The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Security Policy Making: Professionalism and Self-Perceptions, 1942-1961

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THE ROLE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING: PROFESSIONALISM AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS, 1942-1961

by

John Charles Binkley

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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VITA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Looking back on nearly forty years of service at the highest levels of the British government, Lord Hankey asked the following question:

...whether the whole of the control of war should not be delegated by the government to the military authority; in other words, whether a war should be controlled by statesmen or solely by fighting men.¹

His question is deceptively simple; yet it strikes at the very heart of any theory of civil-military relations. Whether it is during peace or during war, the role of the military in policy formulation is central to the security of the state. The question is what form that role will take. While it is correct to say that in democratic societies, based on civilian control, the military performs in an advisory capacity, that answer really only begs the question. If the military are to advise the civilian leadership, then what considerations should the military officer incorporate into his thought process as he strives to fulfill that advisory function.

Within any society, that advisory function is restricted to a handful of senior military professionals who interact with the political leadership. In the United States, this advisory function, since the outbreak of World War II, has

¹Lord Hankey, Government Control in War (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1945), 11.
fallen upon the shoulders of one particular group of military professionals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By law, they are the "principal military advisors" to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Organizationally, the JCS consists of the military heads of the four services, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. They are assisted in their duties by a vast internal organization made up of several thousand military and civilian members. This structure not only advises the civilian leaders on the military aspects of national security questions but it also coordinates and implements the military aspects of the civilian leadership's decisions. Residing within the Chiefs' purview is: the development of war plans, the supplying of military input into the defense budget process, weapon systems acquisition decisions, foreign policy issues, and a multitude of other tasks. All of these have important military and political consequences. The magnitude of these decisions is fully realized when one considers that for almost all of the period since the end of World War II, the defense budget has been the nation's largest single expenditure.

Unfortunately, examining the statutory functions of the Joint Chiefs reveals only the tip of the iceberg concerning their actual role within the national security policy making system. One problem in attempting to determine their
role has been the secrecy that shrouds the inner workings of the JCS. Even governmental task forces examining the activities of the Department of Defense complain that they are not allowed within the inner sanctum of the JCS to observe its operations. Despite this shortcoming, it is apparent that the period between 1945-1960 was crucial in the development of the organization. Although first established during World War II, it was during the first decade and a half after the war that the JCS evolved structurally and defined its relationships with other elements concerned with national security policy. In this regard the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations were the gestation period for the JCS as well as the whole national security policy making structure.

At the outset of this period, the whole structure was organized without any unanimity as to what the final product should look like. Although the National Security Act of 1947 supplied a general framework, it went through three major reorganizations, 1949, 1953, and 1958, as the structure evolved to meet new requirements. With the 1958 reforms the basic structure of the JCS as well as the other elements within the defense community had been finalized. Over twenty years later the nation's military forces are still operating under this basic system. The importance of this gestation period is not exclusively a function of
structure. By the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the basic relationships between the Chiefs and the remainder of the defense policy arena had solidified. The apparent revolutionary changes that occurred in the Defense Department during the 1960s were merely a continuation of the basic trends that already had begun during the 1950s. Thus by the end of this gestation period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not only completed its organizational development, but had clearly established its role within the defense policy making structure. An understanding of the events surrounding that period is essential to comprehend how and why defense related organizations interact today.

Thus far I have referred to the JCS as part of a national security policy making system. The concept of a policy making system is not as precise a scientific phenomenon as some social scientists would like to believe. Instead, it is merely an intellectual construct consisting of those sub-systems (e.g. individuals, groups, or organizations) whose participation is necessary to reach a decision and to make policy. For the purposes of this study we are concerned with those decisions that involve the national security. While the number of possible sub-systems or actors that might be involved in a particular national security issue are almost limitless, all of those issues ultimately are associated in one way or another with the nation's
military might.

Since the Joint Chiefs are the political leadership's "principal military advisors," they are an integral part of that policy system and thus the process of policy integration. If military power is to have any use it cannot exist within a vacuum, but must support the nation's goals. This requires the development of an integrated political/military policy that carefully considers all aspects of national power before ascertaining the nation's political commitments. Through this process the policy maker guarantees that those commitments are compatible with the ability of the nation to support them. But merely identifying an organization as an actor within a specific policy system tells us little about the role it plays. Attempting to determine, by administrative and structural examination, an organization's influence and manner of participation in the policy arena, places the analyst in a position similar to Plato's cave dwelling characters, who only see vague shadows of reality. Part of the reason for this is that the nature of an organization's participation or role is as much molded by bureaucratic forces and self-perceptions as it is by formal structural relations. In order to more carefully define the nature of an organization's participation, and thus the parameters of its role, I propose a heuristic model that consists of four interdependent variables. Despite the
limitations that are associated with all social science models, it will supply a framework within which an effective understanding of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in defense policy making may be developed.

The first of the variables is the sub-system's place within the formal organizational and administrative structure. This structure, along with various statutes, charters and functions papers, identify the key participants and define the formal relationships between them. For the JCS, the National Security Act of 1947 and its ensuing amendments supply this skeleton. An understanding of that framework is an essential first step because the role of the JCS is worked out within the context of that formal structure.

The second variable is the sub-system's own internal organizational dynamics. This consists of the nature of its bureaucracy and its organizational goals. These factors determine how the sub-system will respond to outside agencies and what kind of product it will produce as input for the policy system. Within the JCS, the peculiar nature of its bureaucratic structure is instrumental in influencing the type and content of the Chiefs' advisory input. Furthermore, the nature of bureaucracy impacts upon the Chiefs' relationship with other agencies.

The third variable is the perception of other actors within the system as to what role the sub-system should play.
How important those perceptions are in actually molding the sub-system's role depends on the hierarchical relationship that exists between them. Among the various agencies within the national security policy system, the executive leadership's perception of the Joint Chiefs' role is the most important. That leadership appoints the Chiefs, looks to them for advice, and is their superiors within the military chain of command.

The fourth variable is the sub-system membership's own perception of what their role should be. What the Chiefs believe their own role to be is a crucial factor, because those beliefs will motivate them to act in whatever manner is appropriate to that perception. Granted, outside pressures will have some impact, but it can never equal the self-generated beliefs of the Chiefs themselves. In this regard, the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military professionals is quite important. It supplies the normative basis for their participation not only in the policy process, but also for their relations vis-a-vis the parent society. But professionalism is important beyond its ability to shape the behavior patterns of the officer corps; it also forms the basis of much of the administration's perceptions as to the Chiefs role. Those perceptions are founded upon certain historically derived assumptions as to the nature of civilian control of the military, and of the military professional's
role vis-a-vis the government. Those assumptions in turn are inextricably connected to specific interpretations as to the nature of military professionalism and what subjects the professional may advise the government on. An integral part of the officer's advisory function is the determination of what factors to take into consideration while developing that advice. The criterion by which the officer makes that determination is based upon his own interpretation of professionalism. Thus the perception of what is the proper nature of military professionalism not only affects the officer's relationship with other institutions, but also affects the product he inputs into the policy making system.

With this framework in mind, my study of the JCS will proceed in the following manner. First, I will examine the nature of military professionalism and how it specifically developed in the United States. This will supply the definitional basis for the officer's interpretation of what it means to be a professional within the American context. Next, I will examine the formation of the Joint Chiefs as a wartime exigency and attempt to ascertain the role it played during that conflict. With the end of the war, the Joint Chiefs had institutionalized some of its basic internal structures and developed certain patterned relationships with outside agencies. This pre-1947 background will form the necessary basis to analyze in turn each of the four
variables in my role model: the defense organizational structure, the JCS bureaucracy and the impact of bureaucratic relations on the Chiefs, the administration's perceptions of the Chief's role, and finally the Chiefs' own perceptions of their role. Once this has been accomplished I will look at the Chiefs' actual participation in the process of policy integration. This should supply us with enough insight and empirical data from which I can draw some conclusions as to the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
CHAPTER II

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE OFFICER CORPS' ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

To understand the role the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff play it is first necessary to comprehend the nature and the historical background of military professionalism. The former supplies the basis upon which the military professional determines what his role in policy formulation ought to be, while the latter, to a great extent, determines exactly what his role will be. It would be a mistake to assume that these factors only impinged upon the American military. On the contrary, a great deal of the organizational framework within which the Joint Chiefs operated was borrowed from Europe. With this in mind this chapter will first proceed to examine the sociological definitions of military professionalism, and then determine in some normative fashion what role the military professional has in the development of national policy. Next, it will examine the manner in which that role has evolved historically in both the Prussian and the American experiences. The Prussian experience, in particular, has a great deal to offer, because the general staff model was designed to offer the military a means of contributing to policy formulation. How that
staff model was transferred to the United States and how it blended with the American approach to professionalism is the framework within which the JCS developed.

It was during the sixteenth century that the military first began to develop into a profession, a development that was inextricably connected to the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism and the Protestant Work Ethic.2 Prior to this period, there had been military leaders who devoted their lives to combat service, but sociologists do not consider them professionals because they lacked the three fundamental characteristics that separate a professional from other occupations within the society: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Professional expertise is considered the acquisition of unique knowledge or competency gained through specialized education, training, or experience. Responsibility is the professional's obligation to the service of his society, and the ethical utilization of his expertise. Corporateness is the common bond and sense of unity that exists between members of a profession, and creates the

self-perception that they are different from other social groups. Some of that sense of corporateness is imposed by the profession's own regulations, but some of it is simply a sense of uniqueness and comradery that grows out of a common base of experience. 3

The feudal or pre-feudal concept of officership was based more on class distinction than on individual competency. "Being a warrior and an officer," according to Coates and Pelligrim, "was simply a facet of the aristocratic feudal responsibility." 4 That responsibility was not to the society, but to a class structure. Furthermore, as Coates and Pelligrim point out, the "skills required of the mass of fighting men were directly available in the civilian populace with little if any specialized military training." The result was that the lack of a distinctive corpus of military expertise, plus the class connection to responsibility and corporateness, tended to eliminate pre-modern forms of officership from the professional category.

3Charles Coates and Roland J. Pelligrim, Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life (University Park, Maryland: Social Sciences Press, 1965), 201-203; also see Huntington, Soldier and the State, 7-19.

4Coates and Pelligrim, Military Sociology, 204.
As the modern nation-state began to take form through increased centralization, simultaneously a bureaucratic/technocratic infrastructure came into existence, based upon specialized expertise. Military power was an integral part of the state's consolidation of power and as such the managers of that military power naturally were incorporated into the infrastructure. It was with this modernization process in mind that Swedish sociologist, Bengt Abrahamsson, suggested that one definition of professionalization should be the "historical transition of a particular organization under the impact of major political, economic and technological developments."

The transition that Abrahamsson suggested occurred from the sixteenth century on, but was accelerated by the industrial and technological revolutions that went hand in hand during the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It led to the mass army, the division organization with its concomitant bureaucratization, the development of new weapons and logistics systems, and the movement toward technical specialization. The nature of warfare now demanded of the military officer skills that were not readily available in the civilian community. During the early stages of this transformation the only specialized

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5 Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, 16.
expertise that the military officer needed, that was not found within his own social upbringing, was in the area of artillery and engineering because of their extensive mathematical basis. At first, the military relied exclusively upon civilian specialists, but during the eighteenth century they began to develop their own military academies which were essentially artillery and engineering trade schools. As nineteenth century industrialism forced the officer to acquire even more complex skills, especially in the area of industrial and logistics planning, the military education system was restructured and most Western nations established post-graduate military schools. 6

The growth of this unique specialized military expertise not only fostered modern military professionalism, but also the perception on the part of the officer corps that they were indeed professionals. This perception caused the military to redefine its relationship to the society, especially in light of the fact that the officer corps ceased to be merely military hirelings. Now the professional officer wanted the same kind of relationship vis-a-vis society that other professionals enjoyed. An essential

aspect of the development of expertise was that the profession took upon itself the responsibility to use that expertise in the name of its client, in this case the society. The military professional sought a doctor-patient relationship analogue. The specific nature of that professional relationship is described in Allan Millet's recent study of military professionalism.

The professional, however, asks that he, and not his client, set the conditions under which his knowledge and skill are utilized and that the client accept the professional's definition of what the problem really is. In return for his professional authoritativeness, the professional enters a compact with the client not to go beyond the 'functional specificity' of the profession.7

It is the nature and the precise definition of this "functional specificity" that has been the cause for a reoccurring debate within the profession. This debate has tended to focus on two contending and prescriptively divergent institutional models. While they have been characterized by Arthur Larson as "radical" and "pragmatic" professionalism and by Donald Bletz as "traditional" and "new" professionalism, they are always associated with Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State and Morris Janowitz's The Professional

7Allan Millet, Military Professionalism and Officership in America, A Mershon Briefing Paper #2 (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, 1977), 3.
Soldier, respectively. Both identify the military as a profession, but they markedly differ in their prescription for the professional's role and relationship vis-a-vis the parent society, and the professional's role in an advisory capacity.

Huntington views the professional soldier as primarily a manager of violence in the Laswellian context, i.e., the primary goal of the soldier is to achieve a high degree of expertise within the narrowly defined boundaries of that management function. The military professional becomes the technically proficient, politically neutral tool of the state. In order to achieve this goal, a divergent military, isolated from the larger, more liberal society becomes a necessity. Naturally, this restricts the professional soldier's role in policy formulation to advising on only the military perspective of any issue. To do otherwise would be unprofessional, and theoretically impose a threat to civilian control. Implicitly, such an approach can only be optimized when the officer views the world as a series of easily definable compartmentalized groupings of factors, within which one can discern the military parameter from others.

Janowitz, on the other hand, views the military as a sub-system of the larger society. This leads him to reject the radical professionals' isolation and to replace it by a military more congruent with the parent society, i.e., a pragmatic or "constabulary force." Janowitz assumes that as the traditional uses of military power become altered by technological advances and a changing political environment, so also does the traditional dichotomy between war and peace. In its place stands the ambiguous nature of limited conflict, where victory becomes an illusive goal. To operate effectively within such an environment, the constabulary officer corps must be cognizant of the non-military factors which characterize modern international conflict and incorporate those factors into his input.

This debate between the "radical" and the "pragmatic" positions stems from confusion as to the military's role within the state's political structure. "Radicalism" presupposes that war is a uniquely different phenomenon from peace, and concludes that the political and the military aspects of the state are separate. The "pragmatist" rejects this bifurcation of political and military matters, believing instead that war and peace both belong on the same continuum as do other forms of the political intercourse of the state. If the "radical" approach is correct, then the military, based upon the client-professional relationship,
should demand complete autonomy in military matters. Furthermore, the only measure of success and competency within the "radical" perspective can be victory on the battlefield. Maximizing combat efficiency is just one more rationale for the "radical's" claim to autonomy.

The key variable in both of these approaches is the relationship of professionalism to the officer corps' proper role in policy formulation. That, in turn, is based upon what factors the officer incorporates into his analysis and has internalized into his cognitive process. For Janowitz, the lack of such factor incorporation results in an "absolutist" professional, who believes that the objectives of the state are achieved through military victory, and that the more total the victory, the more total the achievement of those goals. Limited war becomes inconceivable since total victory is the only objective worth attaining. For Huntington, the internalization of non-military factors violates the officer's professionalism, and undermines "objective civilian control" which is the only way the state can remain non-militarized. Obviously, Huntington rejects the viability of fusionism, which is the melding of non-military considerations and perceptions with the military ones. Janowitz, on the other hand, demands it. It is within this paradigm that all analysis involving the professional military officers' role in policy formulation resides.
Unfortunately, the radical model has focused its attention on the issue of civilian control of the military, as opposed to the more crucial issue of the development of sound military advice. Both contending positions agree that military power is a necessary tool and should support the policy goals of the state. On this point, they differ little from the ideas of the nineteenth century military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz. While Clausewitz never addressed these issues in terms of differing sociological models, his examination of the nature of war and the professional soldier's role in policy formulation substantiates the correctness of the pragmatic position.

Clausewitz bases his claim to pragmatism upon his universally famous definition of war:

War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out the same by other means.  

War is not only an act of political intercourse, a form of conflict resolution, but it is also an instrument to achieve political goals. The use of the term "by other means" does not mean that war is different from other forms of political interaction. On the contrary, war is simply one type of political interaction that exists between states, the only

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difference is that it is "settled by bloodshed." There exists a spectrum of potential instruments at a government's disposal, ranging from peaceful trade to war itself. None of these are totally separable from each other just as the colors of a spectrum are inseparable.

...That war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means. We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same time this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, it is not changed into something quite different, but that in essence, it continues to exist whatever may be the form of the means that it uses.  

Thus in one sense the term "politics" was broadened to include all aspects of state power.

For Clausewitz it was axiomatic that the amount of conflict that existed between states determined how states interacted and how war or any other tool of statecraft was used. The greater the importance or emotional tie to a goal the greater the propensity to use force. Thus the objective will be the standard for determining the means.  

Since war was a political act, military power should never be divorced from its guiding political policy. Military action of itself without the successful resolution of

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10 Ibid., I, 121.

11 Ibid., III, 121; also see I, xxiii-xxiv.

12 Ibid.
political conflict becomes "a senseless thing without an object." If it does not have policy to guide it, military power will establish its own calculus of success, which will be measured in military terms, i.e., victory. Janowitz's theoretical model of the absolutist who strives for the defeat of the enemy regardless of the political goals of the state, results from the separation of military power from policy. While the radical theorists may attempt to disconnect themselves from such absolutism, their claim to professional autonomy and the rejection of fusionism is the basis for absolutism. In order to avoid this situation, the rational development of foreign policy by a government must carefully consider its military option.

The process by which a state chooses which instrument to use is the formulation of foreign policy. For policy to be effective, it must conceptualize the political goals of the state and take into consideration the power or capabilities which the state has at its disposal. Out of necessity, the state's military capabilities must be compatible with the state's political goals or commitments. Implicit within this logic was the assumption that a state's policy goals are constrained by the physical capabilities the state has at

13 Ibid., I, 122.
14 Ibid., III, 124.
its disposal. Obversely, a state's capabilities must be structured and utilized in such a manner so as to fulfill its commitments. Only through rational guidance supplied by the political/military decision making structure can a nation avoid imbalancing its commitments and capabilities.

It is in the process of developing this rational policy that the military officer's advisory role comes into play, or as Clausewitz points out that "innermost part of its [war's] domain, where all the other threads meet."\(^{15}\) That domain is the development of war plans, or in a broader context, the development of policy. If war or power is to be a useful political tool or a political act, then a well organized policy is the key. In many ways, it may have been the most tragic part of Clausewitz's premature death, that Book VIII (which dealt with the question of policy formulation) was only in preliminary draft form. Clausewitz hoped to fully develop his ideas on the spectrum of war "by which everything will be simplified," and to "iron out the many creases in the heads of strategist and statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to be considered in war."\(^{16}\) This chapter is critical to our study since it is here that Clausewitz outlines the method by which efficient policy was to be made and the role of

\(^{15}\) Ibid., III, 99.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., I, xxiv.
the military officer in that formulation. By doing so he prescribed the proper nature of military professionalism.

From the above, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the crux of good policy is the identification of those goals that the state considers important. That is an over simplification. How does a state arrive at that identification, especially if one considers that the capabilities to achieve those goals must be commensurate with those goals? The apparent solution to this problem is bureaucratic interface between the military officer who deals in capabilities and the politician who supplies the commitments or goals. But there is a danger of being drawn into a chicken and egg dilemma when attempting to discern which should be the dominating factor—the policy or the military force to support it. Despite all the above, this is not as ridiculous a fear as it may appear. While Clausewitz emphasized it would be contrary to his whole theory if "policy makes demands on war it cannot respond to," he was a very practical military officer. He fully realized that the types of problems confronting the professional military advisor necessitate immediate solutions, and normally military solutions at that. This combination creates a situation where it may well be possible to posit logically that capabilities guide commitments, and thus situations ought to be analyzed from that perspective. On
this point Clausewitz answered:

The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.\textsuperscript{17}

If the military point of view became dominant, it would mean that the military goal had replaced the political goal as the objective of the state. But the term "subordination" contradicts our earlier conclusion that war is a political act. If this is true, then there can be no "military" wars, only "political" ones.\textsuperscript{18} In this context, war takes on a multiplicity of meanings from actual military conflict to military planning during peacetime, but such planning without regard to the political environment "becomes nothing more than a combination of a few factors of time and space, directed toward an arbitrary goal."\textsuperscript{19} If military planning is to perform any function at all, it must become another form of political planning designed to achieve the political goals of the state.

It is the actual exercise of policy formulation that produces the cohesive direction by which a state achieves

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., III, 124-125.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., III, 126.

\textsuperscript{19} Quoted in Peter Parot, Clausewitz and the State (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 379.
its goals. If the synonymous relationship between political and military planning is correct, then the corollary is the absence of any differentiation between the political and the military points of view. Once it is understood that there are no military wars, only political ones; then there is no military point of view, only varied political views with the integration of different modes of effort.

According to this point of view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely military judgement and the decision is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial, indeed it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely military opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do.\(^{20}\)

To avoid this not only is bureaucratic interface between the statesman and the soldier required, but intellectual fusion as well. This process can only occur if the soldier incorporates into his intellectual process an awareness of non-military factors. For the officer to preface his advice with the caveat "from the military point of view" is absurd as well as dysfunctional, because "there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, or a purely military scheme to solve it."\(^{21}\) All military considerations and all strategic plans are political in nature. The military officer who fails to

\(^{20}\)Clausewitz, *On War*, III, 126; (emphasis added).

\(^{21}\)Quoted in Parot, *Clausewitz*, 380.
incorporate such considerations into his advice is a failure to his profession because, in the last analysis, "none of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into political relations." 22

But what of the civilian political decision maker; what was his role in the Clausewitzian scheme of things? Obviously, there must be an inextricable relationship between the political and the military advisors so policy does reflect the maxim that war is a political act. The politician must understand the state's capabilities and work to keep them in tune with the state's commitments. It is the politician who must never allow the military point of view to become dominant by forcing commitments to conform to capabilities:

But still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a statement of the available means of war be laid before the General, that he may draw out a purely military plan for the War or for campaign in accordance with those means. 23

In the final analysis, any artificial distinction between the military aspects of national power and the political aspects undermines the totality of Clausewitz' approach to

22Clausewitz, On War, III, 126. As part of this intellectual fusion between the soldier and the civilian, the civilian decision maker must have an understanding of the capabilities which his military possess. But even more important is an understanding of the proper use of the military instrument. "...a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political intercourse." Clausewitz, On War, III, 127.

23Ibid., III, 126.
policy making. In order to ensure the realization of that approach both the soldier and the statesman must reject any compartmentalization of political from military planning, and with it the "radical" model of military professionalism.

Thus it is through the "pragmatic" model of professionalism that the military can exercise "responsibility" and help pave the way for the effective integration of political and military policy. While Clausewitz supplied the intellectual and theoretical framework for the development of coordinated political/military policy, he failed to offer an organizational structure that could implement this theory. The closest he came was to suggest that the head of the military should be a member of the cabinet so "that he may take part in the councils and decisions on important occasions." He apparently failed to comprehend that modern war had become too complex for one man to fully understand the ramifications and interrelationships of various actions. The policy planner needed a staff of experts to digest that mass of material and to rationally develop a policy after examining all the possible options. In theory, such an organization could have been the Prussian General Staff.

\[24\] Clausewitz, On War, III, 127; implicitly Clausewitz is calling for civilian control of the military, but such controls were within a fusionist environment.
The formation of the general staff system was symptomatic of the managerial revolution that occurred in the industrial West during the nineteenth century. Whereas earlier staffs were merely functional specialists, usually in collateral civilian fields, the general staff model offered the managerial tool to enable the government's leadership to control and direct its vast resources in time of war.

Scharnhorst, who is considered the father of the modern Prussian General Staff, realized that the successful use of the mass army, with its independent corps and divisions, necessitated the creation of an organization that was "capable of ensuring the effective subordination of the independent units to central control." Unfortunately, concentrating only on controlling combat units ignored the staff's greater potential. By placing the General Staff at the highest organizational levels it could effectively subordinate and control the various elements of national power, and become in the words of professor Frank Simonie


"the bureaucratization of supreme military power." 27

The precise nature of a general staff has become lost in the confusion of myth and the varied national interpretations of the concept. A staff officer is a primary assistant of the commander. He is a source of information and advice, normally on a specific functional area, and it is through him that orders related to that area are issued and followed up on. While the staff officer may issue orders, he does so only in the name of the commander because a staff officer never commands. As war became more complex, it was necessary to broaden some of the supervisory functions of certain staff officers and they evolved into a managerial elite. Spencer Wilkinson, whose book, The Brain of an Army, greatly influenced the formation of the British and the American staff structures, described the Prussian General Staff in the following way:

The duties of command are so multifarious that some consistent distribution of functions among the officers of a large staff is indispensable. In Prussia this distribution is based on a thoroughly rational and practical principle. The general's work is subdivided into classes, according as it is concerned with the direction of the operations against the enemy. All that belongs to administration and discipline is put upon one side of a dividing line, and upon the other side all that directly affects the preparation for or the management of the fighting—in technical language, all that falls

within the domain of strategy and tactics. The officers entrusted with the personal assistance of the general in this latter group of duties are in Prussia called his "general staff." They are specially trained in the art of conducting operations against an enemy...²⁸

Wilkinson, as most analysts of the General Staff, has focused his attention on the staff's operational mission, i.e., guaranteeing operational integrity and unity of action. Within this aspect of the General Staff's mission, the "radical" approach to military professionalism dominates, and operational efficiency, combat effectiveness, and the staff officer's technical proficiency are considered paramount. But Wilkinson, in his discussion of the Prussian Staff tends to ignore the staff's planning mission. If one considers the analogue that Wilkinson has constructed by titling his book The Brain of an Army, then the staff's operational mission is similar to that of the human nervous system, while the planning mission is that of the controlling brain. Granted planning occurs concurrently within operational organizations, but at the highest level operational considerations become less important as political/military planning takes place. It is at this level that Clausewitz' call for pragmatism should be implemented. From the practical viewpoint, the Prussian General Staff implemented this dual but interrelated staff function. One group of staff

officers (Truppengeneralstab) were distributed to the field commands to guarantee unity of operations. A smaller group (Grosser Generalstab) remained in Berlin to develop war plans and were concerned with the development of military input into political/military planning. Thus the general staff model consists of military planning at the highest level, and then the operational implementation of those plans through the field commands. 

