1967

The Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution of 1905

Anthony M. Ivancevich
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses

Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2297

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1967 Anthony M. Ivancevich
THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905

by

Anthony M. Ivancevich

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

June

1967
In an era when there is so much interest in the revolutionary goals and tactics of socialist parties, the role of the Bolsheviks in the upheaval of 1905 against the Tsar deserves notice as an example of the goals and tactics of a Marxist party in a revolutionary struggle. Therefore it is the aim of this study to explain such aspects of Bolshevik revolutionary activity in 1905 as the objectives of the Bolsheviks in a democratic revolution, their revolutionary tactics and strategy, their methods of propaganda and agitation, their attitudes toward the proletariat and other classes in Russia such as the peasantry and the armed forces, their relation to other revolutionary groups, their organization and implementation of armed uprisings against the government, and the reasons for their failure in 1905.

In dealing with this topic I have consulted such primary sources as memoirs of men of various parties, leaflets, newspaper articles and tracts written by the leading revolutionaries, and army and police reports. The secondary sources consisted mostly of works on the Revolution of 1905 published within the Soviet Union and a number of Menshevik and western secondary sources which I consulted to check the accuracy and interpretation of the Soviet sources. Most of the materials used in this study are located in the Harper Library of the University of Chicago, though many valuable sources were also found in the Deering Library of Northwestern University and the Cudahy Library of Loyola University.

Throughout the footnotes, the Library of Congress system of transliteration of Slavic languages has been used. All the dates in the text and the
footnotes, unless otherwise indicated, are given in the Julian calendar then current in Russia. The Julian calendar is thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar now current in the West, and since 1918, in Russia.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Franklin A. Walker who suggested the topic and whose class lectures were a great aid to me in this study. To Dr. Silvestro for her critical analysis of the manuscript and for her helpful comments and further suggestions in the course of its writing, and Miss Laurel Tossing who has been of great assistance in the typing of the final copy of the manuscript.
At the turn of the century, in a period when constitutional and parliamentary limitations on royal power and mass participation in government were becoming widespread in Europe, Russia was still under the rule of an autocrat. The power that Tsar Nicholas II wielded over his 123 million subjects was limited only by the inefficiency of his bureaucracy, of which the most efficient arm was neither the financial, judicial, nor military branch, but the police. Although ideas of self-government and social reform had already made their entrance into Russia, the Tsar was determined to preserve both the autocracy and the hierarchic structure of Russian society. Nicholas' outlook on life and his conception of his duty as head of the state were deeply influenced by his adviser and former tutor, the procurator of the Holy Synod and the most articulate representative of Russian-official-conservative thought, Konstantine Petrovich Pobedonostsev. Like Pobedonostsev, Nicholas thought of society as an organism in which each major division had a definite fixed function to fulfill. The Church was to preach the true faith and loyalty to the state. The nobility was to aid the Tsar in administering the state by providing the personnel necessary to staff the bureaucracy and the officers' corps. The peasants, meanwhile, were to work the soil and fight the wars. Unlike Peter the Great, Nicholas had little use for the urban middle class. He mis-
understood and mistrusted commerce, banking and industry as infiltrated by foreigners and Jews. Nicholas considered it his duty as head of state to preserve the social structure and was determined to prevent any change in it by the use of his autocratic power. Influenced by Pobedonostsev's philosophy which held man to be essentially evil and unable to govern himself, Nicholas mistrusted and opposed any attempt at self-government in Russia. He grudgingly tolerated the zemstvos, the elected organs of local-self-government which had the duty of administering local lower and middle education, hospitals, prisons, and asylums, maintaining roads and bridges, and advancing public health, relief of the poor, commerce, industry, and scientific agriculture, but he severely restricted their freedom of action throughout his reign.

As for self-government on the national level, Nicholas was convinced that the Russian people, especially those, were incapable of governing themselves. He was therefore determined not to share his power with any organ of self-government. Shortly after his coronation in 1894, in a speech widely held to be written by Pobedonostsev, Nicholas crushed the hopes of the zemstvo leaders that they might participate in the general administration of the internal affairs of the state by announcing that he would uphold the principle of autocracy as firmly as did his father, Alexander III, and by calling the notions of the zemstvo leaders "senseless dreams." The Tsar thought of his subjects as his children and though he was deeply interested in their welfare he expected from them the obedience due to a patriarchal father and was completely insensitive to public opinion and the demands of his subjects for self-government.

While the Tsar expected docile obedience from his "children" the economic situation during his reign gave rise to an increasing restlessness throughout the country. Due to primitive methods of farming the Russian peasant had
always barely managed to subsist and usually lived in dire poverty. Shortly before the turn of the century the agricultural situation worsened. The lands which the serfs had been granted with their freedom in 1861 were in many regions barely adequate to sustain the families that worked them while payments required by the state to compensate the nobles for these lands were more than most peasants could afford. At the same time the 1890's witnessed a rapid increase in the agricultural population. Russian industry was still in its infancy and could absorb only a small segment of this surplus population. Consequently, the rural areas of Russia which had always suffered from a low yield from the soil now had the added problem of having more mouths to feed than could be supported by the soil and more laborers than were needed to actually work the soil. Nor was there much hope of improvement. The communal farming and frequent redistribution of the land by the village communes stifled individual initiative depriving the peasants of any desire to improve the land on which they did not have a secure and permanent hold. To aggravate the situation, competition from Prussia, Canada, and the United States considerably lowered the profits of Russian grain exports. Finally, the plight of the Russian peasantry was worsened by foul weather which helped bring on the famines of 1891-2, 1897, 1898, and 1901. The undernourishment caused by these famines and the primitive hygiene which prevailed in the Russian countryside made the population more susceptible to epidemics such as the cholera epidemic which broke out in 1893 following the famines of previous years and dragged on for several years adding to the woes of the population.

The economic strife in Russia produced not only physical hardship but social strife as well. The rapid growth of a surplus rural population toward the end of the century gave rise to a large agricultural proletariat and the
more numerous this class became the lower the wages of the day laborers on large estates dropped. The increasing poverty and exploitation of the rural proletariat intensified the hate which members of that class felt toward large landowners, especially in the Baltic region where the employment of the rural proletariat was especially widespread and where there was the added national hostility of Lithuanian, Lettish, and Estonian farm laborers toward German and Russian landlords. In other regions the proportion of the land held by the nobles varied and was steadily decreasing as impoverished nobles sold or leased their lands to more prosperous peasants. Yet in the midst of economic distress most peasants imagined that the acquisition of the nobles' estates as well as the state and church lands would solve their economic problems by increasing the landholding of the peasants and ridding them of the burden of paying heavy rents. Therefore the peasant class viewed the nobles' estates in the Baltic provinces, Georgia, and southern Russia, as well as the large church and state lands with increasing greed. Already in 1902 the increasing restlessness of the peasantry was manifested by the plundering of estates in the Kharkov and Poltava provinces and by the commencement of a guerilla war in Western Georgia. Of course, almost every region had a history of peasant unrest and revolts but the disorders of 1902 boded ill for the twentieth century.

While the agrarian crisis in Russia was making the peasant class increasingly restive, the development of Russian industry gave rise to a new dissatisfied class, the urban proletariat. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, industrial centers sprang up with heavy concentration in the St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Don Basin regions. By 1900 more than two and a half million workers were concentrated in these areas. Since Russian industry
was still in its infancy the workers were exposed to a great deal of abuse. The average yearly wage for a man at the turn of the century was 188 rubles or less than 95 dollars, while the average American worker in 1900 earned 490 dollars or about 2,000 dollars in today's currency. Russian women were paid half as much while children earned only a third of the regular wage. The working day averaged eleven to fourteen hours in length not including the overtime work which workers were frequently compelled to undertake either by lack of money to support themselves or by pressure from the factory managers. Working and sanitary conditions were deplorable while workers were further degraded by frequent searches for illegal literature, weapons, or stolen parts and tools in the factories as well as in their own living quarters. Fines for inefficiency not only presented another form of degradation for the workers but made their pitiable earnings even smaller. The workers' living quarters, often provided by the company they worked for, were badly built, crowded, unsanitary, and expensive. Throughout the 1890's the government attempted to mitigate the hardships of the workers by passing factory legislation regulating woman and child labor, limiting the work day to eleven and a half hours and setting a limit on overtime work along with other measures. However, these laws were poorly enforced and often evaded proving little help to the workers. Labor was not allowed to organize except for the unions created by the government in 1900 and supervised by the head of the Moscow security police, Sergei Zubatov. The workers' most powerful weapon, the strike, was forbidden and many unauthorized strikes occurring in Siberia, the Urals, and southern Russia in the early 1900's were crushed by volleys from military detachments. To make things even worse, the period just after the turn of the century was marked by a series of depressions which forced many
workers to return to their native villages and while the poverty of those who remained increased.

All in all the harsh condition in which the workers found themselves made them a dissatisfied class and therefore a fertile field for revolutionary propaganda. Furthermore, their concentration in large industrial areas made agitation among them that much easier. Finally, the workers themselves were usually just literate enough to absorb new ideas while at the same time they were ignorant and gullible enough to uncritically accept any utopian and radical ideas offered by the revolutionaries as solutions to the social and economic problems of the working class.

Efforts to improve the economic situation in Russia further increased the burdens of the peasants and industrial workers. The efforts of Count Witte, the minister of Finance, to base Russian currency on the gold standard, finance the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and to accelerate the growth of Russian industry through subsidies to industrialists increase the taxes of all the classes of society. At the same time his maintenance of a high tariff raised the prices of imported articles and maintained the high prices of Russian manufactured goods thus placing an additional burden the lower class.

While it is true that their harsh economic condition made the peasants and workers increasingly restive, more than poverty and dissatisfaction is needed for a revolution. Neither economic hardship nor rebellion were unknown in Russia. However, previous peasant risings such as those led by
1. Ivan Bolotnikov terrorized the area around Moscow in 1607 and Emilian Pugachev led a revolt of the peasants and nomads in the Ural and Volga areas in 1773-1774. Both aimed to exterminate the gentry and bureaucracy and distribute their possessions among the peasants. However, neither could defeat a well-led army and both were eventually executed.

Bolotnikov and Pugachev were poorly led and organized and had no definite objectives beyond murder and pillage. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, however, there was a class in Russia which was willing and able to give the restless masses leadership and organization. This class was the "intelligentsia," which included professional men such as doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers, journalists, and students in the urban areas as well as teachers, agronomists, botanists, veterinarians, economists, and statisticians employed by the zemstvos in the rural areas. Loosely applied, the term "intelligentsia" included not only people of higher education but also those who had a middle school education and were aware of national and world events and new ideas through the reading of newspapers and scientific and economic journals. Such a class had not only enough education to know that political, economic, and social conditions in Russia could be improved but also that idealistic conception that it is the duty of intellectuals to lead the rest of society in achieving a better way of life for all its members. Many of the "intelligentsia" strove to improve the conditions of life in Russia through scientific discovery, economic reform, and humanitarian efforts while others aimed at political and social change. Due to the impetuosity and the poverty which forced many of them to work at other occupations while studying for their degrees at the universities, the students as a whole were prone to support revolutionary ideas, though, of course, they had no monopoly on radicalism.
Some members of the "intelligentsia," and especially the students, had already been taking part in the Populist revolutionary movement which had been active since 1870. The socialist ideals of this movement were so vague that the members themselves rarely agreed on what the structure of the ideal society or their own revolutionary tactics should be. A few resorted to individual acts of terrorism against government officials in order to attain their ends but the ineffectiveness of this method was shown by the fact that the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, contributed nothing toward the overthrow of the autocracy. Probably the basic cause of the failure of the Populists in the nineteenth century is that though they dedicated all their energy to the good of the people, they neglected to obtain the participation of the masses in their revolutionary efforts.

The turn of the century, however, witnessed the rise of organized opposition to the autocracy, carried out by parties with definite platforms and seeking the support and membership of the masses to attain their objectives. Of these parties the one which strictly adhered to Marxist ideas was the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. Its beginnings were modest. Toward the end of the nineteenth century numerous marxist discussion circles sprang up among the "intelligentsia" in the industrial centers. Marxism appealed to many intellectuals because it seemed to provide a clear and definite blueprint toward the attainment of social justice. Eventually many of these circles merged into larger bodies such as the Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class, founded by Vladimir Ilich Ulianov (Lenin) and Julius Martov in 1895, which aimed at spreading Marxist propaganda among the workers and rejected the use of individual terrorism as a waste of effort. Besides maintaining contact with each other, these groups also kept in touch
with exiled Russian Marxists, concentrated mostly in Switzerland, and frequently received letters and pamphlets on Marxist ideology and tactics from such theoreticians as Georgi Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich, and Pavel Akselrod.

The first attempt of the Marxist socialists to create an all-Russian party was for the most part a failure. Due to police harassment, only nine delegates representing the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and Ekaterinoslav Unions of Struggle, The General Jewish Workers' Union, and the editors of the Marxist Newspaper, Rabochaia Gazeta, met in Minsk in 1898. Beyond agreeing to unite in a single Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party and approving a manifesto drawn up by Peter Struve declaring the proletariat to be the only truly revolutionary force in Russia, the congress did not accomplish much. No party program or constitution was drawn up and soon after the close of this First Congress most of the leaders were arrested or fled into exile.

The Second Congress of the party, held in Brussels and London during the summer of 1903 can be said to mark the real beginning of the functioning of the Social-Democrats as a party. The objectives of the party were stated in a clear platform. The Minimum Program outlined the party's immediate aims: the establishment of the eight-hour day throughout the land, the restitution to the peasants of the "cut-off" lands that should have been given to them at the time of their emancipation in 1861, the destruction of all surviving traces of feudalism, such as tithes and rents to nobles, the overthrow of the autocracy, and the establishment of a democratic republic. The ultimate goals were declared to be the socialist revolution, the destruction of capitalism, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On questions of party organization, however, the Social-Democrats split into two factions at the very creation of their party. When a resolution asserting
the power of the Central Committee over local organizations and thus denying the autonomy of the Jewish Workers' Union was passed, the delegates of the Union walked out of the congress. An argument over the definition of party membership brought out an even more basic split in the party. Lenin and his followers, known as the "hards" sought to construct a centralized conspiratorial party. Since 1902 when Lenin had written his pamphlet, *What is to Be Done?*, he had been emphasizing the necessity of a secret conspiratorial organization since conditions prevailing in the tsarist state did not allow the existence of an open, democratically chosen party. Furthermore, according to Lenin, centralism was necessary in a party which was to be the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat to keep its ideology pure and free from "reformism" and "trade unionism" with which the socialist parties of western Europe had already been infected. Lenin's opponents, Julius Martov, Pavel Akselrod, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deich, and A. Potresov did not oppose party centralism as such, but only Lenin's high-handed methods at the congress. However, due to the defection of the Jewish Workers' Union they lost control of the Central Committee and the party organ, *Iskra*, (the Spark). Since Lenin's faction had temporarily obtained control of the party machinery and a majority of the votes at the congress, they called themselves "Bolshevik" (members of the majority) and dubbed their opponents "Menshevik" (members of the minority).

The rift in the ranks of the Social-Democrats continued long after the Second Congress and widened into the practical creation of two separate parties. The basic objectives of the two factions were still the same: the creation of a democratic republic, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the construction of a socialist state. The differences
between them were rarely as absolute as Lenin made them seem in his articles and pamphlets. Very often the differences between the two factions were those of personality and temperament. One subject of dispute was the question of party organization. The Bolsheviks insisted on the necessity of giving the Central Committee strict control over the local committees. The Mensheviks, meanwhile posed as defenders of "party democracy," "freedom of discussion," and "workers participation" in the party organizations and decisions, favoring the right of the rank and file of the party and the workers themselves to participate in forming major policies. As is characteristic of many of the Bolshevik-Menshevik quarrels, neither side consistently maintained its position on the question of party organization.

Questions of revolutionary tactics divided the two factions more clearly. The Mensheviks were more ready to cooperate with the middle-class liberals in overthrowing the autocracy. Not that the Mensheviks bore any love for the middle class but it was good tactics to use one's enemies against one's other enemies. Lenin and the Bolsheviks rejected the concept of an alliance with the bourgeois liberals. Their middle-class interests did not permit them to work for a real victory of the people. They merely wanted to limit the autocracy to seize power for themselves and protect their interests from both the aristocracy and the proletariat. To the Bolsheviks an alliance with the bourgeoisie would only confuse the proletariat and sabotage the movement toward a true peoples' revolution.

In other tactical questions the disagreements between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were the results of mere difference in emphasis. Mensheviks such as Martynov did not oppose violent revolution but feared the use of radical slogans which might frighten away liberal allies. The Bolsheviks,
on the other hand, constantly emphasized that the autocracy could only be overthrown by a violent upheaval and devoted more energy than the Mensheviks in preparing the masses for an armed uprising. Furthermore, the Mensheviks, closely adhering to Marx's teachings, were preoccupied in agitating the urban proletariat while relatively ignoring the peasantry which they considered to be too ignorant, primitive, and apathetic to constitute a truly revolutionary force. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, contended that the peasants' desire for land made them a truly revolutionary force and that since the Russian proletariat was still so small, it could hope to overthrow the autocracy only with the aid of a revolutionary peasantry. Therefore, they urged the necessity of spreading propaganda in the rural areas to form an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. All these differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks provoked bitter polemics on both sides. Though the party remained nominally united, it was practically split in two and its efforts were therefore weakened by producing disorganization and confusion among the masses the party preached to.

The other socialist party in Russia was the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. This group was in many ways an outgrowth of the populist movement and many of its ideas had been derived from the nineteenth-century populists, Lavrov and Mikhailovski. After failures in attempts to create a party in 1897-1898 the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was founded at a congress of several revolutionary organizations held in Kharkov in 1900. The party included several notable revolutionaries such as Victor Chernov, its leading ideologist, Michael Goetz, G.A. Gershuni, and Catherine Breshkov-Breshkovskaiia. The party had its Central Committee and party newspaper, Revoliutsionnaia Rossia, (Revolutionary Russia,) but was poorly organized and did not have a complete
ist organization which included such famous assassins as Boris Savinkov and Evno Azef, who was at the same time a police agent. Though most of the party membership did not actually carry out acts of violence themselves, the party as a whole recognized terrorism as a useful weapon against the autocracy both as a means of reprisal against the government and as a course of action to sustain the revolutionary feeling of the people.

As far as an alliance with the bourgeois liberals was concerned, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, as socialists, scorned and hated the bourgeoisie. However, they considered the middle class in Russia too small and weak to be a real obstacle to the progress of socialism. Consequently, they were prepared to accept the liberals, as well as any revolutionary group which opposed the autocracy, as a temporary ally.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party was never able to take full advantage of its position as the party with the most numerous following in Russia. It was not nearly as well organized as the Social-Democratic Party. It lacked a clear platform and much of its program was derived from conflicting articles in the party newspaper. Ideological and tactical disputes among the members were frequent but seldom settled. Contact between the Central Committee and local committees as well as party discipline were poor. Finally, the Socialist-Revolutionaries concentrated more of their effort on agitating and organizing the masses in the rural areas than did the Social-Democrats, although they by no means neglected the urban proletariat as the Social-Democrats accused them of doing. This preoccupation with the Russian peasant made it much more difficult to build effective party organizations due to the illiteracy of the peasantry and the scattered state of the population.

It took longer for liberalism to become an organized force of political
opposition to the autocracy than it did for socialism. Liberal activity in the nineteenth century took the form of petitions from zemstvo congresses to the Tsar for economic and educational reforms. Some, like D.E. Shipov, the president of the executive board of the Moscow Zemstvo, went so far as to suggest that a national assembly be elected by the zemstvos for the purpose of being consulted by the Tsar in forming his policies regarding the internal administration of the Empire. The tsarist government answered these petitions and suggestions by limiting the power of the zemstvos to raise local taxes, controlling the appointments of members to the zemstvo executive boards, and forbidding the discussion of matters outside zemstvo jurisdiction between zemstvo congresses. Irritated by such stubbornness on the part of the tsarist government, many liberals became more radical in their thought and carried their opposition underground. In 1902 Peter Struve began to edit Osvobozhdennie, (Liberation) a liberal newspaper which had to be printed in Stuttgart and smuggled into Russia. In 1903 the Union of Liberation was founded under the leadership of Ivan Petrunkevich and the historian Pavel Miliukov. This first organization of the Russian liberals as a political force aimed at the establishment of a constitutional government elected by universal suffrage. Though the Union of Liberation was an illegal group its activity remained non-violent rendering the liberals a relatively harmless group for the time being.

While socialism and liberalism constituted most of the opposition to the autocracy in Russia, the growing national consciousness of many of the non-Russian nationalities within the Russian Empire increased the numbers of the opponents of the tsarism. Of the Empire's population of 123 millions at the turn of the century, only about 55 million were Russians and another
35 million were non-Russian Slavs. The rest of the population was composed of Baltic, Finn-Ugric, Caucasian, Turkic, and Mongol groups. Deeply influenced by the thought of Pobedonostsev and the slavophile journalist, M. N. Katkov, Nicholas was convinced that the surest way of holding the Empire together was to follow a policy of centralization and Russification. Both national and religious minority groups were targets of persecution. The printing of the Ukrainian language was forbidden. Finnish autonomy was violated. Conversions from the Orthodox to the Catholic faith were forbidden and the children of Orthodox and Catholic parents were automatically considered as Orthodox. The five million Jews in the Empire made up the most persecuted minority. They were forbidden to settle beyond their pale in Poland and western Russia. Only a limited quota of them was admitted to Russian schools and, on top of everything, periodic pogroms were organized against them.

Around the turn of the century, the minority groups in the Russian Empire began to organize political parties in defense of their national existence. Most of these national parties did not stand for secession from the Russian Empire but for the establishment of cultural and territorial autonomy for national minorities, equal personal and political rights for the members of national minorities, and some of the more radical parties favored the establishment of a federal republic in Russia. Among the most powerful of the national parties were the Armenian Dashnakatsutium (Federation) and Hnchak (Clarion) parties, the Georgian Party of Socialist-Federalists, and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party.

The national parties by no means neglected social issues. The social objectives of the Georgian Party of Socialist-Federalists greatly resembled those of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Party fell apart in 1903 because it was a coalition of separatists, anarchists, Marxists, Populists, and liberals who could not agree on social issues. Other national parties such as the General Jewish Workers' Union and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labor Party were concerned mainly with social issues and used the language and culture of their respective minorities as vehicles of propaganda.

The weaknesses of the national parties lay in that they were primarily movements of intellectuals having little support from the masses of the national minorities which were just beginning to acquire national consciousness. Also, there was often a great reluctance among the leaders to cooperate with other national parties. As an extreme example of this, in 1903 the separatists within the Ukrainian Peoples' Party declared all men to be brothers to the Ukrainian people except Muscovites, Poles, Jews, Magyars, and Rumanians. Each of the national parties was by itself too small to be a real threat to the tsarist government, but if they affiliated themselves to the main revolutionary parties in Russia they could add considerable power to the opponents of the autocracy.

As if the autocracy did not have enough enemies, it added to the numbers of its opponents by the creation of government labor unions. These unions were instituted in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, and other cities under the supervision of Sergei Zubatov, the head of the Moscow security department. The purpose of this "police socialism," as it was called by critics, was to provide cooperative self-help to the workers, furnish them
with recreation and opportunities for cultural improvement, and divert the workers' energies from strikes and other revolutionary activities by having them participate in religious and patriotic demonstrations. The unions were, however, easily infiltrated by agents of radical parties and the entire movement only concentrated and organized the workers; making the task of the revolutionaries that much easier.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War brought on a wave of revolutionary activity. Ever since his tour to the Far East in 1890-1891, the Tsar had been fascinated by that part of the world. Influenced by such advisers as A. M. Bezobrazov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Admiral Alekseev, Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, and Prince Ukhtomski, a very articulate proponent of Russia's Asiatic mission, Nicholas II followed a policy of expansion in the Far East. China was forced to concede to Russia the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula as well as the right to extend the Trans-Siberian Railroad through Manchuria to shorten the route from Chita to Vladivostok. The Russian authorities extended their privileges in Manchuria to policing the area around the route from Chita to Vladivostok, exploiting Manchurian mines and fur-bearing animals, cutting wood in the forests of Northern Korea, and excluding all foreigners except Russians from Manchuria. Such an extension of Russian power collided with Japan's interests on the Asian mainland and in February of 1904 Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

The population of Russia was for the most part indifferent to a war which was so far away, did not promise any clear reward or seriously threaten Russia's national existence. Though socialist parties condemned the war as a capitalist venture, liberals expressed their support of the government against a foreign enemy. Eventually, however, the Japanese siege of Port Arthur and
other Russian defeats in Manchuria revealed the ineptitude of the tsarist government and disgusted even its liberal supporters.

As news of Russian defeats came from the East and the Russian government mobilized the reserves, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats increased their propaganda and agitation among all classes but especially in the armed forces. Soldiers, sailors, and especially reservists became the special targets of socialist propaganda. Leaflets were thrown at passing soldiers and forbidden discussion circles were organized within military units either by agents from outside the army who formed contacts with the soldiers or by newly mobilized reservists who were themselves members of socialist parties. The soldiers were told that the war was being fought to increase the profits of Russia's capitalists, who in the meantime, saddled the Russian people with the burden of hardship, casualties, and taxes. The Tsar was declared to be the peoples' worst enemy and the soldiers were urged to turn their weapons against him and join the Russian people in their struggle for a democratic republic and socialism. For the most part, however, the army remained loyal to the Tsar in 1904 though signs of dissatisfaction were beginning to show. In Georgia some reservists deserted and joined the peasant guerrillas who had been active since 1902. Near Moscow, the 7th Reserve Cavalry Regiment displayed armed resistance against their officers and other units which had been sent to pacify them. Most of the disciplinary problems for the time being, however, consisted of refusals to obey orders rather than active resistance to authority.

The liberals, entirely disgusted with the Tsar's mismanagement of the war, gradually withdrew their support from the government. In the early autumn of 1904 the leaders of the Union of Liberation, Struve and Miliukov,
attended a congress of socialist and national parties, held in Paris and attended by delegates from the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Polish, Lithuanian, and Armenian national parties. The liberals pledged their support of the demands of the other revolutionary parties even as far as the overthrow of the autocracy, the establishment of a democratic republic, based on universal suffrage, the right of self-determination and the removal of all discriminatory restrictions against national minorities.

Liberal unrest also increased within Russia. The new Minister of the Interior, Sviatopolk-Mirski, who had succeeded Count Plehve, recently assassinated by Socialist Revolutionaries, tried to appease revolutionary feeling in Russia by promising administrative reforms, releasing a few political prisoners, and ignoring relatively harmless manifestations against the autocracy. In November and December of 1904 the liberals took advantage of this "political spring" to hold meetings of zemstvos and professional unions and political banquets demanding a legislative assembly, freedom of speech, press, and religion, and autonomy for national minorities.

The end of 1904 was also marked by a growing wave of strikes. The most serious of these strikes broke out in the oil-fields of Baku and spread to the other industries in the area. The revolutionary parties urged the workers to support the general strike and demand the eight-hour day, a constituent assembly, and a democratic republic. Though the workers ended the strike when the work day was shortened, socialists held the strike up as an example of what could be achieved through proletarian solidarity and the Baku strike did foreshadow the general political strikes of 1905.

So it was that the year 1905 in Russia was ushered in amid increasing disorder.
CHAPTER I
THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION

In contrast to the strikes and disorders in Baku, the situation in St.
Petersburg toward the end of 1904 was fairly calm. Although Zubatov's govern-
ment-sponsored unions had been dissolved in 1903 because of their infiltration
by radicals, "political socialism" was given another chance in 1904. The
Assembly of St. Petersburg Factory Workers was approved by the Minister of the
Interior, Plehve, and organized under the leadership of an ex-prison chaplain,
Father Georgii Gapon. Membership was confined to workers of Russian national-
ity and Christian faith. The workers were allowed to organize group recreation
such as lectures, concerts, and tea rooms. Besides creating mutual aid funds
they could even discuss their material needs and publicly declare their real
grievances. Political discussion, however, as well as the right to strike
were not allowed by the government. The purpose of the Assembly was to pre-
vent the contamination of the workers from radical socialism by providing an
atmosphere of Russian patriotism and Orthodox piety.

Nevertheless, infiltration by radicals could not be completely prevented.
Furthermore, given the economic condition of the working class, docility could
not be expected from the workers. Even Father Gapon who maintained contact
with the police by sending reports and receiving directives and contributions
from the prefect, Ivan Fullon, sympathized with the workers and gradually came
to see the workers' need of the right to strike and the gradual attainment of self-government.

Trouble started when four members of the Assembly were dismissed from the Putilov ironworks on December 27, 1904. When the managers of the factory refused to recognize the right of the Assembly as a Union, the workers' delegates demanded that the four dismissed workers be restored to their positions, the work day shortened to eight hours, and the pay be raised to one ruble per day for men and seventy-five kopeks per day for women. While these demands were being formulated, it was suggested that workers in other plants in St. Petersburg support the Putilov strike by stopping work throughout the city, thus creating a general strike. Though the actual membership of the St. Petersburg Assembly of St. Petersburg Factory Workers was only 9,000, Father Gapon and his lieutenants had the sympathy and support of another 100,000. Within a week after the dismissal of the four workers the number of strikers had reached 25,000, including 13,000 workers of the Putilov Enterprises. By January 6, 150,000 of St. Petersburg's 175,000 workers were on strike though the operators of such utilities as steam, gas and electricity plants as well as the streetcar drivers remained aloof from the movement.

Meanwhile, Father Gapon proposed that the workers present their grievances before the Tsar. The petition drawn up on January 6 to be presented to the Tsar on the coming Sunday, included not only measures which would improve the economic well-being of the workers but demands of a political nature as well. Besides being asked to decree the eight hour day in Russia and recognize the workers' right to organize, the Tsar was also petitioned to convene a constituent assembly, grant civil rights, separate Church and State, and end the war. It was decided to present these petitions, signed by thousands of workers,
by marching to the Winter Palace on the bank of the Neva River in St. Petersburg, in a religious procession attended by thousands of workers and their families. The date set for this fateful march was Sunday, January 9.1

Meanwhile, the revolutionary opposition, including the Bolsheviks, did not approve of the spontaneous movement of the workers of St. Petersburg. It is true that the Bolsheviks saw the strike as an opportunity to increase proletarian solidarity and they spread numerous leaflets throughout the city by the St. Petersburg Committee of the Social-Democratic Party calling all workers to support and join the general strike. Furthermore, the workers were urged to demand self-government and political liberty as well as economic concessions for no benefits that the working class could obtain would be safe and permanent under an autocratic government.2 It was partly due to the influence of the Bolsheviks and other socialists who had infiltrated the Assembly of St. Petersburg Factory Workers that political demands were included in the petition to the Tsar. Yet there were many things about Father Gapon's movement of which the Bolsheviks did not approve. A letter from S. I. Gusev, a member of the St. Petersburg Committee, to Lenin, who was then in exile in Switzerland and editing the Bolshevik paper, Vpered, (Forward) is indicative of the Bolshevik attitude toward Father Gapon's movement. Gusev saw Father Gapon as a bourgeois adventurer or, at best, as a well-meaning idealist. He complained that the priest was drawing the masses away from the Social-Democratic revolu-

---


tionary movement and requested that more brochures and articles in Vpered be written condemning bourgeois adventurism and emphasizing that such aims as the creation of a democratic republic could only be achieved through revolution under the leadership of an independent proletarian party. Gusev admitted, however, that for the sake of the reputation of the Social-Democratic Party the Bolsheviks could not afford to stay aloof from a movement which could reach the proportions of a general strike or something even more grandiose.  

As far as the march itself was concerned, the Bolsheviks considered all attempts to petition the Tsar futile. Either the masses would receive illusory promises which would serve only to lead them astray from the only method by which the people could acquire their rights—revolution—or the crowds on their way to the Tsar would be met by violence on the part of the police and the army. On Saturday, January 8, the St. Petersburg Committee issued a leaflet warning the people that to ask the Tsar to grant a constituent assembly based on universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, popular control of the administration, the equality of all before the law, civil rights such as freedom of expression and association and the inviolability of the person and his home, amnesty to political prisoners, and the ending of the war was to ask him to voluntarily abolish the autocracy and turn the privileged classes out of power. The people would receive only lies. They were told that they could only win liberty by their own efforts and not as a gift from the Tsar,

Not to beg from the Tsar, nor even to demand of him, nor to lower ourselves before our sworn enemy, but to cast him from the throne, and chase out the autocratic band with him—only in this way is it possible to win liberty.

Ibid. pp. 8-10. Gusev to Lenin, January 5, 1905.
The liberation of the workers can only be the achievement of the workers themselves and you will receive your liberty neither from priests nor tsars. On Sunday, before the Winter Palace, if they even let you get that far, you will see that you can expect nothing from the Tsar. Then you will see that no outsider will bring you help, but that only you yourselves can win liberty for yourselves.4

Despite their efforts, the Bolsheviks could not prevent the march to the Winter Palace. However, they could not afford to stay aloof from a situation which offered such opportunities for agitation. A clash with the police was expected and the Bolsheviks as well as other revolutionaries joined the procession to the Winter Palace with furled red banners which were to be displayed when the police took action against the crowd and created a revolutionary mood. Orators of all revolutionary parties participated in the march, awaiting their chance to begin anti-government agitation as soon as the crowd had been attacked and the people disillusioned in their father, the Tsar. Some radicals such as the Socialist Revolutionaries hoped to start the revolution right then and planned to break into nearby gunshops as soon as the fighting started.5 The Bolsheviks, however, only planned to use any ensuing violence as an opportunity for anti-tsarist agitation, probably because they considered the masses still too disorganized to begin a serious revolution.

What happened on January 9 shocked even the Bolsheviks who had been expecting something of the sort. The Tsar was not even in the Winter Palace that day. The Minister of the Interior, Sviatopolk-Mirski, and the Prefect of St. Petersburg, Fullon, had decided on the eve of the march to teach the crowds a

---

lesson and had not informed the Tsar of their plans. The crowd, marching in procession with national flags, portraits of the Tsar, and religious icons, was met on the square of the Winter Palace by eight rifle volleys and a cavalry charge. About the same thing happened in other parts of the city such as the Alexander Garden, the Neva Arch, and the Troitski Bridge where smaller processions, also headed for the Winter Palace, were met by troops and police. By the end of the day the authorities succeeded in dispersing most of the people. The only resistance was offered by a few revolutionaries, workers, and students, who fired occasional revolver shots or made isolated attacks on lone policemen. Figures concerning the number of dead vary. The government admitted that 96 people were killed while some journalists claimed to have obtained the names of 4,6000 who had perished that day. All that is certain is that two policemen were killed. It is true that the Tsar had not been in St. Petersburg that day and was uninformed of what his bureaucrats were planning and thus cannot be held directly responsible for the tragedy. But who would believe him or accept this as an excuse? Many now ceased to believe in the benevolence of the Tsar. Previously the uneducated masses had held the Bureaucracy responsible for all the abuses of the government, but after peaceful workers and their families had been met by gunfire in front of the Tsar's palace, they now lost faith in him personally and lost all loyalty to any part of the government. Father Gapon best expressed the disillusionment of the Russian people in the Tsar when he said, "We no longer have a Tsar. A river of blood divides the Tsar from the people."

