Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings

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DEFECT OR DEFEND?
EXPLAINING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

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To my parents, Alan and Darlene Hazen,
for their endless and constant support
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<td>BAT</td>
<td>Brigade Anti-Terrorisme</td>
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<td>BDF</td>
<td>Bahrain Defence Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>BICI</td>
<td>Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry</td>
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<td>BNIR</td>
<td>Brigade nationale d'intervention rapide</td>
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<td>BOP</td>
<td>Brigades de l'Ordre Publique</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
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<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Public Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique</td>
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<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Supreme Defence Council</td>
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<td>Tunisian National Fact Finding Commission</td>
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<td>Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership</td>
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<td>Union générale tunisienne du travail</td>
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<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

How should militaries respond to mass political protests that threaten the stability of the ruling regime? This was a central question several militaries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) wrestled with during the political protests of 2010 - 2011 that are often popularly referred to as the "Arab Spring," but are described to in this project as the "Arab uprisings."\(^1\) In some instances militaries defended the incumbent regime and used violence to subdue protesters (e.g. Bahrain), in other instances militaries defected from the incumbent regime and refrained from using high levels of violence against demonstrators (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia), and in other circumstances militaries fractured as the military was divided between regime loyalty and regime defection. What explains the variation in Arab military behavior during the Arab uprisings? Why did some MENA militaries defend the regime whereas others defected from the regime?

Recent research identifies numerous variables and conditions to explain varying military responses during the Arab uprisings. Some researchers argue MENA military behavior was influenced by institutional factors inherent within the configuration of the

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\(^1\) This project uses the term "Arab uprisings" rather than "Arab Spring" primarily because the term "Arab Spring" is overly optimistic and does not accurately represent the majority of MENA countries that did not experience regime change or experience an increase in democratization as a result of the protests. The name "Arab Spring" was given to the protests due to the initial success in Tunisia, where the incumbent autocrat, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled the country and was replaced by a civilian transitional government. The term "spring" has historical significance and evokes earlier protests such as the "Spring of Nations of 1848," and the "Prague Spring." The former refers to the wave of economic, political, and social protests that swept across Europe in the mid-eighteenth century and challenged the existing monarchical structures. The latter refers to the 1968 democratic protests in Czechoslovakia where citizens challenged the Soviet's economic and political influence over the country. Overall, the term "Arab uprisings" is more neutral than "Arab Spring" and better describes the protests that gripped the region from 2010 - 2011.
military. This research explores the level of military autonomy (Sayigh 2011a; Stepan and Linz 2013), the level of military coherence (Droz-Vincent 2014b, 5), the organizational interests of the military (Brooks 2013), the rivalry between military and internal security forces (Sayigh 2011b, 404), and the level of military professionalization (Gause 2011; Sayigh 2011a, 391; Sayigh 2011b; Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013, 29).

A second group of scholars examines political factors and claims Arab military behavior during the Arab uprisings was caused by regime factors rather than institutional factors within the military. These arguments examine coup-proofing tactics of the regime (Gaub 2013a; Makara 2013; Bou-Nassif 2015), how well the ruling leaders coerced the military (Silverman 2012), whether the military was closely integrated to the regime (Droz-Vincent 2011, 7; Ryan 2012; Volpi 2013), whether the military was politically removed from the regime (Droz-Vincent 2011, 7; Sharqieh 2013), the level of resentment the military had towards the regime (Goldstone 2011), and the regime's level of petroleum production, which could be used to "buy-off" military support (Ross 2011).

Another set of scholars explains Arab military behavior as cost-benefit analyses where officers made decisions that provided them with the largest economic gains. These arguments include militaries protecting the economic interests of the armed forces (Nepstad 2011, 489; Stepan and Linz 2013, 28; Frisch 2013, 188) and the economic benefits and incentives individual officers receive from the regime (Barany 2011, 25; Silverman 2012; Nepstad 2013). A fourth group of scholars examines the societal factors that influence military behavior by exploring the communal configuration of the country and the nature of the protest movements. One of the most salient arguments explores the communal affiliations between military personnel and citizens. Scholars argue either sectarian
differences (Droz Vincent 2011, 7; Gause 2011; Nepstad 2011, 489; Sayigh 2011a; Heydemann 2013, 66; Louër 2013; Droz-Vincent 2014a, 39) or tribal differences (Knights 2013) between military personnel and citizens influence how militaries responded to mass political protests. Research on societal factors also explores the nature of the protest movements. Zunes (2011) argues the Egyptian military defected from the regime since the demonstrations in Egypt were nonviolent in nature. Scholars also postulate the size and strength of the opposition protest movements forced the military to defect from the regime (Droz-Vincent 2011, 7; Goldstone 2011, 459; Shehata 2011, 31).

Lastly, some scholars argue international factors, rather than domestic factors, best explain Arab military behavior. Researchers point to the significance of direct military intervention, such as the effect Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) soldiers had on encouraging the Bahraini military to support the ruling al-Khalifa regime (Goldstone 2011, 5), and the impact of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aerial attacks influencing Libyan officers and soldiers to abandon their posts and defect from the Qaddafi regime (Gaub 2013b). Other researchers indicate political pressure from global leaders, such as the United States (U.S.) and Europe, convinced Arab militaries to respond in certain ways. Nepstad (2011) argues Egypt's military was influenced by the American diplomatic corps to defect from President Hosni Mubarak to ensure political stability in the country and to maintain the continuation of Egyptian policies that were perceived as vital to U.S. strategic interests.2

Overall, the recent wave of research exploring Arab military responses to the Arab uprisings has been illuminating and has provided beneficial knowledge to the complex issue

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2 For more see Brownlee (2012).
of MENA civil-military and regime-military relations. But existing research also has numerous shortcomings and in some regards fail to fully explain military behavior from a comparative perspective. The general shortcoming is none of the research employs a comprehensive analysis that tests the contending variables in a quantitative and region-wide comparison. Rather, the majority of current research on MENA military responses to the Arab uprisings relies on single case studies and small-n comparative case studies that only examine a few salient variables that happen to be present in the observed cases.

To provide an example, some scholars argue professionalized militaries (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) were more willing to defect from ruling regimes and side with protesters, whereas non-professionalized militaries (e.g. Bahrain and Syria) were more willing to defend the ruling regimes and use violence against protesters. However this example can be challenged considering the Tunisian military has been professionalized ever since the country gained independence in 1956. Tunisia had numerous political protests that challenged the incumbent regime such as in 1978, 1984, and 2008, but in these prior protests the Tunisian military defended the ruling regime and used violence against protesters. Therefore, how could the variable of military professionalization have causal significance in 2011 but not in previous years?

The second issue is the research fails to have significant external validity outside of the observed cases since it does not rigorously test the causal variables in a comparative perspective. To continue with the example above, if military professionalization was one of

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3 For more see Gause 2011; Sayigh 2011a, 391; Sayigh 2011b; Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013, 29.

4 For more on these protests see Brooks (2013) and Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
the leading factors that caused the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries to defect from the ruling regime, then how does one explain Libya and Yemen – countries where the militaries are not professionalized yet fracturing occurred where large segments of the military defected from the ruling regimes? Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen all experienced forms of military defection (either complete military defection or military fracturing) but the independent variable of military professionalization varies across these countries. How can one account for this and entrust the independent variable of military professionalization truly has causal significance from a regional perspective? The recent literature on MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings does very little to untangle such issues and tends to observe military behavior narrowly through single cases (or a few cases) and concentrates on causal variables that existed within the observed cases without generally testing those variables in a comparative perspective.

In addition to these two primary shortcomings, existing research also suffers from three other limitations. First, the discipline employs minimal, if any, quantitative measures to explain MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings. Second, recent research disregards the entirety of the MENA region and has not explored the "non-cases" of the Arab uprisings. For instance, even though substantial research examines dynamics of civil-military relations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, significantly less research explores the civil-military dynamics in countries where protests were not as large (e.g. Saudi Arabia), where internal security forces were able to successfully control the protest movements and avoid the need for military assistance (e.g. Algeria), or where the role of the military was less documented (e.g. Oman). Third, the recent research fails to include the entire population of cases from the MENA region into a single analysis.
The goal of this dissertation is to alleviate these shortcomings and to contribute to the recent literature in two distinct ways. First, this dissertation examines MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings comprehensively and tests twenty variables of civil-military relations across twenty-one MENA countries. Second, this project creates a unique and original dataset, called the MENA Military Index, which quantitatively measures military responses during the Arab uprisings through a numerical index score. The underlying argument of this project is there is no single variable that neatly explains military responses to the uprisings across the region. Most of the preexisting literature tends to examine one variable or a handful of variables, but the MENA Military Index aggregates these variables into a single dataset and provides a comprehensive and systematic approach to the question of what explains MENA military behavior during the uprisings.

Theoretical Questions, Empirical Puzzles, and Normative Issues

This project addresses several theoretical questions. First, how do militaries respond when facing mass political protests that challenge the incumbent regime? Will the military defend the regime and use violence against protesters? Will the military defect from the incumbent regime and support protesters? Will the military remain on the sidelines?\(^5\)

To better understand military responses during mass political protests it is crucial to explore a second theoretical question: what is the primary role of the military within the country? In the classic civil-military relations literature, the traditional role of the military is to concentrate solely on external security, including the defense of the country from foreign threats, and (if necessary) engaging in warfare against other militaries (see Huntington 1957,

\(^5\) Pion-Berlin et al. (2014) recently discuss this phenomenon, which they refer to as militaries "staying quartered." This concept will be explored later in this chapter and also in more detail in Chapter 2.
In this traditional view, since the military is responsible for external security, the police and other internal security forces are responsible for the internal security of a country and militaries should not have a role in internal security functions. Nordlinger (1977, 55) states in the traditional model of militaries, officers and soldiers find internal security functions as dishonorable since

Officers see themselves as professional and heroic managers of violence. They are ready and willing to use force against similarly trained and armed soldiers... [but] to do so against their "own people"... [would be] an unpalatable task.

Finer (1962, 27) adds the military "sees itself as a fighting force, not as a body of policemen."

Even though the traditional model highlights the stark division between external security and internal security, in many countries the role of the military and police overlap and differences between the two are blurred and indistinguishable. Kohn (1997, 141) notes militaries in authoritarian regimes are more prone to focus on internal security with the military preying on society rather than protecting citizens. Svolik (2012, chp. 5) observes authoritarian leaders strategically incorporate militaries into internal security and the everyday functions of repression to sustain the longevity of the regime and to quell internal dissenters.

The level of the military's internal security functions is relevant to this project because mass political protests are internal security issues. If a regime orders the military to intervene against domestic protesters, then by definition the military is engaging in internal security functions. If the armed forces primary responsibility is external security, then the military might be less willing to contradict the institutional mission and violently engage

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6 For an extensive examination on this topic see Janowitz (1977) who explores the growth of internal security missions for militaries in developing countries. In addition, other scholars explore this phenomenon across different regions, such as Latin America (Cassman 2007), Europe (Weiss 2011), and Africa (Frazer 1994, 92).
demonstrators. In contrast, if the armed forces are accustomed to internal security functions, then the military might be more willing to intervene against protesters when called upon by an executive.

Understanding the role of the military is an important theoretical question, but it also leads to a third issue: who does the military serve? Does the military serve the regime? Does it serve civilians? Does it serve a specific segment of society or a specific institution? Does it serve certain ideologies or political systems? A general guideline in the civil-military literature is that in democratic systems militaries more frequently serve civilians since democratic political institutions increase civilian oversight over the military (see Kohn 1997). In contrast, in authoritarian systems civilians have less oversight over militaries and militaries more often serve the ruling interests of the ruler rather than the country. If the armed forces serve the regime rather than citizens then it is more likely the military would be willing to use violence against mass political protesters. In contrast, if the armed forces serve the people then it is less likely the military will turn their weapons on civilians to protect a ruling leader.

This project explores these three theoretical questions broadly by focusing on Arab military responses during the Arab uprisings. By selecting the Arab uprisings this project examines a political phenomenon that affected numerous countries across a shared geographic region where wide variation of military responses occurred. In addition to the broader theoretical questions there are a few empirical puzzles that must be examined in regards to military responses specifically during the Arab uprisings. The main empirical puzzle regarding military responses during the Arab uprisings is that prior to 2011 the authoritarian regimes across the MENA region were perceived as overwhelmingly resilient and unlikely to experience significant political change or mass political protest. Scholars
provide numerous arguments as to why the authoritarian regimes across the MENA region were so resilient including the coercive nature of internal security forces and the tendency for militaries to protect the ruling regimes from internal dissent (see Bellin 2004; Brownlee 2005; Cook 2007; Droz-Vincent 2007; Erdle 2010). If militaries and coercive security forces were critical to maintaining authoritarian stability across the region, then why did some militaries defect from the incumbent regime when facing mass political protests during the Arab uprisings? Either there were unique characteristics of the Arab uprisings that compelled some militaries to sever their relationships with authoritarian leaders and side with mass protesters, or the previous literature overestimated the significance military coercion had upon regime longevity.

This leads to another empirical puzzle: why now? After decades of regime stability, authoritarian rule, and military involvement in internal security, why did some militaries defect during the Arab uprisings of 2011 as supposed to decades' prior? Authoritarian regimes across the MENA region have experienced political protests and varying degrees of internal political dissent before, so what was it about the movements in 2011 that triggered political change in some countries?

In addition to the theoretical questions and empirical puzzles, this dissertation addresses larger normative issues. By examining military responses during mass political protests this projects aims to better understand civil-military relations, especially the relationship between the military, the ruling government, and civilians. This dissertation

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7 Such arguments include the region’s proclivity towards violence (Solingen 2007), Arab cultural factors (Huntington 1996), Islam’s incompatibility with democracy (Fish 2002; Rowley and Smith 2009), oil rents (Ross 2001), strength of dominant single parties (Angrist 1999; Brownlee 2007), and effective distribution of patronage (Lust 2009; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).
argues the military is an influential political institution that has the ability to alter political and social life within a country. The reason militaries have such an impactful role is because they possess the majority of weaponry within a country and can easily use physical force to dominate other domestic groups and institutions. For this reason it is relevant for civilians to understand the factors and variables that influence military responses to mass political protests. Part of this significance is drawn from the fact civil uprisings are more likely to succeed if they gain the support of the security forces (Russell 1974). If civilians better understand the factors that influence military behavior, then social movements can better anticipate whether a military will respond with violence, remain neutral, or side with demonstrators. This knowledge can inform social movements and provide individuals with tactics to decrease the likelihood of violent state response during protests. By exploring the conditions and variables that influence military responses to mass political protest, this projects hopes to contribute to civilians’ knowledge of state security responses and provide protesters with better strategies and tactics that can decrease the likelihood of violent state responses.

**Classifications and Definitions**

This section classifies and defines several of the project’s central concepts. First, it is necessary to define and classify the countries that comprise the MENA region. There is no universally accepted definition of the MENA region but the United Nations (UN) refers to the region as the areas of North Africa, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula. In total, the UN categorizes the MENA region as eighteen countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,

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8 Many researchers in political science and sociology argue non-violent protests decrease the likelihood the military will use weapons against demonstrators. For more on this literature see Sharp (1973), Binnendijk and Marovic (2006), and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) and two territories (Palestine and Western Sahara). This project builds off of the UN's classification of MENA countries with a few minor adjustments.

First, this project omits Western Sahara because of the uncertain sovereign status of the territory in regards to its relationship with Morocco and since Western Sahara does not possess many of the institutional state structures that are necessary to examine for this particular project. It should be noted however that Palestine, also a territory, is examined within this project for three primary reasons: the geographic centrality of the Palestinian territories in the MENA region, the political significance of Palestine in regards to the larger Arab identity, and the presence of formal political institutions in the territories, including a robust security sector.

A second adjustment to the classification of the MENA region within this project is including two countries not in the UN list: Iran and Turkey. One could justifiably question the addition of Iran and Turkey since the central aim of this project is to examine MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings and Iran and Turkey are not Arab countries. Yet despite the ethnic and linguistic differences both Iran and Turkey are significant to the

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9 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/MENARegion/Pages/MenaRegionIndex.aspx

10 Even though the Polisario Front retains some territorial and political control over eastern portions of the Western Sahara, Moroccan control over the majority of the territory results in limited or no traditional state institutions across the territory. For more information on Western Sahara, see Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution*, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010).

MENA region and are closely associated culturally, economically, historically, and politically to the Arab world.

Table 1. Countries/Territories of the MENA Military Index

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It should be noted the Arab uprisings directly affected Iran as thousands of Iranians were influenced by the success of mass political protests from Tunisia and Egypt and staged demonstrations across Iran. Protests in Turkey were admittedly limited or non-existent during the Arab uprisings but the inclusion of Turkey into the MENA Military Index is informative for several comparative reasons. One, Turkey has been a regional political power over the last few decades, its democratic political system has been cited as a potential model for the rest of the region, and the Turkish military has been actively involved in domestic politics during the last fifty years. After including Iran and Turkey, and omitting Western Sahara, there are a total of twenty-one countries/territories examined in this project.

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13 For a review of Turkey’s increased political role in the Middle East see F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey RedisCOVERS the Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs*. (2007) 86, 4: 103- 114. For a better understanding of Turkey's
The second concept is to define "military behavior" and specifically address how militaries acted in the face of mass political protests during the Arab uprisings. In the civil-military literature most scholars define military behavior in terms of actions vis-a-vis the regime rather than actions against citizens. For example, Finer (1962, 140) categorizes military behavior as one of four "modes of interventions" against the regime including: influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantment. Recent literature expands the definition of military behavior to include actions against civilians in addition to actions against regimes. Davenport (2007, 487) defines military behavior as a wide variety of actions including domestic spying, verbal and physical harassment, arrests, banning, enforcing curfews and censorship, torturing, kidnapping, and killing. When regimes order militaries to intervene violently against mass political protests, soldiers are employing many of these tactics on civilians. Another useful definition of military behavior for this project is militaries can remain neutral or stay on the sidelines. Pion-Berlin et al. (2014, 231) refer to this term as militaries "staying quartered," which occurs when ruling leaders give orders for the military to intervene against political protests, but the military disobeys these orders and chooses to stay on the sidelines. This dissertation incorporates all three of these concepts and defines "military behavior" as a wide-range of activities, both violent and non-violent, the military as an institution, and also the individual officer and soldier, can exhibit to either the regime or civilians.

role as a possible democratic model for the region see, Meliha Benli Altunisk, “The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” Arab Studies Quarterly, (2005) 27, 1/2: 45 – 63. As for Turkish military intervention the Turkish military intervened in domestic politics and ushered in "democratic" coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Furthermore, the Turkish military maneuvered the Prime Minister's removal in 1997, was publically outspoken of the government in 2007, and several officers were suspected of plotting a coup against the government in 2010. During the writing of this dissertation, a group of mid-level officers initiated a failed coup attempt during the summer of 2016.
A third concept to define is the term “military” and how this concept relates to and differs from the terms “security sector” and “security apparatus.” It is important to emphasize this dissertation examines the role of MENA militaries during the Arab uprisings -- not the behavior of MENA police or MENA internal security forces. When discussing the “military” this project refers to the behaviors of the entire military institution and behaviors from officers and soldiers. Throughout this project the term “military” is used interchangeably with the term “armed forces” and these two concepts specifically refer to a country’s air force, army, navy, and in some instances coast guard. However, the reality is that in most MENA militaries the army is the primary branch and therefore when addressing MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings this typically means the actions of the army. This project also uses the terms “security sector” and “security apparatus,” which broadly refer to all security forces in a country including the military and internal security forces such as anti-terrorism units, internal intelligence organizations, paramilitary organizations, police, presidential guards, and riot control units. A country’s military is included within the larger “security sector” and “security apparatus,” but “security sector” and “security apparatus” do not solely refer to the military. Again, the project explores MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings rather than MENA “security sector” responses. This concept of the military in regards to a country's larger security apparatus will be highlighted and discussed further in the comparative case study portion of this dissertation in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

The fourth concept to discuss is the definitions and differences between "senior officers," "junior officers," "soldiers," and "conscripts" in MENA militaries. It is important to note the twenty-one MENA countries examined in this study have varying military
structures with different ranks, hierarchies, and titles. In this project, senior officers refer to the executive leadership such as generals, whereas junior officers refer to ranks such as colonels, lieutenants, etc. During the Arab uprisings, the primary actors in the militaries were typically senior officers such as General Rachid Ammar in Tunisia (see chapter 4), and General Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi and Lieutenant General Sami Anan in Egypt (see chapter 5). In contrast, soldiers refer to the low-level, rank-and-file of the military. During the Arab uprisings there are some instances of soldiers defecting from the military and abandoning their barracks such as the case in the Syrian military (Heydemann 2013, 64 - 66). In addition, this project discusses conscripts, which specifically refer to the low-level, rank-and-file of the military in countries where there is a system of military conscription in place. Lastly, the term "military personnel" is used in this dissertation as a default term and to also describe senior officers, junior officers, soldiers, and conscripts in the general sense.

The fifth concept to discuss and define is mass political protests. Scholars use the terms "contentious politics," "mass political protest," "mobilization," "revolution," and "social movements" interchangeably when discussing the Arab uprisings of 2011. Scholars are comfortable using the term "revolution" to describe the events that occurred during the Arab uprisings but previous definitions would question whether "revolution" truly describes what occurred during the region in 2010 - 2011. 14 In one of the seminal studies of revolutions, Skocpol (1978, 4) defines social revolutions as "basic transformations of a society's state and class structures...[that were] carried through by class-based revolts from

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14 Several scholars use the term "Arab Revolutions" to describe the events, see Filali-Ansary (2011), and Bishara (2013). Other scholars use country-specific terms such as the "Tunisian Revolution" (Mabrouk 2011; Aleya-Sghaier 2012; Kaboub 2013), "Jasmine Revolution" (Schraeder 2012), and "Egyptian Revolution" (Khalil 2012; Badran 2014).
below." This definition describes the class-based revolutions of the 18th, 19th, and 20th century (France 1789, China 1911, and Russia 1917) better than it characterizes the Arab uprisings of 2011. DeFronzo provides a definition of revolution that removes Skocpol's element of class structures and defines revolutions more broadly as events where "participants attempt to drastically alter or replace existing social, economic, or political institutions within a country (2011, 10)." The lack of a class element in the Arab uprisings has resonated with some scholars including el-Din Shahin (2013, 54) who observes the uprising in Egypt was a classless revolution since it did not represent one particular class but rather incorporated numerous sectors from Egyptian society. Goldstone (2011) provides a similar observation and argues protests were more successful during the Arab uprisings when the movements represented a cross-class coalition of disparate groups, backgrounds, and ideologies.

In addition to a revolution, the Arab uprisings are also referred to as a collection of "social movements," which DeFronzo (2011, 9) defines as "persistent and organized efforts on the part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or to resist social change." Lynch (2014) claims the recent Arab uprisings are a form of "contentious politics," a term coined by McAdam et al. (2001) that generally refers to collective political struggles. Even though the Arab uprisings represent a type of contentious political event, the uprisings were something in-between a revolution and a social movement. In many cases the Arab uprisings fall short of the "classic revolution" definition since protesters were not calling for the absolute upheaval and paradigmatic replacement of pre-existing social structures. The "classic" revolutions of France, Russia, and China (as examined by Skocpol) consisted of

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15 Beinin and Vairel (2013).
extensive movements to entirely replace the economic, political, and ideological structures of the country. Most of the Arab uprisings protests were more modest in their aims and did not promote such drastic reforms. Rather, the majority of Arab uprisings protesters addressed issues regarding corruption, authoritarian political structures, and economic stagnation.

While the Arab uprisings fall short of the classic definition of social revolutions, they contain characteristics that are more extensive than social movements. In general, protesters during the Arab uprisings broadly demonstrated against the entire political system rather than protesting against specific policies and because of this a more appropriate term for the Arab uprisings, and the term broadly used in this project, is "mass political protests." The word "mass" simply refers to the large number of citizens that participated in the uprisings, and "political protests" signifies demonstrators were primarily politically motivated. It should be noted many protesters were also economically motivated (e.g. concerned with unemployment, underemployment, rising costs of basic items, etc.) but the term "mass political protests" encapsulates economic concerns since in most instances economic grievances were politically based and addressed overall failures by the ruling regimes.

**Exploring the Comparative Case Studies**

In this project I introduce a quantifiable metric, the MENA Military Index, to measure MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings. In addition, I employ a comparative case study analysis of three countries: Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia. Earlier research has primarily employed single case studies or comparative case analyses but none have utilized a systematic examination of military behavior across the entire MENA region.

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16 At this point in the project "mass political protests" is not quantified. However, later in Chapter 3, the MENA Military Index employs metrics to measure the size of protests to determine whether the Arab uprisings in specific countries qualified as "large."
A strength of this project is the comparative case study analysis reinforces and complements the quantitative MENA Military Index dataset. In this regards the case study chapters (4 – 6) provide insightful narrative discussion of the Bahraini, Egyptian, and Tunisian militaries, and the unique roles each had during the uprisings. The comparative case study analysis provides useful context to better understand the quantitative results of the MENA Military Index presented in Chapter 3, and to also identify the causal mechanisms that influenced MENA military responses during the uprisings.

Out of the twenty-one MENA countries, Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia were selected for the comparative case study analysis for four reasons. First, all three countries experienced high levels of protests that threatened the ruling regime. It is important to recognize that during the Arab uprisings the level of protests varied from country to country (see Chapter 3) and not all countries experienced large-scale demonstrations like Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia. Second, not only were the protests large in Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia, but in each country the regime ordered the military to intervene and to confront protesters. This second shared characteristic is also important since in many countries across the MENA region internal security forces were able to successfully ward off demonstrations and thus it was unnecessary for militaries to intervene. Third, Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia faced an identical political phenomenon but the militaries responded differently in each country. In Bahrain, the military defended the regime and willingly used high levels of violence against protesters. In Egypt and Tunisia the militaries defected from the ruling regimes, but in Tunisia the military immediately transferred political power over to a transitional civilian government after President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled the country, whereas in Egypt the military retained political power for approximately one-year under the auspices of the Supreme
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) after President Mubarak was forced out of office. Since the militaries of Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia experienced an identical political phenomenon yet behaved differently, the comparative case study chapters provide an ideal comparison of discovering the different causal variables and conditions that led to three different military behaviors and outcomes. Fourth, Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia are empirically compatible since the duration of the uprising in each country was approximately identical (one month in each country), and since military behavior during the uprisings are well documented with plenty of primary (unclassified government documents, government archives, nongovernmental organization archives, etc.) and secondary (journalistic accounts, prior articles and books, etc.) sources available.

**Overview of the Project**

The following project is divided into six additional chapters. Chapter 2 examines the previous civil-military relations literature to understand how prior scholars explained military responses to mass political protests. Chapter 3 discusses the MENA Military Index and summarizes how I developed the dataset, operationalized the variables, constructed the questionnaire, and present the significant findings from the dataset. The examinations of the Bahraini, Egyptian, and Tunisian militaries are explored in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4 examines Tunisia since the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia as the country experienced mass protests starting in mid-December 2010 and ultimately resulted in President Ben Ali fleeing the country in mid-January 2011. Chapter 5 then examines the case of Egypt, which experienced protests beginning in late January and ended with President Mubarak leaving office in mid-February 2011. Chapter 6 examines Bahrain, which experienced protests beginning in mid-February 2011 until mid-March 2011 when the regime and state security
forces stifled the protest movements. The case study chapters provide an overview of each country's military, outlines the historical development of the military, includes a detailed narrative of the Arab uprisings within each country, explains the military's involvement during the uprisings, and explores the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in-depth in each country. Chapter 7 summarizes the key findings, discusses some limitations of the research, and notes the current state of civil-military and regime-military relations across the region and how scholars and policymakers can better understand MENA militaries in the decades to come.

Overall, this project argues that to better understand MENA military responses in the Arab uprisings it is beneficial to examine all MENA countries and to explore a combination of institutional, regime, societal, and international variables. This project also endorses the advancement of quantitative studies and methods into a field that has been primarily driven by qualitative and small-n case studies. As this project reveals in the upcoming chapters, quantitative measurements can explain MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings and with the assistance of case study analysis, can illuminate the factors and variables that influenced militaries to either defend incumbent regimes and fire on demonstrators, or to defect from regimes and support mass political protesters. One of the basic findings from this project is that military behavior during the Arab uprisings was influenced primarily by institutional and societal variables. For example, military defection occurred only if necessary pre-existing institutional and social conditions were present in the country. In regards to institutional variables, military defection occurred when there were parallel security forces that counterbalanced the strength of the military, significant rivalries between the military and other state security forces, a system of military conscription, and
the military had autonomy to control personnel in the mid-and-lower ranks of the armed forces. As for societal variables, military defection occurred when the protest movements were large, non-violent, broad-based, and consisted of non-traditional demonstrators.
CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW

To understand military responses during the Arab uprisings it is necessary to explore the civil-military relations literature and the variables that influenced military responses during mass political protests. During the 1960s and 1970s, civil-military scholars viewed military responses as solely issues of military coups d’état. The majority of research from these two decades explored two general questions: the factors that caused a military coup (Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Nordlinger 1977), and why some coups succeeded whereas others failed (Goodspeed 1961; Thompson 1976).

The military coup literature during the 1960s and 1970s was an expansive field with hundreds of authors studying the military's role in politics through individual case studies (Özbudun 1966; Astiz 1969; Cox 1976), comparative case studies (Feit 1968; Feit 1973), large-n quantitative studies (Wells 1974; Jackman 1978; Zimmerman 1979), and regional examinations including Africa (Welch Jr. 1970; Decalo 1976), Latin America (Fossum 1967; Nun 1969; Solaun and Quinn 1973; Needler 1975), and the Middle East (Rostow 1963; Haddad 1965).

A main reason why the study of military coups was so popular during the 1960s and 1970s was because of the prevalence of coups during this period. Powell and Thyne (2011) note 287 coups occurred from 1950 - 1979, which equaled to approximately ten military coups every year, or a military coup occurring every five to six weeks for thirty years. When one consider the frequency of military coups during the mid-twentieth century it is
understandable why so many civil-military scholars and researchers studied this topic.
However, even though the literature on military coups provides keen insight on the role of
the military, since the research only focused on coups there was little research that examined
other forms of military behavior, especially the role of the military during mass political
unrest.

One of the earliest studies to explore the role of the military during revolutionary
Russell examines the relationship between military disloyalty and the success of mass
rebellions by looking at fourteen rebellions during the early and mid-twentieth century.¹
Russell creates a numerical scale that measures three factors: the degree of military disloyalty,
the point of the revolution when the military defected, and the proportion of military
personnel disloyal to the regime. Russell constructs a military disloyalty score for each
rebellion and notes the higher the military disloyalty score, the more likely mass rebellions
succeeded. However, a critical drawback of Russell's research is she fails to identify the
specific factors that cause military disloyalty and she fails to explain why military personnel
were disloyal.

After the publication of Russell's research in 1974, similar studies on the role of the
military during revolutions and mass political protests remained sparse until the downfall of
communist regimes beginning in 1989 and continuing with the breakup of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. Once the USSR dissolved there was renewed
scholarly interest into how militaries behaved during popular uprisings. For instance,

¹ Russell examines the rebellions of Mexico (1911), Cuba (1912), Italy (1914), Albania (1924), Afghanistan
(1929), Brazil (1930), Honduras (1933), Austria (1934), Spain (1934), Colombia (1948), China (1949), Bolivia
(1952), Burma (1954), and Cuba (1958).
researchers explored specific case studies and asked questions such as: why did the Chinese military repress protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Scobell 1992; Kou 2000), and why did the Indonesian military support protesters during the 1998 protests (Lee 2005)? Additionally, scholars examined the variation of military behavior within a regional context and posed questions such as: what explained differences in military responses across Eastern Europe in the early 1990s (Thompson 2001), and why did some militaries suppress protesters whereas other militaries supported protesters during the Color Revolutions of Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006). An overall drawback of the research is scholars have not examined military responses to mass political protests in a comprehensive and multi-causal manner. Even though scholars explore institutional, domestic, societal, and international variables individually, seldom have researchers combined all of these areas and discuss how the variables interact and influence military responses during mass political protests.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. Section one summarizes research that examines single variables and argues the literature falls short of fully explaining military responses. Section two explores the recent literature that uses multi-causal explanations to explain military responses to mass political protests and contends this field of research also fails to provide convincing arguments and systematic methods that truly explain variation in military responses to mass political protests, especially in a comparative context. This chapter concludes by explaining how this project builds upon previous models to determine varying military responses specifically during the political phenomenon of the Arab uprisings.
Literature Examining Single Variables

There is a rich literature focusing on one explanatory variable or a single group of variables. This research can be categorized into one of six groups: military professionalization and military autonomy; factional divisions within the military and society; divisions within the state security apparatus; regime-military relations; societal variables; and international variables. This section examines each of these six groups, summarizes the main arguments from scholars, and highlights the research’s shortcomings and limitations.

Levels of Military Professionalization and Military Autonomy

A first group examines the militaries' level of professionalization and the level of military autonomy. Some scholars argue militaries with higher levels of professionalization are less likely to use violence against civilians since the military respects civilian control over the state (Huntington 1957) and since military violence against civilians diminishes civilians' trust in the armed forces (Perlmutter 1969, 396). In contrast, other scholars (Nordlinger 1977; Fitch 1998; Kamrava 2000) provide a competing argument that militaries in developing countries with higher levels of professionalization are more likely to use force against citizens. Kamrava (2000) observes Middle Eastern militaries with higher levels of professionalization are usually the most modern and technologically advanced institution in the country and often take advantage of their superiority by suppressing and dominating other political institutions within the country and the civilian population.

Several scholars examine the relationship between the level of military professionalization and military responses during the Arab uprisings. Six years prior to the Arab uprisings, Bellin (2004) categorized MENA militaries as either professional or patrimonial, and argued professional militaries were more likely to defect from regimes than
patrimonial militaries since professional militaries do not serve the ruling regime's self-interests. After the Arab uprisings occurred, Bellin (2012) defended her earlier argument by noting MENA militaries with higher levels of professionalization (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) defected from incumbent regimes and supported mass protesters in comparison to patrimonial militaries (e.g. Bahrain and Syria) that supported the incumbent regime and used violence against civilians. Additional scholars echo Bellin's central findings that MENA militaries with higher levels of professionalization were less likely to fire on citizens and more likely to defect from incumbent regimes (see Gause 2011; Sayigh 2011a, 391; Sayigh 2011b; Lutterbeck 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013, 29).

However, there are two shortcomings of the military professionalization argument within the examination of the Arab uprisings. First, military professionalization fails to explain military fracturing and why individuals from the same military might behave differently. The military professionalization argument presumes military personnel will behave uniformly due to overarching institutional characteristics of the armed forces, but such an approach fails to explain variation of military responses within a single military. Such a scenario occurred in Libya and Yemen where some military personnel defected from the regime whereas others remained loyal to the regime (Barany 2011, 29 - 31). A second shortcoming specifically addresses Bellin's classification of patrimonial versus professional militaries. Bellin notes the Libyan and Yemeni militaries are patrimonial, yet both militaries experienced military fracturing during the Arab uprisings as large number of military personnel defected from the regime. How can the variable of military professionalization fully explain military responses considering both professional and patrimonial militaries experienced full or partial defection during the Arab uprisings?
Another argument discussed in the literature is that the level of military autonomy affects military responses during mass political protests. Military autonomy refers to the level of exclusivity the military possesses from both society and the regime. Examples of military autonomy include whether the military controls the hiring and placement of internal personnel, whether the military has independent control over its budget, whether the military has access to top-of-the-line weaponry, and whether civilian oversight manages the internal affairs of the military (Pion-Berlin 1992). Pion-Berlin (1992) argues that examining the level of military autonomy is vital to understanding military behavior since the military typically makes decisions based upon its institutional interests. For example, Campbell (2009, 14) argues militaries with higher levels of institutional autonomy tend to have less civilian oversight, which makes it easier for militaries to use violence against civilians.

In addition to the relationship between militaries and civilians, military autonomy also addresses the issue between militaries and regimes, and the level of autonomy a ruling leader grants the military can impact how the military behaves. For instance, the Haitian protests in 1986 demonstrate that when a regime provides a military with too much autonomy, and when mass political protests break out in the country; the military can defect from the incumbent regime. President Jean-Claude Duvalier rewarded the Haitian military with high levels of institutional autonomy (including modern weaponry, legal immunity, etc.) as compensation for years of regime loyalty and Duvalier assumed these favors would ensure military officers would remain loyal to him. However, once mass political protests erupted across Haiti, the military defected from the regime because Haitian officers realized the military no longer needed the regime, and the mass political protests provided the Haitian
military with an ideal opportunity to physically remove Duvalier from office and take control of government (Snyder 1992, 387-388).

In addition to regimes granting militaries with too much autonomy, recent examinations of the Arab uprisings have demonstrated regimes can provide militaries with “too little” autonomy. Stepan and Linz (2013, 28) note that in Syria President Bashar al-Assad deliberately limited the institutional autonomy of the Syrian military by constantly watching over the military and micro-managing institutional decisions to ensure the military personnel remained loyal to the regime.

Overall, the main issue with explaining military responses to mass political protests strictly through issues of military autonomy is that the research ignores variables examining the relationship between the military and the regime, and variables between the military and society. The Haitian case above demonstrates the necessity of evaluating both regime and societal variables in addition to examining issues of military autonomy. For instance, the reason the Haitian military intervened against the Duvalier regime was due to mass political protests gripping the country. Since there was civilian unrest in Haiti it provided the military with the opportunity to intervene against the regime. One could argue that if the Haitian protests never occurred then the Haitian military likely would have continued its loyalty to the Duvalier regime, just as it had done for years prior. Overall, the military professionalization and autonomy arguments fail to fully explain military responses to mass political protests since they do not adequately address the dynamics that regime, societal, and international variables can also have upon military behavior.
Factional Divisions within the Military and Society

A second group of variables examines factional divisions within the military and society. Factional divisions refer to cleavages within the military, and cleavages that separate the military from segments of society. Examples of factional divisions include generational differences (senior officers vs. junior officers), communal affiliation (ethnic, regional religious, tribal, etc.), and socio-economic/class affiliation. Within the military, generational differences between senior and junior officers have caused divisions that disrupted military cohesion and influenced military responses during mass political protests. Johnson (1964, 124) observes this trend in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s and notes younger Latin American officers believed they belonged to a "virtuous" generation that made them better qualified to govern the country in relation to senior officers from older generations. Other examples of generational cleavages dividing military personnel and affecting military responses during mass political protests include: 1825 Russia (Taylor 2001, 937), 1945 Venezuela (Johnson 1964, 124), 1979 El Salvador (Williams and Walter 1997, 93-95), 1994 The Gambia (Saine 1996), and 2000 Ecuador (Barracca 2007, 152).

Another factional division occurs when there is communal heterogeneity within a military. This describes militaries where personnel represent different communal affiliations including disparate ethnic, regional, religious, or tribal identities. Scholars note that in heterogeneous militaries, divisions among communal identities can greatly impact how individuals respond during domestic unrest. McLauchlin (2010) observes the communal identification of military personnel and military defection in three Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Jordan, and Syria. McLauchlin demonstrates that military personnel are more likely to support their own communal group during mass political protests, especially if there are
communal cleavages in the military and if the mass political protests highlight communal grievances. Syria is an example where communal identities divide both the military and society. The ruling al-Assad regime represents the country's minority Alawite ethnic group and al-Assad has mostly appointed fellow Alawites to senior military leadership positions (Heydemann 2013, 65). Even though Alawites dominate the upper echelon of Syrian military command, most Syrians are Sunni and due to the country's system of military conscription, young Sunnis tend to fill the lower rank-and-file of the Syrian military. During the Arab uprisings most defections in the Syrian military were from the Sunni rank-and-file who deserted the barracks and refused to use violence against civilians (Heydemann 2013, 64). In contrast, the Alawite officers in the Syrian military have remained loyal to the Assad regime. Yemen provides a similar situation to Syria but in Yemen, military units are organized through close-knit tribal groups and only the military units tribally aligned with President Saleh’s Sanhan tribe remained loyal to the regime (Knights 2013).

Divisions also occur when the military is communally homogeneous but when citizens represent an entirely distinct communal group from the armed forces. Bahrain provides an example as both the ruling al-Khalifa regime and the Bahraini military are composed of Sunni Muslims, the country’s minority sectarian group. In contrast, the majority of Bahraini citizens identify with Shia Islam, which creates a clear sectarian division between the regime and the military, and the total population (see Louër 2013). Due to the communal configuration in Bahrain, the Sunni-based military was willing to use violence against the Shia-majority population due to these rigid sectarian divisions.

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2 For more examinations regarding sectarian splits influencing MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings see Droz Vincent 2011, 7; Gause 2011; Nepstad 2011, 489; Sayigh 2011a; Heydemann 2013, 66; and Droz-Vincent 2014, 39.
A final communal division includes the socioeconomic and class affiliations of military personnel. During the mid-twentieth century scholars noted several militaries across the developing world supported the advancement of the middle classes and intervened in politics specifically to protect middle class interests (Nun 1967; Perlmutter 1969; Nordlinger 1977; Reif 1984). Stepan (1971) examines the self-identification of Brazilian officers in the 1960s and finds Brazilian officers intervened in politics because they felt the Brazilian middle-class was being threatened by the country’s lower classes. In regards to the Middle East, Halpern (1963) claims that the 1952 Free Officers Movement that overthrew the Egyptian monarchy emerged because of middle-class officers wanting to implement more favorable policies for the country's growing middle-class.