The comparison of the general staff model to a managerial tool is drawn as a result of the developmental analogue between the growth of the state and large corporations. Just as administering large businesses became too complex for the individual entrepreneur to maintain control, so governing of the state became too complex for the individual statesman. Managerial scientists, such as Frederick W. Taylor, suggested that the solution was to be found in the formation of a planning staff. Such a planning department would not only be concerned with the effective day-to-day running of the factory, but also long-term growth and reinvestment. The same is true of the general staff; it would be concerned with not only the immediate operational aspects of war plans, but also long-range 

The Prussian General Staff had the potential to help institutionalize the integration of political/military policy, but its role and theoretical base became perverted over the remainder of the century due to a narrow definition of military professionalism. The result was an over-concern for its operational function at the expense of policy integration. Slowly, the military point of view became dominant. By the end of World War I, the concept of war as an extension of politics had become reversed as a result of Ludendorff's sophistry. Ludendorff's rule subordinated the political goals of the state to the military point of view as war was totalized. Since he and the General Staff were the true military experts, and the only means of achieving victory in total war was to maximize military efficiency, it was only natural that Germany should be run as a military dictatorship.

In America, on the other hand, Clausewitz was not just perverted, but totally rejected. Instead of the fusionism that was demanded by his theories, diplomacy was

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compartmentalized from military planning and a professional military ethic developed that inculcated this compartmentalization. The reason may be found in a series of inextricably related factors stemming from America's colonial heritage and the nature of the military profession.

From the very beginning of the colonial experience, Americans viewed themselves and their New World as something quite different from the Europe they left behind. This new hemisphere represented a rejection of feudalism, Catholicism, despotism, and political persecution. Out of this particular world-view developed the American image of war and its relationship to policy. As the Republic matured, the colonial sense of escape was transposed into political isolationism and a repudiation of the time honored European system of Realpolitik. According to the American perception of the world, only despotic states had power as their goal, and deceit and secret diplomacy as their means. Americans apparently believed the line from Pericles' Funeral Oration "We alone do good to our neighbors not upon the calculations of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank

and fearless spirit."

After rejecting power politics as an acceptable approach, it was logical to establish a clear delineation between war and peace. Since it was the search for power that brought on war, America's liberal optimism posited that democracies would never launch an aggressive war. Thus all wars fought by democracies were, by definition, defensive and just.\footnote{Robert Tucker, \textit{The Just War} (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1960), 11.} War became a holy crusade with good ultimately triumphing over evil. Since war was rejected as an act of policy or even as a part of the normal political intercourse or states, it became compartmentalized from diplomacy.

The second factor that led to the bifurcation of diplomacy from military planning was the nation's image of the military. This image, which manifested itself in the form of civilian supremacy and anti-militarism, resulted from America's colonial heritage and Anglo-Saxon traditions. Since England was not a continental power, it was possible to base its army on a militia system; while the fear of another Cromwell made it desirable. Aside from these traditions though, there were practical reasons for the successful transplanting of the militia system to the New World. The communal nature of the early colonies did not allow for
the luxury of a non-productive military, and the omnipresent Indian threat secured the militia's place in colonial society.

The consequences of this very necessary commitment to the citizen soldier were great. First, it contributed to the myth of the militia's effectiveness and preparedness, which in turn laid the basis for the nation's mobilization posture up to World War II. Second, it obviated the necessity for having a professional standing army. No matter how effective or necessary a professional military became, it was considered a necessary evil that had to be isolated from the mainstream of American society.

Such isolation did occur, both as a requirement of mission and as a desire of the society. The Navy's mode of operation isolated it during its long cruises, and the Army became isolated because of its exile to duty on the frontier. These necessary separations from society conformed to the desires of many of its members. Echoing this sentiment, Albert Gallatin, member of Congress and former Cabinet official wrote:

The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where hardly any other inhabitants are to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary

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evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the face of one [soldier] in our cities and intermixed with the people. 35

This isolation was made even worse by the attitudes of the civilian decision makers. Inculcated with the concept of civilian control, they took the idea too literally, and translated civilian control into the absence of military input into the policy making structure. This attitude was not just restricted to the military's involvement in wartime policies. William Jennings Bryan's famous cry that military officers "could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do, till we actually got into war," referred to peacetime foreign policy decisions. 36

That this isolation would have an impact on the self-perceptions of the officer corps was only natural. Professor Burton M. Sapin in his study of the military's role in American foreign policy noted that this isolation "was bound to have some impact on their [the officers'] view of the world, and more practically, on their ability to consider


non-military factors in their planning, training, and operations." Sapin's observation alludes to the growth of "radical" professionalism among the American officer corps. This professionalism restricted the officer from incorporating non-military factors and limited him to looking at the world exclusively from the military point of view. If "radical" professionalism did dominate, it would negate any chance of the officer corps developing "pragmatism," and result in the military officer simply being incapable of supplying the type of advice that the civilian policy maker needed. Just as it is "an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely military opinion," it is equally irrational for the military to perceive the world in purely military terms.

Within this environment, the American military developed all the external manifestations of professionalism: a formalized education system, specialized journals, social

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38 Clausewitz, On War, III, 126.
organizations, and so forth. Concomitant with these institutions were the internal criteria of expertise, responsibility and social cohesion. While the latter two criteria strengthened the individual's internal solidarity with the group, it was expertise that separated the professional soldier from his arch competitor--the militiamen. It was only natural for the professional, believing in his own expertise, to postulate that war had so fundamentally changed during the second half of the nineteenth century, that only the expert could deal with it. With a certain amount of justification, the professional looked upon himself as the sole reservoir of that expertise. At first his new self-awareness was directed against the professional's old enemy, the militia, but slowly the civilians who "controlled" the professionals became a point of focus. The civilian policy maker was no better prepared to deal with the complex strategic-military issues of modern war than the militia was to fight those wars.

This professional perception of the failure of the American military system was most effectively articulated

West Point was merely the first of the various institutions that were formed to instill expertise and with it professionalism. In 1881 the Command and General Staff College was formed at Fort Leavenworth, and in 1901 the Army War College was established. Each school was formed with the idea of furthering the professional officer's education in his area of military expertise. The Navy went through a similar experience but slightly earlier, with the Naval War College being established in 1884.
in the writing of one man, General Emory Upton. A Civil War general and later an instructor at West Point, Upton was the author of numerous works on military policy. He was writing his most important work, *The Military Policy of the United States*, at the time of his suicide in 1881. This work not only reflected a growing sense of professionalism, but helped proselytize it. On the surface, it is a polemical attack on the traditional American assumption of a militia based military. It develops a strong argument for a professional army and an officer corps based upon the criterion of expertise; but the argument implicitly carries beyond the question of the militia's ability to fight, and questions the civilian's ability to lead. The fact that the civilians continue their infatuation with the militia is, to Upton, just a further exhibition of their lack of understanding of the complex military realities of the day. For Upton and many of the professionals, congressional and administration interference during the Civil War epitomized such civilian incompetence. "If you want to know who was the cause of three years of war after we created a disciplined

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40Emory Upton, *Military Policy of the United States*, reprint of 1904 edition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968). Elihu Root was given a copy of the unpublished draft, and it was the Secretary of War that promoted its publication in 1904.
army of 600,000 men, it was Stanton. His solution to the problem that faced the professionals was encapsulated in a single sentence:

Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support armies, and subject to the supervision of the President, only professional soldiers should command them.

Upton was not actually questioning the principle of civilian control, because he, like most of the other professionals, had accepted it as part of their professional dogma. It is just that he sought to isolate war time operations from the non-professionals. Unfortunately, once expertise became the criterion for determining control, then civilian control itself came into question.

The direction in which Upton's arguments would lead is clearly seen in a somewhat prophetic civil-military conflict that occurred some twenty years after his death. After the Spanish-American War the pacification of the Philippine Islands was placed under the direction of General Arthur MacArthur. During his tour, he had a confrontation over powers and prerogatives with the civilian governor of the islands, William Howard Taft. Taft's power was based upon a set of orders issued by the President of the United


42 Upton, Military Policy, xi; emphasis added.
States. MacArthur viewed such Presidential instructions as "an unconstitutional interference with his prerogatives as Military Commander of these islands."\(^{43}\) It is apparent that the elder MacArthur believed that once a military officer had been given a mission, the civilian leadership should allow him to complete it without interference. Such expertise, if unhindered, would not only achieve the required defeat of the enemy, but do it quickly and efficiently. The insertion of non-military factors can only detract from this mission. This example was symptomatic of the officer corps' acceptance of "radical" professionalism.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the American military professional was exhibiting many of the same traits as his German counterpart. Both claimed, by virtue of their expertise, complete autonomy in military operations, to the exclusion of political considerations; but the American professional, because of his heritage and liberal values, never really threatened civilian control. Unfortunately, the bifurcation of political considerations from military planning, which was an offshoot of that same liberal tradition, destroyed any chance of generating the

kind of fusionism that true policy integration demands. The assumption that fusionism would somehow lead to Prussianization failed to take into consideration the differences in the political and social structure between the two states.

Despite these impediments to policy integration, the changing role of the United States during the last part of the nineteenth century demanded some form of organizational reform. These efforts culminated after the Spanish-American War with the formation of the Army General Staff, the Navy General Board, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy. Of these three organizations, only the Army created something that resembled the European general staff model. The other two organizations were essentially coordinating boards without any institutional staff support, and in the case of the Joint Board no authority. 44

The Army came out of the Spanish-American War badly in need of organizational reform. The War revealed its internal defects to such an extent that they could not be ignored. The selection of poor camp sites in the Southern part of the United States, the problems in issuing proper arms and equipment (to include woolen uniforms to troops going into a tropical climate), the massive confusion in

transporting the U.S. forces to Cuba, and the scandals that were reported involving the efforts to supply the troops (to include the infamous embalmed beef scandal), ultimately reflected coordination and planning difficulties. These difficulties in turn highlighted the power struggle between three competing loci of power: the Secretary of War, the Commanding General of the Army, and the bureau chiefs. Although there was no question as to the role of the President as commander-in-chief, "the difficulty," according to Major General Otto Nelson, "arose on the level just below the President where a duality of control existed that had caused bickering and confusion for more than a century."

Although the Secretary of War was the regularly constituted official through whom the President's wishes were presumably to be effectuated, the General Commanding the United States Army had come to occupy, through a long-standing custom aided by Congressional action, a position which was in some respects coordinate with that of the Secretary of War.45

The result of this duality of command was that many of the subordinate elements within the War Department considered themselves to be under the exclusive control of the Secretary or the Commanding General. The independence that many of the bureau chiefs maintained, based upon political ties to Congress and the tenure of their position, exacerbated this situation. Thus there was no single agency in a

position to coordinate the various organizations.

In order to implement this badly needed reform, President McKinley appointed Elihu Root as Secretary of the Army. Root came from a business and legal background, and was thus sympathetic to managerial solutions to organizational problems. He "saw clearly how the muddles all stemmed from the failure of the parts of the Army structure to work in unison," and offered as a solution the creation of a brain to coordinate the service's various activities. The establishment of this brain required two important and interrelated organizational reforms. First, he sought to replace the Commanding General of the Army with a new position, Chief of Staff of the Army. Second, he wanted to create a general staff to help the new Chief of Staff fulfill his duties. Both of these reforms came about in 1903.

These reforms eliminated the duality of command that existed earlier. Even in the Prussian system, where the Chief of the German General Staff actually commanded the army, he did so in the name of the king, who was the commander-in-chief. In place of command, the new American Chief of Staff would head the staff and as such would be the primary advisor to the Secretary of War. Root explained this change of title and function as follows:

46 Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization, 197.
The title chief of staff—denotes a duty to advise, inform, and assist a superior officer who has command, and to represent him, acting in his name and by his authority, in carrying out his policies and securing the execution of his commands. The officer who accepts the position assumes the highest obligation to be perfectly loyal to his commander, to exclude all personal interests from his advice and representation, and to try, in the most wholehearted way, to help him to right conclusions and to successful execution of his policies, even though his conclusions may not agree with the advice given.47

Superficially, it seemed that this completed the organizational restructuring.

Unfortunately, Root's reforms failed to take into consideration the growing sense of professionalism within the Army and the bureaucratic imperatives of the institution. In theory the Chief of Staff is powerless to act on his own for he is not a commander, but he is still the senior officer within the Army. Within the military frame of reference the senior officer is normally regarded as the commander. From the officer corps' perspective, the issue at stake was the unity of responsibility and authority. The old military adage, "that a commander is responsible for everything that his units do or fail to do," reflects the importance of authority. This, in turn, led the military professional to want to keep unified the planning function and the command function. The ultimate responsibility for the actions of a

47 War Department, Five Years of the War Department. Following the war with Spain as shown in the annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903 (1904), 207-98; quoted in Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 18-19.
staff falls upon the commander of that staff. The result of this institutional desire to merge military responsibility and military authority was that the Army perceived the Chief of Staff as the Commander. As the Chief of Staff began to be considered the senior officer in the service, an issue that was not fully resolved until after the First World War, and as he assumed the role of senior spokesman for the professional establishment, the confusion over his command role simply increased.\(^48\) This duality of functions between planner and commander will be addressed in greater depth in later chapters.

In order to support the Chief of Staff in his planning and coordinating functions, Root proposed to create a general staff along the European model. But the Uptonian professionalism that inculcated the officer corps forced the new staff to become overly concerned with operational and administrative details, to the detriment of its planning function.\(^49\) This was not exclusively the fault of the officer corps. For even if they had been prepared to deal with issues related to policy integration, there was no other agency outside the Army with which to coordinate.

Just as the Army had to initiate reform in order to accommodate the changing American strategic role, so did the

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Navy. The major difference was that the Navy never did accept the highly centralized notions that were implicit in the Root reforms. Instead, it maintained a decentralized structure. The reason was not exclusively narrow professionalism. In fact one may argue effectively, as does Richard Challener, that the Navy, because of the nature of its mission, had a greater understanding of the political realities of the world than did the Army. 50 This sense of pragmatism can be seen in the writings of Alfred T. Mahan. Despite this pragmatism, demands for the creation of a Navy general staff by some of the young turks failed, and the Navy managed to avoid staff centralization up to World War II.

Some marginal internal reform was initiated in the wake of the Spanish-American War. Although a general staff was never created, the Navy did establish the General Board in 1900. This organization had no executive responsibility nor authority. It was primarily a planning agency. In this regard, it may actually have been closer to a general staff than the Army version. One of the major impediments to centralization was the clear distinction between support/administrative aspects of the Navy, and the combat portion. The former remained under the control of the bureau chiefs

who maintained their autonomy, not only by political power, but through functional specialization. One abortive effort to centralize power in the Navy occurred in 1915 with the formation of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Paul Hammond in his study of military organizations suggests that the original intent by Navy reformers was to establish a position analogous to that of the Army's Commanding General, a position that would centralize all naval organization. Unfortunately, through a combination of internal naval disagreements and the desires of the civilian leadership, such centralization never occurred until World War II. 51

The Joint Board of the Army and the Navy, formed the same year as the General Staff, held out the potential for becoming an organization for policy integration. Originally established in order to facilitate Army-Navy planning, which was relatively unsuccessful during the Spanish-American War, the Joint Board's creation was an essential step toward policy integration, because the services themselves had to reach agreement on strategic issues before military policy could be integrated with political policy. Prior to its formation, as Lawrence Legere points out, "there never existed, except in the person of the President himself, any regular constituted agency to provide coordination of the

51 Hammond Organizing for Defense, chapter 3.
planning and activities of the Army and Navy." 52 Root had considered the creation of a joint planning structure, the obvious managerial companion to his own Army General Staff, 53 but the lack of authority and a supporting staff destroyed whatever value the Board had. One senior officer was so disenchanted with the structure that he wrote that what was accomplished "could have been solved by other means or placed in a waste basket without seriously affecting either service." 54

While such criticism was correct, it failed to consider the impact of traditional bifurcation of political and military policy and its concomitant introverted military professionalism. The Department of State, "jealous of its legal and historical responsibility for the formulation and conduct of America's foreign policy," excluded the Joint Board from its planning process, thus leaving the military in


54 Quoted in Legere, "Unification," 57; also see Vernon Davis, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Development (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), Vol. I covers the development of the Joint Board up to the creation of the JCS after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
a perceived policy vacuum. The result of this vacuum was to leave the Joint Board in a quandary. They were the professional military experts who were to advise the civilian leadership on military matters, but how could they do so unless they had some idea of the long range goals the civilian leaders wanted to achieve? In 1908 the Joint Board's President, Admiral George Dewey, succinctly expressed this dilemma:

What may be the facts determining the international relations only the administration can know, and until this knowledge is communicated to the Joint Board, it can not intelligently make recommendations as to the specific disposition of the fleet...

Later that year this statement was repeated almost verbatim when the board informed the President that they could make no specific recommendation on the defense of the Pacific until "the facts determining international relations" were given to them and they were told what policies and interests

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55 Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, & American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51. In 1909 the Solicitor of the State Department responded to the Joint Board's call for a conference with the following statement, "as the Department of State is charged with the administration of foreign affairs, and as this conference...falls within the jurisdiction of this department, it would seem that the Department of State might well refuse to surrender its prerogatives." Quoted in Challener, Admirals, 53. Later in the 1920's the State Department again rejected coordination with the Joint Board, see Ernest May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXX, No. 2 (June, 1955), 169-172.

56 Quoted in Challener, Admirals, Generals & American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51.
they were to defend.\textsuperscript{57}

This perceived lack of guidance forced the military at times to rely on their own assumptions, which were naturally produced from a service and military perspective. At times, this resulted in inter-service rivalry which undermined the Joint Board's credibility. At other times, it resulted in advice which was opposite that which the civilian leadership desired.\textsuperscript{58} One such example occurred in 1913 during the war scare with Japan. The Joint Board recommended the movement of ships into the Eastern Pacific in an effort to prepare for the worst case. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels' response to this recommendation was "nothing could be more injurious to peaceful negotiations than the movements recommended and that the Board had exceeded its functions because what it recommended might precipitate war."\textsuperscript{59}

Secretary of State Bryan remarked:

While we were discussing how to prevent a threatened war, these men were busying themselves with plans of how to

\textsuperscript{57}Quoted in Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy," 41.


get us in. It is enough for the Army and Navy to make plans when the Commander in Chief calls upon them to do so.\footnote{Ibid., 165. For a further examination of the civil-military problems that occurred during the Wilson Presidency see Warner R. Schilling, "Civil-Naval Politics in World War I," World Politics, Vol VII, No. 4 (July, 1955).}

In this case the President dissolved the Joint Board, but it merely illustrates the fundamental problem in integrating American political and military policy. On the one hand, the professional military officer feels that he is not receiving the kind of guidance that is necessary for him to produce relevant military input; on the other hand, the civilian leadership perceives that the kind of advice they do get from the military ignores the broader ramifications of military operations and thus is essentially useless.\footnote{For an examination of this problem see Fred Green "The Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940," The American Historical Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, (January, 1961); May, "Political Military Consultation;" Louis Morton, "Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration," in Total War and Cold War, Harry S. Coles, ed. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1961); Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 2 (January, 1959); Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy Without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," Military Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1961). For the most detailed study of the pre-World War I period see Challener, Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914.}

During the Naval Conferences of the 1920's and 1930's the American naval high command was explicitly excluded for this reason.\footnote{Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmament in the 1920's" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (December 1958).} The history of American policy in the Pacific is
a further example of lack of integration. This is not to say that the State Department was oblivious to the importance of the military tool, but appreciation did not necessarily lead to integration. Furthermore, bureaucratic acumen was something fundamentally different from pragmatic professionalism. This continued compartmentalization of the political and military spheres, partially brought about by an exaggerated sense of civilian control of the military, and partially by the military's own professionalism, continued until the Second World War.

As war seemed more likely during the late 1930's, the United States began to develop organizations to facilitate policy integration. The first of these was the Standing Liaison Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments (usually referred to as S.L.C.) formed in April 1938. Originally, the Standing Liaison Committee proposed to deal with the specific problem of German involvement in Latin America, but it held the potential to become the long missing institutional means of policy integration. Unfortunately, even


64 Mable E. Deutch, Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General Fred C. Ainsworth (Washington: The Public Affairs Press, 1962); for a full discussion of the political machinations that were occurring in Washington, especially in regard to the formation of the General Staff, see Otto Nelson, National Security and the General Staff.
before its first official meeting the seeds of its destruction were planted. President Roosevelt named the military heads of the Army and Navy as the service representatives. When a year later the Joint Board was brought into the executive office, it was only natural for the military chiefs to look to the President for guidance and ignore the Standing Liaison Committee as a coordinating agency. Once this happened, S.L.C.'s lack of corporate contact with the White House, coupled with traditional bifurcation of military and political planning, emasculated its effectiveness.

Aside from the Standing Liaison Committee there were other efforts at coordinating political and military policy. For a while, weekly meetings between Hull, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox tried to fill the void. In 1940 this unofficial coordination was replaced by a more formal structure, the War Council. The Council, consisting of Hull, Stimson, Knox, Chief of Staff of the Army George Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark, met once a week with the President. While it


67 Mansfield, Millis and Stein, Arms and the State, 43.
did become in the words of Secretary Hull, "a sort of clearing house for all the information and views we had under discussion," it was never fully utilized, partially because of the unique relationship the military had with the President. Once the United States entered the war in 1941 politics became secondary and with it the State Department. Despite Hull's protests, the traditional separation between military and political planning became standard operating procedure. As Secretary Stimson recalled, "when Mr. Roosevelt learned to like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942, he allowed himself to dispense with any general meeting on war policy." It was not until 1943 that the problems of the future post-war environment forced the necessity for more coordinated political/military policy planning.

This lack of high level policy integration had its impact on the services as they attempted to formulate long-range strategic plans. The instrumentality for such planning existed in the service war plans divisions, which in theory were being coordinated by the Joint Board. But the Board, although vastly improved since its conception, was still hampered by inter-service distrust, a lack of authority, and a continued perception on the part of its members that they

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were receiving insufficient political guidance. This resulted in the same kind of policy vacuum that the Joint Board had complained of some thirty years earlier. It was on this point that Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, emphasized in a January 1941 memorandum:

...the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon the major decision which the President may make for guiding our future naval efforts in the event of war and in future immediate preparations for war.70

On the verge of America's entry into the Second World War, the basic traits of military professionalism: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, had established firm roots in the United States. Unfortunately, the American military had accepted the "radical" definition of professionalism. By its nature "radicalism" emphasized the unique character of military expertise in order to rationalize its claim to autonomy in military matters. As the late nineteenth century world became increasingly dominated by technocratic managers, the military professionals' claim to be "managers of violence" seemed appropriate. But the radical's claim to autonomy ultimately led to a bifurcation of military from political matters. This in turn led to "absolutism" in the Janowitzian sense. The result was that military power, which originally had been one of many means to achieve political ends, now became an end in itself. Victory was the yardstick

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70 Tracy Kitterage, "U.S. - British Naval Cooperation: 1910-1945" (Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Monograph), Chapter XII, pp. 12. (This document was only written in a draft form in which the chapters were never collated.)
by which the professional measured his own competency. This type of absolutism was completely compatible with America's liberal idealistic philosophy. Since America's domestic consensus on the role of the military, and the officer corps' "radical" professionalism were in congruence, no one questioned the relationship of "radicalism" and the officer corps' responsibility to the society. In fact, within the liberal interpretation, "radicalism" was not only responsible, but ethically correct. If nothing else it kept the officer corps out of the political mainstream and thus guaranteed civilian control.

Ironically the same technological expertise that fostered "radicalism" also required a coordinating agent to organize and effectively use that expertise. Such an organization was the general staff model. But the staff model itself was neutral, not emphasizing either form of professionalism. For the model to work effectively it demanded both forms of professionalism to be working in concert, with the radical skills guaranteeing operational efficiency and the pragmatic skills supporting political/military planning. However, the dominance of "radicalism" meant that the operational function of the staff received primacy over the long-range planning function. The staff could develop highly sophisticated operational plans, but the equally important political/military plans, which helped develop the goals for
which military power existed, would only come about if the officer corps was imbued with "pragmatism."