6 Harcave, First Blood, pp. 88-94.

7 Quoted in Lenin's article in Vpered, Jan. 18, 1905.
The bloody events of January 9 had vindicated the Bolshevik position that liberty could be won only by revolution and not by petitions, so they took full advantage of the people's anger against the Tsar to call the workers to arms. The day after "Bloody Sunday" the Bolshevik St. Petersburg Committee and its district committees in the city issued several stirring leaflets designed to fire up the emotions of the masses. One leaflet condemned the wanton murder of workers by the government and asked for money in support of the movement, not specifying exactly what the movement was. Another called on all to turn the present strike into a general one in order to combat the autocracy and capitalism. The workers were urged to draw non-strikers into the movement, especially those operating utilities such as gas and electrical plants, telephones, telegraphs, railroads, streetcars, stables, and mail transport. All were urged to wreck the gas and electrical plants, cut telephone and telegraph wires, and even tear up rails. It was hoped that the destruction of these utilities would weaken the enemies of the people by disrupting their communications and rendering them unable to shift troops to where they were needed.

Other leaflets directly called the people to arms. They emphasized that revolution was the only method by which the working class could improve its condition and reminded them of what had happened to petitioning workers in front of the Winter Palace.

You want to the Tsar to obtain your rights and he met you with rifles and gunfire, blows by spears, and the sharp swords of his "Oprichniks."

You begged for bread and work and he welcomed you with hot lead.

8 Nachalo Revoliutsii, p. 53.
9 Ibid., p. 81.
Didn't we Social-Democrats tell you that you would get nothing from the blood-sucking Tsar? Didn't we tell you that he is not a friend but an enemy of the people and does not concern himself with the good of the people but with the good of his mistresses and attendants.

The people were then called to action.

...Now gather around our red banner. Rise. Go down the streets and see that work is stopped everywhere—that all citizens, as one man rise with arms in their hands against the Tsar and the government, hand leaflets to soldiers and ask that they not shoot at the people.

Down with the Tsar!
Down with the autocracy!
Long live the constituent assembly!
Long live Social-Democracy! 

The army was also a target of Bolshevik agitation. Officers were reminded of their duty to defend the people with their lives and were urged to turn their weapons against the peoples' enemies. Other leaflets aimed at the rank and file reminded the soldiers that they were the brothers of the very people they had fired on and called on them to turn against the government. One very stirring leaflet read,

Soldiers! yesterday with your guns and rifles you killed hundreds of your brothers. They didn't send you against the Japanese, nor to protect Port Arthur, but to kill unarmed women and children. Your officers turned you into murderers. Soldiers! Who did you kill? Those who went to the Tsar to demand liberty and a better life—liberty and a better life for themselves and for you, for your fathers and brothers, for your wives and mothers. Shame and disgrace! You—are our brothers. You need liberty and you shoot at us. Enough! Pull yourselves together soldiers! You—are our brothers. Kill those officers who order you to shoot at us! Refuse to shoot at the people! Come over to our side! Let us go in comradely ranks against your enemies. Give us your weapons!

Down with the murdering Tsar!
Down with the executioner-officers!
Down with the autocracy!
Long live liberty!
Long live socialism!

10 Ibid. p. 65.
11 Ibid. pp. 64-65.
12 Ibid. p. 79.
Similar agitation was carried out by Bolshevik Committees in all the other major cities in Russia. A leaflet of the Moscow Bolsheviks declared the autocratic government and capitalists to be worse enemies to the people than the Japanese were and urged all to arm themselves and demand a constituent assembly, civil rights, and separation of church and state. Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia issued similar calls to arms in the hope of reviving the rioting which had occurred in Baku the past month and intensifying the peasant guerrilla war in western Georgia.

In Geneva Lenin, his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaja, and other Bolshevik exiles including V. V. Vorovskiiwept with emotion when the news of "Bloody Sunday" reached them. They wept not only from sorrow but from joy for they expected a revolution would surely begin after such a bloody act had been committed by the government. In the week following "Bloody Sunday" Lenin wrote several articles defining the tasks of the Social-Democratic Party at such an important time: to arm and organize the proletarian masses and to obtain the support of the army. On January 13 he wrote in Vpered, that the government had put the people in a revolutionary mood, but

...I remains for the Social-Democrats to see to it that the news of the bloody days in St. Petersburg is spread as wide as possible, to rally and organize their forces still better, and to popularize still more energetically the slogan they had long since advanced: the general armed uprising of the people.

---

13 Ibid. p. 237.


If there was to be a revolution the masses needed organization and leadership. According to Lenin, the January 9 gathering of workers was a mob incapable of revolution. A proletarian party was needed to give the masses goals and tactics. It was the duty of the Social-Democratic Party as the vanguard of the proletariat to provide leadership in all aspects of revolutionary preparation. Lenin condemned the Mensheviks for merely heightening the ardor of the workers through agitation. To give the masses the desire to arm was merely the first step. It was also the duty of the Social-Democrats to guide the proletariat in such technical aspects of the revolution as obtaining and distributing arms, organizing revolutionary combat units, and training the workers in the use of weapons and the tactics of street fighting and partisan warfare. 16

In the meantime, the Bolsheviks in Russia sought to take advantage of the mass discontent and disorders which followed January 9. Large numbers of workers struck in almost every major center in Russia in protest against the government's action on January 9. Revolutionaries of all parties encouraged them to include political demands such as a constituent assembly and civil rights along with their economic demands. Professors ceased lecturing and students not belonging to any particular party agitated workers, peasants and soldiers. But the Bolsheviks considered strikes and a restless mood on the part of the people to be only the first step toward revolution. The second step was to be the turning of the sympathy strikes occurring in Russia with no coordination or clear goal into a general all-Russian political strike which was eventually to be a nationwide clash between the people and the government and result in revolution. To achieve this it was necessary to urge the continuance of the sympathy strikes throughout Russia and to draw non-strikes

16 Ibid. VIII. pp. 166-176.
into the movement by urging them to quit work in support of the St. Petersburg strike. Even if such agitation did not immediately bring on a general strike, it would bring about separate strikes which would draw the working class closer to revolution by providing them with political education, showing them the necessity of political liberty as well as economic advancement, making it clear to the working class that its real enemies were the government and the bourgeoisie with whom there could be no compromise, and teaching the workers the need of organization and proletarian solidarity. Thus, the proletariat would become class conscious and politically educated through experience. The workers would learn the necessity of revolution through the violence they would meet on the part of the government and they would acquire class consciousness by seeing that no strike or revolution could succeed without proletarian solidarity and organization. 17

The Bolsheviks were not uniformly successful in all regions of Russia during the first three months of 1905. In some regions they succeeded in widening the strike movement. In others they managed to incite strikes and intensify unrest and violence. In some areas they met with no success at all.

In St. Petersburg the Bolsheviks of the St. Petersburg Committee and members of the Menshevik Social-Democrat Group agreed to sign their leaflets in common in order to set an example of solidarity to the workers and to avoid confusing the masses with intra-party disputes. The agreement did not last beyond the middle of January but at least both factions were able to concentrate their energies on agitating the masses. Frequent demonstrations were held with

---

workers marching under red banners with socialist slogans and Bolshevik and Menshevik orators calling on workers to support the strike and demand political rights as well as economic concessions. At the same time, the workers already on strike were urged to continue their strike, to organize strike committees to gather funds and enforce the strike, and finally, the workers were urged to gather arms and prepare themselves for the coming rising.

However, to turn a series of strikes into a revolution was a difficult task despite the fact that Father Gapon's organization of the workers had given them a foundation for class consciousness and solidarity and that "Bloody Sunday" had put the workers in an angry mood. There was still a lack of revolutionary discipline among the workers. By January 20 the Putilov workers were back on their jobs and a total of 50,000 had drifted back to work on their own in other plants. As far as political demands were concerned, it seems that most workers were not aware of their meaning. Workers shouted revolutionary slogans and adopted Social-Democratic resolutions to rise in arms under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. Yet they also petitioned the government for a graduated income tax, cheap loans to workers, and the gradual transfer of state lands to the people. It is true that many were unaware of the difference between a revolutionary resolution and a petition to the government but this is not the only explanation of the Social-Democrats' failure to instigate a general strike. It must also be remembered that both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were in competition with Socialist-Revolutionary, non-party, and anarchist agitators and therefore many of the workers remained uninfluenced by Social-Democratic leadership and unimpressed by the Social-Democratic program. Furthermore, the great majority of the workers still sought only to improve their economic condition and ignored political issues. As Lenin wrote in
A fighting spirit prevails everywhere but it could hardly be said to be in favor of the Social-Democratic line. Most of the workers stand for a purely economic struggle and against a political one. 18

There were also other obstacles facing the Bolsheviks in their efforts to incite a general strike and an armed uprising. It was one thing to call the proletariat to arms but something else to actually arm it. Rifles and revolvers which could be smuggled into the country or stolen from gun shops were rare. The Socialist-Revolutionaries made some bombs for the workers but most were armed with cold steel such as daggers or home-made pikes and lances. A revolution could not succeed with such equipment.

Furthermore, the police was not idle. Apartments which served as Bolshevik meeting-places were frequently raided and many leaflets stored there were destroyed. By the end of January many of the leading Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg were behind bars and the Bolshevik effort was further disorganized.

By the beginning of February the strike movement threatened to die out. To add to the Bolsheviks' difficulties Tsar Nicholas formed a commission headed by Senator Shidlovskii to investigate the causes of the disaster of January 9 as well as examine the grievances of Russian factory workers. In order to redeem some of the government's popularity among the lower class, this commission was to include representatives elected by the workers as well as by members of the bureaucracy and factory managers. The Bolshevik St. Petersburg Committee would have liked to urge the workers to boycott the elections to the commission. An article appearing in Vpered in mid-February expressed the general attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the commission. It reminded the workers of their

18 Lenin, Collected Works, VIII. p. 115.
experience in dealing with the government on January 9. The Shidlovskii Commission was condemned as an attempt on the part of the government to muddle the workers, deflecting them from their revolutionary purpose, and to appear as a friend anxious to improve their condition. The remedy to the workers' ills was declared to be not cooperation with the government but the resort to arms under Social-Democratic leadership. 19

However, the Shidlovskii Commission was so popular among the majority of the workers that the St. Petersburg Committee did not dare boycott the elections to the commission lest it cut itself off from the masses. Reluctantly, the Bolsheviks decided to make use of the freedom of expression allowed during the campaign to carry out increased anti-government agitation. Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks demanded that the deputies be given immunity from arrest, freedom of assembly, and of the press be allowed in discussing matters concerning the Shidlovskii Commission. If these demands were not met, the Social-Democrats threatened to expose the commission as a fraud and scuttle it by quitting it. The government, of course, would not meet all of these demands and the Social-Democratic electors refused to choose deputies for the commission and called the workers to a general strike. Though only eighty of the four hundred electors were Social-Democrats, enough of the Gaponist and non-party electors joined them in quitting the commission to make it unworkable, so the Tsar ordered the Shidlovskii Commission dissolved on February 20. The Social-Democrats succeeded in scuttling this attempt by the government in reconciling itself with the working class, but even more important, the workers themselves gained political experience from campaigning and electing their

19 Nachlo Pervoi Revoliutsii, pp. 204-206.
representatives and the Shidlovskii Commission proved to be a precedent for later workers' representative bodies such as trade unions and soviets.  

The Tsar made yet another attempt to calm the revolutionary feeling in Russia. On February 13 he issued a manifest promising the formation of a commission including popularly trusted notables which was to advise the Tsar in matters of reform and legislation. Bolshevik orators and pamphlets were quick to point out that this commission in no way limited the autocracy and was meant only to deceive the workers. The creation of the commission did not satisfy even the liberals. Unrest increased after the news of the Russian defeat at Mukden, the revolutionary agitation against the Shidlovskii Commission, and the campaign against the February 18 manifest and strike activity in St. Petersburg increased temporarily. However, by the end of February most of the workers had tired of strikes and political agitation. Though sporadic strikes continued, most of the plants in St. Petersburg were back in operation by March.  

In Moscow the Bolsheviks carried on activities similar to those of the St. Petersburg Committee. After January 9 the workers in the area were urged to cease work in protest of the massacre of "Bloody Sunday." By January 18, however, the strike was nowhere near being a general one. Only 43,000 workers out of the 170,000 in the city stopped work. When the strike was called the
workers were taken by surprise and did not even have their demands worked out. When the demands were finally formulated, they turned out to be generally of an economic nature—eight-hour day, higher pay, better working conditions, abolition of fines, and searches, half pay in case of sickness, the right of elected delegates to present grievances to the management, and free housing for Tartars as well as Russians. To combat this disregard for political issues the Moscow Committee issued several leaflets on the necessity of political liberty as well as economic improvement. One leaflet explained to the workers:

You have put forward demands for the eight hour work day, a raise in wages, and others. But these demands cannot be satisfied by one factory owner or even several. They would have to be promulgated throughout all Russia at once—it means it is necessary to do this in the legislative sphere. And can a law good for workers be passed if the workers themselves cannot send their representatives into a legislative body. It means that it is necessary that the workers have the right to send their freely elected deputies into a popular government, called a parliament, where they would pass laws for the good of the workers.

After reminding the workers of how much they suffered without the freedom of expression and association and the right to strike, the leaflet reiterated the necessity of a political struggle.

For a free struggle against the masters, to secure for themselves civil and political rights, the freedom of assembly, association, the right to strike, and the freedom of speech and the press, the workers must inevitably enter into a political struggle, a struggle to the death with the autocratic government.22

The Bolsheviks intensified their agitation when the February 18 manifest was issued. Street orators and leaflets warned the workers that the manifest did not in any way limit the autocracy or grant self-government but was only a deception on the part of the government to prolong the war and the misery of the working class. The provision in the manifest which allowed workers to

---

present their grievances to the Tsar was especially ridiculed. What had happened when the people tried to petition the Tsar on January 9? If the Tsar really wanted to hear his people, why was there such a heavy censorship in the land? The Tsar would not grant the people anything. Only by taking up arms and establishing a democratic republic could the workers obtain what they demanded. The agitation continued into March. Bolshevik agitators provided workers with ready printed resolutions to be adopted at meetings. The resolutions most frequently declared the government to be void of any popular trust, affirmed that the workers would refrain from petitioning the government for anything, and proclaimed that the factories and land in the nation would fall into the hands of the toilers only through the resort to arms under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party and the establishment of a democratic republic. The proletariat was not the only target of Bolshevik agitation. All citizens were reminded that liberty could only be won through revolution from below and not commissions appointed from above. All classes were warned that no one could be neutral in the present revolution and all were called to support the revolution under the slogan, "People to arms." The Bolsheviks managed to keep the working class in ferment by distributing leaflets, spreading rumors about clashes between workers and soldiers in other cities, establishing secret reading and discussion circles, and holding meetings and demonstrations among workers when they could get away with it.

26 Ibid. p. 319.
However, there was no rising. The workers were still mainly interested in economic questions and readily returned to work when their demands were partially satisfied. From the Bolshevik point of view, the workers needed more political education before there could be a revolution.

In the Transcaucasian region it did not take much effort to make the workers violent. In Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, crowds carrying red banners destroyed shops and houses, tore down telegraph wires, stopped trains, and fired revolvers at troops and police. Similar disorders took place in Poti and Sukhum in western Georgia. Such disorganized efforts, however, were of little use in overthrowing a government. The Bolsheviks attempted to provide the terrorists and the mobs that followed them with some leadership and tactical advice. The Tiflis Committee, of which Iosif Dzugashvili (Keba or Stalin) was a member, called on the rebels to accept the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party so that the Transcaucasian proletariat might be organized into a revolutionary force and coordinate its efforts with the proletariat in the rest of Russia in one general attack against the throne. \(^{27}\) Leaflets offering tactical advice called on all the people not to attack troops in large crowds but to use every building and window as a place for ambush by small units. All were urged to use firearms, bombs, and even rocks, but to concentrate their efforts on disrupting communications and taking the initiative against the troops. \(^{28}\)

In Baku, the violence of the December strikes had never really stopped, but the Armenian and Muslem oilers now turned their weapons against each other.

---

\(^{27}\) Ibid. pp. 609-611.

\(^{28}\) Ibid. pp. 608-609.
turning the city and the oilfield into a battlefield in which unarmed Russian workers were killed as well as Armenians and Tartars. The Bolsheviks accused the police of igniting the latent feud between the two nationalities and urged both sides to join the Russian proletariat in their struggle against the autocracy. It was a futile attempt, however, as both the Armenians and Tartars forgot about the autocracy and the revolution and went on fighting each other.

Throughout the rest of Russia the Bolsheviks similarly made the slogan of a popular armed uprising their main tactical directive. In Reval, Estonia, the news of January 9 brought on two clashes between troops and workers in which several people were killed but no real threat of revolution developed. In Riga the Bolsheviks cooperated with the Lettish Social-Democrats in organizing demonstrations with red banners and revolutionary slogans, one of the demonstrations resulting in about a hundred casualties. In Riga, however, Bolshevik activity was overshadowed by that of the Lettish Social Democrats.

The Bolsheviks' biggest failure was probably in southern Russia. In Ekaterinoslav (today Dniepropetrovsk) there were instances of rock throwing at troops and threats against non-strikers, but the strikes were generally of an economic nature and political agitators were sometimes turned in to the police by the workers themselves. In the Don area there was not much enthusiasm for the strike movement. Generally, the workers would suddenly leave their work and gather to formulate their demands. Sometimes they presented their demands without even bothering to stop work. In Saratov the news of January 9 caused crowds to gather and threaten public buildings, but the presence of troops proved to be sufficient to quiet the situation. Both the Social-Democrats and

the Socialist Revolutionaries urged the workers to support the St. Petersburg
strike by starting a general strike in Saratov but they soon found that the
workers could not even read the demands which were drawn up by their more
enlightened companions. Clearly, the population was for the most part still
too backward to comprehend political issues, much less revolt against the

autocracy.

In January Poland was already in turmoil for the Poles had long been
demanding the use of their language in the schools and local administration
along with civil equality for Catholics. The news of "Bloody Sunday" brought
armed rebellion to Warsaw and Lodz but here the Bolsheviks had too much com-
petition from the Polish Social-Democratic Party, the Social-Democratic Party
of Poland and Lithuania, and the General Jewish Workers' Union to have any
real control of the situation and their propaganda was therefore mainly con-
fined to the Russian garrisons in Poland.

It had always been a basic tactical principle of the Bolsheviks that they could not overthrow the autocracy without the support of the peasantry.
"The interests of the working class," wrote Lenin, "demand the most energetic
support of the peasant revolution--more than that: its leading role in the
peasant revolution." In March of 1905, he reiterated his belief in the
necessity of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry against the
autocracy and the landowning nobility in order to establish a democratic

republic. As unrest increased in the cities, the Bolsheviks attempted to

30 Ibid. p. 391-397.
31 P.I. Klimov. Revoliutsionnaya Deiatel'nost Rabochikh v. Derevne,
(Moscow, Izdatel' stvo Sotsio-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury 1960) p. 46.
32 Ibid. VIII, p. 231.
incite a simultaneous revolution in the countryside. In Georgia the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks attempted to intensify the guerrilla war which was being carried on by the peasants since 1902. The Georgian peasants demanded the lowering of rents on large estates, the abolition of payments due to the state since 1861 to compensate the landowners for the serfs' personal freedom, local self-government, and the use of the Georgian language in local schools. To heighten the revolutionary spirit in the countryside, the Tiflis Committee issued leaflets calling on the peasants to join the workers of Russia under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party to win freedom for all. Aimless destruction of property, however, was discouraged since these estates and goods would someday revert to the people. Instead the peasants were urged and encouraged to organize their forces and maintain contact with the Tiflis Committee in order to provide a good foundation for the revolutionary movement. 33

The Baltic region was also a scene of peasant dissatisfaction. Here, about half the land was owned by German landowners who hired Lithuanian and Latvian day laborers at extremely low wages and extracted large rents and fees from the local peasants for the use of their pastures and wooded areas. Here as in the rest of the Empire, the Bolsheviks urged the peasants to join the proletariat in its struggle for a democratic republic and promised their support of the peasants' demands for the abolition of feudal dues, fees for the use of pastures and woods, and all existing taxes along with the restoration of the lands the peasants believed they should have received with their freedom in 1861. The Baltic peasants were better educated and more orderly than

33 Nachalo Pervoi Revoliutsii, pp. 670-671.
most peasants in the rest of the Empire. They announced they would cut wood without paying fees to the landowners, ceased paying feudal dues, and petitioned the government to legalize their actions. Agricultural laborers went on strike and mobs gathered to threaten non-strikers but there was little violence and no attempt at revolution.

There was plenty of violence in central Russia, especially in the provinces of Kursk, Orel, and Chernigov, but Bolshevik influence was weak. Bolshevik leaflets and workers returning to their families from Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, and the Donetz Basin did not succeed in spreading the Social-Democratic ideas among the peasants but did make them more violent. Independent agitators fired up the peasants by spreading rumors that the Tsar had given the land to the peasants but needed their help in taking it from disobedient landlords. Rumors of revolts in other provinces were spread about and it was even said that the army was returning from Manchuria to chase the landlords off the land. As a result agricultural laborers ceased working, peasant mobs stole grain and livestock from the landlords, and robbed and burned several estates. The motive for these actions was not revolution but robbery and revenge since peasants often returned their loot and turned agitators who spoke against the Tsar in to the police. The Bolsheviks could not organize the violent peasantry into a revolutionary force because they lacked the popularity that the Socialist-Revolutionaries had in that area. Furthermore, the general ignorance of the peasantry made peasants more apt to believe rumors about the Tsar giving the peasants land than to study political issues and revolutionary tactics. Many of the peasants owned no land and

\[34\] Ibid. p. 646.
lacked the sense of responsibility required to change the social structure or landowning system in Russia. They seemed to be more concerned with robbing the landlords of a few material goods than with actually seizing the land themselves or organizing local self-government. The lack of troops in the area because of the war in Manchuria served only to encourage the peasants to greater violence rather than to make them see their opportunity to organize their own local government.35

Looking at the general situation in the beginning of April, the Bolsheviks could see that in the first three months of 1905 there had been much unrest and even violence, but not revolution. The autocracy was still standing. All the revolutionary parties together did not provide the people with a clear revolutionary strategy which would unite all in a struggle against the autocracy. The Social-Democrats themselves were split by a factional strife which served only to confuse their adherents and dampen the revolutionary ardor of the proletariat. There was also much violence in the countryside but no real revolutionary movement. Finally, the army was still loyal to the Tsar. If some remedy were not found for each of these problems, the revolution could not succeed.

CHAPTER II

THE "THIRD" PARTY CONGRESS: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

BOLSHEVIKS AS A PARTY AND THE DEFINITION

OF THEIR REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS

The failure to bring about a general armed uprising during the first three months of 1905 was a bitter disappointment to the Bolsheviks. The dissatisfaction and unrest necessary for a revolution were present but the proletariat as well as the peasantry was still more of a mob rather than an organized revolutionary army and the Social-Democratic Party was nowhere near being in the position of leadership as "vanguard of the proletariat." The party itself was split into two camps resulting in the disorganization of party effort and the confusion of the masses it preached to. Furthermore, tactical questions had to be cleared up before any more progress toward revolution could be made. Who were the allies of the Social-Democrats and the proletariat in the coming struggle? What would be the nature of a future provisional government and what part were the Social-Democrats to play in it? How were the Social-Democrats to organize the masses and increase their revolutionary ardor and political consciousness. Finally, there was also the need for the technical preparation of the armed uprising. Without a solution to these problems there could be no democratic revolution, much less a socialist one.
The first problem was the disunity of the Social-Democratic Party itself. Since the Second Party Congress in 1903 the Mensheviks obtained control of the Central Committee. During the same period Georgii Plekhanov, the founder of the Social-Democratic Party, tended to side with Julius Martov, the Menshevik spokesman on the editorial staff of Iskra, thus undermining Lenin's position in the party organ. With the Central Committee and the party newspaper under Menshevik control, the Social-Democratic Party did not live up to Lenin's expectations of what the "vanguard of the Proletariat" should be.

He feared the Mensheviks' willingness to cooperate with the Liberals would turn the party from a revolutionary proletarian organization into a trade-unionist and reformist socialist party of the western European type. To carry on a theoretical dispute in the party paper would not furnish the proletariat with the leadership it needed but would only confuse and demoralize the masses who did not understand the fine points of the disputes within the party.

Rather, it would be better to break with the Mensheviks and the Central Committee altogether. A completely separate party organization and newspaper would enable Lenin and his followers to carry out their revolutionary program without Menshevik interference and would enable them to clearly present the Bolshevik message without having to confuse their readers with the opposite message on the same page. Lenin, therefore, was determined to make a clean break with his most intransigent opponents even if they composed the majority of the party. By manipulating local committee elections he could arrange a third Party congress dominated by the Bolsheviks. Those who supported the decisions of his congress he would accept as party members while those who boycotted the congress or refused to submit to its rulings would be clearly separated from his organization. Lenin did not mind being in the minority if
the followers he did have were devoted to his own plan of revolutionary action.

It was extremely important to act quickly in order to grab control of the Social-Democratic organizations which were then being formed in the various parts of Russia. In the late summer of 1904 Lenin convoked the famous council of the "twenty-two" somewhere in Switzerland. The "twenty-two" who are said to have attended included Lenin's wife, N. Krupskaia, S. I. Gusev, A.A. Bogdanov, A.V. Lunacharskij, M. Essen, V.V. Vorovskij, M. Liadov, P.A. Krasikov, and R.S. Zemliachka. This gathering called for a new party congress to give a Bolshevik interpretation to the decrees of the Second Party Congress. As the meetings of this body continued, Lenin was granted funds for establishing a Bolshevik paper, Vpered, as a rival to Iskra. The editorial board was to include Lenin, A.V. Lunacharskij, V.V. Vorovskij, and D. Ol'minski. Soon after, the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority, including Gusev, Zemliachka, Bogdanov, Liadov, and M.M. Litvinov, was set up as a Bolshevik substitute for the Central Committee and entrusted with the task of convoking a third party congress. The creation and membership of the Bureau were approved by the Southern Conference, which was supposed to represent three of the Social-Democratic organizations in the Ukraine, the Caucasian Union, which supposedly represented the Baku, Tiflis, Batum, and Imeretii-Mingreliia committees, and the Northern Conference representing the St. Petersburg, Moscow and Riga committees and other organizations in the north and industrial center of Russia. As will be seen, it is extremely doubtful whether these

1M. Liadov, Iz Zhizni Partii Nakanune i v Godi Pervoi Revoliutsii. (Vospominannia) (Sverdlkov, Kommissia Universiteta I.M. Sverdlova, 1926) pp. 54-60. Anna Pankratova, Perwaja Russkaia Revoliutsija, (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1951) pp. 85-90. Liadov claims that he was present at the conference and names some of the "twenty-two." Yet, Solomon Schwartz in his The Russian Revolution of 1905, pp. 257-260, doubts that there was any such conference. The exact location and time of the
conferences actually represented the committees they claimed to represent and even more doubtful whether the mentioned committees themselves represented the majority of the Social-Democrats in their respective areas. The Caucasian Union, for example, represented an area in which Menshevik influence was very strong. By fair means or foul, Lenin practically had his own party with its own paper and central committee in the form of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority by the end of 1904.

One can imagine what effect the creation of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority had on the organization and activity of the local party organizations in Russia. The intra-party feud had been disrupting the party work of the local committees during much of 1904. As the split widened, the peak of the confusion was reached during the critical period following January 9 when the Social-Democrats should have been devoting all their efforts to form and organize a revolution. A few examples should serve to illustrate one of the reasons why they failed to fulfill their task at the time.

One area in which the intra-party feud deeply affected the local committees was the Ukraine. In Ekaterinoslav a Menshevik group had been carrying on its own agitation and organization of the workers separately from the Bolshevik-dominated local committee. The Central Committee of the party continually urged the Bolsheviks to include the Menshevik group in the local

conference are unknown. Furthermore, it is known that Vorovski, Lunacharski, and Essen perhaps a few others could not have been in Switzerland at the time. Perhaps Lenin alone wrote the "Declaration of the Twenty-Two" after consulting Bogdanov and Ol'minski in order to present it as a demand of party workers in Russia, so that he would have a declaration formulated by a formal conference which would be approved by committees in Russia. Or perhaps, there really was a conference which was attended by only a few of the people mentioned by Liadov. In any case, the beginning of the Bolshevik party remains shrouded in mystery.
party organization. Though the Bolsheviks at first refused, they soon found themselves short of propaganda literature from the Central Committee and were forced to accept the Mensheviks as co-workers. The Menshevik group, meanwhile, continued to slander the local committee, as was customary for both factions, and eventually built up a large following among the workers, created or took over the great majority of the Marxist reading and discussion circles in the city, and even managed to gain control of the local party press, thus completely throwing the Bolsheviks out of contact with the masses.

After January 9 the Mensheviks became even more popular among the workers when they proposed that a strike commission formed by the workers be headed by an elected leadership while the Bolsheviks had some presumably less democratic plan of organization in mind. The Bolsheviks were too few and too inept to counter the popularity of the Mensheviks and were eventually cut off from all support from the workers. Finding they could no longer operate under such conditions, four of the five Bolshevik committee members dissolved the committee and left while the fifth member was out of town. An agent of the Central Committee soon came and finding no committee in Ekaterinoslav, formed a new one composed entirely of Mensheviks. When the fifth Bolshevik member returned he claimed his right to form the new committee as he was the last member of the old one. Instead, he was excluded from all committee work for being absent from his party work and not returning within fifteen days after he was called back to Ekaterinoslav. The Bolshevik protested to the Central Committee but received no answer. In the meantime, he organized his own group of Bolsheviks and undertook a campaign against the new committee. Thus, the workers in Ekaterinoslav were again faced with two bickering
factions of the Social-Democratic Party.  

A similar situation arose in Nikolaev, near the mouth of the Bug, when a police raid around the middle of February, scattered the local committee. A week later, an agent of the Central Committee arrived and formed a new committee composed of Mensheviks. As in Ekaterinoslav, a Bolshevik member of the scattered committee returned claiming his right to co-opt the new members necessary for a new committee. The agent from the Central Committee was willing to arrive at some sort of compromise but was not willing to allow both himself and the Bolshevik to form a new committee together. So, the Bolshevik went on to form his own organization and Nikolaev, like Ekaterinoslav found itself with two feuding Social-Democratic organizations. Here, again, the Mensheviks enjoyed far greater popularity among the workers because their organization and program seemed more democratic to the workers.  

In Saratov, the Menshevik-dominated committee sinned in a manner the Bolsheviks considered abominable. Two Mensheviks joined a "United Committee" which was created by liberals in 1901 to carry on an anti-government propaganda campaign. When the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority called on all local committees to elect delegates to the coming party congress, the Saratov Mensheviks refused to comply. In March 1905, M. Liadov, who had been sent to Saratov by the Bureau, held a general party meeting which elected a representative to the party congress. That this irregular move was made against the will of the local committee is proved by the fact that even after the Third Congress the Menshevik committee refused to recognize the legality

---

3 Ibid. pp. 694-697.
of the congress or to accept its decisions. In Voronezh a group of Bolsheviks had obtained the support of a member of the Central Committee and declared the rival Menshevik committee dissolved in September of 1904. The Mensheviks, however, carried the dispute to the Party Council and finally won back their status as a committee in the spring of 1905. In the meantime, during the critical period of revolutionary unrest, party agitation and organization was severely disrupted. In an area where the Socialist Revolutionaries had a strong influence, the rivalry between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks caused the Social-Democratic Party to lose much of its respect and trust among the workers and made it unable to take advantage of the strike movement and peasant unrest.

Even the December strike in Baku was hampered by the dispute in the party. As far back as the summer of 1904 some of the Mensheviks broke off from the local committee and formed their own "Balakhan and Bibi-Eibat Workers' Group." While the strike movement was reaching a peak in late 1904, the quarrel between the two factions over the proper timing of the strike, reduced its effectiveness. The Bolsheviks' support of the strike was reluctant for they wanted to delay the strike till a general all-Caucasian or all-Russian strike movement got under way. On December 27 the Bolsheviks further weakened the strike movement by issuing leaflets calling on the Baku workers to return to work and save their strength for a greater struggle against


5 Tretii S'ezd, pp. 615-620.
capitalism in the near future.

The Kazan Committee composed of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks split over the issue of a party congress and even Lenin doubted the legality of counting the Kazan Bolsheviks' vote in favor of convoking a congress.7

The Riga Committee was a very small Social-Democratic organization and had always had enough trouble combating Lettish and Jewish nationalist propaganda even without internal dissention. The clashes between workers and troops after January 9 brought about such a degree of revolutionary ardor in Riga that there might have been serious trouble in Riga had there been sufficient arms for an uprising. The best the Social-Democrats could do, however, was to urge the workers to strike and organize a strike committee to collect funds and enforce the strike. Just at this crucial moment, an argument over the appointment of a Menshevik to the Riga Committee caused a split in the organization. The Bolshevik-dominated committee dissolved the Mensheviks' organizations, which were carrying on agitation among the "intelligentsia," on the grounds that a separate organization for more highly educated people was not needed. The Mensheviks, however, continued their work, and, in the meantime, contacted the Central Committee. As the strike movement reached its peak between January 20 and 30, the local Bolshevik committee worked along with the Mensheviks rather than disrupt the entire movement. But feuding seemed unavoidable. The strike committee became divided and workers were puzzled and scandalized by the frequent arguments between the

---

7 Khammatov, Kazanskaja Organizatsija Bolshevikov, pp. 40-42.
Social-Democrats. The Mensheviks captured the support of most of the workers in the city, though, after much exertion, the Bolsheviks managed to keep the loyalty of the railroad workers. After a little while, the Mensheviks completely disassociated themselves from the Bolsheviks. The latter remained faced with the task of creating new organizations among factory workers, renewing previous connections among the workers, organizing new discussions and reading circles and creating sub-committees to train new party workers in the various districts of the city. In other words, the Mensheviks had completely wrecked the Bolshevik organization in Riga. Not receiving party literature from the Central Committee and being unable to communicate with most of the proletariat in the city because of the lack of leaflets written in Lettish, the Riga Committee remained a shadow organization supported by some of the railroad workers and a few soldiers belonging to the local Russian garrison.

