terms, the legionary was actually receiving 192 sextantal denarii (120 lib. den. x 16 sex. ass. = 1,920 sex. ass. = 53 Polyb. 6,39,15: "διδόται δὲ τοῖς μὲν συμμάχοις τοῦτον ἐν δωρεᾷ. τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις τούτου τε σιτίου καὶ τῆς ἐσθή- τος, καὶ τιμὸς ὁπλου προσδεχόμενος, πάντων τούτων ὁ ταμίας τῆς τεταγμένης τιμῆς ἐκ τῶν ὑψωτέρων ὑπολογίζεται."

54 Plin. n.h. 33,45; Non. 853L.
This was a better rate of pay than one which the individual could have eked out at home.

If, however, the military wage of two obols per day as stated by Polybius is considered on its own merit, then the stipend does not seem to be an especially attractive pay scale. The stipend, according to Nonius, originally was intended to have been equivalent to only six months pay (semestre stipendia). The amount of the original stipendium, however, is unknown.

The only Republican source to give the rate of military pay is Polybius. According to his testimony, the daily rate for the foot soldier was two obols while a cavalryman received one drachma (denarius). The higher rate of pay for the eques reflects the increased costs of keeping a horse and groom. If the figures given by Polybius represent the pay rate for a conscripted army, then, it might be assumed, the wages paid to mercenary soldiers in

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56 Non. 853L: "aere diruti appellabantur milites, quibus propter ignominiam stipendium, id est merces mensualis aut annua, quae esset in nummis aeris, subtrahebatur;" At this time, the length of the campaigning season was only six months, from Spring planting until harvest. Livy (40,41,11) used the term semestre stipendia to refer to a half year's pay in later times.

57 Polyb. 6,39,12: "οψώνιον δ' οί μέν πεζοί λαμβάνουσι τῆς ημέρας δύο άβολους, οί δ' εδ' ταξίαρχοι διπλούν, οί δ' ἵππεις δραχμῆν." Walbank, Comm. I, 722.
the Greek East should have been considerably higher.

Military Wages in the Hellenistic World

For many years, scholars have maintained that soldiers in the East served primarily for pay with little or no political or sentimental attachment towards their employer. Roman legionaries, on the other hand, were believed to have been drafted into the army, paid a subsistence wage, before the time of Marius, and served for the good of the city without regard for personal well-being or advancement. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain whether or not military service at Rome differed significantly from the Hellenistic East where mercenaries were employed.

Unlike Republican Rome, abundant information has survived from the Greek world regarding the pay scale for mercenary soldiers as well as for the ration allotment which was sometimes available. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians introduced a daily wage as payment to their hoplites. While the empire flourished, the Athenians were able to pay their citizen-soldiers two drachmas per day. It was intended that one drachma would be used

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58 Aristoph. Knights 1367; Arist. Ath. Pol. 27,2; O. Schulthess in RE XV, s.v. Μλοσός, cols. 2078ff. The wage was known as Μλοσός and eventually gave its name to the Greek term for mercenaries, that is, Μλοσόμον. Cf. Suidas 1122, s.v. Μλοσόμονος; F. Lammert in RE XV, s.v. Μλοσόμονος, cols. 2074ff; Griffith, Mercenaries, 16 and 29.

59 Thuc. 3,17,4; Aristoph. Acarn. 159 (μία χάρις), one drachma was provided for the hoplite and one for his
to cover the hoplite's daily expenses while the other drachma would pay for his hyperetes. By the time of Demosthenes, the daily pay rate had fallen to two obols. This lower scale probably reflects the excessive number of men who were available for hire as mercenaries at that time. By the end of the fourth century, that is, during the struggles of the diadochs over the remnants of Alexander's empire, the pay rate had recovered to four obols per day. Xenophon indicates that the Greek ἀξογός, like the Roman centurion, received twice the rate of pay as the common foot soldier. Evidently the Greek horseman was paid about a third more than the Roman eques.

In order to supplement the daily wage, a ration allowance (σῖτος) was also made to the Greek soldier. On occasion, the allotment was paid in the form of cash as indicated by several of the sources regarding the Peloponnesian attendant. R. L. Sargent, "The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare," CP 22, 1927, 201-212.

60 Demosth. 4,28.


62 Xen. anab. 5,6,23; 7,3,10; 6,1 (ἐμύλοιδ). 

63 Ibid., 7,2,36; 6,1 (τερομυλοῦτα). IG IV², 1, 68; 11. 95-99.

64 Suidas 502, s.v. Σῖτος; F. Heichelheim in RE Suppl. VI, s.v. sitos, cols. 833ff.
In the early fourth century, a formal ration stipend (στοιχείον) was introduced with payment made at the beginning of each month during which military service was anticipated. From a Coan inscription of the late third century (ca. 204/201), it can be discerned that rate of the ration allotment was about 16+ drachmas per month based upon a 9 or 10 month contract period. It is likely that a mercenary was expected to find other means of employment for the balance of the year. The rate of στοιχείον which was paid to the Coan mercenaries computes to 3 1/3 obols per day on a 9-month contract or, 2 1/2 obols per day on a 12-month basis. The latter rate, it must be noted, is close to the standard quoted by Polybius for the daily wage of the Roman legionary. The Roman soldier, however, had to pay for his own provisions while the socii received theirs free.

In the third century, the Hellenistic term for mili-

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66 Arist. econ. 2, 29, 1351b; Suidas 495, s.v. Στοιχε-σίον; Schulthess, in RE IIIA, s.v. Στοιχείον, cols. 382ff.