The result of the primacy of "radicalism" was that the Clausewitzian notion of political/military fusion had been rejected as a threat to the liberal definition of civilian control of the military, and the professional officer's outlook was restricted to the military point of view. This "radicalism" led to a failure to utilize the general staff to its maximum, and appeared to the military officer to cut him off from the kind of policy guidance that he thought was necessary to fulfill his planning function. From the civilian leadership's perspective this "radicalism" resulted in "useless" input into the policy making process. Thus they felt they were not getting "responsible" professional advice. This failure to develop policy integration would result in fundamental problems in planning the military aspects of the forthcoming world war.
CHAPTER III

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor it was apparent to both the British and the American military leadership that some form of common institution was needed to facilitate the interchange of information and to generate a unified military approach to the war. To begin accomplishing this, a conference code named "Arcadia," took place in Washington, D.C. between 24 December 1941 and 14 January 1942. "Arcadia's" purpose was to formulate a political/military blueprint for the early stages of the war, while dealing with the immediate crisis in the Pacific. Out of these conversations came not only a reaffirmation of certain strategic principles, such as the Germany first decision; but also the establishment of a supreme U.S.-British military body to direct the military aspects of the war effort--The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). The Combined Chiefs were directly responsible to the President and the Prime Minister as a combined executive. From the very beginning this was exclusively an Anglo-American organization, due in part to the bureaucratic difficulties entailed in incorporating the Russians into the CCS, and in part to the establishment of
Acting in the capacity as the military advisors to the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were in a position to discuss authoritatively the British view on strategic questions. The Americans on the other hand had no equivalent to the COS except the moribound Joint Board. Furthermore, the American staff structure had little previous experience in dealing with inter-nation political/military policy formulation. The inadequacy of the American system was clearly conveyed in a letter from Field Marshal Dill to Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, acknowledged the fact that the war was to be divided up into two spheres of control; the Americans running the Pacific War up to the Asian mainland; while the British ran the war in the Middle East, India, Burma, and the Indian Ocean. The war in Europe was apparently going to be controlled by the Combined Chiefs, although the British seemed to have assumed that they would have more to say because of their commitment and the resources that had been allocated. Arthur Bryant, *Turn of the Tide: A History of the War Years Based Upon the Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957), 254; Vernon Davis, *A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Development* (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), I, 190-200; Grace P. Hayes, *A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* (Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953), I, 119; also see "Brief Statement of the Origin and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 1969, Mimeographed), hereafter referred to as "Brief Statement;" John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945*, Vol. VI of *History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy*, ed. by Sir James Butler (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 339. (Hereafter referred to as United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy.)
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke:

There are no regular meetings of their Chiefs of Staff, and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record their proceedings, they have no joint planners and executive planning agency...then there is great difficulty of getting the staff over to the President. He just sees the staff at odd times, and again no record. The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington.72

The creation of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff was a result of the institutional necessity to supply American participation in the "Arcadia" conversations. Although, there was no specific American organizational counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff, "there never seemed to have been any uncertainty as to what American officers would provide authoritative representation vis-a-vis the British within the Combined Chiefs."73 The British Chiefs of Staff Committee consisted of the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound), the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal), and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (then General, later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke). The American participants were selected by virtue of the fact that they held positions which corresponded to that of the British Chiefs, or to use the term of the day, they were the "United States opposite numbers." Those officers were U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, Commander-in-Chief

72 Dill to Alanbrooke 3 January 1942; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 233-34.
73 "Brief Statement," 1.
U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, and until March 1942, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark. 74

The immediate problem that needed to be addressed at "Arcadia" was the deteriorating situation in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. General Marshall, who had great faith in unity of command suggested that the appointment of a unified theater commander might help stabilize the situation:

I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater--air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation...there should be supreme authority

74 Based upon the "Opposite Number" formula General Marshall's position was analogous to that of General Alanbrooke's. The American Navy's position was complicated by the fact there was a dual chain of command. Since 18 December 1941 there had been two official heads of the Navy. On that date the President, by Executive Order, increased the significance of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to which he appointed Admiral King. Stark, the CNO, from then on concentrated on administrative matters, until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in March of 1942. With Stark's departure, King was the sole Navy representative on the JCS. Arnold's presence was the result of the fact that the Royal Air Force was an independent entity, and thus the U.S. had to supply an "Opposite Number." The logical choice was Arnold. Since he was junior to all the other U.S. representatives he deferred to them on strategic issues and was generally recognized as Marshall's subordinate. As the war progressed and U.S. air power played an increasing role, Arnold's power within the JCS and CCS grew accordingly so that he was promoted to five star rank with the other members of he JCS. See "Brief Statement," 1.
over everyone. Suitable limitations could be imposed to safeguard the interests of each nation.75

Marshall's remarks were directed only at the Pacific situation, where he wanted to create a unified command to direct the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) forces in the area. The selection of the ABDA commander was extremely political because neither the British nor the Americans wanted to be shackled with the blame for the debacle. For this reason, the British Chiefs first opposed such a command structure, and it was not until the intervention of Prime Minister Churchill that the American position was sustained.76

Marshall had first brought up the discussion of a unified command on Christmas Day, 1941, but it was not until

75 ABC 4, JCSSs 2, 25 December 1941, "Arcadia" Conference Proceedings, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter referred to as Proceedings, CCS). General Marshall brought up this question again on 27 December 1941, JCSSs 4, item #5 and inserted a proposed draft of a Unified Command Order, JCSSs 4, annex 1. On 28 December 1941 Prime Minister Churchill agreed to the creation of the ABDA command. This partially reflected the British desire to establish spheres of control. General Wavell received his orders on 10 January 1942, JCSSs 8.


the 10th of January that British General Sir Archibald Wavell was appointed Supreme Commander in the ABDA theater. It was during this interval that the Combined Chiefs of Staff began to take form. The necessity for such an "appropriate joint body" was obvious to the political leadership of both nations; but the problem was institutionalizing it, without allowing, in the words of Harry Hopkins, "everybody and his grandmother" to be a member. While the Combined Chiefs had in practice been in operation since the beginning of "Arcadia," the establishment of a *de jure* unified commander demanded the formation of a *de jure* Combined Chiefs. The first official meeting of the CCS took place on the 23rd of January, 1942. With the agreement to a combined document entitled "Post-Arcadian Collaboration," the basis for all

77 Ibid., 469.
future Anglo-American military coordination was set. 78

The American desire for a unified commander, while operational at the theater level, was simply impractical any higher. No single individual could possibly control the complex military operations needed to conduct world-wide war. Furthermore, neither principal ally could politically afford to hand over the supreme command to an officer from the other nation, especially since the President and the Prime Minister were political equals. Thus the Combined Chiefs had to remain a committee. But even the CCS could not meet continuously, because the military leaders of both nations had to continue to perform their national command functions. A solution was found in naming Washington, D.C.

78 Obviously, the CCS had been operating in a de facto manner since the arrival of the British. At the meeting on 13 January 1942, Admiral Pound proposed that arrangements be made to extend combined collaboration outside the ABDA area, JCSSs 11, 13 January, "Arcadia" Conference, Proceedings, CCS. The following day the Chiefs approved the "Post-Arcadian Collaboration" document which specified the existence of the CCS, a Combined Secretariat, and Combined Planners, 14 January, JCSSs 12, Proceedings, CCS. The original first draft of the "Collaboration" was submitted on 10 January, JCSSs 8, annex 4, Proceedings, CCS, but at that time it was rejected and reworked for later submission. The logic of the CCS growing out of the creation of the ABDA command was first noticed in a December 24th paper entitled "Higher Direction of the War in the ABDA area," Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), 237-245. The CCS was first publically mentioned in a press release on 6 February 1942, and the President signed the CCS's charter on 21 April 1942, "Brief Statement;" Cline, Washington Command Post, 100-101. It was during this period that the term "combined" began to refer to two or more nations in collaboration, while the term "joint" referred to the inter-service collaboration of one nation.
the permanent seat of the Combined Chiefs and having the British post a liaison group there. This liaison group, commanded by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, supplied permanent British staff counterparts to interface with the growing JCS bureaucracy. Dill's placement in Washington, temporarily created the fear, that he would become an intermediary body between the Prime Minister and the CCS, especially since he would have continual access to the U.S. Chiefs when the full CCS was not meeting. After a great deal of discussion it was decided that there would be no super-war cabinet inserted between the Anglo-American political leaders and their military advisors. 79 While this did eliminate the danger of imposing another bureaucracy over the Chiefs, it did create a situation that allowed for a maximum amount of political guidance as well as interference.

The mere identification of individuals to participate in the joint discussions did not alleviate the inherent problems that Dill had pointed out to Alanbrooke. Obviously, if the CCS was to perform its function and manage the war effort, it needed staff support to monitor and plan specific

79 By the seventh meeting of "Arcadia" it was clear that Washington was going to be the permanent seat of the CCS and that the Americans were not going to allow a military representative to be placed between the political leadership and the Chiefs. There was going to be only one Combined Chiefs of Staff. On this point the British gave in and appointed Dill the head of the delegation to Washington and did not make him special representative to the President. JCSSs 11, 13 January 1942, "Arcadia" Conference, Proceedings, CCS. Also see Davis, Organizational Development, I, 183-88.
aspects of the conflict. Such a Combined Staff began to take form shortly after "Arcadia" began. Slowly a series of combined committees were established to deal with functional areas such as plans, intelligence, etc. These committees had both British and American representation, with the U.S. officers being drawn from the JCS's own parallel joint committee structure. Despite Joint Chiefs Historian Vernon Davis' observation that the JCS did not follow any "large and conscious design" as it formed its committees, there were certain factors that helped mold its structure. During the late 1930s the Joint Board began to develop a series of supporting staff committees, most noticeably in the areas of plans and intelligence. These committees were staffed by officers whose primary assignment was to the service staffs of these related fields. They worked together on the Joint Board Committees only as a part-time duty. Thus the members of the Joint Planning Committee were full-time members of the Army General Staff's War Plans Division and the Chief of Naval Operation's War Plans Division. Theoretically, these officers were to "consider this joint work as their most important duty," but invariably they had to devote their primary attention to their own service jobs.

80 Davis, Organizational Development, II, 354.

81 Ibid., I, 30.
Despite this problem the Joint Board's organizational support supplied the nucleus for the forthcoming JCS bureaucracy, which also tended to model itself after the British Chiefs of Staff structure.

Unfortunately, the American staff retained its part-time flavor, as opposed to assigning full-time joint staffers. While the committee structure and the individuals involved changed during the war, the basic pattern of U.S. representation on Combined Committees was that the senior U.S. officers were also the senior service staff specialist in that specific field. Thus the senior US members on the Combined Intelligence Committee were the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence. Similarly, Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), COMINCH, was the U.S. Navy representative to the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), and along with an Army Counterpart made up the senior U.S. representation to the Combined Staff Planners (CPS). For the most part these joint committees had to rely on service staffs for support, although some of the committees had permanent sub-committees made up of full-time staff officers to support them. 82

The part-time relationship between the services and the joint committee reflected an American commitment that

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82 As an example of how the committee structure worked the JPS consisted of five members, the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans of COMINCH) and two assistants; and the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Operations Division (OPD) and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) of the Army Air Staff.
planning would not occur in a vacuum. By having the senior member of the committee the senior service planner, unity of purpose was achieved. But this relationship also fostered a tendency for the joint planner to support his own service position. The British tried to make their staff planners free agents, whose responsibility was to the committee as a corporate group, and not to the service. Thus the British fully anticipated that their planners might go against their services' interest on some issues. The American officers, on the other hand were used to responding to the desires of their superiors, and achieving concurrence at every level. Thus the American planners tended to be more of a service advocate than their British counterpart. The result was, "not to produce the best paper possible within a reasonable time, but a 'perfect' paper, in which all differences had been adjusted to the satisfaction of the various superiors."83 The placement of senior staff officers as the U.S. representatives simply exacerbated this problem, which in turn increased inter-service conflicts within the staff. Therefore, the American staff planners might be split along service lines, while the British planners always spoke in a single voice.

Following closely behind the establishment of the Combined Chiefs, was the de jure establishment of the

83 Davis, Organizational Change, II, 384.
American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who held their first official meeting on 9 February 1942. From the very beginning their functions and duties were never delineated beyond the generalities of coordinating and directing the war effort. For the completion of this mission the JCS was directly responsible to the President. The authority of the Chiefs came from two sources: the members own statutory responsibilities and functions, and their direct relationship to the President. "So long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained the confidence of the President," wrote one JCS historian, "the wartime prerogatives of the agency was secure." 84 It was imperative for the Chiefs to maintain the President's confidence and support if they were to sustain their viewpoint before the Combined Chiefs. In order to enhance this working relationship, General Marshall became convinced that a fourth member of the JCS should be designated to preside at the JCS meetings and to maintain a liaison with the White House. In order to placate Admiral King, General Marshall proposed that the new member be a naval officer. Thus on 20 July 1942, Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed to the newly created position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy. 85

84 "Brief Statement," 5.

85 Admiral Leahy was a close friend of the President, and was recalled from his post as Ambassador to Vichy, France.
The appointment of Admiral Leahy was inextricably connected to a series of reforms that occurred within the services. Both services realized that unity of command was essential for victory, but too much centralization in the hands of a chief would strangle the bureaucracy and crush the chief beneath the weight of trivia. Thus the goal was to balance centralization with decentralization so the chief could concentrate on the broad strategic issues. The Army had begun to think about some form of reorganization during the fall of 1941, when it became apparent that General Marshall would not be able to command the American Expeditionary Force as doctrine called for. Such an approach would only be feasible in a one theater war, as in the case of World War I. For a world wide conflict, a new organization was required. Such a reorganization occurred in March 1942, under the direction of Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney. It centralized the diverse elements within the Army into three major commands, Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Ground Forces. The latter two commands centralized all non-Army Air Forces logistics and training functions under their control, while the former paved the way for Air Force autonomy. Men and material were then sent from these commands to the theaters of operation. In order to handle the vast planning and operational function incurred by the war effort, the War Plans Division within the General
Staff was redesignated the Operations Division (OPD). It was through the OPD that General Marshall controlled the Army, just as a commanding general would have. This reorganization guaranteed General Marshall primacy in the military sphere, vis-a-vis Secretary Stimson, who increasingly became exclusively concerned with administrative matters. 86

During the same time period the Navy was also going through a reorganization. While the Army's effort was at controlled decentralization in order to free the Chief of Staff for strategic issues, the Navy had to centralize its organization in order to achieve unity of command. For a variety of reasons, the Navy had developed a dual command structure, with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) primarily concerned with administrative and planning matters, and the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) acting as the combat commander. In December 1941 Admiral King was appointed COMINCH, explaining the presence of both Stark and King at the "Arcadia" meetings. Increasingly, it became apparent that this duality was dysfunctional and in March 1942 Stark was relieved of his duties as CNO, thus placing King,

who now assumed both the CNO and COMINCH duties, in a position analogous to that of Marshall. 87

These March reforms tended to supply each service chief with a great deal of wartime power and thus made them less interested in the creation of a super agency along the lines of a chief of a joint general staff. The insertion of such an agency would tend to negate the positive effects of the March reforms. Still the Chiefs, and in particular Marshall, felt that the President needed professional staff assistance to effectively perform the duties of the commander-in-chief. 88 In a March 1942 memorandum, General Marshall explained that his notion of a chief of the joint general staff would not be that of a supreme military commander above the services, "but that the office would be established to provide some one person not at present involved in the War or Navy Departments who would coordinate and brief information and opinions," 89 so that the President could make the necessary policy decisions.

The role of Admiral Leahy has always been an extremely difficult one to ascertain primarily because, like the

87 Davis, Organizational Development, I, 237-8; King's assumption of both Navy offices meant that the Army outnumbered the Navy two to one.

88 Ibid., I, 239-50.

89 Ibid., I, 251.
president's commander-in-chief power, Leahy was given a title without a corresponding list of functions. There is a certain amount of ambiguity in Marshall's proposal for a chief of the joint general staff. Undoubtedly, Marshall never envisioned Leahy becoming the commander of all U.S. military forces. This could violate the President's constitutional power, as well as undermine Marshall's own position, that in effect had been elevated to that of commanding general as a result of the March 1942 reforms. Instead Marshall was thinking of a typical military chief of staff who acted as coordinator of the staff, an avenue of expression for the commander, and a means of communication between the commander, the staff, and the commanders in the field. This is precisely the kind of role that Marshall outlined in March 1942. The ability to be a neutral arbitrator between the various factions within a staff is typically one of the chief of staff's primary functions. This explains Marshall's desire to have a neutral chairman for the JCS who could arbitrate inter-service conflicts. This was one of Leahy's strong suits. Not only would his appointment equalize the number of army and navy officers on the JCS, but Marshall "was willing to trust Leahy to be a neutral chairman...."90

Originally, the President did not see the necessity for such an individual, maintaining that he was his own chief

of staff. Although, the President was finally persuaded as to the value of such a position, his own desire never to let power reside outside his immediate control tended to degrade the position. General Marshall pointed out that Leahy increasingly became "the Chief of Staff to the President and less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff...." The apparent derogatory tone of Marshall's statement conveys the notion that Leahy was not allowed to become as involved in the formulation of policy as Marshall thought he should by virtue of his position.

The British Official History, while not describing this transformation, clearly notes that Leahy's role was to "explain rather than formulate." The President himself described Leahy's role as "a sort of 'leg man,' who would help him [Roosevelt] digest, analyze, and summarize a mass of material with which he had been trying to cope with

91 Ibid., 299.

92 Ibid., 300.

93 The role of General Hastings Ismay, personal Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, may have been the model that Marshall was basing his ideas on. He may also have been thinking of a role that would be analogous to that of the Secretary of Defense as the position was first conceived in 1947.

singlehanded." In the final analysis Leahy became primarily an avenue of information and feedback between the President and his military advisors. Unfortunately, as Leahy was drawn into the President's political conversations toward the end of the war, this avenue at times became blocked.

Whatever Admiral Leahy's role, his presence greatly facilitated the operations of the Joint Chiefs, but the lack of an official organizational charter continued to be a problem. In January 1943, the Secretary of the JCS circulated a proposed charter among the Chiefs, who subsequently sent it to the President for approval. The charter specified that the Chiefs were to act as the military advisors to the President, make joint plans, issue joint directives, and exercise jurisdiction over strategy and operations. Leahy, who opposed such a document, believed that the Joint Chiefs functioned effectively without one. Since the JCS already had direct access to the President, Leahy believed that such a document could only constrain their relationship and limit the scope of their activity. Apparently, the President

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95 William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), 97-101; after the war Leahy recalled that the relationship of the JCS toward the President was exactly as a staff to a commander.

96 Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 300.


agreed with his Chief of Staff, because he rejected the charter with the following note:

It is my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are encountering no new conditions currently requiring clarification of their status or a new definition of their functions. It seems to me that such an order would provide no benefits and might in some way impair flexibility of operations. Consequently, I consider the issuance of an Executive Order now as superfluous. If at a latter date an Executive Order seems necessary to meet a new situation, the matter can be reconsidered. 99

President Roosevelt's refusal to grant the Joint Chief's a charter suggests something of his administrative desires and supplies insight into his perceptions as to what role the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to play during the war. It is generally admitted that Roosevelt was a poor administrator, who liked to handle things personally. This personal control, which maximized his flexibility and allowed him to utilize his very potent political skills, may help explain the transition in Leahy's role. This administrative attitude is part of four interrelated factors that must be considered in determining the Joint Chief's war-time role. These four factors were: (1) Roosevelt's war-time political objectives and his self-perception as commander-in-chief; (2) the political objectives of the British and their effective political/military planning structure which sought to

guarantee the achievement of those goals; (3) the Joint Chiefs' own strategic concepts and self-image as military officers and advisors to the President; (4) the committee nature of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Despite the appearance of unity within the Anglo-American alliance, there existed profound political and strategic differences. To the degree that the membership of the CCS was responsible to the political leadership of their respective nations, these disagreements permeated the military discussions. Due to the committee nature of the Combined Chiefs, none of the members were capable of forcing a successful resolution of an issue except by using the age old political methods of persuasion and compromise. "The combined organization..." one British Chief wrote, "gives us the constitutional right to discuss on equal terms." This equality meant that each Chief had effectively the power to veto any CCS action. Since the Chiefs had no organizational superior other than their political leadership, it was only from that level that a decision could be imposed. When divergent views clashed and compromise failed, the issue had to be dealt with at the highest level. In practice this meant that support by the political leadership determined one's ability to impose one's views on opposing Chiefs.

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100 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945, 348.
Under such a system, the British possessed certain inherent advantages. In the first place, the British policy structure optimized political/military planning and assured support from the political leadership. In the second place, the British unity of purpose combined with their preponderance of military resources in the European Theater led to their dominance in strategy up until 1943.101 Finally, the American Chiefs were split over strategic matters, with the naval representatives far more concerned with the Pacific Theater than were their army counterparts.102

The fact that these inter-service conflicts existed was partially the fault of the committee nature of the Joint Chiefs. Just as it was within the CCS, it was impossible to impose a decision from within the Joint Chiefs on a recalcitrant member. Thus a great deal of "quiet military diplomacy"

101 Ibid., 332, 338.

was required to "reconcile the diverse service theories."

In regard to the Pacific area of operations, where the Joint Chiefs were autonomous, the services negotiated with each other over strategic issues as if they were sovereign nations. Despite these internal conflicts the Chiefs were very reluctant to reveal their differences to any outside agency. To do so might allow the decision making power to gravitate elsewhere. Reflecting on this point, Admiral King remarked that "matters of major import that required presentation to the President could be counted on the fingers of one hand. We usually found a solution. Sometimes a compromise." Under these circumstances Admiral Leahy performed a vital function,

103 Maurice Matloff, "American Leadership in World War II," Soldiers and Statesmen, Proceedings of the Fourth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1970 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1973), 94. The individual veto power of a Chief was exemplified in 1942 when the JCS considered cutting back on the number of capital ships that were to be ordered so that more landing craft could be built. Only Admiral King was opposed to this. When Admiral Leahy remarked that it looked as though "the vote is three to one," King replied that as far as he was concerned the JCS was "not a voting body on any matter that concerns the Navy." Quoted in Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 18.

104 Quoted in Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, 19; one example of the conflicts that existed within the JCS was the issue of British naval reinforcement to the Pacific late in the war. The President had agreed to the Royal Navy sending a fleet, but Admiral King was opposed. At a CCS meeting King even refuted the President, to which Admiral Leahy remarked, "I don't think we should wash our linen in public," Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1951), 612.
because it was through him that the Chiefs discovered the
president's strategic predilections and thus they were able
to avoid revealing many of their internal differences. One
knowledgable insider, Captain Tracy Kitterage of the U.S.
Navy maintained that such a process actually enhanced the
president's control over military decisions:

It may be true that the President formally overruled them
[JCS] on a very few occasions, but this was only because
informal discussions of the President with Leahy, Marshall,
King, and Arnold usually led them to know in advance the
President's views. They, no doubt, frequently recognized
the advantages of accepting the President's suggestions
with their own interpretations, rather than of risking an
overruling by presenting formally proposals they knew
would not be accepted.105

The picture presented of Presidential-JCS interaction
is one of decentralization. While this reflected the Presi-
dent's desired mode of administrative control, the nature of
such decentralization leads automatically to unstructured
lines of communication. General Marshall, in particular,
despised such operational methods and complained to British
Field Marshal Alanbrooke that there were occasions he did
not see the President for four to six weeks at a time.106
Under these circumstances Marshall was forced to use Admiral
Leahy, Harry Hopkins, and even Field Marshal Dill to dis-
cover the White House's thoughts on certain matters. At

105 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 957n.

106 Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 242n.
other times, though, all the members of the JCS went to the president and discussed strategic issues. Lawrence Legere has correctly observed that since President Roosevelt was not a skilled administrator, he liked to have "cooperating, but not highly coordinated subordinates," which resulted in the JCS being "tailor-made for his taste." This structure allowed the President to easily impose his desires on the organization, thus making his attitudes and his role all important.

Probably no aspect of Roosevelt's Presidency is more controversial than his wartime role as commander-in-chief and his impact on military decisions. The reason is the inextricable relationship between these decisions and the subsequent development of the Cold War. Obviously, many of the "military decisions" made during this period had long term political consequences and vice versa. It thus becomes important to ascertain the extent of the President's impact on such decisions.

There is little doubt that Franklin Roosevelt took his responsibilities as commander-in-chief very seriously.
His personal commitment to the President's military function combined with the 1939 order that brought the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations into the Executive Office resulted in a close rapport between the JCS and the White House. Even if the President had had no desire to fulfill his Constitutional role, the very nature of the Combined Chiefs would have thrust him into the military arena.

The extent to which the President controlled military decisions is difficult to determine, due to conflicting impressions and interpretations of his actions. Admiral Leahy stated in his memoirs that the President "was the real Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Army, and Air Force." Some historians, though, have taken the view advocated by Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State. Huntington maintains that the civilian decision makers unofficially abdicated their responsibilities and allowed the military to run the war. He bases his contention on the belief that the President rarely overruled his military advisors and defended their positions at international conferences. This abdication forced the military to make crucial decisions of a political nature.

110 Leahy, I Was There, 345.

This thesis does supply a rationale to explain the failure of American post-war policy, but the record fails to substantiate it. In a recent study by Kent Roberts Greenfield, formerly Chief Historian of the United States Army, at least twenty-two examples of Presidential decisions made "against the advice or over the protests of his military advisors," and another dozen examples of Presidential initiatives in strategic matters were identified. Significantly, Greenfield found that the only point of contention between the President and the JCS after 1943 was over the recall of General Joseph Stilwell from China.\textsuperscript{112} Greenfield's work paints the portrait of a President deeply involved in the military progress of the war. But why after 1943 was there a sudden absence of conflict between the President and his military advisors? Professor Paul Emerson, in his study of Roosevelt as commander-in-chief, suggests that the President's political goals and the military objectives of the Joint Chiefs coincided near the end of the war, thus abrogating any need for Presidential intervention:

The political considerations seen by the President and the logistical and strategic considerations seen by the Chiefs paralleled one another in 1943 and afterwards.

\textsuperscript{112}Greenfield, American Strategy, 80. This list by no means exhausts the number of times the President was involved in the decision making process. General Arnold records that it was the President that suggested the island hopping strategy used in the Pacific, Arnold, Global Mission, 372.
The consequence was close concurrence of political and military views.\textsuperscript{113}

If Emerson is correct then the President's political goals form the basis for determining the role of the Joint Chiefs.

It is generally assumed that the President's primary wartime goal was victory, possibly even at the expense of post-war problems.\textsuperscript{114} While this is essentially true, it may be suggested that victory was only a means to a greater end. James McGregor Burns, in his biography of Roosevelt, describes the President as:

\ldots both a soldier of the Faith, battling with his warrior comrades for an ideology of peace and freedom, and a prince of the State, protecting the interests of his nation in a tumultuous and impious world. His difficulty lay in the relation of the two.\textsuperscript{115}

The ideological objective that Roosevelt sought was a reformed world based upon his Four Freedoms, but in order to accomplish that goal the evil of fascism had to be eradicated. Within this framework, unconditional surrender was a concrete manifestation of total war. It was with this framework in mind


\textsuperscript{114}Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, interview with members of the staff, January 1975.

that Roosevelt could say to Churchill, "the political considerations you mentioned are important factors, but military operations based thereupon must be secondary to the primary operation of striking at the heart of Germany."

As Burns noted, though, Roosevelt was also a prince of the state attempting to promote and to protect American national interest. Winning the war was not only an ideological goal, but also a very practical political policy. Central to achieving this goal was keeping the coalition together. Roosevelt may have spoken in terms of a world structured on the Four Freedoms, but he apparently envisaged a world governed by the Four Policemen; the United States, Russia, England, and China.