Even the St. Petersburg Committee was not spared the strife between the two factions. After the formation of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority the Mensheviks in the capital struck back by campaigning among the workers against the Bolsheviks. Apparently, the Mensheviks succeeded in making their rivals very unpopular. Bolshevik prestige fell to such an extent that workers frequently beat Bolshevik agitators and destroyed their leaflets.

The Bolsheviks' prestige rose after January 9 because their views concerning the march had been vindicated. For a few days even the Mensheviks cooperated with them in a United Committee which carried on agitation and issued leaflets jointly signed by Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The friendship

8 Tretii S'ezd, pp. 581-600.
did not last long, however. Although Bolsheviks and Mensheviks occasionally met and discussed party work, their loyalties remained with their own organizations. Workers often demanded that both factions unite and stop their arguing but it was no use. Even the Social-Democratic Student Organization, which had been organized years before to recruit party members from among the students, obtain funds for the party, and support the revolutionary movement among students of all parties, was also split by the party squabble. When the Bolsheviks supporting party centralism demanded that the Student Organization, which included many non-party members, be headed by a member of the Bolshevik-dominated committee, those sympathizing with the Mensheviks quit and formed another organization. Despite the efforts of conciliators to unite the two factions in a "Executive Committee," the Menshevik-orientated students declared that two thirds of the original organization had quit and demanded the treasury, press, and large library of Marxist literature be given to the new Menshevik student organization. Thus, even in the imperial capital the feud between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks weakened and disorganized the party's work.  

So, it is easy to see how the deplorable condition of the Social-Democratic Party rendered it too weak to carry on its task of organizing the proletariat into a revolutionary army. The Bolshevik Bureau's campaign to obtain the necessary approvals of local committees for a third party congress only worsened the situation by resulting in the formation of many pseudo-committees and shadow organizations. Yet Lenin thought it well worth the temporary confusion to obtain freedom of action for himself and his followers. That he was determined to be completely disassociated from his opponents is

9 Ibid. pp. 537-546.
shown in a letter Lenin wrote to Gusev late in January of 1905 urging, "For God's sake...put through an unconditional split, a split, a split!" Nor did Lenin let the possibility that he would end up in a minority deter him from creating his own party. In February he wrote to Gusev and Bogdanov,

But now, after the Bureau, after Vpered, the split is a fact! And when the split had become a fact that materially we were very much weaker...The Mensheviks have more money, more literature, more transportation facilities, more agents, more "names," and a larger staff of contributors...only after a long battle, and only with the aid of an excellent organization, can we turn our moral strength into material strength..."11

As the year 1905 commenced, Lenin was already deep in his campaign to obtain enough support to make his congress at least seemingly legitimate. The Mensheviks' domination of the Party Council and the Central Committee was the main obstacle to his plans. Lenin's article, "Time to End It," which appeared in Vpered in early January, is a good summary of his position regarding the upper circles of the party. Since the Party Council and the Central Committee were obstructing the convocation of a congress against the will of the majority of the committees, the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority would take upon itself the duty of organizing the congress which would be held with or without the approval of the Central Committee. Lenin went on to declare that Iskra had lost the confidence of the party because of the lies it printed, and therefore, Vpered was now the major party organ.12

Throughout the first third of 1905 Lenin continued his abusive campaign against the Mensheviks, blaming them for the split in the party and condemning

the Central Committee and Party Council for their opposition to a party congress. In February of 1905, Fortune, in the form of the Russian police, smiled upon Lenin. Nine of the eleven members of the Central Committee were arrested in Russia, while the remaining two, L.B. Kruusin and A.L. Liubimov, were "conciliators" anxious to repair the split in the party even if it meant satisfying Lenin's demands. With the opposition of the Central Committee removed, it became a much simpler matter for the Bureau to obtain the necessary majority of votes by local committees calling for a party congress. By April 4, Lenin could triumphantly announce that with the consent of the Central Committee the support of twenty-four local committees, he had more than the necessary majority of committee votes to convokc a congress. To dispel any doubts concerning the legality of the congress, the Mandate Commission which had the duty of checking the delegates' credentials at the congress, obtained a three-fourths majority of the votes by accepting the affirmative votes of a few committees which were so recently formed that their full privileges had not yet been confirmed. It must be remembered, however, that many of these organizations were mere splinter committees. For example, the Kazan and Nikolaev Committees were obviously not regularly formed committees, while the real approval of the Saratov Committee had never really been obtained.

At the same time, some of the legitimate committees such as those of St.

---


14 The local committees which gave their approval were the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Northern, Nizhni Novgorod, Tver, Tula, Riga, the Siberian League, Voronezh, Saratov, Orel-Briansk, Kursk, Polissie, Smolensk, Northwestern, Nikolaev, the Ural League, Kharkov, Samara, and the four Caucasian Committees. Collected Works, VIII, pp. 336-337.

15 Tretii S"ezd, p. 497.
Petersburg, Riga, Kharkov and some of the Caucasian committees did not enjoy the support of the majority of the Social-Democrats in their respective areas.

The congress opened in London on April 12 (April 25 in London) with Lenin presiding. The Central Committee and Party Council were represented along with twenty of the local committees, all of which had full deciding votes. A few committees commissioned men already in exile to represent them in order to save the expense and risk of traveling from Russia to England and so it turned out that Lenin represented the Odessa Committee while Vorovskii represented the Nikolaev Committee.

The first question to be considered was the declaration of the party's attitude toward an armed uprising. Lenin submitted a resolution declaring the proletariat to be the leading revolutionary force in the democratic revolution in Russia and that it could play its role in the revolution only if united under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. Therefore, it was the task of the Social-Democratic Party to set up an apparatus in order to provide the masses with information and leadership for a direct struggle with the autocracy by means of mass political strikes and general armed uprisings. All party organizations, therefore, had the duty not only to provide the proletariat with class consciousness and a political ideology but also to organize special groups to provide and distribute arms, devise a detailed plan for the struggle against the autocracy, and to actually lead the armed uprising.

---

16 See Above, pp. 49-55.

17 For a full list of the delegates and the organizations they represented, see Treti s"ezd, pp. 469-470.

18 Lenin, Collected Works, VIII. p. 368.
After some discussion on the exact timing of the uprising and the readiness of the proletariat to rise, Lenin asserted that the events of the past few months had shown the proletariat to have a sufficient degree of class and political consciousness to be a revolutionary force though he admitted that more information from local party workers was needed on the readiness of the proletariat. There being no serious objections, Lenin's resolution was adopted unanimously.

Regarding participation in government elections to such bodies as the Shidlovskii Commission or to the council which was to advise the Tsar in matters of legislation, Lenin argued that there was no need to be so rigid in political tactics. By participating in such election campaigns, the Bolsheviks could take advantage of the freedom of expression offered by the government on such occasions to consolidate the peoples' gains of new liberties and expose the government's effort to disunite, deceive, and draw the workers away from their true interests. Lenin emphasised that the party must act in the open as well as in the underground, and therefore, should use every legal means to develop class consciousness among the masses. Should the field of legal political action be left to the liberals, the bourgeois class would strengthen its economic and political domination over the masses and make the working class an appendage of bourgeois democracy. However, some Bolsheviks found it hard to adjust to stepping into open politics. Krasin, the repre-

19 Tretii S"ezd, p. 450-451. N.V. Romanov, the delegate of the Northern Committee, wanted an additional resolution on the timing of the uprising since he considered the revolutionary enthusiasm in Russia at that time to have fallen considerably since January and feared a premature uprising. pp. 154-157. Most of the delegates supported Lenin in his belief that the proletariat was ready for an uprising at the time and Romanov's resolution was ignored. Did anyone remember Romanov's warning in December?
sentative of the Central Committee, proposed a clause forbidding the party to participate in government commissions and in actual elections, thus allowing Bolshevik participation only in the campaigns preceding the elections. Finally, a resolution embodying Lenin's position, calling on the Social-Democrats to take advantage of every legal means of carrying on their agitation, was passed.

One of the most noteworthy contributions of the Third Congress to the Bolshevik tactical plan of revolution was the new agrarian program. This program was not entirely new. The Bolsheviks had already realized for a long time that in Russia, where the great majority of the population consisted of peasants, the relatively small urban proletariat could hardly hope to overthrow the autocracy without help from the countryside. Bolshevik leaflets had long been declaring that the Social-Democratic party supported the peasants in their efforts to abolish all feudal dues and rents, all existing taxes and payments to the government as compensation to the landlords for the loss of their serfs, along with the transfer of all Church, State, and "cut off" lands to the peasants. This policy, as far as it went, was found to be unsatisfactory. In the first place, the acquisition of merely the "cut off" lands did not attract most peasants. They wanted to seize all the nobles' estates as well as the state, church and monastery lands. Another problem lied in the Social-Democrats analysis of the social structure of rural Russia. To the Social-Democrats the peasantry did not represent a single class, but an exten-

---

20 Ibid. p. 174.
21 Ibid. p. 453 contains the text of the resolution.
22 Shmygin, Bolshevikstkie Organizatsii Srednei Povolzhe, pp. 126-127.
sion of urban class differentiation into the rural areas. Just as there was a proletariat opposed to a bourgeoisie which owned the means of production in the cities, there was a rural proletariat composed of agricultural day laborers who owned no land opposed to a rural bourgeoisie which owned the means of production in the rural areas—land and livestock. Consequently, there was a fear among most Social-Democrats that by supporting the entire revolutionary peasantry they would be surrendering the rural proletariat under the tutelage of the peasant bourgeoisie. Finally, a concrete tactical directive was needed to enable the peasants to overthrow the autocracy and landed nobility.

During March and April of 1905, Lenin gave much thought to devising a clear resolution which would provide the congress with a solution to these problems. Regarding the seizure of estates, Lenin quickly realized that the old Social-Democratic slogans calling for the seizure of the "cut off" lands had failed to give the peasantry a common aim to unify it as a revolutionary force. Overhearing a conversation of Father Gapon, who had arrived in Switzerland soon after "Bloody Sunday," with another emigre and became convinced that the peasants wanted something far more than the seizure of the state, church, and "cut off" lands. They wanted all the land, including the nobles' estates. He realized that only by supporting the most radical peasant demands could the proletariat hope to obtain the support of the peasantry in a struggle for a democratic republic. The peasantry might be backward and politically unconscious, but if their main interest—the seizure of all the

land—were at stake, they would be the most determined opponents of the autocracy and feudal order. Therefore, Lenin saw no objection in supporting the peasant revolution in its most extreme form. In April he wrote in Vpered,

We are in full sympathy with the peasant movement. We would consider it a tremendous gain in both for the general social development of Russia and for the Russian proletariat if the peasantry, with our help, succeeded in wresting from the landlords all their lands by revolutionary means.25

Though the seizure of all the nobles' estates would mean the destruction of the old feudal order and the advance of political democracy, the increase of economic freedom would only enlarge the problem of capitalist oppression. Though it was the duty of the Social-Democratic Party to support all revolutionary actions of the peasantry, Lenin added that the rural proletariat must be organized by the party in order to make it conscious of itself as a class with interests antagonistic to those of the peasant bourgeoisie. Once democracy had been won, the urban and rural proletariat were to unite in a common struggle against bourgeois society. Although for the time being the rural proletariat was to participate in the democratic revolution in the countryside, it was also to prepare itself to act together with the urban proletariat in the great social struggle in the near future.26

Finally, as a tactical directive for a successful agrarian revolution against the state and the nobility, Lenin insisted that the peasants create their own village committees which were to democratize rural society by seizing and distributing the land, grain, and livestock, and setting up revolutionary self-administration. In his draft of the resolution to the Third Congress, Lenin further recommended that the peasantry disrupt the

26 Ibid. VIII, pp. 235-236.
autocratic government refusing to recognize its authority, non-performance of military service, and refusal to pay all taxes. 27

Lenin's resolution at the congress on the Social-Democratic attitude toward the peasant revolutionary movement expressed these ideas on Social-Democratic support of the peasant seizure of all state, church, and nobles' estates, the organization of the rural proletariat, and the formation of revolutionary peasant committees. 23

Krasin did not like the idea of actually supporting the peasant bourgeoisie and submitted a resolution stating that the party would not oppose the peasant movement which went so far as to seize all the nobles' lands, 29 but Lenin's resolution was adopted without alteration.

Another tactical question facing the congress concerned the relation of the Social-Democrats to other parties participating in the revolution. The Mensheviks were the first group to be dealt with as Lenin already considered them outside the party for all practical purposes. In a short resolution of one paragraph Lenin condemned the Mensheviks for putting mass spontaneity above consciousness of the proletarian struggle and thus relinquishing the role of the Social-Democrats as the vanguard of the proletariat, disrupting party discipline and organization, endangering the independence of the party by close cooperation with the liberal bourgeoisie, and denying the possibility and desirability of the party playing the organizing role in an armed uprising and participating in a future democratic provisional government. The resolution further called on all party members to combat and expose the falsity of

---

23 Tretii S"ezd, p. 454.
29 Ibid. p. 239.
Menshevik doctrines and decreed that only those who submitted to party discipline and recognized all the party congresses were party members. Since determined Mensheviks would never recognize the legality of the Third Congress, this would automatically exclude them and their organizations from Lenin's party.30

Not all Bolsheviks were prepared to write off the Mensheviks so quickly. M.G. Tsikhaisaia, one of the representatives of the Caucasian Union, denied that the Mensheviks had become a separate party and declared that they were still the Bolsheviks' comrades and that the party split could still be healed. He further declared the Bolsheviks to be partially responsible for the split and condemned the formation of a personal cult around Lenin. The Bolsheviks were devoted to a revolutionary method and ideology and not to "Leninism." Lenin might be one of the party's most able theoreticians but he was not infallible and would make mistakes.31 Krasin, who was devoted to restoring unity in the Social-Democratic party, objected that the present period of revolution was not a time to further divide the party but to unite it. If ever the Mensheviks' energies were needed, it was now. Besides, there were so many different shades of belief among the Mensheviks themselves that it was hard enough to define the group much less condemn it.32 Romanov reminded the delegates that Menshevik cooperation was necessary at the local level and proposed a resolution condemning individuals rather than entire organizations whose cooperation was needed.33 B.V. Avilov denied that the party split

---

30 Ibid. p. 455.
32 Ibid. p. 349.
was very wide and pointed out that in his own town, Kharkov, in the Ukraine, both factions distributed *Izve* and *Vpered* and recognized the Central Committee. Therefore, other committees should be willing to merge with the Mensheviks and guarantee them freedom of expression.  

This idea, however, was too much for even the "conciliators" and provoked an outburst of laughter. But though there was much opposition to Lenin's proposal to make a complete break with the Mensheviks, his opponents could not agree on a plan that would remedy the Mensheviks' disruption of Bolshevik propaganda and organization. Consequently, Lenin's resolution was finally passed without a dissenting vote.

The Bolsheviks' attitude toward other Social-Democratic parties in the Russian Empire was far more friendly. Parties such as the Lettish Social-Democratic Labor Party, the Social-Democratic Labor Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Armenian Social-Democratic Labor Organization, and the General Jewish Workers' Union were Marxist parties which differed from the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party mainly in that they carried on their propaganda in the language of the minorities among which they worked and in that they usually demanded autonomy within the Russian Empire for these national minorities. For instance, the Lettish Social-Democrats resembled the Bolsheviks in belief and action even more than the Mensheviks did and proved this by temporarily fusing with the Bolsheviks in 1906. Believing that the interests of the common struggle of all the proletariat against the autocracy demanded the eventual unification of all proletarian parties, the Bolsheviks looked forward to their absorption of the other parties. Many, however, still remembered their disagreements with the Jewish Workers' Union over autonomy.

---

34 Ibid. pp. 351-352.
for national groups within the Russian Social-Democratic Party. G.L. Shklovskii, representing the Minsk Group, warned that it would be wise to readmit the Jewish Workers' Union into the party, not as an organization, but as individual members. As a further precaution to keep the principles of the Bolsheviks free from the influence of possible erroneous beliefs of other Social-Democratic Parties, all agreed that the Central Committee should carefully oversee all forms of cooperation between such parties on the local level. Therefore, a resolution introduced by Vorovskii, proclaiming the necessity of the eventual unity of all proletarian parties, reaffirming the principle of centralism against federalism within the party as established by the Second Party Congress, and instructing the Central Committee to supervise all forms of cooperation between Social-Democratic parties on the local level was quickly adopted.36

The Socialist Revolutionary Party received special consideration because the Bolsheviks considered it not a socialist party but a radical liberal one. Its program promising the distribution of all land in Russia so that each family would have as much land as it could work without the use of hired labor was condemned by the Bolsheviks as bourgeois while its non-Marxist hope that democracy would immediately replace capitalism with socialism was decried by the Bolsheviks as utopian. At the congress, many delegates saw great difficulty in working out a plan of cooperation with the Socialist Revolutionaries. V.M. Obukhov, representing the Saratov Committee, and P.A. Dzhaparidze, a representative of the Caucasian Union, both came from regions where there was ample opportunity to observe the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and cautioned the other delegates at the congress

that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was overrated and far less active than was commonly thought. Therefore, cooperation with it might actually hinder the Social-Democrats' revolutionary effort rather than help it. G.I. Kramolnikov of the Saratov Committee added that there was such diversity of belief and tactics among the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves that they did not really constitute a party. Further complaints were raised that since there was no real Socialist-Revolutionary program or party discipline, many of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were monarchists and reformists rather than revolutionaries, thus making it impossible for the Social-Democrats to cooperate with them. Finally, the congress accepted a resolution introduced by Lunacharskii and supported by Lenin. Militant agreements between Socialist Revolutionary and Social-Democratic organizations for the purpose of combating the autocracy were approved provided that they did not restrict the independence of the Social-Democratic Party or affect the purity of its proletarian principles. As in relations with all other parties, the Central Committee was to supervise all forms of cooperation between the local Social-Democrat and Socialist-Revolutionary organizations.

It was also considered necessary to pass a resolution on revolutionary cooperation with the liberals. Lenin's mistrust and hatred of the liberals, however, was well-known. Since the class interests of the bourgeoisie democrats were essentially anti-proletarian, Lenin believed they would eventually turn against the proletariat as they had in other countries. In the meantime they were willing to ally themselves with the Social-Democrats in order to

\[37\text{Ibid. pp. 385-388.}\]

\[38\text{Ibid. p. 456.}\]
obtain the support of the working class in a common struggle against the autocracy—to use the workers to win freedom for themselves. Lenin did not object to striking against the autocracy with any group that opposed it, but he did object to entering into a formal agreement with any party. The Social-Democratic Party could hope to attain victory only if it preserved its independence and purity of ideology. A formal alliance with even radical bourgeois democrats such as the Socialist Revolutionaries would lead to a fusion of trends and ideas which would result in chaos in the Social-Democratic revolutionary program and the confusion of the proletariat. How much more then was an alliance with the liberals to be feared. 39 One had only to look at the Menshevik wing of the party to behold the inconsistency and wavering which resulted from dealing with the liberals. Accusing the Mensheviks of clouding the class consciousness of the proletariat by cooperating with the liberals, he wrote,

...Considering themselves to be Social-Democrats and the true spokesmen of the working class aspiration, these gentlemen do not understand, or do not want to understand, that the working-class movement will achieve substantial results only if it is led by a working-class party, if the proletariat is conscious of its class distinctions and realizes that its true emancipation lies in its own hands and not in the hands of the bourgeois democrats who are discrediting the actions of the workers' party. These 'strictly speaking' Social-Democrats, alleged Marxists, ought to realize the demoralization they are bringing among the working-class masses by seeking to prove that certain 'democrats' (but not Social-Democrats), consisting exclusively of bourgeois intellectuals, 40 are called upon to show the workers the way to freedom and socialism.

Lenin was determined that the Bolsheviks would not follow the Menshevik course of cooperation with the liberals.

Most of the other delegates felt that a resolution on the question of

39 Lenin, Collected Works. VIII, pp. 159-166, 221-223.

40 Ibid. VIII. p. 229.
cooperation with the liberals was necessary. A resolution submitted by Voroovskii declared that the Social-Democrats should support the bourgeoisie in its opposition to the autocracy but also warned that the Social-Democrats must also show the workers the limited quality of the bourgeois movement and the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian character of all liberals, especially those of the Union of Liberation, and must struggle to prevent the bourgeois democrats from taking the leadership of the workers' movement or any part of it into their hands. V.I. Fridolin, a representative of the Ural Union, supported the resolution by claiming there were various shades of liberalism besides the most radical, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and that these less radical liberals could join the struggle against the autocracy. \(^{41}\) Lenin had his doubts,

To undertake the question of cooperation with the liberals is unwise. Our cause in Russia has come to an uprising, and under these conditions such agreements are unreliable. Even if some groups of the "Liberation" or liberal leaning students, which do not refuse to step forward with weapons in their hands can be found, that does not conclude an agreement with Struve. \(^{42}\)

However, since the resolution contained the warning that the Social-Democrats were obliged to expose the anti-proletarian nature of the liberal movement, Lenin discontinued his opposition to it and it was passed unanimously.

The relation of the Social-Democrats to other parties in the revolution was an important tactical question, but it was necessary to look further ahead. What would be the role of the Social-Democratic Party once the autocracy had been overthrown and the revolution accomplished? Could the Social-Democratic Party take part in a revolutionary provisional government with non-proletarian

\(^{41}\) Tretii S"ezd, 375-377.

\(^{42}\) Ibid. p. 376.
elements? Most Mensheviks would say not. Though they were willing enough to enter into agreements with the bourgeoisie in order to strike together against the autocracy, they were wary of entering into a bourgeois government and thus ceasing to be a revolutionary oppositional party, lapsing instead into "reformism" and "opportunism" as head many socialist parties in western Europe. In a pamphlet entitled Two Dictatorships, A.S. Martynov warned that the Social-Democrats' participation in a democratic government and their consequent effort to establish socialism would frighten all the anti-proletarian elements into restoring the monarchy and expelling the Social-Democrats from power. On the other hand, if the Social-Democrats participated in the government without attempting to establish socialism, they would be guilty of "Jauresism" i.e. "reformism." Therefore, Martynov advocated the boycott and opposition to a future provisional government.

Lenin saw the problem in another light. He retaliated by issuing a pamphlet entitled Social-Democracy and the Revolutionary Provisional Government and an article, "the Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry," in which he set forth his views on the desirability of seizing power. In the first place, under Russian conditions, there could be no truly democratic government with universal suffrage, the arming of the people, separation of church and state, economic reforms, civil rights, and so on, without the participation of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie in the provisional government. According to Lenin, Martynov was confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. The present revolution was a democratic one and Social-Democratic

---

44 Ibid. VIII, pp. 293-303.
participation in the destruction of the last remnants of the autocracy and feudalism, the defence of the republic against monarchist reaction, the distribution of the land among the peasants, and the implementation of such economic reforms as the establishment of the eight-hour day did not constitute a socialist revolution. Lenin was vague on when and how socialism would be implemented in Russia and expressed the hope that the western European proletariat would rise and come to the aid of the Social-Democrats. Until then it was best for the Social-Democrats to concern themselves with the establishment and preservation of a democratic republic. In the Russian situation, Social-Democratic participation in a democratic government did not constitute "Juresism" or a betrayal of the proletariat but the defence and consolidation of political liberty which was the first step toward socialism. The proletarian party would not sanction the abuses of power by the bourgeoisie but use its own political power to eliminate the bourgeoisie. As for the possible reaction against the proletarian party and democracy in general, it was probable that there would be one, but then a revolution cannot be won without risks and struggles. The possibility of a reaction made it all the more necessary for the proletariat to unite with the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie to defend the political liberty they had gained. The main thing to remember was that if the proletariat was participating in a revolution, and even leading it, it must hope and expect to win power or there was not much purpose in the struggle.

In his speeches at the congress Lenin restated his views on the participation of the Social-Democrats in a provisional government. He especially stressed the need of seizing power to combat reaction; "Even if we did seize St. Petersburg and guillotine Nicholas, we would still have several Vendees to
deal with. How were the people to force the bourgeoisie to consummate the revolution or rise against it if they renounced the state treasury and government power? The Social-Democrats would always keep the interests of the proletariat in mind and remain a party of opposition to the bourgeoisie elements in the government, but to Lenin the *Iskra* principle of "only from below and never from above" was an anarchist principle. In the midst of revolution, the proletariat could not afford to fear or shun victory and the power it would bring. The Martynovist fear of seizing power only sapped proletarian energy:

At such a time Martynovism is not mere folly but a downright crime, for it saps the revolutionary energy of the proletariat and clips the wings of revolutionary enthusiasm.

Most of the delegates agreed with Lenin. Krasin, however, warned that though participation in a revolutionary provisional government was as a general principle desirable, the question of whether or not the Social-Democrats should participate in a revolutionary provisional government would have to be decided on the basis of such concrete conditions as the relative strength of the bourgeoisie and proletariat in the government for certainly the Social-Democrats could not participate in a predominantly anti-proletarian government. Furthermore, the party would have to exercise close supervision over its representatives in the government to ensure that they did not betray the interests of the proletariat or compromise the party's independence. Lenin agreed with Krasin on these points and his resolution with Krasin's additions

was adopted as a statement of the party's objectives in the democratic revolution. The resolution declared that the interests of the proletariat, namely the final implementation of socialism, required the greatest possible amount of political freedom which could be achieved only by the replacement of the autocracy by a democratic republic. The creation of a democratic republic was possible only as a result of a victorious popular uprising, whose instrument, the provisional revolutionary government could establish full liberty of pre-election agitation and convocate the constituent assembly on the basis of general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. However, the resolution also warned that the democratic revolution would not weaken but rather strengthen the hegemony of the bourgeoisie which, at a favorable moment, would attempt to seize most of the gains of the revolution from the proletariat. Therefore, the Third Congress provided a blueprint for Social-Democratic participation in a revolutionary government:

a) It is necessary to spread among the working class a concrete representation of the most probable progress of the revolution and the necessity of the appearance, at the right moment, of the provisional revolutionary government of which the proletariat demands the realization of all the immediate political and economic demands of our program (Minimum program);

b) Depending on the relation between forces and other factors which cannot be determined ahead of time, participation in the provisional revolutionary party by plenipotentiaries of our party is permitted with the aim of ruthlessly struggling against all counterrevolutionary attempts and all attempts to set aside the independent interests of the working class;

c) The strict control of the party over its plenipotentiaries and unceasing protection of the independence of social-democracy striving for the full socialist revolution and an irreconcilable enmity to all bourgeois parties stand as the necessary conditions for such participation;

d) Regardless of whether the participation of the social-democracy will be possible or not, it is necessary to propagate among the widest strata of the proletariat, the idea of the necessity of constant pressure on the provisional government by the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democrats, with the intention of protecting, strengthening, and widening the gains of the revolution. 49

This, then, was the goal of the Bolsheviks in 1905—the establishment of a democratic republic as a first step toward socialism.

Besides outlining the tactics to be used in the coming upheaval, the Bolsheviks also organized themselves as a party though they still kept the name of Social-Democrats to make the Mensheviks appear as the secessionists. Committees not recognizing the Third Congress were declared dissolved and a new Bolshevik Central Committee was elected. 50 The organization of the party contained elements of centralism as well as of local autonomy. The definition of party membership which Lenin had failed to attain at the Second Congress was adopted. A party member was defined as one who adhered to the party program, contributed to the party’s support, and what was very important to the Bolsheviks, worked in one of the party’s organizations. The Central Committee was made the supreme organ of authority having control of the party paper so that the Party Council, which used to be composed of members of the Central Committee and the party organ, was now needless. The Central Committee also had the power of organizing new committees and co-opting members for them with the consent of the majority of the remaining members of the committee. A two thirds vote in the Central Committee could also dissolve a

49 Tretii S"ezd, pp. 451-452.

50 The new Central Committee included Lenin and Krasin who were left over from the previous Central Committee as well as the new members, A.A. Bogdanov, D.S. Postolovskii, and A.I. Rykov.
local committee if two thirds of the local party members consented. Finally, to end the wrangling which had plagued the previous central Committee, the unanimous vote of the remaining committee members was required to co-opt a new member into the Central Committee.

Yet there were also signs of decentralization. Local committees were granted considerable freedom in printing their own literature as long as they did not take it upon themselves to decide general party questions in their publications. All organizations were guaranteed the inviolability of the autonomy that was given to them when they were organized. Subordinate organizations were given the right to influence the local committees and receive information regarding party business from them. It was hoped by the Bolsheviks that such decentralization would increase local initiative and that some freedom within the party would appeal to the masses as had the Mensheviks seemingly more democratic organization. Lenin wanted to go even further and admit enough workers to enable them to outnumber the party intellectuals four to one. He urged the creation of more perty organizations and less stringency in admitting workers. Finally, he even suggested the admission of workers from the lower party circles into the local committees as a means of political education. Lenin saw the recent disorders in Russia as having shaken the foundations of the autocracy and believed that an exclusively secret and conspiratorial organization was no longer necessary, though he by no means discarded the underground aspect of the party. In such a revolutionary situation, he considered it necessary to increase the membership of the party both to give it more of the bulk it needed to carry out its task of

51 Ibid. pp. 460-466. contains the party constitution.
organizing the proletariat to lead the revolution and to increase the revolutionary mood among workers by making their membership in the party a means of political education. Though in this case Lenin may have been approaching the Menshevik position on mass participation in the party, he was not adopting their tendency toward party spontaneity for he probably still counted on the structure of the party to keep the workers under the tutelage of the professional revolutionaries. However, many agreed with N.V. Romanov and V.A. Desnitskii when they warned that the autocracy was still standing and that since the situation had not really changed, the party had better remain primarily an underground organization for the time being. After considerable debate, the project was shelved and the question of the number of workers and the conditions under which they could be admitted was left open.52

On April 27 (May 10 in London) the Third Party Congress closed. Most of the delegates departed for Russia while Lenin, Vorovskii, and a few others returned to Switzerland where Lenin continued to edit Vpered, the name of which was changed to Proletary in May. With the conclusion of the Third Party Congress, the Bolsheviks were left organized as a separate party and in possession of a clear plan of action for the coming revolution.

52 Tretii S"ezd, pp. 253-266, 722n.
CHAPTER III

BOLSHEVIK EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THE MASSES

During the spring and summer of 1905, most of the Bolsheviks' efforts were directed toward inciting a general strike throughout the Empire. Though by April revolutionary ardor and unrest had somewhat decreased, no one had forgotten January 9 and the situation was far from peaceful. To revive the revolutionary spirit, all revolutionary parties, including the Bolsheviks, took advantage of every occasion to incite political demonstrations and strikes, hoping that these might grow into an all-Russian general strike. The best occasions for creating unrest were May Day, which in some Russian cities was celebrated on April 18 to coincide with the first of May in western Europe, July 9, which commemorated the passing of six months since "Bloody Sunday," and any day on which news of defeat from the Far East or clashes between workers and troops in other cities served to stir up the people. Whether the agitation by revolutionary parties resulted in mere political meetings or in actual violence depended on local conditions such as the amount of unrest among the workers and the measures taken by the police.

In St. Petersburg the situation was relatively quiet. The May Day celebrations consisted of political meetings with revolutionary speeches but not violence. This does not mean, however, that the local Bolsheviks were idle. A police raid on one of the party presses uncovered a small store of
rifles, revolvers, and daggers as well as a pamphlet, "on the Eve of the Struggle" calling on all workers to seize such strategic points as administrative buildings, especially the Ministry of Interior, police stations, and banks as well as surrounding buildings by a surprise attack and urging them to prepare themselves for the uprising by gathering bombs, dynamite, and flammable materials. Along with this store of equipment which was apparently intended for use on May Day about a hundred members--mostly university students--of the "Armed Uprising" group were arrested, thus disrupting any plans the Bolsheviks might have had for creating a major disturbance on May Day. 1

For the next two months Bolshevik activity in St. Petersburg consisted mainly in gathering crowds with red flags around railroad stations and threatening officers embarking recruits to Manchuria. Late in June, the Putilov workers ceased work and were followed by the wagon-works and port workers. However, the strike failed to achieve anything because workers in many plants, especially those in the Sestroretskii armaments factory refused to join the strike. To the Bolsheviks this provided another example of why political freedom was necessary to improve the workers' economic condition. A leaflet issued by the Neva District Bolsheviks told the workers,

...our enemies understood very well that as long as the autocracy exists we cannot organize ourselves into such a powerful and mighty trade unions as our comrades abroad, and as long as we are not organized we cannot successfully struggle against capitalism for the betterment of our economic condition and even if we do strike we will be unsuccessful. So that we can successfully struggle against capitalism we need wide political liberty, i.e. the freedom to strike, associate, gather, freedom of speech and press, so that we may freely gather, discuss and print our demands. But all these liberties, as it is well known, can be guaranteed to us only by popular representatives chosen from all

1 Akademia Nauk, SSSR, Revoliutsii 1905-1907 v Rossii, Dokumenty i Materialy, Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhennia v Rossii Vesnoi i Letom 1905 Goda, (Moscow, 1957) Part I, 259-266.
classes of the people by general, equal, direct, and secret voting, and passing laws protecting the interests of the people as well as seeing to it that they are protected.\(^2\)

Following this argument up in other leaflets, the Bolsheviks, as well as the Socialist Revolutionaries and Gaponists, called on all workers to join in a general strike on July 9 to commemorate the passing of half a year since "Bloody Sunday." Much of the Bolshevik agitation was aimed at the Putilov workers, both because the motor works were such a large and important part of the economy of the city and the nation and because they had already had experience in organizing themselves under Father Gapon. The Mensheviks expected the Tsar to grant a constitution and wanted to wait till July 16 but they finally gave in to the persuasion of the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries and with their support about 60,000 workers struck on July 9. The strike, of course, was nowhere near being a general one, but as the summer progressed the workers began to show their political awareness by increasingly including demands for a constituent assembly, a peoples militia, labor reforms, and free education for all among their economic demands.\(^3\)

In Russia's other great industrial center, Moscow, the Bolsheviks had great difficulty in implanting a proletarian self-consciousness among the workers who maintained their patriarchal relations and whose primary allegiance was still to their clans. Bolshevik leaflets and orators constantly reminded the workers that without a general strike and a final uprising against the autocracy, the socialist goal, the ownership of all factories and railroads by all the people could never be reached. Only a fraction of the workers struck at any one time and these quickly returned to work when granted higher

\(^2\)Ibid. I. pp. 287-288.