68 Polyb. 6, 39, 13-15.
tary wages and ration allotments, μισθὸς, σίτος, σιταρχία
and σιτερέσιον, were superseded by a new term, ὀψωνίον. 69
Unlike σιταρχία, but like μισθὸς and stipendium, ὀψωνίον
was credited to the individual's account and the remaining
balance paid at the conclusion of his term of service. 70

The testimony of the late third and second centur-
ies, drawn primarily from Ptolemaic Egypt, indicates that
mercenary wages fell during this period. 71 Officers, how-
ever, continued to receive the same amount of pay which Ro-
man centurions received. 72 The evidence from Ptolemaic
Egypt for military wages may not represent the prevailing
wage for mercenaries in the late Hellenistic world. 73 Due

69 Suidas 1093, s.v. ὀψωνίον; Aug. Hug in RE XVIII,
s.v. ὀψω, cols. 759ff.; Griffith, Mercenaries, 274, also
indicates that Polybius frequently used this term, 276, n.

70 Ins. v Perg. I, 13; OGIS I, 266; Reinach, "mercen-
naires," 196ff.; If the payment of ὀψωνίον, as used by
Polybius is consistent with the usage in Ins. v. Perg. I,
13, then the imperial practice of crediting a soldier's
wage to his account would seem to have originated in the
Republican period.

71 During the third century, native soldiers received
only one obol per day (P. Lille I, 25, ll. 3 and 18). By
ca. 170, however, papyrological evidence demonstrates that
wages of one or two obols per day were common (BGU IV,
1290, ll. 2, 8, 17). In the mid-second century (ca. 158/7)
the rate of daily pay seems to have fallen to about ½ obol
(UPZ I, 14 and 99).

72 P. Bad. no. 47 (ca. 127). C. Préaux, L'Économie
Royale des Lagides, Brussels, Fondation egyptologique reine
Elizabeth, 1939, reprinted New York, Arno Press, Inc., 1979,
31, 36.

73 It is likely that many of the recruits were Hel-
to the nature of compulsory service in Egypt, it seems to have been possible to pay the native levies considerably less than foreign mercenaries could demand.

The concept of the mercenary soldier conjures images of the roving warrior who sold his skill to the highest bidder. In this sense, mercenary service in the Hellenistic world has long been held by modern scholars to have been considerably more remunerative than service in the Roman legions. Nevertheless, a comparison of military wages under the Roman and Hellenistic systems during the period following the Hannibalic War demonstrates that the Roman legionary was not a poorly paid militia-man who only fought for the glory of the res publica and received a minimum wage for his efforts on behalf of the city. In fact, stipendium rather closely resembled the wage scale which was available to mercenaries in the Hellenistic world. Furthermore, in the development of an imperial attitude at Rome, military service appears to have been one of the most lucrative occupations which a poor but ambitious individual could pursue. The lure of adventure, fame, riches and sta-

tus was an important motivating factor in obtaining recruits for the legions. As the requisite property value had fallen to such a low standard, it is likely that anyone who presented himself for military service was readily accepted.

The Reduction of the Census Requirement to 1,500 Asses

As has been shown, the 400-drachma (denarii) property requirement noted by Polybius did not preclude enrolling relatively poor citizens into the army. On the contrary, the lower standard enticed poorer citizens to join the legions. The 400-drachma property requirement should not have been difficult to attain. Upon enlistment, the recruit would have been credited with 120 denarii. This amount as previously noted was equivalent to 192 sextantal denarii. The new enlistee would have had another 100 denarii of property if the value of his clothing was included in his net worth. 74 These two items alone would have represented 220 or 292 denarii, respectively, of the 400 denarii of property which the recruit needed to own in order to meet the census requirement for legionary enrollment. Although no direct evidence exists, it is not difficult to imagine that the conquistiores either found a sufficient amount of other property to satisfy the minimum property requirement or ignored the standard altogether. The 400-

74 Plut. Cato Mai. 4,3.
drachma (denarii) standard was not a formidable barrier by which the poor were prohibited from joining the legions.

The duration of the Polybian standard cannot be gauged with any certainty. At a later date, however, Cicero,75 Gellius, and Nonius indicate that the property standard was reduced even further to 1,500 asses.76 It has been suggested by Gabba that this reduction should be dated to the period of the last years of Scipio Aemilianus or to the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus.77 If we can assume that this assessment is correct, then the new recruit must have owned little more than the clothes on his back. Appian's comment, therefore, that day-laborers were taken right off the villas and into the army seems to be an accurate description.78 As previously shown from a re-examination of the literary evidence, land, especially after the reduction to 400 denarii in the time of Polybius, had

75 Cic. de rep. 2,22: "...eos, qui aut non plus mille quingentos aeris aut omnino nihil in suum censum praeter caput attulissent, proletarios nominavit,..."

76 Gell. n.a. 16,10,10: "Qui in plebe, inquit, Romana tenuissimi pauperrimique erant neque amplius quam mille quingentum aeris in censum deferebant, proletarii appellati sunt, qui vero nullo aut perquam parvo aere censebantur, capite censi vocabatur, extremus autem census capite censorum aeris fuit trecentis septuaginta quinque." Non. 228L: "proletarii cives dicebantur qui in plebe tenuissima erant et non amplius quam mille et quingentos aeris in censum deferebant."

77 Gabba, Esercito, 22ff.

78 App. BC I,7.
been long since abandoned as the sole qualifying asset for legionary service.

It is likely that as a result of the social turmoil of the Hannibalic War, nearly every Roman citizen was eligible for military service. The ownership of land, while a requisite for citizenship, probably lapsed as one of the requirements for military service. The further reduction of the minimum census rating to 1,500 *asses* assured that even the youngest or most destitute individual could be properly enrolled into the legions. The accreditation of the *stipendium* to the recruit's legionary account, enabled the traditionalists to claim that even the poorest men continued to be enrolled according to the Servian standards. Sallust's claim, therefore, that Marius enrolled recruits who were not qualified to serve seems to be inaccurate. In the chapter which follows, the evidence which demonstrates that the pre-Marian Roman legions had attained all of the attributes of a professional fighting force will be examined.
CHAPTER V

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PRE-MARIAN PROFESSIONAL ARMY

The stress of the Hannibalic War upon the social fabric of Rome, as in the earlier instances of Veii, the Gallic invasion, the Samnite Wars and the Pyrrhic War, contributed to the proletarianization of the Roman army and the emergence of paid professional soldiers. In the discussion which follows, the various conditions which accelerated the development of professional soldiers before Marius from the time of the Hannibalic War will be considered. Therefore, it will be necessary to investigate the factors which led to voluntary enlistment and the eventual professionalization of the legions: (1) the length of military service, (2) the need of dispossessed farmers to find other forms of employment, (3) the attraction of seemingly lucrative campaigns to the unemployed of Rome with the prospect of donatives and rewards and, (4) the growing tendency on the part of ambitious commanders to enlist experienced veterans into their armies.