Within this overall structure there were stages when certain policies were more important than others. Paul Emerson observed three such periods: prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt's main policy was to deter aggression; after December 1941, and until the end of 1943, the main goal was coalition unity; after 1943, it was ending the war in such a way as to avoid any long term commitments to Europe. Greenfield's study of Presidential military

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118 Emerson, "F.D.R.," 176.
decisions tend to support Emerson's theory. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor the main points of contention between the President and the Chiefs were over the allocation of the limited American resources to support Britain and the use of American military and economic power to deter Japan.\textsuperscript{119} Once the United States had entered the war the decisions made by Roosevelt were aimed at keeping the coalition together. The most visible manifestation of this policy was Roosevelt's support of the invasion of North Africa (Operation "Gymnast/Torch"), in which he overturned the American commitment to a cross-channel invasion\textsuperscript{120} and rejected the JCS's advice to concentrate instead in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{121} Secretary of War Stimson wrote after the war that:

The Torch decision was the result of two absolutely definite and final rulings, one by the British and the other by the President. Mr. Churchill and his advisors categorically refused to accept the notion of a cross-channel invasion in 1942. Mr. Roosevelt categorically insisted that there must be some operation in 1942.\textsuperscript{122}

One consequence of Roosevelt's commitment to coalition unity may have been his neglect for the long term political

\textsuperscript{119} Greenfield, American Strategy, 80-84.


\textsuperscript{121} Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehead, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Memoir (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1952), 425.

\textsuperscript{122} Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 425.
questions involved in restructuring the post-war world. This is the thesis advanced by Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells. Wells believed that this commitment stemmed from the President's "conviction that as Commander-in-Chief his paramount obligation was to permit nothing to jeopardize the winning of the war." Wells may have been wrong though in believing that short term unity was the President's only political goal. According to Emerson, after 1943, the President was primarily concerned with winning the war as quickly as possible in order to avoid any long term commitments to Europe. Emerson's thesis is based upon a letter from Roosevelt to Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.:

I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstructing France, Italy, and the Balkans. This is not our natural task....It is definitely a British task in which the British are far more vitally interested than we are...our principal objective is not to take part in the internal problems of Southern Europe.

This letter not only reflected Roosevelt's understanding of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, but it also referred back to his image of the world based on the Four Policemen. Such a system would leave Europe to the English and the Russians. Any effort to solve all the

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various and complex political problems in Europe might well alienate the Russians, whose support was sorely needed to complete the grand design.

As the war reached its inevitable conclusion, the necessity for a Russian-American understanding became more apparent. In a Joint Chiefs memorandum of July 1944, this issue was discussed:

After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of first magnitude....The relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other, even if that power were allied with the British Empire.125

The memorandum concluded that with the end of the war the British Empire will have "lost ground both economically and militarily." Based on this analysis it made sense that Roosevelt would want to postpone any confrontation with the Russians. Moreover, the faster the war ended the faster the post-war restructuring of the world could begin, even if it meant the disruption of the Anglo-American alliance. It is within this context that Roosevelt's rejection of Churchill's Balkan schemes must be analyzed. As the war came closer to its conclusion, the military and political goals of the United States increasingly coincided. Although there may have been differences between the President and his

125 Ibid., 523-24.
military advisors over specifics, there was a real unity in purpose between them. Both had as their primary goal the defeat of the enemy; for the President it was a means; for the military it was an end. If keeping the coalition together in 1942 meant that the cross-channel invasion would have to be cancelled and replaced with an invasion of North Africa, then that was the way it was to be. But as the political and military goals of the JCS and the President coalesced, the military point of view appeared to become dominant.

From the beginning, the President's political goals were the guiding factor in the formulation of strategic policy, and this was enhanced by the close relationship that existed between the JCS and the White House. It was to the President and not to the State Department that the Chiefs looked for guidance. In fact it was the President who became the point of coordination for all aspects of policy formulation; much to the dismay of the British:

The Americans have never been accustomed, in consideration of military or quasi-military matters, to link harmoniously the civil and the military interests. They have no War Cabinet and they have no Defense Committee at which requirements, both civil and military can be scrutinized and programs formed with due regard for the merit of the case. Nor have they any means by which the conflicting views of the several agencies can be harmonized and the common policy reached. The whole burden of grouping the extravagant demands of the War Department and of co-ordinating the action of the many agencies which

126 Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, interview with members of the staff, January 1975.
have been created fall on one man--the President. 127

While the British criticism succinctly analyzed the failure of American political/military planning and Roosevelt's mode of administration, it failed to consider that the committee nature of the Combined Chiefs forced the Chiefs of Staff of both nations to rely upon their political leadership in order to achieve a successful resolution of issues before the CCS. A general study of the major CCS decisions made during the war reveal an interesting pattern. When the President failed to support the American Chiefs' position in the face of British unity, it normally failed; when he did support the American Chiefs, they prevailed. The decision to undertake the cross-channel invasion is one case in point.

The American commitment to the cross-channel invasion, which stemmed from the Germany first decision made at "Arcadia," was specifically formulated in March and April of 1942. Almost immediately the British began to disclaim support for the operation and proposed instead the North African venture. The Americans fully realized that implementing Operation "Torch" would postpone the cross-channel invasion to 1943, at the earliest. For this reason General Marshall fought hard against the African project. He maintained that the only way to defeat Germany was to invade the Continent and fight the

127 Gwyer, Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 1942, part 1, 394.
decisive battle in Northern France. The President on the other hand, was far more interested in coalition politics and thus rejected Marshall's advice. At the Casablanca Conference, in 1943, Marshall was again put in a position of advocating the European invasion without Presidential support. Before the American contingent left for Africa, the President held a conference with the JCS and inquired whether the Americans should meet the British "unified in advocating a cross-channel operation." Roosevelt was well aware that the British would be unified in opposition to such a plan and would recommend a continuation of the Mediterranean strategy. While Marshall favored a unified confrontation, the President sought to postpone it and favored some form of compromise. In the end there was no understanding between the military and their commander-in-chief. Roosevelt left the Chiefs free to voice their own views, while remaining uncommitted himself. In the face of unified British opposition the invasion was cancelled until 1944.

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It was not until the President decided to make a stand on the invasion that the American position finally prevailed. Roosevelt first began to support his military advisors during the Washington "Trident" Conference in May of 1943. Within the Combined Chiefs a confrontation was inevitable. The American Chiefs hoped that "the strength of the force to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation in 1944."\textsuperscript{130} The British on the other hand maintained "the attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure her elimination from the war and thus opposed weakening allied forces below that level."\textsuperscript{131} While this deadlock existed within the Combined Chiefs, a similar confrontation occurred in the White House between the President and the Prime Minister. Although the President's support for the cross-channel attack was by no means as stringent as the American military would have liked, a 1 May 1944 date was agreed upon for the

\textsuperscript{130} CCS 219, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "Conduct of the War in 1943-44," 14 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. This was a further defense of CCS 215, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "Invasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-44," 13 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. Also see Leahy, I was There, 160.

\textsuperscript{131} CCS 229, Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, "Operations in the European Theater between HUSKY and ROUND-UP," 14 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. This was the British response to CCS 215.
invasion.\textsuperscript{132} Despite this commitment, Marshall was still unsure of Roosevelt's support. Not until the first Quebec "Quadrant" Conference in August 1943 and at the Teheran Conference two months later was the issue fully settled.\textsuperscript{133}

Obviously, this has been an over simplification of the Overlord decision. It has excluded discussing tactical feasibility as well as Soviet influence. Despite these weaknesses, it is still useful in leading us to some interesting observations. As long as Marshall failed to have presidential support he found it simply impossible to force a successful resolution of the cross-channel issue within the committee structure of the Combined Chiefs. This was especially true as long as the Prime Minister was adamantly opposed to it. Churchill insured this by keeping his Chiefs under very tight control. According to Lord Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, Churchill browbeat the CCS "like they were a bunch of pickpockets."\textsuperscript{134}

With Presidential support though,


\textsuperscript{133}CCS 303, CCS 303/1, and CCS 303/3, Quadrant Conference, Proceedings, CCS.

it was possible for the American military's position to prevail. This reinforces the contention that the President was the only point of contact for the coordination of political/military policy. While he might be able to direct the American military toward his political goals, there was no effort made to institutionalize such coordination. If the President did not handle it himself, it simply was not done. At times this resulted in leaving the Joint Chiefs in a guidance vacuum which put the Americans at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their British counterparts. This problem was never more apparent than during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

The main issue at the conference was the direction of allied strategy during the remainder of the year. The main point of contention was the American supported cross-channel invasion versus the British desire to continue operations in the Mediterranean Theater. The leading advocate for the American position, as discussed earlier, was General Marshall, who maintained that "Germany must be

135 Two such examples of Presidential influence occurred when the President supported the American position on daylight bombing in the face of British opposition, Arnold, Global Mission, 393; and the lack of Presidential support meant that the JCS desire to conduct the "Anakim" Operation in the China-Burma-India Theater could not occur in the face of British opposition; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944, 139-142.

136 Cline, Washington Command Post, 104.
defeated by a powerful effort on the continent." He and the other American Chiefs were anxious to avoid "interminable operations in the Mediterranean" that would postpone the invasion indefinitely. 137

Unfortunately, for Marshall and the other American planners, their effort was doomed from the start. There were three factors undermining their position. The first was not only the lack of Presidential support, but a lack of political guidance upon which they could base their arguments. The second was that the British military arguments against the invasion were extremely valid. The last was that the Americans confronted a unified British team supported by its political leadership. 138 This was in marked contrast to the American delegation, whose military advisors were themselves divided over strategic questions.

From the very beginning, the British took the Casablanca Conference very seriously. Arthur Bryant, in his biography of Lord Alanbrooke, records how the British planned their confrontation with the Americans with all the care of a military operation. Prior to the conference, the Prime

137 Casablanca Conference, Proceedings, CCS, 208-239.

Minister told his Chiefs of Staff that "they were not to hurry or try to force an agreement, but to take plenty of time, there was to be full discussion and no impatience--the dripping of water on a stone." While the British Chiefs worked on their American counterparts, the Prime Minister planned to work on the President.\(^{139}\) Not only were the British better unified for the conference, but they were also better equipped. They arrived with a large number of staffers, an effective communications system, and a six thousand ton ship converted into a floating reference library.\(^{140}\)

In the words of one American planner, General Albert Wedemeyer, the British:

Swarmed down upon us like locusts with a plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants with a pyramid of plans to ensure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with promise of continuing their role of directing strategically the course of the war.\(^{141}\)

Wedemeyer went on to note that, "one might say we came, we listened, and we were conquered."\(^{142}\)

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\(^{139}\) Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, 445.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 443.

\(^{141}\) Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 January 1943, ANFA Memo 14-23 January, 1943, Box 1, Documents of Allied Commands-CCS, Military Documents, Beddle Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas.

\(^{142}\) Ibid.
figuratively "lost their shirts" at the conference.  

The British success at Casablanca was due to several factors. Probably, the most important factor was the British unity of purpose, which existed from the Prime Minister down through the staff planners. The Americans, in contrast, not only failed to have the President behind them, but they themselves were internally split. Admiral King at times was ambivalent, at times sided with the British, but constantly supported increased operations in the Pacific. The second important factor was the superior British staffing and preparation. While the British staffers were assigned full time to strategic planning, most of the American staffers had primary responsibility within their own services. This division of their time was reflected in their staff work.

In the end the Casablanca Conference was a perfect example of the type of artificial compartmentalization that existed between American political and military planning. The President's political goals (which obviously had military

\footnote{The final destruction of the American effort at Casablanca is revealed in a pair of cables sent from General Wedemeyer to General Handy (AGWAR): 17 January 1943, "We still have our shirts but we have lost a few buttons pd Looks like HUSKY." On 19 January 1943, Wedemeyer wrote, "The shirt is gone...HUSKY is Next." References 245 and 320, "ANFA Cables: Outgoing, 14-26 January 1943, Box 1, Military Documents, Bed- dle Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas.}

\footnote{JCS Meeting, 6 January 1943. Casablanca Conference, Proceedings, CCS, 239.}
aspects) were totally contradictory to the JCS's military goals (which had an equal amount of political aspects). The British on the other hand were fully cognizant of the political ramifications of the military decisions to be made at Casablanca, and acted accordingly. The problem the American Chiefs faced was one of a lack of guidance. The President did not support the urgency of the cross-channel invasion, and the State Department was not involved. The American Chiefs were determined that there would never be a repetition of the Casablanca debacle. Massive changes were made within the JCS structure in order to guarantee that American planners would be better prepared for their next confrontation with the British, but restructuring the Joint Chiefs' staff system could not substitute for the lack of institutional political/military coordination. In a memorandum written in June 1943 General Wedemeyer addressed this particular problem:

The JCS frequently requires information and advice as to how the military decisions will effect our foreign and national policies, or as to whether the decisions are in conformity with international law, or as to what effect, if any, their decisions will have on our national interests. Some solution will be necessary if we are to achieve that unity of national effort which is so well exemplified in the British organization.

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145 Davis, *Organizational Development*, II, chapter XI.
One month later General Marshall followed up Wedemeyer's memorandum with a letter to Mr. James Byrnes, then Director of War Mobilization:

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have been aware for a long time of a serious disadvantage under which they labor in their dealings with the British Chiefs of Staff. Superficially, at least, the great advantage on the British side has been the fact that they are connected up with other branches of their government through an elaborate but closely knit Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we suffer accordingly. The British, therefore present a solid front of all officials and committees. We cannot muster such strength.147

It is apparent that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were acutely aware of the need for better coordination of political/military policy. Having the President as the sole point of coordination had been a failure. As the war progressed to its inevitable conclusion, the need for such coordination became increasingly important. Unfortunately, the military blamed the breakdown in coordination solely on the civilian leadership's lack of political guidance. The Chiefs' concern over this problem manifested itself early, in a December 1942 Joint Staff Planners memorandum entitled, "A Proposed National War Planning System." This system started with a "determination of the national concept of the war," by the civilian leadership. This "national concept of war" included political, economic, military, and other factors. From there the military determined a strategic policy, upon which plans

147 Ibid., 106.
and operations were based. The proposal was never officially acted upon, and the Chiefs never did consider that this breakdown in communications was a two-way street, stemming from the traditional perceptions of both the civilian and military leadership.

It must never be forgotten that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a product of an American system that inculcated a set of perceptions that resulted in the compartmentalization of political from military policy. They had been brought up to believe in civilian control of the military, which meant, from their perception, that the civilians controlled all of the political decisions and the military were to restrict themselves to "purely military" matters. This view of civil-military relations had been described by one insider as the "strict constructionalist" approach. This view was manifest from Admiral Leahy through the members of the JCS and down to the field commanders. Leahy had exhibited a tendency to think in such "strict constructionalist" terms during his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations and continued to do so as the Chief of Staff to the President. During the Potsdam Conference the British suggested that the term unconditional surrender needed to be explained in greater detail. Leahy's reaction

148 Davis, Organizational Development, II, 380.
149 Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, Interview with members of the staff, January 1975.
was that it was a political issue and thus outside the pur-
view of the Combined Chiefs. General Marshall elaborated
on this theme during an interview in 1957:

I do not think the military authorities should make any political decisions unless they are instructed accord-
ingly, because the effects are too wide-reaching, there are too many influences involved, and it is quite a question of how much of this would be familiar to the military participants.

What is of interest is the implication by Marshall that the military officer should not be effectively schooled in the political ramifications of his actions. But what of supplying input into the political decision making process?

We [JCS] probably devoted more time in our discussions, our intimate discussions, to such matters [political than] to any one [other] subject, because we were fear-
ful that we might find our whole campaign upset by some political gesture. I frankly was fearful of Mr. Roose-
velt introducing political methods, of which he was a genius, into a military thing which had to be on a fixed basis.

In expanding this theme General Marshall went on to say:

[Diplomatic matters were] Mr. Roosevelt's [responsibi-
Con] and our problem was to be on the guard that the military picture--Army, Navy and Air--was not completely disjointed by what I will call some irrelevant political gestures which were made without due thought to what was going on at the time...

As to British criticism that the American Chiefs did not exhibit any political awareness, Marshall answered that "we didn't discuss it [political decisions] with them [the Brit-
ish] because we were not in any way putting our necks out as

150 Mns. 193rd meeting of the CCS, 16 July 1945, Termi-
nal Conference, Proceedings, CCS.

151 Pogue, Organizer of Victory: 1943-1945, 316.
to political factors which were the business of the head of state--the President--who also happened to be the Commander-in-Chief." 152

The portrait of the Joint Chiefs that the Marshall interview reveals is that of a group of officers who are highly cognizant of the political ramifications of military operations, but were equally cognizant of their role within an international committee structure. Thus superficially, the military seemed to be performing their function along the lines that Clausewitz had originally outlined. It also appears to be the antithesis of the Huntington argument. This position is reinforced by Admiral King, who described his role at Yalta as "advisory in nature." 153 Marshall's explanation, moreover, of the JCS's role vis-a-vis the British Chiefs may be an excuse for Leahy's actions on the British query on unconditional surrender. But if the JCS were fulfilling the Clausewitzian perfection of civilian control of the military, then why was the lack of political/military coordination emphasized so extensively by the key members of the wartime administration? 154 Furthermore, if the Chiefs did have real input into the political decision making process, then how is one to explain Admiral King's description of the process

152 Ibid., 315.

153 King, A Naval Memoir, 592.

154 See chapter IV, "Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Organization: 1945-1960."
at the Potsdam Conference?

...the main business of the conference was the affair of the political heads of state, assisted by the State Department representatives. This was in no way surprising, for it is a long established government practice to reach political agreements without reference to the military forces that must be relied upon to pull the chestnuts out of the fire when the political agreements do not work out as anticipated.

Admiral King's description reflects more than the traditional compartmentalization of politics from military policy. It appears to be a clear contradiction of General Marshall's previous statement; or is it? It would appear that the Chiefs were fully aware of the political ramifications of their military actions, but this awareness may have been only an internal systemic input, and not fully incorporated into the externally transmitted advice consumed by the civilian decision makers. Admiral King was not only criticizing the compartmentalization of policy formulation, but implicitly legitimizing it by virtue of its traditional source. The expectation was that such compartmentalization was part of the American professional military ethic, despite its obvious dysfunctional aspects. This expectation became a self-fulfilling prophesy, by virtue of the inculcation of that expectation. Thus the military officer was fully aware of the political ramifications of the military operations he was planning, but he had been socialized to believe that it was

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155 King, A Naval Memoir, 611.
not his role to externalize those opinions. Furthermore, the perception of compartmentalization that had been inculcated, led the military officer even to question the value of integrating political factors into operational decisions. General Omar Bradley noted that "as soldiers we looked naively on the British inclination to complicate the war with political objectives." Mr. Robert Murphy, political advisor to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Africa, reported not only this naive confusion over the political aspects of war, but real alienation toward him because of his role:

One day an American Major General asked me: "Will you please tell me what in the hell the State Department has to do in an active theater of war?" He was asking for information, so this, in effect, is what I told him: "War is a projection of policy when other means fail. The State Department is responsible to the President for foreign policy.... It was directly concerned in the political decisions inevitably to be made during the military operations, and it will have to deal with the postwar political aspects of this campaign...." While, internally the Chiefs may have perceived the need for the integration of political perceptions, externally they manifested the ethic of compartmentalization. When supplying advice to the civilian decision makers, the Chiefs prefaced their input with the caveat "from the military point

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157 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 155-156.
of view." They thus looked at extremely political issues and supposedly analyzed them militarily. The professionalized attitude was reinforced by the desires of the civilians, and in particular the President. During the Casablanca Conference Roosevelt did not bring any State Department advisors with him primarily because he viewed the conference as "essentially military" in nature. This view coincided nicely with the military's perception and explains the lack of State Department involvement in policy formulation all through the war. Furthermore, the President's apparent desire to compartmentalize decision making allowed the military to manifest its tendency to make war absolute. The Chiefs could analyze issues in terms of missions and objectives, and rationalize goals toward the achievement of

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158 As typical examples of the type of political decisions the JCS dealt with and then cloaked their recommendations in military expertise, see the following taken from Admiral Leahy's papers at the Naval Operations Archives in Washington, D.C.

Memo to SecWar, 30 December 1944: "There are no military objections to any occupations of Austria by U.S. Forces," (in file entitled "Correspondence-1944").

Memo to SecWar and SecNav, April 1945; sub: French Proposal for Zone of Occupation in Germany and Austria. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered from the military point of view the proposals of French Government." The JCS did not oppose the French getting a zone nor did they oppose the French return to Vietnam but warned of avoiding American commitment, (found in file "January-April, 1945").

159 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 163; the JCS Official History of the Second World War goes out of its way to emphasize the fact that the Chiefs were only involved in military discussions at Yalta and not any of the political meetings, Hayes, The War Against Japan, II, 347.
military success. Originally, a product of the marriage of nineteenth century professional military perceptions and American moral values, this outlook increasingly became institutionalized in the twentieth century. This was the view that was being articulated in 1931 by General Douglas MacArthur when he said "decisive victory in the field of battle invariably results in the attainment of the national purpose for which the appeal to arms was made." During the war General Marshall reaffirmed this view when he stated that all strategic decisions were made subordinate to the defeat of Germany. If this analysis is correct, then the military considered victory to be the primary goal with political considerations secondary. In order to test this assumption we will examine the decision in 1945 not to seize Berlin but to halt at the Elbe River.

This decision was possibly the most important, if not the most criticized decision of the European War. As the role of Berlin became more important in the subsequent Cold War, this decision took on new importance. The British

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160 Walter Millis with Harvey Mansfield and Herold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military elements in National Policy (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 113-115. Also see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, Chapter 13; and Chapter II of this dissertation.

161 Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 197.
in particular have been extremely critical of the American failure to take this most important "political" objective. "The Americans," wrote Montgomery, "could not understand that it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we lost it politically." 162 Essentially the issue may be bisected into two sub-questions or issues. The first deals with the physical ability of the American's to actually take Berlin before the Soviets. Stephen E. Ambrose in his book Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe; develops a convincing case, based on logistics and military mobility, that the U.S. forces did not have the physical capability to take the city. 163 While the military capabilities may well have been an overriding constraint, the question which is important for our purpose is why was an attempt not made? The answer to that question is found in the military's perception of looking at the world from the military point of view.

The single most important driving force behind Eisenhower's decision to halt at the Elbe was his belief, shared by other military officers, that the war should be ended as


quickly as possible with as few political complications as possible. This perception was reinforced by Eisenhower's initial directive that ordered him to "undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." As the war wound down there was an increased fear on the part of the Western Allies that the remnants of the Nazi regime might attempt to continue the war from an Alpine redoubt. This would by no means change the outcome of the war, but would indefinitely lengthen it. Thus the overriding imperative was the destruction of the German Army in the field, whose existence made such a redoubt a possibility. For Eisenhower the decision became a choice between taking Berlin or destroying the German Army. While the fear of the redoubt became the rationalization for a military decision, Berlin was identified as a political objective and the military's desire to avoid political complications led them to avoid Berlin. On the 11th of April, the day that General Simpson reached the Elbe River, Eisenhower made this very point most clearly:


165 See Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," 480-81; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 70-79.
From a tactical point of view it is highly inadvisable for the American Army to take Berlin and I hope political influences won't cause me to take the city. It has no tactical or strategic value.  

But Eisenhower was not alone in analyzing the situation from a military point of view. Four days earlier he had appealed to the Combined Chiefs for guidance on this particular point. He began by making it very clear that he was basing his plans on military assumptions; he then went on to discuss the Berlin issue:

I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of the proceedings to make Berlin a major objective, particularly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from the Russian lines. I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.

It appears that the CCS never considered Eisenhower's appeal for guidance, which can only be interpreted as confirmation of his military assumptions.

The decision not to consider taking Berlin was an example of perceiving an issue in purely military terms. It is apparent that the military fully understood the "political" nature of Berlin and for that reason the city was anathema.

166 Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 97.
167 Quoted in Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," 486.
168 Ibid.
This compartmentalization of the political from the military was not only revealed by Eisenhower's communications and the lack of guidance from the JCS and the CCS but was also manifested by the civilians. In mid-April the representatives of the European and Russian Affairs Division of the State Department reported that "for governments to direct movements of troops definitely indicated political action and that such movements should remain a military consideration at least until SHAEF is dissolved and the A.C.C. (Allied Control Commission) is set up." We can thus see that while the military did perceive the Berlin decision from a military point of view, they were conforming to their mandated role. It is also clear that the Joint Cheifs considered victory to be the primary goal, with political considerations secondary. Within this context the Berlin decision makes sense, as much sense as the JCS commitment to bring the Soviets into the Pacific War, despite its obvious political ramifications. The Chiefs supported the President's desire to postpone major political confrontations with the Soviets until the war was over. This point was stressed by former Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Wells:

It was altogether natural that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should constantly warn the President that, whatever the theoretical future advantages of trying to settle

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169 Ibid., 481, footnote #4; emphasis in the original.
170 Pogue, Organizer for Victory, 505-536.
political and territorial problems during the war, they were offset by the immediate dangers of the controversies with Russia that might be aroused.171

As the war came closer to its conclusion, it became more and more difficult to postpone dealing with those political controversies. Moreover, the issues that began to surface were far more political than were the decisions that had had to be dealt with earlier. One issue that was of particular importance was the resolution of the political/military questions revolving around the occupation of enemy territories, especially Germany. In February 1943, the President gave the State Department the proponency for the occupation of enemy countries.172 Unfortunately, the State Department's mission ran directly into the Chief's control of military operations. By the beginning of 1944 these two organizations were working in opposite directions. The bureaucratic conflict between these two organizations has been completely documented in Paul Hammond's study "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy." Hammond identifies the War Department's opposition to the State Department's interference in what the War Department considered a military mission:

171 Wells, Seven Decisions, 133-134.

172 Stimson, On Active Service, 559.
...the War Department viewed civil affairs as an intrusion upon its primary responsibilities, both because these 'non-military' matters seemed to threaten the involvement of the Army in politics, and because they were rivals of military requirements.\textsuperscript{173}

Ostensibly, the Chiefs opposed the fusion of civil affairs planning on the grounds of security problems, the desire to postpone political decisions until the termination of the conflict, and because they felt that the European Advisory Commission was controlled by the British. In reality their opposition probably resulted from their inherent desire to compartmentalize planning. At the same time the military was complaining about the lack of guidance upon which to build their plans, they were isolating their own plans from the civilians who needed to coordinate political efforts. Thus the State Department was forced to conduct some of its planning in a vacuum.\textsuperscript{174}

The result of such planning can be seen in the failure of political/military coordination of key issues and decisions made toward the end of the war. The American representative to the European Advisory Commission, Ambassador John Winant, was forced to rely on the military to supply him with information on American policy. As a result Ambassador Winant


\textsuperscript{174}Ibid., 331.
was assured by the War Department that there was "no military necessity for an access stipulation" into Berlin.175

In conclusion what can we say about the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War? To some degree Huntington was correct in that the military was given a freer reign than would normally be acceptable under the concept of civilian-control of the military. But Huntington was wrong in drawing the conclusion that they lost their professionalism by virtue of having to make political/military decisions. On the contrary, the military never did lose their professional perception and continued to analyze the world from the military point of view. When they were allowed to make political/military decisions they made them from the perspective that the civilian leadership wanted them to make. A case in point was the Berlin decision, when the State Department supported Eisenhower's views. Obviously, a greater degree of intellectual fusion and political/military coordination would have eliminated some of the worst of the post-war problems, but probably not all of them. As the war neared to its conclusion, the political goals of the President and the military goals of the JCS coincided, thus allowing the military greater impact on the decision making process. As Roosevelt's political goals became more military

175 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 232.
in nature this tended to confuse even further the efforts at political military coordination.\textsuperscript{176}

In the long run what were the lessons to be derived from our study of the war. It is apparent that the President had greater control over military decisions than he is normally credited with. The JCS, working within a committee structure, revealed all the problems and weaknesses that are normally associated with such systems. This included the surfacing of inter-service fighting over numerous issues, some important and some trivial. Furthermore, it was apparent that the President remained the sole point of coordination of political/military policy. In this regard the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not substantially improved the structure from the way it operated at the turn of the century. One could even argue that the JCS became a focus for problems that previously were scattered and relatively benign. Granted in terms of military operations the JCS had been successful. It allowed for effective interface with the British Chiefs of Staff and its committee staff structure

\textsuperscript{176}This may well explain Leahy's remark, that the JCS, in 1945, were under no civilian control, quoted in Huntington, Soldier and the State, 338. Why should there be when the civilian and the military objectives coincided perfectly? Apparently Leahy was referring to some form of objective control. This problem became complicated in 1945 with the death of Roosevelt. Truman, coming in somewhat cold to the situation, was very wary of asserting himself until he became more familiar with the military and the international situation.
marked the beginning of a joint planning structure, but on the level of political/military planning it had clearly failed.