Overall, factional divisions fail to fully explain military behavior for several reasons. First, in regards to generational divisions, militaries are hierarchical institutions that are constructed where older and more experienced officers usually occupy senior positions, whereas younger officers and rank-and-file soldiers hold junior positions. This institutional configuration is nearly universal in all militaries across the world, so if there is a characteristic of this system that inherently causes severe divisions within the military -- one should expect constant struggles between senior and junior officers in militaries across the world. However, this is not the case, which indicates grievances between senior officers and junior officers cannot singularly explain military responses during mass political protests. If anything, generational divisions appear to be an exception rather than a norm, and it is unconvincing to assume generational divisions solely explain variation in military responses, especially during the Arab uprisings.
Additionally, one cannot predict military responses solely by examining the communal affiliation of military personnel in comparison to the communal affiliation of civilian populations. For instance, the communal affiliation argument fails to explain varying military responses between Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia during the Arab uprisings. All three of these North African countries are relatively homogenous in regards to ethnic and sectarian affiliations since the majority of citizens in these three countries are Arab-Berber and overwhelmingly identify with Sunni Islam. Of these three countries only the Tunisian military defected from the regime and supported the civilian demonstrators during the Arab uprisings. The communal division argument also fails to explain why the Algerian and Moroccan militaries remained loyal to their respective regimes even though both countries have a similar communal configuration to Tunisia. If various factional divisions exist within a country those divisions can certainly influence military responses during mass political protests, but as the Arab uprisings demonstrate, factional divisions alone cannot explain varying military responses and institutional, regime-military, societal, and international variables also have to be considered.

Divisions within the State Security Apparatus

A third group of variables explore divisions within the state security apparatus. This includes divisions between the military and other internal state security groups, and also intra-branch rivalries within the armed forces. Janowitz (1977) observes internal security forces increased in size and political strength in many developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, which led to militaries and internal security forces competing for material

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3 See the 2010 CIA World Factbook, which indicates the non Arab-Berber populations in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are less than one percent. To access the 2010 CIA World Factbook visit https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2010. Accessed September 5, 2015.
resources, budgets, and political prestige. An example of this occurred in Tunisia, as there were divisive institutional rivalries between the Tunisian military and the Tunisian internal security forces. During the Ben Ali regime the Tunisian military was politically marginalized by the regime in comparison to the internal security forces housed within the Ministry of Interior. Several authors argue that since President Ben Ali politically alienated the Tunisian military it was easier for Tunisian officers to defect from the regime and side with protesters (see Brooks 2012; Jebnoun 2014; Bou Nassif 2015; Lutterbeck 2015).

Divisions between militaries and internal security forces also address the larger issue of coup proofing and counterbalancing. Quinlivan (1999) notes coup proofing is a common practice for autocratic leaders that includes the creation of multiple internal security agencies that continuously monitor the military to detect any disloyalty throughout the country’s security apparatus. Libya provides an example of coup proofing as President Muammar Qaddafi deliberately weakened the military and counterbalanced it with special units and militias better equipped and better trained than the regular army (Droz-Vincent 2011, 6). These coup-proofing tactics allowed Qaddafi to remain in power for over four-decades, however, once the Arab uprisings began, the coup-proofing tactics backfired on the Qaddafi regime (Gaub 2013a, 221). Since Qaddafi deliberately weakened the military, the armed forces were essentially ineffective and helpless once NATO aerial attacks were launched against Qaddafi’s strongholds. The coup-proofing tactics employed by Qaddafi ended up euthanizing the Libyan military, and as a result the Libyan military disintegrated and fractured, resulting in large factions of desertion and defection.

The last variable in this group explores divisions within the military between different armed force branches. Throughout the developing world, the army is usually the
most relevant (and sometimes the only) military branch within a country. However, scholars note there are some examples where divisions between armed force branches can cause varying military responses. One example occurred during the Burmese protests in 1988. Boudreau (2004, 213) demonstrates that prior to the protests the Burmese government provided higher salaries to army officers and lower salaries to air force officers. Once mass political protests began in August 1988, officers from the Burmese Air Force were more likely to defect from the regime in comparison to officers from the Burmese Army, since air force officers were financially marginalized by the regime.

These three variables fail to fully explain military responses because they disregard the significance of regime, societal, and international variables. Internal divisions between military branches and rivalries between security forces are less informative without also examining the role of the regime and the ruling leader. As the Burmese uprising in 1988 indicates, ruling leaders have an integral role in contributing (and sometimes stoking) divisions between armed force branches. In the case of Burma, the government deliberately favored the army over the air force. Therefore, to truly understand divisions within the state security apparatus, an observer must also understand the dynamics and interactions the ruling leader plays in creating and sustaining intra-service rivalries.

Coup proofing and counterbalancing security forces also fail to fully explain military behavior since it ignores the impact of foreign intervention and society. In the case of Libya, decades of successful coup proofing by the Qaddafi regime could not ensure regime loyalty or regime longevity once a superior foreign military force launched aerial attacks against the country. The Libyan case specifically demonstrates the importance of examining international variables. Overall, the three variables in this section do not incorporate regime,
societal, or international variables, and as a result they only provide a partial explanation to
military responses during mass political protests.

Regime-Military Relations

A fourth group of variables explores the relationship between the military and the
regime and whether the military is central to the incumbent regime or if the military is
marginalized by the regime. Lee (2005) argues that the military's relationship to the ruling
regime is complex and that the armed forces will not necessarily be loyal to the ruling leader
even if it is closely associated with the regime. In fact, institutional measures that draw the
military closer to the regime can either be rewards or punishments, which Lee refers to as
"carrots" and "sticks." Lee highlights three types of "carrots:" (1) corporate benefits, which
consist of larger military budgets, the military's access to modern weapons and materiel, and
permitting the military access to additional economic sectors; (2) private benefits, which are
the individual incentives that officers receive including inflated salaries, supplementary
salaries, bribes, "kick-backs," and exclusive access to housing, consumer goods, and medical
care; and (3) political benefits, which include access to key political appointments such as
ambassadorial positions, and receiving political immunity, etc. (Lee 2005, 82).

Regimes can also use ultimatums or threats to induce military cooperation (i.e.
"sticks"). Examples include the regime threatening the military with imprisonment, violence,
or even execution if they are disloyal to the regime. Despite employing different tactics,
"carrots" and "sticks" ultimately serve the same function, which is to ensure military officers
and soldiers remain loyal to the ruling leader and the incumbent regime. Lee (2005) notes
regime "carrots" and "sticks" had tremendous impact on influencing military responses
during the mass political protests of China (1989) and Indonesia (1998). Lee argues one
reason the Chinese military remained loyal to the regime during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests was because the military was afraid of the repercussions if they defected from the regime. In contrast, Lee notes once mass political protests occurred in Indonesia, the country’s military defected from the regime even though Indonesian officers received numerous incentives and benefits from the regime. Due to these findings, Lee argues that regime "sticks" are more effective in ensuring military loyalty than regime "carrots."

The case of Syria during the Arab uprisings confirms Lee's central argument considering the al-Assad regime employs numerous tactics and "sticks" to ensure the Syrian military remains loyal to the regime. Other studies discuss the relationship between the military and the regime during the Arab uprisings including Ryan (2012) who argues Jordanian officers remain loyal to King Abdullah since the Jordanian military has close ties to Jordanian royalty, and Volpi (2013) notes in Algeria the military remains loyal to the regime due to the benefits officers receive from the Bouteflika government.

Another variable that affects military behavior during mass political protests includes the channels of communication between the regime and the military. There are two issues regarding communication channels that affect military behavior, the first is the process of how a ruling leader gives orders to the military, and the second issue is whether the regime isolates the military and blocks external communication from reaching the barracks during mass political protests. An example of this latter issue occurred during the 1989 protests in China in which Deng Xiaoping, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, limited the external communication Chinese soldiers received (Kou 2000, 49). Once protests started,

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4 For example, the Syrian regime has ruthlessly responded to military defectors and has reportedly staged public executions of captured defected soldiers. For more see CNN, "Dozens of defecting Syrian soldiers executed, activists say," March 2, 2012, accessed March 24, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/.
Deng took precautionary steps to control the circulation of information and eliminated any unofficial communication to military units, which resulted in the Chinese military becoming isolated from the rest of society and unaware of any updates regarding the crisis from sources outside of the regime. This type of control over the communication channels ensured the Chinese military remained loyal to the regime.

There are several shortcomings to the arguments that explain military responses to mass political protests solely through variables depicting the relationship between the military and the regime. The main reason is these arguments fail to fully address additional variables, especially societal factors. The 1998 Indonesian mass political protests demonstrate the necessity for examining societal variables because even though the Indonesian military received numerous incentives and benefits from the Suharto government, these “carrots” were unable to ensure Indonesian military loyalty to the regime. Since Indonesian officers defected from Suharto this indicates there were characteristics of the mass political protests that caused officers to reevaluate their relationship with the regime. Thus, to truly understand Indonesian military behavior in 1998, one must also examine the societal variables and how the unique characteristics of the protests influenced military defection. In addition to “carrots,” the “sticks” wielded by regimes to enforce military loyalty can crumble in the face of international variables. Libya provides an example as Qaddafi employed numerous ultimatums and threats that discouraged Libyan officers and soldiers from defecting from the regime. However the "sticks" of the Qaddafi regime became ineffective once NATO forces launched aerial attacks against the regime. This demonstrates that domestic arrangements between regimes and militaries can potentially be nullified by an exogenous shock, such as direct foreign military intervention. A third
shortcoming of the regime-military variables is that the communication channel argument fails to incorporate societal variables. As technology and telecommunication become more ubiquitous it will become more difficult for regimes to shield the military from non-regime communication. Even though the Chinese government was able to successfully block outside communication to the military in 1989, the prospects of replicating that in the twenty-first century is unlikely. Overall, the regime variables that impact military responses during mass political protests are incomplete since they overlook other variables, especially societal and international factors.

Societal Variables

A fifth group of potential causes of military behavior includes societal variables, such as the level of violence of the protest movement and the impact this has on military response. In regards to the Arab uprisings, demonstrations were generally nonviolent since protesters did not initially aim to achieve their goals through violent means. In some instances, such as Libya and Syria, the protests devolved into violent civil wars, but these instances are rare in comparison to the rest of the region. Also, the protests in Libya and Syria escalated into violent armed conflicts partially because the government responded with high levels of violence early on in the demonstrations. Recent research explores the relationship between the level of violence of a protest movement and the type of response exhibited by the military. Zunes (1994, 411) argues nonviolent movements are more likely to influence military defections since the military is more hesitant to shoot unarmed civilians, such as the case in the 1986 Philippines uprising. Zunes (2011) finds similar outcomes during the Arab uprisings and notes the Egyptian military defected from the Mubarak regime since the demonstrations in Egypt were generally nonviolent in nature. Nepstad (2013)
echoes these findings and claims nonviolent movements increased military defection during the Arab uprisings by enhancing domestic and international legitimacy, and encouraging broad-based participation.

Another societal variable that can affect military responses include the size of the protest movements. Beissinger (2007, 271) observes that when protest movements are large in size, the military and state security forces are less willing to physically confront demonstrators. Examples of large revolutionary movements that induced military defection include the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Kurzman 2004, 165), the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s (see Beissinger 2007), and the Philippine uprising in 1986 (Boudreau 2004, 152-153). In regards to the Arab uprisings, Angrist (2013, 549-550) argues that a key component to the success of the Tunisian protest movement was that the demonstrations were not only numerous, but also consisted of civilians from different classes and different geographic regions across the country.

A final societal variable includes the ability of protesters to “win” over military support. In the protest theory literature, Helvey (2004, 11) proclaims that a primary goal of any protest movement should be to convince the military not to intervene and to assure officers and soldiers that they will have a secure place in the future of the country if regime change occurs. One example of protesters winning over the military occurred during the 1986 Philippine uprising in which the country's Catholic Church encouraged the military to defect from the regime and urged protesters to support military defectors. The head of the country’s Catholic Church, Archbishop Jaime Sin, urged Filipinos to support military defectors, which resulted in tens of thousands of nuns, priests, and civilians demonstrating in the street encouraging the military to defect from the regime (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011,
35). Another example of protesters winning over the military occurred during the Iranian Revolution where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gave numerous public speeches that persuaded the Iranian military to defect from the regime, and for the Iranian public to open their arms to any military deserters (Kurzman 2004, 114). In Iran, the protest movement developed networks of individuals who supported military defectors by providing deserters with physical protection after they defected, and providing logistical assistance, such as civilian clothing, food, and transportation for deserters and their families.

Even though societal variables provide tremendous insight on how militaries behave, they do not fully explain military responses in all instances. First, the hypothesis that non-violent protest movements increase military defection is questionable even when examining the Arab uprisings. For example, in both Bahrain and Tunisia the protest movements were non-violent, yet in Tunisia the military defected from the regime whereas in Bahrain the military defended the regime. In Bahrain, even though the protests were mostly non-violent, the Bahraini security forces willingly and openly used violence to repress non-violent demonstrators. Second, the size of the protest movement also fails to explain military responses to mass political protests. The argument that more protesters increase the likelihood of military defection fails to explain Bahrain during the Arab uprisings, which experienced hundreds of thousands of protesters, yet the military still used violence against these large crowds (Coates Ulrichsen 2013, 3). Third, the argument that militaries will defect if protest movements successfully “win” over officers and soldiers also fails to fully explain military behavior because it overlooks the importance of international and institutional variables. Even though thousands of Egyptian protesters urged the Egyptian military to not use violence during the Egyptian uprising, some argue the real reason the Egyptian military
defected from the Mubarak regime was due to international pressure from the U.S. (see Brownlee 2012). Overall, societal variables fail to fully explain military behavior to mass political protests because they do not address domestic dynamics such as communal divisions, institutional variables, and international variables.

### International Variables

A sixth group of variables examines the international factors that influence military responses. The first of these variables include external military threats. During the Arab uprisings, direct foreign military intervention occurred in Bahrain and Libya, and the presence of foreign soldiers had a significant impact on influencing how the Bahraini and Libyan militaries responded. Even though Bahrain and Libya both experienced direct foreign intervention during the Arab uprisings, the motivations for foreign militaries invading each country were drastically different. As noted by Goldstone (2011, 5), GCC forces invaded Bahrain to support the al-Khalifa regime and to assist in the repression of the Shia-led protest movements. In contrast, NATO forces launched aerial attacks to remove Qaddafi from power. In Bahrain, the effect of direct military intervention served as a physical and psychological reinforcement that encouraged the Bahraini military to continue supporting the al-Khalifa regime. In Libya, the direct intervention of NATO led many Libyan military personnel to defect from the regime.⁶

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⁵ For example, a popular slogan chanted by protesters during the Egyptian uprising was “The people and the army are one hand.” This demonstrates the Egyptian public was deliberately trying to win over support of the military and to decrease the likelihood of violent military confrontation. For more see David D. Fitzpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Mubarak’s Allies and Foes Clash in Egypt,” New York Times, February 2, 2011, accessed January 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03egypt.html?pagewanted=all.

⁶ NATO forces influenced the Libyan military to defect in several different ways. The most direct way was through aerial attacks, which influenced many Libyan military personnel to defect from the Qaddafi regime. NATO also persuaded Libyan military personnel to defect from the Qaddafi regime through propaganda. NATO forces created thousands of pamphlets that were written in Arabic and airdropped over the Libyan military. These pamphlets attempted to persuade the military to defect from Qaddafi. The tone of the
In addition to direct foreign military intervention, a second international variable includes non-lethal foreign assistance such as military aid, arms transfers, joint alliances, diplomacy, etc. In the recent literature on authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way (2009) claim that countries geographically closer to the U.S. and the European Union (E.U.) (such as the Caribbean Basin or Eastern Europe), have stronger links to the West and are more easily influenced by Western leverage than countries that are geographically distant from the U.S. or the E.U., such as the former Soviet Union states, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Levitsky and Way infer that authoritarian countries with more Western links are more likely to adopt Western political structures and ideals, and are more likely to be held accountable by Western governments. If an authoritarian regime with closer links to the West were to display actions or policies that Western countries found inappropriate, such as suppressing political opposition or using a disproportionate amount of violence towards citizens, then the non-Western regimes would face harsh Western condemnation.

Some MENA scholars argue that the Western linkage and leverage thesis is misleading and Brownlee (2012) specifically contends that the argument fails to explain the unique relationship between the U.S. government and the Egyptian military. Brownlee (2012, 173) postulates:

In the conventional sense of Levitsky and Way's main concepts, during the post-Cold War era no autocracy has been more linked to and more leveraged by the United States than Egypt. Rather than prying open the Egyptian regime...Washington has preserved [Egyptian autocratic rule].

pamphlets varied. One example stated Libyan military should lay down their weapons since senior officers have already defected. A second example urged the Libyan military to defect to restore peace and to rejoin their families. A third example threatened the Libyan military to defect and warned them that if they continued to fight and support Qaddafi that they would be physically overrun by NATO's superior forces. Another example threatened Libyan military personnel to defect or else they would be persecuted in the International Criminal Court if they were captured. For information on this argument and NATO's role in Libya see Gaub (2013b, 24 - 25).
Overall, Brownlee exclaims that during the last forty years no country has been more politically tied to the United States than Egypt, and that the foundation to this partnership is the close relationship between the U.S. government and the Egyptian military, and that during this time the primary institutional objective of the Egyptian military has been to maintain its lucrative partnership with the U.S. In comparison to Egypt, Tunisia was able to change "not only a leader, but a regime, in large part because the Tunisian military did not pursue a political role and was not a major geostrategic ally of the West" (Brownlee 2012, 168). Brownlee adds "Tunisia was blessed with a military that was less entangled in politics than the Egyptian armed forces, [and] they benefitted secondarily from the fact that their country mattered less to the U.S. than did Egypt...Tunisia was never a regional powerhouse, nor did it pose a strategic challenge to Israel" (2012, 169).

Brownlee is not the only scholar to observe the influence Western powers can have on MENA politics. Yom and Gause (2012, 84) argue that a major reason why regime change did not occur throughout the Arab monarchies is due to the diplomatic, economic, and military support Arab regimes receive from Western countries. An example includes Bahrain where foreign support lowers the cost of regime repression since it is unlikely that international powers will criticize the Bahraini regime (Yom and Gause 2012, 85). Bahrain is also the home to the United States' Fifth Fleet and the base provides the Pentagon with a strategic port that is in proximity to Iran and also provides convenient access for the U.S. military to respond to conflicts across the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Given the strategic importance of the naval base in Bahrain for the U.S. military, it becomes clear why the Barack Obama Administration did not criticize the al-Khalifa regime
during the Arab uprisings and why the Bahraini military was able to respond more forcefully without the threat of harsh, international condemnation.

Another international variable that has influenced military responses is revolutionary diffusion, which has also been referred to as contagion, "wave-like" clusters (Levitsky and Way 2009, 38), and "spillover effects" of geographic proximity (Beissinger 2007). The argument is that political events occurring in one country can easily influence and “spill-over” into neighboring countries. This is exactly what transpired during the Arab uprisings, which initially started in Tunisia and then moved to Egypt, before spreading across the entire region. Government responses in one country can also affect how a neighboring government will address the issue if the event spills over into their country. The Color Revolutions of Eastern Europe in the early 2000s demonstrate this phenomenon where the success of protesters in Yugoslavia (2000) and Georgia (2003) decreased the likelihood of violent military responses in Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005)(Beissinger 2007). Conversely, revolutionary diffusion can also harden a military’s resolve to repress protesters, regardless of the outcomes in neighboring countries. Solingen (2012) argues that the Arab uprisings hit a “firewall” when it reached Algeria, Iran, and the GCC countries, and the video footage of autocrats being ushered away from presidential palaces in Tunis and Cairo alarmed autocratic leaders in other countries to take necessary measures to ensure that would not happen to them. Clark (2012, 72-73) provides a similar argument by claiming the Arab uprisings were unable to diffuse in a southern direction towards the authoritarian regimes of Sub-Saharan Africa since the earlier protests in North Africa served as a warning sign to leaders in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda. The regimes in these countries immediately dispatched security forces and militaries onto the streets, cordoned off key
public spaces, and arrested key political dissidents before the demonstrations increased and could pose a threat.

The international variables provide a necessary perspective to better understand military behavior during mass political protests, but international variables in isolation cannot fully explain MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings. Direct foreign military intervention is a unique variable because if a powerful foreign military intervenes it can trump domestic factors. But direct foreign military intervention is rare and in the majority of cases where there is no direct foreign military involvement one must explain military responses through different factors. For example, in Tunisia there was no direct foreign military intervention during the Arab uprisings, yet, the Tunisian military still decided to defect from the Ben Ali regime, and the reason for Tunisian military defection must be explained by domestic, institutional, and societal variables between the Tunisian military, the Ben Ali regime, and the Tunisian population.

The foreign links-and-leverage argument also fails to fully explain military behavior. If foreign links were truly the most significant variable in military responses to mass political protests then military behavior would be pre-determined by the policies and interests of dominant foreign countries. Such a deterministic view inherently overvalues the power of dominant foreign countries and undervalues institutional, regime, and societal variables in the country experiencing mass political protests. Even though international links can have a significant impact on military responses, this factor oversimplifies the complexity and the decision-making that can influence militaries when they face a mass political protest.

The third international variable, revolutionary contagion, also fails to fully explain military behavior. The primary reason is because most political crises are unique to just one
individual country and are not a part of a larger contagion movement. For example, the revolution in the Philippines in the 1980s was an isolated incident (both temporally and geographically) and was not directly inspired by any preceding mass political protest movement. Moreover, the Tunisian uprising that sparked the Arab uprisings cannot be explained by contagion since the protests started in that country. Overall, the international variables cannot fully explain military behavior in isolation since regime, institutional, and societal variables have a significant role in determining the decision-making of officers and soldiers during mass political protests.

**Literature Examining Multi-Causal Explanations**

Fitch (1977, 78) claims "there is no single criterion, but rather a multiplicity of decision criteria" that influence the militaries' decision to intervene in politics. Two recent studies build upon this quote and examine multi-causal explanations in regards to military behavior to mass political protests. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new phenomenon was identified by Pion-Berlin et al. (2014) called "military quartering." This term includes instances during mass political protests where ruling leaders order the military to use violence against protesters but the military disobeys these orders and decides to remain “quartered” within its barracks. As Pion-Berlin (2014, 231) et al. indicate, military quartering is not as mutinous as conducting a military coup but it also demonstrates the military is insubordinate towards the regime. When a military officer decides to ignore an executive order and to not violently engage protesters, the decision to remain on the sidelines can be seen as an act of political intervention, albeit indirect and passive.

To examine this recent phenomenon, Pion-Berlin et al. study seven cases of military quartering since 2000: Serbia (2000), Argentina (2001), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004),
Ecuador (2005), Tunisia (2010), and Egypt (2011). The authors also identify three cases since 2000 (Bolivia 2003, Iran 2009, and Bahrain 2011) where the military obeyed executive orders and used violence against demonstrators. The authors determine that five variables influence whether militaries disobey executive orders to use violence against mass political protesters: (1) when the military has grievances towards the lack of material benefits they receive from the regime; (2) when the military is more closely affiliated to public interests than regime interests; (3) when the military rejects actions to undertake internal security missions; (4) when it is unconstitutional for the military to use violence against civilian protesters; and (5) when there are institutional divisions within the country’s security apparatus (Pion Berlin et.al. 2014, 246). This recent research is beneficial to the literature as it attempts to synthesize variables from various sources (institutional, regime, and societal). However, despite the research’s insight, the primary shortcoming is that the authors fail to differentiate between the independent variables, as it is unclear whether there is a relationship between these five variables. For instance, does military quartering occur because all five variables are present, or does military quartering occur only if one or two of the factors are present? Even though the researchers examine institutional, regime, and societal variables, they do not explain the relationship between the variables.

Another recent article that examines multi-causal explanations is Barany (2013) who argues that military responses to revolutionary movements are best explained by eighteen variables across four sources: (1) influences from the military, (2) influences from the state, (3) influences from society, and (4) influences from outside the country. The eighteen variables from Barany’s model are listed below in table 2.
Table 2. Barany's Variables for Measuring Army Responses to Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influences from the Military</th>
<th>Influences from Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic/Religious split within uniformed ranks</td>
<td>• Size composition, and nature of demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sociopolitical divisions among military elites</td>
<td>• The army's record of conduct towards society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elite versus average units</td>
<td>• The popularity of the revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regular military vs. other parts of the security state</td>
<td>• Rebel efforts to win the army's support</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Splits between branches of the armed forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Senior versus junior officers</td>
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<td>• Professional soldiers versus conscripts</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Generals' decision-making autonomy</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influences from the State</th>
<th>Influences from Outside the Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The regime's treatment of the military</td>
<td>• The potential for foreign intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The generals' view of the existing regime</td>
<td>• Revolutionary diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The regime's directions to the military</td>
<td>• Foreign exposure of officers</td>
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</table>

Barany (2013, 63) states his model takes into account all the main sources of military influence and provides scholars with the ability to broadly apply these variables across disparate settings. In this regard, Barany provides a welcomed addition to the literature by exploring multi-causal explanations with a systematic model. However, even though Barany identifies eighteen different variables across four sources, it is uncertain how the eighteen variables interact with one another. For example, Barany suggests institutional variables are the most significant influence on military responses during revolutionary movements, but it is unclear how much more significant institutional variables are in comparison to regime, societal, and international variables. Additionally, Barany's model is unclear whether there is any significance as to the total number of variables there are within a country. What if a country only possesses one institutional variable, yet another country possesses four variables?

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institutional variables? One would logically assume the more variables present in a country increases the likelihood of military defection, but Barany does not provide any insight or expectation of how these eighteen variables interact in regards to influencing military responses to revolutionary movements.

This dissertation aims to test Barany’s model and systematically apply the eighteen variables to the MENA region specifically in regards to the Arab uprisings. It should be noted Barany cautions:

There is no clever model that can tell us, once we “plug in” all the appropriate variables, what a military will do in a crisis...[and]...there is no way around the sobering reality that the weight of each variable is ultimately determined by the individual context. There is no shortcut, no substitute for knowing the individual case and knowing it well (2013, 64).

While it is true that in-depth knowledge of a country is the single best measure of understanding military responses within a specific country, Barany underestimates the usefulness of systematically comparing the dynamics of military responses in a comparative and regional context. In addition to Barany's specific model, this project builds upon the larger literature by examining the variation of military responses during the Arab uprisings across the entire MENA region. This project explores cases where MENA militaries either defected from the regime, defended the regime, fractured, or played a minimal role during the Arab uprisings due to internal security forces successfully suppressing the demonstrations or because the country's protest movement never reached a threshold that necessitated state security responses. Overall, this project builds upon the literature and creates a unique dataset that examines the entire MENA region to better understand how different variables impacted varying military responses during the Arab uprisings.
Conclusion

This chapter argues research that examines only a single variable or a single variable group does not fully explain military responses during the Arab uprisings. Additionally, even the recent research that explores multi-causal explanations does not systematically synthesize varying conditions across numerous episodes of mass political protests. This dissertation argues that institutional, regime, societal, and international variables all contribute to military responses, and that these variable groups need to be tested systematically in a comparative, region-wide setting. In the next chapter I outline how I transform Barany's model into the MENA Military Index, an original dataset that measures military responses during the Arab uprisings by measuring military behavior across twenty-one different MENA countries. The aim of the MENA Military Index is to combine institutional, regime, societal, and international variables into a single unified dataset with the goal of better understanding varying military responses during the Arab uprisings.
CHAPTER 3:
THE MENA MILITARY INDEX

This chapter presents the methodology of the project and the data analysis. In the methodological portion of this chapter I examine the dependent and independent variables, explain how I developed the MENA Military Index from Barany's model, discuss how I operationalized the index and address the role MENA experts played with the index's questionnaire. The second half of the chapter examines the results and central findings from the MENA Military Index. The dependent variable of this project is the variation of MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings and I categorize five different types of military responses. The independent variables for the project are derived from Barany's model in which he explores eighteen variables across four areas (institutional, regime, societal, and international). I then detail how I transform Barany's model into the MENA Military Index, which is a collection of twenty dichotomous variables that measure military responses during the uprisings. In this section I also explain how MENA scholars and experts contributed to the creation of the MENA Military Index through their in-depth knowledge of one of the region's twenty-one countries. In the second half of the chapter I present the findings of the index and suggest that MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings are best understood through the combination of both institutional and societal variables. MENA militaries defected or fractured from ruling regimes if there were institutional variables in the country prior to the uprisings that paved the way for military insubordination. In addition, military defection or fracturing occurred if the uprisings possessed specific societal
characteristics that made it more difficult for the military to use violence against protesters. The final section of this chapter concludes and discusses the case study chapters that will be examined in chapter 4 (Tunisia), 5 (Egypt), and 6 (Bahrain).

**Varying Military Responses during the Arab Uprisings**

This project measures varying military responses during the Arab uprisings. The goal of the dissertation is to understand why some militaries defected from incumbent regimes and supported mass political protesters whereas other militaries defended incumbent regimes and used violence to repress mass political protests. In total, there were five types of military responses during the Arab uprisings including, (1) militaries that defected from the incumbent regime and sided with protest movements, (2) militaries that fractured with some personnel defecting from the regime and others defending the regime, (3) militaries that defended the incumbent regime and willingly used violence to suppress protesters, (4) militaries that played a limited role due to internal security forces effectively suppressing the demonstrations thus avoiding the need for the armed forces to intervene, and (5) militaries that played a limited role since demonstrations in the country were minimal or non-existent.

Table 3 lists the twenty-one MENA countries and the five military response types. The first response type includes militaries that defected from the ruling regime and sided with mass political protesters. This describes Egypt and Tunisia where both militaries were unwilling to use violence against demonstrators and by the end of the uprising Egyptian and Tunisian officers defected from their respective incumbent regimes.¹

¹ For more details on the role of the Tunisian and Egyptian military during the Arab uprisings see Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation.
Table 3. Five Types of Military Responses during the Arab Uprisings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defected and sided with the opposition</th>
<th>Fractured, some defected and some defended</th>
<th>Defended the regime and repressed protesters</th>
<th>Minimal Role: Success of Internal Security Forces</th>
<th>Minimal Role: Limited Protests</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The second response type includes militaries that fractured with some officers and soldiers defecting from the ruling regime while others defended the regime. This describes the militaries in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In Libya, the military split between forces that were closely linked to President Qaddafi through familial and tribal affiliation, and other forces that were not communally linked to Qaddafi and defected from the regime.² Military fracturing in Libya ultimately led to the breakout of civil war where Libyan rebels overcame forces still loyal to Qaddafi through the assistance of NATO airstrikes. In Syria, the military fractured primarily based upon communal affiliation as Alawite officers were more likely to defend the regime than the Sunni soldiers that were not ethnically affiliated with the president (Droz-Vincent 2014a, 50). This distinction partially explains why the Assad regime has remained in power even though the country devolved into a bloody civil war. Fracturing also occurred in Yemen as military officers and soldiers from the Sanhan tribe were more likely to support President Ali Abdullah Saleh whereas officers and soldiers not affiliated

² Barany (2011, 29 - 31).
with the Sanhan tribe were more likely to defect from the regime. In Yemen, military fracturing forced President Saleh out of office and he ultimately stepped down from office and transferred political control to a transitional government (Knights 2013).

The third response type includes militaries that defended the ruling regime and used violence against anti-government protesters. One notable example includes Bahrain where the military defended the al-Khalifa regime and used violence to suppress the protest movement (Coates Ulrichsen 2013; Louër 2013; Nepstad 2013). The Iraqi and Omani militaries also defended the ruling regimes and used violence against domestic political protesters during the Arab uprisings even though these cases are less documented and military responses in each country were not as severe or intense as in the Bahraini case. The involvement of the Iraqi military during the Arab uprisings was unique given the peculiar political and security situation of the country over the last decade. The U.S. invasion of Iraq left a heightened political and security landscape in the country and as a result the newly formed Iraqi military was responsible for intervening in domestic security issues to ensure state stability. In March 2011, mass political protests gripped Iraq and military forces responded by joining internal security forces and violently dispersed and suppressed protesters. Similarly, in Oman, the military intervened in late March 2011 and assisted internal security forces in dispersing demonstrators and arresting anti-government protesters (al-Shaibany and Hammond 2011).

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3 Ibid.
4 For more see Chapter 6.
The fourth and fifth military response types during the Arab uprisings involved no military response at all. In these instances protest movements were either effectively addressed by internal security forces and thus did not necessitate the need for military personnel to intervene, or the demonstrations in the country were minimal and did not warrant state security intervention. There were eight countries during the Arab uprisings where militaries were not involved due to internal security forces successfully suppressing protests (Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia). Lastly, there were five countries where militaries did not respond due to the fact that demonstrations during the Arab uprisings were either minimal or non-existent (Israel, Palestine, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates). Israel is a cultural and political outlier in the region as the country is a democracy and remained relatively immune to the broader pan-Arab wave of social movements that swept across the region. As for Palestine, the territories experienced some demonstrations where protesters marched in solidarity with the movements in Egypt and Syria, but these events were isolated and minimal.  

Coincidentally, Turkey, a democratic country, and the authoritarian gulf sheikdoms of Qatar and United Arab Emirates, also experienced minimal protests during the Arab uprisings and there was no need for the militaries of either country to intervene since there were hardly any anti-regime demonstrations to address.

**Operationalizing the Variables**

To explain these five military response types during the Arab uprisings, I created the MENA Military Index, which in an index of twenty variables that explore institutional, regime, societal, and international factors. The variables from the MENA Military Index are

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derived from Barany's model that was discussed in chapter 2 and outlined in table 2. To create the MENA Military Index, I transformed Barany’s original eighteen variables into yes-no questions where each “yes” answer confirms that the variable is present within a country and each "no" answer indicates the variable is absent from a country. A "yes" answer means a condition existed within the country and increased the likelihood the military defected from the incumbent regime during the Arab uprisings. In contrast, a "no" answer means a condition did not exist within the country and decreased the likelihood the military defected from the incumbent regime during the Arab uprisings. Ultimately, a "yes" response increases the likelihood of military defection during the Arab uprisings whereas a "no" response increases the likelihood of military defense of the incumbent regime during the uprisings.

Table 4 lists Barany's original eighteen variables and how I converted them into the MENA Military Index. The left column lists the variable group (military, regime, society, and international) and the variable number, the middle column lists Barany's original variable, and the right column transforms the variable into a yes/no question. The MENA Military Index consists of twenty variables whereas Barany’s original model includes eighteen variables since Barany includes a single variable that measures the "size, composition, and nature" of protest movements. In the MENA Military Index, I separate these three concepts into three distinct variables (variables 12, 13, and 14).

Since I convert Barany's original variables into either "yes" or "no" responses I also apply numerical values to each response where a "yes" equals a 1 and a "no" equals a 0. The methodological motivation for transforming Barany’s variables into an index of dichotomous variables is based upon the research from Fish (2006), who creates a global index (the "Parliamentary Powers Index") that examines the political strength of national
parliaments. Fish measures global parliaments across thirty-two dichotomous variables and applies a process where if a variable is present within a country's legislature it receives a “yes” and if a variable is absent from a country's legislature it receives a “no.”

There are advantages and disadvantages with adopting such a methodological approach. One disadvantage with dichotomous variables is that yes and no responses oversimplify complexities and nuances that exist in the reality of everyday civil-military and regime-military relations -- especially in the predominantly authoritarian regimes across the MENA region. Admittedly, many of the variables influencing military responses during the Arab uprisings go well beyond simple yes or no responses. A second disadvantage is that the dichotomous variables are rudimentary and do not provide a complex analysis of MENA militaries. However, there are numerous advantages to this methodological approach such as the simplicity of the yes/no responses. The binary responses create a useful guideline as to whether certain variables are present or absent within a country. A second advantage is that the dichotomous variables make it possible to uniformly measure numerous characteristics across a disparate region. The metric can provide observers with a general overview of the similarities and differences of civil-military and regime-military relations in the MENA region and the ability to detect discernable trends across MENA militaries. A third advantage is that the literature examining civil-military relations in the MENA region contains few, if any, systematic and "quantitative" studies. Even though the quantitative aspects of this project are fundamental, they still provide a useful methodological addition to a field with few systematic and quantitative studies, especially in regards to a region and subject where data availability has been elusive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Barany (2013) Variables</th>
<th>MENA Military Index Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Ethnic/Religious split within uniformed ranks</td>
<td>Are there any significant communal (e.g. ethnic, regional, sectarian, tribal) splits that divide soldiers within the military? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>Sociopolitical divisions among military elites</td>
<td>Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any significant rifts within the military? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>Elite vs. Average units</td>
<td>Are there any parallel security forces within the state's security apparatus that deliberately counterbalance the strength of the military? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>Militaries vs. other parts of the security state</td>
<td>Are there any significant rivalries between the military and other security forces (e.g. police, presidential guard)? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>Splits between branches of the armed forces</td>
<td>Are there any significant rivalries between the armed force branches (e.g. rivalries between the Army, Navy, Air Force)? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6</td>
<td>Senior vs. Junior officers</td>
<td>Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7</td>
<td>Professional Soldiers vs. conscripts</td>
<td>Does the military use conscription? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8</td>
<td>Generals’ decision-making autonomy</td>
<td>Does the ruling leader grant the military autonomy over selecting officers? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9</td>
<td>Regime's Treatment of Military</td>
<td>Are soldiers unsatisfied with the amount of material (e.g. salaries, weaponry) and non-material (e.g. job appointments, preferential access to education, housing, medical) benefits they receive from the ruling leader? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10</td>
<td>Generals' view of the existing regime</td>
<td>Did someone other than the current ruling leader (e.g. prior leader, legislature, judiciary) appoint the Defense Minister and other senior generals? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11</td>
<td>Regimes' Directions to the Military</td>
<td>If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the ruling leader? (Y/N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12 Size, Composition, and Nature of Demonstrations</td>
<td>During the Arab uprisings did more than 1% of the country's population take part in the demonstrations? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13 Size, Composition, and Nature of Demonstrations</td>
<td>Did the Arab uprisings protesters include a significant proportion of demonstrators other than young men (e.g. women, the elderly, children)? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14 Size, Composition, and Nature of Demonstrations</td>
<td>Was the country's Arab uprisings originally non-violent in nature? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15 Army's Record of Conduct Toward Society</td>
<td>Does the military have a clean record without any significant domestic human rights violations? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16 Popularity of the Revolution</td>
<td>Were the Arab uprisings protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#17 Rebel Efforts to Win the Army's Support</td>
<td>Was the Arab uprisings protest movement successful at winning over a significant proportion of soldiers? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#18 Potential for Foreign Intervention?</td>
<td>During the Arab uprisings, did foreign military troops intervene with the purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#19 Revolutionary Diffusion</td>
<td>In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab uprisings? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#20 Foreign Exposure of Officers</td>
<td>Did a significant proportion of officers receive their military education or training in a foreign country? (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Question 18 deviates slightly from Barany's original variable. In his article Barany states “the most important external variable is the possibility that a foreign power or powers might intervene in the country experiencing revolutionary upheaval” (2013, 72). In this vein, Barany indicates a military’s response to domestic political protests is based upon the possibility or likelihood a foreign military will intervene. However, the MENA Military Index examines whether a country actually experienced foreign intervention rather than examining the possibility of foreign intervention. The primary reason for this change is because it is easier to measure whether a foreign military actually intervened rather than measuring the possibility of foreign military intervention.
After creating the MENA Military Index, I constructed a questionnaire, which was given to selected MENA regional scholars and experts (see Appendix A for the full text of the questionnaire). The majority of experts were academics or non-academic policy experts and I contacted them due to their extensive knowledge and publishing record on one of the twenty-one MENA countries. In total, I contacted 182 experts and asked each expert to answer the questionnaire specifically regarding their country of expertise. Overall, seventy-one experts responded to the questionnaire (39% percent response rate) and a distribution of the number of respondents per countries can be found in table 5. After the seventy-one experts completed the questionnaire I aggregated the responses for each country by identifying the majority responses for each question. For example, if a country had three expert respondents and two of the experts answered a question with a "yes" and a third expert answered the same question with a "no," the majority response was favored (in this scenario the variable would be considered as "yes").

After the questions were aggregated I created an index score for each country, which I calculated by taking the sum of yes/no responses divided by twenty (the total number of variables). Index scores range between 0.00 and 1.00 with a score of 0.00 meaning that all twenty variables for a country received a 0, or every response was a no. An index score of 1.00 indicates that all twenty variables for a country were 1, or were answered as a yes, and an index score of 0.50 means that ten of the aggregated responses were 0 and the other ten

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8 In some instances, experts were split on "yes" and "no" responses and when this occurred I examined each non-majority response and determined the final outcome as to whether the variable should be counted as a “yes” or a “no.” The list of non-majority responses and the rationale for each answer is provided at the end of this dissertation in Appendix B. Moreover, I went through several of the variables to ensure accuracy and a list of these variables and the rationale for the changes are listed in Appendix C.
were 1. The significance of the index score is to provide a quantitative metric to predict a military's response during the Arab uprisings. Since it is assumed that yes responses will more likely lead to military defection, the primary hypothesis of this project is that the higher a country's index score, the more likely the country's military defected from the ruling regime during the Arab uprisings, whereas the lower a country's index score the more likely the country's military defended the ruling regime during the Arab uprisings.

Table 5. MENA Military Index: Number of Respondents for each Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings of the MENA Military Index

The initial findings of the MENA Military Index are presented below in table 6, which lists the index scores in numerical order from highest to lowest. The highest index score belongs to Egypt (0.7), which possessed fourteen variables that influenced military defection during the Arab uprisings whereas Turkey had the lowest index score (0.2) and only possessed four variables that influenced military defection. Overall, the average index score for all twenty MENA countries was 0.395, meaning that on average MENA countries

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9 Egypt’s index score is calculated by 14 ÷ 20 = 0.7; Turkey’s index score is calculated by 4 ÷ 20 = 0.2
possessed eight variables to influence military defection during the Arab uprisings. There are several useful observations to discern from table 6. First, military defection can occur even if some of the twenty variables are absent from the country. This is verified since no country possesses an index score of 1.00 even though there were still cases of military defection during the Arab uprisings. Second, every MENA country possesses at least some variables that can encourage military defection since no countries have an index score of 0.00. Third, most MENA countries have an index score of 0.4 or lower, suggesting that the majority of MENA countries possess only a moderate number of variables to influence military defection.