The Standing Armies

The soldiers who were enlisted during the Republic normally expected to serve in the legions for a brief period of time before being discharged. The Hannibalic War, however, changed the pattern of military service. The sur-
vivors of Cannae were ordered by the senate to remain under arms in Sicily until the Carthaginians had been driven from Italy.\textsuperscript{1} Those individuals who had attempted to evade military service during the course of the war were also dispatched to Sicily to wait out the end of the war.\textsuperscript{2} This action was taken in order to punish those men who shirked their civic duty. The length of service in the case of the legiones Cannenses entailed at least sixteen consecutive years of military duty. In some cases survivors of these legions had been enrolled since 218 when the war commenced.

Service in the Spanish provinces was especially hard. During the Hannibalic War, it had become necessary for strategic purposes to send legions to Spain. While a Roman army was operating in Spain, the Carthaginian forces could not send Hannibal in Italy the reinforcements he needed to bring the war to a successful conclusion. These legions remained in that province until their total defeat or victory.\textsuperscript{3} From \textit{ca.} 200 until \textit{ca.} 188, there was at least one legion stationed in each of the two Spanish provinces, except in 195 when three legions were required in

\textsuperscript{1}Liv. 23,25,7.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 24,18,9.
\textsuperscript{3}The initial army under the Scipio brothers arrived in Spain 218 and remained there until their defeat in 211. Under Scipio Africanus, the new legions for Spain labored until the end of the war (\textit{ca.} 201). Cf. H. H. Scullard, \textit{Scipio Africanus, Soldier and Politician}, London, Thames and Hudson, 1970, 32ff.
Citerior. ⁴ From 187 until 168, that is, when the text of Livy ends, two legions are known to have been required for service in each of the provinces. ⁵

According to Appian, a legionary assigned to one of the legions in Spain could usually expect to remain in the province for at least six years. ⁶ Smith has accepted Appian's testimony as substantially correct, but has extended the term of service slightly to six or seven years. ⁷ Brunt calculated that the two legions in Spain (196-189) received sufficient reinforcements (supplementa) to have replaced about 830 legionaries every year. ⁸ The ancient testimony, however, does not support Brunt's contention. The supplementa were used to replace those who had been killed in action, those who were too seriously injured or ill to continue serving in the legions, and also to discharge some of

⁴Liv. 33,42.

⁵Brunt, IM, Appendix XXIII, 664, n. 5, states that both provinces were each normally garrisoned by one legion. The legionary complement was doubled when the province was upgraded to consular status. The ancient sources are conveniently collected in Broughton, MRR I, 369-428.

⁶App. Iber. 78: "ἐφ' ὁς τῷ τε Πομπηίω σύμβουλοι παρήσαν ἐκ Ἐρώμης καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις (ἐξ γὰρ ἐτη διελθοῦσι στρατευόμενοι) διάδοχοι νεωκατάγαροι τε καὶ ἔτι ἀγύμναστοι καὶ ἀπειροπόλεμοι." Toynbee, HL 2,79.


⁸Brunt, IM, Appendix XXIII, 662f.
the veterans who had served the longest terms or were relieved from military duty as they had completed the requisite number of stipendia to qualify for their final discharge (emerita stipendia). In 193, the two legions stationed in the Spanish provinces were reinforced by 3,000 Roman foot and 100 horse each. If each legion numbered 5,200 legionaries, then 58% of the personnel would have been replaced. In 190 and in 189, 1,000 Roman foot were sent as supplementa to each of the legions, replacing about 19% of the personnel. Since the legionaries in this particular period were replaced only every other year, the actual annual turnover was only 9.5%. Under this system, legionary personnel would have been fully replaced only after ten years had passed. In ca. 180, Livy relates that the legions in the Spains received fresh drafts after seven years had passed. A fragment of Lucilius indicates that some soldiers might have served in Spain for as long as eighteen years. The evidence may refer to the wars in

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9 A point conceded by Brunt, IM, 66. For emerita stipendia see Livy 34,56,9; 37,4,3; 40,35,11.


11 Liv. 36,2,8-9.

12 Liv. 37,50,11.

13 Ibid., 40,36,10f.

14 Nonius apud Lucilius, 545L: "dum miles Hibera terrast atque meret ter sex, aetate quasi, annos." idem. lib.
Spain which were waged from ca. 153 to 135.

The legions which campaigned in Italy in the post-Hannibalic era may have fared better. These legions were stationed in Gallia Cisalpina or Liguria. During the period of ca. 200 to 168, six legions were stationed on three different occasions in Gaul and Liguria (192, 182, and 176), while another pair of legions was assigned to Etruria in 192. The sources indicate that on average five legions were stationed in Italy, excluding Sicily and Sardinia. The advantage that these men had over their fellow soldiers in Spain was the opportunity to return home if the level of fighting had sufficiently subsided and the commander was favorably disposed. The concentration by Rome in the area of the Po Valley reflects Roman concern with the pacification of an area which had provided Hannibal with a fertile recruiting ground and also served as a staging area for his assault upon the Republic.