What was obviously needed was an institution that would break down the compartmentalization of political considerations from the military ones. In such an institution the JCS would be an important element, but not the only one. While institutional measures were established in 1947 its success could not hang upon the existence of mere bureaucratic interface. What was imperative was the destruction of the mindsets that existed in both the civilian and military communities that lead to that compartmentalization. 177

For the military to have meaningful input into the new National Security Council structure created in 1947, the internalized military perception that demanded analyzing the world from strictly a military perspective had to be eliminated. Unfortunately, these kinds of mindsets are difficult

177 The civilians felt that the military had no business interfering into what was considered political decisions. This attitude was reflected by Senator Vandenberg, who wrote in his diary, "It remains to be seen whether one of his [Marshall's] general officers [Wedemeyer], who heretofore has sought a chance to testify, will come and still say that our military leaders totally disagree with the commitments made by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca—their function being solely to work out the achievement of the military plans upon which FDR and Churchill agreed." Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. ed. with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 48-50.
to eradicate, and would be a major obstacle in the ensuing
efforts during the next decade and a half to develop an
institution to facilitate political/military planning.
Despite the successful outcome of the Second World War, the American political/military decision making and coordinating structure was clearly found to be deficient. The most glaring problem was the lack of an institutional means short of the President to coordinate policy. Not that bureaucratic interface guarantees positive results, but the organizational linkages established by such interface are a necessary prerequisite for political/military coordination. While this defect was minimized during the war by a centrality of purpose and the apparent compatibility of political and military goals, the necessity to coordinate the plethora of post-war political/military problems magnified this flaw. This point was made emphatically clear by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who sought the solution in some form of war cabinet, "which might have done in war diplomacy what the Joint Chiefs of Staff did in military strategy." For Secretary Stimson the reasons necessitating such an organization were obvious:
Problems like those of China and France were not merely diplomatic, the State Department could not and would not take the whole labor of determining in areas where the military interest was so significant.\textsuperscript{178} 

From Stimson's perspective, the problem was not a civilian problem nor a military problem, but one that demanded the integration of bureaucratic objectives in order to effectively develop policy. Unfortunately, since the demise of the Standing Liaison Committee, no such organization had existed.

Over the next fifteen years, two presidential administrations initiated four major governmental reorganizations and numerous smaller actions in an effort to achieve policy integration. Since the Joint Chiefs would be an integral part of that structure, an examination of these organizational changes would be a useful gauge in determining the effectiveness of the Chiefs as well as identifying any fundamental flaws. Understanding this organizational framework is also important for one other reason. It describes the theoretical relationships that exist between institutions and supplies the parameters within which these organizations define their own roles.

\textsuperscript{178}Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 562. There did exist two loosely constructed organizations that are referred to as the war council and war cabinet. Both were essentially improvised and lacked all forms of staff structuring to support their efforts. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security. Senate Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945 (Hereafter cited as Eberstadt Report), 54.
During the summer and fall of 1944, the problems relating to occupied territories and post-war planning increased the importance of developing some form of institutional or organizational means of coordination. Out of necessity, the State Department "adopted" the procedure of writing directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its information. This ad hoc coordination effectively eliminated the service's civilian secretaries from the decision making process. In November 1944, Secretary Stimson, always mindful of his prerogatives, formally objected to Secretary of State Hull, stating that his responsibilities required that he "...must participate actively in the formulation of military policy and in the expression of the military point of view...."179 This particular point was further raised in a joint memorandum addressed to the Joint Chiefs from the Secretaries of Navy and War.180 This memorandum was not exclusively concerned with secretarial prerogatives. It noted the lack of any "established agency of the Joint

179 Eberstadt Report, 76.
180 Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject: Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc. Memos," U.S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as U.S. Naval Archives.)
Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic, and fiscal policy...", and it raised the larger question of political/military planning at the highest levels:

In recent months an increasingly large number of problems considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff involve questions having a political as well as a strictly military aspect. In the final stages of the war, as well as in the period immediately following the close of hostilities in the various theaters political aspects of military events inevitably are emphasized and matters affecting the overall defense policy of the nation in the post-war period emerge. The problems can be of great significance and the full judgment of the Chiefs of Staff and the respective Secretaries should be made readily obtainable by the other Agencies of the Government, particularly the Department of State.181

In December 1944, after the retirement of Secretary Hull, the first steps were initiated to institutionalize the ideas put forth in the joint memorandum. Hull's successor, Edward Stettinius, immediately reinstituted the State-War-Navy Secretarial Committee and helped establish an interdepartmental organization, the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). SWNCC was given the responsibility for the working groups that were so necessary for the coordination of political/military policy.182 While SWNCC did become a conduit for the exchange of political/military advice, it operated at such a low level within the bureaucratic

181 Ibid.

hierarchy that it was little "more than a clearing house for information." It was not until October of the following year that the respective departmental secretaries designated it as "the agency to reconcile and coordinate action...and establish policies on political/military questions...."

In the final analysis, though, the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee did not have broad enough powers to deal with the issues that it was confronting.

The formation of SWNCC, despite its failures, reflected a very real desire on the part of the civilian leadership to facilitate coordination. Only six days after assuming the presidency, Harry S. Truman wrote in a memorandum that "[today I] Authorized State, War and Navy to confer on matters affecting political and military problems in the war area." Interestingly, the President pointedly placed at the bottom of the page the following notation,

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185 Eberstadt Report, 54.

186 President's Notations, April 18, 1945, Harry S. Truman Papers, Personal Secretary File, box 82, folder "Presidential Appointment Daily Sheets: April, 1945," Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter referred to as Truman Papers and Truman Library.)
"Hadn't been done before." The fact that SWNCC had been operational for almost six months prior to this notation, is a fitting evaluation of the organization. But the President's desire did not materialize in an organizational structure to expedite planning. Over a year later, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was still echoing the President's sentiments when he wrote, "what was everywhere demanded was a far closer coordination of the diplomatic and military arms, ...better use of the military/political instrument we possessed." 187

Thus the civilian leadership was fully aware that the central problem resided in the coordination of political/military plans and that in turn revolved around balancing the nation's commitments (a product of the State Department) and the nation's military capabilities (a product of the JCS). They were also aware that existing institutions had failed to develop the needed integration. Central to this issue was that the military had to be involved in some aspect of the decision making process. This had been the thrust of the joint War-Navy memorandum in the fall of 1944. Inextricably connected to the solution of inter-departmental coordination was the need to elicit unified military advice. Thus the post-war battle over unification was a conflict to solve

two interconnected problems; the first, service unification; and the second, inter-departmental political/military policy making. It was in an effort to solve these two problems that the National Security Act of 1947 was written.

The issue of unifying the military services was by no means a new one. While the military was fully cognizant of the advantages to be accrued from joint planning,\textsuperscript{188} the idea of political unification was a far different question. Obviously, the Joint Chiefs had played a pivotal role in achieving victory, but inter-service conflicts over everything from strategic policies to Pentagon office space had permeated the war effort.\textsuperscript{189} Secretary Stimson, in particular, blamed the committee nature of the JCS for aggravating these differences:

...the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an imperfect instrument of top level decision.... It remained incapable of enforcing a decision against the will of its members. Any officer, even a minority of one, could employ a rigorous insistence on unanimity as a means of defending the interests of his own service.... Only the President


was in a position to settle disagreements by a definite and final ruling.  

The Secretary of War felt that unification would eliminate the worst aspects of these conflicts.

While the nation's civilian leadership was identifying dysfunctional aspects in the command structure, the military were reassessing their own internal organization. As early as September 1942, General Marshall asked the Joint Chiefs to eliminate some of the ambiguities stemming from the theater concept of unity of command. The Navy already involved in a series of inter-service controversies, was suspicious of the War Department's intentions and buried the issue in joint committee. But this did not end the desire on the part of both the civilian and military leadership of the War Department to unify the whole military establishment in its own centralized image. From the spring of 1943 on, various organizations within the War Department and the JCS began to study intensively the unification issue. These studies culminated in a memorandum originating from General Marshall, entitled "A Single Department of War in the Post War Period." In this memorandum, Marshall suggested a single

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military agency composed of four functional departments, ground, air, naval, and supply. Each of these departments would be directed by an under-secretary and a chief of staff. In place of the present JCS structure, there would be a Chief of Staff to the President and a United States General Staff. While such a unified structure was, for General Marshall, the necessary response to the increased complexity of future wars; it also signified the opening shot of a four year battle over unification. The War Department's centralized approach ran counter to the Navy's decentralized management structure. These organizational differences were compounded by the perceived fear by sea power advocates who, in the words of Lawrence Legere, were "afraid of what might happen if sea power came to be judged by men ignorant of its potentialities."  

Within the JCS the reaction to Marshall's memorandum was predictably split along service lines. Despite opposition from the Naval members of the JCS, the Army continued its advocacy for a single military department. In the spring of 1944, during the House of Representative's investigation into "Post-War Military Policy," (the Woodrum Committee),

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192 Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 250.  
193 Ibid., 402.
Secretary Stimson became the first civilian secretary ever to openly advocate the unification of the services. In his mind, the weaknesses inherent in the JCS committee structure merely reflected the essential structural weaknesses of the whole military system. After Secretary Stimson completed his statement, the Army's proposal for unification was presented by General Joseph T. McNarney of the Army Air Force. His proposal, which reflected Marshall's influence, called for a single Secretary of the Armed Forces, with three under secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force, a common supply service and the continued existence of the JCS under a new designation, the United States Chiefs of Staff. This new Chiefs of Staff organization had four members just as its predecessor organization did. Of special interest was the role McNarney gave the Chiefs in determining the budget. While they would be involved in the traditional duties of developing military strategy, they would also make the "general determination of budgetary needs and the allocations involved in their recommended strategic deployment for national defense." The power of the Chiefs in budgetary matters was such that the Secretary of the Armed Forces could

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194 U.S. Congress, House, Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, Hearings before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 1944, 31 (hereafter cited as Woodrum Committee). Also see Stimson, On Active Service, 519.
only communicate the Chiefs' proposals to the President with his own recommendations attached. He could not change them in any way. 195

The Navy correctly perceived that the plan was the Army's attempt to force through a fait d'accompli. From that time on, it attempted to fight a rear guard action and delay the decision. 196 Under Secretary James Forrestal, who became the Navy's chief spokesman following the untimely death of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, attacked the Army's proposal at its weakest point, the budgetary process. Forrestal and other Navy witnesses played upon the Congress' traditional fear of losing civilian control of the military. In the end, the Woodrum Committee could only recommend postponing determination of the issue until the war was over. 197

While the congressional investigation was in progress, the Joint Chiefs themselves designated a "Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense" to examine the issue. This committee is usually referred to as the Richardson Committee, after its senior member, Admiral J. O. Richardson (Retired). After five months of investigating the issues and interviewing key field commanders, the committee

196 Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 259-260.
197 Stimson, On Active Service, 519.
announced its findings on 11 April 1945. With the exception of the senior member, the committee was unanimously "in favor of a single departmental system or organization for the Armed Forces of the United States." The majority of the committee felt that unification would increase efficiency, eliminate the worst aspects of inter-service competition, and guarantee civilian control. In the final analysis, the majority believed that such unification would lead to better "Correlation of Military Preparedness and National Policies." Admiral Richardson's dissent was based upon a dislike for an autonomous Air Force, fear for the future of the Marine Corps, and a basic abhorrence of a single military commander. The Navy rebutted the majority report with a 160 page document of its own that attacked every one of the majority's assumptions. While Marshall himself did not fully concur with the highly centralized view projected by the report, he advocated that it be forwarded to the President with a statement of principle supporting a


199 Ibid., 43.
a single departmental structure. Internally, the JCS was so badly split over the report, that it was not forwarded to President Truman until 16 October 1945, and then it was accompanied by the split opinions of the four chiefs.

Although the services' leadership may have agreed on a superficial level that some form of organizational reform was needed, service imperatives and fears blocked any consensus on the format. For the services, the fight over unification was a foreshadowing of future inter-service conflicts over strategy, budgets, and resources. Samuel P. Huntington has suggested that "interservice rivalry was the child of unification," but the wartime inter-service conflicts over the direction of the war effort, resources, and even trivial matters such as promotions suggest the opposite. It would instead appear that the rivalry was fostered by the tensions resulting from increased military commitments being carried out by comparatively decreased resources. The Army's desire for unification was based on the belief that it would foster

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201 Within the same file as the Richardson Report was also the Navy's 160 page rebuttal, and the Chiefs' written positions on the Report when it was finally forwarded to the President. Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of the National Defense Structure and Comments: October and November, 1945," U.S. Naval Archives.

greater budgetary stability and a more logical and equitable division of the military budget. Any division of the military budget would be based upon need, and need would be determined by the mission of the service. The Navy, preferring to maintain the status quo, realized that this logic could be used to rationalize the Marine Corps out of existence, based on the grounds of duplication of functions; and a similar rationalization could ultimately lead to the absorption of its carrier fleet into the newly created and autonomous Air Force.

Previously, the Navy had hoped to either postpone unification, or if that failed, at least to implement it on its own decentralized terms. The report of the Richardson Committee badly undermined that strategy, and the death of President Roosevelt the day after the report's release destroyed it. The new President was a strong advocate of unification believing "that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be organized quickly as a step toward ensuring our future safety and preserving world peace."204

In the face of such growing solidarity on the unification issue, Secretary Forrestal realized that the Navy could no longer postpone reorganization, and that unless it

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203 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings on Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 360-365. From this hearing it is apparent that the Marine Corps still had not lost its fear of being eliminated.

wished to be excluded completely as obstructionist, it had
better supply some acceptable alternative to the Army's
centralization plans. In May 1945, Forrestal stressed this
very point before the Navy's Organization Policy Group:

Having gone before the Woodrum Committee last year and
been a party to their postponing consideration at
that time, I feel that we have got to be very positive
this time in some kind of plan which is a Navy Plan. I
don't think we can be negative any further as far as
Congress is concerned. I don't think the reaction of the
public last year was too favorable to our position. I
don't think we can again say "Let's postpone this, let's
postpone that."

A week later Senator David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval
Affairs Committee, wrote Forrestal a letter along exactly
the same lines, suggesting that the Navy Department make a
"thorough study of this subject" and propose its own plan for
organization.206

This political necessity prompted Secretary Forrestal
to ask an old personal friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to head
a task force to explore the unification issue. Their friend-
ship had started before the war as members of the prestigious
New York investment firm of Dillon and Read and continued
during the war as members of the Army and Navy Munitions
Board. Specifically, Forrestal asked Eberstadt to prepare
a report on the following questions:

205 Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 262.
206 Eberstadt Report, iii, iv.
1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?

2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security?

3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security? 207

Eberstadt's report concluded that "unification of the Army and the Navy under a single head" would not necessarily improve the nation's security and that a "coordinated system" based upon decentralization would be more functional. It emphasized the vast administrative difficulties connected with any single secretarial structure, and the dangers to civilian control of the military. As an alternative structure, the Report favored an independent Army, Navy and Air Force, each administered by its own civilian secretary of cabinet rank. In order to deal with the complicated problem of political/military coordination within such a confederated structure, Eberstadt proposed the creation of a National Security Council and a National Security Resources Board. These organizations, whose membership included the service secretaries, would advise the President on policy and coordinate planning and execution.

207 Ibid., 1; Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 227.
The Report found the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a highly successful organization that should be maintained in its present form. Although it reaffirmed the weaknesses concomitant to a committee structure, it felt that the "record does not indicate that they could have performed their duties better if a supreme military commander had been inserted between them and the President." This was clearly a rejection of McNarney's centralized organization. The Eberstadt Report apparently assumed that the Chiefs could work together in a crisis situation, but that they must be given legal status to define their duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, as an organization they must be integrated into all other aspects of the national planning structure. To facilitate the workings of the JCS, a joint staff was to be provided.

The plan that Eberstadt proposed corresponded extremely well to Forrestal's own views of defense organization. Forrestal, who had fought centralization within the Navy all through the war, realized that the most important aspect of an organizational plan was that it must allow for integration of the various capabilities of all the services. He fully appreciated that on some issues there were bound to be differing professional viewpoints, whether military or civilian; but he felt as Secretary of the Navy "that his task was to create an organization, in which both views could be
freely developed and upon which a decision could be made." 208

One week after the Eberstadt Report was released the Army countered with a new unification proposal put forth by Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins. The Collins plan, which addressed only the organization of the military hierarchy, envisaged a single Department of the Armed Forces headed by a single civilian secretary. The JCS was to remain essentially as before, except for the addition of a fifth member, a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, whose functions were unspecified. The plan furthermore recommended the Joint Chiefs be an advisory body, and as with the McNarney Plan, they be given the authority to prepare and recommend to the President the military budget. The civilian secretary could comment upon, but not amend these budgetary recommendations. 209

After the release of the Eberstadt and the Collins plans, it was apparent that the services had reached an impasse. Under these circumstances, the President took the initiative and on 17 December 1945 submitted his own plan for unification. President Truman's interest and attitude toward unification can be traced back to an article he wrote for

208 Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 277.

209 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, Hearings, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945, 157 ff.
Colliers magazine during the 1944 Presidential campaign. In this article, Truman's arguments for unification were based on economics and the elimination of waste and duplication. Underpinning this argument was the apparent conviction that some type of coordinating and planning authority was needed to deal with defense problems as an interrelated whole. He attacked the JCS committee structure and expressed his desire that "a General Staff in full charge of tactics and strategy, viewing the nation's offense and defense as an indivisible whole and totally unconcerned with service rivalries" be created. 210

These ideas were easily identifiable in the President's 1945 reorganization plan. As a result of his disenchantment with the JCS structure, he called for the establishment of a civilian Secretary of National Defense and a single military chief of staff. Furthermore, the plan eliminated the present Joint Chiefs' structure and substituted a military advisory body with unspecified duties. 211 Thus, in December of 1945, the President's dislike for the JCS led him to the conclusion

210 Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must be Unified," Colliers. CXIV (26 August 1944), 64.

that some form of centralization under a single chief of staff would eliminate the ills of the military organization. Yet by 22 May 1946, the President had totally reversed himself and saw a single chief of staff as a threat to civilian control of the military. 212

The explanation for this complete reversal may be partially found in a memorandum written by Clark Clifford on 18 December 1945. In this memorandum, Clifford warned of the dangers of a single chief of staff and felt that such an individual would be in a position to "override the civilian secretaries' views on future controversies." 213 Clifford argued forcefully that the retention of the present JCS structure allowed for the continuation of pluralist decision making and that this in turn permitted diverse views to surface to the attention of the civilian leadership. Such pluralism maximized civilian control.

The Clifford memorandum goes a long way toward explaining the change in Truman's attitude, but it also surfaced

212 Harold D. Smith Papers, Box 1, Truman Library. This box contains the diary of Mr. Smith who was director of the Bureau of the Budget. In his diary Mr. Smith notes that the President desired to institute a single chief of staff on 13 December 1945. This coincides with his own unification plan. On the 22 May 1946, Mr. Smith records that the President had come to see a single chief of staff as a threat to civilian control of the military. There is no comment on why the change occurred or when it came about.

213 Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 18 December 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder, "Post War Military Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library.
another possible explanation, the administration's concept of structuring its relationship with the military. While Roosevelt had controlled and guided the military by the force of his personality, Truman looked toward institutions to accomplish that goal. Clifford was very sympathetic with Forrestal's belief that foreign policy and military policy had to be fully integrated, but it was only through institutions that such integration could be optimized. In a note written on 13 December 1945, Clifford emphasized that only in the integration of the nation's "foreign, military, and economic policies... [was there] hope for preventing our participation in another war." Unification of the services was only one aspect of the effort toward total integration. Within this framework, though, a single chief of staff held out a potential danger, not only from the point of view of stifling diverse opinions, but such an individual could also develop a narrow perspective of the world around him. A single chief of staff could potentially be "in no


215 Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 13 December 1945, Samuel Rosenman Papers, box 4, folder "Unification Folder #1," Truman Library.
position to view the overall problems of politics, diplomacy, and military affairs." It was thus through the instrumentality of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs that such a situation could be avoided.

Conversely, one should not give Clifford total credit for Truman's transformation, nor mistakenly assume that the primary motivation for the National Security Act was efficiency. If the latter was the case, then a single chief of staff would have been ideal. Wilber Hoar, long time chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, maintains that the reason for the 1947 legislation was to give guidance to the military. While this is partially true, it is also probable that the administration was as much concerned with controlling the military as directing it. Truman's own perception of the military was essentially one of distrust and dislike. In his later years, the former President described this in language that was typically Trumanese:

216 Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 18 December 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder "Post War Military Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library.


You always have to remember when you're dealing with generals and admirals, most of them, they're wrong a good deal of the time.... They're most of them just like horses with blinders on, they can't see beyond the end of their nose.219

Naturally, this view did not extend to all the military, because the President had the greatest respect and confidence in Leahy, Marshall, and Bradley, but this belief led him to a total commitment to civilian control, not only in theory, but in practice.220 Logically, the President was extremely protective of his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief, and felt that he had to have complete control of the military:

I took the position that the President, as the Commander-in-Chief, had to know everything that was going on. I had just enough experience to know that if you are not careful, the military will hedge you in.221

The ideas of Presidential prerogatives and civilian control of the military were deeply intertwined. This conviction was never more evident than during the Truman-MacArthur controversy.222

Whatever President Truman's motivations were, it was the force of his office that generated the inter-service compromise that resulted in the National Security Act of

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221 Ibid., 88.

222 Miller, Plain Speaking, 287; Hoar, "Truman," 199-208.
The heart of that compromise was Eberstadt's decentralized approach. Central to the legislation was the creation of a National Defense Establishment headed by a civilian secretary. Conforming to the Eberstadt view of decentralization, though, the powers vested in this secretary were very limited. He was given the power of "general authority, direction and control," over the three services. Since the service secretaries were also of cabinet rank, it meant in a practical sense that the Secretary of Defense's power was nil. Moreover, the impotent nature of the Secretary's role was exacerbated by the fact that all three of the service secretaries were also members of the National Security Council. This political reality was legally reflected in the fact that the National Defense Establishment was not an executive department. This also led to


It appears that Truman originally did not want the service secretaries to be of cabinet rank. U.S. Congress, Senate, National Defense Establishment, 184.
the criticism of too much military influence in the NSC. 225

In regard to the JCS, there was a surprising consensus of thought on what role the Chiefs were to take and how they were to be structured. Congress, in particular, had great confidence in the organization and stated that its duties should be "substantially as at present and permit functioning in accordance with procedures developed by war experience." 226 Similarly, the military themselves had reached a consensus that whether or not there would be a single chief of staff, the JCS should structurally continue as it had previously. Thus, the original proposals relating to the JCS, developed by the Army and Navy negotiators, Lieutenant General

225 Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill to promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947), Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman Library. In this memorandum General Marshall notes that the proposed establishment of the NSC would "give predominance in the field of foreign relations to a body composed of not less than six, of which at least four would be the civilian heads of military establishments. I think it would be unwise to vest such a council by statute with broad and detailed powers and responsibilities in this field." Marshall went on to say that "there is also a strong feeling that the direction of policy, foreign or domestic, should be dominated by the non-military branches of government." This point was brought out in the interviews conducted by the 1948 Hoover Commission, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force on National Security Organization (Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 62. (Hereafter cited as the Hoover Commission.)

Loris Norstad and Vice Admiral Forest Sherman, were accepted almost in their entirety by Congress. 227

The provisions of the National Security Act that established the Joint Chiefs of Staff named the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and "the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, if there be one," as its members. 228 The incorporation of Leahy's position is somewhat paradoxical in light of the President's newly acquired dislike for a single chief of staff. While it is true that Truman had a great deal of respect for Roosevelt's Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, and thus may have been motivated to continue the personal relationship, a more plausible explanation may be found in Truman's faith in institutional control of the military. Leahy, by virtue of his proximity to the President and his rank, could serve as a means of control and a conduit of guidance for the Chiefs.