\(^3\)Ibid. I. pp. 253-309.
wages. In July the Moscow Committee despaired of achieving a general strike in the near future and saw no point in one at the present time anyway. In a letter to Lenin a member of the Committee pointed out that a general strike by itself would not overthrow the autocracy but only partially paralyze it. Only an armed uprising could destroy the autocracy and due to the lack of arms and the disorganization of the proletariat, it would be unsuccessful at present. Therefore, the Moscow Committee held that it was better to save the workers' strength for the time when all Russia would rise against the Tsar than to prematurely and uselessly waste the strength of the working class in the central city of the Empire.

In most other industrial centers the Bolsheviks similarly failed to organize a general strike but the increase in gatherings and demonstrations did serve to make the workers more concerned with political affairs. The firing of the troops on a May Day demonstration in Warsaw stimulated sympathy strikes as far away as Baku. In June, violence broke out in Reval, in Estonia, and Odessa but nothing substantial was achieved. There was heavy fighting in Lodz and Warsaw, reaching the stage of pitched battles among barricades but the Bolsheviks played a very small part in these uprisings which were mainly the work of the Polish Socialist parties.

Though there was no general all-Russian strike in the summer of 1905, the Bolshevik strongholds of the north-central industrial regions and the Urals produced something much more significant—the seeds of revolutionary self-government. Up until May, revolutionary agitation urging the workers to organize and the workers' own tendency to organize during the strikes in early

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid. I, pp. 351-352.
1905 had resulted, at best, in the creation of strike committees which kept a strike fund, formulated demands, and exerted pressure on the workers to adhere to the strike. The formation of a workers' council or soviet, however, marked a departure from the regular strike committee in that a soviet signified the seizure of certain governmental powers by the workers.

The newly-instituted soviets arose from previously existing strike committees and developed gradually so that it is hard to determine just when a strike committee actually became a soviet. In the second half of May, the workers in Nadezhdino, a small town on the western side of the Urals, went on strike and elected a council of ten deputies to formulate their demands. Once the council or soviet was formed, the workers and the deputies expelled the police from the plant where the workers held their meetings. Admittedly, this was a modest beginning, but the exclusion of the police from the plant did mean taking a part of the area out of the jurisdiction of the local town authority. The news of the soviet quickly spread to some of the nearby mines and railroad stations and the institution was copied in these isolated places on a small scale. At about the same time, workers in Nizhni Tagil, in the Urals range seized control of the local theater, and elected deputies to a soviet, or as some called it, a "comrades' court." The soviet's regulations announced,

The Comradely Court, or Soviet, consists of workers' deputies and has the aim of protecting the legal and material interests of the comrades, by maintaining a moral influence and undertaking to raise the class consciousness and initiative of fellow comrades.

5 Bystrikh, Bolshevikkie Organizatsii Urals, pp. 119-120.

6 Ibid. p. 121.
In Ivanovo-Voznesensk, a textile factory center in the north-central industrial region, the Bolsheviks spent most of the spring urging the workers to go on a general political strike. Several economic strikes occurred in the first half of May and the Bolsheviks continued to urge togetherness, class solidarity, and organization among the workers. By the middle of May over 50,000 textile, river-port, shoe-factory, and railroad workers had struck. At a meeting held in the town square on May 14 about one hundred and fifty deputies were elected to carry on negotiations with the government and to conduct the strike. This "Assembly of Deputies" maintained unity and discipline among the workers by forbidding individuals to return to work and by assuming the authority to bargain for all the workers collectively. To give the new "Assembly of deputies" more protection and authority the organization of a workers militia was begun. Due to the lack of arms, this militia could not even protect workers' meetings from Cossack attacks, much less undertake an armed uprising, but it did give the workers a sense of unity and power.

As the summer progressed, the institution of soviets or "assemblies" spread to a few other towns. In July, an "Assembly of Deputies" was founded in Kostroma. It organized a workers' militia of 110 men which occasionally clashed with the police, organized a financial commission, and in general was recognized by the workers as an autonomous democratic authority.7 There was also a similar organization in Odessa at about the same time but for the most part, the soviets remained isolated phenomena in the Ural and north Russian industrial centers for the remainder of the summer of 1905. However, these early soviets did provide precedents for the larger soviets in the autumn and

---

winter months of 1905. 8

Besides directly appealing for an armed uprising, the Bolsheviks also
sought to unite all classes against the government in common opposition to
the war being fought in Manchuria against Japan. Leaflets and orators of all
socialist parties told the workers that the war was being fought by the lower
classes in the interests of the greedy Tsar, nobles, bureaucrats, and capital-

8 Since the soviet or "Assembly of Deputies" was such a new institution
many Bolsheviks failed to see its significance or usefulness as an organ of
revolutionary government, thus leaving the initiative of creating the soviets
in late 1905 to the Mensheviks. For example, the Moscow Bolsheviks urged
the workers to elect deputies in August of 1905 to combine the demands of the
working class and for mutual support but as the workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk,
but it seems they did not look upon the Ivanovo-Voznesensk organization as
the beginning of a revolutionary government. S. Schwartz, The Russian Revolu-
tion of 1905, p. 351. And little wonder! Some of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk
Bolsheviks themselves did not think of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk "Assembly of
deputies" as much more than an oversized strike committee. Some of the local
party workers did express pride in what their agitation accomplished. An
unnamed correspondent wrote to Lenin that the "Assembly of Deputies" enjoyed
immense authority among the workers as a provisional government and proudly
claimed that every detail of the recent events was due to the role of the
local Bolshevik organization. Revolutsionnoe Dvizhenie v Rossii I, p. 468. Miha-
11 V. Frunze, a member of the Northern Committee and later leader of the
red forces against Kolchak's forces in Siberia in 1919, took great pride in
the part the Bolsheviks had played in Ivanovo-Voznesensk in those days.
While it is true that Bolshevik party workers guided the election of deputies
and printed leaflets for the "Assembly of Deputies," some Bolsheviks were
remarkably indifferent to the "Assembly." Some Bolsheviks themselves became
deputies only because to refuse would injure the reputation of the party and
because as deputies they could broaden their contacts and influence among the
workers. Mikhail Frunze himself expressed concerned that those Bolsheviks who
were elected deputies might not be able to fulfill their duties to the party.
At the same time no Bolshevik was ever a chairman or a secretary of the
"Assembly," this role being left to non-party individuals. Schwarz, The
Russian Revolution of 1905, p. 136. Many of the workers do not seem to have
considered the "Assembly of Deputies" as much more than a strike committee.
In letters concerning the Assembly, printed in Krasni Arkhiv 1935, #4, p.131-137,
do not indicate that the correspondents thought of the "Assembly" as a rev-
olutionary government. Finally, when the strike was broken late in June,
the "Assembly of Deputies" dissolved and was not revived late in 1905 when
soviet were becoming widespread throughout Russia. Apparently both the
workers and the Bolsheviks considered the need for the "Assembly of Deputies"
to be ended with the strike. The case of Ivanovo-Voznesensk indicates that
the idea of workers' assemblies being organs of revolutionary government had
very modest beginnings.
ists. Peasants were urged to evade military service by refusing to report to mobilization centers, workers in the munition plants and railroads were urged to go on strike, and soldiers were urged to turn their weapons against their worst enemy the Tsar. Like the other socialists, the Bolsheviks welcomed the defeats at Port Arthur, Mukden, and Tsushima because they served to show the corruption and inefficiency of the Tsarist bureaucracy and disgust the people with the entire government. After the fall of Port Arthur, in the last days of 1904, Lenin rejoiced in Vpered,

The war is not ended yet by far, but every step towards its continuation increases immeasurably the unrest and discontent of the Russian people, brings nearer the hour of the new great war, the war of the people against the autocracy, the war of the proletariat for liberty.9

After the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima, in May of 1905, Lenin expected that all classes would be up in arms against the government. He wrote in Vpered,

Everything is up in arms against the government: the wounded national pride of the great and petty bourgeoisie, the outraged pride of the army, the bitter feeling over the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in a senseless military venture, the resentment against the embezzlement of hundreds of millions from the public funds, the fears of financial collapse and a protracted economic crisis as a result of the war, the dread of a formidable people's rising, which (in the opinion of the bourgeoisie) the Tsar should have avoided by means of timely and "reasonable" concessions...Now the autocracy is facing the end it deserves. The war has laid bare all its sores, revealed its rottenness to the core, its complete alienation from the people, and destroyed its sole pillars of cesarean rule. The people have already passed sentence on this government of brigands. The revolution will execute the sentence.10

Therefore, it is easy to see why the Bolsheviks did not desire peace at any price as many socialists were demanding. The longer the war continued, the

9 Lenin, Collected Works, VIII, p. 53.
10 Ibid. VIII. pp. 483, 485.
closer the revolution came. They encouraged desertion and rebellion in the army to bring on more defeats and increase the disgust of the people with the government. However, the last thing the Bolsheviks wanted was a peace concluded by the Tsar which would leave the autocracy in power and release the troops in the Far East for the suppression of domestic uprisings. It was essential that the people first overthrow the Tsar and then conclude peace through a constituent assembly. A leaflet of the Moscow Committee reminded readers of the many war deaths and the increase in the national debt and taxes and even accused the government of preparing another war in India against Great Britain, Japan's ally. Only by overthrowing the Tsarist government could the people avoid further bloodshed.

Only the Constituent Assembly will end the war and conclude peace with Japan. Only it will save us from excessive toil, only it will declare a democratic republic and give us liberty and rights, necessary to us so that we can struggle against capitalism for our happiness, for socialism.12

In this way the Bolsheviks held peace out as a bait for revolution.

In attempting to unite all the people, and especially the proletariat, against the autocracy, the Bolsheviks also sought to obtain the support of all the nationalities which had so long been oppressed by the tsarist policy of Russification. On the local level the Bolsheviks frequently cooperated with proletarian national parties such as the Lettish Social-Democrats or the Social-Democrats of Lithuania and Poland. The Baku strike in December of 1904 was marked by cooperation between the Bolshevik Baku Committee, and the Armenian Droshak and Hunchak groups participating in a united committee which

12 Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhennie I, p. 311.
was to organize and sustain the strike. When the Armenian-Tartar conflict broke out in the same town in early 1905, the Bolsheviks frantically strove to prevent the two sections of the proletariat from wiping each other out. However, violence spread throughout the Transcaucasian region and involved not only Armenians and Tatars but also Georgians and Russians. The Tiflis Committee accused the police of inciting these riots in order to maintain its authority by the tactic of "divide and rule." One of the Committee's pamphlets, written by Stalin, called on all nationalities to unite against the Tsar.

These miserable slaves of the miserable Tsar are trying to foment a fratricidal war among us here in Tiflis! They are demanding your blood, they want to divide and rule over you! But be vigilant you Armenians, Tatars, Georgians, and Russians! Stretch out your hands to one another, unite more closely, and to attempts by the government to divide you, answer unanimously: Long live the fraternity of the peoples!

However, nationalistic riots spread not only to Tiflis and Erivan but even to Kazan, where bad feeling arose between Russian and Tatar workers. A leaflet of the Bolshevik Kazan Committee, written in the Tartar language, pleaded with the workers.

Victory will only be obtained by the workers when the workers of all nationalities--Tatars, Russians, Jews, Armenians, and others--stretch their hands out to one another, as brothers, all fusing into one close family...Always remember comrades Tatars your enemy is not the Russian people but the autocratic government.

Throughout 1905, the Bolsheviks strove to influence the non-Russian masses. Stalin wrote leaflets for the Tiflis Committee in Georgian. Other

---

13 Tret'ii S'ezd, p. 612.
15 Khammato, Kazanskaia Organizatsiia Bolshevikov, p. 39.
Bolshevik Caucasian committees wrote party literature in Tatar and Armenian as well as Russian. In Kazan, Hussein Iamashev harangued Tatar workers and organized Marxist discussion circles in the Tatar language. Attempts were even made to spread revolutionary propaganda among the Mongolian Buriats in south-central Siberia. Leaflets were also written in Yiddish and Lettish, though for the most part, Bolshevik influence in Poland and the Baltic area was overshadowed by the national Social-Democratic parties such as the General Jewish Workers' Union, the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, and the Polish Socialist Party. In the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks neglected to produce party literature in the Ukrainian language, leaving the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union, which was an autonomous organization of Ukrainian Leninists, without competition in this field while the Bolsheviks themselves concentrated on the urban proletariat in the Ukraine which was mostly Russian.

There was not, however, any agreement between the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties on a national scale. The only attempt to reach some sort of tactical agreement between most of the revolutionary organizations in the Empire turned out to be a failure. After "Bloody Sunday" Father Gapon fled from Russia to Switzerland where the emigre revolutionaries hailed him as a hero. Lenin himself tried to convert the priest to Marxist and encouraged him to read the works of Plekhanov. Soon, however, Lenin observed that though Father Gapon was indeed a revolutionary, he still lacked the materialistic viewpoint necessary to be a Marxist. Nevertheless, Father Gapon proceeded to arrange a conference of revolutionary parties which was to include the

\[16\text{Ibid. p. 47.}\]
Socialist Revolutionaries, both factions of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and fifteen national social-democratic and socialist revolutionary organizations. The conference was doomed even before it began. The Marxist socialists objected to the seating of the Finnish Activists while no real attempt had been made to even invite the Workers' Party of Finland. The Lettish Social-Democratic Party strongly objected to the participation of the Lettish Social-Democratic League which it considered to be a fictitious organization. The Mensheviks declined the invitation outright. When it became obvious that the Marxist parties would be outnumbered by the Socialist Revolutionary groups, the Bolsheviks, Lettish Social-Democrats, the Jewish Workers' Union, and Armenian Social-Democratic Labor Organization withdrew from the conference. With the Marxist parties absent, the conference adopted the Socialist Revolutionary program, including the seizure of land whose cultivation was based on the use of hired labor, independence for Poland and Finland, Autonomy for the Caucasus, and a federalist government for the rest of the Empire. With the announcement of the conference's decisions, the Bolsheviks and other Marxist organizations disassociated themselves from the conference and its program. Hereafter, the Bolsheviks worked with other parties only in local situations, usually in organizing strikes and combat detachments.

The Bolsheviks' relations with the Mensheviks and liberals were even less cordial. Soon after the Bolsheviks' Third Party Congress, the Mensheviks closed a conference of their own at Geneva and, except for a resolution declaring they would boycott a provisional government which contained bourgeois

---

elements and a more democratic party organization, they largely agreed with the Bolshevik revolutionary program.\footnote{Schapiro, \textit{Communist Party of the Soviet Union}, pp. 62-63. S. Schwarz, \textit{The Russian Revolution of 1905}, pp. 11-14, 226-229.}

The Menshevik conference goaded Lenin into writing an entire pamphlet, \textit{Two Tactics of the Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution}, devoted entirely to the condemnation of the Mensheviks. Lenin's main objection to the Mensheviks' Revolutionary program was their refusal to participate in a revolutionary provisional government with the bourgeoisie. In the pamphlet Lenin restated the decision of the Third Party Congress which affirmed the necessity of proletarian participation in the future provisional government as well as the arguments he himself presented to the congress on that point.\footnote{See above, pp. 68-70.} Lenin claimed that the establishment of a democratic government was not in itself socialism but a first step toward socialism. The full consummation of the democratic revolution, that is, the redistribution of land to the peasants, the establishment of a fully democratic republic, and the sparking of a revolution throughout the rest of Europe, could not be achieved by boycotting the provisional government and thus renouncing governmental power, but only through the armed dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.\footnote{Lenin, \textit{Polnoe Sobrannoe Sochinenii}, XI, pp. 44-45.}

Toward the end of the pamphlet Lenin re-emphasized that the first step toward socialism could not be taken without the armed dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The actualization of the demands of the contemporary peasantry, the complete defeat of the reaction, and the winning of the democratic republic will be the full end of the revolutionary leanings of the
bourgeoisie, even the petty bourgeoisie. It will be the beginning of the present struggle of the proletariat for socialism. The more complete the democratic upheaval, the sooner, wider, more clearly, and more decisively will this new struggle develop. The slogan, "democratic dictatorship" designates the historically limited character of the present revolution and the necessity of a new struggle, on the basis of a new order, for the full liberation of the working class from all oppression and all exploitation.

Both the pamphlet and Lenin's speeches at the Third Party Congress regarding the provisional revolutionary government show that he was not dabbling in the "simultaneous revolution" of the democratic and social kinds but held the full consummation of the democratic revolution to be necessary before the socialist revolution could be begun. To Lenin the establishment of a fully democratic republic did not constitute socialism, which is the ownership of all the means of production--factories, communications, and land--by all the people. The former had to come before the latter, perhaps with the aid of a revolutionary western European proletariat. Therefore, the claims by some historians which hold that at this time Lenin formulated the tactics of simultaneous revolution are unfounded.

Besides condemning the Mensheviks for their refusal to participate in a democratic provisional government, Lenin denounced them for emphasizing the possibility of revolutionary cooperation with the liberals rather than emphasizing the necessity of exposing the liberals' anti-revolutionary class interests to the proletariat. Lenin feared that Menshevik cooperation with the liberals would only lead them astray from the path of revolution, cause them to dampen the revolutionary ardor of the people, and lead the Mensheviks themselves into betraying the interests of the proletariat through the loss

21 Ibid. XI, pp. 120-121.
of their independence of action and their absorption in liberal parliamentary and reformism.

Finally, Lenin condemned the Menshevik revolutionary program as vague, especially because it did not explicitly call for the establishment of a republic and admitted the possibility of participating in an assembly within a monarchist government as a party of extreme opposition. He ridiculed this vagueness in the Menshevik program calling it "tactics as process" and accusing the Mensheviks of confusing the workers by not giving them a clear goal of a democratic republic. As for participation in a tsarist representative assembly, Lenin pointed out that any promises the Mensheviks could extract from the autocracy by parliamentary opposition would be only lies since the autocracy would never consent to ending its own existence. Therefore, the only way in which truly representative government could be achieved only by means of an armed uprising and the Mensheviks were only hindering the revolutionary movement by not making this clear.

Lenin's condemnation of the Liberals was even stronger. Throughout the summer, his articles in Voered and Proletary attacked the Liberals as hypocrites who were willing to use the people to gain liberty for themselves but not to establish a truly popular government. The liberals were willing enough to end the autocracy but their class interests did not permit them to destroy the monarchy and the bureaucracy for fear that a people's government would deprive the bourgeoisie of its property. To back this argument, Lenin analyzed the constitutional projects proposed by the Union of Liberation group of liberals and compared them with the goals of the Social-Democrats. The

\[\text{Ibid. XI, pp. 121-125.}\]
liberals wished to retain the Tsar as a constitutional monarch while the Social-Democrats stood for a democratic republic. The liberals proposed a bicameral legislature of which one house would be elected by indirect and unequal suffrage while the Social-Democrats demanded a unicameral legislature elected on the basis of general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. The liberal plan provided for a division and separation of powers which, by leaving only one house to popular control, would leave only one third of the power of the government to the masses, while the Social-Democrats demanded that all power pass into the hands of the people with no checks, divisions of power, or privileges for capitalists and landowners. The liberals feared Jacobin centralism as a threat to their property and desired not a popular revolution but one of the 1848 variety. All the liberals wanted was to balance the monarchy with the power of the people. They did not wish to destroy the monarchy but to use it as a brake on the popular will by retaining the police and army for the protection of the bourgeoisie. They failed to give the power of the state, undivided, into the hands of the people for they dared not give the proletariat the freedom to struggle for socialism and thus abolish all class privileges and put all the means of production in the hands of the people. 23 This argument was put in outline form and widely circulated as a leaflet entitled Three Constitutions or Three Systems of Government, comparing the monarchist, liberal and Social-Democratic plans for a future constitution for Russia. 24

Of all he said about the bourgeoisie, Lenin most wanted the people to remember was that:


24 Ibid. VIII. pp. 557-559.
...The bourgeoisie does not, and because of its class position cannot want, revolution. It merely wants to strike a bargain with the monarchy against the revolutionary people: It merely wants to steal the power behind the people's back. 25

While Lenin and other exiles continued their polemics in Switzerland, the Bolsheviks in Russia had their hands full combating the political backwardness of the people and the influence of other parties. Due to its conspiratorial nature, it is impossible to accurately state the size of the Bolshevik organization in Russia and very difficult to determine the strength of the Bolsheviks' influence relative to other parties. In mid 1905 the membership of all Social-Democrats numbered in the thousands but it is very doubtful whether it reached the ten thousands. 26 In general, it can be said that the Bolsheviks' main strength lay in the central and northern industrial region.

25 Ibid. IX, pp. 244-245.

26 L. Martov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov, (eds.) Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie v Rossii v Nachale XX-go Veka, (Petersburg 1909) Vol. III, pp. 572-574. Martov gives figures showing the size of many Social-Democratic organizations but these must be understood as only approximate. For one thing the conspiratorial nature of the party did not allow the keeping of an accurate roll. Furthermore, in those days there was no formal admission of an individual into the party. An individual who regularly supported and worked for the party was considered a member. Consequently, Martov's designation of "organized workers" might vary from place to place depending on how a local committee defined an "organized workers." However, Martov's report is accurate in designating the areas in which either the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks predominated. According to Martov, some of the largest Bolshevik organizations were in Moscow and St. Petersburg with several hundred organized workers each. The Ivanovo-Voznesenak Committee was supposed to have about 600, Nizhni Novgorod about 400, and Jaroslav and Kostroma, each with about 200 workers and students. The largest Bolshevik committee in the south seems to have been the Odessa Committee with about 300 organized workers but in this region the Bolsheviks were in competition with such Menshevik organizations as the Odessa Group of about 700 workers, the Kiev Committee with 500, the Poltava Committee with 400, the Kremenchug and Kharkov Committees with 300 workers each, the Skaterinoslav Committee with perhaps 1000 workers, and the Crimean Union which in addition to workers counted several hundred sailors in its membership. At the same time, the membership of the Mensheviks in the Caucasus numbered in the several thousands. It appears, therefore, that the Bolsheviks' name is itself misleading and that they were actually the party minority in the Social-
stretching from the area surrounding Moscow to the White Sea in the north, and the Ural region. In St. Petersburg, the Mensheviks' organization of twelve or thirteen hundred workers and several hundred students heavily outnumbered the Bolshevik organization. The same was true in most of industrial centers of the Ukraine, southern Russia, and the Caucasus which were centers of Menshevik power. In the Baltic area the Mensheviks were more powerful than the Bolsheviks but both organizations were much smaller than those of the Lettish Social Democrats, the Jewish Workers' Union, and the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania. In the Volga region the Bolsheviks might have been more powerful than the Mensheviks but both groups were insignificant compared to the Social-ist Revolutionaries' organizations in numbers if not in organization. In Siberia the division between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was not yet clear.

The local committee was the unit of organization around which all the party's activities in a given area were centered. Most of the local committees consisted of five men, approved by the Central Committee. Usually a chairman was elected from among the five and was given the power of acting for the entire committee if for some reason it was impossible for the committee to meet as a whole. Each committee had the responsibility of carrying on propaganda and agitation among the masses by means of speeches at gatherings and

Democratic Party if one considers the number of members. Even Bolshevik sources corroborate Martov. The Protocols of the Third Party Congress reveal the weakness of the Bolshevik organization in St. Petersburg. In the beginning of 1905, the St. Petersburg District which contained some 10,000 workers had only 128 workers belonging to Bolshevik organizations. The Vyborg District with 20,000 workers had only 129 in Bolshevik organizations. The City district had only 325 workers organized in various Bolshevik propaganda circles. The Neva District Bolsheviks were even worse off with 150 organized workers and outnumbered by the Mensheviks by about three to one. Tretii gizd, pp. 538-556. The Bolsheviks were somewhat stronger in Moscow where some of their districts had as many as 300 organized workers. Kliueva, Moskovskie Bolsheviki vo Glave Vooruzhenogo Vostanija v 1905 god e, (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1955) p. 20.
demonstrations, the distribution of party literature, and the organization of reading and discussion circles. Also, it was considered no less important for each committee to print its own literature, maintain contact with the Central Committee, and prepare for an armed insurrection against the government by organizing and arming combat units. To carry out these tasks, each committee had special departments attached to it. Almost every committee had an attached technical department which handled the printing storing, and distribution of local party literature. Almost invariably propaganda and agitation departments were also attached to the committee. It was the business of the propagandists to hold lectures and preside over discussion circles while agitators had the duty of serving as orators at mass meetings and demonstrations, explaining the party program to the crowds, exhorting them to take some revolutionary action, and condemning rival parties. Committee members themselves took on the duties of organizers. This involved the organization of new circles and the recruiting of new party members. Often a financial department was also attached under the authority of the committee to collect contributions and distribute the money for such party needs as printing, equipment, paper, the renting of apartments for printing and storing literature, and the acquisition of weapons. Special attention was given to spreading propaganda among the youth because the young were potentially the most revolutionary section of the population and could therefore be the source of devoted and energetic party recruits. The St. Petersburg Bolsheviks had a student society made up mostly of students from the university, while the Kazan and Saratov Bolsheviks organized youth departments to spread Lenin's writings among the young, especially the middle school students. In regions where the committee was too small to have a special student organization, individual party members
would frequently hold discussions and spread literature among the youth on a more informal basis. Ia-M. Sverdlov, one of the Bolshevik organizers who operated in Kostroma, Iaroslavl, and Perm spent much of his time with students, discussing Marxism and especially those works of Lenin which he gave them to read.27 Such informal gatherings often grew into large students organizations.

In addition to the student organizations, the "periphery" consisted of district committees and factory committees which were subordinated to the local committee. The organization of the "periphery" depended on the size and social structure of the industrial population in the surrounding area. The St. Petersburg Bolsheviks organized six district committees, each of which was passed on a geographical section of the city and headed by a member of the St. Petersburg Committee. The main City District was even subdivided into four subdistricts, each with its own committee. Finally each district committee administered and supervised numerous plant and factory committees made up of the employees in these enterprises, various reading and discussion circles, and apartments full of leaflets, pamphlets, and books, which served as illegal libraries of Marxist literature.28 The Moscow Bolsheviks had a similar organization of ten districts and a large suburban organization which eventually had to be converted into a committee in its own right. Other Bolshevik organizations were subdivided on an occupational rather than a geographical basis. Sometimes a mixture of both types was used. Sevastopol had a Bolshevik city collective and a port collective.

Gatherings and demonstrations were an important part of the Party's

28 Tretii S"ezd, pp. 538-556.
activity. Bolshevik agents would often appear at factory workers' meetings to persuade them to adopt political demands as well as economic demands in their ultimatums to the management. At various times, when the revolutionary feeling among the masses provided an opportunity, Bolshevik agitators gathered crowds around themselves and harangued them on the necessity of political freedom, a constituent assembly, the creation of workers' organizations, the need of a general strike and armed uprising against the autocracy, and so on. Besides treating with these general topics. Bolshevik agitators were careful to deal with more immediate and local issues such as "Bloody Sunday" and the Shidlovskii Commission in St. Petersburg, the necessity of a railroad strike in Siberia to end the war against Japan, the necessity of supporting the general strike in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, protests against police brutality, and so on. After the Third Congress, much time was spent by the agitators explaining the resolutions of the Congress to the masses and condemning the Mensheviks. Invariably the meetings included the handing or scattering of leaflets among the crowds. For special occasions such as the first of May or July 9, large demonstrations were planned ahead of time and special literature was prepared. All the socialist parties would organize processions and meetings at which orators from other parties would appear to counteract each other's influence, often resorting to heckling and other forms of abuse. Then the demonstrations would end with the distribution of leaflets and the adoption of resolutions promising to work for the overthrow of the autocracy under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. All this would be done amid red banners and the singing of revolutionary songs—or violence if the police and Cossacks attacked the meeting. Due to police surveillance, meetings in many centers had to be held outside of town. The Riga and Odessa Bolsheviks often held meetings in the nearby forests.
M.F. Frunze, the future marshal of the Red Army, held mass meetings in the woods outside of Ivanovo-Voznesensk so that the first large soviet carried on much of its activities in a forest. I.M. Sverdlov who usually operated in the upper and middle Volga region, often held mass meetings in the fields near the river and had boats and barges ready to support the agitators and the crowd to the opposite bank of the Volga in case the police or the Cossacks showed up. Not all agitators were as fortunate as Sverdlov, however. In June the Cossacks made a severe attack on a forest meeting outside Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Gatherings in other towns like Kazan were frequently threatened by the police or by the "Black Hundreds" which were bands of super-patriots who organized religious and patriotic manifestations honoring the Tsar which frequently resulted in the beasting and even murder of Jews, Armenians, revolutionaries and even students. Few local committees had the money to procure arms to protect themselves. Some, like the Kazan Committee, built up a small reserve of rifles and homemade bombs which served as a deterrent against indiscriminate attacks but did not make the Bolshevik organizations revolutionary threats. By the end of the summer of 1905 only the St. Petersburg and Moscow Committees had made any progress toward organizing strong combat organizations. The St. Petersburg Committee's Technical Groups, headed by S.I. Gusev, had been organizing workers' combat detachments, distributing arms to them, and manufacturing bombs since early spring. The Moscow Bolsheviks did not begin organizing a revolutionary combat organization until the summer, but soon, with the cooperation of other revolutionary parties, about forty

29 Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhennie, II. p. 435-443.
30 Ibid. II. pp. 745-746.
31 Akinin and A. Makhovskii, Voennaia i Boevasa Rabota Bolshevikov v 1906-1907 gg. (Moscow, 1953) pp. 3-7.
combat detachments were organized, of which half were composed of Bolsheviks. At the head of this force was a loosely organized coalition council composed of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and of organizations of students, printers, and non-party revolutionaries. However, the Central Committee soon realized that such isolated instances of success would not provide sufficient force for an all-Russian revolution. Representatives of the Central Committee were sent to contact local organizations to aid them in organizing the workers into combat detachments and in building laboratories for the manufacture of explosives. In the meantime, the Central Committee sought to obtain arms from abroad. Firearms and ammunition were smuggled into Russia from Austria but one of the main sources of arms was the ship, John Grafton which smuggled arms into Russia from Sweden. However, it was soon sent to the bottom of the Baltic Sea by the Russian navy and despite the efforts of Bolshevik "fishing" operations, to salvage some of the weapons, most of a large cargo was lost. Despite feverish efforts and great risks the Technical Department of the Central Committee could only fail in its efforts to sufficiently arm the Bolshevik combat organizations all over the Empire and by the end of summer, few centers besides St. Petersburg and Moscow--perhaps Lugansk in the Don Basin and Sukhum in Western Georgia--had respectably large and well armed combat organizations.

Finally, at the bottom of the party organization were the equivalents of today's cells in the Communist Party, the factory and plant committees and the propaganda reading and discussion circles. The plant and factory commit-

---

32 Kliueva, Moskovskie Bolsheviki pp. 20-21.
tees operated among the workers of a given manufacturing enterprise at their place of employment and spread Social-Democratic slogans and programs by distributing literature, conversing, and encouraging or organizing gatherings to discuss the workers' grievances or to strike. Usually, the committee members would hold a speech before his fellow workers showing them the necessity of obtaining political freedom to better their economic conditions. Often a ready printed resolution signifying the agreement of all to fight for a constituent assembly under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party would be passed around among the workers to be approved and adopted by them by acclamation. Though the resolutions meant little since many of the workers did not fully understand them, this method did serve to make workers more conscious of the main points of the Social-Democratic program and of their own political interests.

The small circles run by the party were a more intensive form of propaganda and agitation. They were classified as instruments of propaganda because they were designed to impart a Marxist outlook on life to its members and to recruit them either as full party members or cooperative sympathizers --what would be known today as fellow-travelers. The questions of the immediate situation and necessary courses of action in local affairs were, of course, not wholly left to agitation such as factory meetings and mass demonstrations. Local and immediate themes were discussed in the circles along with the main tenets of Marxism and Social-Democracy but the main function of the circles was to give the members a deeper understanding of the Social-Democratic movement and obtain their support in one form or another. Usually the circles met in apartments rented by the party for that purpose but in towns which were small enough to be under strong police surveillance, circles
secretly functioned in the nearby forests. The size of the circles also depended on police efficiency. The safe number of members in a circle was six to twelve people in most places. There were exceptions, however. Some propagandists in St. Petersburg crammed up to thirty-five people into an apartment. Often the same landlord would rent other apartments to circles of other parties thus making the building a prime target for a police raid. Often these apartments served not only as meeting places for circles but as libraries circulating Marxist and Social-Democratic literature.

Each circle was run by a propagandist appointed by the local party committee and sometimes another propagandist would also be assigned to deliver a lecture concerning a subject in which he was considered an expert. The program of the circle varied with the education of the propagandist and the general intelligence of the members. In some circles composed of semi-peasant workers in the surrounding areas of a city, the propagandist would merely read a copy of Vpered or one of Lenin’s earlier pamphlets aloud to the other members and comment on it or discuss the local situation with them. In other circles the members merely discussed the Marxist literature they had read at home and how this material applied to their own situation. In larger urban areas such as St. Petersburg, circles for the "intelligentsia" featured a series of lectures, each given by a specialist in that field, explaining the history and program of the Social-Democratic Party, the inevitability of socialism through the operation of immutable social and economic laws, and the necessity of a proletarian party to liberate the working class. Some of these circles practically served as courses in schools of Marxism. One circle in St. Petersburg presented a series of nine lectures. The first consisted of a Marxist interpretation of world history, tracing the war between the
exploiter and the exploited through the stages of ancient slavery, medieval feudalism, and modern capitalism and explaining the inevitability of socialism. The second lecture was an analysis of the French Revolution and other western European revolutions in the nineteenth century. The third lecture recounted various working class movements in the West and in Russia. Other lectures dealt with the basic principles of Marxism; Marx's surplus theory and his political economy; historical materialism; the Erfurt Program; the Communist Manifesto. Finally, the program was concluded by two lectures on the errors of the nineteenth-century populist and anarchist revolutionaries and a summary of the program and constitution of the Social-Democratic Party. Of those who completed this course, any that wished could progress to a higher circles dealt with socio-economic analyses of the situation in Russia, the revolutionary movement in Russia, revolutionary tactics, and the tactical errors of Menshevism. Another circle, established toward the end of the year in the same city, had a similar program with the addition of a lecture on the class nature and anti-revolutionary leanings of the bourgeoisie. A circle designed especially for university students included a lecture on the role of the "intelligentsia" in the revolutionary movement and its natural opposition to the autocracy. Circles in other towns adapted their lectures to fit local conditions. A series of lectures in Perm, in the Urals, resembled the basic courses given in St. Petersburg but also added lectures on the uselessness of

---


36 Tretii S"ezd, pp. 575-576.
individual terrorism as practiced by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the hypocrisy of the liberals, the necessity of supporting the peasant movement and the methods by which a general strike could be begun and turned into an armed uprising. To assure that Social-Democratic propaganda also reached the Tartars, some circles, such as these run by the teacher Gafur Kulakmatov, were conducted in the Tarter language.