The wars in the East required no standing army as Roman policy seems to have preferred to leave the Greeks to their devices whenever possible. For the period of ca. 200 to 168, Afzelius records that Roman troops campaigned in the East for only fourteen years. These years were con-

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centrated around the three great campaigns against Philip V (200-195), Antiochus and his Aetolian allies (191-188), and Perseus (171-168). The usual legionary complement consisted of two strong legions of 6,000 men each in the war against Philip V, while the efforts against Antiochus and Perseus required armies of four strong legions in each instance. As noted by Brunt, the wars in the East were of short duration with good prospect for obtaining riches.

The Urban Crisis

Before the Hannibalic War, farming was the primary means by which an individual earned a living. The small farmer could provide himself and his family with the basic necessities of life and, in most cases, could accumulate a small amount of wealth from his profits. If his crops failed, or if protracted military service caused the

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18 Liv. 44,21,8-10; Colin, Rome et la Grèce, 373ff.; Errington, Dawn of Empire, 211ff.

19 Liv. 42,31,2; 43,12,4; 44,21,8.

20 Brunt, IM, 395ff.
farmer to be absent from his land for an extended period of
time, the farm could be ruined.\textsuperscript{21} The Hannibalic War had
cailed a considerable amount of damage to the land while
some areas had simply gone unattended for the duration of
the war. Having been removed from the land for a long
period of time, there were many men who no longer looked
upon farming as their sole means of earning a living. Com-
petition from the large landholders made the small farm un-
tenable. As a result, there was a general movement from
the countryside to the neighboring towns and especially to
Rome.

The earliest notice for this population shift is re-
corded by Livy in 189.\textsuperscript{22} In that year, the Latin allies
complained of their loss of fellow tribesmen to Rome. The
senate ordered the praetor to remove these people from Rome
and to return them to their original homes. Accordingly,
12,000 Latins were compelled to leave the city. In 177,
however, the Latin allies again complained to Rome about
their loss of citizens.\textsuperscript{23} In this same year, Livy\textsuperscript{24}
reports that nearly 4,000 families of Samnite and Paelignian

\textsuperscript{21}Brunt, IM, 398; Toynbee, HL II, 101; Garlan, War, 93.
\textsuperscript{22}Liv. 39,3,4ff.
\textsuperscript{23}Liv. 41,8,6-7; J. Göhler, Rom und Italien, Breslau, Verlage Priebsatzch's Buchhandlung, 1939, reprinted Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1974, 65ff.
\textsuperscript{24}Liv. 41,8,8.
origin had left their homes and moved to Fregellae. The concern of the Latin, Samnite and Paelignian communities was that they had not received a corresponding reduction in the quota of troops which they were required to furnish for the dilectus even though the number of their citizens had fallen.

It has been suggested by Badian that this population movement to the urban areas was a conscious effort on the part of the Roman and Italian husbandry to seek other means of employment rather than farming. Badian has further proposed that many veterans, upon their return to Italy from a particular war, remained in the cities in order to receive the earliest possible news of a new or lucrative campaign and thereby volunteer for enlistment. These soldiers would have represented nearly all of the Roman tribes and would not necessarily have been transferred to the urban tribes on account of their new residence. An example of this situation is the tribal affiliation of Sp. Ligustinus. Livy states that this veteran declared that he was a member of the tribus Clustumina. He may, however,

26 Ibid., 683.
28 Liv. 42,34,2ff.
have lived in or near the environs of the city. Un- doubtedly, Ligustinus is not an isolated case as other veterans must have settled in or near the city in order to receive the news of a new and lucrative campaign as quickly as possible.

It should be noted that the public building contracts which were let by the censors at Rome also may have attracted some individuals to the city. Polybius indicates that the construction of public buildings was especially active during the mid-second century. Frank has demonstrated that although most of this construction was on a relatively small scale, the contracts may have provided enough temporary employment for the city labor force. Badian has further suggested that the Gracchan crisis may have developed as a result of the depletion of funds for public works and the collapse of civilian employment opportunities at Rome.

Donatives and Rewards

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29 Shochat, Recruitment, 70f. Shochat has suggested that Ligustinus may have been born in the Ager Ligustinus which was located in Aemilia and Liguria. The local Roman tribe in this area was the tribus Pollia. If Shochat is correct, then the censors may have indeed transferred Ligustinus from the Pollia to the Clustumina.

30 Polyb. 6,17,1-4; Walbank, Comm. 1,692ff.; F. Coarelli, "Public Building in Rome Between the Second Punic War and Sulla," PBSR xlv N. S. xxxii, 1977, 3ff.

31 Frank, ESAR, 1,152ff.

32 Badian, "Tiberius Gracchus," 713.
An important factor which contributed to voluntary enlistment was the anticipation of the payment of a bonus after the successful conclusion of a campaign. Although the military stipend may have provided an adequate subsistence for the poorer soldiers, the legionary looked forward to receiving a share of the profits after the war was over. Sallust remarks that each man imagined himself returning home enriched with booty. 33

The donative was derived from the spoils which the army had won during the campaign and was subject to the discretion of the commander. 34 Roman custom dictated that as the Roman soldiers pillaged the enemy's field, sacked his towns or overran his encampment, the captured booty be surrendered to the tribunes in order that it become the common property of the army, and not the personal property of its captor. 35 At the conclusion of the campaign, the booty, whether human or chattel, would be sold to the merchants who followed in the train of the legions. 36 Both the Romans and their allies shared equally in the spoils. 37

33 Sall. BJ 84, 4: "Sese quisque praeda locupletem fore, victorem domum rediturum alia huiusce modi animis trahebant,"

34 I. Shatzman, "The Roman General's Authority Over Booty," Historia 21, 1972, 177-205.

35 Polyb. 6, 31, 13; 33, 1; 10, 16, 7; Walbank, Comm. I, 714ff.; Gell. n.a. 16, 4, 2; Plut. Apophth. Scip. Min. 7.


37 Polyb. 6, 39, 14; Walbank, Comm. I, 722; Toynbee, HL
For the most part, the funds obtained from the auction of the spoils were distributed to the soldiers at the end of their general's triumph or ovation.\textsuperscript{38} The troops of Cato, Scipio Africanus, and Aemilius Paullus, however, received their rewards while still in the field.\textsuperscript{39} If the distribution of the donative followed the pattern of legionary pay as described by Polybius, then the centurions would have received twice the amount given to the foot soldier, while the cavalryman was given three times that amount.