Aside from specifying the membership of the JCS, the National Security Act also identified their functions, starting by naming them the "principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense." Noticeable by its absence

227 Major Changes, 17.

228 The Commandant of the Marine Corps was not considered a member of the JCS in 1947. On 28 June 1952 with passage of Public Law 416 the Commandant was made an equal to the other chiefs when discussing matters affecting the Marine Corps. In practice this has almost always meant the presence of the Commandant at JCS meetings. In 1980 the Commandant was made a full and equal member of the JCS.
was the fact that the Cheifs were not made advisors to the National Security Council. This apparent anomaly may be explained by remembering that Truman was deeply concerned about his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief. To make the JCS advisors to a committee that contained individuals outside the military chain of command might in some way dilute this prerogative. In an agendum written in February 1949, this relationship between the President and his military advisors was clearly articulated. This agendum suggested that the President speak to the JCS informally on the fact that:

The Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense depend upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the professional information, analysis, and decisions upon which the President must, in turn, make decisions of great moment to the nation. (In this essentially strategic, professional process, no authority other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President can intervene.)

Such an outside authority would be the National Security Council. Moreover, the specific role of the NSC was still very much in doubt at the time of the passage of the National Security Act. While its duties were outlined, the nature of

its relationship with the executive was still in question. 230

Aside from this advisory function, the other specific functions assigned to the Joint Chiefs were:

1. to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

2. to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

3. to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

4. to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

5. to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

6. to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

230 The State Department leadership was opposed to giving too much power to the NSC because it attacked their institutional prerogatives. In the February 7th Memorandum to the President, Marshall, noted that "the constitutional and traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs, principally throughout our history with the aid of the Secretary of State, is deeply rooted," Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill to Promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947), Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman Library. The Secretary of State furthermore said that the envisioned legislation would make the Secretary "the automaton of the Council." Acheson also had his doubts about the value of the NSC. Forrestal records that General Norstad believed that Acheson would "try to castrate its effectiveness." Forrestal, Diaries, 315. Also see Chapters VI and VIII for further discussion on Truman's use of the NSC.
(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.231

To help accomplish these functions, the statute established a Joint Staff consisting of one hundred officers supplied equally from the three services.

The formation of the Joint Staff exemplified the pressures that were at work during the unification process. It seems to have been a foregone conclusion that the Staff's organization would resemble the existing committee structure that had evolved during World War II. The Chiefs agreed that they should name the Joint Staff's director as soon as possible and allow him to recommend the Staff's internal organization since that was not outlined in the statute. With that in mind, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther was appointed on 25 August 1947 and one month later submitted his recommendations for the Joint Staff's organization.

General Gruenther's plan kept the basic outline of the World War II committee structure, although the internal agencies were renamed. He recommended a structure based around three full-time staff groups that supported three senior part-time inter-service committees. As was the case during World War II, the membership of the committees were

part-time representatives from the service staffs. The staff groups were designated the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint Strategic Plans Group and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. These three groups would support the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint Logistics Committee. In order to guarantee better coordination between the joint committee and its supporting group, the group's director sat in with the senior committee.

The newly created Joint Staff thus consisted of the Director of the Joint Staff and the three joint groups. General Gruenther built his recommendations upon the assumption that the JCS was going to remain a "planning, coordinating, and advisory body, and not an operating or implementing group." But the Joint Staff was not the only organization that supported the JCS. A larger, less distinct institution, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), of which the Joint Staff was a part, was also available for that purpose. Along with the Joint Staff, the OJCS consisted of the Joint Secretariat and a variety of functional committees, such as the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. The specific number and designation of these other agencies changed during the 1947-1958 time frame, but the basic organizational structure remained the same. In October 1947 the JCS approved General Gruenther's recommendations.

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232 Major Changes, 18-20.
The small size of the Joint Staff guaranteed a continued reliance upon the service staffs for support. This was quite acceptable to the services who wanted to maintain their avenue of expression on service issues and their ability to influence decisions. In practice, an issue was sent out of the Director's office through the Joint Secretariat, to the appropriate joint committee. The joint committee determined which of the Joint Staff groups would support the project. It was within these groups that the actual paperwork was produced, although the service staffs might become involved. Upon completion, the project was forwarded to the appropriate joint committee for concurrence. Before that was accomplished though, a paper might be returned to the joint group for revision or be sent to the service staffs for examination. Either way, the requirement for service concurrence guaranteed the protection of service interests before the project was sent forward to the Joint Chiefs. 233

There was one major deletion from the original statutory provisions that pertained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The original version stated that the JCS was to "make recommendations for the integration of the military budget." This was obviously a retention from earlier Army proposals in the budget area. While this deletion enhanced civilian control,

it left the JCS without a specific role in the budgetary process. As a result the Chiefs' role in budget matters varied during the period of our study.\textsuperscript{234}

The passage of Public Law 253 (the National Security Act of 1947) gave the Joint Chiefs legal status for the first time and identified their place within the policy making structure. The reasons for the deliberate specification of the duties of the Chiefs (as well as other organizations covered by Public Law 253) were twofold. The first was to clearly place the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs within the governmental system. The second was to indicate not only the extent of the Chiefs' functions, but also their limitations. For the first time in American history, the act attempted to create a single system for the development of political/military planning and policy. Unfortunately, the lines within that system were so complex and overlapping that at times they became totally indiscernible. Despite this complexity, there are three fundamental levels within the system. At the top is a totally civilian level consisting of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and others. The lower level is that of an

\textsuperscript{234}The original JCS budgetary function was mentioned in a 16 January 1945 memorandum from Patterson and Forrestal to the President. This memorandum states that the JCS "will formulate strategic plans, assign logistics responsibilities to the services in support thereof, integrate the military requirements and, as directed advise in the integration of the military budget." U.S. Congress, Senate, \textit{National Defense Establishment}, 2.
implementing bureaucracy in charge of any particular function. In dealing with military questions this level is all military. In the context of this study, these two levels may be identified as the political and the military levels or, in functional terms, developing commitments and developing capabilities. On defense matters the middle level is made up of mixed civilian and military agencies such as the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In theory, this middle level is the point of contact, or to use contemporary bureaucratic parlance, the 'interface' between the bureaucracies involved in developing commitments and capabilities. The Chiefs, as representatives of an implementing bureaucracy, enter into the system at this point. It was for this reason that President Eisenhower considered the Joint Chiefs the "hinge" between the military establishment and the higher civilian control. They are positioned at that point within the system where the nation's commitments and capabilities are meshed and hopefully balanced.

While the Joint Chiefs may have been the hinge between commitments and capabilities, the National Security Act did not explain how the various organizations would actually function. In this regard, the JCS was no different from any

other organization established in 1947. Obviously, the Chiefs' advisory function was their reason for being. The civilian leadership would look to the JCS to supply expert military advice on military matters. But what exactly a "military" matter was, was never defined. We can assume, that given America's traditional compartmentalization of political from military policy, this implied a "radical" form of professionalism. All of the other functions specified in the statute were specifically related either to developing military advice or to maximizing military command and control. This may partially explain the deletion of the JCS's budgetary function. In any case, the role that the Chiefs were to play would have to be worked out between the institutions involved.

The provisions incorporated into Public Law 253 concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense contained certain inherent difficulties and contradictions. The elimination of these inherent problems would be the subject of three massive reorganizations and several minor changes in the Defense Department structure during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The National Security Act gave the Chiefs dual and sometimes conflicting roles. On the one hand, as a corporate body, they are the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense; on the other hand, they are the military heads of
their respective services. As such, they command a bureaucracy that has its own imperatives and vested interests. By virtue of their advisory function, the Chiefs enter into the highest mixed civilian-military councils such as the NSC, but are forced to defend their organizational interests and imperatives in those councils.

Historically, it has proved extremely difficult for the Chiefs to divorce themselves from their services. This service connection has probably been the greatest single criticism leveled against the JCS. One such critic, retired Lieutenant General James Gavin writes:

The Chiefs must wear two hats, one as a member of the JCS, and the other as a member of their own service. In a larger sense, they should keep the national interest paramount. But...the record will show that interest in the particular service usually prevails, although, entirely in a patriotic sense, since their background, loyalties, and responsibilities all suggest that in this manner the national interest is best served.236

It may be unreasonable to expect a chief, with over thirty years of service in a particular organization, to take on a new set of perceptions or world view. Faultless or not, this problem must be confronted by each and every chief, as noted in the following remarks by former Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Decker:

As service representative... I had the job of trying to get for my service as much of the resources available in the National Defense kitty as I could.... As a member of the Joint Chiefs... I had the responsibility for the overall military preparedness of the country.

He went on to say that he reconciled these two roles by "making as much of the pitch as I could for the Army, at the same time keeping in mind the requirements of the other services."\textsuperscript{237} The inherent weakness of leaving it up to the individual to balance between two such powerful sets of imperatives is rather apparent. The Truman administration, and in particular Clark Clifford, thought that the National Security Act would help alleviate this problem.\textsuperscript{238} Unfortunately, as events were to prove such hope was unfounded, and this was one of the prime motivations for later reorganization plans.

The problem of the Chiefs' double role is inextricably connected to another dilemma they face; are they commanders, are they planners, or both? If they are to carry out both of these functions then it is quite logical for them to wear two hats. If not, then one of these roles should be eliminated. It is this command role that motivates the Chiefs to

\textsuperscript{237} Interview with General George H. Decker, January, 1975, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{238} Undated Memorandum on Issues, Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification Bill, Comments and Recommendations," Truman Library.
defend their service interests. This role confusion has always existed, as indicated earlier, in regard to the Chief of Staff of the Army, who by statute, is prohibited from being the commander; but the confusion within the JCS is exacerbated by the command responsibility given the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The military themselves feel very strongly that planning responsibility and operational control must go hand in hand. The combining of the two roles eliminates the development of "ivory tower planning" by individuals who will never have to worry about actually carrying out their plans. Former Chief of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer made this very clear, "to separate planning from operational authority is a gross error."

239 The National Security Act of 1947 specifically stated that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force "shall exercise command over the United States Air Force;" Title II, sect. 208(b). As part of the 1958 reorganization command was changed to read "supervision." A similar change occurred in the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Marine Corps Commandant to their respective services. But a degree of ambiguity still remains. According to The Marine Officers Guide the Chief of Naval Operations commands the operating forces of the Navy and implies that the Commandant is the actual commander of the Marine Corps. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Marine Officers Guide, 4th edition rev. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 46, 81.

240 Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, January, 1975, Washington, D.C.
A second major problem which arose out of the 1947 legislation was the position of the Joint Chiefs within the chain of command. According to the statute, they were "subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense," and were the principal military advisors to both. By virtue of their service responsibilities, they are also under the service secretaries. The administrative confusion which can result from having three bosses is quite obvious. Furthermore, the mere existence of the Secretary of Defense created not only a potential competitor for the role of principal military advisor to the President, but an official potentially capable of dominating the Chiefs and usurping their functions.

These then were the problems and contradictions implicit within the 1947 legislation that the ensuing amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 attempted to rectify. Generally speaking, these changes followed three lines. The first was to centralize power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The second was to streamline the chain of command in an effort to eliminate the above mentioned ambiguities. Finally, these changes tried to take command responsibility away from the Chiefs and make them into more of a planning organization. This last point was an essential step in disconnecting the Chiefs from their service parochialism.

\[241\] National Security Act 1947, Title II, sect. 211(a).
The original 1947 legislation conformed to Eberstadt's view of decentralization, by creating a weak Secretary of Defense with only "general control" over the Military Establishment, and by allowing the military services to be "separately administered." This approach was institutionalized by giving the services all powers not specifically granted to the Secretary of Defense. At first, this approach was totally acceptable to Secretary Forrestal, but slowly he began to appreciate the inherent disadvantages in such a decentralized system, and he came to realize the Secretary needed greater control over the Military Establishment. In his "First Report" as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal suggested massive reforms designed to enhance and centralize the power of the Secretary:

The statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense should be materially strengthened, not only by providing him with an Under Secretary, but also making it clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the agencies of the National Military Establishment.242

The elimination of the disabling adjective "general" in front of "direction, authority, and control" was a necessary prerequisite for the centralization of power into the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As a corollary to this change, Forrestal also suggested that the National Military

Establishment be converted into an Executive Department, with a corresponding reduction in the status of the services and the removal of their representatives from the NSC. In a 8 February 1949 memorandum to the President, these changes were identified as "necessary if he [the Secretary of Defense] is to exercise adequate control over the military services." In order to support the Secretary in his new centralized role, Forrestal called for an increase in the size of OSD.

Secretary Forrestal's recommendations were reinforced shortly afterward by the report of the Military Establishment Task Force of the Hoover Commission. This Commission, officially entitled the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, was brought into existence in 1947 to examine all aspects of the executive branch, especially in terms of economy and efficiency. Former President Herbert Hoover headed the Commission, while Ferdinand Eberstadt headed the Military Establishment Task Force. The Commission's report identified the positions of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the two "critical points" where problems existed in the National Security structure. As for the Secretary, the report supported Forrestal by emphasizing the need to improve the Secretary's "managerial

243 Memorandum Clark Clifford, Frank Pace and James Forrestal to the President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of the National Security. Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence: Director of Staff," Truman Library.
This meant centralizing his power and increasing the supporting bureaucracy. As for the Joint Chiefs, four major problem areas were identified:

(1) The JCS has remained detached and remote from the other parts of the National Security Organization and have not become involved in the totality of economic, political and scientific planning. Part of the problem stemmed from a lack of guidance on the part of the NSC, "but their [JCS] own attitude has been one of far too great detachment from the broader tasks of the modern strategic planner."

(2) The Chiefs are influenced far too much by service considerations which deter efforts at integrating a total military policy.

(3) The Chiefs themselves are too heavily burdened by service functions, at the expense of their JCS role.

(4) The JCS is burdened by too many minor matters.

Each of these problem areas contributed in their own way toward diminishing the effectiveness of the JCS in fulfilling their statutory functions. Consistently, the Task Force emphasized the dysfunctional nature of inter-service conflict and the diffusion of energy that resulted from the Chiefs' involvement in service matters. It recommended removing the Chiefs from the chain of command and upgrading the service's Vice-Chiefs so that they could take over more of the service responsibilities. But the Task Force failed to supply any substantive suggestions for rectifying the first problem area. The Task Force criticized the isolated "aloofness" with which the JCS operated; the fact that the JCS had substantially failed to "relate their military
plans" to the nation's economic, industrial, and scientific capabilities; and that it was difficult to get advice from the Chiefs. As a superficial solution to the problem, it was suggested that the Chiefs should become more involved in the workings of the NSC, and that they should sit in on more NSC meetings. Unfortunately, this naive panacea did not fully deal with the fundamental issue that the Task Force was addressing. In reality the Task Force was criticizing the Joint Chiefs for two separate and distinct faults. The first was their service parochialism, which could be dealt with through organizational change. The second was that they were restricting their outlook to the "military point of view." The simple solution of more bureaucratic interface and a larger Joint Staff would have very little effect on such a narrow "radically" professional outlook.

As a result of the desire for centralization manifested by Forrestal and the Hoover Commission, President Truman asked for a reorganization of the National Military Establishment along the lines indicated by Forrestal. As a result of the desire for centralization manifested by Forrestal and the Hoover Commission, President Truman asked for a reorganization of the National Military Establishment along the lines indicated by Forrestal.

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245 U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D.C., Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964), Harry S. Truman, 1949, 163 and 382. (Hereafter cited as Public Papers.)
supported the President by adopting amendments to the National Security Act that greatly strengthened the power of the Secretary of Defense. This increase in power corresponded to his new status as head of an executive department, the Department of Defense (DoD). Possibly, in response to the Hoover Commission's criticism of JCS remoteness, the Chiefs were named the "principal military advisors" to the National Security Council, along with their duties as advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.\footnote{National Security Act of 1947, Title II, sec. 211(a) as amended in 1949.} Another explanation for this change in function may have been the President's growing confidence in the NSC, coupled with the administration's increased awareness of the complexity of national security problems.\footnote{U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Defense, Hearings before a Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), I, 573. (Hereafter cited as the Jackson Committee). In these hearings Admiral Sidney Souers, Former Secretary of the National Security Council discussed how President Truman began to take a more controlling hand in NSC affairs. While the Admiral did not specifically say so, it may be suggested that the President simply began to get used to the structure and no longer feared it.} 

As part of the general trend toward centralization within the Defense Department, the 1949 legislation established the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the Second World War, the JCS acted primarily as the President's personal military staff. This relationship was
described by Admiral Leahy, after the war:

He [FDR] was the Commander-in-Chief. He just appointed us like he would appoint a staff. . . . We went to the President. We dealt directly with the President. We were the staff of the President of the United States.248

This statement reflected the fact that only the President had the power to force an issue through the JCS, and partially explained why Leahy was given the title of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, as opposed to commander of all American forces. Leahy continued to function in this capacity until illness forced his retirement in 1949. Before that, however, his ability to deal with the complex nature of national security problems and to minimize inter-service rivalry had diminished toward the end of his tenure. General Bradley noted Leahy's ill-preparation, in comparison to what he considered to be the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff.249 As such, Secretary Forrestal began to look elsewhere for the kind of independent military advice that Leahy should have supplied.

At first, the Secretary looked to General Alfred Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff. In 1948, he sought to have the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, named as his

248 U.S. Congress, House, Reorganization Hearings 1953, 211.

249 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Hearings on S. 1843, To Convert the National Military Establishment into an executive department of the Government, to be known as the Department of Defense, to provide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority and with civilian and military assistants adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibilities, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 2912. (Hereafter cited as House Hearings 1949.)
special military advisor, but both Bradley and Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall opposed the change, maintaining that the General was needed in his present capacity.  

Once Leahy had retired, Forrestal turned to retired General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to temporarily fill the void. By virtue of Eisenhower's age, rank, and experience, it was hoped he would be able to exert some pressure to coordinate the Chiefs. Eisenhower's return to duty was specifically in response to the difficulty the Chiefs were having developing budgets and war plans. As Forrestal wrote to the President:

> It is in these circumstances and against this background that it occurred to me that the talents of Ike, in terms of the identification of problems and the accommodations of differing views, would be highly useful.

The Secretary desired to have available to him "some disinterested separate professional advice from an individual who owned no particular allegiance to one service." For a while, Forrestal thought about creating an independent military committee outside the JCS, consisting of Eisenhower, General

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250 Major Changes, 21; Forrestal, Diaries, 496.

251 Letter James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, 9 November 1948, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 120, folder, "Forrestal General." Truman Library.

Ira Eaker (USAF), and Admiral John Towers; all of whom were retired. Ultimately, the Secretary returned to the idea of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who could act as a link between the civilian leadership and the JCS, while abrogating the worst aspects of inter-service rivalry. Obviously, such an individual needed to devote his full time to these goals, but Forrestal was by no means suggesting a single chief of staff. It was the individual's duties, not his title, that was important. In this regard, the Secretary noted, "the fundamental question was not whether or not there should be a single Chief of Staff but what the scope of the single Chief of Staff's responsibility as agent of the Secretary should be."  

Forrestal's use of the word "agent" to describe the relationship between the proposed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

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253 Ibid., The idea of the chairman also being retired was discussed extensively; even the Hoover Commission considered using Eisenhower as the model. See U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, 1949, 2788.

254 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act Amendment of 1949: Hearings on S. 1269 and S.1843, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 10. (Hereafter referred to as Senate, Hearings, 1949.)

255 Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library. It should be emphasized that Forrestal had not lost any of his belief in the Navy's coordinated approach to administration. The chairman would simply facilitate such coordination.
of Staff and the Secretary of Defense reflected his desire to maximize institutional control over the Chiefs. The Chiefs' independence was based on three pillars: their natural prestige and expertise derived from their position as a chief of a service; their statutory function as advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense; and their other statutory functions enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947. From the practical point of view, the Chief's statutory functions would have to be eliminated before institutional control could be optimized. In a 8 February 1949 memorandum, Forrestal, along with Clark Clifford and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, advocated the elimination of both of these statutory pillars. They considered it desirable to "delete the specific statutory duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and to designate the Chairman as the "principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense." Moreover, they thought it desirable to reword the provision prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from creating a military staff of his own "in order to make it clear that the Chairman (or Chief), as well as the Joint Staff, can function as the military staff of the Secretary of Defense." These increases in the Chairman's functions were a logical extension of Forrestal's plan to use him as an "agent" of the Secretary and

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256 Memorandum, Clifford, Pace, and Forrestal to the President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of the National Security, Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director of Staff," Truman Library.
make him a "responsible head" of the JCS:

...the Chairman must be in a position to secure unanimity from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, if he fails to secure such unanimity, he must be able to identify the basis of the differences of opinion, and he must in such a circumstance have the right to submit to the Secretary of Defense his recommendations as to the decisions which the Secretary of Defense should make.257

Along these same lines, Forrestal also wanted the Secretary to assume the function of appointing the Director of the Joint Staff.258

The stripping away of the Chiefs' statutory functions was what Forrestal called the "shadow concept" of control. The administration felt that sweeping legislative changes, such as "abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff," would run into political difficulties. Instead, it opted for the subtler approach of eroding the Chiefs' functions, and with them their independence, thereby making them more subservient to secretarial control. Such secretarial control would exist by virtue of lack of restrictions. In much the same manner that the elastic clause of the Constitution paved the way for the expansion of Federal power, the elimination of the delimitating statutory provisions would allow for the expansion of the Secretary's power.259

257 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, 1949, 10.

258 Major Changes, 24.

259 Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library.
Generally speaking, the Chiefs were receptive to Forrestal's desire to establish a full-time institutional moderator within the Joint Chiefs. This point was made by General Bradley during the Congressional hearings:

In our experience serving as Joint Chiefs, we have come to the conclusion that the lack of such a Chairman is a flagrant shortcoming of the present organization for security. A senior officer, of competent military background, who devotes his total time to the Joint Chiefs' prescribed functions, and the Joint Chiefs' agenda is essential.260

But a full-time moderator, equal to the other Chiefs, was a far cry from the "agent" that Forrestal envisioned. In a 25 March 1949 reply to the Secretary, the Chiefs suggested greater limitations on the proposed powers of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, the Chiefs recommended that their previously prescribed duties be included in any future law. They reaffirmed this position before the Senate by recommending the following: (1) the Chairman should have no command power; (2) the Chiefs should keep their statutory functions; (3) the advisory function should be kept with the Chiefs as a corporate entity and that the chairman should be part of the JCS and not separate from it; (4) the Joint Staff is the operating body of the JCS and that the JCS should appoint the Director, not the Secretary of Defense.261


261 Major Changes, 24.
The Chiefs were fully aware of the effect Forrestal's proposal would have on their prerogatives. From the administration's view, the proposals would be a major step in extracting the Chiefs from the chain of command and their command function. This was a crucial step in eliminating service parochialism. From the Chiefs' perspective, the legislation would eliminate them from the decision making process all together. They would, in effect, be relegated to that of the staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If we can judge from the form of the final legislation, the Congress appeared to be sympathetic toward the Chiefs in this power struggle with their civilian superiors, although, I would suggest for different reasons. The highly centralized power of the chairman was too close to the "Prussian" model of a general staff to be acceptable. This is not to say that Congress was sanctioning inter-service competition, it is just that Congress felt it was the lesser of two evils.

The 1949 amendment to the National Security Act maintained the Joint Chiefs' corporate advisory function and delineated their specific remaining functions. The chairman would serve for a maximum of four years, except in time of war, and while he had precedence over all other military officers, he had no command authority. The question of precedence represents an interesting study in semantics. It was
clear that nobody, except a few advocates of the centralized army approach, wanted to see the chairman become a uniformed chief of staff. Clearly, the Chiefs envisioned him as the first among equals. The question of his rank, and its relationship to the other services was foremost in the thoughts of the Chiefs. This ambiguous relationship of rank may have prompted the administration to promote Bradley, the new Chairman, to the five star rank of General of the Army, a rank comparable to that which was held by both of his predecessors.

The 1949 legislation further specified that the Chairman could not vote in the JCS. This latter provision had little real importance, since the Joint Chiefs is not a democratic institution. While it is true that they present their various views on programs and send recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, all positions are sent forward whether they are unanimous or not. Bradley noted during the hearings that, "I see no reason to give him [the chairman] the vote as long as it doesn't mean anything." In fact Bradley saw a non-voting chairman as advantageous, since it could mean a greater degree of non-bias if the Chairman did

did not have to "commit himself by a formal vote." Specifically, the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were enumerated as follows:

(1) To serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) To provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable.

(3) To inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or Secretary of Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been reached.

Tied in with the creation of the chairmanship was an increase in the size of the Joint Staff to 210 officers. This would facilitate the JCS's planning function. The Director of the Joint Staff continued to be appointed by the Chiefs, though not by a secret ballot as Forrestal had desired.

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act laid the foundation for future DoD centralization that would ultimately culminate in the McNamara Monarchy of the 1960s. Despite Forrestal's earlier dislike for centralization, he was instrumental in what he considered "an additional step

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263 U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, 1949, 2903. During the hearings General Bradley said "He [the Chairman] should never have to go back to his service to answer for the things he did as Chairman.", 2996; Ibid., 2896.

264 Major Changes, 26.
in the evolutionary process." It was his exposure to the fundamental weaknesses within the defense structure that led him to modify his attitude. In particular, it was the budget process, hampered by inter-service rivalry and the lack of cohesive strategic planning, that made the greatest impact. From Forrestal's perspective, Clifford's pluralistic JCS had failed. He sought a partial solution in the form of an Under Secretary of Defense to help him with the massive amount of work that he was involved in, but it appears that he became increasingly convinced toward the end of his tenure that it was the JCS that needed to be restructured. A chairman with increased power to act as the Secretary's "agent" became Forrestal's panacea. By promoting Bradley to five star rank, the general had the formal rank and prestige to become the "agent" that Forrestal sought. He also attempted, but never succeeded in separating the Chiefs from their services.