One might ask just how effective or convincing these discussion and lecture circles were, or what actually led a person to become a Bolshevik. The biographies of party leaders such as Lenin or Stalin are well known, but the motivation of a party worker lower down the party scale may also prove to be of interest. V. Shaurov's account of why he joined the party provides us with an enlightening example. No single event or piece of literature converted him to Bolshevism. It was a gradual process. While he was a student at the polytechnical institute of the University of St. Petersburg, his studies in the natural sciences, philosophy, history, and economy convinced him that materialism provided him with the only true view of the universe. To him Marxism was the logical consequence of his materialism. When he joined a reading circles established by the Bolsheviks, his reading of Marx and other materialists such as Herzen, Chernishevskii and Pisarev along with Social-Democratic literature confirmed him in his convictions and roused a desire in him to take an active part in the revolutionary movement. Why did he become a Bolshevik? He preferred the Bolsheviks' efficient and centralized organization and their revolutionary program. Above all, he admired the

37. Bystrikh, Bolshevikskie Organizatsii Urala, p. 111.
The Bolsheviks' determination to achieve victory.

The Bolsheviks concentrated their main efforts in the urban areas but the countryside was not ignored. If the Bolsheviks expected to lead a successful revolt against the government, they could not afford to disregard the rapidly intensifying movement which might involve the bulk of the population of the Russian Empire. In the early part of 1905, the bulk of the peasant population, with some notable exceptions in Georgia, south-central Russia, and the Volga region, waited quietly for some cataclysmic event. Rumors that the Tsar had granted the land to the peasants or that he had quit abounded. With the approach of summer, however, the peasants took more positive action. The number of strikes among agricultural day-laborers increased. In Poland, White Russia, and the Kuban region, most of the peasantry ceased to pay rents, taxes or fees for pasturing animals or cutting wood on the nobles' land. In the Volga region there was a number of cases of looting of large landowners' barns and even murder. In Georgia, peasants and army deserters intensified their guerrilla war. In the Baltic area, peasants organized their own committees and militia units and a serious threat to the government's authority would have developed had not the Baltic peasants been as orderly and self-restrained as they were. The Bolsheviks sought to organize such revolutionary peasant committees and militia organizations throughout Russia, to incite strikes among the agricultural proletariat, and to persuade the peasants to boycott all government authority, especially by ceasing to pay taxes and with-
holding recruits from the army. It was not all that easy, however. First, the political consciousness of the peasantry had to be raised in order to give the violence of the peasant movement direction toward a definite goal—the overthrow of the autocracy. Bolshevik Committees in Tver, Poltava, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, and Saratov, among others, sent some of their most trustworthy party members into the surrounding countryside to organize gatherings, propose Social-Democratic resolutions to the peasantry, and distribute leaflets. The Saratov Bolsheviks concentrated much of their propaganda on the village teachers and the peasant youth. Teachers converted to Bolshevism could be even more useful than regular party agitators. They were respected and listened to attentively by the villagers. Often the teachers would hold gatherings in the village and speak against the Tsar and the landlords, reminding the peasants of their poverty and impressing them with the need of a constituent assembly. Reading circles were also established by the teachers in some villages and the literature circulated among the peasants who could read included Marx's *Communist Manifesto* and *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*, Engels' *The Peasant War in Germany*, and some of Lenin's earlier pamphlets such as *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and *To the Village Poor*. However, the Bolshevik effort to obtain the organized support of the peasantry must, on the whole, be considered a failure. Due to their small numbers, Bolshevik connections with the countryside remained few and weak. Partly, however, it was their own fault. Compared with the attention given to the urban workers by the Bolsheviks, the peasantry was ignored and neglected. For example, of 170 leaflets issued by the Samara Committee in 1905, only ten were addressed

---

directly and exclusively to the peasants despite the fact that Samara lies in the middle of one of Russia's most important agricultural regions. Polemics between revolutionary parties did not help the situation. Stalin's tour of Georgian villages in the summer of 1905 to combat the influence of his popular Menshevik rival, Ramishvili, probably only confused the peasantry. Verbal attacks on the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the agricultural areas where they predominated did not serve to raise Bolshevik prestige. At any rate, the peasants still were attached to the Tsar and hoped he would better their condition. As evidence of the failure of the Bolsheviks' rural campaign against the Tsar, the peasants outside Moscow occasionally sent petitions to the Tsar asking him to grant a constituent assembly, local self government, equality before the law, and the transfer of the land to those who tilled it. The peasants around Tver asked approximately the same concessions and added the very unrevolutionary petition for the alleviation of taxes. Even where the peasants did organize in peasant unions as the Bolsheviks had urged, these were most often dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries while the Bolsheviks were left without much of a following in the countryside.

If the Bolsheviks could not afford to lose the support of the peasantry, they could afford to lose the support of the army even less. As it turned out, the entire course of the revolution depended on the attitude of the military forces toward the government and the revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks, of course, were not ignorant of this. The Social-Democratic Party had been print-

41 Ibid. p. 81.
42 Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhenie, I, 388-390.
43 Ibid. I, p. 588-590.
ing leaflets calling on the troops to turn against the Tsar since 1901. In the first few years of the twentieth century, Social-Democratic agitation in the army consisted of handing out or throwing leaflets into barrack windows or at soldiers at railroad stations. With the coming of the Russo-Japanese war, the Bolsheviks, like all other revolutionaries, intensified their work among the troops. Leaflets were issued by the Central Committee urging the soldiers to go to prison or even be shot rather than face the horrors of the war—the end would be the same anyhow. Other leaflets reminded the soldiers that the revolutionaries were struggling against the autocracy which was oppressing the workers, peasants, and soldiers alike. New methods of agitation were also adopted. Bolsheviks organized anti-war demonstrations around mobilization centers where the conscripts were being gathered. Campaigns were launched in which parents of soldiers were urged to write to their sons imploring them not to shoot at revolting peasants and workers. Meanwhile, all along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, workers attempted to fraternize with the soldiers and even invited them to attend their gatherings. However, the Bolsheviks quickly realized that no revolutionary movement in conjunction with the army could be made without direct contact between the party and the military forces.

By the end of 1904, Social-Democratic cells of both factions of the party began to appear in the army and the navy. These were organized either by Social-Democrats who had been conscripted into the army or by soldiers themselves who had come in contact with party workers at street gatherings or casual conversations. Up through the summer of 1905 these organizations were scattered and

---

44 Ibid. I, 66-69.
varied in their composition and complexity. Some of the most complex revolutionary organizations within the armed forces in the Baltic area. In the Riga garrison the Bolsheviks and the Lettish Social-Democrats succeeded in creating many cells among the soldiers and sailors with a hierarchy of coordinating committees at the battalion and regimental levels. In 1905, the total membership of this organization may have numbered as high as 300 men. Similar though smaller organizations were built up at Ust Dvinsk, on the other bank of the Dvina, and Libau. At the same time, a large "Soldiers' Union" was organized among the garrison troops in Tiflis Georgia.

The work of the cells consisted mainly in secretly holding conversations on current events among the soldiers and distributing literature supplied by the nearby Bolshevik Committee among them. In some cases the cell members would even dare to organize gatherings and hold revolutionary speeches within the barracks. The work of the cells, however, was neither safe nor easy. Officers restricted furloughs to prevent revolutionary contacts, planted agents among the troops, and frequently searched the barracks for revolutionary literature. Arrests of cell members were frequent, as for instance, the entire Bolshevik organization in the Twenty-First East Siberian Battalion, stationed in Moscow, was arrested.

Bolshevik and numerous other revolutionary organizations succeeded in spreading dissatisfaction and rebellion. Disobedience of orders was frequent, especially in cases where the army was used to restore order in the towns and villages. In Lublin, Poland, for instance, a Polish Social-Democrat organiza-

---


tion headed by F.E. Dzershinskii, the future head of the red secret police, succeeded in dissuading the garrison from marching against the neighboring peasantry to restore order. However, real revolutionary actions were rare until the last quarter of the year. The only serious rising that summer occurred in the Black Sea port of Sevastopol. Here some of the sailors organized the Social-Democratic Sevastopol Naval Central, which maintained contact with the Sevastopol Social-Democrats and aimed at a general rising in the fleet and the town. Frequent meetings were held aboard the naval vessels and on shore and dissatisfaction spread among the crews. The Socialist-Revolutionaries also operated within the fleet and soon most of the crews either belonged to revolutionary organizations, or, more often, were merely disgusted with the conditions of naval life. The Bolsheviks themselves were planning to lead a revolt sometime in the fall when more of the crews would be conscientious revolutionaries and there would be more chance of an all-Russian uprising. They had an especially large organization on the Ekaterina II and expected to lead the Black Sea Fleet in spreading the revolution all along the coast. However, the spontaneous unrest among the mass of the crew took the control of events out of the hands of the Bolsheviks as was to happen so often in the coming months. In June of 1905, a rumor that the fleet was to sail to the Far East alarmed the crews and increased the tension. News of the Russian defeat in the Tsushima Straits and a worker's uprising in Odessa made the sailors even more restless. On June 14, the crew of the battleship, Kniaz Potemkin Tavricheskii, found their meat to be rotten. Refusing to eat it they started an uproar. When the officers attempted to shoot at some of the mutineers, two Bolshevik members of the crew, G. Vakulenchuk and P. Matiushenko, started a scuffle which ended with the death of Vakulenchuk and three officers. The crew then raised
the red flag and signalled the rest of the fleet to join them. The crews on
the other battleships were not prepared to go that far, however, and the
Potemkin sailed out of Sevastopol and toward Odessa, where the uprising organ-
ized by the Social-Democrats had been going on for several days. By the time
the Potemkin arrived in Odessa, most of the Bolshevik insurgents had been
arrested and for some reason the Mensheviks failed to contact the mutineers.
The battleship shelled the city for awhile, hit nothing in particular, and
after Vakulenchuk was buried ashore, it sailed off to Rumania where it was
interned and given back to Russia without the crew.

The Potemkin mutiny could have been a far more serious affair had it
not been so ill-prepared. However, there was little contact between the
crews of the other ships. The revolutionary organizations within the fleet
were as yet too small and most of the crews, though disgusted with the harsh
conditions in the navy, were not prepared to take the final step toward mutiny.
Finally, little contact was made with the Social-Democrats in Sevastopol and
Odessa and therefore, the sailors could not join with the workers to make up
the revolutionary army the Bolsheviks dreamt of. In short, the rising was
premature and spontaneous being mostly out of the control of the Social-Demo-
crats and did not at all turn out as the Bolsheviks had wanted. The mutiny
itself received world-wide publicity and serious doubt was cast on the relia-
bility of the military forces. However, it was only a foreshadowing of things
to come later in the year.

In spite of their risks and efforts to organize the workers, soldiers,
and peasants into a revolutionary force under their leadership, the Bolsheviks

48
Paskokii, A.V., Revoliutsiiia 1905-1907 gg v. Rossii, (Moscow, Nauka,
failed. By the later summer of 1905, it was obvious that the Bolsheviks' achievements in the countryside and in the armed forces were still negligible. Their success among the workers also seems to have been unimpressive. Speaking of both factions of the Social-Democratic Party, the Menshevik, Evgenii Maevskii, admitted,

The organizational ties of the Social-Democratic Party with the masses were always very weak. The number of organized workers in relation to all the masses was insignificant. However, the ideological influence of the party was great.49

How great the Social-Democratic influence on the workers really was, was yet to be seen.

49 Evgenii Maevskii, 1905 god: Ocherki Revoliutsionogo Dvizheniia, (Moscow, Skobolevskaiia Kommissiia, 1917) p. 31.
CHAPTER IV

THE OCTOBER MANIFEST AND THE RISE OF THE SOVIETS

As the summer of 1905 wore on, pressure on the Tsar increased from all sides. The Union of Unions, made up of organizations of the liberal professions and white-collar workers, had been carrying on liberal agitation since May. In July, radicals representing various local peasant unions founded the All-Russian Peasants' Union and immediately began agitating for land reform. Seeking to decrease the disorder in the Empire by satisfying at least some of the revolutionary elements, the Tsar announced on August 6 that he was granting to the people an elected state council which was to advise him in matters of Legislation. The limitations of the state council or Duma were immediately realized by all the oppositional parties. The Duma was only an advisory and not a legislative body. It was not to be elected by universal suffrage since most of the non-Russian areas were excluded and a property requirement limited the classes which could vote. The suffrage was also indirect, having several levels of electors. Workers in general were excluded from the voting and all who sat in the Duma had to be able to speak Russian.

The Tsar's move did serve to divide the revolutionary forces. The liberals in the zemstvo congresses were willing to accept the Duma, hoping to eventually turn it into a real legislative body. The Union of Unions, however, voted to boycott the Duma. Most socialists were also willing to boycott the
Duma. A congress representing the Russian, Lettish, and Polish Social-Democrats, the Jewish Workers' Union, and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party voted for the boycott of the Duma. One of the leading Mensheviks, Julius Martov, put forth a plan to use the Duma elections to form a provisional revolutionary government. He proposed that all Social-Democrats, though not participating in the elections themselves, set up agitation committees which would expose the shortcomings of the Duma to all voters and urge them to elect the most democratic and radical candidates. These elected candidates could then gather in some city in Russia and proclaim themselves a constituent assembly thus illegally usurping the powers of the Tsar and providing the foundations for self-government. Lenin rejected this idea as naive. Since the workers were excluded from the election, even the most democratic assembly of delegates would represent the interests of the bourgeoisie and a victorious revolution in such a case would only yield the leadership of the revolution and possession of the governmental power to the liberals at the expense of the Social-Democrats.

Even more important, the autocracy would never allow the existence of a provisional revolutionary government. One could not have a provisional government followed by a revolution but the provisional government itself could only be the result of an armed uprising. ¹ Lenin saw the Duma as a grant of limited freedom or as a step toward constitutionalism, but as an attempt of the Tsar to divide the forces of the revolution and quash the revolutionary movement. As for the liberals who supported the Duma, Lenin claimed that this only proved their counterrevolutionary nature and that their participation in the Duma was nothing but an agreement between the constitutional monarchists and

¹Lenin, Collected Works, IX, pp. 224-226.
the conservative liberals to divide the power of the government among themselves and rule in harmony over the proletariat. It was therefore the duty of the Social-Democrats to carry on a campaign condemning the Duma for its shortcomings and the liberals who participated in it and urge the necessity of an armed uprising among the masses.

The Bolsheviks diligently agitated against the Duma through leaflets, gatherings and even breaking into liberals meetings. One leaflet of the Central Committee listed the limitations of the suffrage and of the powers of the Duma and called upon all to fight for liberty—to the end. The Moscow Area Committee called on the peasants to adopt a resolution reading,

We now realize that if we want to better our lot, and obtain a better life, it is necessary for us to carry on a struggle so that the business of the government be run not by the Tsar and his officials, but our representatives, with full deciding votes, without any Tsar or officials, with the full power of passing laws in our interests. We know also that the R.S.D.L.P. struggles for the full liberation of the people from the yoke of the autocracy and the rich. We unite with it and announce: 1) We will not elect anyone to the Tsarist Duma; 2) We will obtain with weapons in our hands our popular duma—a democratic republic given to us by a constituent assembly on the basis of general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

Throughout 1905, the Bolsheviks had been urging and hoping for the general strike that they hoped would turn into the final armed uprising. And then—unexpectedly—it happened. On September 20, a strike broke out spontaneously among the Moscow printers and spread to the bakers, restaurant employees, and workers in the furniture factories and tobacco shops. As the strike spread through Moscow, the mood of the workers became more violent.

2 Ibid. IX, pp. 179-188, 193-199.
On September 25, the printers broke into several gunshops to obtain weapons and clashed with the police and even raised barricades. After two days of fighting twelve workers were dead and thirty wounded. Nevertheless, the unrest in the city increased. Toward the end of September, the workers of several occupations, and especially those of the printing and furniture industries, formed their own individual soviets. As yet these were not organs of revolutionary government but mere strike committees embracing only their own occupations. In early October, several strike committees of the printers, mechanics, and railroad, furniture, and tobacco industry employees formed a joint strike committee which was joined by liberal professors, students, lawyers, doctors, and even bank employees and government bureaucrats. A few days later, the strike movement spread to the railroad workers. On October 7, the Kazan, Iaroslavl, Kursk, and Brest branches of the system radiating from Moscow struck. The other branches soon joined the movement and the Great October Strike spread to every industrial center in the Empire. The strike not only involved 700,000 railroad workers and more than 300,000 workers of other industries, but also countless professors, lawyers, doctors, office-workers, pharmacists, and small shop owners. Admittedly only about one third of Russia's industrial work force went on strike but this third included the operators of such public utilities as post and telegraph, electricity, gas, steam, and water plants, streetcars and cabs, and, of course railroad workers. Many of the workers entered the strike demanding civil rights and a real constitutional assembly but a great number also struck to satisfy economic demands or because they were coerced by other workers.  

Surprisingly, neither the Bolsheviks nor the Mensheviks incited the strike. In fact they were unprepared for it. The strike itself was a spontaneous movement among the industrial proletariat which was by this time more politically conscious, more dissatisfied with the autocracy and management, and better organized in various trade unions such as the All-Russian Railway Union, the All-Russian Post and Telegraph Union, and the liberal Union of Unions. The Mensheviks were somewhat more instrumental in inciting, spreading, and organizing the movement once it was started but even they were caught unawares. It is true that the printers who set off the strike were strongly influenced by the Mensheviks, that the Moscow-Brest Railroad workers who were instrumental in spreading the strike among the rest of the railroad workers were under the domination of the Mensheviks, and that once the strike was started, Mensheviks played a great part in helping the workers formulate their demands and elect their deputies to the various soviets which sprang up during the strike. However, it must be noted that the Mensheviks were not at all pleased by being faced with a general strike at the time since the workers were still too poorly armed and disorganized to turn the strike into a successful uprising. The strike had already become general before they even dared call for it but seeing that it was the irrepressible wish of so many of the workers in Moscow, the Mensheviks could only follow along and help the workers organize.

The Moscow Bolsheviks were even less prepared or enthusiastic about the general strike than the Mensheviks. Like the Mensheviks, they saw the workers were not yet sufficiently organized or armed for an uprising and a premature

attempt would certainly end in disaster. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks feared that the idea of a general strike might eclipse the goal of an armed uprising. Even after the strike movement had spread to the railroad workers on October 7, the Moscow Committee decided against appealing for a general strike by a vote of seven to two. Only after so many of the Moscow workers joined the strike that the Bolsheviks feared they would be cut off from the masses did the Bolsheviks call for a general strike on October 10. In the meantime, they remained aloof from the task of organizing the workers and left the organization of elections of workers' deputies to the soviets and the agitation for the creation of an all-city soviet of workers' deputies to the Mensheviks. When in early October, several strike committees of the printers, mechanics, and furniture, railroad, and tobacco workers formed a joint strike committee which was joined by liberal professors, students, lawyers, doctors, engineers, bureaucrats, and even judges, the Bolsheviks eagerly joined the Mensheviks in attempting to build a separate strike organization made up exclusively of proletarian industrial workers and to break up Moscow Strike Committee which contained bourgeois liberals.  

Violence between workers and police broke out in Kharkov and Odessa but events took a really revolutionary turn when the strike movement reached St. Petersburg. The Mensheviks urged all workers to support the general strike in Moscow. They emphasized the need of a massive workers' organization against the autocracy. Even if this organization was a non-party workers congress, it might still be converted into a form of revolutionary self-government which could lead the masses against the autocracy. Large meetings

---

were held in the streets and in the halls of the St. Petersburg University calling on the workers to join the general strike which would eventually turn into an armed uprising. By October 12, every industrial enterprise in the city was affected by the strike and even the government offices closed. On October 13, representatives of several strike committees and striking workers of various enterprises met at the technological institute of St. Petersburg University under the presidency of G.S. Krustalev-Nosar' and proclaimed themselves the Soviet of Workers' deputies. The Soviet was supposed to be a non-party organization uniting the broad masses of the workers in their struggle against the autocracy. However, its organization had been initiated by the Mensheviks and it remained under their domination throughout its short existence. Though the Soviet was presided over by a non-party lawyer, Krustalev-Nosar', and dominated by Leon Trotsky, not strictly a Menshevik but a "conciliator," the great majority of the deputies were Mensheviks or under Menshevik influence. The Bolsheviks, however, were not unrepresented in the Soviet. Their agitators had some influence on the St. Petersburg workers. A few of the elected deputies were Bolsheviks and two of them, B.M. Kruniants-Radin and D. Sverchkov, were members of the Soviet's executive committee.

Though the Bolsheviks had always looked upon a general strike as the first step toward an armed uprising, the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks certainly did not approve of either the Great October Strike or the creation of a Menshevik-dominated Soviet. Like the Moscow Bolsheviks, they saw that the strike by itself would not bring an end to the autocracy but would only sap the strength the workers needed in the final armed revolt. At the present time, there was no possibility of converting the strike into a victorious uprising
despite the enthusiasm of the masses for the revolutionaries had very few firearms and the great majority of the workers had only knives and crowbars for weapons. Bolshevik agitation had produced its effect. A number of workers was willing to take up arms against the authorities. However, the Bolsheviks' technical unpreparedness for the armed conflict now put them in an embarrassing position. When the Bolsheviks distributed a pitifully small store of revolvers among the workers they were bitterly disappointed and asked the Bolsheviks why they had been calling for an armed uprising the past several months while they had only thirty Brownings with which to arm the workers. With so little hope of a successful armed uprising, it is easy to see why the Bolsheviks did not issue a definite call to the workers to join the general strike until October 13 when it was already well under way. At the same time, the Bolsheviks hesitated to support the St. Petersburg Soviet. They distrusted a multi-party political organization as a rival. Seeing the Soviet mainly as a large strike committee, they did not think of it as an organ of revolutionary leadership. Therefore, to counteract the Mensheviks' influence on the workers and to use it as a means presenting their own revolutionary program before the workers.

Under Menshevik leadership the Soviet turned out to be more than the large strike committee the Bolsheviks accused it of being. As soon as it convened, it called on the workers to arm themselves and to form combat detachments. In defiance of the censorship laws it printed its own bulletin and exercised its own censorship on conservative publications by ordering the printers to continue their strike even when other printers returned to work.

8Ibid. pp. 139-141. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage, pp. 39-47.
Furthermore, the Soviet demanded money and food for the workers from the municipal authorities, the control of the actual distribution of supplies to the workers, the discontinuance of all supplies to the police, and the expulsion of all troops from the city. In the meantime, the Soviet increased its basis of representation. Its first meeting was attended by less than forty delegates, each theoretically representing five hundred workers, but eventually, the number of delegates passed five hundred.9

With most of the Empire paralyzed by the general strike and a workers' revolutionary government developing in the capital, the Tsar was faced with the choice of granting real constitutional government or establishing a military dictatorship over his realm. Was he willingly to limit his own autocratic power or risk a gigantic revolution which might deprive him of his throne?

Amid the conflicting advice offered him by the members of his court, Nicholas II vacillated between martial law or a constitutional government. Count S.I. Witte, who now enjoyed great prestige because he had managed to keep the Russian losses at a minimum in the treaty of Portsmouth which ended the Russo-Japanese War, advised a liberal course. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolae-vich advised putting the Empire under martial law but refused to take the dictatorial powers himself. Finally, the Tsar decided with Witte. On October 17, he issued the famous manifest ending the centuries-old autocracy in Russia. The October Manifest, drafted by Witte, granted full civil liberties to all, that is, freedom of opinion, speech press, and association. The State Duma

was to be elected by all classes and nationalities previously excluded though the classes remained unequally represented. The most important provision, however, established that no law could be promulgated without the consent of the Duma and that the Tsar's officials were accountable to the Duma. Though the suffrage was weighted to favor the privileged and wealthier classes and the executive power remained wholly in the hands of the Tsar, at last the Tsar's power had been limited. The autocracy was at an end!

The Manifest met with various reactions. The conservatives were dismayed. The Constitutional-Democrats, a moderate liberal party formed early that autumn, were dissatisfied with the Manifest but willing to enter the Duma in order to pressure the Tsar into granting a truly constitutional government. Among the Social-Democrats the Manifest served to open another tactical debate between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Menshevik Position was probably best expressed by A.L. Helphand, (Parvus). The Duma was a wonderful opportunity to agitate and organize the masses without opposition from the government. The Social-Democrats might just as well take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Duma to prepare the masses for a revolution by freely expressing the Social-Democratic program and limiting the power of the Tsar by such means as refusing to provide the money and the armies he needed to stay in power. The Duma was a political fact and a Social-Democratic boycott would not destroy it but only leave the Social-Democratic Party and reduce the power and will of the Duma to oppose the Tsar. Helphand agreed with the Bolsheviks that the liberals were essentially enemies of the proletariat, but why could not the Social-Democrats support them in the Duma against the Tsar? Why not use the energies of one's enemies to combat his other enemies? It was strange that Lenin should take such an obstinate stand on participating
in the Duma and cooperating with the liberals. He was turning these tactical questions into moral issues though there is no political morality—only class morality. Helphand denied that by entering the Duma the Social-Democrats would be lapsing into reformism or renouncing revolution; rather, they would merely be using another weapon for revolution. The Social-Democrats would have to be willing to use every weapon in the long process toward revolution and not rely exclusively on an armed uprising.10

The Bolsheviks, meanwhile, maintained the same position toward the October Manifest as toward the August Manifest. Lenin condemned the October Manifest as an agreement between the Tsar and nobles who needed bourgeois support and the bourgeoisie who did not want a complete revolution but only to seize the government machinery. To Lenin, the armed uprising was the only way toward the complete liberation of the toiling masses.11 Vorovskii joined Lenin in condemning the Mensheviks for not urging the boycott of the Duma and not concentrating their energies toward preparing an armed uprising. He denounced the Duma as a trick by the Tsar and the liberals to split the forces of the revolution and condemned the Mensheviks for falling for it.12 Along with Lenin's and Vorovskii's articles in Proletarii, the Bolsheviks issued leaflets throughout the Empire, denouncing the October Manifest as a lie. A leaflet of the Central Committee cautioned the people not to be deceived by the Manifest and urged them to obtain real rather than paper rights by force of arms.

10 Parvus, Rossiia i Revoliutsiiia (St. Petersburg, S. Glagolev, 1907) pp. 144-176, 183-190.
Only by force of arms, only by a popular armed uprising will we sweep the enemy from the face of the earth and win liberty for ourselves...Forward into battle!...To arms comrades! Down with the false constitution! Long live the popular armed uprising!  

Obviously, the October Manifest had not deterred the Bolsheviks from their revolutionary purpose.

The Bolsheviks and many Mensheviks found it their task to convince the people that the Manifest had gained them nothing and that the real revolution was still to come. In the first few days after the issuing of the Manifest, the streets of St. Petersburg were filled with rejoicing crowds celebrating the victory of the revolution. Trotsky reminded the crowds that the Manifest had changed nothing. The Tsar still actually held autocratic power. His troops and his police were still present. Even the promised release of political prisoners had not yet been carried out. The Bolsheviks echoed his warning throughout St. Petersburg urging all, even the students to continue the general strike and prepare for an armed uprising.

Along with the Manifest, the Bolsheviks denounced the Duma as a sham parliament controlled by bourgeois liberals. In Ekaterinburg in the Urals, I.M. Sverdlov held several speeches at workers' meetings repeating Lenin's position that the liberals had betrayed the revolution and concluded a deal with the Tsar to maintain their hegemony over the working class. In Moscow a leaflet printed by the Federated Council of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks expressed the typical Bolshevik attitude toward the Duma. After condemning the

---

13 Piskovskii, Revoliutsiya 1905-1907 v Rossii, p. 139.
14 Shaurov, 1905 god, p. 49.
liberals as traitors because of their support of the Duma it closed with,

Down with the exploiters! Down with peaceful friends! Down with the liberals! Down with the Tsarist government and its collaborators! Long live the armed uprising! Long live the popular constituent assembly Long live the democratic republic--pir sole dependable way to socialism! Obviously, the October Manifest had not deterred the Bolsheviks from their revolutionary purpose.

The Bolsheviks were justified in fearing that the October Manifest would split the forces of a popular revolution. Disorder increased throughout the Empire after October 17 but not all of it was directed against the government. After the announcement of the October Manifest, a wave of violence, motivated by a mixture of patriotism, reaction, and racial hatred, swept Russia, swept the Empire and especially its non-Russian regions. Demonstrators clashed in St. Petersburg. In Moscow, N.E. Bauman, one of the leading Bolshevik agitators, was released from prison by virtue of the Tsar's amnesty and killed when the triumphant crowd surrounding him was fired on by counter-revolutionary demonstrators. Even worse crimes were committed by such Black Hundred organizations as the Union of the Russian People, the Society of Russian Patriots, and the Russian Monarchist Party, sometimes with the local authorities' passive approval and even assistance and sometimes in defiance of all authority. Murderous pogroms were carried out against the Jews in Odessa, Kiev, Gomel, Lodz, and Brest-Litovsk. In Saratov police, troops, and volunteers carried out a general pogrom against local revolutionaries who had freed a large group of arrested railroad workers. In Cheliabinsk ninety members of the local Bolshevik combat detachment were surrounded in a building and severely beaten by the police and
the Black Hundreds. In Ufa there was an armed conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Black Hundreds from which Sverdlov barely escaped. The worst disaster occurred in the Siberian town of Tomsk when a large crowd of the Black Hundreds surrounded a building where a workers' meeting was being held and set it on fire burning about 400 people to death despite the resistance offered by a small group of Bolsheviks. Even in Moscow the students were surrounded in the university by a menacing crowd until they were saved by the police. 17

Even if the mass of the population did not engage in such counterrevolutionary activities, most of the people had lost interest in the revolutionary movement. In St. Petersburg and Moscow the defiant spirit of the workers began to wane. Realizing this, the St. Petersburg Soviet called off the general strike on October 19 while the Moscow Strike Committee, which represented the greater part of the city's labor force, and the All-Russian Railroad Union had recommended the cessation of the general strike even earlier. Seeing that the strike would only fade away rather than turn into an armed uprising, the Bolshevik Moscow Committee urged the workers in the Moscow area to return to work temporarily and prepare and organize themselves for the next general strike which was to turn into the final decisive struggle of the proletariat for the fulfillment of its political and economic demands. 18

The Great October Strike was over. It had been something the Bolsheviks had desired and agitated for but certainly they were neither its sole nor main instigators. Other parties had been agitating for a general strike also, but more important factors were the general condition of the working class, the

17Pankratov, Pervaja Russkaia Revoliutsiia, p. 134.
18Ibid. p. 135.
widespread unrest of 1905, the disgraceful behavior of the government on "Bloody Sunday," and defeat in the Far East. As far as revolutionaries of all parties were concerned, the Great October Strike had been a partial success. It resulted in the limitation of the autocracy. It had made the proleteriat more politically minded. It had established a revolutionary power in the capital—the Soviet—and many lesser revolutionary bodies, such as the Moscow Strike Committee, which were to provide bases for the construction of future soviets. Finally, it in itself was a revolutionary weapon which other European socialist parties later used either actually or as a threat. However, as far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, the strike was also largely a failure. The tsarist government was still standing. At least the Bolsheviks could take a little comfort in that their tactical principle had been proven correct: the government could not be overthrown by a general strike alone; the government could only be destroyed by means of a general armed uprising.

The failure to convert the general strike into a revolution proved that the Bolsheviks were not anywhere near being prepared to lead an armed uprising. The strike was over and a great opportunity had passed by but perhaps there was still time to achieve something. Lenin believed that the point of balance had now been reached. Many of the military units were considered unreliable. The autocracy had betrayed its lack of confidence in its own power by retreating before the anger of the people and granting a constitution. A great victory had been won but it was only the first step. Russia did not yet have a democratic republic or even a responsible ministry. The proletariat had to press further, to organize a workers' militia, to gain the support of the soldiers, to overthrow the autocracy and thus spark a general European socialist revolution which would establish socialism throughout all Europe, including
Throughout 1905 Lenin had spent much of his spare time in the Geneva library studying the works of Cluseret, the leader of the French "Communards" in 1871, on street fighting. While news of disorders and uprisings in Russia reached Switzerland, Lenin longed to be at the scene of events. If he could not be present, he would at least send advice to his embattled comrades. Apparently he became well-versed in revolutionary tactics. The advice he sent to the Bolsheviks in Russia was sound. He urged them to arm themselves with anything they could get hold of including rope, Keroseve, and even nails to slow down the charging cavalry. Leaders were to be elected and the necessary preparations for an effective struggle made: the organization of headquarters, the prearrangement of secret signals for communication, the reconnaissance of primary targets such as banks and police stations as well as secret escape routes. He urged each Bolshevik committee to organize small combat detachments of three, five, or even thirty men each. It was not necessary that these men should be social-Democrats as long as they were sincere revolutionaries. Of course, these units could not be successful without the preparation of the men themselves for their tasks. Training was to be carried out on the theoretical level by reading historical literature on revolts in other European cities as well as by lectures presented by ex-soldiers. More important, the men were to obtain practical experience by attacking individual policemen, raiding banks and police stations, and clashing with the Black Hundreds. No definite deadline was set for the armed uprising, but Lenin did warn against a premature revolt and expressed his opinion that it would be best to delay the

---


20 Ibid. IX, pp. 244-246, 420-424.
uprising until the coming spring when the most dissatisfied segment of the army would return from Manchuria. 21

Though there was no date set for the armed uprising, the Bolsheviks intensified their preparations for it lest the masses rise in a spontaneous and uncoordinated effort before the Bolsheviks were ready. In St. Petersburg the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee worked together. More party members and sympathizers were organized into combat units in every district. Each unit had about ten men and was headed by a "desiatnik" who was under the command of one of the party's district organizers. It is impossible to tell how many Bolsheviks were organized in such detachments but there were enough to provide a deterrent against attack on the workers' meetings by the Black Hundreds. Rifles and revolvers were distributed among the men and they practiced using them by hunting outside of town or firing a few quick shots in the parks at night. There was always a shortage of firearms, however, and many workers resorted to improvising daggers, pikes, and other homemade weapons within the plants themselves. The technical department of the Central Committee meanwhile, managed the aspects of an uprising which could not be handled on the district level. M. Litvinov was in charge of smuggling weapons from Germany and Austria into Russia. Ammunition was often obtained from the revolutionary cells within the army in exchange for party literature. A member of the Central Committee, Leonid Krasin, took on the task of manufacturing, testing and storing bombs. The university students in St. Petersburg also built up a combat force composed of all classes of revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks among them saw no point in not participating in this organization with the Mensheviks.

and Socialist-Revolutionaries. They all agreed on the necessity of an armed uprising and a revolutionary provisional government. Not only was the student organization an ally of the Bolshevik fighting units, but it also gave them access to the university’s laboratories to make bombs.