Some wars proved to be quite profitable both for Rome and her legionaries. At the conclusion of the war against Antiochus, the common soldiers (pedes) received an additional 25 denarii each.\textsuperscript{40} In 184, the soldiers who had defeated the Gallograeci (Galatii) each received a donative of 42 denarii and a double stipend.\textsuperscript{41} In 180, the victorious legionaries in Spain were each given an extra 50 denarii from the spoils and were granted a double stipend.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to pay and donatives, the soldiers ex-

\textsuperscript{38} Liv. 39,7,2-3; 40,43,7.  
\textsuperscript{39} Plut. Cato Mai. 10,4; Apophth. Cato Mai. 26; Liv. 37,59,6; Briscoe, Comm. XXXIV-XXXVII, 394; Plut. Aem. Paul. 29,3.  
\textsuperscript{40} Liv. 37,59,6.  
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 39,7,2-3.  
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 40,43,7.
pected to be allowed to loot the enemy. Polybius states that the soldiers of Africanus mutinied at Sucro because they had to remain in a pacified province where they were unable to obtain plunder. Livy also notes that during the campaigns in Gallograeca, Phocaea, and Spain the main concern of the legionaries was the amount of booty which was to be won. Livy also notes that men enlisted for the war against the Istri in the hope of gaining riches. By the time of the Third Macedonian War, looting had become such an integral part of military life that the soldiers expected to be allowed to have a free hand in amassing plunder. Plutarch relates that the soldiers of Aemilius Paullus complained so bitterly about their commander's refusal to allow them to plunder Macedonia that the senate gave its permission for them to loot the towns of Epirus on their way home. Apparently, it seems to have made little difference to the senate that Epirus had not aided Perseus in his war against Rome.

The final war against Carthage and the Achaean War do not reveal much about the motives of the troops or the donative which may have been paid to them. As to the Third

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44 Liv. 38,23; 38,32; 40,1.

45 Liv. 40,10ff.

Punic War, Appian states that under the consul Piso army discipline had deteriorated to such an extent that the soldiers often resorted to blows, wounds and even murder while contesting the ownership of the plunder. After Carthage was captured, Scipio allotted the soldiers a certain number of days in order to loot the town, except for the gold, silver and votive offerings which were to be sent to Rome. Although the conduct of the legions which sacked Corinth is uncertain, Pausanias reports that their commander, the consul L. Mummius, kept for himself a number of art treasures which were found in the city. Polybius, who was an eyewitness to the destruction of Corinth, reports that he observed the Roman soldiers playing dice over the paintings of famous artists. It is likely that the winner of the game would have sold the particular work which he had won to one of the merchants who usually accompanied the army.

Volunteers and Professionals before Marius

Thus, by the second century, conditions were such that we can speak of a professional volunteer army. From the evidence previously reviewed, it can be held that Marius merely finalized a status quo. The professional sol-

47 App. Lib. 115; 116.
48 App. Lib. 133.
49 Paus. 7,16,8. Strabo (8,6,23) states that Mummius cared little for the art which he had captured.
dier was an individual who enlisted for a particular campaign without being compelled to do so through the dilectus. Unlike the volunteers of the regal and early Republican periods, those men who joined the army in the period after the Hannibalic War were motivated by the need for employment and the hope of personal gain. The volunteers (voluntarii) eventually developed corporate identity which differentiated them from the conscripts. This is an issue that calls for attention.

Volunteerism in the Early Republic

As noted, the Republican legions consisted of conscripts and volunteers. Among those classified as conscripts were new recruits as well as veterans. According to the ancient sources, it is likely that voluntarii were drawn exclusively from the ranks of the veterans. Unfortunately, when relating the enrollment of men into the legions, the ancients were not always precise in their terminology about methods of recruitment. The Latin phrase used by the earliest writers to denote legionary enlistment was "in nomina dare." In some instances, the sources are referring to the dilectus while in other cases voluntary enlistment is meant.\(^51\)

Livy\(^52\) often mentions that men joined the legions

\(^{51}\)Marquardt, RSt II, 383; Brunt, IM, Appendix XIX, 630, (cf. Liv. 3, 57, 9; 10, 25, 1; 27, 4, 3; 42, 32, 6,) and IM, Appendix XX, 635, (cf. Cic. Sest. 34).

\(^{52}\)Liv. 3, 57, 9; Ogilvie, Comm. 507; Liv. 3, 69, 8; es-
voluntarily:

3,57,9: Cum ad ea bella dilectum edixissent, favore plebis non iuniores modo sed emeritis etiam stipendiis pars magna voluntariorum ad nomina dando praesto fuere, eoque non copia modo sed genere etiam militum, veteranis admixtis, firmior exercitus fuit.

31,8,6: Sulpicio, cui novum ac magni nominis bellum decretum erat, permissum ut de exercitu quem P. Scipio ex Africa deportasset, voluntarios quos posset duceret;

42,32,6: ...et multi voluntate nomina dabant, quia locupletes videbant, qui priore Macedonico bello aut adversus Antiochum in Asia stipendia fecerant.