Table 6. The MENA Military Index Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index Score</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index Score</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 provides the index scores of the twenty-one MENA countries organized by the five military response types. The main finding from this table is that higher index scores led to military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings. The five countries to experience either military defection or fracturing (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) all have an index score of 0.55 or higher. This suggests that these five countries possessed at least eleven variables that influenced the military to either defect or fracture from the regime. The two countries that experienced military defection, Egypt and Tunisia, have an index score of 0.70 and 0.55, respectively. The three countries that experienced military fracturing,
Table 7. Index Scores by Military Response Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defected</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Fractured</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Defended</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Minimal Role: Success of Internal Security Forces</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Minimal Role: Limited Protests</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Libya, Syria, and Yemen, have index scores of 0.55, 0.6, and 0.65, respectively. In countries where the militaries defended the regime or had a minimal role during the Arab uprisings, the index scores are 0.50 or lower. There appears to be a transition point between an index score of 0.50 and an index score of 0.55. It is unclear why this is the case but it intuitively makes sense that the more variables a country possesses, the more likely that country will experience military defection or fracturing. It is interesting to note that this threshold exists at the halfway mark, meaning that if a country possesses eleven or more of the twenty observed variables, the country experienced military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings, whereas if a country possesses ten or fewer of the twenty variables, the military either defended the regime or had a limited role.

The index scores in table 7 suggest there are numerical differences between varying military responses, but the table does not provide insight into why there are differences and it fails to identify the specific variables that are present in some cases and absent in others. To better understand the specific variables within the MENA Military Index it is worthwhile to examine all twenty variables across each MENA country in a single, comprehensive chart. Tables 8 and 9 list the twenty variables and the twenty-one MENA countries and identifies whether a variable was absent or present in each country. If a variable was present within a country it is marked with the numeral 1, and if a variable was absent within a country it is left blank. The tables also include the sum of how frequent a variable was present across all of the twenty-one MENA countries. To make tables 8 and 9 more legible the variable number is listed rather than the variable name. The variable names can be referred to from Table 3.

10 The variable names can be referred to from Table 3.
numerical order, whereas in table 9 the variables are listed left to right based upon the frequency they appear within the MENA Military Index.

The first observation to make with tables 8 and 9 is the summed totals at the bottom of the chart, which demonstrate the variables that are most present and least present in the index. For example, variable 14 (non-violent nature of protests) was present in every MENA country. In the classic literature on revolutions, protesters typically employ strategies of violent armed struggles to achieve their goals, such as the classic revolutions in the 1800s and 1900s in China, France, and Russia. One of the motivations for variable 14 in the MENA Military Index is to measure the violent nature of the protest movement, which the recent literature argues that non-violent protests can be more successful than violent protests in increasing the likelihood that the military will defect from the ruling regime.\(^\text{11}\) It is important to mention that variable 14 does not imply that the uprisings across the twenty-one MENA countries were identical, and it also does not assume that protesters never used violence against state security forces. Rather, this variable indicates that during the Arab uprisings the majority of demonstrations were non-violent since protesters did not aim to achieve their goals specifically through violence, physical force, or armed insurrections.

On the other end of the spectrum there were four variables that were only present in either one or two MENA countries. This includes variable 5 (rivalries between the armed force branches), variable 10 (someone other than the ruling leader appointing the defense minister and other senior military generals), variable 11 (whether orders for the military to intervene were indirect or came from someone other than the ruling leader), and variable 18 (foreign military troops intervening with the purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime).

\(^{11}\) For more see Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
A second observation regarding tables 8 and 9 is to identify the variables present in Egypt and Tunisia since those two countries experienced military defection. In total, Egypt and Tunisia share eleven variables (variables 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17). Four of these variables are institutional including parallel security structures that counterbalance the military, significant rivalries between the military and internal security forces, military conscription, and the military having the autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed forces. The shared variable that relates to the regime is that significant portions of Egyptian and Tunisian officers were unsatisfied with the material and non-material benefits they received from their ruling leaders. Lastly, six of the shared variables are societal including the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries not having a precedence of committing egregious human rights violations against civilians prior to the uprisings and in both countries the protests were large, consisted of non-traditional protesters, were non-violent, broad-based, and demonstrators were successful at winning over the military.

A third observation to make with tables 8 and 9 is to examine the difference between militaries that defected and militaries that fractured. Overall, the variable that differentiates military defection from military fracturing is variable 1, which discusses whether there are communal splits that divide military personnel. In the two countries where militaries defected (Egypt and Tunisia) there are no communal splits between military personnel, however in the three countries where militaries fractured (Libya, Syria, and Yemen) there are communal splits between military personnel. It is not a coincidence that communal splits cause military fracturing as the variable inherently assumes cleavages within the armed forces. It should be specified that communal splits between military personnel do not singularly explain military fracturing since there were seven other MENA countries that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Type</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Societal</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Defected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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12 For the variable name see Table 3.
### Table 9. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Most Frequent to Less Frequent)

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possessed communal splits within the armed forces but did not experience military fracturing (Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates).

A fourth observation with tables 8 and 9 is to examine the variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman, since the militaries in these three countries defended the ruling regime from mass political protests. There were six variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman including variable 5 (rivalries between the armed force branches), variable 6 (generational splits between senior and junior soldiers), variable 7 (whether or not the country has military conscription), variable 10 (someone other than the ruling leader appointing the defense minister and other senior military generals), variable 11 (whether orders for the military to intervene were indirect or came from someone other than the ruling leader), and variable 18 (foreign military troops intervening with the purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime). The next step is to compare whether any of the six variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman are present in Egypt and Tunisia. Of the six variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman, the only one present in both Egypt and Tunisia is variable 7, which examines whether a country employs a system of military conscription.

This is an interesting finding because in theory, conscription expands the diversity of individuals serving within a country by making military service mandatory. It seems possible that the presence of military conscription increases military defection since conscripts come from varying backgrounds and should more easily identify with the general public and population at large. Additionally, in countries without military conscription the regime can construct the military to specifically recruit groups and individuals that will be more loyal to the regime (such as a specific ethnic, religious groups, etc.). Similarly, in a system without
military conscription the government can deliberately block certain groups from military service that would be less loyal to the ruling leader or incumbent regime.

For these reasons it is tempting to assume that the variable of military conscription neatly explains military responses during the Arab uprisings, but the information from tables 8 and 9 proves this is not the case. The clear reason why military conscription cannot singularly explain military behavior during the Arab uprisings is because military conscription also exists in Algeria, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen even though military defection did not take place in any of these countries. Overall, the information from tables 8 and 9 suggest that no single variable can neatly explain military responses during the Arab uprisings, which was one of the primary arguments for creating the comprehensive approach of the MENA Military Index in the first place.

Even though individual variables fail to explain military responses it is possible that different types of variables can explain military behavior during the Arab uprisings. In his original article, Barany argues that military behavior during revolutions is primarily based upon institutional variables within the military, followed by variables between the military and the regime, then societal variables, and lastly, international variables. To test Barany’s variable rankings, table 10 lists the five military response types and tabulates the percentage of institutional, regime, societal, and international variables present in the twenty-one MENA countries. To recall, there were two MENA militaries that defected from the regime, three militaries that fractured, three militaries that defended the incumbent regime, seven militaries that did not respond due to the success of internal security forces, and five militaries that did not respond due to the country experiencing minimal protests. In addition, the MENA Military Index includes eight institutional variables, three regime variables, six
societal variables, and three international variables. Table 10 calculates the percentage of the four variable sources present in each of the five military response types. For example, since there are two countries that experienced military defection, there are sixteen possible institutional variables that can exist within those two countries (since there were eight institutional variables examined).

Table 10. Percentage of Present Variable Conditions by Military Response Type

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<th>Military Response Type</th>
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<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Societal</th>
<th>International</th>
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<tr>
<td>Defected</td>
<td>63% (10/16)</td>
<td>33% (2/6)</td>
<td>100% (12/12)</td>
<td>17% (1/6)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractured</td>
<td>63% (15/24)</td>
<td>56% (5/9)</td>
<td>78% (14/18)</td>
<td>22% (2/9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defended</td>
<td>29% (7/24)</td>
<td>11% (1/9)</td>
<td>72% (13/18)</td>
<td>33% (3/9)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response: Internal Security Forces Success</td>
<td>33% (21/64)</td>
<td>29% (7/24)</td>
<td>42% (20/48)</td>
<td>25% (6/24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Response: Minimal Protests</td>
<td>30% (12/40)</td>
<td>0% (0/15)</td>
<td>30% (9/30)</td>
<td>33% (5/15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accumulative Percentage</td>
<td>39% (65/168)</td>
<td>24% (15/63)</td>
<td>54% (68/128)</td>
<td>27% (17/63)</td>
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</table>

If Barany’s original argument is correct then in militaries that defected from the ruling regime, institutional variables should have the highest percentage, followed by regime variables, then societal variables, and lastly international variables. But as table 10 demonstrates, this is not the case since societal variables have the highest percentage (100 percent), followed by institutional variables (63 percent), then regime variables (33 percent) and lastly international variables (17 percent).
This finding suggests that societal variables most strongly explain military defection, and a way to test this is to compare the percentage of societal variables present in militaries that defected (Egypt and Tunisia) to militaries that defended the regime (Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman). If societal variables truly explain the difference between military defection and military loyalty, then one should expect significantly lower societal percentages in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman. However, table 10 indicates this is not the case considering that 72 percent of the societal variables were present even in the three countries where the militaries defended the ruling regime. Interestingly, there are a higher percentage of societal variables in countries where the militaries defended the regime in comparison to institutional variables (63 percent), regime variables (33 percent), and international variables (17 percent) in countries where the militaries defected from the ruling regime. This finding is important because it demonstrates that societal variables were prevalent in instances of both military defection and military loyalty. Also, across the entire index, societal variables have the highest percentage (54 percent), which indicates that in many countries across the MENA region the protest movements possessed unique characteristics that could have influenced military defection since protests were large, non-violent, broad-based, and attracted non-traditional demonstrators.

Even though societal variables do not fully explain the difference between military defection and military loyalty during the Arab uprisings, it is possible that institutional variables do. For example, 63 percent of institutional variables are present in countries that experienced military defection or military fracturing, whereas 29 percent of institutional variables are present in countries where the militaries defended the ruling regime. Moreover, in countries with no military responses, institutional variables are only present 32 percent of
the time.\textsuperscript{14} This demonstrates that the presence of institutional variables creates conditions for military insubordination through either defection or fracturing.

Overall, table 10 suggests that military defection and military fracturing occurred because of the presence of both societal and institutional variables. More specifically, it appears as if military defection and fracturing occurred during the Arab uprisings as a result of a two-step process. Step one: a country had to possess the institutional variables that paved the foundation for military defection and step two: the country also had to experience the necessary societal variables during the Arab uprisings that increased the opportunity for military defection or fracturing. This two-step process explains why the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries defected from the incumbent regimes, yet the Bahraini military defended the regime. As table 8 demonstrates, even though Bahrain contained the necessary societal variables for military defection, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain did not possess the necessary institutional variables.

**Conclusion**

Recent studies examining the role of MENA militaries during the Arab uprisings explore individual countries or small-n comparative analyses while examining only a few variables that happen to be present in the observed cases. The MENA Military Index builds on Barany’s model and creates a comprehensive dataset to test MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings. The central hypothesis of the project is that countries with higher index scores were more likely to experience military defection during the uprisings in comparison to countries with lower index scores. Overall this finding was confirmed and it

\textsuperscript{14} This calculation examines both no military response groups in which institutional variables were present 33 times out of a total of 104 possibilities $33 \div 104 = 32\%$. 
was also discovered that militaries that defended and fractured possessed similar index scores. The primary variable that differentiated between military defection and military fracturing was variable 1 -- whether there were communal cleavages within a country's armed forces.

Overall, the index demonstrates that military defection and fracturing occurred due to societal and institutional variables. Specifically, military defection and fracturing during the Arab uprisings was a two-step process. First, countries had to possess the necessary institutional variables that helped paved the foundation for military insubordination such as parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, a damaging rivalry between the military and other state security forces, a system of military conscription that filled the rank-and-file of the armed forces with young men from the at-large population, and the military's institutional autonomy to select and make personnel decisions within the armed forces. Second, the country had to experience an event that gave the military the opportunity to defect or fracture. A mass political protest had to occur in the country and the uprising had to possess specific variables, such as being historically large, broad-based, non-violent, consist of non-traditional protesters, and employ a strategy to win over the military.

The MENA Military Index is the first project of its kind to comprehensively examine varying military responses across the MENA region in regards to the Arab uprisings; however, it is useful to compare the findings from this project to other research. The most relevant study to this project is the research by Pion-Berlin et. al (2014), who examined instances of "military quartering," where militaries refused orders from ruling leaders to repress mass political protesters. In their study, Pion-Berlin et. al identify five variables that cause militaries to not intervene during mass political politics: grievances towards the regime,
close affinity to the public interests, disdain for internal security missions, constitutional measures that discourage the military's political intervention, and internal divisions within the state security apparatus. The main similarity between the MENA Military Index and the research from Pion-Berlin et. al is that both studies identify divisions within the security apparatus as a main factor for why militaries do not use violence against demonstrators. The MENA Military Index finds that if the regime deliberately creates parallel security forces to counterbalance the military, and if there are significant rivalries between the military and other state security forces, then these two variables can pave the way for possible military defection or fracturing. Interestingly, the striking difference between the MENA Military Index and the "military quartering" argument is that the latter fails to identify societal variables and how the specific characteristics of the protest movement can affect military response. This dissertation suggests that within the context of the Arab uprisings, the dual role of institutional and societal variables caused militaries to either defect or fracture.

The remainder of this project examines three cases during the Arab uprisings: Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia. The three case study chapters use primary sources (unclassified government documents, government archives, nongovernmental organization archives, etc.) and secondary sources to examine the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in more detail. Each chapter follows a similar format by first examining the historical role of the military within the country, then discussing the role the military played during the country's uprising, and lastly, examining the twenty variables from the MENA Military Index at a more detailed level. Overall, the case study chapters reinforce the findings from the MENA Military Index, confirm the experts' evaluations, and also highlight the influence institutional and societal variables had on military responses during the Arab uprisings.
CHAPTER 4

THE TUNISIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

This chapter examines the Tunisian military during the Arab uprisings. The Tunisian protests were unexpected and caught the Tunisian government and much of the world off-guard. The protests began on December 17, 2010, with the self-immolation of struggling street merchant, Mohamed Bouazizi, and then spread across the entire country motivating hundreds of thousands of Tunisians to protest against the regime and the country’s struggling economic conditions. After weeks of intensifying nation-wide protests, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali ordered the Tunisian military to assist internal security forces in confronting demonstrators. However, the Tunisian military was unwilling to use violence against civilians and defected from the regime in favor of protesters. After the military defected, President Ben Ali fled the country on January 14, 2011, and political power was transferred to a civilian, transitional government. The Tunisian uprising served as a spark for other MENA protests and encouraged millions of citizens across the region to demonstrate against autocratic governments and stagnant economic conditions.

This chapter explores the variables that contributed to Tunisian military defection during the uprising. To better understand the context of the Tunisian military during the uprising the first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the Tunisian military from 1956 until 2010 and examines the development of the Tunisian armed forces and the role of the military within Tunisian politics and society. The second section examines the Tunisian uprising in detail and highlights the role of the Tunisian military
during the unrest. The third section examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in Tunisia and reinforces the central findings from chapter 3. This section highlights that the Tunisian military possessed institutional variables that paved the way for military defection and that the characteristics of the uprising made it more difficult and raised the costs for the Tunisian military to use violence against protesters. This chapter demonstrates that the Tunisian military was marginalized by the Ben Ali regime as the country's internal security forces grew and expanded at the expense of the Tunisian military. In addition, the 2010-2011 Tunisian uprising possessed characteristics that made it more difficult for the military to use high levels of violence and repression against protesters, considering the movement was historically large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional demonstrators, and protestors strategically aimed to win over military. As suggested by the MENA Military Index in chapter 3, the Tunisian case verifies that the presence of both institutional and societal variables created conditions that made Tunisian military defection possible.

**Background of the Tunisian Military**

To better understand Tunisian military response during the Arab uprisings one must understand the historical role and development of the Tunisian military. Tunisia was a French protectorate during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century before officially gaining independence in 1956. One of the noteworthy characteristics of Tunisian independence was that it was a peaceful transition with no armed struggle and as a result the Tunisian military had a limited role in the independence movement. This is critical because at the dawn of Tunisian statehood, the Tunisian military was not a significant political institution in the country and it remained politically
insignificant, and was deliberately constructed to be a small institution under the rule of the country’s first president, Habib Bourguiba (Brooks 2013, 209). President Bourguiba ensured that the military concentrated on external defense and was not responsible for the internal security of the country (Abadi 2013, 434-436, 533-534). Additionally, Bourguiba ensured the military remained apolitical by prohibiting military officers from joining political parties or from creating political associations. There are several reasons why Bourguiba limited the political role of the Tunisian military under his rule. The first reason is that in the late 1950s, Tunisia did not have many external threats from neighboring countries and there was no need for a large military. A second reason is that Bourguiba feared a large Tunisian military could potentially threaten his regime and he kept the military deliberately small and apolitical to decrease the likelihood of a military coup against him.

In 1961, Tunisia faced its first major military test as an independent country. The French Navy still maintained a base in the northern Tunisian city of Bizerte and the base was tactically important to the French military during its war in Algeria. In opposition to French military involvement in Algeria, the Tunisian military blockaded the French fleet in Bizerte, which escalated into a four-day confrontation between the French and Tunisian military. In total, 670 Tunisians were killed during the Bizerte crisis and the episode demonstrated the resolve of the nascent Tunisian military and eventually led to the French abandoning its military bases.

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1 For more see Brooks (2013, 209) and Jebnoun (2014, 300).

2 Bourguiba’s decision to keep the Tunisian military small and apolitical also conforms to the early concept of coup proofing, which was explored in Chapter 2.

3 For more on the Bizerte crisis see Alexander (2010, 90-91).
After the Bizerte crisis, the Tunisian military grew in size and expanded its institutional mission. The 1959 constitution instituted a system of selective military conscription two years prior to the Bizerte crisis and as a result, the number of troops in the armed forces increased significantly. After the events in Bizerte the Tunisian military grew from 8,000 in 1959 to 17,000 in 1965.\(^4\) As the Tunisian military expanded in the early 1960s, so did its institutional mission, and the military became more involved in international peacekeeping missions across the African continent. For example, in the mid-1960s Tunisia volunteered soldiers, materiel, and resources to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC).\(^5\) However, despite the growth of the Tunisian military in both terms of personnel and the expansion of its institutional mission, the Tunisian military was still devoted to external defense and did not participate in internal security issues.

By the 1970s, Tunisia was beginning to change demographically and economically. Demographically, the generation that ushered in independence in the mid-1900s was aging while younger Tunisians were more critical of the Bourguiba regime, especially regarding the country’s economic policies and lack of economic growth. During the mid-1970s, students and workers frequently staged protests against the government and these events culminated in January 1978 when the country's labor union, the *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (Tunisian General Labor Union, UGTT), called for nationwide protests.\(^6\) The UGTT strike drew nearly 500,000 protesters from across the country and overwhelmed the Tunisian internal security forces, which were on the ground responsible for controlling the crowds.

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\(^4\) For more on the relationship between conscription and the growth of the Tunisian military see Ware (1985, 48) and Abadi (2013, 434-436, 533-534).


\(^6\) For more on these protests see Alexander (2010, 47).
(Disney 1978, 12). The 1978 protests prompted President Bourguiba for the first time in the country's modern history to deploy Tunisian soldiers onto the streets to assist the internal security forces. Bourguiba’s decision to deploy the military proved to be wise as the military was able to assist internal security forces and suppress the uprising, which resulted in the death of 100-200 civilians. As a result of deploying the military, the Bourguiba regime remained intact and in power, and the 1978 protest represented a key moment in Tunisian history by demonstrating that the Bourguiba regime was willing to order the military to repress political protesters, and when ordered, the Tunisian military was willing to use violence in confronting civilian demonstrators.

In the early 1980s, the Tunisian economy continued to struggle and in order to receive financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tunisia instituted austerity measures that significantly raised the prices of basic foodstuffs such as bread. Once the IMF-led austerity measures were implemented in 1984 and the cost of basic foodstuffs skyrocketed, thousands of Tunisians flooded the streets in the so-called “Bread Riots.” The Bourguiba regime responded by deploying both internal security forces and military soldiers throughout downtown Tunis to enforce the government’s state of emergency and the country’s nighttime curfew (Paul 1984, 4). Similar to the unrest six years prior, the Tunisian military intervened on behalf of the regime and suppressed protesters.

In 1987, three years after the Bread Riots, President Bourguiba was eighty-four years-old and on November 7, 1987, Ben Ali, then prime minister, led a constitutional coup against Bourguiba claiming the president was no longer mentally or physically capable of running the country (Ware 1988, 592). Tunisian doctors corroborated Ben Ali’s claim and as

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7 For estimates on the number of protesters that died see Disney (1978, 12) and Vandewalle (1988, 607-608).
residing prime minister, Ben Ali conveniently assumed the role of the presidency in Bourguiba’s absence.

From the military perspective, the political ascent of Ben Ali to the presidency was viewed optimistically considering Ben Ali was a former officer who served in the Tunisian Armed Forces in the 1960s and 1970s. One of Ben Ali’s first security directives as president was creating the National Security Council (NSC), a small group that consisted of the president, the prime minister, the defense minister, the foreign minister, the interior minister, the deputy secretary of the ministry of interior, the chief of staff for the armed forces, and the general director of military intelligence (Jebnoun 2014, 6). The purpose of the council was to collect, analyze, and assess information on domestic, foreign, and defense policies with the aim of safeguarding internal and external state security (Ware 1988, 595). At first the Tunisian military perceived the establishment of the NSC positively and thought it would provide the military with more direct access to the president and to the ruling political elite of the country. However, the Tunisian military quickly realized that Ben Ali was not going to bring the military closer to the regime, and in fact, the opposite occurred. During Ben Ali’s rule, Tunisian military officers were further marginalized from political influence and power.

Even though Ben Ali served in the Tunisian military earlier in his career, his political ascent occurred within the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Interior, especially in the country’s internal intelligence and internal security organizations. Overall, Ben Ali was a byproduct of the internal security apparatus and he favored the expansion of the Ministry of Interior at the expense of the Ministry of Defense and the Tunisian military. There are three specific examples early in Ben Ali’s presidency that demonstrate this: first, Ben Ali took direct

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8 For more on the role of internal security forces during Ben Ali’s presidency see Lutterbeck (2015).
control of the country’s police and the Ministry of Interior; second, Ben Ali placed the country’s Presidential Guard directly under his control where prior it was controlled by the government; and third, Ben Ali created parallel security structures to fuel competition and prevent cooperation between the country’s security forces (Lutterbeck 2015, 821-824).

While Ben Ali centralized control of the internal security forces he also took steps to deliberately marginalize the Tunisian military. Four years into Ben Ali’s presidency, the so-called “Bareket el-Sahel affair of 1991” occurred and highlighted Ben Ali’s preference of the Ministry of Interior and internal security forces over the Ministry of Defense and the military. The affair was the result of growing, conservative Islamist ideology that swept across the country and infiltrated the political and religious ideologies of many Tunisian military personnel. In 1991, Interior Minister Abdallah Qallal informed President Ben Ali that hundreds of Islamist sympathizers in the Tunisian military were plotting a coup against the president (Lutterbeck 2015, 817). Through domestic intelligence the Ministry of Interior uncovered that a group of coup plotters had met in the small town of Bareket el-Sahel and state security forces arrested the meetings’ participants, tortured them, and rooted out the coup before it could be initiated (Bou Nassif 2015, 70). Upon this discovery, Ben Ali arrested hundreds of military officers affiliated with the coup or who were believed to harbor Islamist ideologies. Most of the officers arrested were eventually released or declared innocent, but the episode significantly demoralized the Tunisian military and created an institutional rift between the armed forces and the Ben Ali regime. The animosity between

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9 There are different transliterate spellings of Bareket el-Sahel including ‘Barakat al-Sahil,’ ‘Bareket al-Sahel,’ and Barraket Essahel.’ The name refers to a small town in Tunisia that is approximately five kilometers west of the beach resort town, Hammamet.

10 For more on this episode see Bou Nassif (2015, 70-73), Jebnoun (2014, 303), and Lutterbeck (2015, 817).
Minister Qallal embellished the Bareket el-Sahel scandal and encouraged President Ben Ali to arrest military officials in order to increase the institutional standing of the internal security forces (for more see Bou Nassif 2015).

After the political embarrassment of the 1991 Bareket el-Sahel affair, the Ben Ali regime financially marginalized the military, which is demonstrated by the disproportionate budgets the Ministry of Defense received in comparison to the Ministry of Interior. Every year during Ben Ali's presidency the Ministry of Interior received a higher budget than the Ministry of Defense. For example, the highest percentage of the national budget that the Ministry of Interior received during Ben Ali's presidency was 9.7 percent in 1992, whereas the lowest percentage was 5.5 in 2005. In contrast, the highest percentage of the national budget that was allocated to the Ministry of Defense during the Ben Ali regime was 5.9 percent in 1992 and the lowest percentage was 3.6 in both 2005 and 2008.\footnote{Percentages are derived from Bou Nassif (2015, 72).}

In addition to the financial disparity between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, political controversy continued between the Tunisian military and President Ben Ali. In 2002, a military helicopter crashed under suspicious circumstances and killed the army chief of staff, Brigadier General Abdelazziz Skik.\footnote{Jebnoun (2014, 304), and BBC News, “Tunisian army chief dies in air crash,” May 1, 2002, accessed September 30, 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1962415.stm.} Some in the Tunisian armed forces believed the Ben Ali regime had a direct role in the helicopter crash (Signé 2014, 8) and the regime certainly raised suspicions by attempting to cover up the episode and then not releasing the investigative files on the crash (Jebnoun 2014, 8).

Others claimed that even if the regime did not have a direct role in the 2002 helicopter crash, the faulty equipment that caused the crash was a result of the small budgets
the Ministry of Defense received, which forced the military to operate with second-hand and outdated equipment (Signé 2014).

One of the most paradoxical aspects of the Tunisian military during the Ben Ali presidency is that despite the military’s marginalization, officers willingly followed regime orders and intervened against protesters such as during the 2008 demonstrations in Gafsa. The city of Gafsa is located approximately 350 kilometers southwest of the capital and has traditionally been overlooked by the central government and has received only minimal resources in comparison to other regions across the country. Protests in Gafsa started in the early half of 2008 and were focused on the rampant unemployment in the region, the regime's lack of transparency, and the ongoing nepotism within the government (Pachon 2014, 522-523). Initially, the Tunisian internal security forces were able to control the protests, but by June the demonstrations intensified and increased in size, which made it more difficult for the police to contain the crowds. On June 7, 2008, the regime ordered the army to reinforce internal security forces, and soldiers were deployed across the area, leading to the arrest of hundreds of protesters and effectively ending the demonstrations (Pachon 2014, 523).

Military involvement in the 2008 protests raises an interesting question. Why did the Tunisian military follow orders in 2008 considering it was so marginalized by the Ben Ali regime? There are three possible explanations: (1) since the military intervened in protests in 1978 and 1984 there was a historical precedent for the military to confront demonstrators, (2) since the protests took place in Gafsa, a marginalized region hundreds of kilometers from the capital, it was easier for the military to rationalize intervention against protesters, and (3) even though the military was marginalized by the regime, the armed forces was a
professionalized organization and respected and followed institutional protocol when an order was given.

Considering the Tunisian military intervened and used force against demonstrators in the 2008 Gafsa protests, one would logically assume the armed forces would have acted similarly during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings. However, as the following section demonstrates this was not the case. After the Arab uprisings began, the internal security forces were the first security units to respond, but once protests intensified, military soldiers were ordered by the regime to support and reinforce the internal security forces. The Tunisian military deployed soldiers across the country to assist internal security forces, but the Tunisian military only went so far in defending the regime. The Tunisian military was unwilling to use violence against protesters that would have been necessary to maintain Ben Ali’s presidency. The next section of this chapter provides a detailed narrative of the Tunisian military during the country’s uprising and explains how the military responded during the four weeks of protest.

The Uprising in Tunisia and the Role of the Military

Sidi Bouzid is centrally located in Tunisia approximately 300 kilometers (186 miles) southwest of the capital, Tunis. The city is situated between four Tunisian cities with the city of Kasserine to the west, the phosphate mines of Gafsa to the southwest, the industrious and coastal city of Sfax to the east, and the conservative and religious heart of the country, Kairouan, to the northeast. Despite Sidi Bouzid’s geographic centrality in the country, the city and the larger region have been traditionally marginalized by the government in Tunis, and have received minimal resources and infrastructure in comparison to the northern and coastal provinces of the country. On Friday December 17, 2010, a twenty-six year-old street
vendor, Bouazizi, who typically set up his wares in Sidi Bouzid’s main market, went in front of the city’s local municipal building, poured petrol over his body, and lit himself on fire. Bouazizi’s defiant act was triggered by desperate circumstances in which he was struggling to make a living for his family of eight, and was frequently targeted by state security officials and forced to provide bribes for his cart to remain open. In front of the Sidi Bouzid municipal government building, Bouazizi lit a flame to protest his individual grievances, and by doing so he highlighted the struggling conditions and unfair treatment that so many other Tunisians like him experienced.

Bouazizi was taken to the hospital, still alive, and Sidi Bouzid erupted in protests. Hundreds of citizens flooded the streets and saw themselves in Bouazizi: hard-working Tunisians who were unable to overcome the obstacles of regime corruption and crippling economic conditions. As hundreds of citizens took to the street in Sidi Bouzid, the government responded by deploying local police forces to control and contain the demonstrators. Even from day one, the Tunisian internal security forces were willing to violently confront protesters by firing tear gas on the hundreds of protesters who were ransacking shops and clogging Sidi Bouzid's major roadways.

In the days following Bouazizi's self-immolation, protests intensified and spread to other regions across the country. But as demonstrations intensified, so did the government’s harsh response, and on December 25, 2010, in the town of Regueb, forces from the Brigade de l’ordre Publique (Brigade of Public Order, BOP), a specialized security unit, fired the first

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shots of the uprising and injured several protesters. A few days later, on December 28, 2010, Ben Ali made his first televised speech and compared protesters to “outlaws” and “terrorists.” The president referenced Tunisian law No. 69-4 of 1969, and reminded Tunisians that government authorities had to be informed before any public meetings, demonstration, or gathering could take place. Ben Ali demonized the protesters and warned Tunisians that future protesters would be subject to arrest and receive harsh punishment in accordance to Tunisian law.

On the same day as Ben Ali’s televised address, the government transferred the still ailing Bouazizi from a hospital in Sfax to a specialized burn unit facility in Ben Arous, a region just south of the capital. The president’s speech, combined with Bouazizi’s medical transfer, resulted in a decrease of protests during the following days. However, everything changed on January 4, 2011, after Bouazizi finally succumbed to his injuries and died.

Four changes occurred in the aftermath of Bouazizi’s death that propelled the Tunisian uprising. First, protests intensified across the country, especially in the interior towns of Douz, Kasserine, and Thala. Second, internal security forces responded to the increased protests with a high level of violence and physical force. The majority of deaths and injuries during the Tunisian uprising took place during the period of January 4 - January 14 in the interior of the country. Third, prior to Bouazizi’s death the protests primarily consisted of the lower class, the unemployed, students, and disenfranchised youth. But after Bouazizi’s death, the movement attracted a wider spectrum of citizens. For example, the

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16 Ibid., 8

country's labor union, UGTT, and the country's bar association also joined the protests and this expanding cross-class coalition not only increased the overall number of demonstrators but also heightened the national identity of the movement. Fourth, prior to Bouazizi’s death, protests were isolated to the rural and marginalized regions in the country's interior, but after Bouazizi's death the protests began to spread to the coastal regions, and ultimately to the capital.

After January 4, 2011, some of the most violent episodes of the entire uprising occurred in the region of Kasserine, especially in the town of Thala. On January 5 and January 6, there was widespread protesting, rioting, and looting across Thala and internal security forces responded violently and harshly, leading to the injury and incarceration of dozens of protesters. On the morning of January 8, hundreds of citizens gathered outside Thala’s main police station and demanded authorities to release the prisoners from the previous days’ protests. Rather than acquiescing to the citizens' demands, the Tunisian internal security forces called for reinforcements and the following day more troops plus heavily armed-paramilitary units and snipers arrived into the city.

The escalation in Thala was one of the bloodiest events during the entire uprising. The Tunisian National Fact Finding Commission (TNFFC) notes that in the region of Kasserine, where Thala is located, internal security forces were responsible for the deaths of twenty-one citizens and the injury of 624 citizens. Out of the twenty-one deaths in the region, the commission determined the police caused twenty, and out of the 624 injuries, the


police caused approximately 500, two were caused by the National Guard, and the remaining 
122 were undocumented (even though it is highly likely those injuries were also caused by 
the police).\textsuperscript{20} The commission also determined that the Tunisian internal security forces did 
not properly follow institutional protocols during the uprising. For instance, in Tunisia there 
is a protocol in which security forces are supposed to use a gradual increase of force when 
confronting protesters. The first step is to use water cannons, the second step is to utilize 
tear gas, the third step is to fire vertically in the air away from protesters, the fourth step is to 
fire over the crowds' heads, and the final step, which is only to be utilized in survival 
situations, permits security forces to fire directly on citizens. The TNFFC (2012, 100) reports 
that Tunisian internal security forces blatantly violated the protocol and fired directly at 
protesters without properly increasing force gradually.

The military did not have any role in the uprising until the violence in Kasserine 
intensified in early January. In Tunis, President Ben Ali immediately ordered an emergency 
meeting for his national security committee and discussed strategies on how to respond and 
address the demonstrations. The meeting included top security officials such as the 
president, the interior minister, the defense minister, the head of presidential security, and 
the chiefs of staff of the military branches. One of the meeting's outcomes was that the 
Tunisian military needed to intervene and reinforce the internal security forces on the 
ground. On January 9, 2011, army chief of staff, General Rashid Ammar, deployed a squad 
of military soldiers in the city centers of Thala and Kasserine, and soldiers were ordered to 
secure government buildings while internal security forces directly engaged protesters 
(TNFCC 2012, 82 and 105).

\textsuperscript{20} For more information of the number of deaths and injuries in the Kasserine region during the Tunisian 
On January 10, 2011, President Ben Ali gave his second televised speech, which was markedly different from the first speech he delivered on December 28, 2010. One difference was that Ben Ali spoke in the local, colloquial Tunisian Arabic dialect, rather than in the standard, and more formal Arabic. A second difference was that in the second speech Ben Ali acknowledged the protesters' legitimacy and provided some concessions such as pledging to not run for president during the next election, lowering the price of basic foodstuffs, creating over 300,000 new jobs, promising to no longer cut off the country's internet services, and removing some of his cabinet members from office.\(^{21}\) A third difference is that Ben Ali made security concessions and assured the public that state security forces would no longer use firearms against civilians. Despite Ben Ali's conciliatory tone his speech did little to reduce the protests in the country, and in the following days demonstrations only increased, especially in the capital. In the neighborhood of Ettadhamen protesters unleashed a new wave of riots and demonstrations and despite Ben Ali's televised assurance security forces would no longer use firearms, reports indicated police forces were firing on protesters.\(^{22}\) With unrest gripping the capital, the regime ordered the military to deploy throughout the streets of Tunis and to monitor major intersections and protect key governmental buildings. But by January 13, 2011, the military's willingness to support the regime was waning and newspaper reports claimed that some soldiers began to withdraw from their posts.\(^{23}\)


The following day, January 14, 2011, would end up being a historic day in Tunisia, since that was the day President Ben Ali fled the country and his twenty-four years of autocratic rule ended. There is still uncertainty of the exact details of what happened on January 14, 2011, but the TNFFC provides the best account of the days' events and of the commission’s 1,000-page report, approximately seventy pages exclusively detail and summarize the events of January 14, 2011.

There were five key events that occurred on January 14. First, the day began with high levels of protests in the capital as tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside of the Interior Ministry building early in the morning. This was important because the Ministry of Interior was one of the most crucial political organizations within the Ben Ali regime, and the thousands of protesters converging outside of the building were a physical reminder that the government’s grip on power was slipping. Second, reports indicate President Ben Ali was paranoid of an imminent assassination attempt all day, and this fear was heightened by rumors that Tunisian military helicopters were spotted over the presidential palace with orders to kill the president. Third, several family members of the president's wife (the Trabelsis) were apprehended at the Tunis-Carthage Airport by

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24 The TNFFC indicates there was a lot of miscommunication within the Tunisian security apparatus on January 14, 2011, especially in regards to the threat of military helicopters against President Ben Ali. The presidential chief of security, Ali Seriati, was adamant that military helicopters posed a threat to Ben Ali, and this resulted in the president ordering his security units to shoot down any military helicopter that flew over the palace. However, President Ben Ali and Seriati did not realize that Defense Minister Ridha Grira ordered security reinforcements to be sent from Bizerte to assist and defend the presidential palace. Since Bizerte is located approximately seventy miles north of Tunis, the forces were flown in and coincidentally these reinforcements were transported to Tunis via helicopter. President Ben Ali and Seriati thought the military helicopters were sent to kill the president, when instead, they were delivering reinforcements to protect the president. A total of six helicopters arrived from Bizerte during the day, and the final two helicopters landed at el-Aouina military base, coincidentally at about the same time President Ben Ali's envoy arrived at the airport to flee the country. At first, President Ben Ali thought these forces were there to assassinate him, only to then realize they posed no threat. Overall, this episode demonstrates the chaos and miscommunication that occurred within the Tunisian security apparatus on January 14, 2011. For more information on this specific event see the TNFFC (2012, 332-333), Jebnoun (2014, 309) and al-Arabiya (2012).
Lieutenant Colonel Samir Tarhouni while they were trying to flee the country for Europe. Fourth, at 3:00 p.m. President Ben Ali ordered a state of emergency, and fifth, at 5:47 p.m., President Ben Ali, his wife, and a small coterie of other family members departed on the presidential plane from the el-Aouina military base and headed towards Saudi Arabia.

The senior military officers especially played a key role on January 14, 2011. It is important to note there are examples of both military loyalty and military insubordination during the day. For instance, the TNFFC reports that the army chief of staff, General Ammar, was compliant with at least three regime orders on January 14, 2011. First, the chief of presidential security, Ali Seriati, feared protesters would descend upon the presidential palace in Carthage and as a precaution, Seriati ordered General Ammar to send military reinforcements to the presidential palace, which Ammar reluctantly did (Jebnoun 2014, 308).

Second, when President Ben Ali declared a state of emergency at 3:00 p.m., Defense Minister Ridha Grira called General Ammar and ordered him to deploy military forces onto

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25 The ordeal regarding the Trabelsis at the Tunis-Carthage airport is particularly interesting. Presidential Chief of Security Seriati, called the head of the Tunis airport during the day and demanded seven seats be made available immediately on the next international departure for members of the Trabelsi family. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Tarhouni, an officer in the country's anti-terrorism squad, BAT, which is a specialized internal security unit, found out about Seriati's demand and intended on stopping the Trabelsis from leaving the country. Coincidentally, Tarhouni's wife, Shiraz Yacoubi, was an air traffic controller at the Tunis airport, and upon hearing the news Tarhouni immediately called his wife and told her to do everything in her power to ensure no flights would depart the airport for at least fifteen minutes while Tarhouni and his BAT squad made their way to the airport. Fifteen minutes later, Tarhouni and his BAT squad arrived at the airport and immediately seized the Trabelsi family members, who were waiting in the airport's VIP lounge for a flight to Europe. The situation was diffused hours later after Army Chief of Staff Ammar, personally went to the airport and urged Tarhouni to let the Trabelsi family members leave unharmed. Ammar pleaded with Tarhouni and told him that if he did not let the Trabelsi go unharmed, then President Ben Ali would seize his wife's family members by force. It appears Ammar wanted to avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between security forces at all cost and in the end, Tarhouni allowed the Trabelsi to go free. However, it remains unclear why Tarhouni decided to seize the Trabelsi family members in the first place. In testimonies after the uprising, Tarhouni was often vague and contradictory as to his motives when questioned by government officials. There is a rumor that an unknown high-ranking official in the Ben Ali regime ordered Tarhouni to seize the Trabelsis, but this has not been proven. Rather, the most likely explanation for Tarhouni's action is his desire to capture a moment of notoriety and fame. This is corroborated by the fact that during the standoff between the Trabelsis and Tarhouni at the airport, the Tunisian press somehow found out about the ordeal and arrived to the scene. It is strongly believed Trabelsi leaked the story to Tunisian news outlets in a calculated move to become the “hero” of the revolution by capturing the president's corrupt family members at the airport. For more details on this episode see the TNFFC (2012, 230-232), and al-Arabiya (2012).
the streets of Tunis in order to protect key buildings, which Ammar also did (TNFFC 2012, 225 and 305–306). Third, after Lieutenant General Tarhouni apprehended members of the Trabelsi family at the airport, Defense Minister Grira ordered General Ammar to go to the airport to sort out the ordeal (TNFFC 2012, 238 and 306).