The money for this general arming came from various sources. Bolshevik orators collected contributions from the workers at factory and street gatherings. Political clubs which were looser forms of workers’ discussion circles yielded additional funds. Maxim Gorkii used his popularity and influence among the rich to obtain contributions. Apparently he was very successful for even wealthy industrialists such as the two Moscow factory owners, Schmidt and Morozov, contributed large sums of money to the Bolsheviks. Yet, the Bolsheviks were always short of funds. Weapons were costly but they were not the party’s only expense. The party presses needed printing equipment, paper, and ink. Apartments had to be rented to hold meetings and store arms and literature. Furthermore, few of the Bolsheviks could support themselves by even part-time work. It is difficult for fugitives and revolutionaries to find work in a police state.

The Moscow Bolsheviks worked even harder to prepare for the armed uprising. Around the time of the October Manifest, the Bolshevik combat organization numbered only 250 men, armed for the most part, by bad revolvers and low quality bombs. After Bauman’s murder on October 13, the Moscow Bolsheviks realized the weakness of their combat organization and accelerated their efforts to build a real revolutionary army. The organization of the combat force was

---

similar to that of the St. Petersburg organization with its "desiatniki" and district organizers. It seems that volunteers were screened more strictly, however, for it was required that every member be well known and recommended by a party organization as a determined revolutionary. These most disciplined and adept at handling weapons were admitted into the active companies while the rest were members of the reserve. Strict discipline was maintained in the obedience of orders, disposal of arms, and expenditure of ammunition. The members were constantly impressed with the fact that it was their immediate duty to protect the party from attacks by the police and Black Hundreds and that their ultimate duty was to lead the proletariat in its final struggle against the autocracy.

Much time was devoted to the training of the men for their duties. Ex-soldiers organized nightly target practice in basements and schools where the sound of the shots could be muffled. Instructors held lectures on street-fighting tactics used by western European workers in the revolutions of 1848 and the defence of Paris in 1871. Stations and escape routes for revolutionary steffs and snipers were picked out and plans for lines of barricades were drawn up. Bomb laboratories were set up. Political meetings were held more frequently to obtain more contributions from the workers. A gift of 20,000 rubles by Schmidt, the great furniture manufacturer, toward the end of 1905 was also very welcome.

In addition to all this training and preparation, the Bolsheviks gained first hand experience in small, isolated exploits against the Black Hundreds. Sometimes they broke up meetings of the Black Hundreds by shouts and gunfire,

\[23\] Vyshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, I, pp. 600-601.
but there were no serious clashes. More serious were the attacks on individual
policemen to rob them of their guns and passport books and attacks and burgl-
aries of small gunshops to obtain firearms.

Similar organizations were also built up in the suburbs of Moscow, and
with the development of Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and anarchist,
and non-party combat organizations, the Moscow area rivalled St. Petersburg
as the revolutionary center of the Empire. Yet mistakes in the training and
organization of these units left serious weaknesses in the structure and effi-
ciency of these combat groups which would only become apparent in the heat of
battle. V. Kostitsyn, one of the Moscow Committee's organizers, complained
that while combat units were organized on the basis of the area in which they
operated, they also accepted volunteers from other sections of the city. When
the shooting started, these men would be more anxious to defend their own
neighborhoods than the ones they were assigned to. Even more serious a defect
was that the leaders themselves were inexperienced. The party's organizers
were essentially political agitators who had themselves never had any experi-
ence in actually leading an armed uprising. The instructors, who were usually
ex-soldiers, had been trained for fighting in the countryside, in the field
or on rugged terrain, but not for street fighting in a large urban area. When
the actual clash came, these shortcomings would cost the Bolsheviks dearly.

24 V. Nevskii, (ed.) Dekabr' 1905 na Krasnoi Presne (Moscow, Agitprop-
Otdel, Krasno-Presenskogo B'ekoma, RKPB, 1926) V. Kostitsyn, "Dekabrskoe
Vosstanie 1905 goda" pp. 21-30. M. Sidorov, "Vospominaniia Druzhinika F--ki
Schmidt'a," 117-121. N. Korolev (Batyshchev) "Na Brestskoi Zheleznoi Doroge

25 V. Kostitsyn, "Dekabrskoe Vosstanie 1905 goda" Nevskii, Dekabr' 1905
na Krasnoi Presne, pp. 120-121.
Similar combat organizations were being built up in most of the industrial centers of the Empire by all revolutionary parties including the Bolsheviks. The strength of the Bolshevik organizations varied with the size of the local population and the influence the Bolsheviks exerted on it. Nizhni Novgorod with its 300 armed Bolsheviks had an even larger organization than even the Moscow Committee. In a town like Voronezh where they had less influence, the Bolsheviks could only arm seventy or eighty men. Even more important than numbers, the fighting efficiency of the various centers varied with the initiative of the local Bolshevik leadership and the availability of money and arms. These differences, however, would only become really apparent once the fighting had started.

Despite their extensive preparations for the final armed uprising, the Bolsheviks managed to arm and organize a very small portion of the urban working class. What the Bolsheviks always aimed for, however, was a mass rising led by themselves—not a coup executed by a conspiratorial minority. How could the support of the masses be obtained? The obvious answer would seem to have been the soviets which could be the basis of a workers' revolutionary organization. Yet, many Bolsheviks mistrusted the soviet as an organ of revolutionary government. Though soviets had their uses on such occasions as political strikes, the Bolsheviks did not think them capable of assuming political leadership because they were non-party institutions which would not necessarily adhere to the Social-Democratic program. Therefore, the Bolshevik attitude toward the Soviets in general was not only one of mistrust, but downright hostility. B.M. Kruniants-Radin, one of the two Bolsheviks in

\[26\]

Bystrikh, Bolshevikskie Organizatsii Urala, p. 176.
the St. Petersburg executive committee, feared that if the Soviet was not used
to propagate the party's ideas, the Soviet might turn out to be the germ of
an "independent labor party" as opposed to socialism. Many of the Bolsheviks
in St. Petersburg looked upon the Soviet as little more than a strike commit-
tee which, once the general strike was over, had outlived its purpose and be-
come more of a nuisance than an asset. They were mainly concerned with the
question of whether they should boycott the Soviet or join it ad "explode" it
from within. Whatever the tactics to be used, most Bolsheviks agreed that the
St. Petersburg Soviet had become "unnecessary" and that it should leave the
political leadership of the proletariat to the Social-Democratic Party and
accept its lead and party program or dissolve. 27

The attitude of the Central Committee toward the Soviet is probably best
expressed in the Central Committees "Letter to all Party Organizations" of
October 27. The Central Committee instructed Social-Democratic participants
in all soviets or similar organizations to invite the soviets to adopt the
program of the Social-Democratic Party and accept its leadership, and ultim-
ately to dissolve into it. If the soviet refused to accept the program of
the party, the Bolsheviks were to leave and expose the antiproletarian nature
of such an organization. If the soviet refused to accept the entire party pro-
gram but reserved its right to decide on every individual political issue as
it came up, the Bolshevik deputies could stay in the soviet but had to expose
the "absurdity" of such political leadership. 28

27 Schwarz, The Russian Revolution of 1905, pp. 179-185. Schwarz's
chapter "The Soviets of Workers' Deputies" pp. 157-93, is a detailed survey
of the Bolshevik and Menshevik attitudes toward the soviets.

godu." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, April, 1925, p. 90.
Following these instructions, the Bolsheviks in the St. Petersburg Soviet proposed that the Soviet accept the Social-Democratic program or disband, arguing that such a vague, political amalgam as the Soviet could not be the political leader of the working class. The Socialist Revolutionaries in the Soviet immediately objected that the Soviet was supposed to represent the entire proletariat and could not be attached to any one party since the Social-Democratic party was not the sole representative of all working people. Had this proposal by the Bolshevik minority been put to a vote, it might have destroyed the Soviet, but fortunately for that organization, the question was shelved.

Lenin himself had a somewhat different attitude toward the soviets. Previously, he had always feared that such non-party organizations as trade unions might lead the proletariat astray from its revolutionary path and believed that the party must either infiltrate and control such organizations or destroy them. However, he saw the soviets in a different light. To carry out a successful revolution both the party and the soviets were necessary. The soviet could serve as the instrument of the proletariat and all people opposed to the autocracy. It should proclaim itself and take over the duties of a revolutionary government and serve as the central organization of the revolutionary soldiers and sailors, the peasant committees, the armed proletariat, the revolutionary democrats, and intelligentsia. As long as the party maintained its independence of action, there was no reason why the non-socialist revolutionaries should be alienated. Nor would the leadership of the soviet be a weak coalition. The soviets had functioned well so far.

despite their multi-party character. Besides, all revolutionary elements would be united in the struggle for full civil liberty, the eight-hour day, and the transference of all the land to the peasants, without much disagreement.\footnote{30} 

Most Bolsheviks, however, were not as liberal in their views of the soviets as Lenin and believed the sole justification of their existence was that they could be used as instruments of the party. Lenin's letter expressing his views on the soviets, which was addressed to the editorial board of the new Bolshevik newspaper in Russia, \textit{Novaia Zhizn}, was not printed until two decades later. In towns like Kolomna and Kostroma, in the north-central industrial region, and Motovilikh and Ufa, in the Urals, where Bolshevik influence was so predominant that they could easily control the soviet workers to accept the leadership of the party, the Bolsheviks readily agitated and helped the workers to organize soviets.

In Moscow, where other parties also had a sizable influence, the overbearing attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the soviets became more apparent. Since the Moscow Bolsheviks and Mensheviks shared the same views regarding the armed uprising against the Tsar and the falsity of the Duma, the Bolshevik Moscow Committee and the Menshevik Moscow Group united in a Federative Soviet which was actually a local party council and not to be confused with a workers' soviet. This Federative Soviet issued joint leaflets and organized gatherings at which Bolshevik and Menshevik orators condemned the October Manifest, condemned the liberals for betraying the revolution, and called on the workers to organize and arm themselves for the coming uprising. Both

factions in the Federative Soviet condemned the Moscow Strike Committee because it included professionals, store keepers, and even government employees along with the factory workers. In place of the Strike Committee, the Federative Soviet urged the workers to form a soviet composed exclusively of the proletarian workers of the Moscow area. During November, several district soviets were organized in Moscow. The Strike Committee was eventually dissolved by the combined efforts of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and on November 22, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, modelled on the St. Petersburg Soviet and having one delegate for every 400 workers represented was organized, was founded. The Moscow Soviet began its activity by declaring its support of all the present strikes in the city with funds and a sympathy boycott of all enterprises involved in the strikes. Eventually, however, the Moscow Soviet called on all workers to refrain from initiating scattered and isolated strikes and to prepare for a new general strike.31

It seems, however, that the Bolsheviks were not very enthusiastic about the organization of the district or city soviets and tried to make them mere party tools wherever possible. M.I. Vasil'ev-Iuzhin, one of the Bolshevik representatives in the executive committee of the Moscow Soviet, was not very interested in the Soviet because he thought the political leadership of the proletariat belonged to the Social-Democratic party rather than non-partisan organizations.32 The Bolshevik aversion to independent action by the soviets became even more apparent in their behavior toward the district soviets. In


32M.I. Vasil'ev Iuzhin, "Moskovskii Soviet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905 godu." Proletariiskaia Revoliutsiia, April, 1925, p. 89.
the Presnia District Soviet, for instance, the Bolsheviks argued that the proletariat was a single class which should have a single party in its struggle against Tsarism. Unless the soviets did not openly recognize and accept the program and leadership of the Social-Democratic Party, they would become a "non-party party" and therefore a dangerous rival to the Social-Democratic Party. The Mensheviks protested that the Social-Democratic propaganda but that such a blunt demand of the formal recognition of Social-Democratic leadership would only alienate a sizable portion of the workers, especially those under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks, however, were unmoved by such arguments. The Conference of most of the Bolshevik northern committees, held on November 21-23, adopted the following resolution regarding the soviets.

Soviets of workers' deputies need only be created where the organization cannot direct the proletariat's mass action in any other way or where it is necessary to detach masses that have fallen under the influence of bourgeois parties. The Soviet of Workers' deputies must be the party's technical apparatus for carrying the RSDRP's political leadership to the masses. Therefore, it is necessary to seize control of it and to persuade it to recognize the program and the political leadership of the RSDRP. 

In Nizhni Novgorod (today Gorkii) the Bolsheviks managed to organize the rudiments of a popular revolutionary government which would always be under their control, and therefore, succeeded in bypassing the organization of a soviet. In keeping with Lenin's exhortations to make the Social-Democratic Party a mass organization by allowing more workers into the party, the local Bolsheviks held mass meetings in which workers were encouraged to dis-

---

33 Gervi, Vospominaniia Sotsial-Demokrata, p. 603.
34 Vysshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, I, p. 23.
cuss and vote on party affairs. At many of these meetings a "Peoples' Court" was held to settle differences among the citizens by a vote rather than by resorting to the regular courts of the government. A popular militia, made up of all classes, was also organized to protect the city against pogroms. Though this was not a strictly proletarian fighting organization, it was a force which included the proletariat and had several Bolshevik organizers within its command. In Kazan, the Bolsheviks participated in a rudimentary provisional government. On October 20, a large crowd of citizens of all classes and parties marched on the town duma disarming policemen along the way. Once there, they organized a peoples' militia and town commune in which all revolutionary parties participated. There was much rivalry between Damperov, the Bolshevik leader of the militia, and the liberals for the control of the combat detachments. The armed workers, meanwhile, aggravated the situation by seizing the town's printshops and publishing workers' papers. It would have been interesting to see the outcome of the Bolshevik-liberal rivalry in this rudimentary provisional government, but it was very short-lived. On October 26, a force including Cossacks, police, and Black Hundreds surrounded the duma hall where the commune was meeting, arrested the leading revolutionaries, including most of the Bolsheviks, and subjected the town to a three-day orgy of looting and killing. In both Nizhni Novgorod and Kazan would have preferred to have had the sole leadership revolutionary movement, but they realized how pitifully small their forces were and that they could have no hope of overthrowing the government without the alliance with non-

36 Khammatov, Kazanskaia Organizatsiia Bolshevikov, pp. 68-80.
proletarian elements. Therefore, they entered soviets and multi-party provisional governments to direct the energy of all the people against the government. How much state authority a soviet could usurp depended on the daring of the revolutionary leaders and the unrest of the local population as well as on the strength of the local authorities. The Bolshevik-dominated Mотовилов совет in the Urals expelled the police from its place of meeting, carried on collective bargaining for all the workers in the town, took over the administration of the local hospital, and collected money for weapons. However, the largest and most powerful soviets sprang up in the Ukraine and the Caucasus where the Mensheviks predominated. The Mensheviks did not share the Bolsheviks' mistrust of the soviets and were therefore more ready to aid the workers in building up such organizations. Nor was the Menshevik leadership in the soviets squeamish about seizing local government or leading an armed uprising as Bolshevik historians have claimed. The Odessa Mensheviks had already been engaged in several battles against troops and police even before the October Manifest was issued. In Kharkov, a general strike was enforced by a workers' militia which forcibly closed shops. Peoples' Courts were founded and a soviet of doctors and hospital employees took over the administration of the local hospital. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, the Mensheviks unhesitatingly resorted to violence to seize governmental powers. In western Georgia, the peasant guerillas, known as the Red Hundreds were very much under the influence of the Mensheviks. They attacked the police

and even Cossacks. Government officials and prominent citizens were assassinated in a wave of terror much more systematic than the isolated assassinations perpetrated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Where the Red Hundreds were victorious, they seized the railroad stations, took over the town administration, formed peoples' courts and passed sentences, and emptied the government buildings of arms and money. Towns like Poti, when they were taken over by the Red Hundreds or affiliated organizations, temporarily came under a red dictatorship. The Bolsheviks were certainly not the only party willing to resort to violence to overthrow the government.

No matter how well organized the soviets were, there could be little hope of victory without the support of the army. Hoping to combine the strength of the local garrisons with those of the soviets, the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties intensified their agitation in military units. The Bolsheviks concentrated especially on sailors, artillery-men, sappers, and railroad troops whose personnel was largely drawn from the industrial proletariat. In the course of 1905, the Bolsheviks found that political agitation appealed only to the minority of the men in the armed forces. To gain the support of the mass of the Empire's military personnel, they sought to take advantage of the soldiers' and sailors' prevailing disgust with the harsh discipline, bad living conditions, delay in demobilization, and the use of garrison troops to restore order. Organizers within the military units encouraged meetings at which agitators formulated complaints to the officers, denounced the Tsar, and called for a constituent assembly. Most frequently the soldiers demanded a two-year term of service, an immediate demobilization

\[39\text{Ibid. III, pp. 800-811.}\]
of the reservists, better food and clothing, better treatment by their officers, more frequent furloughs, the right to assemble and discuss their needs within their barracks, the right to read what they wished, amnesty for all soldiers undergoing punishment for previous disciplinary offences, and that they no longer be used to restore order against their own people. Sometimes, at the instigation of revolutionary agitators they would include the demand for a constituent assembly. By uniting the demands of the politically conscious minority with that of the merely dissatisfied minority, the Bolsheviks hoped to build up a massive following within the army.

The Bolshevik activity in the Moscow garrison and its results were fairly typical of Bolshevik efforts in other Russian garrisons. After the October Manifest, revolutionary cells within the army organized an increasing number of company and battalion meetings. The main themes of the agitation dealt with the incompetence and corruption of the bureaucracy which had lost the war, the hardships of Russian military service, and the injustice of forcing soldiers to shoot at their own people to uphold the tsarist government. Outside the barracks, workers and agitators fraternized with the soldiers, conversing with them or inviting them to workers' meetings. Toward the end of November, some of the sappers in the Moscow garrison decided to present their officers with demands to better the condition of the rank and file. If these demands were not satisfied, they planned to arrest their officers, seize the regimental store of arms, and the telegraph, and call the other units of the garrison to join them. On November 26 and 27 the sappers and 300 men of the Nesvizhski and Perenovski regiments held armed demonstrations outside the barracks. Had they been quickly joined by the city proletariat, there might have been an armed uprising. However, before the workers could join the
soldiers in an armed disturbance, the officers quickly satisfied some of the soldiers' demands. Most of the men were not interested in staging a revolution and when their demands were partially satisfied, they first hesitated and then returned to duty.

A similar demonstration took place in Kiev on November 17, but again, the workers were not prepared. A great crowd of workers did join the sappers' demonstration in the Jewish Market and for awhile there was much shooting and disorder. The workers, however, were unarmed and loyal troops soon scattered the demonstration by opening fire on it.

One of the grossest examples of lack of cooperation between the proletariat and the army occurred in Voronezh on November 18. A disciplinary battalion rioted against their officers protesting the rotten food they were receiving. When the local Bolsheviks learned of the disorder they were totally unprepared to take any action. Apparently they had neglected to form any connection within the garrison and did not have the slightest inkling that trouble was brewing. By the time they sent a few men over to investigate and gathered a force of armed workers, the disturbance within the barracks had been crushed and there was nothing for the workers to do but return to town.

The Bolshevik effort to win the army over to the revolutionary cause was not a total failure, however. Along the Trans-Siberian railroad they succeeded in forming large soldiers' organizations which closely cooperated with the railroad workers. In Krasnoiarsk, the soldiers frequently joined workers' demonstrations carrying weapons and red flags and shouting Social-Democratic slogans. In Irkutsk, many of the soldiers went on strike and elected a committee

---

41 Vyshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, III, pp. 218-265.
42 Shaurov, 1905 god, pp. 56-61.
partially composed of officers. The Bolsheviks opposed the inclusion of officers in this committee because they considered them to be bourgeois and rightly feared that they would exert a moderating influence on the men. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-party soldiers, however, did not object to the presence of officers, many of whom they still respected, and disregarded the Bolsheviks in this matter. In Chita, the junction of the railroads leading to Vladivostok and Harbin, the Bolsheviks had their greatest success. On November 22, a Soviet of Soldiers and Cossacks was formed not so much through the influence of the revolutionary cells within the army but of participation in workers' meetings and the oratory of local Bolshevik agitators such as V.V. Kurnatovskii. The Soviet readily declared its acceptance of the Social-Democratic leadership and the solidarity of the soldiers with the proletariat. On November 26, this organization did combine with the workers in the town and formed the Combined Committee. To have started a general strike along the railroad would have harmed the welfare of the army in Manchuria and alienated it from the revolution. Therefore, the soldiers and workers decided to seize control of the railroad themselves and arrange for the speedy transportation of the Far Eastern army back to European Russia. In the meantime, the soldiers seized some of the railroad cars on the sidings and distributed 800 rifles among the workers, thus leaving the regular city government powerless.

Strangely enough, where the Bolsheviks hoped to have the most success—within the defeated army in Manchuria—there was no rising or soldiers' soviet. In Harbin, Manchuria, a Menshevik Harbin Committee and a Bolshevik Harbin Group

both carried out oral agitation and distributed leaflets urging the soldiers to return home to protect their families against the Tsar and telling them it would be necessary to seize the railroad to get out of Manchuria from where the Tsar feared to bring them back. The only disturbances caused by the soldiers were temporary strikes and enough reliable troops were left to crush the revolutionary movement in Siberia in the next two months. It seems that an army on the field is much more loyal and conservative than units on garrison duty.

The Bolsheviks were not more successful in the navy. At Kronstadt, the island fortress guarding St. Petersburg, the cells among the sailors and the garrison's artillery-men intensified their activity after the October Manifest and agitated for a democratic republic. However, the membership of the Social-Democratic circles remained small, totaling about ninety men and its influence was diluted in a sea of Socialist-Revolutionary and non-party sentiment. In spite of this, the Bolsheviks hoped that their organization would grow and lead a well-planned revolution in connection with the St. Petersburg proletariat. However, before the Bolshevik organization could be enlarged, outside factors increased the ferment in Kronstadt. Many of the sailors had been kept on duty beyond their term of duty. During the entire war they had been occupied with garrison duty while news of defeats in the Far East and the mutiny in Sevastopol caused seething unrest. On October 26, the dissatisfaction became open when many sailors and artillery-men held an armed demonstration through the streets of Kronstadt demanding a constituent assembly, the reduction of the term of duty for seamen from seven to four years, civil rights for all, and the right to be educated in one's native language. When on the next day they

Ibid. p. 530-533.
were joined by civilian workers, living in Kronstadt, and agitators, the
demonstration got out of hand. Sailors and hooligans raided several shops
and the public library, killing a few people in the process. This was no
organized uprising but an outburst of vandalism which the small Bolshevik
organization could neither control nor make use of.45

A better organized uprising took place again in Sevastopol. Sailors,
garrison troops, and Sevastopol workers held frequent meetings together and
separately in their own ships, barracks, and warehouses. Soviets were organ-
ized by many of the crews and there was much talk of the necessity of the
improvement of conditions in the navy to gain the support of the mass of
non-political members of the crews and garrisons. Again, the Social-Democrats
lost control of the situation before an organized uprising could be organized.
Lieutenant P.M. Schmidt, commander of the Ochakov, was himself a revolutionary
liberal and urged the Bolsheviks to call off the disorders in the fleet and
wait for the liberal Union of Unions to start the all-Russian revolution in
Moscow. When most of the sailors' deputies refused to listen, Schmidt agreed
to help them by staging a night raid and kidnapping all the fleet officers.
However, he was only able to take over the Ochakov and three mine layers.
Furthermore, he failed to capture many of the officers. The crew of the
Panteleimon (which was actually the Potemkin renamed to erase its shame)
attempted to take over the ship as it had been taken in June. Though they
raised the red flag, the officers and the loyal portion of the crew managed to
restore order. Similarly, on the other ships, the crews hesitated before the
prospect of mutiny and were still too disorganized to stage a coup against

45 Vyshii Pod'om Revoliutsii, II, pp. 191-227.
their officers. The Sevastopol garrison which had promised the sailors not to fire at the fleet if it mutinied, finally submitted to their officers and opened fire on the Ochakov setting it on fire and ending the mutiny on November 17, after six days of great unrest and disorder in the port. It seemed that the great enemy, spontaneity, stalked all Bolshevik efforts to organize the revolution.

The Bolsheviks' campaign to organize and unite the mass of the Russian population, the peasantry, to the proletarian movement similarly failed. At first the outlook seemed favorable. There was plenty of revolutionary feeling among the peasantry. When the October Manifest was issued the first reaction of the peasants was, "What? Nothing about the land?" Seeing that the October Manifest only brought on an increase in the disorder in the countryside, the Tsar issued a special decree for the peasants on November 3, reducing and gradually abolishing all payments collected by the state to compensate the landowners for the loss of their serfs' lands in 1861 and establishing land banks which provided cheap loans to peasants who wanted to acquire more land. The Bolsheviks quickly launched a campaign against this decree lest the peasants should be partially satisfied by it and become more conciliatory toward the landlords and the government. They urged all the peasants to stop all payments immediately instead of complying with the gradual reduction of payments since, in the past forty years, the peasants had paid more than the lands were worth. The land bank was denounced as a means of making the rich peasantry even richer while driving the poorer peasants further into debt. Finally, the peasants were reminded that the Tsar sought only to protect the

large landowners by quieting peasant unrest with promises while the November 3 decree did not give a bit of land to the peasants. 47

The Bolsheviks had little trouble in keeping up the revolutionary ardor of the peasantry since, after all, they had plenty of help from the Socialist Revolutionaries in that respect. But this was not enough. For a successful revolution, organization was needed. Special groups of Bolshevik organizers were sent out from towns to organize revolutionary peasant committees in the villages. In some cases they succeeded. Even a few days before the announcement of the October Manifest, the peasants of Nikolaevski in the Saratov province organized a "Revolutionary Peasants' Committee" to replace the regular government officials with elected officials, destroy the government records, abolish government taxes and replace them with a progressive income tax, organize an armed militia, requisition stores of bread from the nearby estates and confiscate all estate lands without compensation. Soon after the proclamation of the October Manifest, the villagers of Nikolaevski, joined by the villagers of Marevka, began to carry this program out. On October 20, an armed band moved into town and seized all the government offices including the post and telegraph offices and the wine shop. After confiscating all the money and arms they could find in these offices, the villagers installed their own committee there and began the confiscation of nearby private stores of bread. 48 In the nearby Samara province, the villagers of Staro-Zulansk even went so far as to draft their own constitution. The regular government was replaced by a peoples' congress and a popularly elected executive board. Under direct popular control, the executive board was responsible for the

47 Vysshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, I, pp. 823-825.
48 Shuygin, Bolshevistskii Organizatsii Srednei Povolzha, pp. 196-198.
protection of the village against the regular government, the collection and dispensation of revenues, and education in the village. The land was declared to be at the disposal of the community and available to those who could use it productively, though it could be taken away from them if they used it irresponsibly. The final settlement of the land question, however, was left to the future constituent assembly. Finally, peoples' courts were established and all officials, including teachers and militia officers were elected. These and other such popular governments were quickly destroyed when the army returned to restore order but they did represent the Bolshevik ideal of a revolutionary peasant committee.

Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, these instances of peasant revolutionary were rare exceptions rather than the rule in the Russian countryside. Instead of a well-organized revolution by self-governing communities, November of 1905 saw a wave of violence sweep across most of the rural areas of Russia. The more moderate instances of lawbreaking were the cutting of wood and grazing of animals on estate lands without the payment of a fee, the stealing of grain and hay, the threatening of agricultural laborers who remained at work, and the evasion of taxes. However, most regions were beset by more violent manifestations of peasant discontent. Assaults at agricultural day-laborers that remained at work, the wrecking of farm machinery, the theft of livestock, grain, hay, and food stores, the looting of manor houses, the destruction of entire estates, the beating and expulsion of village elders and police chiefs, the clashes with police and Cossacks, which defended the estates, and even murder became widespread in the Baltic region, central Russia, the northern

Ukraine, the Volga region, the Urals, and, of course, Georgia. Even in the
Baltic region, where numerous villages had established self-government peace-
fully, there was a wave of violence in November. In that one month, 230
estates were destroyed in Lithuania, 229 in Courland, and 197 in Estonia.\(^5^0\)

Two centers of the greatest violence were the Saratov province on the middle
Volga and the Chernigov province in the northern Ukraine. In the Saratov
province alone, about 300 estates were levelled during November.\(^5^1\) Chernigov
remained quiet during November, but in December there was a rash of clashes
between peasants and Cossacks. In western Georgia, peasant guerrilla warfare
reached a new peak. Late in October, the Red Hundreds ambushed a Cossack
prison detail inflicting seventy casualties on the Cossacks.\(^5^2\) Bolshevik
agitators calling for the organization of revolutionary peasant committees
were lost in a sea of non-party agitators including doctors, agronomists, and
even priests, calling for attacks on the government and the landlords, but
gave no definite revolutionary directives. Socialist-Revolutionaries set an
example of widespread terrorism against government officials, but, according
to the Bolsheviks, they did not preach the actual overthrow of the tsarist
government or the establishment of a democratic republic. Peasant unions
accepted resolutions approving the seizure of land by the peasantry but said
nothing definite about the overthrow of the Tsar. Some Socialist-Revolution-
aries stirred up disorganized violence among the peasants by travelling around
the countryside in generals' uniforms and telling the peasants that the Tsar

\(^5^0\) Iakovlev, Vooruzhenie Vosstaniiia, pp. 410-411.

\(^5^1\) Vyshshii Pod' em Revoliutsii. II, pp. 771-773.

\(^5^2\) Akhun, Boevaia Deiatelnost, p. 50.
had given them the land but needed the help of his loyal subjects to seize it from the landlords. Such methods did stir the peasants to violence but not to revolution against the tsarist government. In fact, most of the peasant violence was motivated not by a desire to overthrow the government but by the prospect of personal gain or revenge—in short, crime. Instances of cooperation with the proletariat, such as the bringing of food to strikers in urban areas were rare. Indiscriminate murders were more common, as, for instance, six agitators of revolutionary parties were killed by the peasants themselves in the Saratov province during November of 1905. During that same month, Vladimir Voitinskii, a Bolshevik agitator operating in the village of Chorino, near St. Petersburg, found the peasants to be in a violent mood but unwilling to reject God or the Tsar. They were very unresponsive to his message and he was only rescued by tsarist troops while the peasants were attempting to blind him with a splinter.

The agrarian revolts of 1905, therefore, constituted more of a crime wave than a revolution and were of little help to the urban revolutionary movement. Order was temporarily restored in December, but in 1906, the Empire was swept by even more serious peasant revolts. However, these also came to nothing. The lack of organized cooperation between the peasants and the urban proletariat was one of the main causes of the failure of the revolution of 1905.

While the Bolsheviks were occupied in infiltrating soviets, encouraging the organization of peasant committees, agitating the soldiers, and, in general, preparing for the armed uprising, the Menshevik-dominated St. Peters-

---

53 Vysshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, II, p. 773.
54 Woytinsky, Stormy Passage, pp. 73-80.
burg Soviet was pushing the workers and the government toward a collision between themselves. Early in November the workers began implementing the eight hour day by revolutionary means, which meant that they just dropped their work after eight hours. Many of the Soviet's deputies, and especially the Bolsheviks hesitated to begin a struggle against the capitalists before they had gotten rid of the tsarist government. The spontaneous pressure of the workers for a struggle to better their economic condition, however, was so strong, that no elected body could oppose it and retain the support of the workers. Consequently, against the better judgement of most of the deputies, the Soviet decreed the eight-hour day in St. Petersburg. Moreover, prestige and sympathy forced the Soviet into additional economic struggles against the St. Petersburg industrialists. On November 2, a political strike was called to protest the government's treatment of the mutineers in Kronstadt and the establishment of martial law in Warsaw. The strike involved some 115,000 workers but it soon died out and had to be called off on November 7. On November 16, the St. Petersburg Soviet again became involved in a strike movement when it declared its support of the All-Russian Post and Telegraph strike though the strike had been initiated without preliminary consultation with the Soviet and came too soon after the political strike in St. Petersburg which had ended on November 7. Many in the Soviet, especially Trotsky realized that too frequent use of the general strike cheapened it as a political weapon and weakened the proletariat for its final struggle against the government.

In addition to the political strike, the Soviet had other means of

---

56 Vysshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, T. 345-388.
resisting government authority. It exercised an effective resistance to the limited government censorship which remained after October 17. Printers were ordered to strike against all papers conforming to the government's censorship laws and the workers were all called on to boycott such papers. In the meantime, the workers printed the Soviet's "Bulletin" without government interference.

Nor was the Soviet uninterested in revolution and absorbed in an economic struggle against the St. Petersburg industrialists as most Communist historians have maintained. As a whole, the Soviet recognized the eventual need and inevitability of an armed uprising. Throughout its existence it aimed to organize and arm the workers by collecting arms and money and calling on all the workers to make their own weapons of cold steel. Some success was achieved. Several hundred revolvers were distributed among the Soviet's deputies for their own protection while about 6,000 workers did manage to arm themselves with homemade pikes and bludgeons. However, the St. Petersburg workers were certainly not so well armed that they could hope to successfully overthrow the government. As the strike movement dragged on, contributions for weapons were reduced to a trickle and it became evident that the workers could hope to revolt successfully only with the support of rebellious army units.

If Trotsky and many other deputies opposed an armed uprising at the time, it was not that they were anti-revolutionary but that they were realistic.

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were not idle. More factory and street gatherings were held. New political clubs were opened. Taking advantage of the new liberties, granted with the October Manifest, the Bolsheviks began publishing

---

57 G. Khrustalev-Nosar', "Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov (do 26 Nojabria 1905 goda.)" Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov, pp. 91-98.
their first legal newspaper, Novaia Zhizn (New Life), under the editorship of Maxim Gorkii, Leonid Krasin, and Maxim Litvinov. The general format of Novaia Zhizn was similar to that of Vpered and Proletaryii: leading articles on current events and condemnations of the government or other parties; decisions of the Central Committee; telegrams of disturbances in other towns in Russia; correspondence of party members and workers relating their experiences in their work or the social conditions of the working peasants, and soldiers in their localities; and even some articles on the arts.58 When Lenin arrived from Switzerland to St. Petersburg by way of Sweden, Novaia Zhizn practically became the Bolsheviks' central organ. It was a great triumph for Lenin to be able to edit his paper in the capital of Russia and he soon set himself to the task of urging the enlargement of the Bolshevik organization by including more workers in the party and reaching some sort of arrangement with the Mensheviks. Lenin's first article in the new paper appeared on November 10, and called for the inclusion of more workers in the party to give it some needed bulk.