In reference to the early Republic, voluntarii are associated with an emergency call to arms to all citizens to defend the city.\(^{53}\) These early cases, however, are limited to the period when Rome had not yet extended her influence beyond the borders of Latium and depended solely upon her own citizens for her defense. By the Hannibalic War, however, the Roman army, for all practical purposes, had become a professional fighting force. It is to Delbrück's credit first to have noticed this change.\(^{54}\) It should be noted that the first recorded case of discharged veterans joining another expeditionary army occurred in 200. Livy

\(^{53}\) Liv. 5,7,5-13; 16,5ff.; Dion. Hal. 10,43; Donat. ad Ter. Eunuch. 4,7,2; cf. Serv. ad Aen. 2,157; 7,614; Isid. orig. 9,3,52-55: "qui rem publicam salvam vult sequi-mini;" Marquardt, RSt II, 387.

\(^{54}\) Delbrück, Kriegskunst, 465.
states that the senate allowed those veterans who had returned from Africa with Scipio to enroll for the war against Philip V if they so desired.\textsuperscript{55} Coercion could not be used. Procedurally, the veterans had to be discharged by Scipio before they could enlist in Galba's army. A method of transferring the men or their specific maniples had not yet been developed. A few years later, in 198, Flamininus again tapped the pool of Scipionic veterans by enrolling 3,000 of them as volunteers.\textsuperscript{56} Flamininus added these men to his army in order to provide it with a higher degree of military experience. In 190, Livy reports that 5,000 Romans and Allies volunteered to serve under L. Scipio in the war against Antiochus.\textsuperscript{57} It is interesting to note that on the staff of Lucius, serving as a legate, was the hero of Zama, Africanus. It is quite unlikely that the voluntarii had enlisted because of the military reputation of L. Scipio.

At the outbreak of hostilities with Perseus, the consul P. Licinius Crassus had no difficulty in obtaining sufficient numbers of veterans for his army. Many men,

\textsuperscript{55}Liv. 31,8,7; Briscoe, \textit{Comm. XXXI-XXXIII}, 94.


\textsuperscript{57}Liv. 37,4,3. The plunder seized in this war was particularly significant and helped foster the tales of the
Livy notes, volunteered in the hope of profiting from the war.\textsuperscript{58} The text of Livy ceases with the defeat of Perseus. It is unfortunate that the epitomes of Livy's missing books, as well as other literary sources, do not offer sufficient evidence regarding voluntary service before the outbreak of the Third Punic War.

Appian states that in the last war against Carthage, many volunteers again offered themselves for military service as the prospect of gaining booty seemed good.\textsuperscript{59} After the appointment of Scipio Aemilianus to the command of the war (in 148), the senate permitted him to raise, through the dilectus, only as many men as the legions had lost during the previous year. He was, however, permitted to enlist as many voluntarii as he could from among the Allies.\textsuperscript{60}

\textit{fabulous wealth of the East.} Appian (\textit{Syr.} 42) relates how the army of the legate Manlius collected or extorted such vast sums of booty and tribute from Asia Minor that it was set upon by the Thracians on their return to Greece. The resultant battle assumed a character of a fight between rival bandit groups rather than a pitched battle between armies.

\textsuperscript{58}Liv. 42,32,6: "Dilectum consules mucho intentiore quam alias cura habebant. Licinius veteres quoque scribemat milites centorionesque; et multi voluntate nomina dabant, quia locupletes videbant, qui priore Macedonico bello aut adversus Antiochum in Asia stipendia fecerant."


\textsuperscript{60}App. Lib. 112: "ἐξοδηθεὶς αὐτῶς στρατὸς ἐκ μὲν κατάλογος, ὅσος ἦν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολολῶτων, ἐθελοντας δ' ἀγελν, δο-
After the fall of Carthage, the sources are again silent about the enlistment of volunteers for the legions until the campaign of Scipio Aemilianus against the Celtiberian town of Numantia. Although Aemilianus was voted the command of this war, the senate had forbidden the levying of additional troops through the dilectus.\footnote{App. Iber. 84; Liv. Epit. 56; Plut. Apophth. Scip. Min. 15; A. E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1967, 184.} To circumvent this interdiction, Scipio obtained 4,000 \textit{voluntaarii}, mainly clients and friends by making a personal appeal. From these volunteers, he formed a personal bodyguard of 500 men.\footnote{App. Iber. 84; Fr. Fröhlich, Die Gardetruppen der römischen Republik, Diss. Aarau, 1882, 29-35, 39f.; Th. Mommsen, "Die Gardetruppen der römischen Republik und der Kaiserzeit," Hermes 14, 1879, 26ff.; De Sanctis, Storia, IV\textsuperscript{3}, 259ff.; Gabba, Esercito, 11; H. J. Hellegouarc'H in Brisson (ed.), Problèmes de la Guerre à Rome, Paris, Mouton & Co., 1969, 159 f.; H. Simon, Roms Kriege in Spanien 154-133 v. Chr., Frankfurter Wissenschaftliche Beiträge, Band II, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1962, 173 f.; Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, 136; R. Tullio, "Cohors Praetoria e Cohors Amicorum," RFIC N. S. xx, 1942, 54ff.} It should be assumed that the rest of the contingent, 3,500 men, was formed into a legion or, more likely, interspersed among the legions currently stationed in the province in order to inject them with proven

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οὺς περιείπαρiosisυμμάχων." It is likely that the Roman the recruiting officers (\textit{conquisitores}) would not have turned away any Roman who wished to enroll as a volunteer.
\end{quote}
military ability.

To denote *volontarii*, Appian used the term ἑθελοντὴν throughout his accounts of the Third Punic and Numantine Wars. ἑθελοντὴν was also used in the same context by Polybius when he described the volunteers who were serving in the army. It is possible that Polybius may have had in mind the personal appeal of the commander to the soldiers when he states that *volontarii* served "...καὶ τινές τῶν ἑθελοντὴν στρατευμένων τὴ τῶν ὑπάτων χάρις,....."

'Evocati' and Time-Expired Veterans

There was another group of soldiers which, over a period of time, and before Marius' consulship, assumed the nature of professional warriors. These were the veteran soldiers who, having satisfied their military obligation of 16 or 20 years, returned to the legions because of a national emergency or the appeal of their old commanders. This new type of soldier was known as an *evocatus* (ἡοὐκα-τος).