Since Forrestal understood the political difficulties in radically restructuring the Joint Chiefs, he opted instead for his "shadow concept" of control. By gaining control over the functions of the JCS, the Secretary would then be in a position to remold the institution. Unfortunately, he was never in a position to put his ideas into effect. Even before

265 Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library.
the amendments to the National Security Act were implemented, James Forrestal was dead. Exhausted by the very factors that led him to seek reorganization, he committed suicide in May 1949.

It remained for Harry S. Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to complete the reorganization effort that Forrestal began. Eisenhower's experience as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, as well as temporary Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, left him convinced of the effectiveness of certain methods of organizational control. In the first place, he brought with him a strong conviction as to the necessity for unified command, both in terms of administrative control and staff members attitudes. This belief was translated into the practical concept of teamwork which for him was the "essence of all success." Secondly, Eisenhower brought from the Army very strong attitudes on proper organizational and staff procedures. John Donovan, the Eisenhower administration's court historian, observed that the President "imported from the army a form of the staff system, in which all functions and responsibilities flow in a more or less fixed order and sequence from the President down."


The same staff procedures that had worked so well during the war under the supervision of General Walter Bedell Smith, were very much apparent in the person of Governor Sherman Adams, who handled domestic affairs, and Robert Cutler in the National Security Council. Finally, the President arrived at the White House a strong advocate of civilian control of the military, firmly believing that civilians rather than the JCS should control the Department of Defense. 268

With these general attitudes as a backdrop, Eisenhower developed very specific ideas on how the defense structure should be organized. These ideas were enumerated in two memoranda written in 1948 and 1949; the former was a response to a Hoover Commission inquiry, while the latter was written during his tenure as acting Chairman of the JCS. 269 The major thrust of his recommendations in both memoranda was centralizing decision making power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such authorization would allow the Secretary to deal effectively with inter-service differences and "to render timely and


decisive judgments whenever there is a major difference of opinion among the services and which they themselves cannot solve.\textsuperscript{270} This authority would be of particular value in the realm of budgetary matters where the Secretary "may be forced to make specific decisions in numerous cases."\textsuperscript{271}

In order to help the Secretary of Defense make these tough decisions, Eisenhower proposed that two new official positions be created; an Under Secretary of Defense and a Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The former foreshadowed the numerous assistant secretaries that came about as a result of the 1949 legislation and Eisenhower's own Reorganization Plan of 1953. The latter was just another name for the title of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief that Admiral Leahy wore and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that was created in 1949. What was unique about Eisenhower's Military Assistant was the role he recommended for him. The Military Assistant would have only general administrative functions, never be a commander, and would normally retire after this assignment.\textsuperscript{272} His primary function was to be a coordinator, who "should have no power of formal decision in his own right."\textsuperscript{273} In other words, he would be a

\textsuperscript{270} Memorandum, 1949.
\textsuperscript{271} Memorandum, 1948.
\textsuperscript{272} Memorandum, 1949.
\textsuperscript{273} Memorandum, 1948.
chief of staff in the technical military sense. This statement is also very similar in intent to the non-voting provision incorporated into the 1949 and 1953 amendments to the National Security Act. The Chairman-Military Assistant acted essentially as an intermediary between the administration and the Chiefs.

To General Eisenhower, teamwork was essential both in a military staff and in a presidential administration:

The President should state in unequivocal terms his determination to produce teamwork in the Security establishment and should seek a virtual pledge from each individual...that there will be given to every decision of the President and the Secretary of Defense complete loyalty and respect, both as to letter and to spirit. He should also invite any subordinate who might feel himself unable to give such a pledge to ask for another assignment.\(^{274}\)

The role of the Military Assistant was central to the creation of teamwork because it was his job "to make certain that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly consider every major problem that should properly come to their attention," and "assure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reach, whenever possible, joint conclusions and recommendations on these problems."\(^{275}\) The ability of the Military Assistant to assure that the Chiefs reach these "joint conclusions" lies beyond the realm of just coordination and effective administration:

\(^{274}\) Memorandum, 1949.

\(^{275}\) Ibid.
His mere presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the trusted assistant of the Secretary of Defense, should do much to induce, if not compel, the attainment of unanimous recommendations and conclusions.  

This approach was by no means new. Forrestal had sought to establish the chairmanship with much the same desire for unanimity in mind. If unanimity could not be reached, then it was the Military Assistant's job to "present the matter in all its aspects to the Secretary of Defense asking for a decision." Unquestionably, the right of access to the Secretary and their close relationship would have great impact upon the outcome of the decision.

Along with desiring to centralize the decision making process, Eisenhower also wanted to take the Chiefs out of the service's administrative channels and to have them concentrate upon strategic planning. Their JCS work was to take "precedence over any personal or individual service matter." Again, this followed the lead that the Truman administration had initiated.

It is apparent that during this period, Eisenhower's thinking was running parallel to that of Secretary Forrestal. He, like Forrestal, identified increased centralization as the solution to the problems brought about by the committee.

276 Ibid.
277 Memorandum, 1948.
278 Memorandum, 1949.
nature of the JCS, but the 1949 legislation did not effectively eradicate these detrimental tendencies and forced Eisenhower to face the issue of reorganization upon his assumption of office in 1953.

Even before Eisenhower's inauguration, certain prominent individuals, identified with the incumbent administration, suggested fundamental reform within the Department of Defense. Both Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chief of the Research and Development Board, and Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, went on record advocating a restructured chain of command that reinserted the civilian service secretaries into a position of prominence, increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and transformed the JCS into more of a planning agency. Both Bush and Lovett found inter-service rivalry and the Chiefs' service obligations as the primary source of impairment to the JCS' planning mission. Bush, far more radical in his approach, suggested totally separating the JCS from the chain of command and creating a new organization to deal with the command functions. This would allow the Joint Chiefs to devote full time to planning. Lovett, somewhat more conservative, merely suggested giving increased power to the services' vice chiefs of staff and transferring most of the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Theoretically, these changes would result in the Chiefs paying more attention
to planning, while minimizing the services' impact upon decisions. 279

Upon his inauguration, Eisenhower had to deal quickly with the matter of defense reorganization. Through Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, a special committee, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, was appointed to study the Defense Department. This committee, accepting the Lovett-Bush viewpoint, sent forward a series of recommendations that were totally incorporated into the President's Reorganization Plan #6, outlined on 30 April 1953. 280

The President stated that the first objective of the plan was the "clarification of lines of authority within the Department of Defense so as to strengthen civilian responsibility." Civilian control was the constitutional principle that guided civil-military relations and this meant in organizational terms that:

We must recognize and respect the clear lines of responsibility and authority which run from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments, over the operations of all branches of the Department of Defense.

279 Major Changes, 28-30.

Establishing the chain of command in the above manner, centralized a great deal of power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and streamlined the chain of command. Furthermore, it removed the confusion surrounding the relationship between a chief, acting as an executive agent, and his service secretary and the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 1953, a chief of service was named as the executive agent over the unified commands in which his service had a primary interest. It was through the executive agent that communications and decisions were transmitted, thus placing the JCS within the chain of command. In his capacity as executive agent, a service chief did not deal with his service secretary, who felt that his power was being circumvented. After 1953, a military department (i.e., the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) was named the executive agent as opposed to an individual chief.

This restructuring of the chain of command to exclude the JCS was part of the President's desire to "improve our machinery for strategic planning for national defense." Following this approach, the President specifically stated that the Chiefs "are not a command body, but are the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." In order to facilitate carrying out this advisory mission, the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were to be enhanced. Specifically, the
Chairman would be made responsible for managing the work of the Joint Staff and approving the appointment of its members. It was intended that this would free the Chiefs from administrative details and allow them to concentrate on their planning function. Moreover, by giving the Chairman control over the Joint Staff, including the veto power over any appointment, it was hoped that this would ensure the selection of officers who were above service interest and who would be able to concentrate on the "entire effort" of defense planning.

The President's reorganization plan resurfaced the decade-old argument over centralization versus decentralization. Opponents of the bill attacked it for "Prussianizing" the Joint Staff, transforming the Chairman into a single chief of staff, and perverting the original intention of the National Security Act. Proponents defended the bill in terms of efficiency, necessity, and as the only means of eliminating interservice rivalry. The administration carefully emphasized that the Chairman would not be in a position to dominate the


In summary, the advantages the administration saw in the bill were:

"better managerial supervision over the Joint Staff and the relief of the service members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the burden of this managerial function so that they can devote more of their time to the vital and critical responsibilities they have in the fields of service readiness and operations in strategic planning and advice. These advantages will be obtained without the possibility of a situation where a viewpoint could be completely submerged by any action of the Chairman under the duties assigned to him by statute and the additional duty assigned to him in the reorganization plan." 284

During the next year, the planning mission of the JCS was greatly emphasized by a series of directives and memoranda. The first of these was a Presidential revision of the 1948 Key West Agreement on the functions of the Joint Chiefs. This revision, issued on 1 October 1953, deleted from the Chiefs' functions "the direction of all combat operations," and substituted for it "guidance for the operational control of forces and conduct of combat operations." While the term "guidance" was relatively ambiguous, it clearly was less authoritative than "direction," which implied command. This put into effect the President's view that the Chiefs "are not a command body." The rewording of the functions statement was a step toward achieving the reorganization's objective, namely, to extract the Chiefs from the chain of command. On 26 July 1954,

284 Memorandum, 17 June 1953, subject: Purpose and application of Section 1(c) and (d) of Reorganization Plan No. 6, 1953, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder "Reorganization Plan 36," Eisenhower Library.
Secretary of Defense Wilson issued a directive on "Method of operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their relationship with other staff agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense." This directive stated that JCS work was to "take priority over all other duties," and that the Secretary of Defense was to be fully informed as to all the deliberations of the JCS. It further stated that the Chairman was required to forward to the Secretary of Defense his own "views, advice, and recommendations," whenever he was in disagreement with the other Chiefs. Finally, on the 19th of October 1954, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, issued a memorandum on "Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization, its structure and management," which pursuant to the President's intentions, consolidated the Chairman's control over the Joint Staff. 285

The result of these various memoranda and directives was to decrease the Joint Chiefs' command functions while correspondingly emphasizing their planning mission. These documents also continued the trend toward centralization within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the consolidation of power into the hands of the Chairman. After the July 1954 directive, the relationship between the Chairman and the

285 U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, Main Features of the Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Since 1947, 12 January, 1972, 7-9 (mimeographed).
Secretary of Defense began to resemble the one that Eisenhower had outlined back in 1949. Despite this increased centralization, the traditional problems of service rivalry and lack of cohesion in policy formulation continued to be a hindrance. This point was acknowledged by the President in his January 1958 State of the Union address. After stressing the importance of strategic planning and the damage that resulted from inter-service competition, the President indicated that a reorganization of the defense structure was in the offing. The direction of this new plan was disclosed when the President said the "end of interservice disputes requires clear organization and decisive central direction." Increased centralization was offered up again as the panacea, just as it had been in 1949 and 1953.

Following the President's State of the Union address, a special Advisory Committee was set up by Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy to study Defense Department organizational problems. For the remainder of January and through February, the committee met regularly. In their endeavor to analyze the weaknesses of the defense structure, they were aided by two recently completed staff studies: the top secret Gaither Report, produced by the Security Resources Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, and the widely

286 Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1958, 2 ff.
disseminated Rockefeller Brothers Report, *International Security: The Military Aspects.* What is of particular interest is the linkage between the authors of these two staff studies and the membership of the Advisory Committee. Both William C. Foster, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, who co-chaired the Gaither Committee, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, who headed the 1953 reorganization study, were members of the Advisory Committee.

Of the two studies, it was the Rockefeller Report that addressed the problems of the Defense Department in detail. It emphasized the necessity for cohesive national security policy, and it was extremely critical of the DoD structure. As in the case of earlier studies, inter-service rivalry was singled out as the culprit, and increased centralization was offered as the solution. The Rockefeller Report recommended making the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, an idea that had been contemplated by Forrestal almost a decade earlier. In regard to the chain of command, it recommended placing all forces under a unified or specified command and excluding the services from the operational control of those commands. This

was a reversal of the 1953 Rockefeller position. With the services eliminated as executive agents, the chain of command would run directly from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the various forces in the field. With operational control in the hands of the civilian secretary, it was logical, as was suggested, to place the Joint Staff directly under the control of the Chairman who in turn would work directly for the Secretary. 288 This would make the Joint Chiefs purely a planning agency along the lines indicated by Dr. Bush and Secretary Lovett in 1952. The Gaither Report, completed in November 1957, proposed very similar conclusions in regard to the chain of command and the services' role as executive agent. 289

Restructuring the chain of command along these lines became the nucleus of the President's reorganization package presented to Congress in April 1958. Although the Advisory Committee did not publish a formal report, the nature of its advice was a reiteration of the earlier proposals. In a February 27th memorandum to the President, Charles Coolidge, a committee member, wrote:

The concept of executive agency should be abandoned and unified, etc. commands should be placed directly under

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the Secretary of Defense, with the J.C.S. doing the staff work, supported by an integrated operations division of the Joint Staff. 290

One should not assume that the impetus for the 1958 reorganization was predominately from the outside. On the contrary, the evidence seems to indicate that the President was one of the prime movers in this area. Before a combined Armed Forces Policy Council and Advisory Committee meeting, the president emphatically said, "the use of an executive agency for strategic orders was crazy," and the service secretaries "should not be involved in the preparation of strategic planning." This meeting, occurring on 25 January, a month before the Coolidge memorandum and very close to the onset of the Advisory Committee's work, indicates the ultimate impact of Eisenhower's thinking. 291

One thing that is striking is the administration's reversal from its 1953 position on the organization of the chain of command. President Eisenhower attempted to explain this change to the Congress by stating that the administration had become aware that the executive agency system was

290 Memorandum for the President, 27 February 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(1)," Eisenhower Library. Coolidge had been special advisor to Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, thus partially explaining his support for increased centralization.

"cumbersome and unreliable in peace and not usable in time of war." He went on to explain that the technological revolution of the mid-1950s demanded a greater degree of responsiveness from the military. 292 This of course meant increased centralization. A more plausible explanation for this reversal may be sought by examining the total package submitted by the President, and by analyzing the fundamental changes that were to be brought about within the Joint Chiefs.

If the President's proposal for reorganizing the chain of command was accepted, then all major organizational elements of the military would be incorporated under the banner of either a unified or specified command, and these would be directly under the command of the Secretary of Defense. Theoretically this would separate the commanders of these unified and specified commands from their chief of service, thus achieving an integral part of the President's overall program:

Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units in his command.... I recommend, therefore, the present law, including certain restrictions relating to combat functions be so amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full unity of our commands and the full command over them by unified commanders.293

293 Ibid., 279-280.
This would finally remove the Chiefs from their command role and make them into a planning agency. With the President echoing the Coolidge memorandum of February 27, he proposed that in the future the Chiefs should "serve as a staff assisting the Secretary of Defense." Obviously, for the Chiefs to accomplish this new and vital mission, the Joint Staff would have to be enlarged and, in words identical to the Coolidge memorandum, an "integrated operations division" would have to be created within the Joint Staff. In order to maximize the effectiveness of this newly integrated staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be allowed to assign duties to the Joint Staff and, with the "approval of the Secretary of Defense, to appoint its Director." Moreover, as part of the administration's effort to expand and strengthen the power of the Chairman, the meaningless restriction on his voting within the JCS was to be removed.

The President's program was fully accepted by the Congress. Instrumental in the passage of the bill was the support it received from the members of the JCS. Only the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph Pate, opposed the movement toward centralization. All of the other Chiefs actively supported the bill and reiterated that the role of the JCS had not diminished. Why the Chiefs gave into centralization when they had so vociferously opposed it less

294 Ibid., 281-282.
than a decade before is difficult to answer. Undoubtedly, the prestige of President Eisenhower on military matters was important, as well as the fact Eisenhower's Chiefs had been selected with loyalty as a key criterion. Both of these points will be addressed in some detail in later chapters. It is also possible that the Congress began to feel that efficiency in military matters was more important than fear of potential "Prussianization." The national security structure had been in existence for over a decade, so many of the early fears had eroded. Whatever the actual reason, the legislation was the culmination of the centralization process that had started under Forrestal.

Inter-service rivalry and the lack of a cohesively integrated national security policy was the cause of all four major post-war reorganizations. In each case, the solution was further centralization. Theoretically, the 1949 amendments gave the Secretary of Defense sufficient power to deal with the problems that were endemic to his department. This was the opinion of the Chief Counsel of the 1953 Rockefeller Commission:

Subject to the President and certain express prohibitions ...the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense is complete and supreme. It blankets all agencies and all organizations within the Department of Defense.295

Yet in every case, the increased power granted to the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proved to be insufficient

and merely led to greater centralization in the next reorga-
nization. The reason for this was that the fundamental prob-
lem within the Department of Defense was never addressed. A
canvassing of the recommendations of the special task groups
that analyzed the problem reveals a single common denomina-
tor, the committee nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As
far as these studies were concerned, it was the committee
nature that promoted service competition. 296

As part of his 1958 reforms, the President attempted to
deal with the committee issue, not within the JCS but within
the Joint Staff. Since Eisenhower's failure to address the
committee problem in 1953, the intensification of inter-service
rivalry forced him to reevaluate the situation. If a truly
integrated staff was to be established, as the President pro-
posed in 1958, then the committee system had to be abolished.
This point was made abundantly clear by the President during
the January 25th Advisory Committee meeting when he asked "... why we should not have the best integrated organization within
the Joint Staff where the best officers would be assigned
rather than a committee system?" 297


The restructuring of the committees fell within the executive prerogative, thus allowing the administration to implement changes without Congressional concurrence. Under the President's and the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Chairman announced on 27 May 1958 that the committee system would be abolished. In its place, the Joint Staff would be structured along a traditional staff format that was in normal operation in other military staffs. The new organization consisted of six directorates: J-1 Personnel, J-2 Intelligence, J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics, J-5 Plans and Policy, and J-6 Communications-Electronics. These six directorates, along with the directors of Military Assistance, Advanced Studies, and Joint Programs, made up the newly constituted Joint Staff.

One of the primary motivations for changing to this type of organization was that it allowed the Joint Staff to work effectively with the similar staff structures of the unified and specified commands. In conjunction with this reorganization, the Secretary of Defense revised the formal statement of the JCS's functions incorporated in DoD Directive 5100.1. While reiterating some of the traditional functions of the Joint Chiefs, the revision clearly reflected the thrust toward transforming them into a planning agency as opposed to dealing with the new responsibilities of the Joint Staff, it was increased to 400 members in the 1958 legislation.
to a command group. It specifically identified the JCS as the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense and as a corporate group, placed them in the operational chain of communication through which the Secretary of Defense issued orders to the unified and specified commands. It was also hoped, that by giving the Chairman more control over the Joint Staff, the officers selected would be above service interest.

While the President was preparing his reorganization effort, the Chiefs were in the process of examining their own organizational structure and that of the Department of Defense. In December 1957, an Ad Hoc Committee within the JCS was created, under the direction of Major General Earl G. Wheeler, to examine DoD organizations in "order to determine if there are deficiencies" that could be eliminated through reorganization. The report outlined five areas in which it felt there were fundamental problems.

1. Problems and delays within the JCS decision making process and "subsequently above their level."

2. Insufficient coordination between logistics and strategic planning.

3. Complicated channels of authority to commanders in the field.

4. Confusion as to the internal lines of authority within the services, DoD, OSD, and the role of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

5. Service budgets were unduly influenced by non-military determinants.

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299 Ibid., 38.
Among those areas identified by the Wheeler Report, those pertaining to internal problems within the JCS and the complicated channels of authority to field commanders were also addressed by the President. At no time did the Ad Hoc Committee mention inter-service conflict, nor did it consider the committee nature of the Joint Staff to be a problem; despite the fact it noted that the Chiefs tended to reach decisions through compromise and that there were continual divergencies of opinion within the JCS. For obvious reasons the Ad Hoc Committee never could identify the real cause of these problems nor blame the Chiefs and their structure. Instead, they sought the solution through procedural means by which the JCS would resolve their divergencies, and they advocated greater involvement by the civilian decision makers on appropriate issues. In regard to the chain of command problems, the Wheeler Report suggested either returning to the executive agency structure or giving operational responsibility directly to the Chiefs. In either case this was completely contrary to the President's desire. Needless to say, the President's plan superseded the JCS report, and it was never acted on.300

The Eisenhower administration hoped that the 1958 reforms would eliminate once and for all the problems of

300 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization of the Department of Defense. 24 January 1958.
inter-service rivalry and the lack of policy integration. Unfortunately, as in the case of the three earlier plans, increased centralization proved to be ineffective. The reason for this failure, as in all the previous efforts, was that it never did strike at the fundamental issue, the bureaucratic nature of the JCS. A 1959 memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget outlined the continuing nature of this problem:

The high rank of the officers involved, the importance of the issues with which they deal, the aura of mystery which surrounds their work, the very title "Joint Chiefs of Staff"—all have served to obscure the fact that the JCS is a committee. Originally it was an interdepartmental committee. Now it is an intra-departmental committee. All intra-governmental committees, whether manned by civilians or military men, are capable of performing only limited functions. Failures have been the inevitable result of attempts to assign to committees duties which they are organizationally incapable of performing. Past efforts to strengthen the JCS have involved the provision of a Chairman, later enlargements of his duties and most recently an expansion of the Joint Staff which serves the JCS. All of the changes, however, have left the committee character of the JCS essentially intact. It is clear that the JCS will remain the main obstacle to sound staff organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense until (1) the committee character of the JCS is clearly recognized and its duties reduced to those which can be performed effectively by a committee and (2) the other duties of the JCS are assigned to other OSD staff elements.  

As the memorandum noted, all the efforts at centralization had left untouched the basic structure of the JCS. Almost in a sense of desperation, the memorandum called for the establishment of independent analytic capability in the Office of the

301 Memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget, December 1959, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder, "Reorganization Plan No. 1," Eisenhower Library.
Secretary of Defense. This had been Secretary Forrestal's original reason for creating the office of the Chairman, but in so doing he had left the JCS structure basically unchanged. Whether Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara read this memorandum is unknown, but the establishment of the Office of Systems Analysis, and the power which he ultimately vested in it achieved the kind of independent analysis that the memorandum called for. In many ways that office fulfilled the role that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to force the Joint Chiefs to take. 302

For both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, the crucial issue regarding political/military planning was the establishment of an organization that could effectively integrate the nation's commitments and capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was the hinge upon which this policy integration hung. However, in the eyes of both administrations the JCS failed to fulfill their primary mission, the development of usable input into the national security policy making structure. Without this input, policy integration was doomed from the start.

As the civilian leadership assessed the policy making structure in order to determine where the organizational breakdown was occurring, they continually pointed to the JCS as the culprit. It was for this reason that the JCS became the focal

point of the three major reorganizations that occurred after 1947. Within the JCS, the committee structure was identified as the single greatest flaw. The committee nature of the Chiefs appeared to precipitate the inter-service conflicts that destroyed the Chiefs' ability to give unified advice to the political leadership. Without an agreement on the nature and needs of the nation's military capabilities, it was impossible to determine if those capabilities could support the political commitments that were being considered. In practice these differences of opinion stemmed from the twin dilemmas that haunted the Chiefs: their corporate role versus their service role, and their planning function versus their command function. From the very beginning, there was confusion as to which role or function took precedence. General Gruenther assumed, when he was organizing the Joint Staff, that the Chiefs' planning function and hence their corporate role was the most important. But the National Security Act of 1947 left the Chiefs a command function, simply by not identifying that planning had primacy. The result was that the three subsequent reorganizations sought to extract the Chiefs from the chain of command, thereby forcing them into the role of planner.

The heart of all three of these reorganizations was centralizing power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once it had been determined that a pluralistic JCS resulted in dysfunctional competition, the solution appeared to be centralized
management from above. This was the direction that Forrestal marked in his **First Report**, but the first Secretary of Defense also realized that he needed to have military advice from an expert. It was for this reason that he wanted to establish a powerful Chairman so that he could become his "agent" within the Joint Chiefs. Based upon his experiences as acting Chairman, Eisenhower came to the same conclusion. A strong Chairman, whose rank, prestige, and power was superior to that of the other Chiefs, would be in a position to eliminate inter-service conflicts and force the Chiefs to be responsible.

What is apparent is that the Chiefs sought to maintain their command prerogatives in the face of these organizational changes. This goal is still very clear when one examines the Wheeler Report. If the Chiefs lost their command function they would be relegated to what Robert Golembiewski describes as the Neutral and Inferior Instrument (NII) model of a staff. 303 In the NII model the staff is outside the line of command and is primarily a thought and planning structure, as opposed to an organization concerned with execution. In reality it becomes purely an advisory body. From an organizational chart perspective, Eisenhower's 1958 reforms made the JCS a Neutral and Inferior Instrument. The Chiefs were taken

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out of the chain of command, and the Joint Staff became less a vehicle of the services and more of a planning agency responding to the direction of the Chiefs. The Secretary of Defense became, in effect, the commander of the United States military forces, since he now had the sole ability within the Defense Department to issue direct orders to the unified and specified commands.

While the above analysis did lead to massive organizational changes, the internal problems within the JCS remained untouched. The reason was that there was not one single problem, but two separate problems within the JCS. The first was the one that everyone identified—bureaucratic infighting. Since it was easily identifiable the organizational changes attempted to deal with it. The second problem was alluded to by some of the outside studies, but never formally identified. That problem was the nature of the Chiefs' professional outlook. It caused the Chiefs' "aloofness" when they dealt with other decision making institutions. In order to fully understand the impact of both of these flaws and how they interrelate, we must examine each one in turn, always remembering the organizational structure which supplies the parameters within which they operate.
CHAPTER V

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE BUREAUCRACY

A description of organizational changes tells us very little about the actual decision making process. Vince Davis correctly noted that trying to discover how a decision is made by looking at an organizational chart is like trying to determine who will win a ball game by buying a score card. In order to fully appreciate the role of the Joint Chiefs in policy formulation, it is necessary to understand the JCS's own internal decision making system. The product of this system forms the basis of the Joint Chiefs' input into the national policy process. Despite extensive changes within the organization of the JCS, both in terms of size and structure, the staffing procedures of the Joint Chiefs have remained remarkably stable. This personification of bureaucratization has been described by one author as "The Flimsy-Buff-Green-Red Striped Nightmare." These terms refer to


the color coded papers which are used at the different stages of the process.