Even though General Ammar was complicit with these orders it should be noted that during the day he also refused several orders from senior officials. For example, in the morning, protesters ransacked the houses of Trabelsi family members and Seriati called Ammar and wanted military soldiers deployed outside the Trabelsi residences to protect the family members and their property. Ammar refused and cited that the responsibility of the military was to protect state institutions and public facilities and not to protect the private property of the president’s extended family (TNFFC 2012, 306). Ammar also refused an order from Seriati to send more military forces to the presidential palace after Ben Ali had fled the country (al-Arabiya 2011).

As soon as Ben Ali fled the country, the Tunisian security apparatus split and a power struggle emerged between the varying security units. Defense Minister Grira was skeptical of Seriati and assumed Seriati had deliberately forced Ben Ali out of the country to seize power for himself. Shortly after the presidential plane departed, Defense Minister Grira called the air force chief of staff, Taieb Lajimi, and ordered him to arrest Seriati. Lajimi was stationed at the el-Aouina military base where Ben Ali’s plane just departed and Grira knew Seriati would still be there. Approximately thirty minutes after Ben Ali’s plane took off, at around 6:15 p.m., Air Force Chief-of-Staff Lajimi arrested Seriati on orders from the defense minister (Jebnoun 2014, 310).
The distrust between the security forces continued in the following days after Ben Ali fled the country. There were reports of firefights between the military and internal security forces who were still loyal to Ben Ali and Seriati. Some of the security forces that remained loyal to Ben Ali thought the president was going to return from Saudi Arabia and they were afraid the military was attempting to seize political power in Ben Ali's absence. However, Ben Ali never returned to Tunisia. Amidst the chaos of Ben Ali’s departure, an emergency meeting convened on the night of January 14, 2011, and ruling government officials determined Ben Ali should not be allowed back in the country. Initially, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannoushi temporarily took over as president, but this only lasted one day before the speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, replaced him. A new unity cabinet was formed, and Ben Ali's ruling party, Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), was dissolved. In regards to the military, on January 24, 2011, Army Chief of Staff General Ammar publically announced his support for the revolution when addressing a crowd of 1,000 demonstrators outside of the Defense Ministry building.

The TNFFC determined that during the Tunisian uprising the Tunisian military never fired weapons on protesters. This is telling because at the onset of the uprising, the Tunisian military was complicit with regime orders. For instance, when Ben Ali ordered the military to deploy onto the streets of Kasserine and Thala in early January 2011, senior military leadership followed orders. When senior security officials, such as the defense minister and presidential chief of staff, ordered the military on January 14, 2011, to secure crucial governmental buildings, the military leadership followed orders. When General

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Ammar was ordered to negotiate the release of the president's family at the Tunis-Carthage Airport, he followed orders. However, crucially, the Tunisian military never fired weapons and never used the level of violence necessary to ensure the survival of the Ben Ali regime. The unwillingness of the Tunisian military to use violence against protesters contributed to Ben Ali fleeing the country, and after his departure the Tunisian military did not interfere once political power was being transferred to a civilian, transitional government.

The next section examines the variables that contributed to Tunisian military defection from the Ben Ali regime during the Arab uprisings. The section explores the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in-depth and determines that the Tunisian military defected due to the presence of both institutional and societal variables. As for institutional variables, the Tunisian military was marginalized by the Ben Ali regime, there was a rivalry between the armed forces and the internal security forces, the military had autonomy to select personnel within the armed forces, and there was a system of conscription. In addition, the uprising possessed numerous social variables that made it more difficult for the military to rationalize using violence against protesters. For instance, the Tunisian uprising was large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and actively tried to win over military support. All of these factors raised the cost of violence and decreased the likelihood the Tunisian military would use violence against protesters.

The MENA Military Index & Tunisia

As discussed in chapter 3, Tunisia possesses a MENA Military Index Score of 0.55, which means there were eleven variables that influenced the military to defect during the uprising. Table 11 illustrates the twenty variables in Tunisia and indicates which of the
variables were present (labeled as "yes") and which of the variables were not present (labeled as "no"). According to the MENA Military Index the eleven variables that potentially influenced the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime during the uprising include: (1) the presence of parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, (2) the rivalry between the military and other security forces, (3) the system of military conscription, (4) the military’s autonomy to make institutional appointments at the mid-and-lower levels of the armed forces, (5) officers' dissatisfaction with regime benefits, (6) the large size of the Tunisian uprising, (7) the participation of non-traditional protesters in the uprising, (8) the non-violent nature of protests, (9) the Tunisian military’s clean history with no egregious human rights violations against the population, (10) the broad-base scope of the protests, and (11) the movement's ability to successfully win over the military. Of these eleven variables four are institutional and address characteristics within the military and Tunisia’s security apparatus, one variable addresses the relationship between the military and the regime, and six variables are societal and based upon the characteristics of the Tunisian uprising.

Barany’s original argument claims institutional variables are the most relevant factor to explain military behavior in revolutions, followed by regime variables, then societal variables, and lastly international variables. However, the Tunisian case suggests societal variables were equally, if not more, influential than institutional variables. The importance of societal variables influencing Tunisian military behavior makes sense if one examines why the Tunisian military did not use violence in the 2010 - 2011 uprising, whereas the armed forces willingly used violence against previous protests in 1978, 1984, and 2008. The 2010 - 2011 protests were different from previous Tunisian demonstrations since it was larger,
broad-based, consisted of a wide coalition of classes and social groups, occurred across the entire country, and was non-violent. Overall, there was something unique in the events that unfolded in late December 2010 and early January 2011 that forced the Tunisian military to question whether it truly wanted to use violence against citizens, given the size, breadth, and depth of the protest movement.

According to the MENA Military Index there are an additional nine variables that were not present in Tunisia including: (1) no significant communal rifts within the military, (2) no socio-economic rifts within the military, (3) no rivalries between the armed force branches, (4) no significant generational rifts between senior and junior soldiers, (5) Ben Ali appointed the defense minister, (6) the fact Ben Ali did not explicitly order the military to fire on protesters, (7) the absence of any foreign military troops that invaded the country with the aim of overthrowing the incumbent regime, (8) military defection did not occur in neighboring states, and (9) minimal influence from foreign military training.

The following subsections explore the institutional, regime, societal, and international variables in more detail and discuss the role each of these variables had on Tunisian military response during the uprising. The first subsection explores the eight institutional variables, the second subsection explores the three regime variables, the third subsection explores the six societal variables, and the fourth subsection explores the three international variables. As these subsections reveal, the presence of existing institutional variables in Tunisia coupled with the societal characteristics of the Tunisian uprising influenced the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime.
Table 11. Tunisia and the MENA Military Index Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Communal splits between soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>11. Did orders to intervene come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Socio-economic rifts between soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12. Uprising larger than 1% of population?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Parallel security forces to military?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13. Protesters include women and children?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rivalry between military and other security forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14. Uprising non-violent in nature?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rivalries between military branches?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15. Military have clean record with no human rights violations?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conscription?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17. Did movement win over soldiers?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Military have autonomy in appointments?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18. Did foreign troops intervene to overthrow leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Someone other than the current leader appointed the Defense Minister and other leading generals?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20. Significant portion of soldiers receive foreign military training?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Institutional Variables

Of the eight institutional variables in the MENA Military Index, four were present in Tunisia and the other four were absent. The four institutional variables that were present and potentially influenced Tunisian military defection included the Ben Ali regime counterbalancing the Tunisian military with parallel security forces, the stark rivalry that existed between the Tunisian military and the Tunisian internal security forces, the Tunisian military’s ability to make appointments within the armed forces, and the system of military conscription.

Of the four variables present in Tunisia, the two that arguably impacted military defection the most were parallel security forces that counterbalanced the armed forces, and the rivalry that existed between the Tunisian military and the Tunisian internal security forces. Bou Nassif (2015) argues that one of the characteristics of the Ben Ali regime was the expansion of the Tunisian internal security forces at the expense of the military. After taking office, Ben Ali instituted two new provisions, Article 10 of Law 88–6 (June 2, 1988), which placed the control of the Presidential Guard under presidential authority, and Law 88-88 (July 25, 1988), which placed the entire internal security apparatus also under presidential control.28 In addition to centralizing the internal security forces under his control, Ben Ali created an internal security apparatus, which some scholars note, was “byzantine in its complexity” (Hanlon 2012, 5). The hierarchy and organization of the internal security forces during Ben Ali’s regime largely remains a mystery since many of the documents remain classified. However, there were five types of internal security forces within the Ministry of Interior including: (1) the traditional police, (2) the Garde National (National Guard), (3) the

28 In particular, see Article 60 of Constitutional law No. 76–37. For more see Latterbeck (2015, 821-824).
sûreté de l'État (State Security, also referred to as the political police, which was quickly disbanded in the spring of 2011 shortly after Ben Ali fled), (4) the garde présidentielle (the Presidential Guard), 29 and (5) the police judiciaire (the Judicial Police). In addition to these five main branches, there were also numerous specialized police forces such as the Direction Générale des Unités d'Intervention (Intervention Units), which consisted of the Brigade Nationale d'Intervention Rapide (National Rapid Intervention Brigade BNIR), BOP, and the Brigade Anti-Terrorisme (Anti-Terrorism Brigade, BAT) (Pachon 2014, 514).

The Tunisian internal security forces also counterbalanced the Tunisian armed forces by outnumbering military personnel. Lutterbeck (2015, 818-819) notes that even though the exact number of Tunisian internal security forces during the Ben Ali regime is unknown, peak estimates claim there were as many as 130,000-200,000 internal security forces in the country. Schraeder and Redissi (2011, 6) note that if these estimates are correct, then Tunisia’s internal security forces equaled the total number of internal security forces in France, a country where the population is six times larger than Tunisia. More conservative estimates claim the Tunisian internal security forces during the Ben Ali regime numbered 50,000, which are based on the totals provided by the interim-interior minister, Farhat Rajhi, in February 2011. 30 Even if the conservative estimates of 50,000 are used, those figures still suggest that internal security forces outnumbered the 35,800 Tunisian military forces. 31

29 Lutterbeck (2015, 824) discusses the expansion of the Presidential Guard under Ben Ali as it grew from 1,500 to 3,000 members. He also addresses the functions of the security forces as it changed from an organization that was primarily concerned with the security of the president into a parallel security force that had its own intelligence gathering capacities and was tasked with monitoring Tunisian ministers.

30 For more on the potential size of the internal security forces in Tunisia see Jebnoun (2014, 314).

The counterbalancing role of the internal security forces created a rivalry between the military and the internal security forces, which is best exemplified by the Bareket el-Sahel affair that was explored earlier in this chapter. In that episode, hundreds of Tunisian military officers were arrested under the suspicion they harbored Islamist sympathies and were aiming to overthrow the president. This episode created a discernable rift between the military and the regime and further emphasized Ben Ali's preference and closer allegiances to the senior officials of the internal security apparatus.

A third institutional variable that appears to have influenced Tunisian military defection during the uprising was the military's ability to make appointments in the mid and lower levels of the armed forces. Even though Ben Ali marginalized the military and counterbalanced it with internal security forces, he did not micromanage the personnel appointments at the mid and lower levels. Other MENA autocrats have deliberately appointed junior officers at the mid and lower levels of the armed forces to ensure military loyalty (see Quinlivan 1999), but Ben Ali did not employ this tactic, and instead, the personnel decisions within the Tunisian military were based on merit. Tunisian military promotions are codified and institutionalized within Tunisian law and decree number 72-380 from December 6, 1972, outlines the process of how promotions are earned within the military.\footnote{Tunisian Government, \textit{Decree 72-380 December 6, 1972}, accessed on Nov. 16, 2015. http://www.legislation-securite.tn/sites/default/files/files/lois/D%C3%A9cret%20n\%2072-380\%20du\%206\%20D%C3%A9cembre\%201972\%20(Fr).pdf.}

Tunisian officers are promoted within the military through merit and performance, rather than through communal links and patronage. Because of this, the Tunisian military has qualified and professional officers across the military organization, but these officers are
not unconditionally loyal to the regime since they were not handpicked by the regime to occupy those positions.

A fourth institutional variable that possibly influenced Tunisian military defection during the uprising was the system of military conscription that fills the lower-ranks of the armed forces. Military conscription is derived from Article 15 of the 1959 constitution and the Tunisian Ministry of National Defense's website indicates all citizens over the age of twenty are liable for military service for one year.\textsuperscript{33} In reality there are numerous exemptions to military service such as citizens enrolling in military vocational schools rather than serving in basic training. Another exemption is a program referred to as “individual assignments,” where employed citizens can forego military service by paying a fee to the government that is based on a proportion of their salary.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the conscription system, the Tunisian government does not heavily enforce the program and many citizens avoid military service entirely. Estimates claim less than 10 percent of twenty-year olds in Tunisia appeared for their service over the last few years, and government experts suggest only 3,500 conscripts have been registered annually during the last decade (Meddeb 2015). Moreover, most Tunisians with higher levels of education and income are able to avoid military conscription resulting in conscripts disproportionately representing the lower classes. Interestingly, Tunisian conscripts shared similar characteristics to many of the early protesters from the 2010 - 2011 uprising as both groups were less educated, from poorer and more rural regions, and had limited economic opportunities. Even though there is no evidence officers ever ordered conscripts to fire on


\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
protesters, it is reasonable to assume it was less likely Tunisian conscripts would have used violence against civilians, especially considering conscripts shared similar demographic characteristics to many of the demonstrators.

Four institutional variables from the MENA Military Index were absent in Tunisia including no socio-economic, communal, or generational splits among military personnel, and no splits between the armed force branches. The first three variables are closely related such as the lack of significant communal, socio-economic, or generational splits between military personnel. Regarding the lack of communal splits, Tunisia is a homogenous country and most of the 10.6 million inhabitants are of Arab descent and identify with Sunni Islam.\footnote{See the 2010 CIA World Factbook.} As a result there are no significant ethnic or religious rifts that fracture citizens or military personnel.

The only possible communal fault line in Tunisia is regional affiliation, where the capital Tunis, its surrounding suburbs, and the coastal regions of the Sahel (which incorporates cities such as Hammamet, Mahdia, and Sousse) have disproportionately received more resources from the government in comparison to regions in the country's interior and south.\footnote{This was discussed in earlier sections and is corroborated by the fact that the uprising began in the marginalized city and region of Sidi Bouzid.} Jebnoun (2014, 4) mentions this regional disparity also exists within the Tunisian military as most officers typically come from the cosmopolitan and wealthy regions of the country, whereas the rank-and-file conscripts tend to represent the poorer and more rural regions of the country such as Gafsa, Kairouan, and Sidi Bouzid. However, despite the regional disparity within the military, Jebnoun (2014) notes this difference does not play a significant role in creating animosity within the armed forces. In addition to the lack of
communal splits, there is no evidence of socio-economic or generational splits within the Tunisian military.

The fourth institutional variable from the index not present in Tunisia is there is no significant rivalry within the military between the armed force branches. Similar to militaries in most countries, in Tunisia, the largest and most politically significant armed force branch is the army. This is evident in the number of Tunisian Army personnel in comparison to air force and navy personnel. For example, in 2010, the Tunisian Army had 27,000 personnel whereas the air force had 4,000 and the navy had 4,800. Even though the majority of Tunisian military personnel are from the army there is no evidence air force or navy personnel were envious of the army’s larger size and more active political role. Even if there were minor divisions within the military, they were overshadowed by the larger rivalry between the armed forces and the internal security forces.

Of the eight institutional variables, the ones that appear to be most significant in influencing the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime are the counterbalancing of the military with parallel security forces, the rivalry between the military and internal security forces, and the military’s autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed forces. Even though it does not appear Ben Ali specifically enlarged the internal security forces to “coup-proof” the regime from military intervention, the growth of the internal security apparatus marginalized and created a rivalry with the Tunisian military. It should be noted numerous scholars argue that the marginalization of the Tunisian military was a major influence as to why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime during the

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uprising (Brooks 2013; Jebnoun 2014; Bou Nassif 2015; Lutterbeck 2015), so the results from the MENA Military Index reaffirm these earlier studies.

Regime Variables

According to the MENA Military Index there was one regime variable present in Tunisia and two regime variables absent. The one regime variable that was present and possibly influenced Tunisian military defection was the military’s dissatisfaction with the benefits it received from the Ben Ali regime. As discussed above, Ben Ali favored the internal security forces and provided the Ministry of Interior with larger budgets, more personnel, and closer access to the regime’s nucleus of ruling power. As an institution, the Tunisian military was marginalized by the regime and was unsatisfied with the funds it received (see figure 1). From an individual level, officers did not receive many personal benefits (either monetary or political) from the Ben Ali regime. Bou Nassif (2015) demonstrates that the majority of cushy political appointments and ambassadorial positions in the Tunisian government during the Ben Ali regime were typically given to high-ranking officials from the country’s dominant political party, the RCD, rather than awarded to senior military officials. Bou Nassif (2015, 78) notes only three percent of ambassadorial appointments during Ben Ali’s tenure consisted of former military officers whereas approximately ninety-five percent of appointments were provided to civilians, specifically to Ben Ali's political cronies from the ruling RCD party.38

This trend is also evident when examining the salaries of officers. For example, a mid-ranking officer, such as a colonel-major, received a monthly salary of $900 U.S. dollars (approximately 1,500 Tunisian Dinars), and a first lieutenant in the Tunisian military received

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38 Only six out of 184 ambassadorial appointments during Ben Ali were military officers.
a monthly salary of $450 U.S. dollars (approximately 750 Tunisian Dinars).\textsuperscript{39} In comparison, the average income for a Tunisian worker is approximately $390 U.S. dollars (650 dinars)\textsuperscript{40} suggesting that mid-level officers made a little bit more than the average Tunisian worker.

Figure 1. Percentage of the Tunisian National Budget (1981 – 2011)\textsuperscript{41}

The Ben Ali regime also did not provide the Tunisian military with lavish monetary compensation, or access to preferential political appointments. Rather, the primary beneficiaries of the regime’s patronage were high-ranking officials in the country’s ruling party, and more closely, the president’s family, especially his wife’s family, the Trabelsis. Schraeder and Redissi (2011, 9) note the first lady’s family was able to accumulate a tremendous amount of wealth during Ben Ali’s rule, which resulted in both immediate and distant Trabelsi family members owning at least 180 major companies across the country and accumulating an estimated net worth of nearly 16 billion U.S. dollars (Byrne 2012). The

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 85, 58n.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Beissinger et. al (2014, 27).
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Derived from Bou Nassif (2015, 74-75).
\end{itemize}
Tunisian military as an institution, and individual military personnel within the armed forces, were not the primary beneficiaries of Ben Ali’s corrupt regime. Instead, they were on the outside looking in and were generally unsatisfied with the lack of resources they received and once protests culminated, it was easy for officers to step aside and allow civilian unrest to topple the government. An example of these sentiments are demonstrated by a retired Tunisian naval chief of staff who expressed during the Tunisian uprising “the [Tunisian military] officers were not going to risk their lives, and the lives of others, for the sake of a regime that had offered [the military] nothing” (Bou Nassif 2015, 79 – 80).

The first regime variable that did not appear to influence Tunisian military defection is that Ben Ali appointed all of his defense ministers and senior generals in the Tunisian armed forces. The theory behind this variable argues that if the ruling leader appoints the country’s defense minister and senior military executives, then those individuals are more likely to remain loyal to the leader during anti-regime protests. In Tunisia the defense minister is a civilian appointed by the president and during the uprising Defense Minister Grira was a close confidant to President Ben Ali. Three senior military chiefs advise the Tunisian defense minister and at the outbreak of the uprising this included Air Force Chief of Staff General Lajimi, Army Chief of Staff General Ammar, and Naval Chief of Staff Senior Captain Mohamed Khamassi.  

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42 This is based from Article 55 of the country’s 1959 constitution.

43 During the Bourguiba regime, there was an additional military official in the Ministry of National Defense called the chief of staff of the armed forces. The chief of staff advised the defense minister and coordinated policy between the three branches (Hanlon 2012, 4). President Ben Ali dissolved this position in 1987, yet after the Tunisian uprising, the transitional government reinstated the position and appointed the former Army Chief of Staff General Ammar, to this position (Jebnoun 2014, 302). 2010.
In addition to appointing the defense minister, President Ben Ali also appointed all three of the military chiefs. According to the MENA Military Index, since Ben Ali appointed all four of these positions it was assumed all would have remained loyal to Ben Ali during the uprising. However, during the Tunisian uprising this is only partially true. Defense Minister Grira remained loyal to the Ben Ali regime but Army Chief of Staff Ammar was only loyal at the beginning of the uprising and less loyal to the regime as events unfolded on January 14, 2011. Air Force Chief Lajimi also displayed mixed responses during the uprising considering he arrested Ben Ali's chief of security, Seriati, on January 14, 2011, but did so on orders from the defense minister. This can be perceived as an act of obedience, since he followed the chain of command from a superior official, but also as insubordination since he arrested the chief of Ben Ali's personal security unit. Overall, this variable provides mixed results but demonstrates that even though President Ben Ali appointed the three military chiefs and the defense minister this did not ensure the military would remain loyal to the regime.

The second regime variable that did not appear to influence Tunisian military defection is the issue of whether and how the Ben Ali regime gave orders to the armed forces during the uprising. The theory behind this variable argues that if a ruling leader gives the military a clear and direct order to violently engage protesters, then the ruling leader’s intentions are clearly signaled to the military and the military is more likely to follow those orders. However, if a ruling leader gives an ambiguous order, or if someone other than the

ruling leader orders the military to violently engage protesters, then the military is less certain of the ruling leader’s intentions and this uncertainty leads officers and soldiers to question the orders and elect not to fire on protesters. Immediately after the Tunisian uprising there was uncertainty as to whether executive orders were ever given to the military to fire on protesters, and if so, what those orders entailed and who gave those orders to whom. After the uprising, Army Chief of Staff Ammar testified he never received direct orders from President Ben Ali during the uprising to fire on protesters (Jebnoun 2014, 306 and Bou Nassif 2015, 65). However, even though Ben Ali may not have explicitly given orders to General Ammar to fire on protesters, there is evidence that numerous senior officials gave the military implicit orders to violently intervene during the uprising. For example, on January 11, 2011, Defense Minister Grira ordered the military to deploy soldiers on the ground and instructed them to not wear their distinguishable military regalia. General Ammar realized that without the military's regalia, soldiers would look nearly identical to internal security forces already deployed on the ground. Ultimately, Ammar agreed to deploy the military but they wore their traditional military regalia out of fear that not doing so would implicate the military in the violent actions that the internal security forces were committing against civilians (TNFFC 2012, 304 and Jebnoun 2014, 306).

In this subsection the only variable that appears to have influenced defection was the military's dissatisfaction with the lack of benefits it received from the Ben Ali regime. In many regards this issue is similar to the institutional variables explored in the previous subsection. Since the internal security forces were arguably Ben Ali's preferred security institution, the military did not receive either corporate benefits or private benefits from the regime. The Tunisian case also relates to the argument of "carrots" and "sticks" presented by
Lee (2005). President Ben Ali did not utilize carrots to the Tunisian military, which Lee argues does not ensure regime loyalty. Moreover, Ben Ali used sticks more than carrots to the military personnel, but these actions were still unable to ensure regime loyalty, which counters Lee's central finding. In addition to this variable, the Tunisian case provides mixed results regarding variable 10 (defense minister appointments) because even though Ben Ali appointed all of the senior military officials, this did not ensure all of the leading generals and chiefs of staffs would remain loyal to the ruling leader.

Societal Variables

All six of the societal variables from the MENA Military Index were present in Tunisia, suggesting the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime partially due to unique characteristics of the country’s uprising. The first societal variable suggests the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime since the protests were numerous and included hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. The Arab Awakening dataset from Jenkins and Herrick (2012) indicates approximately 1.43 percent of Tunisians protested during the uprising, whereas the surveys from Beissinger et al. (2014, 11) note that 16 percent of respondents protested during the uprising. It is likely the actual number of Tunisian protesters during the uprising is somewhere in-between these two figures, but even if a median point, such as eight percent, is used, that still represents an extraordinarily high number of Tunisian protesters. For instance, eight percent of the Tunisian population would mean approximately one million citizens demonstrated during the uprising.

The second societal variable that possibly influenced the Tunisian military to defect was the broad-based nature of the protests. A unique characteristic of the Tunisian uprising is it took place across the entire country and attracted a wide range of Tunisians from
different social and economic backgrounds. The Tunisian uprising began in the interior and marginalized region of Sidi Bouzid before spreading to other rural and poorer regions such as Gafsa and Kasserine. Eventually, the protests migrated to the commercial hub of Sfax, and north to the coastal cities of Sousse and Hammamet before reaching the capital of Tunis. The TNFFC reports that protests occurred in all of Tunisia's twenty-four regions, which suggests the uprising was not isolated to a specific regional area but was truly representative of the entire country. In addition to geographic breadth, the Tunisian uprising consisted of numerous social groups. Initially, protesters were either similar to Bouazizi, young men from the lower classes who were struggling economically, or unemployed youths and students. However, as the protests spread, demonstrators diversified and the movement incorporated the middle-class, business professionals, labor unions, and lawyers. Similar to the regional breadth of the uprising, the wide range of societal groups that participated in the Tunisian uprising meant the protests were not isolated to a specific group or social class. It was an uprising for all Tunisians and thus did not represent a single group.

The third societal variable that played a role in influencing the Tunisian military to defect was the non-violent nature of the protests. The goal of the movement was to force political change and to draw attention to two grievances: the increasing corruption of the Ben Ali regime, and the crippling economic conditions that Tunisians were facing in their everyday lives. The uprising was not an armed rebellion where the opposition attempted to overthrow the government through violence and physical domination. Rather, the uprising attempted to achieve its goals through mass protests and non-violence. This does not mean all Tunisian protesters were non-violent, as there were instances of protesters attacking
security forces, ransacking government buildings, or burning police stations. But these violent acts were rare and generally occurred in response to the violence state security forces initially displayed against protesters.

The fourth societal variable that potentially influenced the Tunisian military to defect was the non-traditional protesters, such as women, the elderly, and children participated in the uprising. Survey data from after the uprising report 79 percent of the Tunisian protesters were male and 21 percent were female (see Beissinger et. al 2014). Even though the gender percentage is not evenly split, it is noteworthy that a fifth of all protesters in the Tunisian uprising were women and demonstrates female protesters were active participants during the unrest. The TNFFC (2012, 508) highlights the significance of women and devotes an entire section of the report on the role of women during the uprising. In total, twelve women were killed and twenty-five were injured as a result of violence from state security forces. In addition to women, the Tunisian uprising also consisted of middle-aged and older demonstrators. Beissinger et. al. (2014) find that nearly 40 percent of all protesters during the Tunisian uprising were aged thirty-five or older, and that a quarter of all protesters were aged forty-five or older. The survey data did not include minors (under the age of eighteen), but other sources suggest children were also involved in the uprising. The TNFFC (2012, 83) reports teenagers were instigated several protests, such as the case in Kasserine on January 8, 2011. This is further demonstrated by the figures that fifteen children died as a result of state security violence during the uprising (TNFFC 2012, 514).

The fifth societal variable that possibly influenced the Tunisian military to defect was anti-regime protesters strategically tried to win over the armed forces. This occurred because

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the Tunisian military was generally well liked, especially in comparison to the disdain that most Tunisians had towards the country’s internal security forces. One of the reasons Bouazizi set himself on fire was due to the rampant corruption of the country's internal security forces, and most Tunisians understood the differences between Ben Ali’s *mukhabarat* (security state) and the country's military. There are numerous accounts during the uprising where soldiers and civilians warmly embraced and celebrated with one another. Another interesting component addressing the relationship between civilians and the Tunisian military occurred when Tunisian news outlets reported on January 7, 2011, that President Ben Ali removed General Ammar from his post because the general refused to follow presidential orders to fire on protesters. As it turned out these claims were untrue and months after the uprising it was discovered the source of this false story was the Tunisian blogger, Yassine ‘Ayari, who was the son of a deceased military officer and a vocal critic of the regime. ‘Ayari admitted to fabricating the story and leaking it to the press for several reasons: (1) he wanted to create a wedge between the military and the regime, (2) he wanted to paint the military in a positive light to increase public support of the military, and (3) he that hoped once the story was leaked it would make it extremely difficult for the military to fire on protesters if they ever received such an order.

The sixth societal variable that possibly explains why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime is there is no evidence of the Tunisian military committing egregious human rights violations against Tunisian citizens in the historical context of the

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46 For example, in the affluent Tunis suburb of La Marsa, the American political scientist, Peter. J. Schraeder witnessed civilians hugging military soldiers and taking photographs with them on their cellphones during the uprising. For more on this particular event see Schraeder and Redissi (2011, 13).

country. To examine this empirically, the CIRI Human Rights dataset was consulted, which examines the level of human rights violations in a country. The index ranges from 0 – 8, with 0 indicating the country has performed poorly and commits high levels of human rights violations against the population, whereas an 8 indicates the government does not commit human rights violations against the population.

Figure 2. Tunisia & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011)

Figure 2 charts the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index from 1981 to 2011. As demonstrated by figure 2, Tunisia has generally scored between 3 and 6 on the physical integrity rights index since 1981. Tunisia scored a 3 in 1986, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2006, and 2008. To examine whether or not the Tunisian military was responsible for human rights violations during these years, the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights

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49 Physical Integrity Rights measures the government’s role in torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances.
Practices\textsuperscript{50} and Amnesty International's Annual Reports\textsuperscript{51} were examined. The reports only mention the Tunisian military twice and both occasions involved the Tunisian military convicting a civilian in military court.\textsuperscript{52} Notably, the reports indicate that the Tunisian internal security forces were responsible for the majority of human rights violations within the country, not the military.

Tellingly, all six of the societal variables were present in Tunisia. This suggests that the societal characteristics played a key role in convincing the Tunisian military to not use violence against protesters. Out of the six variables the three that appear most influential include the large size of the protests, the broad-based nature of the protests, and the non-

\textsuperscript{50}See the following reports from the U.S. State Department, including:

\textsuperscript{51}The following Amnesty International reports include:

violent tactics of demonstrators. Since the Tunisian uprising consisted nearly a million Tunisians from across the entire country and contained individuals from various backgrounds, it was difficult for the regime to discount the legitimacy of the uprising. At first, President Ben Ali called protesters "terrorists" and "outlaws," but as the protests expanded and incorporated doctors, lawyers, women, teachers, students, women, Islamists, secularists, etc. it was increasingly difficult to deny the legitimacy of the uprising. The Tunisian case verifies recent arguments that non-violent demonstrations, high number of protesters, and cross-class coalitions can decrease the likelihood of violent military response (see Zunes 1994, Chenoweth and Stepan 2011, and Nepstad 2013). The characteristics of the Tunisian uprising increased the costs of repression and dissuaded violent military response. The Tunisian military was never accustomed to using high levels of violence against the population on a day-to-day basis in comparison to the internal security forces. Ben Ali created a de facto police state where the Tunisian internal security forces monitored, harassed, and violently confronted civilian opposition but the military was mostly pushed to the sidelines of everyday regime maintenance and removed from the internal machinations of day-to-day politics. This difference partially explains why the Tunisian internal security forces were prepared to use violence against the population but the Tunisian military was unwilling to use violence against protesters, especially considering the unique characteristics of the uprising that increased the cost of repression.

International Variables

All three of the international variables were absent in Tunisia. The first international variable was that Tunisia did not experience direct foreign military intervention during the uprising. The theory behind this variable argues that a foreign military intervening a country
experiencing mass political protests with the specific aim of overthrowing the incumbent regime would increase the likelihood of military defection. This variable did not play a role in Tunisia since there was no direct foreign military intervention or even a threat of foreign military intervention during the uprising. Even though foreign troops did not directly intervene in Tunisia does not mean foreign powers, especially the U.S. and France, did not play a role before and during the uprising.

The U.S. provided military and security assistance to the Tunisian military especially through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program, a State Department-led initiative that assists North African and Sahelian countries with territory control and strengthening counterterrorism measures (Arieff 2011, 11-12). In addition, the U.S. provided support and training to the Tunisian military through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. However, even though the U.S. had close military relations to Tunisia, many officials in the U.S. government became more critical of the Ben Ali regime and recognized the president's ostentatious wealth, greed, and corruption were a detriment to Tunisian politics. These perspectives became public after Wikileaks disclosed hundreds of internal U.S. State Department cables.

In contrast to the U.S.'s growing uncertainty of the Ben Ali regime, there is indication that France supported the Ben Ali regime up until his ouster on January 14, 2011 (Aleya-Sghier 2012, 41, and Schraeder 2012, 668). For example, the French foreign minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, vacationed in Tunisia in late December 2010 while protests were in full force in the southern regions of the country, and several days before Ben Ali

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fled, Alliot-Marie suggested France should send security experts to assist the Tunisian police in quelling the protests.\textsuperscript{54} Even though French security personnel never arrived, it was reported the French government delivered 10,000 teargas grenades to the Ben Ali regime, which arrived coincidentally on January 15, the day after Ben Ali fled the country (Jebnoun 2014, 314 10n).

The second variable absent in Tunisia included the limited foreign military training of the Tunisian armed forces. Even though the U.S. was closely affiliated with the Tunisian military in programs such as IMET, unclassified U.S. Department of Defense records from the 2010-2011 fiscal year show only 121 Tunisian military personnel received military training and education from the U.S. military,\textsuperscript{55} which is a small number and does not represent a sizable proportion of the entire Tunisian armed forces. However, the total number of Tunisian military officers and soldiers trained by the U.S. does not give the whole story and the U.S. provided sizeable foreign and military aid to Tunisia in the years leading up to the uprising ranging from 19 million to 37 million per year from 2008 - 2010 (Arieff 2011, 12). Also, during the uprising President Obama recognized and supported the legitimacy of the Tunisian protesters as he released an official statement on January 14, 2011, that applauded the "courage and dignity of the Tunisian people" and called on the Tunisian government to "hold free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and


aspirations of the Tunisian people."\(^{56}\) Due to this it appears the U.S. government supported the Tunisian uprising and were fine with regime change from taking place in the country. However, there is no hard evidence the U.S.’s indirect support of the Tunisian protesters directly influenced the Tunisian military to defect, even though American support made it more likely the Tunisian armed forces would refrain from using violence against civilians. Overall, these two international variables (direct foreign military intervention and foreign military training) from the MENA Military Index were absent in the country and there is no direct evidence these two factors influenced Tunisian military defection.

Lastly, the third international variable that did not appear to influence Tunisian military defection was “contagion” did not have an effect on Tunisian military behavior during the country’s uprising. The reason for this is Tunisia was the first country during the Arab uprisings to experience unrest and it was impossible for the Tunisian military to be influenced by the actions of other MENA militaries since the protests originated in Tunisia.

According to the MENA Military Index, Tunisia did not possess any of the three international variables. As this chapter reinforces, a foreign military did not invade Tunisia during the uprising, a significant number of Tunisian soldiers did not receive foreign military training, and there was no influence from contagion from neighboring countries. That being said, the role of international governments might be underestimated in the index in regards to Tunisia since it does not account for factors such as diplomatic relations, foreign aid, etc. It is noteworthy that the U.S. government was supportive of the Tunisian protests and accepted regime change and the ousting of President Ben Ali. The Tunisian case demonstrates that the international variables of the MENA Military index might not be

capturing the full effect of international influence on military response, but despite this it still does not appear that international variables played as large a role on shaping Tunisian military response in comparison to institutional and societal variables.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the Tunisian uprising of 2010-2011 and explored the historical development of the Tunisian military, the specific role of the Tunisian military, and the variables that influenced the Tunisian military to defect from the regime and to not fire on protesters. The Tunisian military is a professional institution deliberately kept small by President Bourguiba and was further marginalized during the presidency of Ben Ali. However, the Tunisian military was willing to intervene and protect the ruling regime in protests in 1978, 1984, and 2008. However, apart from these three instances, the Tunisian military did not use violence against protesters during the 2010-2011 uprising.

The main finding of this chapter is the Tunisian military defected from the regime during the recent uprising as a result of institutional and societal variables. As for the societal variables, the 2010-2011 Tunisian uprising was unlike previous protests in Tunisian history considering the uprising was large, non-violent, broad-based, included non-traditional protesters, and successfully won over the military. These unique societal variables combined with institutional variables helped pave the way for military defection. Institutionally, the presence of parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, the rivalry between the military and the internal security forces, and the ability for the military to make personnel decisions within the armed forces also contributed to the Tunisian military refraining from using violence against civilians and ultimately deciding to defect from the Ben Ali regime.
CHAPTER 5:  
THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

This chapter examines the variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian uprising, which took place from January 25, 2011, to February 11, 2011. The unrest in Egypt was arguably the apex of the Arab uprisings as international media broadcasted the mass demonstrations from Cairo’s Tahrir Square and captivated audiences from across the world. The Egyptian uprising started just eleven days after President Ben Ali fled Tunisia as Egyptians were inspired by the events that took place in Tunis. However, there are three main differences between the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. First, whereas the Tunisian demonstrations started in the country’s marginalized interior and eventually reached the country’s capital weeks later, in Egypt, the protests started and remained in the capital of Cairo during the duration of the uprising. Since the Egyptian protests took place in Cairo it meant the Egyptian government had to address the demonstrations immediately and the Egyptian government ordered the military to reinforce internal security forces only after three days of protests, whereas in Tunisia, Ben Ali ordered the military onto the streets after three weeks of demonstrations. Second, there is documentation that the Egyptian military used violence and fired on protesters at the onset of the demonstration. This contrasts with Tunisia where there is no evidence that the Tunisian military ever fired their weapons on Tunisian protesters. The third difference is that in Egypt, once Mubarak resigned from office, the Egyptian military controlled the post-
revolutionary government, whereas in Tunisia the military immediately transferred political power to a civilian-led transition government. After Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, Egyptian officers oversaw the governance of the country for a year and a half before government control was formally handed over to civilians once Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood politician, won the presidency. Interestingly, Morsi’s reign as Egyptian president only lasted one year as the Egyptian military intervened against Morsi in July 2013 and removed him from power. Shortly afterwards a former military officer, General Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi, was elected as Egyptian president, and has held that position since June 2014.

The first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the Egyptian military and discusses the role and development of the Egyptian military in Egyptian politics from 1952 until the onset of the demonstrations in 2011. The second section explores the major events that occurred during the Egyptian uprising and highlights the substantive role the Egyptian military played during the demonstrations. The third section applies the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index to the Egyptian case and identifies the variables that influenced Egyptian military behavior during the protests. Despite the differences between the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, this chapter demonstrates that the variables influencing military behavior in both countries were similar. For example, the Egyptian military defected from the President Mubarak regime due to existing institutional variables that paved the way for military defection. Similar to Tunisia, in Egypt there were parallel security forces that tried to counterbalance the military, there were rivalries between the military and other state security forces, there was a system of military conscription, and the Egyptian military had the institutional autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed forces. Egypt also possessed additional institutional variables such as socio-economic and generational divisions within the armed forces. These institutional variables in Egypt were coupled by the
unique characteristics of the Egyptian protests that provided the military with the opportunity to defect. Similar to the Tunisian uprising, the Egyptian uprising was large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and demonstrators actively won over the military. These factors raised the costs of sustained military violence against civilians and increased the likelihood the military would side with protesters.

**Background of the Egyptian Military**

To better understand the role of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian uprising, it is useful to briefly examine the evolution and formation of the Egyptian armed forces during the second half of the twentieth century. The modern configuration of the Egyptian state began in 1952 when a group of nationalist, junior officers called the Free Officers initiated a coup against the country's ruling leader, King Farouq. The Free Officers intervened due to a combination of economic, political, and societal factors. Economically, the Free Officers felt King Farouq was too compliant with Western economic interests and permitted Western businesses unhindered access to Egypt's markets at the expense of cultivating and growing Egypt's domestic economy. Politically, the Free Officers thought the monarchical regime was systemically corrupt, ineffective, and failed to address the concerns of middle-class Egyptians. Socially, the Egyptian military was still recovering from its defeat against Israel in the 1948 war and Egyptian popular opinion remained unfavorable towards the Egyptian military.¹

After the 1952 coup the Free Officers controlled Egyptian politics under the auspices of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), consolidated political control, dissolved political parties, and eliminated political rivals (i.e. The Muslim Brotherhood)

¹ For more on the 1952 Free Officers Movement and the prevailing factors that influenced officers to intervene against the King Farouq regime, see Beattie (1994)
(Beattie 1994, 101; Abdel-Malek 1968, 91-92). In 1956, four years after the coup, one of the leaders from the Free Officers Movement, Gamal Abdel Nasser, officially became president and by this time the Egyptian military had arguably become the most powerful institution in the country.

By the 1960s, Egypt was geopolitically one of the most important countries in the MENA region, which was reinforced by Nasser's active foreign policy agenda that attempted to spread and unify the ideology of Arab socialism. As a result, the Egyptian military became actively engaged in numerous foreign conflicts across the Middle East such as the 1962 Yemeni Civil War. The crisis in Yemen started after the death of the Yemeni king, Imam Ahmad bin Yahya, which triggered a group of Yemeni military officers to launch a rebellious coup against the monarchy with the aims of overthrowing the king’s successor and establishing a republican state modeled after Egypt. To support the Yemeni republican forces, the Egyptian military sent 70,000 troops to Yemen but the war was a calamitous affair and resulted in a drawn-out five-year quagmire in which neither side (the Yemeni Royalists, or the Yemeni Republicans and Egyptian military) could make significant advances (Hashim 2011a, 70-71). The prolonged war had several negative effects on Egypt including the death of thousands of Egyptian soldiers, straining the Egyptian treasury, and overextending the Egyptian armed forces.² This final aspect especially haunted Egypt as the 70,000 Egyptian troops stationed in Yemen meant there were fewer troops available to defend the country and left Egypt susceptible to a possible attack.