It has been suggested by Delbruck that the first

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64 Polyb. 6,31,2: frg. 129: "Ἐθελοντὴν] τοὺς παραβολους κινδύνους ἑθελοντὴν ἀναδειγμένος." frg. 130: "Ἐθελοντὴς] προσλαβὼν ἑθελοντάς ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος."

65 Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, 311: "Das Freiwilligen aufgebot ward auf diese Weise immer mehr zur Sache nicht der Regierung, sondern des Feldherrn, der einfach, und oft geradezu nominell, seine Veteranen aufrief; sie hiessen daher später schlechterweg 'evocati,' welcher Ausdruck sich zeitweise mit 'volontarii' sachlich deckt." Mason, Greek Terms, 5; 6; 52.
case of the enrollment of evocati into the army occurred in ca. 455. The term evocatus, however, not only referred to a time-expired veteran, but, more correctly, meant a veteran who had returned to the standards on account of his affiliation with a particular commander. Delbruck's proposal, therefore, does not seem to apply to this case. Although the term evocatus is not used by the literary sources until the last days of the Republic, Marquardt has proposed that the veterans of Scipio Africanus who had joined Flamininus in 198 were an example of the manner in which evocati re-enlisted into the legions. The first inscriptive evidence which records this particular term is dated to the period of Augustus.

Although the Scipionic veterans had voluntarily returned to the army at the behest of a popular general, Flamininus had not been their previous commander. In fact, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that relations between Scipio and Flamininus were cool even in the best of

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66 Delbruck, Kriegkunst, 446f.
69 CIL 6,213; 624; ILLRP, Nos. 497 and 498, p. 289f.
times. The personal attachment of the *evocatus* to his old general is a characteristic which is peculiar to this type of military service. The term *evocatus*, therefore, should not be applied to professional soldiers of the Republic until the last century before Augustus. The Republican *voluntarii* were actually forerunners of the latter-day *evocati*.

From the limited scraps of available literary evidence, a pattern has emerged which is particular to the identification of the *voluntarii*. These soldiers were usually veterans who joined campaigns about to be undertaken by proven commanders and whose motive was the attainment of personal wealth. This pattern elicits some further questions: (1) From which socio-economic group did the *voluntarii* come? (2) How numerous were they in the legions? and (3) Did they form any sort of corporate identity?

**Social Origins of the Voluntarii**

Although the socio-economic origins of the *voluntarii* are indeterminable, it is safe to assume that those men who needed to find employment were able to do so through the army. Livy states that in 205 Scipio enlisted 7,000 impoverished Umbrians and Sabines for the Af-

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71 Toynbee, *HL II*, 98.

72 Liv. 28,45.
rican campaign. It is reasonable to assume that some of these men must have survived the rigors of the war and returned to Italy with Scipio. It was probably from this same group of men that both Galba and Flamininus were able to enlist veterans for their campaigns in Greece.

The Career of Spurius Ligustinus

The literary sources provide only one example of a rather poor Roman citizen whose enlistment into the army seems to have been his only means of earning a living. This is the well-known and much-discussed case of Spurius Ligustinus. Livy is the sole source for this veteran's career. He reports that Ligustinus enlisted as a common soldier, was promoted several years later to the lowest rank of centurion and, after years of service, eventually held one of the highest posts of the Republican centurionate (primus pilus). Ligustinus seems to have held that post on several occasions. Whether Ligustinus was an historical character or whether he was an anachronistic creation of Livy cannot be established with certainty.74

In summing up Ligustinus’ military distinctions, Livy states that in his twenty-two years of military ser-

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73 Liv. 42, 34-35.

74 The sources which Livy used for this particular section are uncertain. W. Soltau Livius' Geschichtswerk, Leipzig, 1897, reprinted Rome, "L'ERMA" di Bretschneider, 1971, 45 favors Claudius as the source. H. Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius, Berlin, Weidmann, 1863, reprinted
vice, he had been appointed as a primus pilus on four occasions, had been decorated thirty-four times for bravery and had been awarded six civic crowns for saving a fellow-citizen's life. Shochat, in reviewing Livy's episode regarding Ligustinus, remarks that the incident was another demonstration of the citizenry's reluctance to serve in the army. Shochat, however, ignores the obvious cause of Ligustinus' objection to military service under the conditions which were presented to him. The veteran balked at being inducted into the army at a rank lower than that which he had last held. Pride aside, Ligustinus' demand that his previous rank not be ignored was made from a valid economic concern. As a pedes, he would have received only a third of the pay which a centurion received and would have been entitled to only a half-share of the booty. In exchange for his own service, Ligustinus offered the enlistment of his four sons, if all that Rome needed was manpower. In reality, it was his expertise which the consuls wanted.

The objections raised by Ligustinus were similar to


75 Shochat, Recruitment, 55ff.
76 Liv. 42,34,13-14; 35,2.
77 Polyb. 6,39,12.
78 Liv. 42,33,4-6.
those made by a certain Volero Publilius whom Livy relegated to an episode in the early fifth century (ca. 475). The case of Publilius probably also belongs to the period of the second century. Whether or not Livy fictionalized these men is immaterial. The incidents surrounding the two cases demonstrate that there was a growing consternation over the manner in which the dilectus was conducted and over the appointments which the legionary officials were making to their staffs. It is unlikely that Livy could have fictionalized events with which other contemporary historians, and the reading public in general, were familiar without jeopardizing his own veracity.