By this time he had lost his fear that the swelling of the party's ranks by any but the most devoted and ideologically pure members might dilute the strength of the party. He hoped that it would be the other way around—that the older party members might be able to educate the workers to a higher level of political consciousness if they were all in the same organization. Lenin's support of a mass membership and elected leadership did not mean the abandonment of a conspiratorial apparatus of the party, but that the Bolsheviks could operate on the legal as well as the illegal level. However, coming events

58 KISS, Bolshevikskaia Pechat' (Moscow, 1960) II, pp. 149-208.
prevented the implementation of Lenin's ideas in most branches of the party and it remained a substantially centralized and conspiratorial organization.

While both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in St. Petersburg grew more militant, neither the government nor the factory owners remained passive. The factory owners combatted the Soviet's campaign for an eight-hour day with a general lockout which did much to weaken the ardor and strength of the mass of St. Petersburg's industrial force. The government, meanwhile took more direct action against the Soviet. Annoyed by the Soviet's support of the Post and Telegraph operator's strike, which had begun on November 16, Count Witte, and the minister of the Interior, General Trepov, had the president of the Soviet, Khrustalev-Nosar', arrested. This step did not disorganize the Soviet for a "Presidium" composed of Trotsky, Zlidiev, a Menshevik, and the Bolshevik, Sverchkov was soon elected. The arrest of Khrustalev-Nosar' far from eased the situation but incited a furor within the Soviet against the government.

There was a brief argument in the Soviet. The Bolshevik delegates and many Mensheviks called for an immediate general strike. Trotsky, however, sided with the Socialist-Revolutionary deputies who opposed an immediate uprising at the time and feared that a general strike certainly would bring about a premature revolt. The workers were poorly armed and there was no sign of a military revolt. Trotsky therefore wisely proposed that such drastic action as a general strike or an armed uprising be postponed until a more favorable moment and hoped that the government might release Khrustalev-Nosar' anyway thus giving the Soviet a great moral victory without an immediate con-

No definite decision was yet taken on the question of an armed uprising, but on December 2, the Soviet retaliated against the government by issuing the "Financial Manifest" based on the idea of the Menshevik, Halphand (Parvus), that the government might be destroyed or very seriously weakened by bankruptcy. To prevent the government from paying the large war debt it had incurred against Japan and to paralyze it by depriving it of the revenue necessary to carry out its regular functions, the "Manifest" called on all the people to withhold taxes and all payments due to the government, demand that all wages be paid in gold, or coin for amounts of less than five rubles, and that everyone withdraw their deposits from government banks. The "Manifest" was signed by the Soviet and the central committees of the all-Russian Peasants' Union, the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and of the Polish Socialist Party. 61

The "Manifest" must certainly have touched the government in a sensitive spot, for on the next day, December 3, Trotsky, the rest of the Soviet's Presidium, and almost 250 deputies within the Soviet were arrested. What was left of the Soviet met a few days later and called for a general strike to start on December 8 as the beginning of a struggle for a constituent assembly, civil liberties, freedom of expression, the ending of martial law throughout the Empire, amnesty for all political prisoners, the transference of all the land to the people, and the eight-hour day. By December 9, 110,000 workers were on strike in St. Petersburg. There were numerous parades, demonstrations, revolutionary speeches, and isolated clashes with the police and Cossacks, but

nothing decisive could be done by the workers without the news of an important revolutionary victory elsewhere in Russia. The news of a victorious uprising in another important center never came, however. Tired by numerous demonstrations and strikes in November and lacking firearms, most of the workers gradually lost interest in the strike and by December 20, practically all of the workers of St. Petersburg were back at work.  

Lenin and most of the other Bolsheviks of the Central and St. Petersburg Committees, meanwhile, fled to Finland, where a Bolshevik conference was held at Tammenfors, December 12-17. The most important decisions reached were rather inconsequential as far as the revolutionary movement of 1905 was concerned. The decision to fuse the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organizational Committee in order to arrange a fourth party congress to reunite the two factions had importance for the next year, while the command to all local committees to prepare for an immediate armed uprising and to notify the Central Committee when they were ready came rather late to have any meaning. Other cities in the Empire were already rising against the government though St. Petersburg was to remain quiet for the rest of 1905.


63 Vysšii Pod’em Revoliutsii, I, pp. 28-32.
CHAPTER V
THE ARMED UPRISINGS

There would be no armed uprising in St. Petersburg in 1905, but many other Russian cities, especially Moscow, were to be the scene of clashes between the government and revolutionary forces. Rebellion among the garrison troops signalled the beginning of the conflict in Moscow. The scene of this beginning was the barracks of the Rostov regiment which made up part of the garrison in Moscow. This military unit was already riddled with dissatisfaction. It had been used to restore order in Sevastopol in November and this experience had disgusted many of the men with the government. Within the regiment were a Bolshevik, a Menshevik, and a Socialist-Revolutionary circle, each of which held frequent meetings, distributed revolutionary literature, and provoked the officers in taking frequent disciplinary measures. On December 2, at the instigation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, part of the regiment arrested three of its officers, forbade other officers to approach the barracks, and elected a twenty-man commission representing each company to act as the regimental executive commission. After taking possession of the regimental arsenal and food stores, the soldiers announced they would no longer carry out police duties against their own people, and demanded better treatment, abolition of the death penalty, amnesty for all political prisoners, freedom of discussion of soldiers' needs, and the shortening of military
service. The next day, an army soviet representing the Rostov regiment, the Cossacks and artillery-men, and units from six other regiments was organized. Civilian Bolshevik agitators also attended the meeting of the army soviet and urged cooperation and solidarity between the army and the proletariat. For their part, most of the soldiers promised they would not take any action against the workers if they revolted while some even promised to join and arm the workers if the Moscow Soviet called for a general strike and uprising.

That same day, December 3, the news of the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet arrived in Moscow and, of course, caused an outburst of indignation in the Moscow Soviet. With the garrison in revolt and the people in a revolutionary mood, the fifteen-member Bolshevik Moscow Committee thought it time to hold a conference and make a momentous decision on the question of a final armed uprising. On December 4, the Moscow Committee, representatives from the Central Committee, and heads of the army agitation in department and the combat staff met secretly in a rented apartment. The question on everyone's mind was, "Is this the right moment to begin the uprising?" One representative of the Central Committee, I.A. Sammer, who had just come from St. Petersburg with instructions, did not make it any easier to arrive at a decision. He announced that the Central Committee suggested that the Moscow Committee take the initiative in beginning the armed uprising which was to sweep all Russia since the Central Committee had more confidence in the Moscow Committee than in any other. However, this was only a suggestion and the final decision still rested with the Moscow Committee. And it was a difficult decision to make.

There was considerable division and debate among the Bolsheviks, and a leading

"Gavrilov, Moskovskie Bolsheviki, pp. 91-95. Kliueva, Moskovskie Bolsheviki, pp. 40-42."
member of the Bolshevik combat staff, M.I. Vasiliev-Iuzhin, one of the Bolshevik representatives on the executive board of the Moscow Soviet, urged that the Moscow Committee immediately call all the soldiers and workers to join in an armed uprising. V.I. Shantser, also a member of the Soviet's executive committee and the Bolshevik combat staff, doubted that the rest of the army would support the uprising and urged that the Moscow Bolsheviks hold the soldiers and workers in readiness, but wait for instructions from the Central Committee. R.S. Zemliachka opposed an uprising at the time for she thought the supply of firearms to be insufficient and suggested that the Bolsheviks save their strength for another occasion. Though this probably would have been the correct decision, other factors made it difficult to arrive at. That very day, the Soviet had called upon all the people of Moscow to prepare for a general strike and an uprising. The working class of Moscow was in a militant mood. If the Bolsheviks did not take the lead in the matter of an armed uprising, the workers might stage a rising without their leadership and bring disaster on the revolutionary movement and disgrace to the party. If the Bolsheviks did take the lead and initiated an uprising, what were the chances of a revolutionary victory? Kudriavtsev, one of the Bolshevik combat experts, provided some figures for encouragement. He calculated the revolutionary forces to consist of 300 armed Bolsheviks, 300 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 100 Mensheviks, 150 students, and 150 or 200 armed men of other or no groups at all. However, Kudriavtsev hoped that as the fight went on, others would join. Most of those at the conference had their doubts about the success of the revolution. Zemliachka cast grave doubt on the support of the uprising by the soldiers and by the rest of Russia. Many shared her doubts and the conference voted, twenty to seven to delay the call
for a general strike and an armed uprising and wait for further instructions from the Central Committee or to see what course the mood of the workers would take.2 Throughout the rest of December 4, the Bolsheviks even attempted to delay the Moscow Soviet's decision on a general strike so that they could discuss the matter further among the workers in the factories and wait for an answer from the Central Committee. They found the workers to be in an angry mood over the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet and expecting the aid of the army. With the workers and the soldiers in such a revolutionary mood, the Bolsheviks could not pass such an opportunity up. M.I. Vasil'ev-Iuzhin brought up the question of the situation in the army. He estimated that of the almost 15,000 troops in the Moscow area, the government could rely on only 4,000. Most of the rest would certainly refuse to shoot at the workers, but they would not join the revolutionary movement unless they were sure of a strong and determined effort on the part of the workers. If the Bolsheviks passed up this opportunity, would the army ever be in such a mood again? It was a difficult situation. The soldiers would not rise unless they were sure the workers had really risen. Yet how could the workers rise if they were not sure of the soldier's support? Consequently, on December 5th an all-city conference of Bolsheviks decided to recommend to the Soviet that it begin the general strike on December 7 and to call for an armed uprising in the name of the Moscow Committee.3 It was their most fateful decision of the year.

The Bolshevik decision to take up arms was also supported by the Menshe-


3Kliueva, Moskovskie Bolsheviki, pp. 40-42.
viks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. All of them pressed for a resolution which was adopted unanimously in the Moscow Soviet on December 6.

In Petersburg the Soviet of Workers Deputies has been arrested, gatherings are being dissolved; we are prepared to answer this provocation by the government with a general strike, hoping that it can and should turn into an armed uprising. The Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the Committee and Group of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and the Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party declare: To announce in Moscow on December 7 at 12 o'clock a general political strike and to strive to convert it into an armed uprising.

A leaflet issued on the same day by the Moscow Soviet and the revolutionary parties called the soldiers to join the movement.

Comrades Soldiers! You are our blood brothers and children, together with us of the same mother, long-suffering Russia. You already know of this and are confirming it by your participation in the general struggle. Today when the proletariat announces the deciding war to the hateful enemy of the people—the tsarist government—act with determination and courage. Refuse to submit to your bloodthirsty commanders, chase them away and arrest them; elect from your own midst reliable leaders, and with arms in hands unite with the rising people! Together with the working class obtain the dissolution of the standing army and obtain the arming of the people and the abolition of military courts and martial law.

But even as the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary groups were committing themselves to a conflict with the government and calling on all the people to join them, the favorable situation began to deteriorate. While the Bolsheviks

---

4 Ibid. p. 151.

5 Visshi Pod'em Revoliutsii, I. p. 649. Though the revolutionaries were united in their desire to begin the uprising, there were considerable differences in their motives and expectations, The Menshevik, P. Garvi, argued that the revolutionaries had to defend themselves against the growing reaction which had already attacked the St. Petersburg Soviet and hoped that the peasants would join in the struggle. Therefore, he urged an immediate uprising. Garvi, Vospominniia Sotsial-Demokrata, pp. 611-617. V. Zenzinov, a Socialist-Revolutionary member of the Moscow Soviet's executive Committee, felt the revolutionaries would surely lose due to their lack of arms, but supported the armed uprising for the honor of the revolution and because of the general enthusiasm. V. Zenzinov, Perekhodie, (New York, 1963) p. 225.
and other revolutionaries were deciding whether they should begin the armed uprising or not, the revolutionary spirit in the army declined. In many of the regiments the officers promised to improve living conditions, raised monthly pay, and distributed liquor to partially satisfy the troops and get them to betray the agitators among them. Some battalions in even the most rebellious regiments refused to join the movement and now the rest of the units returned to duty. Though they were still not considered reliable, there was no longer a danger of a rising among the troops. 6

On the day that the general strike began another disaster struck the revolutionary cause. Two of the leading members of the Bolshevik combat staff, Vasilievich-Iuzhin and Shants, had previously worked out a plan to seize the Governor-General's home, the Kremlin, and all the telegraph offices, banks, and railroad stations in order to take power in Moscow. However, just as these two Bolsheviks were conferring with Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary combat leaders, all of them were arrested by the police. The two Bolsheviks were jailed while the others were later released, thus depriving the Bolsheviks of a coherent tactical plan and some of its best central leadership. 7

Without the support of the army the situation did not look too favorable for the Bolsheviks or the other revolutionaries. Against the 4,000 or 5,000 reliable soldiers and 2,000 policemen the revolutionaries could muster about 250 Bolsheviks, 200 Mensheviks, 150 Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 250 others including a student organization, the Caucasian brotherhood, and some non-party

6Kliueva, Moskovkie Bolsheviki, p. 43.

7Sidorov, "Vospronimaniia Druzhinkika F-Kd Schmidt" Nevskii, Dekabr'1905 na Presne, pp. 122-123.
volunteers and anarchist groups. A Menshevik source, Gimer, whose work was published in 1906 and has since been lost, and Trotsky agree with these figures for the most part though they add one or two hundred Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-party volunteers. At any rate there were not more than 1,000 armed and organized revolutionaries in Moscow at the time. Perhaps 3,000 or even 6,000 others followed the combatants, hoping to pick up weapons from fallen comrades or soldiers. Litvin-Sedoi, the Bolshevik chief of staff in the Presnia District on the west side of Moscow, estimates that the arms available to the rebels consisted of perhaps 200 rifles, some of them Winchesters, and 500-600 revolvers, most of them Browning's, and about 30 low grade bombs. This is a conservative estimate, but it was evident that the revolutionary forces were badly armed. This revolutionary army was under the loose control of a war council made up of combat leaders from the revolutionary parties and headed by Litvin-Sedoi. Attached to this staff were a medical department, a financial department, and a mechanical department for the repair of weapons.

On December 7 the General strike started. The Moscow Soviet ordered all stores and enterprises to be closed by the workers, except such essential enterprises as the gas works and food stores. Those enterprises which were allowed to remain open were warned not to charge the more than the usual prices and to grant the strikers credit. To make the strike felt even more widely the Soviet called on all tenants to stop paying rent.

9 Partia Bolshevikov, p. 430.
10 Vishii Pod'em Revoliutsii, I, pp. 655-658.
The fighting started on the day after the beginning of the general strike. It started off in a desultory fashion—nothing like the surprise coup against all strategic points as Vasilievich-Iuzhin had planned. Rather than a concentrated effort against strategic points, the rebels carried out a scattered and uncoordinated campaign of attacks on small groups of policemen and army officers and burglarized gun shops in the dark. For the first two days, they still sought to win the soldiers over to their side and tried to talk to them and give them leaflets rather than attack them. However, Admiral Dubasov kept the most unreliable elements of the garrison within the barracks. The soldiers who did patrol the streets did not usually fire at the workers' gatherings or at the revolutionaries except in self defence, but they refused to give the rebels their arms, accept their leaflets, or even talk to them.

On December 9, the first barricades began to appear in Moscow. Most of these were built in the Miisk Park, Tver Boulevard and Square, the Triumphal Gate and Strastnaia Square in a rough pattern which seemed to indicate that the revolutionaries were trying to cut off the center of the city from the outer districts. However, there was no coordination between the rebel units. The war council lost contact with the separate districts and no coordinated offensive could be taken against any strategic point. The railroad workers did take all the railroad stations except the Nikolaevsk Station which

---

11 Garvi, the leader of the Prosnia Mensheviks says there was a definite plan and order in the construction of the barricades. *Vospomnimanija Sotsial-Demokrata*, p. 629. V. Zenzinov, the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary detachments, says the barricades were constructed haphazardly and spontaneously, more for moral effect than for actual use in defense, *Pereshhitoe*, p. 225. Perhaps there was a vague plan in building the barricades, but the lack of coordination between the various districts did not allow the construction of a tidy network of barricades.
was the terminal for the railroad connection with St. Petersburg. Haphazard attempts were made by the Bolsheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to seize this station and several banks, but all these were made in such a piecemeal and disconnected manner, that they were easily repelled. On December 9 and 10, some military units took the offensive, and, placing artillery on the Tver and Strastnaia squares, fired down the length of the boulevards clearing barricades with shells and caseshot. Of course, the military and police forces were too small to occupy the entire city and often barricades sprang up in the same places where they had been cleared. However, the army also had its successes. The "Aquarium" Theater was cleared of demonstrating crowds and armed anarchists. On December 9, the Fidler school, where hundreds of revolutionaries had gathered for a general descent upon the police, was surrounded by the army and shelled. When the defenders surrendered after some ineffective shooting and bomb-throwing, it was a grave defeat for the revolutionary forces for anywhere from 120 to 500 prisoners, most of them Socialist-Revolutionaries, were taken.

In such a situation, the revolutionaries adopted partisan tactics hoping to wear down the army and eventually take over the strategic points in the city. On December 11, the Moscow Committee issued a leaflet advising the revolutionaries to operate in small units:

1. The first rule—do not act in crowds, work in small details of three or four men, not more. Let there be as many of these details as possible and let them learn to attack quickly and disappear quickly. The police strives to shoot crowds of thousands of people with a hundred Cossacks. To fall on a hundred is easier than on one, especially if that one shoots and escapes unnoticed. The police and army will be helpless if all Moscow is covered with these small and elusive details.

2. In addition comrades, do not take up fortified positions. The army always attempts to take them or simply destroy them with artillery. Let our fortresses be passable yards and all places from which we can shoot and escape easily. If they take such a place, they
will not find anyone there, and will lose many of their own. It is impossible to take them all, for to do that it would be necessary to settle every home with a Cossack.

3. Therefore, comrades, if anyone should call you to go in a great crowd or to take a fortified place, consider him a fool or a provocator. If he is a fool, don't listen to him. If a provocator --kill...

The leaflet went on to suggest that the revolutionaries attack soldiers only in self-defence, but that they unhesitatingly kill officers, Cossacks, and high-ranking policemen or those known to have been cruel to the workers.12 For the most part, the revolutionaries followed this advice, sniping, running, and attacking individual officers and policemen. Barricades were not seriously defended, but only used to slow up charging troops so that they would provide better targets. The revolutionaries did have some moments of success. In one instance they captured an artillery piece but then found they did not know how to operate it. At the same time, costly mistakes were also made by the rebels. They paid a high price learning that soldiers were accurate shots at a far greater distance than policemen. To add to the rebels' misfortunes, the town duma on December 13 armed 2800 volunteers to combat the revolutionary forces and another 1000 to guard the strategic points in the city. By December 12, communications between the rebel combat units in the various districts had practically dissolved and what was left of the revolutionary forces spontaneously drifted to Presnia, one of the main workers' districts on the west side of town.13 Here, Z. Litvin-Sedoi, who had lost contact with the Central Committee and most other revolutionary units in Moscow, took charge of about 400 armed and 800 unarmed men of all parties, including the units led by E. Desser, a Bolshevik, P. Garvi, a Menshevik,

12 Vysshii Pod' em Revoliutsii, I, p. 665.
13 Klineva, Moskovskie Bolsheviki, pp. 46-47.
and I. Dubrovinskii, a Socialist-Revolutionary, the Menshevik Pchelka group, and the Socialist-Revolutionary Medvedev group. Litvin-Sedoi set up his headquarters in Presnia, complete with a military court which did have the opportunity to pass a death sentence. Other "executions" were less formal. Litvin-Sedoi himself led a band which disarmed a Cossack colonel and shot him. Sakhar, a policeman regarded with great hatred among the workers, was shot without a trial by the Bolsheviks who feared that the Mensheviks would be too "soft" to carry out the execution. Other policemen, officers, and Cossacks who were foolish enough to surrender met similar ends.

While the fighting was concentrating around Presnia, M. Liadov was sent by the Moscow Committee to St. Petersburg to inform the Central Committee of events in Moscow. On the way he saw that the St. Petersburg Moscow railroad was working at full capacity shipping troops to Moscow. When Lenin heard this he exploded at Krasin, the head of the Central Committees technical group which had the duty of mining the tracks to Moscow. Krasin came up with some lame excuse about his men losing their way in the dark and what actually happened was never cleared up. The result was that Lenin and the Central Committee ordered that the action in Moscow be broken off in an orderly manner in order to save the Bolsheviks' strength for a future rising. 14

On the night of December 15 the Semenovski and Ladoga Regiments, both completely reliable units, arrived in Moscow from St. Petersburg. The next day Presnia was cut off from the rest of the city and shelled severely. Many of the men were demoralized not only because they were surrounded and shelled but also, the workers of many factories, newspapers, and electric plants were

14 Liadov, Iz Zhizni Partii, p. 141.
back at work since December 15 and it looked as if the defenders of Presnia had been betrayed. Dosser, one of Litvin-Sedoi's Bolshevik lieutenants, urged him to order the men to hide their arms and scatter so that they would be available for a future rising. Litvin-Sedoi wanted to hold out a little longer, hoping that the newly-arrived troops were unreliable and fearing that ending the struggle in Moscow might betray the other uprisings going on in the empire at the time. But when late on December 16 he saw that most of the Moscow proletariat was back at work he saw the wisdom of the Mensheviks’ viewpoint and ordered the men to stash their arms where they could find them again and to filter out of the district, through the troops, as best they could. The next day, amid heavy shelling, the rebels hid their arms in various places, and one by one, they stole away. On December 18 the soldiers charged into the district as the revolutionaries had expected and found hardly anyone. The uprising in Moscow was over. On that day the Soviet issued the leaflet telling the workers they had not been supported by the rest of Russia nor by the army and that they should return to work and prepare for the next rising.

If the uprising was through the Bolsheviks were not. A leaflet issued by the Moscow Committee late in January of 1906 struck a defiant note. The events of the past month had shown everyone that liberty could only be won by an armed uprising. In conclusion the leaflet read,

The December rising in Moscow has shown that the victory of the working class is possible and near.
It is necessary to prepare for another struggle.
One more great, cooperative, general effort of the Russian proletariat and victory is ours.
Comrades, let us all unite together, and step under the red

Vissshii Pod’em Revoliutsii, I. pp. 713-715.
banner of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party for the unremitting struggle with the arbitrariness, force, and lawlessness of the Tsarist government.

Long live the armed uprising!
Long live the popular constituent assembly and the democratic republic!
Long live the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party!

Of course, the Moscow uprising could not avoid having its repercussions in the rest of the Empire. Like ripples from a disturbance in the water, an ever-widening circle of rebellion spread from the heart of Russia, to the rest of the Empire. In Nizhni Novgorod a general strike was called on December 7 in cooperation with the Moscow strike. On December 12 workers clashed with Cossacks and patriotic demonstrators. For the next two days combat units of Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries followed the same tactics as the Moscow revolutionaries—sniping, attacking in small groups, and running from house to house. Some fortified a three-story school building and repulsed Cossack attacks inflicting some ninety casualties on them. When the army trained artillery on the school on December 14, the rebels quickly evacuated the school and the disorder quickly died down. As in Moscow, the revolutionaries, led by the Bolshevik Semashko, failed to seize the strategic points in the city such as the telegraph office, arsenal, or a bank. 17

In the Urals, the Bolshevik stronghold, events followed the same general pattern. In Ufa, the Bolshevik-dominated soviet called a general strike on December 7 in support of the Moscow strike. When some of the Bolsheviks kidnapped a handful of Cossacks the troops outside of town opened fire on the shops and the rebels scattered into the hills. At the munitions plant in Motovilikha, the Bolsheviks began hostilities by attacking and disarming police—

16 Ibid. I, p. 757.
men. However, out of a work force of 10,000 they could only arm 300 men. As in Moscow the Bolsheviks built a few barricades and did a lot of sniping. After they tried and failed to seize some of the strategic points in the area, most of them were surrounded and captured. In general, the rising workers in the Ural towns received no support from the army or the peasantry. The Bolsheviks were totally unprepared to lead an armed uprising in the Urals, especially since they lacked firearms, yet they felt they should show some support of the Moscow uprising lest the workers be demoralized even if the rising was hopeless.

In the Ukraine and the Don Basin, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cooperated in staging numerous and bloody uprisings. In Kharkov the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Federated Soviet could not agree when to start the general strike and many Bolsheviks were arrested during the delay. On December 12 a crowd of workers preparing to seize the strategic points in the city were surrounded in the Gelferikh-Sade Factory. All attempts by large crowds to save the workers were repelled by gunfire. This group of Bolsheviks seemed to have everything going against them. The Menshevik-controlled railroad workers refused to strike and let the soldiers in on the railroad. The troops which were thought to be unreliable fired at the workers despite reports about their loyalty. The peasants who were staging a revolt in nearby Kupiansk and Lebedin did not come to help. Finally, of course, there was the shortage of arms. So, the combat groups in the factory surrendered. In Rostov on the Don a combat group of 400 men, mostly Social-Democrats but also including some Socialist-Revolutionaries and students seized some of the

railroad stations and proceeded to disarm the police and Cossacks in the vicinity. The army restored order on December 15 by using artillery though Bolshevik groups held the Temernik District and the suburb of Nakhichevani on the other side of the Don until December 21.19

Even bloodier conflicts took place on several stations on the railroad from Kharkov to Rostov. One of the bloodiest conflicts of the revolution took place at Gorlovka. Revolutionary combat units from Debaltsevo, Emakievo, Ianisovataia, Avdeevka, and Grishino, increased greatly by a combat group from Lugansk, led by Klementi Voroshilov, the future World War II hero and red marshal, swelled the number of the rebels to 4,000 of which about a 100 had rifles, 500 had revolvers and shotguns, and the rest were armed with homemade pikes, leadpipes, daggers, and tools. When this horde charged the railroad station and the barracks the garrison fled. The soldiers returned the next day, December 18, with reinforcements consisting of Cossacks and dragoons and routed the rebels, killing about 200. Similar seizures of railroad stations by large combat groups took place all along the line with similar results. It is noteworthy, however, that this area was one of the few regions in which peasants cooperated with the workers thus swelling the numbers of the rebels to several thousand. By seizing the railroad stations, the rebels planned to regulate traffic and especially to control the food supplies of the cities, obstruct troop movements, and shift their own reinforcements where they were needed. The region of the eastern Ukraine and the Don Basin, therefore presents a rare example of an entire area, rather than one city, rebelling as a coordinated unit with cooperation between towns. However, they were

19Jakovlev, Vooruzhennie Vosstaniia, 315-360.
too poorly armed to win.

In the central Ukraine the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Aleksandrovsk (today Zaporozhe) seized the railroad station and hospital. After heavy firing and plenty of bomb throwing, the station was retaken on December 14 with the death of 300 workers making it one of the bloodiest classes of the revolution.

On the eastern coast of the Black Sea the Bolsheviks participated in the creation of the "Novorossisk Republic." When news of the Moscow general strike arrived by telegraph on December 7 a soviet was organized. The next day it took over the town government, held new town duma elections in which all classes were to be represented, and organized a "people's court." During the next few days the Soviet taxed the rich to support the unemployed, forcibly closed government liquor stores and other larger business enterprises while it regulated the prices of those it left open. With a force of 300 to 500 men of which a few had revolvers while the rest were armed with cold steel, the Soviet felt itself strong enough to begin requisitioning arms, threatening Liberal and conservative newspapers, and demanding the gold deposited in the local bank. However, either because its forces were too weak or because most of the members of the Soviet wanted to establish a purely popular government, no attempt was made to seize the bank, opposing newspapers, or to disarm guard units made up of the middle classes. When a troop train arrived and a battleship trained its guns on Novorossisk on December 25, however the Soviet was its forces to be ridiculously weak and dissolved without resis-

---

The situation was not so quiet in the Transcaucasian area. Peasant Red
Hundreds and Bolshevik bands led by S. Ordzhonikidze attacked small military
units, took over entire villages, raided government offices for arms and
money, and stopped trains throughout western and central Georgia, and espec-
ially around Sochi, Sukhum, Poti, Kutaisi, and Gori. In Tiflis a Central
Strike Committee made up of eighteen Mensheviks and twelve Bolsheviks took over
the city's railroads permitting only provision necessary to the workers to
enter the area. The entire Nadzaladevi district was taken over by the Bolshe-
vik, S. Ter-Petrosian (Kamo) who was later to become famous as the party's
leading "expropriator" as a result of his engineering the Great Tiflis Bank
Robbery. The police was chased out of the district and the administration
taken over. However, troops returned to Tiflis on December 15. Though there
was no organized resistance there was plenty of sniping and bomb-throwing
by all the revolutionaries in Tiflis and order was not completely restored
there until December 29. Meanwhile, an army led by Alikhanov-Avarska carried
out a ruthless suppression of the peasant revolt in Georgia.

In creating a revolutionary army and a provisional government the Bolshe-
viks achieved their greatest success in Siberia along the Trans-Siberian
Railroad. In Krasnoiarsk a Soviet of Soldiers and Workers was formed in
early December. Seeing that there was no power in the vicinity to oppose it,
the Soviet began to convert itself into a provisional government. All news-
papers were commanded to defy the censorship laws. The eight-hour day was

21 Vissh1 Pod'em Revoliutsii, II, pp. 574-580. Iakovlev, Vooruzhennie
Vosstannie, 261-261.

22 Visshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, III. 768-377. G.V. Khachapurieze,
"Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 v Gruzii," Ivanov, Revoliutsiia v Natsionalnikh Raionakh
pp. 522-525.
declared. All liquor shops were closed. The workers and soldiers themselves regulated railroad traffic. As time went on the Soviet took on even more governmental powers. The police was disarmed. Print shops were seized by the Soviet to print workers' papers. Democratic elections to the town duma were arranged. Finally, the Soviet organized a workers' militia and levied taxes to provide it with arms. However, though the Krasnoiarsk Soviet approached the Bolshevik ideal of a revolutionary provisional government, it fell short of the ideal in many respects. The soldiers, under the influence of Kuzmin, one of the Socialist-Revolutionary agitators within the army, held aloof from the workers and refused to give them their arms, thus making it impossible to form a truly powerful workers' militia. On the other hand, the Soviet itself hesitated before certain steps. The police was disarmed but not imprisoned. Instead of spending more of its time and energy organizing and training the workers and seizing the bank, arsenal, and prison, the Soviet spent most of its time arranging and campaigning in the town duma election which it wanted to make a model democratic government.

The weakness of the United Soviet of Soldiers and Workers became apparent when the Krasnoiarsk Regiment returned from duty in Western Siberia and restored the town's print shops to its owners. The rebellious soldiers represented in the Soviet either lost their nerve or did not wish to fire on their fellow soldiers and most of them surrendered their arms to the Krasnoiarsk Regiments. The workers also lost their nerve and limited their action to throwing leaflets at the newly-arrived troops. Even the Bolshevik Melnikov advised against violence because of the insufficiency of arms among the workers. The situation became even more impossible for the Soviet when the defeat of the Moscow insurrection released more government troops against the
revolutionaries in Siberia. On January 1, 1906, a strong expeditionary column under General Meller-Zakomelski arrived in Krasnoiarsk. The Soviet dissolved quickly enough but about 250 soldiers and 120 of the most revolutionary workers took refuge in the railroad machine shop building. There they were pinned down by rifle fire and cut off from water and heat while the temperature dropped to \(-46^\circ\) Centigrade. When they surrendered on January 3, the workers were released but the soldiers were held for severe punishment.23

In Chita a similar association of soldiers and workers took over the regulation of traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In taking control of the line, the Bolsheviks and their military allies hoped to spread dissatisfaction among the troops returning from Manchuria, let the most dissatisfied and revolutionary elements pass into European Russia to aid the revolutionary cause, and obstruct the passage of loyal troops to the west. In contrast to the situation at Krasnoiarsk, the workers in Chita did not suffer from any shortage of arms. On December 5 a railroad shipment of 800 rifles had been given by the soldiers to the railroad workers. In January thirteen wagons of arms and five of ammunitions were given to the railroad workers. With such an armed force the soldiers and workers defied not only the civil authorities but also the military authorities by freeing several imprisoned sailors. At the same time, the workers' militia policed the town and telegraph communications with imperial authorities were cut off.

Despite the formidable power of the workers and soldiers together, they were not able to resist the government forces sent from Manchuria. On January

6, 1906, General Rennenkampf, who was to suffer the disaster at Masurian Lakes. in 1914, quickly arrested almost all the revolutionaries of all factions in Harbin and immediately set out for Chita with six trainloads of troops picked for their reliability, made up mostly of the 5th East Siberian Rifle division and 11th Siberian corps which had been convinced by the officers that they were not defending reaction but the tsarist government limited by the principles of October 17. When the Chita rebels heard of the coming expedition, they mined the railroad near Chita and hoped this might stop the approaching force. However, mines not covered by fire are almost useless and Rennenkampf's sappers had little trouble detecting them and clearing the railroad. The rebellious troops had no desire to combat Rennenkampf's large force. The workers, led by the Bolsheviks V.K. Kurnatovski, I.V. Babushkin, and A.A. Kostiuzhko-Valiuzenich, saw themselves deserted by the troops and facing a large and well-armed force. The Bolshevik leaders, taking the size of the government forces and the workers' lack of experience in fighting, advised them to hide their weapons and scatter. This they did but Rennenkampf's troops captured the Bolshevik leaders of the Chita Committee and shot most of them with and without court martials. The last Bolshevik uprising of the revolution was thus snuffed out.

Besides the armed uprisings in which the Bolsheviks participated, there were outbreaks of violence in Latvia, Finland, and a troops revolt in central Asia with which they had little or nothing to do. In addition to the armed

CONCLUSION

As the year 1905 drew to a close, the Tsarist government was still standing. To be sure, it was not an absolute autocracy as it had been at the beginning of the year but it was far from being the democratic republic the Bolsheviks had aimed for. The Bolsheviks had failed and when one looks over their activity over the course of 1905 it is easy to see why.

One of the most evident weaknesses of the Bolsheviks and their revolutionary allies was their lack of arms. An entire empire cannot be armed by a series of smuggling operations, gun shop burglaries, or assaults on individual policemen. The defeat of the revolutionaries in almost every one of the armed uprisings of 1905 can be attributed to the lack and poor quality of firearms. There was, however, very little either the Bolsheviks or any other revolutionaries could do about it.