In June 1967 such a scenario occurred as Israel launched sudden and devastating attacks on its Arab neighbors, including the Egyptian territories of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian forces were caught off-guard and were quickly overrun by Israeli forces.

² For more on the Egyptian military's role in Yemen see McGregor (2006, 260 – 264).
forces as the Egyptian military was in disarray since thousands of Egyptian troops remained in Yemen. Israeli forces quickly destroyed the majority of the Egyptian Air Force in the Sinai and within a week the Israelis occupied the entire peninsula.³ This was a cataclysmic result for President Nasser and demonstrated that significant changes had to be made within the country and the armed forces. After the 1967 defeat, Nasser implemented five notable changes to the Egyptian military: forcing the defense minister to resign, purging the military ranks of deadweight officers especially those loyal to the defense minister, professionalizing the military and placing more significance on military training, streamlining and centralizing military command under the auspices of the Minister of War, and removing superfluous military structures that complicated the armed forces' chain of command (Gawrych 1987).

Nasser ruled Egypt for three more years until his death in 1970, and his vice president and former Free Officer compatriot, Anwar Sadat, took over as president. At first there was uncertainty over how long Sadat would remain president since there were a number of military and political elites that wanted to pry executive control from Sadat's hands. But Sadat surprisingly demonstrated a Machiavellian touch for politics and initiated numerous policies in 1971 known as the "Corrective Revolution," that removed key rivals from office and implemented his own system of rule and governance to solidify his presidency.⁴ In regards to the military, Sadat feared a possible coup, so as a countermeasure, he implemented numerous changes to the Egyptian armed forces. Sadat heightened the intra-military rivalries within the Egyptian armed forces, created numerous alliances with

³ For a detailed account of the 1967 Six Day War, especially Israel's campaign in the Sinai Peninsula, see Gawrych (1991).

⁴ For more on Sadat's "Corrective Revolution" see Ryan (2001, 30) and Cook (2004, 8).
junior officers to undermine senior officers that disagreed with him, imposed a system of frequent rotation for soldiers and officers, and implemented divide-and-rule tactics to encourage unrest and competition between officers (Bou Nassif 2013, 513 and Gawrych 1987, 282). Impressively, even though Sadat enacted measures that heightened competition at the individual level, the system made the Egyptian military a more efficient security force since officers became more disciplined for fear that a single misstep could have them demoted, reassigned, or fired.

The watershed moment for the Egyptian military during Sadat's regime occurred in the 1973 "Yom Kippur War" when Egyptian forces reclaimed territory in the Sinai Peninsula from Israel. After decades of military failures, the success of Egyptian forces during the 1973 war was long overdue from the Egyptian perspective and the "victory" provided President Sadat with tremendous leverage both domestically and internationally. After the 1973 war, Sadat transformed Egypt's foreign policy by dissolving Egypt's relationship with the USSR. As Cairo averted its eyes from Moscow, Sadat found a new strategic international partner in Washington D.C., and by the mid-1970s, Egypt was increasing its political and military relationship with the United States and Western-centric international institutions. For instance, in 1977 Egypt implemented economic programs recommended by the IMF and the World Bank, which required Egypt to cut subsidies on essential commodities, impose austerity programs of state spending, and increase the prices on many basic food items.\(^5\)

After these policies went into effect thousands of Egyptians erupted in protests in response to these economic changes. In fact, the demonstrations were so large that protesters overwhelmed the Egyptian police forces and as a result President Sadat ordered the military to support internal security forces and to use violence against the civilian

\(^5\) For more information on this event see Gotowicki (1997), Harb (2003, 283), and Ryan (2001, 37).
protesters. The Egyptian military helped the regime survive the 1977 protests and this event demonstrated that Egyptian officers and soldiers were willing to intervene against civilian protesters in order to defend the ruling government.

In addition to the Western-led economic changes in Egypt, the other significant foreign policy development in Egyptian politics in the late 1970s was the Camp David Accord agreement that diffused military relations between Israel and Egypt and provided the Egyptian military with a substantial increase in U.S. financial and military assistance. Even though the Camp David Accords were celebrated in the West and within the upper echelons of the Egyptian government, many Egyptians were appalled that their government partnered with both Israel and the United States. As a result, Islamist factions emerged in Egyptian society and infiltrated the military ranks, which led to a band of militant junior officers assassinating President Sadat at a military parade in 1981.\[^6\]

After Sadat’s assassination, Vice President Mubarak took over as Egypt’s next president. Mubarak, similar to his two predecessors, was a former military officer who ascended through the ranks of the Egyptian Air Force before being appointed as Sadat’s vice president in the mid-1970s. The fact that some junior officers from the Egyptian military assassinated President Sadat did not escape Mubarak and as a result he enlarged the country’s internal security forces to counter the strength of the Egyptian military and to also monitor political dissent and root-out extreme Islamist threats that existed across Egyptian society. The main body responsible for eliminating extreme Islamist factions was the Central Security Forces (CSF), an organization that existed since the late 1960s under Nasser but significantly increased in size and strength under Mubarak. Similar to the Egyptian military, the CSF used conscripts to fill the rank-and-file of the organization. Typically, conscripts

\[^6\] For more on the assassination of Sadat, see Harb (2003, 284), and Abdalla (1988, 1455).
that were deemed unfit for the Egyptian military were sent to the CSF and these soldiers faced difficult conditions such as multi-year service time, mediocre pay, a rigid and physically demanding daily routine, and the psychological toll of violently engaging civilians.\textsuperscript{7} Ultimately, the conditions in the CSF worsened to such a state that a mass revolt of CSF conscripts gripped the country in 1986 that included mass demonstrations, rioting, and acts of arson.\textsuperscript{8} In response, President Mubarak ordered the Egyptian military onto the streets to subdue CSF troops and as a result 107 were killed and another 715 were wounded in the clashes (Ryan 2001, 33). The Egyptian military intervention quelled the riots and demonstrated that even though the president changed, the Egyptian military was still willing to defend the regime.

President Mubarak also ensured Egyptian officers remained loyal to his regime by providing economic benefits to individual officers and also fostering the Egyptian military’s economic empire. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Egyptian military established the Ministry of Military Production, a bureaucratic branch of the Egyptian military that oversaw the military’s factories and commercial production. In addition, Law 32 in 1979 provided the Egyptian military with financial and institutional independence from governmental budgetary oversight.\textsuperscript{9} As a result of these policies, the Egyptian armed forces became one of the most dominant economic powers in the country and received hundreds of millions of dollars yearly from these sectors.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{7} For more on the conditions of the CSF see Gotowicki (1997).

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{9} For more information see Harb (2003, 285-286) and Frisch (2001).

\textsuperscript{10} For more on the Egyptian military’s economic production see Gotowicki (1997) and Frisch (2001).
After the Egyptian military supported President Mubarak during the 1986 CSF riots, he turned a blind-eye to the economic development of the Egyptian military and left the economic empire of the Egyptian armed forces unmonitored. However, this changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the rise of Egypt’s liberal capitalist elite, whose economic policies potentially threatened the economic stronghold of the Egyptian armed forces. Interestingly, President Mubarak’s son, Gamal, was a key figure in Egypt’s liberal capitalist elite and Gamal’s ascent in Egyptian politics created a power struggle between the military, the president, and the president’s son and his liberal capitalist elite colleagues.

While this power struggle gripped the upper echelons of Egyptian politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was an increase of protests and social movements taking place across the country. In particular there were three significant social protests in Egypt leading up to the 2011 uprising including the Kefaya Movement of 2004-2005, the 2008 April 6 Protests, and the protests in the aftermath of the death of Khaled Said (an Egyptian man who was beaten to death by Egyptian internal security forces in the summer of 2010).

These separate movements demonstrated the rising tensions in Egyptian society and this discontent was unleashed in early January 2011 as images of the Tunisian protests were broadcasted into Egypt. The sight of President Ben Ali fleeing Tunisia was inspirational to thousands of Egyptians who were disenfranchised with the Mubarak regime. President Ben Ali fled Tunis on January 14, 2011, and Egyptian protest groups immediately mobilized. It

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13 The death of Khaled Said inspired the Egyptian blogger, Wael Ghonim, to start a Facebook group entitled, “We Are All Khaled Said.” Also see Ghonim (2012).
only took these groups nine days to coordinate protests and they eyed a symbolic date to unleash their uprising -- January 25, 2011, which coincidently was Egypt's National Police Day -- a day to remember and celebrate the civic role, duty, and heroism of the country's police forces.

There are six key observations relevant to understanding the context, role, and position of Egyptian military at the dawn of the 2011 Egyptian uprising. First, the Egyptian military has been an important political institution in the country ever since the Egyptian military initiated the 1952 coup that founded the modern state. Second, since the Egyptian military was the engine of the 1952 coup it meant the Egyptian military had the leverage to create political structures advantageous to the military as an institution and also construct systems that were economically and politically beneficial for officers. Third, all three Egyptian presidents from 1952 to 2011 were former military officers, which demonstrates the political significance of the Egyptian armed forces and its central political role. Fourth, Egypt played a key geopolitical role across the MENA region during the second half of the twentieth century. Egypt was involved in numerous foreign wars and conflicts, and the Egyptian government often utilized the Egyptian military as the country's primary foreign policy instrument. Because of this the Egyptian military needed to be large, needed to have modern weaponry, and needed to have an external focus. Fifth, President Mubarak, much like his Tunisian contemporary, President Ben Ali, modified the Egyptian security apparatus in the 1980s and 1990s by massively expanding the Egyptian internal security apparatus, which in essence created a de facto police state in Egypt. Sixth and perhaps most interestingly for this study, is that the Egyptian military demonstrated on several occasions that it was willing to defend the incumbent regime and use violence against civilians. This is evident as the Egyptian military followed regime orders and physically intervened during the
1977 Bread Riots and the 1986 CSF Riots. Even though the Egyptian military defended the regime and used violence against civilians and internal security forces in 1977 and 1986, the Egyptian military decided to defect from the regime during the 2011 uprising. The following section details the Egyptian uprising from late January 2011 to mid-February 2011 and highlights the specific role the Egyptian military played during the eighteen-day uprising that transformed Egyptian politics.

The Uprising in Egypt and the Role of the Military

On the evening of January 24, 2011, thousands of Egyptians were preparing for nationwide protests across the country for the following day. Social media played a pivotal role as protest groups assisted with organizing details such as establishing the times and locations of when and where demonstrators would occur. Existing civic groups such as the organizers of the “April 6 2008 Protests,” the Kefaya movement, and the "ultras" of Egyptian football clubs (i.e. al-Ahlawy SC and al-Zamalek SC) were critical in orchestrating the logistics of the January 25 protest (Hashim 2011b, 114). According to social media posts, the plan was for protesters to meet outside of the Ministry of Interior building at 2:00 p.m. on January 25, 2011, and then to demonstrate for three hours until 5:00 p.m. (el-Ghobashy 2011). The government was aware of these plans and the regime made preparations outside of the Interior Ministry building, which included sealing off streets and increasing photo ID check points in the surrounding area.14 However, the protesters never planned on marching to the Interior Ministry building, starting demonstrations at 2:00 p.m., or ending at 5:00 p.m. Instead protesters planted those fake plans to obfuscate and confuse Egyptian security forces – and it worked. At 12:00 p.m., dozens of small demonstrations started throughout the city at different locations and these groups marched through the streets of Cairo with

14 Ibid.
one common goal – to converge in Cairo’s center at Tahrir Square by late afternoon (el-Ghobashy 2011). Egyptian security forces were caught off-guard and were unprepared for the number of protesters, the route change, and the overall fervor of the demonstrations. By early evening, thousands of protesters made their way to Tahrir Square demanding substantive political changes including the firing of the country’s interior minister, the cancellation of Egypt’s on-going state of emergency, and implementing term limits to Mubarak’s presidency.\(^\text{15}\) Near midnight the crowds in Tahrir remained raucous and refused to disband and the regime ordered more police forces to descend upon the square to physically remove the thousands of protesters still there. As a result, approximately 13,000 riot police and hundreds of armored security vehicles invaded Tahrir firing tear gas canisters at demonstrators and dispersing protesters with physical force (el-Ghobashy 2011).

The following morning, January 26, reports indicate that demonstrations took place in other cities across the country such as the port of Suez where state security forces killed three, injured 110, and arrested dozens (el-Ghobashy 2011). The security forces in Cairo altered their tactics for the upcoming day’s protests by closing downtown businesses, rerouting metro lines, establishing numerous security checkpoints across the city, and dispersing thousands of plain-clothes police officers to blend into the crowd and monitor civilian activity (el-Ghobashy 2011). But the change in police tactics did little to stop protesters from flooding the streets of Cairo as tens of thousands of Egyptians continued to demonstrate across the country and state security forces responded by firing rubber bullets, tear gas canisters, and wielding bamboo staves and metal batons.\(^\text{16}\)


The events of January 25 and 26, 2011, were the largest demonstrations in modern Egypt and the magnitude of the protests suggested to the regime that riot police and internal security forces would not be enough to ensure stability. On Friday evening, January 27, 2011, the regime was preparing for the next wave of protests and decided it was time to deploy the Egyptian military. By Saturday afternoon, military soldiers were stationed on the streets of Egypt and were supporting, reinforcing, and even resupplying internal security forces with tear gas canisters and ammunition in the areas surrounding Tahrir Square (Ketchley 2014, 168). As protests escalated on Saturday afternoon, the Egyptian military became more directly involved as soldiers started replacing internal security forces rather than reinforcing police forces (Ketchley 2014, 155). In Suez, there were reports of heavy gunfire taking place between Egyptian soldiers and angry protesters outside of the Suez police station.\(^\text{17}\) Across the country the military was deployed to secure public buildings and in Cairo the military set up their primary “base” outside of the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities, which is one block north of Tahrir Square.\(^\text{18}\)

The initial behavior of the Egyptian military was similar to military response during the 1977 and 1986 protests and suggested that the Egyptian military was willing to defend the incumbent regime and use physical force to suppress civilian protesters. For example, Amnesty International (2011c, 76) reported that on January 29, a thirty-six year-old man was stopped by the military for being out after curfew and was handcuffed, blindfolded, and beaten by soldiers. In addition, there are reports the Egyptian military fired weapons into the


\(^{17}\) See Amnesty International (2011c, 62).

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 34.
air at Tahrir Square and the military’s main base near the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities became a de facto prison where protesters were detained and subjected to torture and ill treatment from soldiers.¹⁹

Even though reports indicate that Egyptian military soldiers were violently engaging civilians on the ground, the senior military officers painted a different picture. On February 1, 2011, Egyptian military officials announced on state media that the military would not use force against citizens in upcoming protests and stated, “the presence of the army in the streets is for [the people’s] sake and to ensure [the people’s] safety and well-being…the armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people.”²⁰ That same evening, President Mubarak also made a televised announcement to the country in which he agreed he would not run for reelection after his term was over but he would stay in office until his term ended in September 2011.²¹

February 2, 2011, represented a turning point in the Egyptian revolution as pro-regime forces on horseback and camelback invaded Tahrir Square and violently attacked demonstrators.²² It is believed these forces sympathetic to the regime were hired by the regime to intimidate and disperse the anti-government protesters in Tahrir. Even though there is no evidence these pro-regime forces consisted of soldiers, there are reports the

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¹⁹ Ibid., 18, 71.


military indirectly assisted them. For example, the pro-regime crowds entered Tahrir
Square from the north and the only way to enter Tahrir from that direction meant passing
through military checkpoints. Moreover, it is reported that during the "Battle of Tahrir" the
military looked-on motionless as pro-regime forces attacked protesters. The February 2
attacks in Tahrir Square were a turning point in the Egyptian uprising for two reasons. One,
the episode demonstrated how out of touch the Mubarak regime had become. Even if the
regime had nothing to do with the pro-regime forces that invaded Tahrir Square, the attacks
only galvanized the protest movement and proved that demonstrators would not be
intimidated or deterred through physical force. Two, despite the evidence that the Egyptian
military implicitly assisted pro-regime forces at the Tahrir Square attacks, the Egyptian
military began inching closer to the side of the protesters and away from the Mubarak
regime.

In the days following the attack the senior military leadership convened and explored
alternative options outside of Mubarak. The newly appointed vice president, Omar
Suleiman, Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq
opened up discussions with opposition forces and began to devise plans on how to remove
President Mubarak from power through constitutional measures. Suleiman, Tantawi, and
Shafiq were all former military officers and their meeting demonstrated for the first time
during the uprising that the military institution was beginning to drift away from the
Mubarak regime.

\[23\] Amnesty International (2011c, 36) and Ketchley (2014, 175).

In addition to coordinating events behind the scenes, senior military officers, such as Defense Minister Tantawi and Lieutenant General Sami Hafez Anan visited Tahrir Square and displayed their solidarity with the movement and gave assurances that the protesters' demands would be met.\textsuperscript{25} On February 10, 2011, military officers reinstated the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a council only convened under dire circumstances, and met without President Mubarak or Vice President Suleiman (Frisch 2013, 188). In the SCAF meeting Egyptian military leadership discussed the next course of action in Egyptian politics and released a public communiqué (the first of several) to the Egyptian people. The first communiqué stated:

Based on the responsibility of the Armed Forces, and its commitment to protect the people, and to oversee their interests and security, and with a view to the safety of the nation and the citizenry, and of the achievements and properties of the great people of Egypt, and in affirmation and support for the legitimate demands of the people, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces convened today, 10 February 2011, to consider developments to date, and decided to remain in continuous session to consider what procedures and measures that may be taken to protect the nation, and the achievements and aspirations of the great people of Egypt.\textsuperscript{26}

The first SCAF communiqué was vague but suggested that the military was making plans behind the scenes to oust Mubarak from power.

At this point the entire country assumed Mubarak was on his way out, and when an impromptu presidential address was scheduled for the evening of February 10, 2011, most Egyptians thought this would be Mubarak’s formal resignation speech. Hundreds of


thousands of Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square and millions watched from their homes, but astonishingly, President Mubarak did not resign that night and rather, in a rambling and infantilizing speech, Mubarak maintained he would remain Egypt’s president but would delegate more responsibility and substantive powers to the vice president. At first the protesters in Tahrir Square were dumbfounded and shortly afterwards the confusion turned into rage. Nearly a million protesters flooded Cairo’s streets late Thursday night after Mubarak’s address and the following day there were massive plans for demonstrations across the country in solidarity against Mubarak.

Early on Friday, February 11, the SCAF released a second communiqué that stated the military’s commitment “to protecting the legitimate demands of the people and…to ensure a peaceful transfer of authority and the achievement of the democratic and free society that the people demand” (emphasis added by author).27 While the second SCAF communiqué was released to the Egyptian public, discussions and meetings took place behind the scenes that paved the way for Egypt’s future. At 4:00 p.m. on Friday February 11, President Mubarak left Cairo for his residence in the southern Sinai resort town of Sharm el-Shiekh. Two hours later, Vice President Suleiman publically announced President Mubarak had stepped down and that governance of the country was immediately handed over to military leadership under the SCAF.28 Upon Suleiman’s announcement, the SCAF released a third communiqué, which stated, “the current government, and governors shall continue as a caretaker administration until a new government is formed,” and guaranteed a “peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows for the assumption of

27 Ibid.

authority by a civilian and elected authority to govern the country and the building of a democratic and free state.” After these announcements, millions of Egyptians celebrated in the streets throughout the country.  

The following day celebrations across Egypt remained euphoric, but as protesters and demonstrators celebrated their victory, the Egyptian military made political maneuvers to bolster their new position in Mubarak’s sudden absence. On February 12, the SCAF dissolved both houses of Parliament, suspended the Constitution, declared the military would rule Egypt for six months until elections could be held, and announced Prime Minister Shafiq would remain head of the caretaker government until a new government was formed. Much like the 1952 Free Officers coup, the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011 involved the Egyptian military lingering in political control longer than advertised. Overall, the SCAF remained in power for a year and a half until June 2012, when presidential elections finally occurred and the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Morsi, was sworn in as president. The eighteen-month transition period was a tumultuous and politically charged time in Egypt in which varying political groups vied for political power in Egypt’s new political landscape. Mass demonstrations continued during 2011 and 2012 and coincidentally, since the Egyptian military was in power during this time, military officers were more willing to use violence to suppress protesters and restore public order. The SCAF reluctantly handed over the reins of government to President Morsi, but Islamist rule in Egypt was short-lived as the Egyptian military intervened and overthrew Morsi from office.


31 Amnesty International (2011c, 23).
in July 2013. After a transition period of one year with a caretaker government, in which the Muslim Brotherhood was essentially disbanded, another round of presidential elections occurred in the summer of 2014 and al-Sisi, a former member of the SCAF, was victorious and was named Egyptian president in June 2014.

At the beginning of the Egyptian protests it was unclear whether the Egyptian military would ultimately defect from the Mubarak regime. The Mubarak regime ordered the Egyptian military to dispatch across the country only after three days of protests and the military followed these orders willingly. Plus, there is documentation that the Egyptian military used force and violence against civilians during the uprising. As discussed in chapter 4, after the Tunisian uprising the transition government mandated a committee to investigate the role of the Ben Ali regime during the Tunisian uprising and it resulted in a 1,000 page thorough report called the “Tunisian National Fact Finding Commission.” In contrast, while the Egyptian transition government also mandated a commission to investigate the role of the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian uprising, the results have been less informative and less substantive in comparison to the Tunisian report. For instance, the majority of the Egyptian report remains classified and the only unclassified excerpt includes a fifty-page document, "Final report: The Investigative Fact-Finding Committee on the Events that Accompanied the Revolution of January 25, 2011," that only provides minimal insight on the government and state security’s role during the unrest.  

Overall, all the details and actions of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian uprising are unclear. Reports from groups like Amnesty International document that some Egyptian soldiers used violence against demonstrators during the uprising, but overall these occurrences seem rare. Also, there is no evidence of institutional grievances in which senior

or junior officers ordered violence against protesters at an institution-wide level. With the data available this project argues that the Egyptian military ultimately defected from the Mubarak regime since it did not use high levels of violence against protesters and since the military elite was essential in orchestrating Mubarak’s departure. Regarding the first point, the Egyptian military is an extremely large and powerful military that possesses heavy artillery and weaponry that could easily dominate civilian protesters. However, despite this advantage, the Egyptian military did not use high levels of violence against demonstrators suggesting the armed forces were unwilling to protect the regime and thought it was too costly to violently confront unarmed civilians. Regarding the second point, as the uprising continued officers realized they could lead the country in Mubarak’s absence and decided to sever its allegiances with the president and thus initiated his ouster on the back of the country’s uprising.

What were the variables that influenced the Egyptian military to not use high levels of violence against protesters? The following section answers this question by examining the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in detail and demonstrates that existing institutional variables paved the way for military defection and that the historic and unique characteristics of the Egyptian protests provided the Egyptian military with the opportunity to defect.

**The MENA Military Index & Egypt**

The remainder of this chapter examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index with specific focus on the impact these variables played upon influencing the Egyptian military’s decision to defect from the regime. As discussed in chapter 3, Egypt possesses the highest MENA Military index score of all twenty-one MENA countries with an index score of 0.70. This means fourteen of the twenty possible variables were present in the Egyptian
case that contributed to military defection. Table 12 illustrates the twenty variables from the MENA Military Index in Egypt and indicates which of the variables were present (labeled as “yes”) and which of the variables were not present (labeled as "no").

The fourteen variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime include: (1) socio-economic splits within the military, (2) the presence of parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, (3) rivalries between the military and other security forces, (4) generational rifts between senior and junior officers, (5) the system of military conscription, (6) the military's autonomy to make internal appointments, (7) the military's dissatisfaction with regime benefits, (8) the large size of the Egyptian protests, (9) the participation of non-traditional protesters in the uprising including women, the elderly, and children, (10) the non-violent nature of protests, (11) the lack of egregious human rights violations by the Egyptian military against the civilian population in the country’s history, (12) the broad-based scope of the Egyptian protests, (13) the movement’s ability to successfully win over the military, and (14) a significant proportion of Egyptian officers and soldiers receiving training and education from foreign militaries. Of these fourteen variables six are institutional and address characteristics within the military and the country’s security apparatus, one variable addresses the relationship between the military and the regime, six variables are societal and based upon the characteristics of the Egyptian uprising, and one variable addresses international dynamics.

The Egyptian case demonstrates two aspects. First, there were institutional variables that paved the way for military defection, but these institutional variables alone would not cause military defection. The second important aspect is that the uprising had to contain unique characteristics that provided the military with the opportunity and motivation to
Table 12. Egypt and the MENA Military Index Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Communal splits between soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>11. Did orders to intervene come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Socio-economic rifts between soldiers?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12. Uprising larger than 1% of population?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Parallel security forces to military?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13. Protesters include women and children?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rivalry between military and other security forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14. Uprising non-violent in nature?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rivalries between military branches?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15. Military have clean record with no human rights violations?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conscription?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17. Did movement win over soldiers?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Military have autonomy in appointments?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18. Did foreign troops intervene to overthrow leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Someone other than the current leader appointed the Defense Minister and other leading generals?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20. Significant portion of soldiers receive foreign military training?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
defect. This occurred in 2011 as the protests were large, broad-based, non-violence, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and specifically won over the military.

In addition to the fourteen variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect, there are six variables from the MENA Military Index that did not influence the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime. This includes (1) no significant communal rifts within the military, (2) no significant rivalries between the branches of the Egyptian armed forces, (3) President Mubarak appointing the defense ministers during his regime, (4) the lack of uncertainty of whether President Mubarak ever explicitly ordered Egyptian soldiers to fire on protesters, (5) the absence of any foreign military troops invading the country with the aim of overthrowing President Mubarak, and (6) militaries of neighboring states not defecting from their incumbent regimes.33

The following subsections explore the institutional, regime, societal, and international variables in more detail and discuss the role each of these variables had on Egyptian military response during the uprising. The first subsection explores the eight institutional variables, the second subsection explores the three regime variables, the third subsection explores the six societal variables, and the fourth subsection explores the three international variables. As these subsections reveal, the presence of existing institutional variables in Egypt coupled with the societal variables of the Egyptian uprising influenced the Egyptian military leadership to defect from the Mubarak regime and to seize power for themselves.

33 Egypt borders Libya and Israel, and even though large factions of Libyan soldiers defected from the Qaddafi regime this occurred after the Egyptian uprising and therefore could not have sequentially affected Egyptian military behavior. Plus, even though the Egyptian uprising and protests were influenced by the events in Tunisia, there is no evidence that the Egyptian military was influenced by Tunisian military behavior. For more see the last section of this chapter.
Institutional Variables

Out of the eight institutional variables, six were present and two were absent in Egypt. The first and second institutional variables that potentially influenced the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime include the counterbalancing of internal security forces against the Egyptian military, and the subsequent rivalries this created between these two institutions. The Egyptian security apparatus is an extensive and complex organization that consists of dozens of individual security forces housed in both the country's Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. Some of the notable internal Egyptian security forces include the Egyptian police, the CSF, the State Security Investigations (SSI), the Republican Guard, the General Intelligence Services (GIS), and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID).

Ever since 1952, the internal security forces in Egypt have increased in size, scope, and mission, and have been utilized by the regime to counterbalance and rival the size and strength of the Egyptian military. Immediately after the 1952 coup the Free Officers expanded Egyptian internal security forces by creating the Republican Guard to protect the president from any potential military counter-coups. The GIS was created as a domestic and foreign intelligence service, the SSI was the primary security and intelligence arm of the Ministry of Interior, and the CSF was a paramilitary force that was created to provide an additional layer of internal security, and to counter the size and strength of the military.

The internal security forces expanded under President Sadat in four ways. One, Sadat "militarized" the Republican Guard by upgrading the units to a brigade of special troops equipped with tanks, armored cars, and military-grade weaponry (Kandil 2012, 283). Two,

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34 For more see Kechichian and Nazimek (1997, 128), Frisch (2013, 193), and Krieg (2011, 16).
Sadat used the Republican Guard to arrest rivals and deter a military coup from removing him from power in 1971 (Campbell 2009, 95). Three, Sadat expanded the privileges of the Egyptian police and appointed former policemen as provincial governors rather than appointing these positions to military officers. Four, Sadat rivaled the Egyptian military with the SSI by having SSI forces block military promotions and siphoning off top-line equipment and artillery to internal security forces (Kandil 2012, 301).

President Mubarak continued the tradition of increasing the size and strength of the internal security forces. For instance, Mubarak oversaw the implementation of Ministerial Decree 702 of 1986, which increased the breadth and scope of the internal security forces and divided the Ministry of Interior into thirty-four specialized subcategories and provided internal security forces with more autonomy (Kandil 2012, 335). In addition, President Mubarak increased the role of the Republican Guard; especially after his security detail thwarted an assassination attempted on his life in 1995 (Bou Nassif 2013, 517n26). Mubarak also weakened the military by increasing the budget of the Ministry of Interior in comparison to the Ministry of Defense. For example, the Ministry of Interior's budget as a proportion of the country's GDP doubled from 1988 to 2002, police salaries quadrupled, and the regime continued turning a blind eye to the bribes police forces extorted from civilians (Kandil 2012, 336).

Towards the end of his regime Mubarak created closer relationships with senior members from the internal security forces such as Habib al-Adly (the former minister of interior), and Omar Suleiman (the former director of the General Intelligence Directorate), in contrast to officers from the military (Frisch 2013). By the end of Mubarak's regime the Egyptian internal security apparatus permeated and penetrated all aspects of Egyptian
politics and society and consisted of millions of officers and nearly 17,000 detention centers located across the country.\footnote{Kandil (2012, 335-339) and \textit{The Military Balance} (2012, 322).}

The growth of Egypt's internal security forces had two effects on Egyptian military behavior during the uprising. First, since the internal security forces typically used repression against civilians, the military seldom used violence against civilians and were unlikely to use force against demonstrators during the uprising. Second, since the Egyptian internal security forces counterbalanced the Egyptian armed forces, the military was not willing to use high levels of violence against civilians and protect a regime that deliberately oversaw and cultivated the expansion of the internal security forces.

The third institutional variable that possibly influenced the Egyptian military to defect was that the armed forces retained tremendous amounts of institutional autonomy in its ability to make internal appointments and personnel decisions within the military. Since 1952, the only time the Egyptian president closely monitored and micromanaged the personnel configuration of the armed forces was during Sadat's presidency. As discussed earlier in the chapter, when Sadat became president he warded off numerous political rivals and overzealous officers by overseeing military appointments and enforcing a system of swift rotations so officers and soldiers were constantly being switched to different assignments, positions, and locations (Bou Nassif 2013, 513-515 and Campbell 2009, 79). However, Mubarak was less involved in the internal configuration and decision-making of personnel within the armed forces than his predecessor, which meant that throughout the military, most soldiers and officers had weak links to the president, which made it easier for the individuals to defect and sever ties from the regime.
The fourth and fifth institutional variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect include generational splits and socio-economic splits between military personnel. One of the main reasons generational splits occurred within the Egyptian armed forces was due to economic disparity between senior and junior officers. The Egyptian military is one of the most privileged groups in all of Egyptian politics and ever since the 1950s senior military officers have enjoyed an exclusive status in Egyptian society, which has included prized political appointments both domestic and abroad, and also access to tremendous wealth and salaries upon retiring from the military (Bou Nassif 2013; Frisch 2013, 181). Even though a small minority of senior military officers have benefited from this system, overall, there is a significant gap between senior officers, junior officers, and conscripts. For example, towards the end of Mubarak’s regime enlisted soldiers and conscripts made approximately $20 U.S. dollars per month, junior officers received approximately $333 U.S. dollars per month, while the upper echelon of senior officers made up to $33,000 U.S. dollars per month (Bou Nassif 2013, 516 and Holmes 2012, 298). While it is possible for junior officers to receive promotions and to secure a lucrative senior military position on their own, the reality is very unlikely. Promotions are slow, spots are competitive, and often patronage or familial ties trump merit when selections are made at the upper levels of the Egyptian military (Hashim 2011b, 107 and 121).

In addition to socio-economic rifts, ideological rifts have also caused animosity between senior officers, junior officers, and conscripts in the Egyptian armed forces. The most significant example include the disgruntled junior officers that were disenfranchised with senior military leadership in the 1940s and 1950s and initiated the 1952 Free Officers coup that created the modern Egyptian state. Over the decades other ideological rifts have
caused generational splits within the Egyptian armed forces such as in the 1970s when junior soldiers and conscripts tended to be more sympathetic towards Islamist ideologies in comparison to senior officers. This partially explains the growth of Islamism within the Egyptian military, which ultimately led to a group of Islamist junior officers assassinating President Sadat in 1981. This religious rift continued during Mubarak's presidency as senior officers were skeptical of the susceptibility of junior officers and conscripts of adopting Islamic ideology and as a result when Egypt combatted Islamic terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s, senior military officers did not want the majority of counterterrorism missions to be given to junior officers or conscripts.

The sixth institutional variable present in Egypt is the system of military conscription, which dates back to 1948 and was institutionalized by the Free Officers in 1952 through Law 505 (Kandil 2012, 17). Military conscription requires Egyptian men from the ages of 18 to 30 to serve for three years in the armed forces, but there are numerous exceptions to get out of military service, such as physical, economic, and familial reasons, etc. Egyptian conscripts tend to represent young men with lower education levels and from poorer socio-economic backgrounds. Military service for conscripts is difficult as it lasts up to three years, includes difficult living conditions, is physically and mentally taxing, and only provides modest financial compensation.

In Egypt, military defection occurred at the senior levels as generals and senior military officials initiated defection against President Mubarak and paved the role the

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37 Ibid.

38 For instance, most conscripts in the Egyptian military are paid between $10 and $40 USD per month. For more see Krieg (2011, 25).
Egyptian military played during the post-revolutionary transition period. There is no
evidence Egyptian officers ever ordered conscripts to fire on protesters (even though there
are reports soldiers used violence against demonstrators at the beginning of the uprising),
but it is reasonable to assume Egyptian conscripts would have been less likely to use violence
against civilians. This is because conscripts shared many similar characteristics to the
protesters and further reinforced by the fact that the uprising had such a nationalistic and
broad-appeal across the country.

There were two institutional variables absent in Egypt including the lack of
significant communal rifts between military personnel, and the absence of significant rivalries
among the armed force branches. Egypt is a relatively homogenous country as the majority
of the population ethnically identifies as Arab-Berber and religiously identifies as Sunni
Islam. However, there is a small minority of Coptic Christians in Egypt that make up
approximately 10 percent of the total population. There is no data that examines the ethnic
or religious affiliation of the Egyptian military but since Egypt has a system of military
conscription this suggests citizens from all backgrounds are represented in the armed forces
even though there are not many Copts in the Egyptian military (Sharp 2012, 3). However,
despite the small number of Copts there is no evidence of communal rifts between the Arab-
Sunni majority and the Coptic minority within the Egyptian armed forces. Another possible
area that can cause communal rifts is the regional background of military personnel but there

39 2010 CIA World Factbook.

40 During and after the uprising there were an increase of attacks against the Coptic minority but this occurred
at the civilian level rather than in the government or military. For more see Michelle Boorstein, "Egypt's
March 6, 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/03/AR2011020307089.html.
is no evidence regional affiliation caused splits within the Egyptian armed forces. Overall, there is no evidence communal rifts existed within the Egyptian armed forces and this variable had no influence on the military defecting from President Mubarak.

A second institutional variable absent in Egypt was the lack of significant rivalries between the military branches. The Egyptian armed forces consist of four main branches including the army, the navy, the air force, and air defense. The army is the largest branch with 375,000 troops, the air defense is the second largest with 70,000, the air force is the third largest with 20,000, and the navy is the smallest with 14,000.\textsuperscript{41} Even though the Egyptian Army is approximately three times larger than the Egyptian Air Defense, Egyptian Air Force, and Egyptian Navy combined, there is no evidence of significant intra-military rivalries within the military. In fact, the four Egyptian military branches have been relatively harmonious during the last sixty years. For example, after the 1952 Free Officers Coup, the newly created RCC consisted of officers from all four military branches (Kandil 2012, 100).

In addition, despite President Mubarak’s air force background, he understood the necessity of maintaining equal relations with the various chiefs of staff from the four military branches. Another example was during the uprising the SCAF was comprised of officers from all four branches including Major General Sedky Sobhy (Egyptian Army), Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz Seif al-Din and Lieutenant General Anan (Egyptian Air Defense), Field Marshal Tantawi and Air Marshal Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed (Egyptian Air Force), and Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish (Egyptian Navy).\textsuperscript{42} Overall, there is no evidence that

\textsuperscript{41} The Military Balance 2011 (2012, 320).

significant rifts existed between the branches of the Egyptian armed forces and this variable had no impact on the Egyptian military's decision to defect during the uprising.

It is telling that six of the eight institutional variables were present in Egypt. This indicates there were institutional conditions present in Egypt that helped pave the way for possible military defection prior to the Arab uprisings. For example, President Mubarak, similar to President Ben Ali in Tunisia, built up the internal security forces, which ultimately served as a counterbalance and became a rival to the Egyptian military. The Egyptian military also had the institutional autonomy to coordinate personnel decisions within the armed forces and Mubarak did not specifically place loyal officers and soldiers throughout the Egyptian military. In addition, there were socio-economic and generational splits within the military but it is unclear how much impact these factors had on military defection. If present, splits between military personnel more likely indicate possible military fracturing where large portions of soldiers are divided on their allegiances. Even though there is evidence of socio-economic and generational differences between senior and junior officers, the Egyptian military did not experience fracturing, so it appears these two variables did not have as large a role as the other institutional variables. Lastly, Egypt possesses a system of military conscription and even though the officers were the primary actors that initiated military defection, since the rank-and-file of the armed forces are drawn from citizens across the country, it was less likely conscripts would have used high levels of sustained violence since conscripts could closely relate to the general population.

Regime Variables

There was one regime variable present in Egypt and two regime variables absent. The one regime variable present in Egypt that potentially influenced the Egyptian military to defect was Egyptian officers dissatisfied with the benefits they received from the Mubarak regime. In some regards this seems like a paradox considering the Egyptian military has been arguably the most privileged political institution in the country since the 1950s. One of the most lucrative sectors for the Egyptian military is the enormous economic complex that has existed in Egypt over the last four decades. As explored earlier in this chapter the Egyptian military has earned billions of dollars from land development projects, water treatment programs, waste management, food production, textiles, etc.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, Bou Nassif (2013, 516-528) finds that senior military officers were rewarded with plush political appointments and exorbitant salaries. Mubarak appointed senior officers to local governorship positions and executive positions in the state bureaucracy and also provided direct cash payments to officers for years of "loyalty" to the regime.

This plush arrangement between Mubarak and officers was jeopardized by the rise of Egypt's liberal capitalist elite. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Gamal Mubarak, President Mubarak's son, was a key member of Cairo's liberal elite and was trained in finance and worked as an investment banker in London before returning to Cairo in the 1990s. In the 1990s and 2000s Gamal Mubarak and his coterie of liberal capitalist colleagues gained access to the echelons of the country's ruling party and challenged the monopoly of the Egyptian military economic sector (Osman 2011; Zahid 2010). In addition, it was widely believed Gamal Mubarak was being groomed as Mubarak's presidential successor (Brownlee

\textsuperscript{43} For more on the Egyptian military's economic production see Gotowicki (1997) and Frisch (2001).
2007/2008. As Gamal rose through the political ranks, friendlier liberal-capitalist economic policies were initiated, which directly threatened the unmonitored and highly lucrative military economic sector. Even though the Egyptian military as an institution and the individual senior Egyptian officers received tremendous political and economic benefits under the Mubarak regime, the liberal-capitalist policies concerned officers. As a result, many officers were dissatisfied with the Mubarak regime by 2011, and these sentiments contributed to the Egyptian military's decision to not use high levels of violence against protesters during the mass uprising.

There were two regime variables absent in Egypt including President Mubarak appointing the Egyptian defense minister, and the uncertainty as to whether Mubarak ever explicitly ordered the military to fire on protesters. As to the first regime variable, during Mubarak's presidency there were three different defense ministers beginning with Field Marshal Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, who Mubarak inherited after Sadat's assassination. Abu Ghazala served as Mubarak's defense minister for eight years but the relationship between the two was competitive and eventually led to Mubarak sacking Abu Ghazal in 1989.44 After a two-year period with Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb as defense minister, President Mubarak appointed the former head of the Republican Guard, Tantawi, as the new defense minister in 1991. Tantawi remained the Egyptian defense minister for twenty years up through the Egyptian uprising. The theoretical argument of this variable in the MENA Military Index is that if a president appoints a defense minister then it is more likely the defense minister will remain loyal to the president in the event of mass political protests that challenge the regime. However in the Egyptian uprising, Tantawi did not remain loyal to

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44 For more on the relationship between President Mubarak and Defense Minister Abu Ghazala see Campbell (2009, 113-120).
Mubarak since he was unwilling to have Egyptian military forces use high levels of violence against protesters and more importantly, Tantawi was the chairman of the SCAF, which played a key role in ensuring President Mubarak was removed from office.