The number of voluntarii in the army cannot be determined from the state of the present evidence as separate figures were not kept for this type of enlistee. Meyer, however, has suggested that after ca. 153 the legions consisted more and more of volunteers. The precedent, therefore, had been set before Marius. More recently, scholars like Brunt and many others have conceded that although there were volunteers and professionals who had enlisted in the legions during the second century, they assume without additional evidence that they may have formed only a small

79Liv. 2,55,4; Ogilvie, Comm. 374ff.; Toynbee HL I, 640.
80Meyer, Kleine Schriften, II, 226.
81Brunt, IM, 396; Adcock, Art of War, 17-19; Harmand, "Les Origines," 268; Harris, Imperialism, 46ff.
percentage of the total manpower needs of the army, an issue which does not appear to fit the evidence above.

The Development of a Corporate Identity

The impact of volunteers serving in the legions may best be discerned from select passages in the literary sources regarding the behavior of these soldiers. It is likely that professional soldiers, although within the framework of the legionary personnel, would have projected the same needs and desires, different from those of their conscripted comrades.

The earliest evidence of this corporate identity was demonstrated during the Hannibalic War. Livy, in relating the formation of the slave legions after Cannae, states that the slaves volunteered to enlist. Later, 6,000 criminals and debtor-slaves were added to the legions. The Romans appointed Ti. Sempronius Gracchus as commander of these legions. The volones served under Gracchus until his death in 212, at which time they deserted the standards. Apparently, the volones interpreted their oath of duty as having terminated with the death of their general.

During the Spanish campaign of 140, Dio relates an

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82 Liv. 22,57; Toynbee, HL II, 530f.; Fest. 511L: "volones dicti sunt milites, qui post Cannensem cladem usque ad octa milia cum essent servi, voluntarie se ad militem optulere."

83 Liv. 23,14.

84 Liv. 25,16-17; 20, they re-enlisted in 207 (Liv. 28,10).
episode concerning the select troops (ΣΕΛΟΥΝΤΗ) and their relationship to their commander, Servilius Caepio. Relations between the general and his allied horse and the volunteers had deteriorated to such a point that Caepio had become the object of the campfire jests of his soldiers. To reassert his authority, Caepio ordered the allied horse to cross the river which separated the Roman camp from that of Viriathus and collect firewood. In a demonstration of support for their comrades, the voluntarii, in a body, accompanied the allied horse across the river, collected the wood, and piled it around the commander's tent. Caepio fled for his life.

The independent actions of the volones of Gracchus and those of Caepio are similar to that of the Fimbrian legionaries. These particular soldiers were initially enrolled by Flaccus for the campaign in Asia. Flaccus was later murdered by his legate Fimbria who asserted his command over the soldiers. The troops were eventually brought over to Sulla's cause while in Asia Minor, and were still serving there nearly 20 years later when they were enlisted by Lucullus. In these instances, the Roman le-

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85 Dio 22,78,3.
86 App. Mith. 51; Smith, Service, 38ff.; Harmand, L'Armée, 280ff.
87 App. Mith. 52.
88 Ibid., 59; 72; Dio 36,14,3; Plut. Luc. 7,1.
Legionaries were motivated by a desire to further their own personal interests, not the good of Rome.

It is important to note that the voluntarii who survived the various campaigns formed a close personal bond not only to their general, but also among themselves. In his military treatise, Polybius notes that the voluntarii were billeted together near the commander. 89 Their special status in the legion would have fostered a natural spirit of camaraderie and commonality among them. As shown, the formation of a corporate identity began, not with Marius, but with those soldiers who had voluntarily enlisted in the armies of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and especially that of Scipio Africanus in 205 and had re-enlisted under various commanders during the wars of the early decades of the second century. If Badian is correct in stating that the discharged veterans settled in Rome and lived off their booty until the next campaign, then they probably lived in the same communities and, over a period of time, were connected not only by common military experiences, but also through friendship and ties of marriage among various members of their families. 90

89 Plut. 6,31,2.

90 Badian, "Tiberius Gracchus," 683.
CONCLUSION

It has been shown that contrary to the "constitution" ascribed to Servius, poor citizens were enrolled into the army from the earliest times, and that by the time of the Hanniballic War it had become a commonly accepted practice. Although military service was considered a civic duty by the middle and upper classes, the poor sought to join the legions in order to provide themselves with the means of earning a livelihood. The continuous warfare which followed the close of the contest with Hannibal provided numerous opportunities for employment. Due to repeated, practically uninterrupted enlistments, a core of professional soldiers was formed.

The subliminal movement away from a strictly conscripted army did not go unnoticed by the ancient sources. While maintaining that Rome did not hire mercenaries, as Diodorus and Dionysius strongly acclaimed, the ancient writers indicate that men voluntarily enlisted in the legions in the hope of earning pay and gaining riches. These men are identified by the Latin writers as voluntarii while the Greek texts refer to them variously as ἐθελοντη and ἐπίλευσαν. All of the sources, however, refer to these soldiers as volunteers. This was the means which was employed to circumvent the Servian restrictions. By the time Marius
made his appearance upon the Roman political scene, the practice of enrolling the poor, that is, the *proletarii* and *capite censi*, had long been in effect.

What then was the reason for the outcry against Marius for the enrollment of the poor into the legions? As shown, Scipio Africanus, Flamininus and Scipio Aemilianus and many more commanders of less renown, had enrolled the poor into their armies. Simply stated the *optimate* sentiment against Marius was the result of opposition by the entrenched nobility against a *novus homo*. Any action which was taken to circumvent the will of the senate would have been portrayed as contrary to tradition, revolutionary and dangerous to the State.

The main goal of this study has been the determination of the accuracy of the account of Sallust regarding the Marian *dilectus* of ca. 107. Proceeding with an examination of the ancient testimony, and by drawing upon additional evidence not previously considered, it has been proven that the actions of Marius did not result in an innovation in legionary recruitment. From the earliest times, all Romans had been liable to serve in the army when an emergency arose. At times of great distress, the citizenry usually volunteered to serve in the army and save the State (*"qui rem publicam salvam vult sequimini"*). After the Hannibalic War, this principle was extended to include non-emergency situations.
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