Another technical difficulty which cost all the revolutionary parties dearly was the inexperience of the members in actually fighting battles against the government. Most of the men who made up the combat units were professional agitators or workers. They soon found that engaging the army was a far cry from merely dodging the police. The same lack of coordination between revolutionary units and the same failure to execute a well-planned attack against strategic points were evident not only in Moscow but repeated over and over again in countless towns and villages. The lack of military ability among the revolutionaries, in general, was exhibited on the strategic as well as the tactical level. Communications between towns and regions were almost
non-existent. The eastern Ukraine offered a rare example of cooperation between towns in a region, pooling resources and shifting forces to threatened points in the area—too rare as far as the Bolsheviks and the other revolutionary parties were concerned. Throughout the year the government retained effective control of communications and kept the initiative by attacking the revolutionary forces when and where it pleased. The grossest example of this is the passage of troops from St. Petersburg to Moscow in the most critical times of the December rising while the railroad employees went about their work of operating the railroad. The only real exception was in Siberia where the revolutionaries seized control of the line but this was quickly repaired by Rennenkampf and Meller-Zakomelski.

The very size of the revolutionary forces made victory almost impossible. The small number of men who were actually able and willing to take up arms in Moscow is representative of other centers in Russia. As yet, only a fraction of the proletariat was actually revolutionary. In the second half of 1905, most workers' demands did include political liberty and a representative government. However, it is doubtful that any great number of the workers were willing to fight and die for these ideals or even fully understood what they meant. Only a small part of the proletariat participated in the strikes. Only 31.4% of Russia's factory workers participated in the great October Strike, while in the December strike, which was supposed to represent the peak of the revolutionary movement, this figure dropped to 26.2%.¹

If the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties had little support

among the proletariat, they had even less among the peasantry, the largest class in Russia. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were the only revolutionary party which had any real influence among the peasants and though they did rouse many to revolt, the peasant risings were scattered, unorganized, and disconnected from the proletarian revolutionary movement. The Bolsheviks, understandably, concentrated most of their effort on the proletariat and it is difficult to see how such a small party could influence and organize such a large and dispersed class as the Russian peasantry. Yet, to get the support of the peasantry, as Lenin had so often emphasized, was essential for a proletarian victory and the Bolsheviks' failure to coordinate the peasant movement with the proletarian movement was a major cause of their defeat.

Perhaps even more important was the failure to obtain the support of the army. Again, this is partly due to the Bolsheviks' and other proletarian parties' concentration of effort on the working classes. The bulk of the men in the military forces seem to have belonged to no party at all or adhered to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which appealed to the peasant majority in the army. However, the failure to turn the army against the government was due more to the difficulty of evading the army's security and disciplinary measures against agitators and revolutionary organizations than to anything else. Furthermore, it was found that troops at the front are less susceptible to revolutionary agitation. The revolutionary parties failed to turn the Far Eastern forces against the government. General Rennenkampf was able to muster a sufficient force to clear the Trans-Siberian Railroad of revolutionaries. Most manifestations go to the front. Even in those risings which resulted in bloodshed, most of the rebelling soldiers directed their anger against their officers and the army's disciplinary system while retaining a basic loyalty to
God and their Tsar. With the Empire's large and well-armed military force still basically loyal to the government, the revolution had no chance of success.

While the revolutionary parties influenced such a small part of all the classes of the population, they were further weakened by division among themselves. There was no one leader who could marshal all the revolutionary forces for one blow against the government. Lenin was a forceful leader but commanded the loyalty of only a small party. The largest party, the Socialist Revolutionary had many leaders and was not as well-organized as the Bolshevik faction. Meanwhile, there was little cooperation between the many parties. Father Gapon's congress in early 1905 collapsed and resulted in no substantial unity between revolutionary parties. Bolshevik committees did often reach local agreements with the Mensheviks and even the Socialist-Revolutionaries as at Baku, Moscow, and Kharkov, but usually the parties could not agree on when to start or end a general strike or an armed uprising or what tactics to use. Even during the Moscow uprising there was frequent bickering between the combat units of various parties.

Finally, one of the most important reasons for the Bolshevik failure in 1905 was that they let events control them and initiated the armed uprising prematurely. The proletariat was as yet mostly disorganized and poorly armed. The peasant masses, though in the midst of a violent upheaval, were still disorganized and largely disconnected from the proletarian movement. Most important of all, the army was still generally loyal to the government, thus making a revolutionary victory in 1905 virtually impossible. Faced with such a situation the Bolsheviks should have postponed the uprising at least until spring as Lenin suggested, or even for several more years. In allowing them-
selves to be provoked by the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet and drawn into action by a doubtful revolt in the Moscow garrison and by the fear that the masses would be demoralized if they did not act immediately, the Bolsheviks relinquished their independence of action and failed in their role of "vanguard of the proletariat."

But no revolution is a total loss. The agitation of the Bolsheviks and other political parties, the October General Strike, and the armed uprising did serve to make the masses more conscious politically. The soviet was introduced into Russian politics and sprang up again in 1917 as soon as the Tsar's authority was overthrown. Judging by the way the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they had learned some valuable lessons from their defeat in 1905. In 1917 Lenin put little faith in the proletarian Red Guard and waited for the army to support him against the Provisional Government. Nor did the Bolsheviks allow the spontaneity of the masses to draw them into a conflict with the Provisional Government prematurely. They withdrew their support from the July uprisings in 1917 and waited for additional casualties at the front and the fear of a royalist reaction inspired by the Kornilov revolt to do their work before they dared to seize power in October.

One thing the Bolsheviks did not realize in 1905 was that they had been defeated. In the first week of January of 1906 Lenin wrote,

Let the tasks of the workers' party stand clearly before it. Down with constitutional illusions. It is necessary to gather the new forces joining the proletariat. It is necessary to "gather the experiences" of the two great months of revolution (November and December). It is necessary again to adapt to the restored autocracy. It is necessary to be able to crawl back into the underground wherever necessary. It is necessary to establish practically and more definitely the colossal tasks of a new, active drive by preparing for it more firmly, more systematically, more persistently, gathering, wherever possible, the strength of the proletariat, exhausted by the struggle of the strikes. Wave follows wave. After the capital the provinces. After the border areas the very heart of Russia. After the proletariat the town
petty bourgeoisie. After the town the countryside. The overthrow of the reactionary government is inescapable in the execution of their all-embracing tasks. Much of the outcome of the first phase of the great Russian revolution depends on our preparations for the spring of 1906.

2

2 Lenin, Sochinenia, XII, pp. 152-153.
Appendix I

RESOLUTION OF III PARTY CONGRESS

ON THE ARMED UPRISING

1. Whereas the proletariat being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;

2. Whereas this movement at the present time has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising;

3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably take the most energetic part in this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution in Russia;

4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only if it is united in a single and independent political force under the banner of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically; and

5. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism against the propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment.

Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations:

a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not only the political significance, but the practical organisational aspect of the impending armed uprising,

b) to explain in that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during the progress of the uprising, and

b) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof, for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and when necessary.

Appendix II

DECISION OF III PARTY CONGRESS ON THE
PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

1. Whereas both the direct interests of the Russian proletariat and those of its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the democratic republic;

2. Whereas the actualization of a democratic Republic in Russia is possible only as a result of a victorious popular armed uprising of which a provisional revolutionary government will be the organ, which alone is capable of securing complete freedom of agitation and of convening a Constituent Assembly that will really express the will of the people, an Assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot; and

3. Whereas this democratic revolution in Russia by its Socio-economic system, will not weaken, but, on the contrary, will strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie, which, at a certain juncture, will inevitably go to all lengths to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the revolutionary period as possible;--

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:

a) that we should spread among the working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is absolutely necessary, and discuss at workers' meetings the conditions required for the full and prompt realisation of all the immediate political and economic demands of our programme;

b) that in the event of the victorious uprising of the people and the complete overthrow of the autocracy, representatives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending the independent interests of the working class;

c) that essential conditions for such participation are strict control of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the bourgeois parties;

d) that, irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate among the broadest sections of the proletariat the idea that the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pressure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating, and extending the gains of the revolution.

Trettii S"ezd, p. 451-452.
Appendix III

DECISION OF III PARTY CONGRESS ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT

1. Whereas the growing peasant movement, though spontaneous and politically unconscious, is nonetheless inevitably directed against the existing order and all remnants of serfdom in general,

2. Whereas it is one of the tasks of Social-Democracy to support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order;

3. Whereas, in view of the aforesaid, the Social-Democrats must strive to purify the revolutionary-democratic features of the peasant movement of all reactionary premises to develop the revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry and fulfill their democratic demands to their logical conclusion;

4. Whereas the Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the proletariat, must in all cases and under all circumstances work steadfastly for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and to clarify for this class the irreconcilable antagonism between its interests and those of the peasant bourgeoisie;

Therefore, the Third Party Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. instructs all Party organisations:

a) To carry on propaganda among the wide masses of the people that Social-democracy considers it its task to support all revolutionary measures of the peasantry, which are capable of bettering of its condition, even to the confiscation of patrimonial State church, monastery and private estates.

b) To put forward as a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into the peasant movement, the necessity of the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees that shall have as their aim the carrying out of all revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interests of the peasantry and the liberation of the peasantry from the tyranny of the police, the officials, and the landlords;

c) To the peasantry and rural proletariat, to non-performance of military service, general refusal to pay taxes, and refusal to recognise the authorities, in order to disorganise the autocratic regime and support the revolutionary onset directed against it;

d) To work for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and for its fusion with the urban proletariat under the banner of the Social-Democratic Party and the inclusion of its representatives in the peasant Committees.

Tret'ii Sъezd, p. 454.
Appendix IV
LENIN'S POSITION VERSUS LIBERAL
COMPROMISE WITH AUTOCRACY

THREE CONSTITUTIONS OR THREE SYSTEMS
OF GOVERNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do the police and officials want?</th>
<th>What do the most liberal of the bourgeois (the people of the Osvobozhdenie, or the Constitutional-Democratic Party) want?</th>
<th>What do the class-conscious workers (the Social-Democrats) want?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The absolute monarchy.</td>
<td>The constitutional monarchy.</td>
<td>The democratic republic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OF WHAT DO THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT CONSIST?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute monarchy</th>
<th>Constitutional monarchy</th>
<th>Democratic Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The tsar--an absolute monarch.</td>
<td>1. The tsar--a constitutional monarch.</td>
<td>1. No tsar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix IV (Cont'd.)

### WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute Monarchy</th>
<th>Constitutional Monarchy</th>
<th>Democratic Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 and 2. Complete power of the police and the officials over the people</td>
<td>1. One-third of the power in the hands of the police and the officials, headed by the tsar.</td>
<td>1. No independent power for either the police or the officials; their complete subordination to the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consultative voice of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords.</td>
<td>2. One-third of the power in the hands of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords.</td>
<td>2. No privileges for either the capitalists or the landlords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No power for the people.</td>
<td>3. One-third of the power in the hands of the whole people.</td>
<td>3. All power—wholly, completely and indivisibly—in the hands of the whole people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WHAT PURPOSE SHALL THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT SERVE?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute Monarchy</th>
<th>Constitutional Monarchy</th>
<th>Democratic Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>That the courtiers, the police, and the officials may live on the fat of the land; that the rich may rob the workers and peasants at their own free will; that the people may remain forever without rights and live in darkness and ignorance.</td>
<td>That the police and the officials may be dependent on the capitalists and landlords; that the capitalists, landlords, and rich peasants may freely and easily rob the workers of town and country, by right and not by arbitrary rule.</td>
<td>That the free and enlightened people may learn to run things themselves, and, principally, that the working class may be free to struggle for socialism, for a system under which there will neither be rich nor poor and all the land, all the factories and works, will belong to all the working people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comrades! Our terrible strike has delivered an awful blow to the hateful government of the Tsar. In confusion, the autocracy grasps on to its last remaining recourse: it struggles within the loving embrace of the bourgeoisie and its servants, the moderate liberals. The cowardly manifest of the Tsar is a solemn offering of hand and heart to our sworn enemies, our eternal oppressors, the bourgeois class. The proletariat it insures nothing but cloudy promises of all liberties and new threats and coercions. Our strike has delivered an awful blow to the Tsarist government, but it has also shown us that it is impossible to kill it and wipe it from the face of the earth by means of a strike alone. "Weapons!" "Give us weapons!" that is the demand that resounded from all sides. The strike has united and organized us, it has shown the entire world our strength, it has opened the eyes of our blind comrades, it has sparked the thirst for liberty in all the proletariat. The present strike has played its great role, it has given all it can give. We can get nothing more from it. We propose that it be temporarily suspended. Temporarily, comrades! Because we will soon take the field again, we will take the field in the decisive struggle and for that decisive taking of the field we should prepare as follows--"To arms!"--That is our immediate call. Arm yourselves, comrades, with whatever you can, obtain weapons wherever you can. We know that many who have aided us in the strike are leaving us. Many of these will become our enemies and will kiss the hand which only yesterday whipped them. But the terrible proletariat does not need false allies and is not afraid of its enemies as many as there may be. Organize, comrades, close your ranks tightly, and gather under our pure proletarian decisive struggle. We swear by the blood of our fallen comrades that we will not lay down our arms until we destroy the government and obtain the realization of our demands. We will prove that contemporary society is supported only by the strength of proletarian shoulders. And let the entire bourgeois world know that we will bring all our strength to bear against it if it thinks to stand in our way. Suspending the general political strike for now, we propose that those of our comrades who have put forth economic demands, use all means to realize them. Along with that, we call upon all comrades to champion the liberty of speech and assembly with all their strength, everywhere where we have obtained it. And after that, we will quickly prepare ourselves, comrades, for the armed uprising. With armed hands we will overthrow the tsarist government and then the provisional revolutionary government will call together a popular constituent assembly, which will legalize our immediate demands. Let our terrible calls carry over all of proletarian Russia like a storm. To arms! Long live the uprising! Long live the popular constituent assembly! Long live the democratic republic! Long live the struggle for socialism! Long live the Russian Social-Democratic Party!"
APPENDIX VI

LETTER OF OCTOBER 27 TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
SHOWING THE BOLSHEVIK ATTITUDE
TOWARD SOVIETS

The Russian Social-Democratic party must at the present time openly step forward as the party of the Proletarian masses. In the way of such a manifestation it meets politically vague and socialistically immature workers' organizations created by the spontaneously revolutionary proletariat. Each one of these organizations, presenting a certain stage in the political development of the proletariat in so much as this development stays within the ranks of social-democracy. But objectively such an organization faces of holding back the proletariat on a primitive political level and so subordinates it to bourgeois parties.

One such organization is the Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The tasks of Social-Democracy in its relation to the Soviet is to induce it to adopt the Social-Democratic program and tactical leadership. With these aims it is necessary to immediately mobilize all the Social-Democratic forces in the Soviet in order to put the Social-Democratic platform into practice within the Soviet.

In its relations with such independent organizations, in as much as they attempt to take upon themselves the role of the political leaders of the proletarian masses, the tactics of the Social-Democrats should be such:

1) To persuade such organizations to adopt the program of the Social-Democratic Party as the party in accord with the true interests of the proletarian masses. In adopting this program, they should actually define their relation to the Social-Democratic Party, recognize its leadership, and finally, dissolve itself into it. If these organizations should not strive for political leadership but merely remain pure trade organizations, they fulfill their definite purely technical role.

2) In the case of the refusal by such organizations to adopt our party program or their adoption of some other program, Social-Democrats should quit them and expose their anti-proletarian character.

3) Finally, when the organizations refuse to adopt this or that certain program, but reserve for themselves the right to define their policy in each separate instance, Social-Democrats should remain within them and proving within these organizations as well as among the wide masses the absurdity of such political leadership and amplifying their own program and tactics.

APPENDIX VII

RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY

PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

Regulations of the
Workers' Combat Company
of the Moscow Committee of the RSDLP

#1. The Moscow RSDLP imposes the following tasks on its combat company:
First, it must protect all gatherings of organized workers from encroachments by the Black Hundreds, police, and Cossacks.
Second, it must take upon itself the protection of all citizens against the pogroms and lawlessness organized by the police.
Finally, third, it must help the conscious proletariat organize itself for the armed uprising and at the very moment of the uprising must take its place in the front ranks of the proletariat in order to repel the last forces of the autocracy.

One joining the company should calculate his abilities strictly. He should remember that in all conflicts he will be in the forefront and that he will always be threatened by death. A member of the company must be selfless and brave.

#2. Only those persons may be members of the combat company who are well-known by some party organizations and are recommended by it as unconditionally conspiratorial, determined, and devoted to the party.

#3. The company is divided into the active and the reserve components.

#4. The members of the active company are those who have learned to use weapons well, are acquainted with the necessary methods of combat operations, and are possessed of a spirit of strict discipline.

#5. In the reserve are included those persons with preliminary training who wish to join the company but do not meet the requirements of #4.

Note. All local party workers possessing weapons may be included in the reserve.

#6. The active part of the company, constituting the main combat strength of the organization, is divided by districts into details headed by organizers designated by the Committee and approved by the detail. Each detail is composed of several tens made up, if possible, of those working on one plant or living close to each other, and including an elected "Desiatkii" approved by the organizer, a courier, and a scout.

Note. Each new ten of a detachment is recruited from the district reserve under the strict control of the foreman and the organizer.

#7. The responsibility to concern oneself with the prudent growth of the detachment, correct distribution of weapons within the detachment, the correct procedure of military exercises, and so on, falls on the organizer.

At times when the detachment is acting or is performing some service, the organizer is the commander to whose orders all members unconditionally
submit themselves.

Note. For the combat training of each detachment a special instructor may be designated; At the time when the entire company takes the field, the instructor may receive command of the detachment. This fact is to be announced to the detachment by the organizer who from that moment places himself under his command in the role of his closest assistant.

Note 2. The gathering of organizers, under the presidency of a representative of the Committee constitutes the council of the company, managing its internal affairs.

#8. The district organizer can be removed by the demand of a two-thirds majority of a general assembly of the detachment, called together by the representative of the Committee based on the demand of one fourth of the detachment.

#9. It is the responsibility of the "desiatskii" to supervise the distribution of weapons. The responsibility of the distribution of weapons within the ten, the strict account of bullets and their distribution, the supervision of the conditions of the weapons of each member, the calling together of the entire ten on the demand of the organizer, and so on, falls on the "desiatskii." During a period when the ten has taken the field, for example in protecting plant meetings, the "Desiatskii," in the presence of the organizer commands the ten, and consequently, the entire ten is to submit to his orders.

#10. Weapons, given by the organization belong to the organization and not to the individual members. Therefore,

1) No member has the right to arbitrarily dispose of the weapon given to him, to transfer it to other hands, or exchange it with other comrades or give it away for repairs without permission, and so on.

2) Leaving the organization, even temporarily, each is obliged, without fail, to transfer the weapon to the organization, through the "desiatskii."

#11. The right to carry weapons constantly is given only to the active company. Members of the reserve may only have them during target practice and during the fulfillment of some task, if necessary.

#12. In the handling of the weapons, each member is obliged to strictly follow particular instructions and all the directives of the leaders: otherwise, the weapon may be taken away from him by the "desiatskii" or organizer.

#13. To preserve comradely relations members must conform to strict discipline, by the force of which each member is obliged to:

1) To show up in the designated place and time at the first call.

2) During periods of combat activity and service, the company is to submit unconditionally to all the dispositions of the leaders, even if they should seem to be incorrect.

3) Departing from the city for a time, it is obligatory to obtain leave from the "desiatskii" or the organizer, and leave the weapons with him.

#14. Each member must hold the internal affairs of the company in strictest secrecy, not speaking about them needlessly to even the closest comrades.

#15. For a more or less serious breach of the regulations a member may be excluded from the company and this exclusion is possible only by a decree
App. VII (Contd.)

of the comradely court.

Note. Each Desiatniki or organizer may temporarily remove a member from the detachment.

Printing Department of the Moscow Committee.

Vysshii Pod'em Revoliutsii. I, pp. 600-601.
APPENDIX VIII

LEAFLET OF THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE ISSUED ON DECEMBER 4,
CALLING FOR THE PREPARATION FOR A FINAL DECISIVE
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AUTOCRACY.

Comrades! Every day it gets harder for the Tsarist government. Its last support—the army—is also wavering and is beginning to rise directly against it. After Sevastopol, Kronstadt, Piatigorsk, Riga and SamaJa, the army has also rebelled here in Moscow. In the Rostov Regiment all the officers have been expelled, all the authorities' guards have been seized, and the barracks and weapons are in the hands of the rebelling regiment.

The rest of the army is also restless.

Not today, but tomorrow, perhaps, the decisive day will come, when the army will not be in a condition to restrain itself and will come out on the street. Perhaps, the day of the decisive struggle is near. Prepare yourselves, comrades, that you may provide help to your comrades, the soldiers. Prepare yourselves, that we may, through the general strike and other means, help our friends and comrades overthrow the common enemy by force. Organize, prepare for the decisive struggle.

Moscow Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party.

December 4.
APPENDIX IX

CALL OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET AND THE MAJOR REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES IN MOSCOW TO PREPARE FOR THE ARMED UPRISING, ISSUED DECEMBER 6.

TO ALL WORKERS, SOLDIERS, AND CITIZENS

Since October 17 when the working class forcefully tore the promise of various liberties and the "actual" inviolability of the person from the tsarist government, violence on the part of the government did not only not cease but even increased, and human blood is flowing as usual.

Free gatherings where free words can be heard are scattered with weapons. Trade and political unions are cruelly persecuted. Free newspapers are closed by tens. Prison is threatened for striking.

Such mockery and violations are made of the actual "inviolability" of the Russian citizen, that the blood freezes in one's veins.

Again the prisons are being crammed full of fighters for liberty. Entire counties and provinces are being put under martial law. Hungry peasants are being beaten and shot without mercy.

Sailors and soldiers not wanting to be fratricides and joining their people fester in prisons and are drowned and killed.

If all the blood and tears spilled through the guilt of the government only in October were gathered, the government would drown in them, comrades! But with special hatefulness the tsarist government comes down on the working class: concluding an agreement with the capitalists, it throws hundreds of thousands of workers out on the street, dooming them to pauperism and a hungry death.

It places deputies and workers' leaders in prison by tens and hundreds. It threatens to take "exceptional" measures against the representatives of the Social-Democratic Labor Party and the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries.

It has again organized the Black Hundreds and threatens new mass murders and pogroms.

The revolutionary proletariat can no longer tolerate the mockery and crimes of the tsarist government and declares a decisive and unrelenting war against it.

Comrades workers! We, your elected deputies, the Moscow Committee, the Moscow Group, the Moscow District Organization of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, and the Moscow Committee of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries declare a general political strike and call you to drop and stop your work at all factories and plants and in all business and government enterprises on Wednesday, December 7, at 12 o'clock.

Long live the unrelenting struggle with the criminal tsarist government.

Comrades soldiers, you are our blood brothers, children, together with us of the same mother, long-suffering Russia. You have already acknowledged and confirmed this through your participation in the general struggle. Today when the proletariat declares a decisive war on the hateful enemy of the people--the tsarist government--you also act with determination and solidarity.
APPENDIX IX (Cont'd.)

Refuse to submit to your blood thirsty leadership, expell them and arrest them. Elect reliable leaders from among yourselves and with weapons in your hands, unite with the rising people. Together with the working class, obtain the abolition of the army and the general arming of the people. Obtain the abolition of military courts and martial law.

Long live the union of the revolutionary proletariat with the revolutionary army!

Long live the struggle for general freedom!

And you citizens, who truly thirst for widespread freedom, help the rising workers and soldiers as much as you can--by personal participation and general means. The proletarian and the army struggle for the liberty and happiness of all Russia and all the people. The entire future of Russia is placed on a card; life or death, liberty or slavery!

With our united strength we will finally overthrow the criminal tsarist government, convolve a constituent assembly based on general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, and asset a democratic republic which alone can guarantee broad freedom and actual inviolability of the person.

Together into the struggle, comrades workers, soldiers, and citizens.

Down with the criminal tsarist government!
Long live the general strike and armed uprising!
Long live the popular constituent assembly!
Long live the democratic republic!

The Moscow Soviet of Workers Deputies
The Moscow Committee RSDLP
The Moscow Group
The Moscow district Organization
The Moscow Committee of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries
APPENDIX X

Instructions on Guerilla Warfare Issued by
the Bolshevik Moscow Committee,
December 11, 1925.

ADVICE TO THE RISING WORKERS

Comrades! A street battle of rising workers against the army and
police has begun. If you do not adhere to certain rules, many of your bro-
thers may perish in this battle. The combat organization of the Moscow Com-
mittee of the Social-Democratic Labor Party makes haste to point these rules
out and to urge you to follow them strictly.

1. The first Rule--do not act in crowds. Work in small details of
three or four men, not more. Let there be as many of these details as pos-
sible and let them learn to attack quickly and disappear quickly. The police
strives to shoot crowds of thousands of people with a hundred cossacks. You
must put one or two snipers against a hundred cossacks. To fall on a hun-
dred is easier than on one, especially if that one shoots and escapes un-
noticed. The police and army will be helpless if all Moscow is covered with
this small and elusive details.

2. In addition, comrades, do not take up fortified places. The army
always attempts to take them or simply destroy them with artillery. Let
our fortresses be passable yards and all places from which we can shoot and
escape easily. If they take such a place, they will not find anyone there,
and will lose many of their own. It is impossible to take them all, for to
do that it would be necessary to settle every home with a cossack.

3. Therefore, comrades, if anyone should call you to go in a great
crowd or to take a fortified place, consider him a fool or a provocator. If
he is a fool, don't listen to him, if a provocator--kill...

4. Also, avoid going to large meetings. We see them often in free
states, but for now, it is necessary to struggle and only struggle. The
government understands this perfectly and makes use of our meetings to beat
and disarm us.

5. Rather, gather in small clusters for combat conferences, each in
his own district, and at the first appearance of the army, scatter throughout
the yards. From these yards, shoot and throw rocks at the Cossacks and after
that, climb into the neighboring yard and leave.

6. Strictly differentiate between your conscious enemies and your
unconscious and accidental enemies. Destroy the former and have mercy on the
latter. If possible do not bother the infantry. Soldiers are the children
of the people and do not go against the people by their own will. The officers
and the higher leadership set them on the people. Direct your energies
against these officers and authorities. Every officer leading soldiers to
beat workers proclaims himself an enemy of the people and puts himself out-
side the law. Kill him unconditionally.

7. Do not spare the Cossacks. Much of the people's blood is upon
them. They are the constant enemies of the workers. Let them leave for their
own lands, where they have their lands and families, or let them sit shut up
in their barracks. Do not bother them there. But as soon as they come out
on the street--on foot or on horse, armed or unarmed--consider them the most
evil enemies and destroy them without pity.

8. Attack and destroy the dragoons and patrols.

9. In conflict with the police, proceed in this way. Kill all higher
ranks whenever conditions are favorable. Disarm and arrest the others. Also
kill those who are known for their cruelty and meanness. As for the town
militia only take their weapons and compel them to serve not the police but
us.

10. Forbid homeowners to lock their doors. This is very important.
Go after them and if they do not obey, beat them for the first offense, and
for the second--kill them. Compel the homeowners to serve us and not the
police. Then, each yard will be our refuge and place of ambush.

These then, are the most important rules, comrades. In forthcoming
leaflets the combat organization will give you additional advice on how to
protect yourselves, attack, and construct barricades. Now we will say a
few words about something quite different.

Remember Comrades that we want not only to destroy the old order but
to build a new one, in which each citizen will be free from all compulsion.
Therefore, immediately take upon yourselves the protection of all citizens.
Protect them. Make unnecessary that police, which under the disguise of pro-
tector of the social peace and security exercises force over the poor, puts
us in prison, and forms Black Hundred Pogroms:

Our immediate task, comrades is to transfer the city into the hands of
the people. We will begin with the outskirts and seize one part after another.
In the seized part we will immediately establish our elected administration,
install our own order, the eight-hour day, progressive taxes, and so on. We
will prove that under our administration social life will go on more justly,
and the life, liberty, and rights of each will be better protected than now.
Therefore, struggling and destroying, remember your future roles and
learn to be rulers.

Combat Organization of the Moscow Committee of the
Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party.

SPREAD THIS LEAFLET EVERYWHERE, PASTE IT ON THE STREETS, HAND IT OUT TO
PASSESS-BY.

Vysshii Pod'iem Revoliutsii, I, pp. 665-666.
Primary Sources

Akademia Nauk, SSSR, Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Litvy i Dokumenty i Materialy. (Moscow, 1961)

Akademia Nauk SSSR, Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Rossii, Dokumenty i Materialy. (Moscow, 1955-1957)

a) Nachalo Pervoi Revoliutsii, Ianvar-Mart. 1905 Goda
b) Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhenie v Rossii Vesnoi i Letom Aprel-Sentiabr' 1905 Goda
c) Vserossiskaia Politicheskaia Stachka v Oktiabre 1905 Goda
d) Visshii Pod'em Revoliutsii, Vooruzhennie Vosstaniiia, Nolabr'-Dekabr' 1905 Goda


Khrustalev-Nosar', G. Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov g. S. Peterburga, (St. Petersburg, 1906)

Krupskaiia, Nadezhda, Reminiscences of Lenin. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959)


Liatov, M., Iz Zhiznii Partii Nakanunie i v Godi Pervoi Revoliutsii (Vospominaniiia) (Moscow, Universitet Im. Ia M. Sverdlova, 1926)

Listovki i Prokamatsiia Samarskago Komiteta R.S.D.R.P. (b) 1902-1917 gg. (Kuibishev, 1959)

Maevskii, E. 1905 god, Ocherki revoliutsionogo dvizheniia, (1917, Skobolevskaia Komissiia, St. Petersburg & Moscow)

Mitsklevich, A., Revoliutsionnaia Moskva, 1888-1905. (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1946.)

Nevskii, V.(ed.) Dekabr' 1905 na Presne. (Moscov-Leningrad, Agitpropotdel Krasnopresenski otdel Raikoma RKP (b) 1926)

Parvus' (Helphand) Rossii i Revoliutsiiia, (St. Petersburg, S. Glagolev, 1907)

Partiia Bolshevikov v Revoliutsiiia 1905-1907 gg. v Dokumenti i Materialy. (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1964)


Shaurov, V. 1905 god, Vospominaniia Uchastnika Revoliutsiiia 1905-1907 godov. (Moscow, Misl, 1965)
Sh, N.V. Moskovskoe Vosstanie po Datam Svidatelej, (St. Petersburg, Skachkov, 1907)
Sverdlova, K.T. [or], M. Sverdlov, (Sverdlov, Mokodaia Gvardia, 1960).
Sverdlov, Ia, Izabrannie Proizvedeniia' (Gosizdat, Moscow, 1957)
Svetscharoff, D. Im Morgendorf der Revolution (Berlin, Jugeninternational, 1922) Institute Marksisma-Leninisma Pri TsK KPSS.
Tretii S'ed FSDFP, Protokoly, (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1959)
Trotsky, L. 1905. (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1922)
Vorovskii, V.V. Izabrannie Proizvedeniia o Pervoi Russkoi Revoliutsii (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1955)
Visshaia partinnaia Shkola pri tsK KPSS, Bolshevikistskaiia Pechat (Sbornik materialov) (Moscow izdatel'stvo VFSzh AON pri Tsk KPSS, 1960)
Witte, S. Tu. Vospominaniiia, III.
Woytinsky, Vladimir S. Stormy Passages: A Personal History through two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom. (New York, Vanguard Press, 1961)

Secondary Sources

Akhun, M. and Makovskii, A. Voennaia i Boevoia Rabota Bolshevikov v 1905-1907 gg. (Leningrad, Leningradskoie Gazetnov-i-Zhurnalskoe i Knizhnoie Izdatel'stvo, 1941)
Beria, On the Question of the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia. (London, No date)
Bystrykh, F.P. Bolshevikskskie Organizatsii Urala v Revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg. (Sverdlovsk, Sverdlovskoe Knizhnoie Izdatel'stvo, 1959)
Deutscher, The Prophet Armed.
--------- Stalin, a Political Biography. (N.Y., Oxford Press, 1960)
Dulov, N. Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhenie v Vostochnoi Sibiri, 1905-1907 gg. (Irkutsk, 1955)
Efremtsev, Rabochie Kolomni v Pervoi Rosskoi Revoliutsii, 1905-1907 gg. (Moscow, Moskovskie Rabochii, 1955)
Florinsky, Michael T. Russia: A History and an interpretation. (N.Y., Macmillan Company, 1953)
Gavrilo, B. Moskovskie Bolsheviki v Borbe za Armiu v 1905-1907 gg. (Moscow, Moskovskie Rabochii, 1955)
Ivanov, L.M., Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Natsionalnikh Rainonakh Rossii, (Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, Moscow, 1955)
Iakovlev, N.N. Vooruzhenie Vosstaniia y Dekabre 1905 goda. (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1957)
Institute Marksisma Leninisma pri TsK KPSS, Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskago Soiuza. (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1959)
Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetsogo Soiuza. (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959)
Karpovich, Michael, Imperial Russia, 1801-1917. (N.Y., Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1963)
Kasimenko, A.K., Istoriia Ukrainski SVP, (Kiev, "Naukova Kumka", 1965)
Khamatov, Sh. Kh., Kazanskaia Organizatsii Bolshevikov v Gody Pervoi Russkooi Revoliutsii, (Kazan, Tatknigizdat, 1955.)
Kirilov, V., Bolsheviki vo Glave Massovikh Politicheskikh Stachele v Perio Pod'ema Russkoii Revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg. (Moscow, Institute Marksisma-Leninisma, 1961)
Klimov, Revoliutsionskoi Deiatel'nosti Fabochik v Derevne. (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Sotsial-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1960)
Kliueva, Anna D. Moskovskie Bolsheviki vo Glave Vooruzhenoego Vostanija, (Moscow, IZTs. vo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1960)
Konovalov, B. Revoliutsiionskoi Dvizhenie v Armii v Gody Pervoi Russkoii Revoliutsii: Sbornik Statei. (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1955)
Kostomarov, G., Maskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov vo 1905 godu, (Moscow, Moskovskie R,bochikh, 1948)
Martov, L., P. Maslov, A. Postresov, Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie v Rossii v Nachale XX-go Veka. (Petersburg, 1909)
Pankratova, A.M., Pervaya Rosskaia Revoliutsiia, (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1951)
Pares, Bernard, A History of Russia. (N.Y., Random House, 1965)
Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin, (Simon and Schuster, 1964)
Piaskovskii, A.V. Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg v Rossii, (Moscow, Nauka, 1966)
Treadgold, Donald, Lenin and His Rivals. (N.Y., Frederick A. Praeger)
Wolf, Bertram, Three Who made a Revolution, (Dial Press, 1964)

PERIODICALS

Bylee, 1907.
Krasny Arkhiv, 1924, 1925, 1935.
Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, 1925, 1935.
Proletarii, 1905.
Vpered, 1905.
APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Mr. Anthony M. Ivancevich has been read and approved by the director of the thesis. Furthermore, the final copies have been examined by the director and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date: September 26, 1967
Signature of Adviser: [Signature]