The second variable absent in Egypt refers to the uncertainty of whether President Mubarak ever explicitly gave the Egyptian military orders to fire on protesters. The theory behind this variable argues that if a ruling leader gives the military a clear and direct order to violently engage protesters then military personnel will be more likely to follow those orders since the ruling leader's intentions are clear. In contrast, if a ruling leader gives an ambiguous order, or if someone other than the ruling leader orders the military to violently engage protesters, then military personnel are less certain of the ruling leader's intentions and are more likely to ignore or disobey the order. During the Egyptian uprising there was uncertainty as to whether Mubarak ordered the Egyptian military to fire on protesters. At the beginning of the protest it was originally believed Mubarak ordered the military to fire on protesters, and after Mubarak resigned one of the primary narratives was the Egyptian military saved Egypt by refusing regime orders to fire on protesters. However, after the uprising the authenticity of this argument was called into question as eight months after Mubarak resigned, the chief of staff of the SCAF indicated that Mubarak never provided the Egyptian military with direct orders to fire on demonstrators. More tellingly was the


testimony of Field Marshal Tantawi during Mubarak's trial in June 2012, in which the field marshal also claimed President Mubarak never explicitly ordered the Egyptian military to fire on protesters.47

Similar to the Tunisian case, the only regime variable that appears to have influenced Egyptian military defection was officers' dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. The paradox is the Egyptian military was arguably the most financially privileged institution in the country as it had access to billions of dollars of revenue through the armed forces comprehensive economic empire. In this regards, the Egyptian military directly addresses Lee's (2005) agreement regarding "carrots" and "sticks." In Egypt, the access of this additional revenue could clearly be seen as a carrot, and similar to Lee's findings in Indonesia, carrots doled out by the ruling leader to the military were not enough to ensure the Egyptian armed forces would remain loyal to President Mubarak. As Lee finds, sticks tend to be a better mechanism than carrots in ensuring militaries remain compliant to the regime. The two absent regime variables are also interesting as the ability for President Mubarak to appoint leading senior military leadership had no barring on ensuring loyalty to the regime. Similar to the Tunisian case, even though Ben Ali appointed the senior military officers, not all of these officers remained loyal to Ben Ali, which is the same case that occurred in Egypt. Considering the first two cases of this report counter the theoretical outcomes of this variable, it begs the question as to whether this variable truly has a causal impact on military behavior during mass political protests.

Societal Variables

Similar to Tunisia, all six of the societal variables were present in Egypt, suggesting that the Egyptian military defected from the President Mubarak partially due to the unique characteristics of the country’s uprising. The first societal variable present is a high number of protesters demonstrated during the uprising. The Arab Awakening dataset from Jenkins and Herrick (2012) indicate approximately 2 percent of Egyptians protested during the Egyptian uprising, whereas the surveys from Beissinger et al. (2014, 11) note 8 percent of Egyptians protested during the uprising.

In 2011, Egypt's population was 83.7 million48 and if 2-8 percent of Egyptians demonstrated during the uprising then that equates to approximately 1.7 – 6.7 million protesters. The millions of Egyptian protesters discouraged the Egyptian military from using high levels of violence by raising the stakes of repression, making it more difficult for the military to use physical force, and since so many protesters participated this raised the legitimacy of the entire movement.

A second societal variable present in Egypt includes the broad-based nature of the uprising, which attracted a wide range of Egyptians from different social, economic, and regional backgrounds. Unlike the Tunisian protests, the Egyptian uprising was centered on the capital city from the outset. However, protests took place across the country especially in northern cities like Alexandria, Port Said, and al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Suez in the east, and in the small southern town of Beni Suef (150 kilometers from Cairo). The Egyptian uprising was also broad-based and represented a wide spectrum of Egyptians. Beinin (2014, 402) argues there were parallel social movements occurring in Egypt during the revolution, which

48 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=1
included workers, the urban middle class, the educated, technologically savvy youth, and Islamists. The Egyptian uprising was inclusive and attracted all Egyptians regardless of their political, economic, or religious backgrounds. Since the Egyptian uprising was broad-based it meant the movement better represented the entire country, and thus it made it more difficult for military officers to rationalize using high levels of violence against a movement that represented all Egyptians.

A third societal variable present in the Egyptian uprising was the "non-traditional" demonstrators, especially women, children, and the elderly. According to the survey data conducted by Beissinger et al. (2014, 35), approximately 25 percent of demonstrators in the Egyptian uprising were women. In addition, Amnesty International (2011c, 22) summarizes the role of women in their report on the Egyptian uprising by stating:

> Women from all sectors of society joined the uprising, and many played a leading role in the mobilization. Young and old, veiled and unveiled, educated and illiterate, they chanted for change; they fought against the security forces; they slept, sometimes with their children in protest camps; they defended Tahrir Square; and they debated about what protesters should do next.

The Amnesty International report also addresses the other roles women played during the revolution including the online activists who coordinated events, the doctors and nurses who tended to the wounded in Tahrir Square, and the female victims who were injured, abused, and killed by security forces during protests. In addition to women, there were also a high number of middle-aged and older demonstrators during the Egyptian uprising. Beissinger et al. (2014) find nearly 28 percent of the protesters in the Egyptian uprising were forty-five years or older. Youth were also involved in the uprising and Amnesty International reports that teenagers and even children were involved in protests especially outside of the Interior Ministry building, in the Cairo suburbs of al-Matareya, the northern city of al-Mahalla al-
Kubra, the northern city of Alexandria, and the small central town of Markaz Biba. Since the Egyptian uprising consisted of a significant proportion of women, youth, and the elderly, these "non-traditional" protesters made it more difficult for Egyptian military personnel to use high levels of violence against civilians.

The fourth societal variable present in Egypt includes the non-violent nature of the demonstrations. Similar to the Tunisian protests, the Egyptian uprising used peaceful tactics and did not aim to overthrow Mubarak through physical force. Rather, protests adopted non-violent tactics such as congregating outside of major governmental buildings, occupying public spaces and main thoroughfares, and using vocal chants and community outreach.

Even though the majority of protests during the Egyptian uprising were non-violent, episodes of violence still occurred during the eighteen days of protests, but violence was rare and mostly was in response to the initial violence state security forces displayed against protesters at the onset of the demonstrations. Overall, the non-violent nature of the Egyptian uprising made it difficult for the Egyptian military to rationalize using high levels of violence against civilians.

The fifth societal variable present in Egypt includes demonstrations “winning” over the Egyptian military. For instance, during the uprising one of the most common chants sung by protesters was “the army and the people are one hand.” As Ketchley (2014) mentions this particular chant served three purposes: (1) to increase the bond and fraternization between Egyptian demonstrators and the Egyptian military, (2) to make it more difficult for Egyptian soldiers to use violence against protesters, and (3) to signal to the

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49 Amnesty International (2011c, 35, 39, 48, 57, and 68).

Egyptian military that defectors would be welcomed and accepted by protesters if military personnel decided to defect from the regime. There are other examples of protesters winning over the military, especially given the number of times protesters physically embraced security forces at demonstrations. For instance, there is a YouTube video from January 28, 2011, that shows dozens of Egyptian protesters approaching a phalanx of CSF troops in Alexandria. In the video the protesters approach the soldiers and start embracing and hugging them and there is a particularly powerful image of a young CSF troop weeping as numerous civilians approach him with hugs and kisses on his cheek. The Egyptian protesters also won over the military by climbing on top of parked military vehicles and using the vehicles as a peaceful platform to wave Egyptian flags and embrace soldiers (Ketchley 2014, 176-179). Tanks were targeted by protesters and were "graffitied" by demonstrators with slogans such as “the people’s army” and “leave Mubarak” (Ketchley 2014, 172). Lastly, across the country protesters distributed pamphlets with suggestions and tactics of how to protest smartly and how to “bring individual policemen and soldiers to the side of the people” (Ketchley 2014, 162). While not all Egyptian protesters fondly embraced the Egyptian military, since so many Egyptians treated the military favorably, this provides evidence that demonstrators were trying to win over the military's support. Overall, it appears these displays won over many within the Egyptian military and made it more difficult for military forces to fire on civilians.

The sixth and final societal variable present in Egypt was during modern Egyptian history, the military did not commit egregious human rights violations against the population. To examine this empirically, the CIRI Human Rights dataset was consulted,
which is a dataset that examines the level of human rights violations within a country.\textsuperscript{52} The CIRI Human Rights Index is a number that ranges from 0 – 8, with 0 indicating a country has performed poorly (i.e. committed many human rights violations against the population) and 8 indicating a country has performed well (i.e. committed no human rights violations against the population). Figure 3 illustrates the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index of Egypt from 1981 to 2011.\textsuperscript{53}

Overall, Egypt's CIRI Human Rights Index score during this period is poor and for fourteen years Egypt scored a "3" or lower. Similar to the Tunisian case in Chapter 4, this chapter examines \textit{U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices}\textsuperscript{54} and


\textsuperscript{53} Physical Integrity Rights measures the government’s role in torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances.

\textsuperscript{54} The reports for 1993 and 1994 were not available, however the others years were available at the following:
Amnesty International Annual Reports\textsuperscript{55} from all the years Egypt scored a 3 or lower on CIRI Human Rights Index (1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2002 – 2011). Within these reports there is little mention of the Egyptian military committing human rights abuses against the Egyptian population. The reason Egypt receives such low human rights scores during these years is primarily due to the egregious acts by the internal security forces such as the Egyptian police and the SSI. Under the Mubarak regime the internal security forces were responsible for imprisonment, torturing, kidnapping, monitoring, and striking fear and intimidation into the Egyptian population. It would be naive to assume that the Egyptian military is entirely innocent of any wrongdoings against the Egyptian public during Mubarak’s regime, but there is no evidence the Egyptian military institutionally and systematically committed human rights violations against the population. Since internal

\textsuperscript{55} Note that the Amnesty International annual reports explore events that occurred in the following year. For instance, the Amnesty International Annual Report 2011 examines events from 2010. The following Amnesty International reports were examined in regards to Egypt’s human right’s record: 
security forces administered the majority of day-to-day state security violence against Egyptians it was unlikely the Egyptian military was going to start using high levels of violence against protesters during the Egyptian uprising. Even though the Egyptian military intervened in 1977 and 1986, there was no historical precedence of utilizing high levels of violence against anti-regime protesters and the military was unwilling to start this trend during the monumental size and fervor of the Egyptian uprising.

Figure 3. Egypt & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011)

It is significant that all six of the societal variables were present in Egypt. It is also not coincidental that all six societal variables were also present in Tunisia. This suggests societal variables played a key role in convincing militaries to defect incumbent regimes and to support mass political protesters. All six societal variables appeared to have a significant role on Egyptian military defection and increased the legitimacy of the uprising considering protests were large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and actively won over the military. These findings echo the research from Zunes (1994), Chenoweth and Stepan (2011), and Nepstad (2013) that states that broad-based coalitions, non-violence, and large number of protesters can increase the legitimacy of the protests and
make state repressions more costly and less likely. In addition, since Egypt is the most populous Arab country, the protests in Tahrir Square received tremendous amount of international media coverage, which also raised the costs of repression for the Egyptian military. The protesters' tactics to specifically win over the military during the Egyptian uprising evoke similar tactics used by demonstrators in the 1986 Philippine uprising (Boudreau 2004) and during the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Kurzman 2004). Overall, all six of the societal variables were present in Egypt and appear to have played a significant role in influencing the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime and to not use high levels of violence against the civilian protesters.

International Variables

Of the three international variables one was present in Egypt and the other two were absent. The one international variable present in Egypt was the high proportion of Egyptian officers that received training and education from foreign militaries. The Egyptian military has maintained close relationships with foreign militaries ever since the 1952 Free Officers' coup. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the pan-Arab ideology of President Nasser linked Egypt with Syria through the United Arab Republic. From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s the Egyptian military was closely associated with the Soviet Union. For instance, President Mubarak received military training in the Soviet Union prior to becoming president while he was a pilot in the Egyptian Air Force (Holmes 2012, 394). Along with Mubarak, it is believed approximately 6,250 other Egyptian military personnel were trained and educated by the Soviets in the USSR during the 1960s and 1970s (Campbell 2009, 104). In the mid-1970s, President Sadat moved Egyptian military influence away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States, which resulted in the historic Camp David Accords of 1979. Afterwards,
the United States became the primary benefactor of the Egyptian military both in terms of military aid, equipment, training, and education opportunities, and during the 1980s approximately 400 to 500 Egyptian military personnel per year were trained in the U.S. (Campbell 2009, 106-107). More recently, the Department of Defense notes that in 2010, 811 Egyptians received military training and education in the U.S., but given the large size of the Egyptian military this only represents .002 percent of the total Egyptian military. However, the small proportion of Egyptian officers that receive training by the United States does not paint the entire picture of American influence on the Egyptian military. First, many of the Egyptian military personnel who receive foreign military training and education are officers and therefore have a more powerful position in the Egyptian military hierarchy and are better placed to guide the overall direction of the Egyptian military. Second, U.S. foreign aid to Egypt is nearly unparalleled as recent accounts indicate that from 1949 – 2015 the U.S. provided Egypt with a total of $76 billion in bilateral foreign aid, including $1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987 to 2015 (Sharp 2016, 13). Brownlee (2012, 10) demonstrates that the U.S.' role in Egypt goes well beyond a traditional bilateral economic agreement since the U.S. plays an active role in Egyptian affairs by "shaping the calculations, priorities, and resources of the [Mubarak] regime." Given the tremendous amount of aid the U.S. provides Egypt, it is only natural to assume the U.S. has some sort of agency or leverage over Egyptian affairs.

During the Egyptian uprising, on January 29, 2011, several senior officers from the Egyptian military happened to be in Washington D.C. for bilateral meetings and senior

officers from the U.S. military met with Egyptian officers and urged them to show restraint if the military was ordered to confront protesters.\textsuperscript{57} Overall, the U.S. has had an active relationship with the Egyptian military for the last thirty years and it appears the effects of training, education, and military aid had some influence on the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime.

The two international variables absent in Egypt was no neighboring military defected from their incumbent regime, and foreign troops did not invade Egypt with the aim of overthrowing Mubarak. Egypt is bordered by Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, and Israel to the east. While factions of the Libyan military defected from Qaddafi during the Libyan uprising, these defections occurred later in 2011 after the Egyptian uprising already took place. Thus, the factions of Libyan military personnel that defected from the Libyan regime could not have impacted the decision-making of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian uprising.

There is also the issue that no foreign troops invaded Egypt during the uprising. Even though foreign troops did not invade Egypt or have a direct effect upon Egyptian military behavior during the uprising, foreign powers, especially the U.S. had an indirect role. At the outset of the protests the United States was still supportive of the Mubarak regime and on January 25, 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton claimed that despite the protests, “the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.”\textsuperscript{58} A few days later, on January 27, 2011, Vice-President Biden appeared on television and echoed Clinton’s views and stated

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57 Ibid.
\end{flushright}
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Mubarak is not a dictator, nor was it time for Mubarak to step down from office. However, as the protests continued, the U.S. government began to reevaluate its support for Mubarak and on January 30, 2011, the U.S. government first referenced the term “transition” when discussing the situation in Egypt. The Obama administration distanced itself more noticeably from the Mubarak regime after the February 2 Tahrir Square attacks by stating that Mubarak needed to speed up his exit from power and leave office as soon as possible. But U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt during this time was not clear or decisive.

Complicating the matter was President Obama’s decision to ask former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, and close friend of President Mubarak, Frank Wisner, to meet with Mubarak with the hopes Wisner’s personal touch would be better received by the Egyptian president. However, after meeting with Mubarak, Wisner publically announced that he thought Mubarak should remain in power and thought President Mubarak’s continued leadership was critical for the stability of Egypt.

The United States’ role during the Egyptian uprising was complicated as the Obama administration was caught between wanting to support Mubarak, its longtime ally, yet also recognizing the validity of the mass political protests gripping the country and wanting to avoid being on the wrong side of history. To further complicate the matter were regional politics and Washington did not want Egypt to devolve into domestic turmoil in which the


peace arrangement between Egypt and Israel would become jeopardized. Overall, the variable of foreign troop invasion did not exist in the Egyptian case, however, that does not mean international factors were unimportant or non-existent. The MENA Military Index measures the international impact of military behavior through three variables: direct foreign military intervention, foreign military education and training, and the actions of a contiguous military. However, the U.S.' role in the Egyptian uprising suggest that additional international variables can also influence military behavior during mass political protests such as foreign military aid, bilateral relations, diplomatic relations, and communicative channels between governments.

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrates that societal and institutional variables best explain why the Egyptian military defected from the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian uprising. Egypt contained numerous institutional variables such as the prevalence of internal security forces and their role as a rival and countermeasure to the Egyptian military, the military's institutional autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed forces, the cleavages that existed between military personnel particularly along generational and socio-economic lines, and the system of military conscription. In isolation, these institutional variables were not enough to cause military defection in Egypt since many of these factors have existed in the country for decades. Rather, the Egyptian military needed an event to trigger defection from the regime, which took place during the historical mass demonstrations of the Egyptian uprising. The Egyptian uprising contained specific societal variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect from the regime. For instance the Egyptian uprising was large, it contained a cross-class coalition of protesters, it consisted of non-traditional
protesters, it was non-violent, and protesters were successful at winning over the Egyptian military. These characteristics differed from previous protests in Egyptian history such as the Bread Riots of 1977 and the CSF Riots of 1986, when the military violently intervened against protesters and protected the regime. The MENA Military Index indicates that Egypt was the MENA country most likely to defect from its regime during the Arab uprisings and as this chapter demonstrates, this was indeed the case and the primary reason the Egyptian military defected from Mubarak was due to existing institutional variables coupled with the particular societal characteristics of the Egyptian uprising.
CHAPTER 6:

THE BAHRAINI MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

This chapter examines the Bahraini military during the Arab uprisings. The Bahraini protests began on February 13, 2011, only two days after President Mubarak resigned as the Egyptian president in Cairo. A wave of demonstrations engulfed the island country for approximately a month from mid-February 2011 through mid-March 2011. Since Bahrain is a small country with only 1.3 million inhabitants, international media did not cover the protests as much as the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. However, the protests in Bahrain were historic as hundreds-of-thousands of demonstrators took to the streets calling for regime change and faced-off against state security forces deployed by the government. The events in Bahrain are critical to examine in this project because the Bahraini military, unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries examined in Chapters 4 and 5, defended the ruling regime and willingly used violence against protesters throughout the duration of the uprising. After a month of demonstrations, several thousand military troops from the GCC entered Bahrain and protected the ruling regime from anti-government protests. Shortly afterwards the Bahraini government issued a state of emergency, expanded the control of state security forces, and razed the "Pearl Monument" in downtown Manama, which served as the central congregation spot and symbol for anti-government protests.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine why the Bahraini military defended the ruling regime during the Bahraini uprising. The first section provides a historical overview of the Bahraini military and discusses the role and development of the Bahraini military from
the 1800s until the 2011 uprising. The second section explores the major events during the Bahraini uprising and highlights the role the Bahraini military played during the demonstrations. The third section applies the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index to Bahrain and identifies the variables that influenced Bahraini military behavior during the protests. According to the MENA Military Index there were numerous variables present in Bahrain that influenced the military to defend the ruling regime. A key finding is even though the Bahraini uprising shared similar characteristics to the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, the Bahraini military did not possess the necessary institutional variables to induce military defection. Moreover, there were international variables in Bahrain that encouraged the Bahraini military to defend the regime, notably, a regional ally, Saudi Arabia, and a global ally, the United States that preferred the status quo in Bahraini politics and opposed regime change from taking place in the country.

**Background of the Bahraini Military**

To better understand the role of the Bahraini military during the Bahraini uprising it is useful to examine the evolution and role of the Bahraini armed forces in relation to Bahraini politics. One of the unique factors of Bahrain is since it was a British protectorate throughout most of the 1800s and 1900s, there was no need for a Bahraini military since the island was defended and protected by British military forces. As the United Kingdom (UK) expanded its colonial operations in India and South Asia in the 1800s the British Royal Navy wanted to ensure British shipping lanes were secure from piracy on the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. As a way to protect British commercial interests and to expand Britain's diplomatic influence in the region, the UK signed numerous treaties with sheikhdoms including one with Bahrain in 1820. This treaty legitimized the royal rule of the al-Khalifa family, gave the British Royal Navy access to Bahraini ports, and in return the British Royal
Navy provided military protection to Bahrain (Lawson 1989, 27-45; Strobl 2011, 24).

British military protection meant Bahrain did not need to develop military forces throughout the 1800s and 1900s and the establishment of the Bahraini military only occurred once British forces left the country and Bahrain was provided with full independence in 1971.

Even though the Bahraini military was not established until 1971, Bahrain developed and institutionalized a domestic police force in 1932 comprised largely of foreigners. The British struggled to create a Bahraini police force that amicably and fairly combined Bahraini Sunnis and Bahraini Shias and after numerous attempts the British decided to recruit foreign soldiers from nearby India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen (Khuri 1980, 115). For many Bahrainis, the fact the country’s police forces consisted of foreigners was a microcosm of the overall influence foreign actors had over the domestic politics of Bahrain. This included the economic sector, which was heavily dictated by foreign governments and foreign companies and despite Bahrain’s increased oil production during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s the wealth from petroleum was distributed to foreign companies and a small domestic elite rather than to the majority of Bahrainis (Lawson 1989, 47-58). The booming success of the Bahraini petroleum industry also led to an influx of South Asian workers who migrated to the country to work for the main petroleum company, the Bahrain Petroleum Company. These factors created a cauldron of discontent and many Bahrainis were upset with how the country was heavily dictated by foreign police officers, foreign workers that took domestic jobs, foreign companies that benefitted from Bahraini oil, and a foreign power, the United Kingdom, that still controlled the island. Unsurprisingly, a fervent Bahraini national sovereignty movement gripped the country in the 1950s with mass political protesters taking to the streets and demanding political change (Lawson 1989, 62).
The Bahraini national movement grew violent in the mid-1950s, which resulted in the Bahraini government strengthening the country's internal security forces. Since many Bahraini police forces were non-Bahrainis it meant these officers were loyal to the regime and not to Bahraini citizens, and therefore foreign police officers were more willing to use violence against Bahraini protesters. The sectarian rifts in Bahrain ruptured during the nationalist movements of the 1950s and pitted majority Shias against minority Sunnis. Although the Shias outnumbered the Sunnis, the al-Khalifa regime was Sunni-based and Sunnis enjoyed a privileged status in Bahraini politics. Once Shias began challenging the al-Khalifa regime in the 1950s many Bahraini Sunnis enlisted in the country's police forces giving the Bahraini internal security forces a distinguishable sectarian division between Sunnis and Shias (Lawson 1989, 66-68).

The primary reason Bahrain gained independence was because the British government decided by the late 1960s that it was time to leave the island and grant the country with full sovereignty. The Bahraini independence movement was a top-down, elite arrangement where the British left the island and transferred formal political power to the Sunni-based al-Khalifa royal regime. As a result the establishment of the Bahraini military was an al-Khalifa creation. In the late 1960s, once it was known the British would be vacating the island, Emir Isa's eldest son, Hamad, was enrolled at Mons Officer Cadet School in England and after graduating at the age of twenty-one, Hamad returned to Bahrain and served as the country's first defense minister for the new military force, the Bahrain Defence Front (BDF) (al-Murshed 2013; Gengler 2013, 64).

After independence, Emir Isa attempted to broaden political participation by creating a Constitutional Assembly to write the country’s constitution. It took over a year to write and approve the constitution and once completed it established a unicameral
parliament known as the National Assembly, which was a group of thirty representatives who were authorized to give advice and consent to the laws initiated by the emir and his cabinet. However, the National Assembly only lasted one-year since representatives challenged the emir’s authority, particularly in regards to internal and national security issues (Lawson 1989, 87 – 91). Three specific security issues divided the National Assembly and the emir. First, representatives in the National Assembly challenged the continuation of the 1965 Public Security Law, which provided Bahraini security forces with sweeping powers to arrest and detain citizens without due judicial process. Second, the emir wanted to expand these laws and give the Bahraini security forces the right to arrest and imprison any individual suspected of disturbing national security for up to three years without interrogation or holding a trial (Khuri 1980, 231). Third, several National Assembly representatives failed to ratify a state security decree that would have extended the lease of U.S. naval ships using Bahraini ports as docking facilities (Lawson 1989, 91). After months of stalled negotiations the emir decided it was easier to dismiss the National Assembly and ended the parliamentary experiment in Bahraini politics.

After the disbandment of the National Assembly mass protests broke out across the country. Large segments of the population participated in the demonstrations but some of the most fervent protests were from workers in March 1972 who demanded the creation of a national labor union. In response to these mass protests Emir Isa deployed internal security forces and military soldiers onto the streets to suppress the demonstrations.¹ It is significant to remember at this point the BDF had only been in existence for one year, yet Emir Isa demonstrated he was willing to order the country's new military force onto the

streets to confront anti-government protesters. Similarly, the Bahraini military showed it was willing to use violence against civilians when ordered to by the regime.

In the upcoming years the Bahraini military became less involved in domestic security primarily because the royal family enlarged the internal security forces, which were able to effectively monitor domestic security. The BDF was shielded by the regime from the general public and as a result the emir employed a strategy to build up the Bahraini military via relationships with wealthy and powerful foreign countries. In particular, the Bahraini military expanded its capabilities through the assistance of foreign military aid from the United States. Similar to the British Royal Navy in the 1800s and early 1900s, in the late 1900s the American Navy wanted to expand its military and diplomatic influence across the Persian Gulf, and Emir Isa, much like his Bahraini royal predecessors a century prior, was willing to accommodate to the powerful Western country. The BDF received equipment, weapons, materiel, and military training in exchange for allowing the American military access to Bahraini ports and military facilities. In the 1980s, U.S. military assistance increased to Bahrain especially after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Shia population in Bahrain has historically been linked to Iran and after the 1979 Iranian revolution removed the shah from power and established a Shia Islamist state, many Shias in Bahrain yearned for a similar outcome to occur in Bahrain. Two years after the Iranian revolution a group called the Islamic Front of the Liberalization of Bahrain unsuccessfully attempted a coup to overthrow Emir Isa with the hopes of installing a Shia Islamic state in Bahrain. The coup plotters planned to attack the country’s government offices, hold government ministers hostage, seize the country’s telecommunication buildings, and impose an Iranian style revolution. However, the Bahraini internal security forces detected these plans before they unfolded and most of the movement’s key figures were arrested and as a result Bahraini state security
forces fiercely cracked down on the country's Shia population. The aftermath of the failed 1981 coup impacted the sectarian divisions between Shias and Sunnis within the country and started a process in which Shias were systematically removed from the Bahraini military.

In the early 1990s many Bahrainis were upset the country still did not reinstate the parliament the emir dissolved two decades prior. At this time there were mass demonstrations and even a formal petition calling for the emir to revive the constitution and parliament. At first the emir responded to these demands and created the Consultative Council, which was comprised of thirty representatives and advised on legislation initiated by the emir and his cabinet. However, despite this gesture many critics claimed the Consultative Council was a watered-down political body with no substantive powers. Shias were especially upset because they believed the Council contained a disproportionate number of Sunnis in relation to the majority Shia population (Louër 2013, 247). The creation of the Consultative Council did little to reduce political unrest across the country and demonstrations continued throughout the 1990s and in many instances the Bahraini internal security forces responded to these demonstrations with violence, as there are reports state security forces fired tear gas canisters, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition at protesters. The security situation became so intense that in 1996 BDF soldiers were briefly deployed onto the streets to quell demonstrators.

Even though mass protests gripped Bahrain during the 1990s, this was also a time of tremendous growth and expansion for the Bahraini military through the utilization of

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2 For more information on the failed 1981 coup in Bahrain see al-Hasan (2013).


4 Ibid.
American military aid. At the beginning of the decade Bahrain cooperated with the multilateral military campaign against Iraq in Kuwait, allowed U.S. military personnel to use the country as a base, and even sent some pilots to lead aerial missions against Saddam Hussein's troops in Iraq (Katzman 2011, 12). The American-Bahraini relationship blossomed after the Kuwait War as the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet became permanently headquartered in Bahrain in 1995 (where it is still stationed today). Also, the Bahraini military expanded its weaponry and artillery in the late 1990s by purchasing equipment from the U.S. including F-16 aircrafts, advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, and numerous other weapons and materiel (Katzman 2011, 14). By the turn of the twenty-first century, the Bahraini military was still small but had built up its weapon capabilities through the assistance of the U.S. and was a pivotal actor in regional security.

Political changes occurred in Bahrain at the turn of the twenty-first century with the sudden death of Emir Isa in 1999. Isa's eldest son, Hamad, took over and immediately ushered in political changes by releasing political prisoners, repealing controversial state security laws, abolishing the State Security Courts, initiating a national referendum to create a forty-member parliament, granting women the right to vote, creating an independent judiciary, and introducing the National Action Charter that called for the creation of a constitutional monarchy. At first it appeared King Hamad was going to usher in a new era of Bahraini politics that drastically differed from his father's rule, but after the first wave of political changes, Hamad entrenched his regime and proposed policies that reduced political access for the opposition. For example, in 2002, King Hamad unilaterally changed the

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5 For more see Louër (2013, 252).  
6 The 2002 Constitution made Bahrain a constitutional monarchy and as a result Hamad's title changed from "Emir" to "King." After 2002, Hamad will be referred to as King Hamad. For general information on the political reforms that took place in Bahrain in 2001-2002 see BICI (2011, 31-32), Coates Ulrichsen (2013, 2), Kechichian (2004, 40), and Wehrey (2013, 119).
constitution and gave himself unchecked powers, limited the power of the parliament, and passed a controversial law, Decree Law No. 55, which gave criminal amnesty to security officers who were accused of committing crimes under his father's regime.  

Despite King Hamad reneging on several of the political concessions he provided in 2001, he maintained the Bahraini parliament and continued parliamentary elections, which were held in 2002, 2006, and 2010. However, these parliamentary elections were highly controversial and created significant ruptures between Shias and the regime. For example, in 2002, one of the most popular Shia opposition parties, al-Wefaq, boycotted the elections because they felt the composition of available seats was unfair and underrepresented Shias (Katzman 2011, 2).

Four years later, in 2006, government documents were leaked to the public and accused the al-Khalifa regime of creating numerous institutional measures to ensure Sunni dominance in Bahraini politics such as blocking Shias from key political positions, employing gerrymandering tactics to ensure Shias did not hold a majority of the population in key districts, and expediting the naturalization of foreign Sunnis to increase the total Sunni population of the country. By the time the Tunisian protests toppled Ben Ali in Tunis and Egyptian protesters forced Mubarak out of office, there were decades of political turmoil in Bahrain ready to explode. The royal al-Khalifa family installed a political system many Shias viewed as unfair and it is unsurprising Bahrain experienced unrest, violence, and mass demonstrations in the early months of 2011. On February 13, just two days after Mubarak

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7 For more information on the policies King Hamad installed in 2002 see al-Khawalja (2014, 190), BICI (2011, 14, 33), Gengler (2013, 55), and Louër (2013, 256).

8 For more on this episode, which is often referred to as "Bandargate," see Louër (2013, 256-257), and Wehrey (2013, 120). For more information on the regime's use of gerrymandering to reduce Shia influence see Katzman (2011, 3-5) and Neumann (2013, 47).
resigned as the Egyptian president, the Bahraini uprising began with mass political protests, demonstrations, and unrest across the country.

Overall, there are six key factors to better understand the Bahraini military at the outbreak of the 2011 protests. First, the Bahraini military lacks a strong national identity and history. Second, the reason the Bahraini military lacks a strong national identity is because historically there was no need for a Bahraini military since the British military protected the island for over a century. Third, once the British left Bahrain and granted the country with independence, the Bahraini military was an elite construction specifically created to protect the regime. As discussed earlier, the emir's twenty-one year-old son, Hamad, became the country's first defense minister even though he possessed limited military experience. Fourth, even though Bahrain's expansive internal security apparatus efficiently monitored and controlled domestic security in the country, the BDF was ordered to support internal security forces during the 1972 labor strikes and the unrest of the mid-1990s. This demonstrates the Bahraini military was willing to use violence and force against anti-regime protesters. Fifth, the Bahraini military expanded through assistance from the American military. The Bahraini military was essentially an appendage of the ruling regime and since the Bahraini political system blocked political opposition, the ruling regime was able to shield the Bahraini military from civilian influence and the al-Khalifa regime unilaterally guided the direction and development of the Bahraini military. The al-Khalifa regime partnered with the U.S. and in return the Bahraini military was able to build up Bahrain's military capabilities. Sixth, due to the unique domestic demographics, the Bahraini military was primarily comprised of Sunnis. The marginalization of Shias in the armed forces became more pronounced during the last several decades, but the sectarian and communal divide had tremendous influence on Bahraini military behavior and motivations. The next section
of this chapter explores the Bahraini uprising in detail and specifically examines the role the Bahraini military played during this historic month of protests in Bahraini politics.

**The Uprising in Bahrain and the Role of the Military**

During the summer of 2009, many Shia Bahrainis paid close attention to the failed-uprising in Iran, popularly referred to as the “green movement.” However, it was not until the outbreak of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia when Bahrainis truly became galvanized and determined to demonstrate against the ruling Bahraini government. At Shia mosques in early February 2011, religious clerics referenced the Egyptian and Tunisian protesters during sermons and called for Bahrainis to demonstrate and achieve political outcomes similar to those in Cairo and Tunis (BICI 2011, 66). In Egypt, President Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, and two days later the uprising began in Bahrain. Initially the protests were small but King Hamad immediately ordered internal security forces onto the streets to directly confront demonstrators. On the first day of protests Bahraini internal security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets at demonstrators. Protests intensified the next day as an estimated 6,000 demonstrators flooded the streets and state security forces violently responded to the unrest, which led to the first civilian death of the uprising. On the evening of February 14, 2011, Ali al-Meshaima, a twenty-two year-old male, was shot in the back from a shotgun by state security forces in the town of Daih, a suburb due west of the capital. The next day al-Meshaima’s funeral drew thousands of mourners and the procession quickly became a protest march that clashed with state security forces still

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stationed in the area. Coincidentally, the confrontation between the protesters and the state security forces at the funeral wake resulted in another death as a civilian was shot and killed by a shotgun from a state security soldier.

The events from February 13 to February 15 sparked further demonstrations across the country and the most significant development was the thousands of protesters who descended upon the capital city of Manama and centralized around the "Pearl Roundabout," a major intersection with a 300-foot pearl monument. By February 16, 2011, nearly 12,000 protesters congregated at the Pearl Roundabout and demonstrations created a carnival-type atmosphere akin to Tahrir Square during the Egyptian uprising as people set up tents, shared foods and stories, slept in the roundabout, and gathered in unity.\(^\text{11}\) On the fourth day of the uprising, and in the early hours of February 17, 2011, the al-Khalifa government deployed military soldiers onto the streets to support internal security forces and to confront the protesters at the Pearl Roundabout. At 3:00 a.m., while thousands of demonstrators were sleeping, 1,000 state security forces (both internal security forces and military soldiers) descended upon the Pearl Roundabout and physically dispersed protesters (BICI 2011, 73). According to the regime, security forces warned protesters over loudspeakers to clear the square before marching in, but many protesters disagree and claim security forces invaded the square unannounced and without warning.\(^\text{12}\) Security personnel were armed with sticks, shields, sound bombs, tear gas, and shotguns, and it took security forces only thirty minutes to clear the majority of the square and in the melee three civilians were reported to have


\(^{12}\) For more on these events see BICI (2011, 73), and *National Public Radio*, "Bahrain Defends Deadly Assault on Protesters," February 17, 2011, accessed on May 9, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2011/02/17/133827875/police-assault-on-bahrain-protest-turns-deadly."
died. After the Pearl Roundabout was cleared the Bahraini military increased its presence around the capital as dozens of tanks and armed vehicles were deployed across the city to set up checkpoints and monitor the general movement around Manama. The following day, February 18, 2011, there were several confrontations between BDF soldiers and protesters. First, it was reported BDF soldiers were stationed outside the Salmaniya Medical Complex, a major medical facility in Manama, and blocked civilians’ access to the hospital, since security forces believed civilians with injuries were protesters who had instigated violence against the regime. Second, approximately two thousand protesters marched back towards the Pearl Roundabout in an attempt to reclaim the area from security forces. On their way there demonstrators confronted armed military soldiers and started chanting anti-military slogans, which escalated into violent clashes and led to the death of another civilian (BICI 2011, 77-78 and 233-234).

The chaos of the previous six days influenced senior officials from the leading Shia opposition party, al-Wefaq, to meet with the Crown Prince and request the regime withdraw military soldiers from the streets and provide some political concessions to the demonstrators. In an act of goodwill the al-Khalifa regime initiated a formal national dialogue with opposition leaders, ordered Bahraini military and security forces stationed in the Pearl Roundabout to step down, and announced the reopening of the Pearl Roundabout.

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to demonstrators. The departure of military and security forces inspired thousands of Bahrainis to retake the streets and it appeared as if the Bahraini uprising might accomplish similar political achievements to the protests in Egypt and Tunisia. Anti-regime protesters had momentum on their side and by February 22, 2011, an estimated 100,000 demonstrators descended upon the Pearl Roundabout to commemorate the civilians killed in the protests during the prior two weeks.

The size of the February 22 demonstrations was phenomenal especially considering the population of Bahrain was only 1.3 million meaning approximately 10 percent of the entire population was at this protest. After security forces reopened the Pearl Roundabout to protesters there were three noticeable changes to the uprising. One, mass protests became more focused on anti-regime chants rather than concentrating on policy changes. Two, demonstrators started staging sit-ins and gatherings in sensitive areas across the city. For example, on March 3, 2011, an estimated 100,000-450,000 anti-regime protesters congregated outside of the al-Fatih mosque, which is located only several blocks away from the American naval base. Additionally, nearly 100,000 demonstrators marched in front of the Council of Ministers and the Prime Ministers' office on March 4 and March 6. Three,


18 The lower estimate (100,000) comes from the Bahraini government, whereas the higher estimate (450,000) comes from the protesters and opposition groups. For more on this event see BICI (2011, 102-103).

on March 11 protesters aimed their sights directly on the royal family as thousands of
demonstrators gathered outside of the king's residence.\textsuperscript{20}

These changes had profound effects on the ruling regime’s interpretation of the
uprising. The anti-regime rhetoric, the spread of protests to critical political and economic
areas in the capital, and the royal family’s residence being specifically targeted inspired King
Hamad to call on regional security forces from the GCC to enter Bahrain in order to protect
the regime from anti-government protesters. On Monday March 14, approximately 1,000
GCC troops entered the country and were sent to the southern region of the country to
protect the country's oil refineries and other vital government locations.\textsuperscript{21} The presence of
GCC troops was vital to the regime as it allowed Bahraini state security forces the ability to
directly confront demonstrators without fear that key governmental buildings and facilities
were unguarded. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared a three-month state of
emergency and initiated martial law, which redeployed the Bahraini military and also gave the
BDF the authority to use force in order to maintain security across the country.\textsuperscript{22}

Thousands of Bahrainis flooded the streets in response to the state of emergency and
the presence of foreign troops in the country. For example, 10,000 demonstrators marched

\textsuperscript{20} Associated Press, "Bahrain protesters march on palace as Gates visits," March 12, 2011, accessed on May 12,

\textsuperscript{21} CNN, "Foreign troops enter Bahrain as protests continue," March 15, 2011, accessed on May 9, 2016,
troops sent to Bahrain as protests escalate," The Telegraph, March 14, 2011, accessed on May 9, 2016.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/8381034/Saudi-Arabian-troops-sent-to-
Bahrain-as-protests-escalate.html.

\textsuperscript{22} BICI (2011, 139), Patrick Cockburn, "Bahrain in state of emergency as crowd marches on Saudi embassy,"
The Independent, March 15, 2011, accessed on May 9, 2016,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bahrain-in-state-of-emergency-as-crowd-marches-
on-saudi-embassy-2242919.html, BBC News, "Bahrain king declares state of emergency after protests," March
to the Saudi Arabian embassy protesting against the Saudi soldiers that invaded the country.23 Protesters reported that Saudi military vehicles fired on Bahraini civilians leading to several deaths, a claim denied by Bahraini and Saudi officials.24 The assistance of GCC troops and the initiation of Bahraini martial law changed the tone of the uprising and signaled the regime's willingness to use force and violence to suppress the movement. On March 16, 2011, BDF soldiers and internal security forces cleared demonstrators from the Pearl Roundabout for the second time in one month. In addition, the Bahraini security forces swept through the entire capital and cleared protesters from the Financial Harbor district, and the Salmaniya Medical Complex.25 Two days later, the uprising effectively ended as BDF soldiers razed the 300-foot pearl statue that was the centerpiece of the Pearl Roundabout.26 The government claimed this decision was made to improve traffic flow in the area, but the razing of the statue was a symbolic blow to the uprising and demonstrated the regime was willing to physically remove the remnants of the anti-government movement.

During mid-February to mid-March the Bahraini military demonstrated on numerous occasions it was willing to protect the regime and use violence against anti-government demonstrators. Moreover, the state of emergency meant the Bahraini military was stationed across the country for the next three months as unrest continued into the summer of 2011. Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain created a commission to investigate

23 Patrick Cockburn, "Bahrain in state of emergency as crowd marches on Saudi embassy," BBC News "Bahrain king declares state of emergency after protests," and BICI (2011, 139).


the events that took place during the uprising and to specifically outline the role of the government and the state security forces. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) produced a 500-page report on the uprising released, which was in November of 2011. Overall, the BICI catalogues the events that took place during the uprising and the specific role internal security forces and the military played during the uprising. Tellingly, the report indicates that the BDF was active during the uprising, wielded assault rifles and machine guns, fired on demonstrators, deployed tanks and armored vehicles, incited violence, blocked access to the Salmaniya Medical Complex, cleared the Pearl Roundabout on two occasions, fired on protesters, and razed the Pearl Monument. Unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries the Bahraini military willingly followed regime orders throughout the duration of the uprising and utilized sustained violence against anti-government protesters.

The key question of this chapter is to examine the variables that influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime during the Bahraini uprising and use violence against civilians? To answer this question the following section examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index and identifies the variables that best explain why the Bahraini military defended the al-Khalifa regime.

The MENA Military Index & Bahrain

This section examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index and specifically focuses on the variables that influenced the Bahraini military to defend the regime and use violence against anti-regime protesters. As discussed in Chapter 3, Bahrain possesses a MENA Military Index Score of 0.30, which means only six of the twenty variables influencing military defection were present in the country. Table 13 illustrates the twenty variables from the MENA Military Index in Bahrain and indicates which variables

were present in the country (labeled as “yes”) and which of the variables were not present (labeled as "no").

The fourteen variables that contributed to the Bahraini military's decision to defend the regime and use high levels of violence against protesters include: (1) the lack of communal splits within the military between soldiers, (2) the lack of socio-economic rifts within the military, (3) the absence of a parallel security force that rivals and serves as a counterbalance to the Bahraini military, (4) the absence of a significant rivalry between the military and the Bahraini internal security forces, (5) the absence of any rivalries between the different military branches in the Bahraini armed forces, (6) the absence of significant rivalries or splits between senior and junior soldiers, (7) the absence of military conscription, (8) the military's lack of autonomy in making internal appointments within the armed forces, (9) soldiers' overall satisfaction with regime benefits, (10) the king individually appointed the defense minister and the leading generals in the Bahraini military, (11) orders for the military to confront protesters came directly from the king, (12) the protest movement's inability to win over Bahraini soldiers, (13) GCC troops invaded the country to support the al-Khalifa regime, and (14) no neighboring military defected from their regime during the Arab uprisings. Of these fourteen variables eight are institutional and address characteristics within the military and the country’s security apparatus, three variables address the relationship between the military and the regime, one variable is societal and based upon the characteristics of the Bahraini uprising, and two variables address international dynamics.

In addition to the fourteen variables that influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime, there were five variables that could have influenced military defection but did not. This includes (1) the monumental size of the uprising and how it represented well over one percent of the country's total population, (2) the Bahraini uprising included
non-traditional protesters such as women, the elderly, and children, (3) the non-violent nature of the protest movements, (4) the Bahraini military did not commit egregious human rights violations against civilians in the country’s history, and (5) the broad-based nature of the protests. The final variable (#20) is highlighted because the events in Bahrain contradict the expected results of the MENA Military Index. The theory behind this variable argues that if a high percentage officers and soldiers received military training and education from a foreign country then those military personnel would be more likely to defect from the regime during the Arab uprisings. Even though a significant number of Bahraini military personnel received military training and education from the United States, this aspect did not influence the Bahraini military to defect from the al-Khalifa regime and there is evidence Bahrain’s relationship with the U.S. had the opposite effect and actually contributed to the Bahraini military defending the regime.

Chapters 4 and 5 examined the military defection in Tunisia and Egypt and overall those two militaries defected from the ruling regime for two reasons. First, Tunisia and Egypt possessed existing institutional variables prior to the breakout of the Arab uprisings that made military defection more likely. For example, both Egypt and Tunisia had parallel security forces that rivaled and counter-balanced the country’s military, in both countries there were significant rivalries between the military and internal security forces at the outbreak of the uprisings, both countries had a system of military conscription, and both countries’ militaries had institutional autonomy to make personnel decisions within the military hierarchy. Second, and equally as important, the protests in Egypt and Tunisia contained the necessary societal ingredients that provided the opportunity for military defection. The protests in Egypt and Tunisia were large, non-violent, broad-based, contained non-traditional protesters, and were successful at winning over the military.
Table 13. Bahrain and the MENA Military Index Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Communal splits between soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>11. Did orders to intervene come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Socio-economic rifts between soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12. Uprising larger than 1% of population?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Parallel security forces to military?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13. Protesters include women and children?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Rivalry between military and other security forces?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14. Uprising non-violent in nature?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Rivalries between military branches?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15. Military have clean record with no human rights violations?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Conscription?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>17. Did movement win over soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Military have autonomy in appointments?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>18. Did foreign troops intervene to overthrow leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Someone other than the current leader appointed the Defense Minister and other leading generals?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20. Significant portion of soldiers receive foreign military training?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter shifts the focus and explores why the Bahraini military defended the al-Khalifa regime and willingly utilized violence against civilian protesters during the country's uprising. This chapter complements the central findings discovered in Chapters 4 and 5 by demonstrating that Bahrain did not possess the existing institutional conditions present in Egypt and Tunisia. Interestingly, the Bahraini uprising contained similar characteristics to the protests in Egypt and Tunisia considering the Bahraini uprising was also large, generally non-violent, broad-based, and consisted of non-traditional protesters. However, the Bahraini case suggests that societal variables alone cannot influence military behavior because even though these factors were present in the Bahraini uprising, they still were not enough to influence military defection. This supports the potential significance that existing institutional variables have upon laying the foundation for possible military defection.

The following subsections explore the institutional, regime, societal, and international variables in more detail and discuss the role each of these variables had on Bahraini military response during the uprising. The first subsection explores the eight institutional variables, the second subsection explores the three regime variables, the third subsection explores the six societal variables, and the fourth subsection explores the three international variables. As these subsections reveal, Bahrain did not possess the necessary existing institutional variables to influence military defection, even though the societal characteristics of the country’s uprising certainly provided the military with the ingredients and opportunity to defect. Moreover, in addition to the lack of institutional variables, Bahrain is uniquely influenced by international factors and the fact Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were in favor of the regime remaining in power also contributed to the Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa regime.
Institutional Variables

All eight of the institutional variables in the MENA Military Index were not present in Bahrain and these variables influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime during the country’s uprising. The first two institutional variables are interrelated, which include the absence of communal splits between military personnel within the Bahraini armed forces and the absence of military conscription. In Bahrain, the primary communal rift in the country exists between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. There are no official numbers as to the percentage of Sunnis and Shias in the country, but a recent Pew Research study suggests there are a total of 400,000-500,000 Shias in Bahrain, which equals to approximately 60-70 percent of the country's population. Despite Shias' majority, the Sunni minority possesses a disproportionate amount of power over the political and security institutions of the country. For example, the Sunni-led al-Khalifa regime has implemented political mechanisms that marginalize the Shia majority such as employing electoral gerrymandering, specifically weakening Shias' role within the parliament, and inflating the Sunni population by expediting the naturalization of Sunni foreigners (Gengler 2013, 69; Neumann 2013, 47; Wehrey 2013, 119).

In addition to the political marginalization of Shias, the al-Khalifa regime has marginalized Shias from the Bahraini security apparatus. In Bahrain, there is no military conscription and even though military service is voluntary, Shias are unofficially discouraged and barred from serving in the military. Louër (2013) argues that the exclusion of Shias in the national security apparatus has been a tactical coup-proofing strategy utilized by the al-Khalifa regime to ensure regime loyalty. The “de-Shiafication” of the Bahraini security

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apparatus occurred most profoundly in the 1980s and the 1990s after the failed Shia coup and as Shia opposition groups became more vocal and aggressive towards Emir Isa’s policies. Louër (2013, 247) notes that in the 1990s a few Shia soldiers remained in the Bahraini military but as Shia-led protests intensified during the decade, Shia soldiers were either fired or forced into early retirement. It should be noted that even prior to the 1980s and 1990s, the role of Shias in the Bahraini military was limited as Shias typically held lower ranked positions in the military hierarchy.

Recent studies verify the absence of Shias from the Bahraini security apparatus. For example, Gengler (2013, 69) conducted a small survey in 2009 asking Bahraini males their profession and in the survey no Shia male claimed to work for the Bahraini security apparatus, whereas 17 percent of the male Sunni respondents indicated they worked in the Bahraini security apparatus. Another striking fact of the Bahraini security apparatus is that foreigners are actively recruited by the al-Khalifa regime, so instead of Bahraini Shias filling the ranks, Sunni recruits from neighboring countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen serve as Bahraini soldiers or Bahraini police officers (Zunes 2013, 156; Katzman 2011, 13).

Since Shias are excluded from the Bahraini security apparatus the Bahraini military and internal security forces are religiously homogenous since officers and soldiers overwhelmingly identify with Sunni Islam. As a result there are no internal communal splits within the Bahraini armed forces and the communal bond between Sunni forces strengthens the loyalty of the Bahraini military to the Sunni-led al-Khalifa regime. On the other hand, the in-group communal bond of Sunni military personnel drives a wedge between the military and the country’s Shia majority. The sectarian composition of the Bahraini armed forces is
one of the stronger indicators explaining why the Bahraini military was willing to defend the al-Khalifa regime during the Bahrain uprising. In addition, the absence of military conscription means the entire Bahraini population is not mandated to serve in the Bahraini armed forces and therefore the Bahraini military is not a “true” reflection of the communal makeup of Bahraini society.

The third and fourth institutional variables absent in Bahrain and that potentially influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime were no significant socio-economic or generational splits between military personnel. It should be noted there are no available data on the income, class, or age of Bahraini military personnel at the individual level, which is not surprising given the closed nature of the al-Khalifa regime. However, despite this lack of primary data, secondary information about the Bahraini military suggests that socio-economic and generational splits between military personnel are not salient issues that would cause military defection. The shared Sunni identity of Bahraini military personnel indicates religious affiliation has a stronger role in the military than socio-economic or generational identities. Also, since Bahrain does not possess military conscription there are only a handful of Shias serving in the state's security apparatus. This is significant because many Shias are economically marginalized by the regime and are generally poorer than their Sunni counterparts.29 Since Shias are economically poorer than Sunnis, and since there are hardly any Shias in the Bahraini military, that means there is less socio-economic variation within the Bahraini armed forces. Lastly, the absence of military conscription also deters generational splits since the Bahraini military is an all-volunteer force. Since Bahrain has an

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all-volunteer military, in theory, all Bahraini military personnel chose to enlist and therefore this decreases the likelihood of insubordination.

The fifth institutional variable absent in Bahrain is the military does not possess high levels of institutional autonomy when it comes to making appointments within the lower ranks of the armed forces. In Bahrain, many of the military decisions are centralized through the king and the royal family, and the ruling regime ensures military loyalty at the lower ranks of the Bahraini armed forces by recruiting foreign Sunni soldiers from neighboring countries. Another way the ruling regime constructs appointments in the armed forces is by not having military conscription. In the Bahraini case the king and the ruling officers deliberately make appointments throughout the military hierarchy to ensure loyalty to the regime. During the Bahraini uprising lower level soldiers willingly followed royal orders and used violence against protesters partially because the king and the ruling regime created systems that ensured loyal soldiers occupied the lower levels of Bahrain’s armed forces.

The sixth institutional variable absent in Bahrain is there are no significant splits within the Bahraini armed forces between separate military branches. The Bahraini military is formally referred to as the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) and contains approximately 8,200 soldiers in three separate branches including the army (6,000 soldiers), air force (1,500 soldiers), and navy (700 soldiers). Similar to many militaries, the army is the primary branch in the BDF considering it has the majority of personnel and also garners a larger proportion of the defense budget, materiel, and equipment. However, despite the larger role of the Bahraini army, there is little evidence of significant splits between the armed force branches. In fact, there are reports during the Bahraini uprising that air force planes were deployed to

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provide aerial support as protests culminated in mid-March 2011 (BICI 2011, 143). In addition, all three military branches are unified and centralized under the al-Khalifa regime as al-Khalifa family members occupy the top three positions in the BDF including the supreme commander (King Hamad), commander-in-chief (Field Marshal Shiekh Khalifa Ben Ahmed al-Khalifa), and the deputy commander-in-chief (Sheikh Salman Ben Hamad al-Khalifa). This organizational structure deemphasizes the institutional strength of each military branch and centralizes the three military branches under the auspices and control of the royal family. Overall, there is no evidence that significant splits exist in the Bahraini armed forces and the cohesion between the armed force branches actually increased the military’s likelihood of supporting and protecting the regime.

The seventh and eighth institutional variables absent in Bahrain include the lack of a significant rivalry between the military and the country’s internal security forces, and the fact the internal security forces do not serve as a counterweight to the military. Bahrain has a complex internal security apparatus that includes numerous organizations within the country’s Ministry of Interior. The majority of internal security forces are referred to as the Public Security Forces (PSF), which contain the police, Special Forces, counter-terrorism, and the Coast Guard (BICI 2011, 52). During the uprising the PSF, especially the regular police and riot police, were arguably the most active and publically visible security force responding to the protests. The PSF were the frontline of the regime and these forces frequently confronted civilians with violence during the protests.

Bahrain also has a National Guard and a National Security Agency (NSA) and both forces straddle the line between internal and external security. The National Guard is an independent military body comprised of approximately 1,200 soldiers and during the
uprising National Guard troops protected government buildings, supported security forces in the clearing of the Pearl Roundabout in March, and arrested citizens through royal decree (BICI 2011, 55). A final security organization is the NSA, which was created in 2002 and replaced the controversial General Directorate of State Security, a security body during Emir Isa’s regime that was criticized for its secretive and strong-armed tactics, especially against Shias. Initially the NSA was an internal intelligence and counter-espionage agency but shortly after its creation its powers expanded and by 2011 it had become a formidable security organization that had the purview to arrest, detain, and interrogate civilians (BICI 2011, 45-49 and 53-54).

Bahrain possesses numerous internal security forces that could conceivably challenge, offset, and serve as a counterweight to the Bahraini security forces. But unlike in Tunisia the Bahraini internal security forces and the Bahraini military work in tandem with one another to support the al-Khalifa regime. One of the main reasons for this is the entire Bahraini national security apparatus is centralized under the direct control of the al-Khalifa royal family. As explained above, the three most senior commanders in the BDF are all members of the al-Khalifa family. However a similar configuration exists in the Bahraini internal security forces as most forces are controlled by members of the al-Khalifa family. The internal security forces in the Ministry of Interior, such as the PSF and the CID, report to minister of interior, Rashid Ben Abdullah al-Khalifa, the NSA directly reports to the prime minister, King Hamad’s uncle, Prince Khalifa Ben Salman al-Khalifa, and the National Guard reports to the king’s brother, Major-General Mohammed Ben Isa al-Khalifa.31

31 For more on the role al-Khalifas play at the executive level of the Bahraini security apparatus see BICI (2011, 53).
There are numerous reports of the Bahraini internal security apparatus and the BDF working together during the Bahraini uprising. For example, the BICI reports that the BDF, Ministry of Interior, and NSA forces collaborated on several occasions during the month-long protest most notably during the two clearings of the Pearl Roundabout.\footnote{For examples of the BDF and internal security forces working together see the BICI report, most notably pages 51, 78, 143, and 159.} There are other examples of Bahraini military soldiers arresting and detaining suspects and then handing them over to internal security forces, and during the end of the protests on March 16, 2011, there are reports internal and external security forces jointly cleared protesters from the Salmaniya Medical Complex (BICI 2011, 144-145). Even prior to the Bahraini uprising there is little evidence of animosity between the BDF and the internal security forces and despite internal security forces having more troops than the BDF (11,260 in the internal security versus 8,200 military soldiers),\footnote{The Military Balance (2012, 318).} the regime does not perceive the internal security forces and BDF as rivals. Rather, the ruling al-Khalifa regime perceives the BDF and the internal security forces unified in supporting the regime and ensuring the political status quo of the country. Overall, since the BDF and the Bahraini internal security forces worked in tandem this increased the likelihood the Bahraini military would remain loyal to the al-Khalifa regime during the uprising.

It is telling all eight institutional variables were absent in Bahrain and increased the likelihood of military defection. The institutional variables in Bahrain created a security apparatus that was unlikely to fracture and split. The three institutional variables that appear to have the most influence on Bahraini military loyalty include the lack of communal divisions, the lack of counterbalancing security forces to the military, and the absence of a
rivalry between the military and the internal security forces. The communal element had a significant influence since the ruling al-Khalifa regime and the Bahraini military personnel were Sunni whereas the majority of the population was Shia. This created a distinct sectarian difference that explains why the Bahraini military was willing to use high levels of violence against the civilian population that was seen as the "other" in the eyes of the military. In addition, the Bahraini security apparatus was centralized through the al-Khalifa ruling family. The majority of military branches and internal security forces were directly managed or overseen by al-Khalifa family members. As a result there were no institutional rivalries in the Bahraini security apparatus and overall, all Bahraini security forces protected and supported the al-Khalifa regime.

Regime Variables

All three of the regime variables were also absent in Bahrain and potentially contributed to the Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa regime. The first regime variable is that the al-Khalifa regime handpicked ruling generals and commanders in the BDF and the military did not have full control of making personnel appointment within the armed forces. As explained in the previous section, a central characteristic of the Bahraini security apparatus is that most senior military officers are members of the al-Khalifa family. According to the 2002 Bahraini Constitution, the king appoints all ministers and serves as the supreme commander of the Bahraini Defence Forces. At the outbreak of the Bahraini uprising the minister of defence affairs was Muhammad Ben Abdallah al-Khalifa, who was appointed to the position by the king in early 2008 (BBC News 2008). In addition, the highest ranking security council in the Bahraini government is the Supreme Defence Council

(SDC), which includes the king, the commander-in-chief of the BDF (Field Marshal Shiekh Khalifa Ben Ahmed al-Khalifa), the deputy commander-in-chief of the BDF (Sheikh Salman Ben Hamad al-Khalifa), the director of the NSA (Sheikh Khalifa Ben Abdulla al-Khalifa), and numerous ministers such as the minister of foreign affairs (Khalid Ben Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Khalifa), the minister of defence affairs, the minister of interior (Rashid Ben Abdallah Ben Ahmad al-Khalifa), and the minister of the national guard (Major-General Mohammed Ben Isa al-Khalifa). The upper echelon of the Bahraini military is comprised mostly of al-Khalifa family members who are handpicked by the king and this ensured officers remained loyal to the regime during the uprising.

Another consequence of the familial makeup of the Bahraini armed forces directly addresses the second regime variable that was absent in Bahrain, which is that Bahraini officers are satisfied with the regime and the benefits they receive from the regime. One indicator of military satisfaction with the al-Khalifa regime includes the preferential treatment many Bahraini officers received in the form of exclusive housing. It is reported that since the 1970s many senior military officials in the BDF have received luxurious apartments, typically in the central city of Riffa. The BDF has been involved in several construction projects that provide high-end housing for officers and also commercial opportunities for civilians such as the Salmabad housing project and the upscale Wadi al-Sali mall. There is limited data on the salaries of Bahraini officers and soldiers salaries but


36 For more on the preferential treatment of Bahraini soldiers see al-Murshed (2013).

considering how close-knit the security apparatus is with the ruling regime, there is no 
evidence the military is systemically unsatisfied with the regime at a level that would have 
caused regime defection during the protests.

The third regime variable absent in Bahrain and potentially influenced the Bahraini 
military to defend the al-Khalifa regime is the process of how the regime ordered the military 
to intervene during the uprising. According to Royal Decree Law No. 32 of 2002, the king 
commands the BDF and has the authority to order the Bahraini military to undertake 
operations both inside and outside of the kingdom (BICI 2011, 50). This decree provided 
the legal authority to order the BDF into the Pearl Roundabout on February 17, 2011, 
during the first clearing of the roundabout. As the uprising intensified in mid-March, the 
king expanded his control over the BDF by issuing Royal Decree No. 18 on March 15, 2011, 
which officially declared a state of emergency and gave the king the authorization to deploy 
BDF soldiers onto the streets via written orders given to his commander-in-chief (BICI 2011, 
47). Given the structure of the Bahraini security apparatus it is apparent all the orders 
originated with the king, which were then filtered through and distributed by his ruling 
generals. Since there was a clear line of communication between King Hamad, the senior 
officers, junior officers, and soldiers, there was no room for misinterpretation when King 
Hamad gave the orders for military soldiers to deploy onto the streets in response to anti-
government protesters. This mechanism increased the likelihood of the BDF defending the 
regime because there was no uncertainty or ambiguity of the king’s intentions.

All three of the regime variables were absent in Bahrain and appeared to influence 
the military’s decision to defend the regime during the Arab uprisings. There are some 
interesting differences between the regime variables in Bahrain and those in Egypt and
Tunisia. First, in Egypt and Tunisia, the ruling leaders appointed the defense ministers but these executive appointments were unable to ensure military loyalty to the ruling leader during the uprising. However, in Bahrain, the king appointed the defense ministers and the senior military officers of the Bahraini Defence Force and these individuals were supportive of the king and the al-Khalifa regime during the uprising. The key difference is in Bahrain many of the senior military officers and defense ministers were al-Khalifa family members and it seems logical that the familial bond between the king and ruling senior military officers ensure loyalty. In addition, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the Bahraini military was satisfied with the benefits it received from the al-Khalifa regime. This finding addresses the carrots and sticks argument from Lee (2005) and suggests that carrots were successful at ensuring the Bahraini military remained loyal to the al-Khalifa regime. This actually counters Lee's original argument in which he argues that sticks are better mechanisms of ensuring military obedience in comparison to carrots. Lastly, in the two previous chapters, it was questionable whether the variable of communicative channels had an effect on military response, but in Bahrain, the king clearly ordered the military to use violence against protesters and there was no confusion from the perspective of the Bahraini military as to the king's intentions.

**Societal Variables**

Of the six societal variables, one was absent and five were present in Bahrain. The one societal variable absent in Bahrain was the protest movement did not explicitly attempt to win over the Bahraini military. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, in Tunisia and Egypt significant segments of the protest movements deliberately focused on winning over the military, which in effect decreased the likelihood military forces were willing to utilize high
levels of violence against the demonstrators. In Bahrain, there is no evidence protesters attempted to win over the military. In fact, there is evidence anti-government demonstrators specifically aimed their chants and discontent towards military forces. For example, the BICI (2011, 94) reports that on February 27, 2011, mass protests marched across the King Faisal Highway in Manama, and demonstrators carried a large banner that read "Shocking! The army kills the citizens." Bahraini protesters did not implement a systematic approach to win over the military most likely due to the sectarian configuration of the Bahraini armed forces. Considering the Bahraini military overwhelmingly consist of Sunnis, the Shia citizens had no desire to try to win over the Sunni military forces during the protests. Moreover, the fact some Bahraini soldiers are foreign also decreased the likelihood Bahraini protesters were willing to win over the military. The lack of a deliberate strategy to win over the Bahraini military contributed to BDF soldiers defending the regime, since there was no ‘pull’ from anti-regime protesters for military personnel to defect and join demonstrators’ cause.

Interestingly, the other five societal variables present in Bahrain should in theory have influenced the Bahraini military to defect from the al-Khalifa regime. The first societal variable present in Bahrain was the monumental size of the Bahraini uprising and how it included well over 1 percent of the country’s total population. In particular, two specific protests demonstrate the sheer number of Bahrainis that took to the street in opposition to the al-Khalifa regime. On February 22, 2011, it was estimated that 100,000 demonstrators occupied the Pearl Roundabout. This protest was significant because it occurred five days after state security forces physically cleared demonstrators from the roundabout. However, in an attempt to save face the regime reopened the roundabout to civilian protesters and in

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38 As addressed earlier in this chapter estimates claim 96 percent of the military is Sunni and 4 percent is Shia.
celebration thousands of protesters congregated at the Pearl Roundabout. The second large protest occurred several weeks later on March 3, 2011, where it was estimated 100,000-450,000 protesters demonstrated outside of the al-Fateh mosque in Manama (BICI 2011, 102-103). Anti-regime protesters and government officials disagree on the precise number of demonstrators at this protest, but in a country with a population of 1.3 million, even if the lower estimation of 100,000 is considered, that means nearly 8 percent of the country’s total population demonstrated. The fascinating puzzle is that despite the phenomenal display of protests in Bahrain, the Bahraini military and internal security forces continued to use violence against the population and were not deterred by the size of the protest movement. The Bahraini case clearly disproves the argument that a large protest will induce military defection since the military displayed violence even despite the monumental number of protesters.

The second societal variable present in Bahrain was that the Bahraini uprising consisted of non-traditional protesters such as women, children, and the elderly. Unlike the Tunisian and Egyptian cases explored in Chapters 4 and 5, there is no data available that explores demographic information of the Bahraini protests from the individual level. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that non-traditional protest groups were active and pivotal during the Bahraini uprising. There are numerous reports of female-led protests taking place during the Bahraini uprising. This includes a rally on February 24, 2011, in which approximately 150 female protesters marched from the Dana Mall in Manama to the Pearl Roundabout while chanting anti-regime slogans, and another report of female

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39 To put this in perspective, 8 percent of the U.S.’ total population in 2011 was 25 million protesters, roughly the equivalence to the state population of Texas. In the European context, 8 percent of the EU’s population in 2011 was approximately 40 million protesters, roughly a little more than the entire population of Poland.
protesters marching from the capital’s financial harbor to the Pearl Roundabout on the King Faisal Highway on March 8, 2011 (BICI 2011, 117). In addition to participating in protests, women were also the victims of state security violence. The BICI (2011, 172) indicates that security forces raided homes in the middle of the night and in the process terrorized women with verbal threats and threats of sexual assault if they did not cooperate. During these raids, security forces were typically looking for male perpetrators and among the chaos soldiers did not allow women the opportunity to cover-up from their nightgown dresses, which is highly inappropriate and indecent for male strangers to invade such private spaces in Bahraini society.

Children were also a significant factor during the Bahraini uprising. There are numerous reports of children and teenagers being the victims of state security violence including the death of fifteen year-old boy, Sayed Ahmed Saeed Shams, who was fatally struck in the head by a tear gas canister on March 30, 2011, in the town of Sitra. It is reported that riot police fired tear gas at Sayed from a close range and then kicked and beat the boy while he was on the ground (BICI 2011, 161). There is another report that a six year-old boy, Mohamed Abdulhusain Farhan, died on April 6, 2011, after state security forces fired tear gas at Mohamed’s home and the young boy suffocated after inhaling the poisonous gas (BICI 2011, 256). Children were also arrested by state security forces for protesting including the episode of three teenagers in the northwestern town of al-Budaiya who were imprisoned, blindfolded, handcuffed, and beaten for throwing stones at police cars (BICI 2011, 273). Children were also protesters and one notable event took place when mass demonstrations broke out at an all-girls high school in Saar on March 10, 2011. Approximately 150 students began anti-regime protests at school, which then led to pro-
regime protests from other female students. Eventually, parents arrived to the school and further confrontations broke out between the parents who were divided between pro-regime and anti-regime factions. Third, elderly protesters also played a role during the uprising, most notably with the death of Isa Abdulhasan Ali Hussain. Isa was demonstrating against the regime on February 17, 2011, and was killed by a shotgun bullet to the head from less than one meter away (BICI 2011, 232). Overall, there is evidence that non-traditional protesters such as women, children, and the elderly were involved during the uprising. However, unlike in Tunisia and Bahrain, the presence of non-traditional protesters did not deter violence from the Bahraini military and state security forces continued to confront demonstrations and support the regime at all costs.

A third societal variable present in Bahrain was the broad-based nature of the Bahraini uprising. Bahrain is a small country approximately 300 square miles (which is equivalent in size to Washington D.C. and D.C’s Maryland suburbs). Considering the small area of Bahrain, there is little regional variation on the island as most citizens live in or around the capital city of Manama. However, during the uprising, unrest and demonstrations took place across the whole island. The major protests occurred in the capital, as Manama was the home to the Pearl Roundabout, the country’s Financial Harbor, major government buildings, major hospitals, and the country’s major thoroughfares and roads. Protests occurred elsewhere including in the northeastern town of Muharraq, the Manama suburb of Sitra, the northwestern towns of Saar and al-Budaiya, the central city of Riffa, the University of Bahrain, which is located near Zallaq in the central-west portion of the country, and

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dozens of villages and towns elsewhere across the island.\textsuperscript{41} From a regional perspective, the Bahraini uprising was broad-based, however the broad-based question becomes more complicated when examining the Sunni-Shia split in the country. On one hand there is evidence numerous clashes and violent confrontations occurred during the uprising that pitted anti-regime Shia citizens against pro-regime Sunni citizens.\textsuperscript{42} On the other hand, there is evidence Sunnis participated in the anti-regime protests as well and that some Shia protesters specifically attempted to de-emphasize the sectarian nature of the movement. For example, a prominent Sunni cleric, Mohamed al-Buflasa, was arrested at a rally during the first week of protests for promoting religious unity between Sunnis and Shias.\textsuperscript{43}

There are also reports of Shia protesters calling for national unity with Sunnis and at the Pearl Roundabout on March 8, 2011, prominent journalists spoke to the crowds and urged demonstrators to reach out to the Sunni community and reassure them that the uprising was not anti-Sunni (BICI 2011, 117). Unfortunately, there are no surveys that collect data on how many protesters during the Bahraini uprising were Sunni and how many were Shia, but there is some evidence Sunnis were involved with the anti-regime protests and some Shia protesters specifically attempted to de-emphasize the sectarian nature of the conflict. Since the Bahraini uprising included both Shia and Sunni anti-regime protesters, the overall movement can be considered as broad-based, but it is important to understand the

\textsuperscript{41} For examples of protests in Muharraq see BICI (2011, 103 and 126), for examples of protests in Sitra see BICI (2011, 68-71 and 152-161), for examples of protests in Saar and al-Budaiya see BICI (2011, 119-120 and 139), for examples of protests in Riffa see BICI (2011, 118-123 and 132-133), for examples of protests at the University of Bahrain see BICI (2011, 355-360).

\textsuperscript{42} For examples of protests in Hamad Town on March 3, 2011, see BICI (2011, 108), and for examples of protests at the Saar all-girls high school on March 10, 2011, see BICI (2011, 119).

Bahraini government and Bahraini security forces did not interpret the uprising as "broad-based."

As explored earlier in this chapter a primary characteristic is that most personnel in the Bahraini armed forces are Sunni and there are hardly any Shias serving in the country's security forces. From this perspective it is likely the Bahraini military viewed the uprising as a Shia threat to the Sunni regime. Gengler (2013) provides an insightful argument that the regional issues between Bahrain and Iran make the Sunni-Shia relationship in Bahrain a security issue in which the al-Khalifa regime is sensitive to the Shia threat both domestically and regionally. Interpreting whether the Bahraini uprising was broad-based or not varies upon ones' perspective. Even though there is evidence the uprising was broad-based, the Bahraini government and Bahraini security forces viewed the uprising as a Shia threat to Sunnis that aimed to destabilize the regime. This interpretation ultimately explains why the Bahraini military was unaffected by the broad-based nature of the uprising and defended the al-Khalifa regime.

A fourth societal variable present in Bahrain was the demonstrations were generally non-violent. At the outbreak of the protests international journalists noted the peaceful nature of the demonstrations and observed the euphoric and celebratory atmosphere that surrounded the Pearl Roundabout in February. For instance, anti-regime protest leaders, such as Hassam al-Meshaima, the Secretary General of the opposition Haq Movement, urged Bahrainis to remain non-violent and to practice peaceful civil disobedience while demonstrating (BICI 2011, 94). For the most part Bahraini protesters remained non-violent, however, as the uprising continued there were some instances of protesters displaying

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violence towards state security forces, which arguably happened due to the initial violence Bahraini security forces displayed towards demonstrators. Despite instances of isolated violence the uprising in Bahrain was non-violent and did not aim to overthrow the al-Khalifa regime through physical force or violence. Even though the non-violent nature of the protesters in Egypt and Tunisia influenced the militaries to defect from the ruling regime, in Bahrain the peaceful demonstrations did not persuade the BDF to abandon the regime, and rather, despite the peaceful protests, the military remained loyal to the regime and willingly used physical force against demonstrators.

The fifth societal variable present in Bahrain was that prior to the Arab uprisings the Bahraini military did not have a history of committing egregious human rights violations against the Bahraini population. To examine this empirically the CIRI Human Rights dataset was consulted, which is a dataset that examines the level of human rights violations within a country.45 The CIRI Human Rights Index is a number that ranges from 0 – 8, with 0 indicating a country has performed poorly (i.e. committed numerous human rights violations against the population) and 8 indicating a country has performed well (i.e. committed no human rights violations against the population). Figure 4 illustrates the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index of Bahrain from 1981 to 2011.46

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46 Physical Integrity Rights measures the government’s role in torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances.
Overall, Bahrain's CIRI Human Rights Index scores have varied ranging from 7 in 2002, 2003, and 2009 to 3 in 1996, 1998, and 2000. To examine the types of human rights violations that occurred in Bahrain in 1996, 1998, and 2000 the *U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and *Amnesty International Annual Reports* were examined. Overall, internal security forces, rather than the military, committed human rights violations during these years. There was only one noted instance in these reports of a BDF soldier committing a human rights violation against a Bahraini citizen, which occurred during mass political protests in 1996 when a soldier fired and killed a demonstrator in the village of Karzakan. However, this is only one incident across a thirty year period and there is no evidence the Bahraini military systemically committed human rights violations against the civilian population. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Bahraini military is small and apart from 1972 and the mid-1990s has traditionally been more focused on external and regional defense rather than on monitoring internal security. The responsibility of the day-

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47 For comparison, during the same time period (1981 – 2011) Egypt had a CIRI score of 3 or less fourteen times whereas Tunisia had a CIRI score of 3 or less seven times. This is rather surprising considering in Egypt and Tunisia the militaries ultimately defected from the regime, whereas in Bahrain the military defended the regime and used violence against protesters.


49 Note the Amnesty International annual reports explore events that occurred from the previous year. For instance, the Amnesty International Annual Report 2011 examines events from 2010. The following Amnesty International reports were examined in regards to Bahrain’s human right’s record:

to-day repression of the regime was given to the various internal security forces rather than the BDF and the armed forces. However, that being said, during the 2011 uprising the military intervened and willingly defended the regime even though there was no systemic historical precedence to do so. Coincidentally, the actions of the Bahraini military in 2011 arguably started a precedence that validates BDF intervention in future conflicts, but at the time the protests broke out in February 2011, there was no strong historical precedence for the BDF to intervene and use violence against civilians on a large scale. Overall, there is little evidence the Bahraini military committed human rights violations against the civilian population prior to the 2011 uprising, which in theory should have decreased the likelihood of the military intervening during the Arab uprisings.

Figure 4. Bahrain & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011)
One of the interesting puzzles of this project is that the Bahraini uprising possessed similar characteristics to the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings since it was large, non-violent, broad-based, and consisted of non-traditional protesters. However, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia the Bahraini military defended the ruling regime and used violence against civilian protesters. As a result, the Bahraini case counters the earlier arguments from Zunes (1994), Chenoweth and Stepan (2011), and Nepstad (2013) that argue that broad-based coalitions, non-violent protesters, and large number of protesters can induce military defection. The Bahraini case suggests societal variables alone cannot influence how a military will respond to mass political protests as the presence of these variables were unable to influence military defection.

International Variables

Of the three international variables, two were absent in Bahrain and one was present, even though this final variable deserves special attention. The first international variable absent in Bahrain that possibly contributed to the Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa regime was foreign troops from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates invading Bahrain through the auspices of GCC forces to support the Bahraini security forces and defend the al-Khalifa regime. The MENA Military Index specifically examines this factor by asking whether foreign troops invaded the country to overthrow the regime. In the case of Bahrain the answer to this question is no, but unlike in many other MENA countries during the Arab uprisings, Bahrain was the only country where foreign troops invaded the country to protect the regime. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Bahraini uprising intensified during the middle of March and King Hamad decided GCC forces were needed
to assist Bahraini forces and deter Iranian military forces from invading the country. On the evening of March 14, units from the Saudi Arabian Royal Guard entered the country. After one week a total of 5,000 GCC troops entered Bahrain including army forces from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and naval forces from Kuwait. The GCC provided critical support to the regime by allowing Bahraini security forces the ability to directly confront protesters while knowing GCC troops were protecting key government buildings and facilities. Overall, the invasion of GCC troops is a strong indicator contributing to the Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa regime during the uprising.

The second international variable absent in Bahrain was in countries contiguous to Bahrain there were no occurrences of military defection. Bahrain is an island and therefore by definition it does not share any contiguous borders with any other countries. However, despite not sharing a land border, Bahrain is closely associated with Saudi Arabia and the two countries are physically connected by the sixteen mile King Faud Causeway, which is a bridge linking the eastern shore of Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The causeway symbolizes the close alliance between the two governments and Saudi Arabia has traditionally been an ally to the Sunni-based al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain. In Saudi Arabia there were minimal protests in comparison to what occurred during the Bahraini uprising and there was no evidence large portions of the Saudi military defected from the Saudi regime during the uprising. Rather, the Saudi military remained loyal to the Saudi regime and were also loyal to the Bahraini regime. The fact Bahrain’s closest geographic country was as invested in ensuring the stability and maintenance of the al-Khalifa regime is a primary reason why the military defended the incumbent government during the country’s uprising.

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The final international variable, whether a significant number of military personnel receive training and education from foreign militaries, deserves special attention because even though the MENA Military Index theorizes the presence of this variable will increase military defection, it appears as if the presence of this variable actually increased the Bahraini military’s resolve to defend the regime and use force and violence against protesters. As explored earlier in the chapter, the modern Bahraini armed forces have a close relationship to the U.S. military, especially since the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain. U.S.-Bahraini military relations strengthened after the 1991 Kuwait War since the Bahraini military assisted with coalition forces that ousted Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces from Kuwait. After the war, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a ten-year defense pact that provided the U.S. military with access to Bahrain’s air bases, expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces, and increased arms transfers to Bahrain including frigates, weapons, aircrafts, coastal radar systems, air-to-air missiles, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (Katzman 2011, 12).

More recently, the Department of Defense notes that in 2010-2011, 553 Bahraini military personnel received military training in the U.S. Given the small size of the Bahraini armed forces this means approximately 6 percent of the Bahraini military received training from the U.S. during this time period. Another aspect that verifies the strong relationship between Bahrain and the U.S. is the tremendous amount of foreign aid the U.S. provided to Bahrain. For example, from 2003 to 2012 the U.S. gave Bahrain approximately $300 million in foreign aid, which is astounding for a country with only 1.3 million inhabitants and a small military force (Katzman 2011, 19).

---

The U.S.-Bahraini relationship demonstrates a weakness with this particular MENA Military Index variable. For instance, the theory assumed if a significant number of military personnel received military training and education abroad then the individuals would be more likely to defect from the ruling regime during the Arab uprisings due to the influence of the foreign military training, which presumably would have expanded their worldviews to different philosophies and political systems and make them more reluctant to use violence against anti-government protesters in their home countries. As Bahrain demonstrates this is clearly not the case and the exact opposite could be argued. The U.S. had strong strategic interests to maintain the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain given Bahrain's vulnerable role between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even though there is no explicit evidence the U.S. encouraged Bahrain to use force against protesters – in fact the opposite is true as the U.S. condemned Bahraini state violence early-on during the protests\(^\text{53}\) – the U.S. government was noticeably less vocal and less critical of the Bahraini government during the Arab uprisings in contrast to its criticism of the Egyptian and Tunisian governments. Even though this particular variable was a “no” in the index and should have influenced military defection, after closer examination the opposite appears to be true and it seems the American military training and education of Bahraini military personnel did not influence the military to defect from the regime and this relationship actually encouraged the military to defend and protect the al-Khalifa regime.

\(^{53}\) In particular, the U.S. was critical of the Bahraini government after the first clearing of the Pearl Roundabout in February. The White House Press Secretary, Jay Carney, urged restraint and many in the U.S. government were concerned of the use of force the Bahraini security forces displayed against peaceful protesters. See Michael Slackman and Mark Landler, “Bahrain Turmoil Poses Fresh Test for White House,” \textit{New York Times}, February 17, 2011, accessed May 9, 2016. [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18bahrain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18bahrain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).
Conclusion

This chapter explored variables that possibly influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime during the Arab uprisings. Even though the Bahraini uprising shared many characteristics with the successful uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, the Bahraini military forces were not influenced to defect from the al-Khalifa regime and support the anti-regime protest movement. The reason the societal variables were unable to influence the Bahraini military to defect is because Bahrain did not possess the necessary existing institutional variables to pave the way for military defection. These institutional variables include no communal, socio-economic, or generational splits among military personnel. Moreover, there were no rivalries within the military between the armed forces branches, no significant rivalry between the military and the internal security forces, and no parallel security forces that deliberately attempted to counterbalance the strength of the Bahraini military. Lastly, Bahrain did not possess a system of military conscription. The reason these institutional variables are absent is due to the historical development of the Bahraini armed forces. As a small country the island was influenced by larger foreign powers and this explains why the Bahraini military did not even exist until 1971 after the British granted the country with full independence. The military was an elite configuration deliberately constructed by the royal family to protect the regime. Since sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shias were a major societal composition in Bahraini society, the Sunni-led al-Khalifa regime created a security apparatus that informally blocked Shias from serving in the military and as a result the sectarian nature of the Bahraini military and the Bahraini internal security forces increased the Sunni communal bonds within the security apparatus and increased the likelihood of military loyalty. In addition to these institutional conditions, the
international factors reinforced Bahraini military loyalty to the regime, since both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. had strategic interests to maintain the political and security status quo of Bahrain.
CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the central findings of the dissertation, addresses the theoretical questions, empirical puzzles, and normative issues of the larger project, re-examines the MENA Military Index, and discusses the role of the MENA Military Index moving forward.

Central Findings

This dissertation explains variation in Arab military responses during the Arab uprisings. Through the creation of the MENA Military Index and a comparative case study analysis of Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia, this project examines MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings through a variety of institutional, regime, societal, and international variables. This project discovers that MENA militaries defected or fractured from incumbent regimes during the Arab uprisings as a result of institutional variables within the country's military and the unique societal characteristics of the demonstration movements. In Egypt and Tunisia, both countries possessed numerous institutional variables that paved the way for military defection. For example, in Egypt and Tunisia parallel security forces counterbalanced the strength of the traditional military, there were significant rivalries between the traditional military and other state security forces, both militaries had the autonomy to control personnel decisions in the mid and lower ranks of the armed forces, and there were systems of military conscription. These institutional variables created a rift between the militaries and the ruling regimes that increased the likelihood the militaries,
would defect. In Egypt and Tunisia, both countries also possessed necessary societal
variables as each uprising was large, non-violent, broad-based, consisted of non-traditional
protesters, and demonstrators actively won over soldiers. In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia,
the Bahraini case demonstrates why it was necessary for both institutional and societal
variables to be present for a military to defect, because even though the Bahraini uprising
shared many characteristics with the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, Bahrain did not
possess any institutional variables that made military defection or fracturing likely.

In total, there were five MENA countries that experienced either military defection
or military fracturing during the Arab uprisings (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen)
and all five countries share six identical variables: variable 3 (parallel security forces to
counterbalance the military), variable 9 (soldiers unsatisfied with the regime), variable 12
(large protests), variable 13 (non-traditional protesters), variable 14 (protests originally non-
violent), and variable 16 (protests were broad-based).

As for the first of these variables, parallel security forces that counterbalance the
military causes defection or fracturing because it marginalizes the military at the expense of
other state security forces. As explored in Chapters 4 and 5, President Mubarak in Egypt and
President Ben Ali in Tunisia both oversaw the expansion of parallel security forces at the
expense of the military and these parallel forces were more closely affiliated with the regime,
received preferential treatment, and also procured large budgets and high levels of material
and non-material benefits. Similar arrangements existed in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where
the ruling leaders created parallel security forces to buttress the regime from domestic
opponents and to also deter the military from initiating a coup against the ruling leader. The
presence of parallel security forces creates a rift between militaries and regimes that can rupture under the pressure of mass political protests.

The second shared variable addresses the military's dissatisfaction with the regime. In all MENA countries that experienced military defection or fracturing during the uprisings, the militaries were dissatisfied with the material and non-material benefits they received from the regime. In Chapter 4, it appears the Tunisian military was dissatisfied with the Ben Ali regime since the armed forces were marginalized by the regime and did not receive preferential treatment in comparison to the country's internal security forces. In Chapter 5, it appears the Egyptian military was dissatisfied with the Mubarak regime because of the expanding political and economic influence of the country's liberal-capitalist elite, which directly challenged the Egyptian military's unmonitored economic empire.

The four other shared variables in countries where the militaries either defected or fractured address the characteristics of the country's mass political protests. For example, in all five countries the protests were large, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and were broad-based. The demonstrations in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen were historically large as hundreds of thousands, and in some cases millions, of demonstrators flooded the streets and demanded regime change. The uprisings were also broad-based as protesters represented numerous socio-economic, political, and regional backgrounds. For example, as explored in Chapters 4 and 5, the protests in Egypt and Tunisia included individuals from all walks of life including the lower class, business professionals, Islamists, and secularists. In addition, the uprisings consisted of non-traditional protesters such as women, children, and the elderly, which made it more difficult for some military troops to use violence against demonstrators. In all five countries the uprisings were originally non-
violent and peaceful. In the cases of Libya and Syria, this changed as the government repressed the protests, which emboldened and radicalized civilians and ultimately led to bloody civil wars. However, the initial demonstrations were mostly non-violent and it was arguably the violent responses from state security forces that facilitated unrest and contributed to these movements becoming armed conflicts.

Overall, these six variables were present in all five MENA countries that experienced either military defection or military fracturing during the Arab uprisings. It is also important to specify the key difference between military defection and military fracturing. As discussed in Chapter 3, the primary difference between countries that experienced military defection and military fracturing was variable 1, which addresses whether there are communal splits that divide soldiers within the military. In countries that experienced military defection (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) there are no significant communal splits that divide soldiers, whereas in countries that experienced military fracturing (e.g. Libya, Syria, and Yemen) there are significant communal splits that divide soldiers.

**Addressing the Theoretical Questions, Empirical Puzzles, and Normative Issues**

Chapter 1 examines the numerous theoretical questions, empirical puzzles, and normative issues of this dissertation. It is worthwhile to re-examine these larger themes and situate how the MENA Military Index and the central findings of this dissertation fit into the broader literature. The first theoretical question addresses how militaries respond when ordered to confront mass political protests. This project reinforces the notion that militaries can respond in various ways when facing mass political protests, such as the option to defect from the regime, defend the regime, or not respond at all due to internal security forces successfully confronting demonstrators.
A second question examines the primary role of the military within the country. Does the military focus solely on external defense, or does the military also intervene and support internal security functions? To more fully understand this concept, researchers need to examine other security forces in the country besides the military. For instance, examining the role of internal security forces, such as the police and paramilitary forces, provides key insight to fully understanding military behavior since internal security forces are typically the main security forces that addresses domestic unrest. During the Arab uprisings eight of the twenty-one MENA countries experienced minimal military responses as a result of internal security forces successfully repressing the protest movements and making it unnecessary for the military to intervene. Why are these internal security forces so successful at suppressing protest movements? Do they possess specific characteristics that differ from other internal security forces? These two questions go beyond the scope of this specific project but these questions are natural extensions to this dissertation and can provide useful insight on the mechanisms and characteristics of internal security forces, which in effect provide a complementary role to the insight and role of a country's military.

The central empirical puzzle addressed in Chapter 1 indicated that prior to the 2011 uprisings, the MENA region was overwhelmingly resilient to democratic transitions. When examining the political systems of the MENA region several years after the Arab uprisings, other than Tunisia there has been limited movement towards democratization. Table 14 provides a list of Polity IV scores, which is a twenty-one-point scale that measures the level of authoritarianism and democracy within a country, where +10 equates to strongly
Table 14 lists the twenty-one MENA countries alphabetically with three columns: the first column lists the Polity IV score of a country from 2010 (the year when unrest broke out in Tunisia), the second column examines the Polity IV score from 2014, and the third column measures the numerical change in the score from 2010 to 2014.

Table 14. MENA Polity IV Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010 Polity IV Score</th>
<th>2014 Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 demonstrates that the only MENA country to successfully democratize after the Arab uprisings was Tunisia, which jumped from a Polity IV score of -4 in 2010 to 7 in 2014. In addition to Tunisia, there were four other MENA countries that experienced

democratic and -10 equates to strongly authoritarian.1 Table 14 lists the twenty-one MENA countries alphabetically with three columns: the first column lists the Polity IV score of a country from 2010 (the year when unrest broke out in Tunisia), the second column examines the Polity IV score from 2014, and the third column measures the numerical change in the score from 2010 to 2014.

1 Polity IV data was collected online from the Systemic Peace website under the section "Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets" and the "Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2013" link. See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

2 Polity IV does not measure the scores of Palestine.
positive changes to their Polity IV scores from 2010 to 2014, including Libya (+7), Morocco (+2), Turkey (+2), and Yemen (+2). Even though Libya made a seven-point jump, the country went from very authoritarian (-7) to quasi-authoritarian (0), so it is not as if Libya experienced full-democratization. Moreover, the positive changes in Morocco and Yemen were only marginal and despite the increases to the countries Polity IV scores, they remain authoritarian. Table 14 also notes that twelve MENA countries experienced no change in their Polity IV scores from 2010 to 2014, and three MENA countries actually experienced decreases to their Polity IV scores, including, Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria.

Chapter 1 discussed a normative goal of this project, which is for citizens to better understand the variables that influence militaries to use violence and physical force against protesters in mass political uprisings. Based upon the MENA Military Index there is both good news and bad news for civilians. The good news is that civilians matter, especially considering that military responses are highly impacted by the societal characteristics of mass political protests. For instance, protests that are non-violent, broad-based, consist of non-traditional protesters, large, and actively aim to win over soldiers are more likely to influence military defection and military fracturing. These conclusions reinforce those of earlier scholars such as Sharp (1973) and Chenoweth and Stepan (2011) that strategic protests can tip the scales in favor of civilians when facing off against resilient authoritarian and state security institutions. The findings from the MENA Military Index echoes these findings and suggest that civilians can play an extremely significant role in decreasing the likelihood of militaries using force against demonstrators by utilize tactics of non-violence, broadening the appeal of the movement, attracting portions of non-traditional voters, recruit as many
demonstrators as possible, and deliberately use strategies that try to win over the military and individual soldiers.

However, despite the good news that civilians can influence military responses to mass political protests, there is also some less encouraging news. The bad news is that in addition to societal variables, institutional variables are just as important to shaping military responses. As discussed during this dissertation, even though the Bahraini uprising incorporated many of the elements mentioned in the previous paragraph, these efforts were unable to stop the Bahraini military from using violence against protesters during the uprising. This is finding is disappointing for civilians because citizens have less control over the institutional mechanisms of the military, especially in authoritarian regimes. The only institutional policy that civilians can possibly influence is the creation of military conscription. The findings from the MENA Military Index suggest that a military that better mirrors society is a military that is less likely to use violence against society during mass political protests. Even though civilians could advocate for military conscription, it is important to not over-emphasize this single policy, especially since the MENA Military Index demonstrates that even in countries with military conscription, if there were not the necessary number of other institutional and societal variables, that the military would not necessarily defect or fracture from the regime.

Mass political protests are seminal events that challenge the resolve of the incumbent regime, the country's military, and the demonstrators. The characteristics of future protest movements are impossible to anticipate, but the findings from this dissertation suggest that for militaries to defect from incumbent regimes or to fracture, there needs to be a
Table 15. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Numerical Order)
(Reposted, Appears as Table 8 in Chapter 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Type</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Societal</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Defected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Fractured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Defended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Minimal Role: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Minimal Role: Low Protests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 For the variable name see Table 3.
combination of both institutional and societal variables to convince the military to not use violence against civilian protesters.

**Re-examining the MENA Military Index**

The primary contribution of this dissertation is the MENA Military Index, which examines twenty civil-military relations variables across twenty-one MENA countries. The main findings of the index are presented in Chapter 3 and Table 8 denotes whether a variable was present or absent in each of the twenty-one MENA countries. Table 8 is reposted in this chapter (as Table 15) to re-examine the overall results of the index and to identify the specific variables that potentially could influence MENA military responses in the future. Since institutional and societal variables are most influential on dictating MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings, it is beneficial to re-examine the distribution of these variables across the entire region.

For convenience, another table is added, table 16, which lists the number of institutional variables present in each MENA country. According to table 16, the five countries that experienced either military defection or military fracturing (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) possess at least three institutional variables. However of these five countries only Libya possesses three institutional variables, whereas the other four possess four institutional variables or more.

Libya represents an outlier because it is the only country that possesses variable 18 -- a foreign military directly intervening in the country to overthrow the ruling leader. This occurred in Libya as NATO forces launched aerial attacks in 2011 against Qaddafi forces and also aided Libyan rebels fighting Qaddafi forces on the ground. The presence of variable 18 in Libya demonstrates two things. First, international variables, especially when a foreign
military invades a country with the sole purpose of overthrowing the incumbent regime, can significantly impact military responses to mass political protests and can ultimately trump domestic variables. Even though this dissertation argues that institutional and societal variables were the most important variables to explain MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings, it acknowledges that international variables can also have a profound impact, particularly when a direct intervention takes place. Second, it is likely that the threshold for military defection or fracturing is four institutional variables rather than three, and the only reason Libya experienced military insubordination during the uprisings was not because it possessed three institutional variables but rather because NATO invaded the country.

Since four institutional variables appear to be a threshold it is necessary to examine the MENA countries that possess four or more institutional variables but did not experience military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings. This includes three countries: Iran, Iraq, and Mauritania. The findings of the MENA Military Index suggest that Iran, Iraq, and Mauritania possessed the necessary institutional variables for military defection or military fracturing but did not due to the lack of societal characteristics during the Arab uprisings that induced military insubordination.

The first country to examine is Iran, which possesses four institutional variables including parallel security forces that counterbalance the military, a rivalry between the military and other state security forces, military conscription, and the military’s autonomy to control personnel at the mid and lower levels of the armed forces. These four institutional variables are coincidentally identical to the institutional variables present in Tunisia (see Table 14), and it is tempting to assume that if the right social variables were present in Iran,
then the Iranian military would have defected from the regime. However, a closer examination of Iran paints a more complicated picture.

Table 16. Number of Institutional Variables per MENA Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Response Type</th>
<th># Of Institutional Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E.</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran's military was overhauled and the new government created two new security forces: the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij. These two security forces became the primary security forces in the country, counterbalanced the strength of the traditional military, and became the military's main security rival. LaChappelle et al. (2012) argue that since the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij were created during the violence of the 1979 revolution there is an institutional precedence in both of these organizations towards violence, which is embedded in the core ethos and identity of both
security forces. For example, troops in the Revolutionary Guard and Basij tend to have extreme religious ideologies, more passionately support party hard-liners than troops from other security forces, and since these groups have used violence against opponents for over three decades they have the “stomachs” for utilizing high levels of physical force against civilians (LaChappelle et al. 2012, 4).

During the 2011 uprising and the 2009 Green Movement, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij willingly used violence against protesters to defend the regime. In both movements the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij successfully suppressed the demonstrations making it unnecessary for the Iranian military to intervene and play a larger role. It is impossible to predict social characteristics of future protest movements, but if the institutional variables remain constant in Iran, and if a future conflict were to possess the necessary characteristics, it is conceivable that the Iranian military could defect from the regime, but, only if the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij were unsuccessful at confronting the unrest and needed large-scale support from the Iranian military. The findings of the MENA Military Index suggest that in such a scenario it is possible for the Iranian military to defect from the regime and refuse to use violence against protesters. However, this is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future because the last three decades provide no indication that either the Revolutionary Guard or the Basij would be unable or unwilling to utilize the high levels of violence necessary to suppress a civilian uprising.

The second country that possesses four or more institutional variables but did not experience military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings was Iraq. Iraq is an interesting case since the U.S. reconstructed the Iraqi military after American forces overthrew Saddam Hussein and disbanded the former Iraqi military. Considering the active
role the U.S. plays in Iraqi military affairs it is difficult to forecast Iraqi military responses to future mass political protests since even the domestic variables in Iraq are uniquely shaped by foreign countries. During the Arab uprisings the protests in Iraq were marginal, yet the Iraqi military defended the regime and used violence against civilian protesters largely because the Iraqi military has played an active role in Iraqi internal security. During the last decade, Iraq has been plagued with constant unrest and instability and as a result the newly formed Iraqi military acts more like a paramilitary internal security force than a traditional external security defense force. Iraq possesses four institutional variables from the MENA Military Index during the Arab uprisings. Two of these variables include communal and socio-economic cleavages that exist between military soldiers, and the other two variables refer to the counterbalancing of the military by parallel security forces, and the rivalry that exists between the military and other state security forces. If a future protest in Iraq possessed the necessary societal variables it is possible for the Iraqi military to fracture along sectarian lines where Sunni soldiers and Shia soldiers were split, especially if the future protests were motivated by sectarian identities.

The third country that possesses four or more institutional variables in the MENA Military Index but not experience military defection or fracturing was Mauritania. The five institutional variables present in Mauritania include communal splits, socio-economic splits, and generational splits between soldiers, the presence of parallel security forces to counterbalance the military, and the rivalry between the military and other state security forces. Over the last thirteen years the Mauritanian military has been active in Mauritanian politics considering there have been two military coups since 2003, including the 2005 coup that ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, and the 2008 coup that ousted
President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdalalhi (Foster 2011). Due to the numerous ethnic cleavages in Mauritanian society and in the Mauritanian military, it is possible that if a future uprising contained the necessary societal variables the Mauritanian military would fracture based upon ethnic affiliation. For example, Mauritania is divided between North African Arab-Berbers and the “Black African” communities of the Fulbe, Sooninke, and Wolof ethnicities (Jourde 2001). Also, considering the active role of the Mauritanian military over the last two decades it would not be surprising to see another military coup occur in the country independent of any mass political uprising.

Institutional variables are only half the equation however and the MENA Military Index demonstrates that societal variables also need to be present in a country for military defection or military fracturing to occur. Table 17 lists the number of societal variables present in the twenty-one MENA countries. The five countries that experienced military defection or military fracturing during the Arab uprisings possess at least four of the six societal variables. During the Arab uprisings, there were four countries that possessed the necessary societal variables to trigger military defection or fracturing, but did not possess the necessary institutional variables. This includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Bahrain was discussed at length in Chapter 5 and even though the Bahraini uprising possessed similar characteristics to the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain possessed no institutional variables that influenced military defection or fracturing and the international intervention of GCC forces reinforced regime stability and contributed to Bahraini military loyalty.

In Kuwait, there were four societal variables present, but the Kuwaiti military only had a minimal role during the uprising because the country's internal security forces were
successful at confronting the protests. However, even if the Kuwaiti internal security forces needed assistance from the Kuwaiti military it is likely the Kuwaiti military would have defended the regime since the country does not possess the necessary institutional variables to induce military defection or fracturing.

Oman possesses many similar characteristics to Bahrain considering both countries are monarchies, are ruled by entrenched royal families, have similar colonial legacies with the U.K., and are members of the GCC. If domestic unrest in Oman reached the same level as Bahrain, it is possible that fellow-GCC countries would also have physically intervened in Oman to ensure the stability of the regime. A possible future scenario in Oman is that the ruler, Sultan al-Said, is in his seventies and it is unclear who will be his successor. There is a scenario where the Omani military might fracture along tribal lines if there is unrest and uncertainty in regards to the sultan’s successor in the upcoming years.

As for Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to imagine the Saudi military defecting from the regime especially considering the close relationship Saudi Arabia has with the United States. It is unlikely the U.S. would remain idle if mass political protests threatened Saudi Arabia and given the current state of U.S. – Saudi relations it appears the U.S. would strongly prefer stability and the status quo in Saudi Arabia, thus decreasing the likelihood of Saudi military insubordination.

Overall, the MENA Military Index demonstrates that military defection or fracturing is caused by the presence of institutional variables that pave the way for military insubordination and unique societal characteristics that provide the military with the opportunity to either defect of fracture. Specifically, the findings from the MENA Military Index indicate that a country needs to possess four of the eight institutional variables and
four of the six societal variables to experience either military defection or military fracturing.

Table 14 demonstrates that there are no countries with four institutional variables and four societal variables that experienced a military response during the Arab uprisings other than military defection or military fracturing.

Table 17. Number of Societal Variables per MENA Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Response Type</th>
<th># of Societal Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E.</td>
<td>Minimal: Low Level of Protests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MENA Military Index Moving Forward

Research on MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings relies on single case studies and small-n comparative case studies that only examine a few salient variables that happen to be present in the observed cases. This project addresses these shortcomings and more fully explains MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings by employing a comprehensive analysis that measures numerous variables in a region-wide, comparative
perspective. The MENA Military Index provides a systematic and quantitative measurement to a field that has employed minimal, if any, quantitative measures. This dissertation tests twenty variables of civil-military relations across twenty-one MENA countries and creates an index score that conveniently measures varying military responses during the Arab uprisings.

The MENA Military Index is an informative measurement that scholars can replicate and build upon. For instance, the initial findings of the MENA Military Index suggest that some variables might be unnecessary including whether the ruling leader appoints the defense minister, rivalries between armed branches, and the communicative channels ruling leader use when delivering orders for the military to intervene against civilians in mass political protests. There are also possibilities for expanding the MENA Military Index and adding additional variables. For example, the Egyptian case demonstrates that the economic role of the military has a tremendous impact on shaping and forming military behavior and military interest. Even though variable 9 attempts to capture this effect, there could be value in specifically examining the economic role of the entire military institution, and the individual economic salaries and incentives officers and soldiers receive from the regime.

Future examinations building off of the MENA Military Index can also improve quantitative and empirical data collection. One of the limitations of this project is the dichotomous variables are unable to detect the intensity of individual variables. For future research it might be beneficial to examine more nuanced measurements of civil-military relations, rather than binary variables of whether certain attributes are present or absent within a country. The unclear nature of civil-military relations in the MENA region makes it difficult for researchers to collect and gather reliable data, but even basic quantitative methods like the one utilized in this study provide a promising step for the field. Lastly, even
though this project believes the central findings of the MENA Military Index can be broadly applied to militaries across the world, it is important for other researchers to empirically test this and determine whether the index is generalizable. Future research can test whether the MENA Military Index applies to individual cases (e.g. Burma 1988, China 1989, etc.), other regions (e.g. Latin America, Southeast Asia), or other waves of mass political protests (e.g. the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Color Revolutions of the early 2000s). In addition to testing the MENA Military Index to other cases of mass political protests, it could be insightful to measure how the index relates to militaries in North America and Western Europe. For example, do the factors of the MENA Military Index explain civil-military relations and possible military behavior in historically stable democratic countries such as the U.S., U.K., or France?

The mass political protests that swept across the MENA region during 2010 - 2011 were seminal political events that caught much of the region and world off-guard. Several years after the demonstrations occurred, it is apparent that MENA militaries and internal security forces played a crucial role in dictating whether protests were able to overthrow rulers or whether incumbent regimes were able to ward off opposition movements. This project discovers that MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings was influenced primarily by a combination of both institutional and societal variables. Institutionally, if there were rivalries between the military and the state's internal security forces, parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, if the military had the autonomy to make personnel appointments within the armed forces, and if there was a system of military conscription, these variables paved the way for possible defection or fracturing. However, social variables also had to be present including protests that were large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted
of non-traditional demonstrators, and specifically aimed to win over the military. In countries where these institutional and societal variables were present, militaries either defected or fractured from the regime. In countries where these variables were absent, militaries either did not intervene during the uprising or defended the regime and used violence to suppress protesters.
APPENDIX A:

THE MENA MILITARY INDEX QUESTIONNAIRE
The MENA Military Index Questionnaire

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Military Index is a measurement that aims to understand civil-military response during the Arab Spring uprisings.

The index consists of one introductory question (the country you will be answering for) and the subsequent twenty questions of the index. The index is constructed by the aggregated results of over 60 MENA civil-military experts.

When answering the questions please keep two issues in mind: (1) only answer questions for the country you selected, and (2) answer all questions at the time of the Arab Spring uprisings (i.e. 2011 not 2014).

The twenty questions can be answered with either a "yes" or "no" response. Even though the complexity of MENA civil-military relations go well beyond dichotomous answers, the index establishes a systematic evaluation of civil-military relations across the region and serves as an introductory measurement that can detect generalizable trends. You are encouraged to answer all the questions, and the recommended time to complete the index is 10-15 minutes.

1. Which country will you be answering questions for?

2. Are there any significant communal (e.g. ethnic, regional, sectarian, tribal) splits that divide soldiers within the military? (Yes/No)

3. Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any significant rifts within the military? (Yes/No)

4. Are there any parallel security forces within the state's security apparatus that deliberately counterbalance the strength of the military? (Yes/No)

5. Are there any significant rivalries between the military and other security forces (e.g. police, presidential guard)? (Yes/No)

6. Are there any significant rivalries between the armed force branches (e.g. rivalries between the Army, Navy, Air Force)? (Yes/No)

7. Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers? (Yes/No)

8. Does the military use conscription? (Yes/No)

9. Does the ruling leader grant the military autonomy over selecting officers? (Yes/No)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Are soldiers unsatisfied with the amount of material (e.g. salaries, weaponry) and non-material (e.g. job appointments, preferential access to education, housing, medical) benefits they receive from the ruling leader?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Did someone other than the current ruling leader (e.g. prior leader, legislature, judiciary) appoint the Defense Minister and other senior generals?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. During the Arab Spring uprisings did more than 1% of the country's population take part in the demonstrations?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Did the Arab Spring protesters include a significant proportion of demonstrators other than young men (e.g. women, the elderly, children)?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Was the country's Arab Spring uprising originally non-violent in nature?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Does the military have a clean record without any significant domestic human rights violations?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Were the Arab Spring protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Was the Arab Spring protest movement successful at winning over a significant proportion of soldiers?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. During the Arab Spring uprisings, did foreign military troops intervene with the purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab Spring uprisings?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Did a significant proportion of officers receive their military education or training in a foreign country?</td>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
NON-MAJORITY RESPONSES FROM THE MENA MILITARY INDEX
| Kuwait | #2. Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any significant rifts within the military? | No | Socio-economic data on Kuwait are difficult to compile. For instance, in the World Bank Gini Index, which measures domestic income distribution, data on Kuwait are not available. In addition, there is no official data on the socio-economic affiliation of soldiers within the military. Kuwait has military conscription and therefore numerous sectors of Kuwaiti society are represented in the Kuwaiti armed forces. In the country there are divisions between Sunnis and Shias, and between Kuwaiti citizens and non-Kuwaiti citizens, but overall, there is no evidence of significant socio-economic rifts between soldiers and officers in the Kuwaiti military. |
| Kuwait | #3. Are there any parallel security forces within the state's security apparatus that deliberately counterbalance the strength of the military? | No | Iraq invaded Kuwait in the early 1990s and ever since the country's primary security objective has been to protect the country from external threats. As a result, Kuwait has not implemented counter-balancing strategies to counter the strength of the military. For instance, in 2011, the Kuwaiti military had approximately 15,500 soldiers and 7,100 paramilitary forces (The Military Balance 2011, 333). However, the paramilitary forces in Kuwait consists of the National Guard and the Coast Guard, which is closely associated to the Kuwaiti armed forces. Overall, there is no evidence of a significant parallel security force in the Kuwaiti security apparatus that deliberately counterbalances the strength of the Kuwaiti military. |
| Kuwait | #6. Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers? | No | The only example of a rift occurring between junior and senior officers in the Kuwaiti military is during the Iraqi invasion in the early 1990s when it was reported that some senior commanders abandoned their posts once Iraqi forces invaded the country (Cordesman 1997, 94). Apart from this example there is no other evidence of significant rifts existing between senior and junior officers in the Kuwait Military, especially during the Arab uprisings. |
| Kuwait | #12. During the Arab Spring uprisings did more than 1% of | No | Jenkins & Herrick (2012) construct a dataset that examines protests across the Arab world from 2006 - 2011. The data provide estimates |
the country's population take part in the demonstrations? to the number of demonstrators at each protest. For Kuwait, I examined protests starting on December 21, 2010, (four days after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia) and running through 2011. The dataset provides different estimate ranges for the number of protesters into one of seven groups (1 = less than 10; 2 = less than 100; 3 = less than 1000; 4 = less than 10,000; 5 = less than 100,000; 6 = less than 1,000,000; 7 = over 1,000,000).

I estimated the number of demonstrators at each protest by calculating the median. For example, if a protest was a "3," (which is less than 1,000 but more than 100) I calculated the mean between Group 2 and Group 3. Since Group 2 is less than 100, and Group 3 is less than 1,000, I calculated that the number of demonstrators in a Group 3 protest as 550. Jenkins and Herrick’s dataset contains protest size estimations for ten demonstrations, and the sum of the protests equal 11,856 demonstrators. According to the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the population of Kuwait in 2011 was approximately 3 million and 11,856 represents .003 of the total population, which is less than one percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>#15. Does the military have a clean record without any significant domestic human rights violations?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To determine whether or not the Kuwaiti military committed human rights violations against the Kuwaiti population I consulted the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International reports on human rights. I examined reports beginning in 1996 (when they became more readily available) through 2011. Overall, there were no reports of human rights violations committed by the Kuwaiti military against the Kuwaiti population.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>#20. Did a significant proportion of officers receive their military education or training in a foreign country?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At the onset of the Arab uprisings the Kuwaiti military had approximately 15,500 troops (Cordesman 2011: 317). According to the U.S. Department of Defense, 154 Kuwaiti military personnel received U.S. military or education training.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
training during the 2011-2012 Fiscal Year. (U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2012 Joint Report to Congress, Volume 1, Section III-IV Near East: Page 3). In addition, the U.S. and Kuwait have close military relations demonstrated by the Defense Cooperation Agreement (Katzman 2016). This arrangement provides the U.S. military with access to Kuwaiti bases and military facilities, which have been vital for the U.S.’s involvement in Iraq. In return, Kuwait receives billions of dollars in military aid and military weaponry from the U.S. government (Katzman 2016, 9 – 15). Due to the close relationship between the U.S. and the Kuwaiti military this variable in considered as a “yes.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>#11. If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There is no evidence the Lebanese Armed Forces were ever ordered by the regime to violently intervene against protesters, so the question of who delivered the orders cannot be appropriately evaluated, and this question must be answered as a &quot;no.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>#16. Were the Arab Spring protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Using the dataset from Jenkins and Herrick (2012), I went through all protests in Lebanon from December 21, 2010 - December 31, 2011. Lebanon is a country divided by sectarian identities and the protests in 2011 mirrored these affiliations. Early in 2011, Shias protested against the United Nations’ indictment of Hezbollah members in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Bassam 2011). Conversely, Sunnis protested once Hezbollah gained political power in 2011 (Siddiq 2011). Even though factions of both sectarian groups protested, these do not qualify as broad-based demonstrations since they were disparate events that were not cohesively organized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>#17. Was the Arab Spring protest movement successful at winning over a significant proportion of soldiers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The protests in Lebanon during 2011 did not target military personnel to defect, and therefore the movement did not win over a significant proportion of soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>#13. Did the Arab Spring protesters include a significant proportion of demonstrators other than young men (e.g. women, the elderly, children)?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Using the dataset from Jenkins and Herrick (2012), I went through all instances of protests in Mauritania from December 21, 2010 - December 31, 2011 and found no mention of non-traditional protesters such as women, the elderly, children, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>#11. If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Even though there were frequent protests in Morocco in 2011, there is no evidence the Moroccan military violently intervened against protesters. Police on the other hand were often cited as using force against demonstrators. For more information about the role of the Moroccan police during the uprising see: Zakia Abdennebi and Marie-Louise Gumuchian &quot;Five Dead in Morocco Unrest After Protests,&quot; Reuters. February 21, 2011; Reuters &quot;Moroccan police break up rally, hurt dozens-witness,&quot; March 13, 2011; Zakia Abdennebi and Adam Tanner, &quot;Morocco teachers say beaten by police during rally.&quot; Reuters. March 24, 2011; Souhail Karam, Matthew Bigg and Christian Lowe &quot;Moroccan police disperse opposition protest,&quot; Reuters. May 15, 2011; Adam Tanner and Souhail Karam &quot;Many wounded as Moroccan police beat protestors,&quot; Reuters. May 22, 2011; William Maelcan, Zakia Abdennebi, and Christian Lowe &quot;Morocco police use truncheons to break up protest,&quot; Reuters. May 29, 2011; Souhail Karam, &quot;Moroccans protest polls, violence in the capital,&quot; Reuters. October 23, 2011;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>#11. If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>There were frequent protests across Oman during 2011 and the military disrupted protesters on several occasions. For several examples see:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Saleh al-Shaibany, “Heavy security prevents protests in Oman city,” <em>Reuters</em>. April 8, 2011;</td>
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<td>The Omani military's involvement in deterring protesters is corroborated by the Human Rights Watch 2012 Report, which claims Omani soldiers cooperated with Omani police in using tear gas and batons to disperse peaceful protesters. (See Human Rights Watch, &quot;World Report 2012: Oman&quot;).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Worrall (2012: 102) broadly states &quot;the government&quot; ordered the army to disperse the sit-in in the city of Salalah. However, if the organizational structure of the Omani Armed Forces is any guide, it is safe to assume that most decisions are centralized around the Sultan himself. In the Omani security structure the Sultan serves as the center of the Sultanate's Armed Forces, which includes the traditional military branches and also the internal Royal Police. Even if the Sultan did not provide the orders himself, it is safe to assume that someone within his inner security circle did. Moreover, from the perspective of the Omani soldiers, they most likely interpreted the order as coming directly from the Sultan or at least being mandated by the Sultan and the regime. Given this information, it is logical (although by no means certain) to deduce that the Sultan either gave the order for military officials to intervene or at least mandated the order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>#8. Does the ruling leader grant the military autonomy over selecting officers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>According to the Law of Service of the Palestinian Security Forces the appointment of the commander and most mid-level positions are determined by presidential decree (Khalil 2007: 37).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>#14. Was the country's Arab Spring uprising originally non-violent in nature?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Using the dataset from Jenkins and Herrick (2012), there were hardly any instances of protest in Qatar from December 21, 2010 - December 31, 2011. But, of the few protests in Qatar, they were all non-violent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>#2. Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any significant rifts within the military?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Syrian Armed Forces has a system of military conscription, which incorporates individuals from across the country. However, the Syrian Armed Forces are specifically constructed so individuals from the same ethnic group as President Assad, the Alawites, tend to occupy senior officer positions. In contrast, the rank-and-file soldiers tend to be Sunnis. This system creates a socio-economic division because Alawites are typically better off financially in comparison to Sunnis. For more see Heydemann (2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Syria     | #13. Did the Arab Spring protesters include a significant proportion of demonstrators other than young men (e.g. women, the elderly, children)? | Yes    | The mass uprising in Syria included non-traditional protesters such as women and children. Even though the majority of anti-regime protesters were men there were notable events of women and children participating in demonstrations. For examples of Syrian protests consisting primarily of women, see: 

Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Syrian women protest at coastal highway: activists," Reuters. April 13, 2011; 


Female activists were also targeted and arrested by security force, for more see: 

Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Wave of unrest shakes
<p>| Syria | #16. Were the Arab Spring protests broad-based in which demonstrators took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies? | Yes | The Arab uprisings engulfed all regions of Syria. Nearly every region of the country experienced some form of protest and unrest during 2011. Looking through the dataset of Jenkins and Herrick (2012) there were over 250 newspaper articles during 2011 that referenced Syrian protests and these demonstrations occurred in approximately thirty villages, towns, and cities across the country. Here is a list of some of the protests that took place in Syria during 2011 divided by geographic region: the northern regions near Turkey (al-Hasakh, Aleppo, Bidama, Hamrat, Idleb, Jisr al-Shuhgour, Maarat al-Numaan, and Qamishli), the coastal regions of the Mediterranean (Bayda, Banias, and Lataika), the country's central region (Hamah, Homs, Houla, Rastan, and Talkalakh), the eastern regions near Iraq (Deir Ez-Zur), the southern regions near Jordan (as-Suwayda, as-Sanamayn, Deraa, Inkhil, Jassem, Khirbet Ghazaleh, and Tafas), the capital of Damascus, and its suburbs (Duma, Saqba, and Zabadani). |
| Syria | #19. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab Spring uprisings? | No | Five countries border Syria: Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan and Israel to the south, and Lebanon to the west. None of these countries experienced significant military defection during the Arab uprisings in 2011. |
| Syria | #20. Did a significant proportion of officers receive their military education or | Yes | According to the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. State Department, there were only four Syrian military personnel that received foreign military training from the United States |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>#4. Are there any significant rivalries between the military and other security forces (e.g. police, presidential guard)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Under the leadership of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the Tunisian military was deliberately marginalized in political strength, whereas the internal security and police (especially under Ben Ali) were increased in size, scope, and jurisdiction (Brooks 2013, 207-208). The military received a small budget, only 1.4 percent of the country’s GDP, whereas the internal security forces received preferential treatment from the Ben Ali regime (Brooks 2013, 210).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>#19. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab Spring uprisings?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two countries border Tunisia: Libya to the east and Algeria to the west. Even though military defection occurred in Libya it occurred after the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime. The Arab uprisings began in Tunisia and therefore the country could not be affected by the contagion effect from other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>#4. Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Even though there is evidence of significant rifts between junior and senior officers in the mid-twentieth century (see Michaud-Emin 2007) there is no overwhelming evidence of</td>
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</table>
significant rifts between junior and senior officers in the contemporary period.**

**Note this analysis was conducted prior to the 2016 failed coup in Turkey, in which mid-level officers attempted a coup against the ruling Erdogan regime. Given this new information it appears there were generational (and possibly ideological) rifts within the Turkish armed forces but prior to this event it was less clear this was the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>#9. Are soldiers unsatisfied with the amount of material (e.g. salaries, weaponry) and non-material (e.g. job appointments, preferential access to education, housing, medical) benefits they receive from the ruling leader?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
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</table>
|  | During the Prime Ministership of Erdogan (2003-2014) there were many changes to Turkey's civil-military relations. Most notably was the electoral referendum in 2010, which reduced the military's autonomy and enacted amendments where coup plotters could be tried in civilian courts (The Economist 2010).

The new constitutional amendment was put into action in 2012 during the controversial Sledgehammer Trial, which convicted 330 military officers of plotting a coup in 2003 (Arsu 2012). The relationship between Erdogan and the Turkish Armed Forces was hostile, and from these high profile events, one could logically surmise that soldiers were unsatisfied with the non-material treatment of the military. The military's dissatisfaction also extended to the lack of material benefits the Turkish military received. For example, one year before Erdogan's Prime Ministership, in 2002, the military budget represented 3.9% of the country's GDP (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database). During Erdogan's tenure the percentage of the military budget dropped, in 2003 it was 3.4% of the country's GDP, and by 2013 it was down to 2.3%. |
APPENDIX C
MENA MILITARY INDEX & UPDATED RESPONSES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Question according to Table 4</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Why/Source</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>#12. During the Arab uprisings did more than 1% of the country's population take part in the demonstrations?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), approximately 0.02 percent (8,500) of the Algerian population participated in the 2011 demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>#19. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab uprisings?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Algeria is bordered by Tunisia to the east, and the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime during the Arab uprisings. For more see Chapter 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>#3. Are there any parallel security forces within the state’s security apparatus that deliberately counterbalance the strength of the military?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There is evidence the Bahraini military and internal security forces worked in tandem in response to the Arab uprisings. Since the entire Bahraini security apparatus is centralized under the al-Khalifa family the internal security forces do not serve as a counterweight to the Bahraini military. For more see Chapter 6, pages 196 - 198.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>#6. Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There is no evidence of significant generational splits within the Bahraini military. For more see Chapter 6, page 195.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>#11. If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the ruling leader?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There is evidence King Hamad directly ordered the military to intervene during the Arab uprisings. For more see Chapter 6, pages 200 - 201.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>#15. Does the military have a clean record without any significant domestic human rights violations?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Evidence suggests the Bahraini internal security forces were more responsible for human rights violations than the Bahraini military. For more see Chapter 6, pages 209 - 212.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>#2. Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any significant rifts within the military?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chapter 5, page 148, discusses how the salary disparity between rank-and-file soldiers and military officers caused resentment and rifts within the Egyptian military.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>#19. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab uprisings?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Egypt is bordered by Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, and Israel to the east. Even though factions of the Libyan armed forces defected from Qaddafi, the protests and unrest in Libya did not occur until after Mubarak resigned from office in Egypt. For instance, Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011 and unrest began in Libya in late February 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>#12. During the Arab uprisings did more than 1% of the country's population take part in the demonstrations?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), approximately 2.16 percent (645,000) of the Iraqi population participated in demonstrations and protests during 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>#19. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab uprisings?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey border Iraq. Even though segments of soldiers defected from the Syrian military, overall, the core of the Syrian armed forces remained loyal to the Assad regime, and thus Syrian military response is not considered as a defection to influence Iraqi military defection. As a result this answer for Iraq is considered as a &quot;no.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>#16. Were the Arab uprising protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the 2011 demonstrations in Israel were minimal and did not consist of a broad-based movement that represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies from across the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>#16. Were the Arab uprising protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the 2011 demonstrations in Lebanon were broad-based. For example, protests occurred across the country including the capital Beirut, Tripoli in the north, and Tyre in the south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>#16. Were the Arab uprising protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the 2011 demonstrations in Lebanon were broad-based. For example, protests occurred across the country including the capital Beirut, Tripoli in the north, and Tyre in the south.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>#13. Did the Arab uprising protesters include a significant proportion of demonstrators other than young men (e.g. women, the elderly, children)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the 2011 demonstrations in Morocco consisted of non-traditional protesters. For example, a female protesters set herself on fire in a copycat act emulating Mohamed Bouazizi from Tunisia (see Souhail Karam, &quot;Moroccan single mother burns herself in protest,&quot; Reuters. February 23, 2011. <a href="http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE71M4ZF20110223">http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE71M4ZF20110223</a>. Accessed February 6, 2015.) Also, women were critical in organizing and participating in protests and were subjected to violence by state security forces. (See Reuters, &quot;Moroccan police break up rally, hurt dozens-witness,&quot; March 24, 2011).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>#16. Were the Arab uprising protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the 2011 demonstrations in Libya were broad-based. Protests took place across the country, and represented a cross-clash coalition of anti-regime elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate political ideologies?</td>
<td>2011 demonstrations in Saudi Arabia were broad-based. For example, protests occurred across the country including the capital, Riyadh, Jeddah in the west, and the Shiite cities in the east such as the al-Qatif.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>#8. Does the ruling leader grant the military autonomy over selecting officers?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Promotions in the Tunisian military are institutionalized and codified into Tunisian law. Therefore, the ruling leader does not have the legal authority to micromanage appointments in the middle and lower levels of the Tunisian military. For more see Chapter 4, pages 102 - 103.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>#10. Did someone other than the current ruling leader (e.g. prior leader, legislature, judiciary) appoint the Defense Minister and other senior generals?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>At the start of the protests in December 2010, the Tunisian Defense Minister was Ridha Grira, who was appointed by President Ben Ali. For more information on this see Chapter 5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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VITA

Dr. Timothy A. Hazen has a Master’s of Arts in Political Science from Loyola University Chicago (2010) and a Bachelor’s of Arts in Political Science from the University of Florida (2005). His research broadly focuses on comparative politics and international relations and specializes on civil-military relations, Middle Eastern politics, authoritarianism, democratization, and revolutions/social movements. He has presented at numerous conferences including the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, the Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference, and the Intra-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

Dr. Hazen received a research grant through the U.S. State Department during the summer of 2012 to study the role of the Tunisian security apparatus during the country’s 2011 uprising. On this trip, Dr. Hazen was supported by the Tunisian university, Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Politiques de Tunis, and the North African research center, Le Centre d’Études Maghrébines à Tunis (CEMAT). Dr. Hazen has taught numerous university courses in Comparative Politics, International Relations, and American Politics, including “Revolutions,” “U.S. Foreign Policy,” “International Relations,” and “The American Political System.” After finishing his doctoral degree in Political Science from Loyola University Chicago, Dr. Hazen will begin a post-doctoral teaching fellowship position at Central Michigan University in August 2016 where he will teach Middle Eastern politics and comparative politics at both the undergraduate and graduate level.