The process itself begins when the JCS is asked to supply input on a subject. The request may be generated either inside the Joint Chiefs or from an agency outside of it. If it is externally generated, then the Director of the Joint Staff will assign a "report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff" to the Joint Staff agency primarily concerned with the problem as well as any other agencies with secondary interest. This "Green Directive" (usually referred to as a "Green Bomb") will identify the problem and the action officer whose function it will be to produce the paper and to shepherd his product through the bureaucratic maze. Secondary agencies concerned with the issue are also requested to assign action officers to help produce the final product.

From the very beginning, the primary action officer is impeded by the short time which is allocated to him to produce his product. Colonel John Harrelson, a former JCS
staffer, noted that "the importance of a paper is measured in inverse order to the amount of time allocated to its preparation." 306 Since the whole bureaucratic process takes on the average two to three weeks to complete, the military strategist is not given sufficient time to produce a quality product. 307

The first stage of the staffing process is writing the "flimsy". 308 The action officer normally has only forty-eight hours to write it. Its purpose is to serve as a catalyst for further discussion, and may either be a serious piece of work or a straw man designed to draw out the service's positions. Once the first draft of the "flimsy" has been written it is then circulated to the secondary action officers, who represent the services and other interested agencies. These officers normally have only twenty-four hours to respond. Once concurrence is reached the "flimsy turns buff," 309 which means that it moves up to the next stage of the process.


308 The term "flimsy" comes from the onion skin paper which the first draft is written on.

309 "Buff" refers to the manila-like legal sized paper that is used.
The "buff" is then circulated among the agencies concerned. If major problems arise that are not editorial in nature, the action officer may call for a planners' meeting in order to hammer out the differences. This meeting is chaired by a Joint Staff planner (flag rank) and is attended by the agency or service planners concerned with the "buff" (usually of COL/CAPT rank). The agency or service positions are circulated in advance on formal memoranda called "purples." Surprise is normally rare, although it may be used if the issue is very important. The selection of specific service planners may also reflect the importance of the issue.

Some military officers have developed wide-spread reputations in the Pentagon for their skill as negotiators. The assignment of such an officer as a service planner can mean that the service involved has an ax to grind or a "hard" position on the subject at hand.\footnote{Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," 249.}

During the meeting the Joint Staff planner attempts to act as the mediator between the contending agency views. The meeting ends with either concurrence or a continued split in the positions. At this point, the head of the Joint Staff agency concerned may "turn the buff, green."\footnote{The "green" comes from the coarse legal sized green sheets upon which the staffing papers are written, since the paper is legal sized it usually is referred to as a "long green".} He may forward the "buff" even though there are still differences of opinion over it. This is called a "split green."
The "green" is the next to last stage in the JCS decision making process. If nonconcurrence continues, the non-concurring agency can submit a "purple" outlining its position, which in turn is rebutted by the action officer. This exchange then becomes part of the "green" as long as the nonconcurrence exists. Once the "buff" has turned "green," it falls under the jurisdiction of the Director of the Joint Staff, who can place it on the Operations Deputies Calendar or the Calendar of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The former organization is made up of the services' Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations. If the Operations Deputies fail to reach agreement on the subject, it may be sent back to the planners for further coordination or it may be sent forward to the Chiefs for them to work out some form of agreement. When the paper is finally accepted, a red-stripe is placed at the bottom of the "green," denoting that is has become an official JCS position. It is then sent forward to the Secretary of Defense. A split may also be sent forward with the service "purples" still attached. As ponderous as this system seems, it still handles in excess of a thousand decisions each year. In response to consistent criticism that the Chiefs are too burdened to deal with the really important joint issues, alternative methods to the "flimsy, buff" system have been created. Unfortunately, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the
majority of the issues were still decided by the Chiefs themselves.

In this description of the JCS decision making process, the requirement to produce consensus at every level of the process is critical. This requirement has led not only to the criticism that the system is ponderous, but that the compromises necessary to produce concurrence actually dilute the quality of the final product. This process of compromise and consensus building reflects what Roger Hilsman calls the "politics of decision making." Hilsman maintains that decisions are made by the political methods of persuasion and bargaining, as contending interest groups attempt to resolve their conflicts. Thus, the rational or authoritative model of decision making rarely exists.

The necessity for operating in this "political" manner lies in the structure of the American Constitutional system and in the nature of the bureaucracy. Professor Richard Neustadt, in his seminal study of the American Presidency, observed that the Constitution did not create a separation of powers, but instead "created a government of separated

312 See Table 1 for an analysis of the JCS decisions.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Decisions</th>
<th>Splits (No. %)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>1628 (1)</td>
<td>5 (0.003)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8873</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>13 (1.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1066</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>21 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>15 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1460</td>
<td>13 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1563 (4)</td>
<td>42 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3017</td>
<td>47 (1.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3281</td>
<td>40 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2690</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2675</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2339</td>
<td>6 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1. Memorandum for General Bradley, subject: Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder 020 JCS (16 December 1951) National Archives.

2. New York Times, 10 January, 1953, p. 4. The Times indicates that during the time frame 1951-52 (the same as covered by the Bradley Memorandum) that the JCS handled 1650 matters, this figure was only 22 off the formal figure given in the memorandum. The Times goes on to state that there were 5 splits during this time. The Bradley Memorandum notes 4, but goes out of its way to state that it is not a complete list. It also notes two "withdrawn splits" which meant that there was Secretarial action taken before the split was sent forward.


4. In 1965 the JCS instituted a new form of decision making, PM-133. This authorized the CJCS to take actions for the JCS and inform them afterwards on 1) matters in which urgency is crucial; 2) matters in which a JCS policy has already been established; 3) matters in which the CJCS knows the corporate view of the JCS on a similar issue; and 4) matters not important enough to consult the JCS as a corporate body. Under certain circumstances Directors of Divisions in the Joint Staff are allowed to use PM-133. Since its institution, PM-133 has accounted for over 50% of the decision statistics. In 1965 it accounted for 1589 decisions or 52.7%, in 1966-2037 (62.0%), 1967-1620 (60.2%), 1968-1507 (58.5%), and 1969-1280 (54.7%).
institutions sharing power." These separated institutions and their representatives proportionally share power based upon their prestige, expertise, size, and impact on society. This power in turn becomes translated into the ability to influence the outcome of decisions. An institution's primary means of achieving the desired outcome is its ability to persuade and bargain with other institutions. In such a pluralistic environment, "the power to persuade is the power to bargain; status and authority yield bargaining advantages."315

The reason an organization bargains is its ideology or prevalent belief which forms the basis for its existence. Some students of bureaucracy have compared organizational ideology to the territorialism of certain species of animals.

Every large organization is in partial conflict with every other social agent with which it deals... the basic nature of all social struggle is the same - each combatant needs to establish a large enough territory to guarantee his own survival.316

This territory becomes defined by the amount of the budget an organization receives or the number of functions that it is given. In the military, these functions become


315 Ibid.

translated into roles and missions, and are inextricably connected to budget allocations. Under these circumstances, an organization will attempt to enhance its essence or mission by any means necessary. The greater the importance of its mission, the greater the influence the organization has, which in turn translates into higher survivability. Any encroachment upon a vital mission is a direct threat to the organization's existence. Conversely, the organization will attempt to incorporate new functions within the boundaries of its mission, thereby increasing its own importance. While all bureaucracies operate in a similar manner, the military has institutionalized its essence in the form of doctrine.\textsuperscript{317}

The service action officer is thus instilled with the commitment to protect the organizational essence and attempt through bargaining with his counterparts to achieve the required consensus. These action officers, who are an essential cog in the JCS staffing process, are called the "Indians," because they work for a "Chief." The service "Indians"  

are usually bright, young Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels who, in the words of retired Marine Corps Colonel John Donovan have,

...usually demonstrated their effectiveness as leaders, planners and organizational managers. They may also have performed heroically in combat, but most of all, they must have demonstrated their loyalty as a proponent of their own service doctrine and their dedication to the defense establishment and its policies. 318

Devotion to the organizational ideology is repaid with promotions and choice assignments while deviation may well mean the termination of a career. Thus, the "primary requisite of those engaged in planning at both the service and joint levels becomes the attainment of a military position which does not injure the vital interest of any service." 319

This problem is by no means exclusively restricted to the service representatives sitting on joint committees; it deeply affects the structure of the Joint Staff system itself. In theory the Joint Staff was to consist of officers detached from their particular service who would develop a "purple suit" mentality. A "purple suiter" is an individual who is truly above service interest. The color "purple" comes from the misconception that combining the colors of


319 Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Policy Formulation," 386.
the uniforms of all the services would result in the color purple. Thus an officer with this type of outlook would not be committed to any particular service ideology. The problem between practice and theory was that the officers assigned to the Joint Staff had to, at some point in the future, return to their own services. Many times their success or failure within their own service depends upon the positions they took while on the Joint Staff. This problem is further complicated by the fact that all papers produced within the Joint Staff are passed around at numerous times for service concurrence. Thus the Joint Staffer has to walk the tight rope between service advocacy and joint orientation. The fact that the Joint Staffer's boss will probably be from a different service exacerbates this problem. 320

320 To what extent the members of the Joint Staff maintain a "purple suit" mentality is difficult to document. A 1955 Dartmouth College study on the attitudes of members of the Joint Intelligence Group and the Joint Logistics Planning Group reveal that of those interviewed it was almost unanimously agreed that an officer who was above service interest helped the organization fulfill its mission more than an officer who vigorously supported his service. Despite this, less than half of the officers interviewed felt that being above service interest would help them in the next promotion (slightly less than half believed that being a service advocate would help in the next promotion), and the majority felt that a superior command performance in their own service carried more weight before promotion boards than a superior Joint Staff performance. While inconclusive, it does seem to support the contention that officers worry how their service of origin will perceive their Joint Staff duty and that service advocacy was somewhat required. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government: Five Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement, Volume I, Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the
Since the participants in the decision making process have an obligation to defend their organizational imperatives, consensus building breaks down and is replaced by such artificial methods of achieving unanimity as "paperclipping," "waffling," and "logrolling." The pressure for unanimity is a result of two systemic constraints. The first is the action officer's short suspense dates. With consensus a prerequisite at every stage of the staffing process, it becomes easier to produce artificial unanimity than it is to

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321 "Waffling" occurs when a paper is written so that it never actually addresses the important issues and so means all things to all people. "Paperclipping" is a means of ameliorating conflicting demands from different institutions or organizations. Instead of choosing or prioritizing demands, all of them are simply combined into a package and sent forward. Thus the different service demands are "paperclipped" together and sent forward as a "joint" position. "Logrolling" is the time honored political means of achieving one's objectives and guaranteeing the passage of pet projects. Individuals or organizations promise to support one another's projects in return for support on their own project.
attempt the less rewarding conversion of attitudes. Such conversions are not only time intensive, which may cause a missed suspense date, but there is little guarantee of success due to the pressure of organizational imperatives and career necessitates.

The second systemic constraint lies within the nature of the bureaucracy and the organizational imperatives of the Joint Chiefs. The purpose of a bureaucracy is to produce a unified position or a decision. The failure to do so forces the issue one echelon higher in the structure, bringing into question the rationale for the existence of the lower levels. It is the action officer's mission to produce consensus and relieve his superiors of the ponderous and difficult task of producing consensus at a higher level. The failure to achieve unanimity reflects on the action officer's capabilities and thus affects his career potential. If the issue is vital to the very existence of the service, it will have to be moved to the highest level of the bureaucracy for reconciliation. Even at the level of the Joint Chiefs, the continued existence of a split position is diametrically opposed to the institutional desires of the organization. The military, like any organization, desires to see its advice accepted and its projects supported. Many years ago Max Weber observed that "technical knowledge...of

itself, is sufficient to ensure it [the bureaucratic organization] a position of extraordinary power."\textsuperscript{323} Obviously, if the military split on an issue, they fail to take advantage of their technical expertise, and thus lose a substantial amount of their capability to influence decisions. However, if the Chiefs present a unified front on a position, they maximize their ability to influence the final action. During the early 1960s the Chiefs found that if they sent split decisions to Secretary McNamara they enhanced his ability to make exactly the decision he wanted to. In a sense, the Secretary had divided and conquered the Joint Chiefs, enhancing even further the civilian domination of military policy during that time. By 1965 the Chiefs realized this and they avoided sending split decisions forward.\textsuperscript{324}

What the Chiefs and the Secretary were acknowledging was the fact that there exists a two-way bargaining relationship between the Joint Chiefs and the administration. On the one hand, the administration makes every effort to gain the Chief's support for the various political or military


\textsuperscript{324}Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 116. See Table 1 for a tabulation of JCS decisions and splits.
programs that it sends before Congress. The support of the JCS adds credibility to the proposals by virtue of their acknowledged "expertise." Conversely, their opposition to a program that lies within their sphere of "expertise" may be enough to destroy the proposal. On the other hand, the Chiefs need the administration's support to attain the programs they desire to have implemented. As a result, there occurs a vertical bargaining relationship between the administration and the Chiefs as corporate groups, while simultaneously, horizontal bargaining is occurring among the services.

There is an old Washington adage that says "where you sit determines where you stand." An essential part of this bargaining is the role a Chief takes on as a "front man." A front man is "a leader of a constituency, the sponsor of a policy, and the principal builder of a consensus for it." Examples of such trade-offs have existed all through the history of the Joint Chiefs, unfortunately they are difficult to document. One example which is well known was in regard to the limited test-ban treaty during the Kennedy administration. Certain guarantees were included in order to gain the support of the JCS. See Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), 282-288. A more contemporary example is the exchange between the JCS and the administration over the Chiefs support of the SALT I agreements. The Navy received a go-ahead on the Trident submarine missile system, and the JCS supported the administration's position on the SALT limitations. John Newhouse, The Cold Down: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 246.

A Chief's constituency is his own service, and he naturally sponsors its policies and strives to build a consensus among the other Chiefs and the civilian administration for the fulfillment of that policy goal. A front man is more than simply an advocate for a specific policy, he is the focal point of communication between his organization below him and the administration above him. He must represent and defend his organizational imperatives to the administration, while developing support within his own organization for the administration's policies. Most simply stated, a Chief has two constituencies to represent - the President and the civilian administration on one hand, and his service on the other. If he fails to represent either one of these two groups adequately, he will lose its support. Once he has lost the support of either one, he ceases to be capable of fulfilling his role and must be replaced. Let us turn our attention to an example that might help illustrate this point.

The "Revolt of the Admirals" was a unique event in the history of American civil-military relations. Essentially, it was a public proclamation by the naval officer corps that it had lost confidence in the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld. At this point in our study, we will not concern ourselves with the specific budgetary and strategic aspects of the episode, but only how it reflects the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs and the roles that various constituencies play in the decision
making process.

The "Revolt" was a product of the unification conflict. The central issue was the relationship of strategic airpower to the future of the Navy. Airpower advocates maintained that a strategic nuclear bomber force was the nation's only reliable deterrent. The Navy countered this by claiming that carrier-based air power still had a role to play in national defense and that technological innovations would allow it to participate as part of the strategic deterrent. The key innovation the Navy counted on was the building of a new generation of flush deck aircraft carriers capable of launching jet nuclear bombers. In a period marked by decreasing defense budgets, each service identified its programs and strategies with the very survival of its organization. In the Navy's case, this perception was especially important. The issue had been temporarily resolved in March 1948 with the signing of the Key West Agreement, which gave the Navy a limited role in strategic bombing. Unfortunately, the agreement did not "solve the impending problem of whether the flush-deck carrier should be built or whether

327 The Key West Agreement assigned to the Navy as a collateral function "to be prepared to participate in the overall air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." For a discussion of the developments of the Navy's effort to develop a nuclear capability see Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, 1966-67 (Denver, University of Denver, 1967), 4-17.
its construction required approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 328

By statute, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are an advisory body only, thus making their concurrence or nonconcurrence superfluous. In the real world, theory is often different from practice. Because of the political nature of the decision making process, prestige, expertise, and so on, may become as important as legally sanctioned power. The Chiefs' approval of any program that has the vast strategic and financial consequences of a super-carrier costing approximately one-half billion dollars was a necessity.

At Key West, Secretary Forrestal announced to the Chiefs that he and the President had decided that the carrier should be built. Previously, he had put the Chiefs on notice that if they could not agree on the carrier issue, "I shall have to make my own decision." 329 Apparently that was exactly what the Secretary did. The Chiefs responded "that they would go along with it [the carrier decision] because it was


the President's program."330 The Chiefs never really discussed the matter, but merely accepted it. General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, later said, "[the carrier] was not agreed [upon], nor was it discussed...."331 After this meeting the Chiefs "positive support" for the carrier was duly reported to the President.332

The carrier issue remained settled for about six weeks until it became inextricably connected to the 1949 defense budget. Admiral Denfeld claimed, before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, that the Chiefs had approved the carrier.333 Air Force General Carl Spaatz denied this, forcing the issue to be returned to the JCS for resolution. By a vote of three to one the carrier was approved for the second time. Of particular interest to our study is General Vandenberg's dissent.

General Vandenberg based his dissent on two points.

330 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 4, Heavy Munitions, Hearings on H.R. 6049 to authorize the President, in his discretion, to permit the stoppage of work on certain combat vessels, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, 6860. (Hereafter cited as Hearings H.R. 6049.)


332 Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 393.

The first was that the JCS had never had the opportunity to fully evaluate the carrier in terms of its impact on the "over-all military structure," and how it would "carry out joint plans." He then went on to deal with the carrier in relation to the budget problem. He maintained that he could not "at this time approve or disapprove one particular part of the budget of one of the services without the thorough consideration of the programs and budget requirements of all three services." Clearly, Vandenberg was basing his dissent on a technicality and avoiding presenting his own views on the carrier. The reason for his obfuscation is revealed in the conclusion of his statement. "Approval by the Joint Chiefs, as opposed to acceptance of a decision of higher authority, connotes military judgment based on thorough considerations."334 In Vandenberg's mind, the Chiefs were again merely rubber stamping an administration directive and supporting an administration policy. Ten months later, though, that policy had changed.

In the spring of 1949, budget problems again brought the carrier issue to the forefront. Louis Johnson, the new Secretary of Defense, in an economy move, wanted to reconsider the carrier decision. On the 15th of April 1949, he

asked the Chiefs, for the third time, to give their opinion on the carrier. This time the vote was two to one against the carrier, with only Admiral Denfeld dissenting. Reinforced by this negative response, Johnson cancelled the carrier eight days later. Outraged, the Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned and was replaced by Francis P. Matthews, whom the Navy officer corps believed to be a Johnson man. The cancellation of the carrier was the spark that ignited the "Revolt," but it was not the cause. The real cause was an increasing belief on the part of naval officers that Admiral Denfeld was not properly defending the Navy's interests in the matter. Unfortunately for Denfeld, he became identified with Matthews and became guilty, through association, for the cancellation of the carrier.

With the traditional lines of communication apparently eliminated, the officer corps sought alternative expressions for their grievances. The result was an outbreak of bureaucratic warfare and public statements against the Air Force's pet project, the B-36 intercontinental bomber. Admiral Denfeld had lost credibility with the officer corps and had thus lost control of the Navy. Professor Paul Hammond in his major study of the carrier controversy clearly noted this.

Copies of the Chiefs' written responses and positions on the carrier vote are found in the Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder "Joint Chiefs of Staff," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Library.)
loss of credibility:

If the professional leader of the Navy, Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations since December, 1947, had ever enjoyed the full confidence of the Navy partisans, by September 1949, it had been withdrawn from him. His role as senior member of the Joint Chiefs in the carrier cancellation recommendations, and in the decision not to hold a contest between the B-36 and a Navy fighter, had been misunderstood within the Navy. He had remained silently in office when Sullivan resigned in a blaze of naval glory. And when in the August hearings the Air Force related the times he, as a member of the Joint Chiefs, had approved the B-36, the misunderstandings grew. 336

To this list of incriminations must be added the cuts in the Navy's 1950 budget and Denfeld's own reappointment as Chief of Naval Operations. This last act looked all too much like a reward for services rendered.

Secretary Matthews' reaction to the Navy's media campaign was to order that all statements critical of the administration's policies must stay within the chain of command. In accordance with this directive, Vice Admiral Gerald Bogan, the commanding officer First Task Fleet, sent a letter to Matthews which reflected the disenchantment of the officer corps.

The morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916.... In my opinion, this descent, almost to despondency, stems from complete confusion as to the future role of the Navy....

Bogan's letter was an explicit indictment of unification and the National Security Act of 1947. The letter was endorsed

by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur Radford, who wrote, "Rightly or wrongly, the majority of the officers in the Pacific Fleet concur...with the ideas expressed by Admiral Bogan...." It was further endorsed by Admiral Denfeld himself. 337 The letter became a political bomb when on 4 October 1949, it was released to the press despite Matthews' efforts to keep it private. 338 Matthews, realizing the potential political dangers persuaded Denfeld to state that his endorsement was a matter of procedure and should not be construed as approval. 339 By doing so, Denfeld destroyed what little credibility he had left with the officer corps.

The release of the Bogan letter had exactly the effect that naval partisans had hoped for; it brought about a full

337 See Ibid., 509-511 for a reproduction of Bogan's letter. Part of Denfeld's endorsement reads as follows: "I concur in the endorsement of the Chief, Pacific Fleet. Naval officers have faith in the Navy and a knowledge of the aggressive role it plays in the defense of the country. They are convinced that a Navy stripped of its offensive power means a nation stripped of its offensive power."

338 G. F. Bogan, Oral History Transcript, Naval Institute Oral History Program (1970), 122-127. Bogan maintains that he had nothing to do with the revolt and that his letter was merely in response to Secretary Matthews' October 1949 invitation to discuss the morale of the officer corps. Captain John G. Crommlin (USN) one of the leaders of the Navy's attacks on the B-36 bomber released the letter on his own. Bogan was later demoted to Rear Admiral and he finally retired. He blames Admiral Forrest Sherman and Secretary Matthews for the demise of his career.

339 New York Times, 5 October 1949. In his public statement, Admiral Denfeld stated that "such an endorsement does not mean approval." He went on to say that he was endorsing Admiral Radford's endorsement, and not the content of the Bogan letter.
scale Congressional inquiry into America's strategic policy. One by one, the Navy's witnesses marched before the Congressional committee and attacked the Air Forces' programs. Denfeld was the Navy's last witness and although his statement was moderate in nature, it did corroborate the Navy's position. Instantly Denfeld's credibility with the officer corps was reestablished, but he had lost his value as far as the administration was concerned. A short time later, on October 27th, Denfeld was dismissed and replaced by Admiral Forrest Sherman, an officer who was not identified with the revolt and who was an outspoken advocate of unification.

This particular case study reveals some very interesting aspects about the Chiefs' perceived relationships with each other, their own services, and the administration. There are two sets of issues which must be examined in order to fully analyze the "Revolt of the Admirals." The first of these revolves around the three JCS votes on the carrier and why the various Chiefs voted the way they did. There are several possible explanations as to the Chiefs' voting

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341 Sherman had been the Navy's representative during the writing of the National Security Act and had defended that legislation during the hearings.
patterns on the carrier issue. One possible explanation is partisan service politics. By this I mean that the votes reflected service values and bureaucratic interests. To some degree, this was obviously true, but it cannot be used as a total explanation. While this may explain Admirals Denfeld's and Leahy's support for the carrier, it surely does not explain General Vandenberg's concurrence at Key West; nor General Bradley's support for the carrier during the first two votes and then his reversal on the third vote. It is apparent that any analysis of the voting pattern lies beyond the simple solution of partisan service politics.

One possible solution to the question of the Joint Chiefs' voting pattern may be found in the realm of psychogroup dynamics, particularly Irving L. Janis' theory of groupthink. Groupthink occurs when individuals are:

deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members strive for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action...[Groupthink] refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressure.342

The voting pattern of the Joint Chiefs did not reflect the usual form of groupthink, which is a product of group dynamics and peer-group pressures. Instead, it reflected a variation of groupthink, which was the product of a set

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of social attitudes inculcated by professionalism and reinforced by a rank conscious system. This variation resulted in the Chiefs subordinating themselves to the real or the perceived desires of their superiors. Admiral Denfeld acknowledged that this was the prime motivation at Key West when he said "that they [the Chiefs] would go along with it [the carrier] because it was the President's program."\(^{343}\) Vandenberg, at the conclusion to his May 1948 dissent, implied that this was the reason for Bradley's support in the second vote. Bradley's own explanation for his reversal in the third vote refers precisely to this type of subordination.

This apparent agreement by me at that time [the second vote] was based upon my understanding that it had been approved by those in authority and I accepted it as a fact accomplished. Therefore, I was merely noting, in effect, a decision that had already been made by higher authority.\(^{344}\)

Bradley's subordination was so total that he even rejected the previous two votes as "a formal decision" by the Joint Chiefs. This despite the fact that the May 1948 memorandum to Secretary Forrestal specifically stated that the Joint Chiefs had considered the following question, "Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the construction of the so-called

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\(^{343}\) U.S. Congress, House Hearings, H.R. 6049, 6860.

To this question Leahy, Denfeld and Bradley "answered in the affirmative." Apparently, Bradley not only subordinated himself to Forrestal, but did so to Johnson as well; thus creating the semantical distinction of "a formal decision." It should be pointed out here that the type of groupthink exhibited during the carrier votes was not a totally unique situation. Janis notes that a similar type of groupthink was demonstrated during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and was inextricably connected to America's Vietnam policy.

In the final analysis the voting pattern on the carrier issue reflected a combination of partisan service politics and a professionalized groupthink. The Key West vote was a clear example of subordination to administration policy on the part of all members of the JCS. In General Bradley's case, this subordination appears to have carried on into the second vote, in May 1948. On the other hand, Denfeld and Vandenberg manifested service interest during the second vote, and most openly, during the crucial third vote. Denfeld's defense of the carrier was based on its

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345 Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 28 May 1948, subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June, 1948," U.S. Naval Archives.

346 Janis, Groupthink, Chapters 2 and 5.
ability to support the Navy's strategic role as well as its traditional roles of sea control and anti-submarine warfare. Rather expectedly, Vandenberg based his attack upon the carrier's potential military value. He pointed out that the super-carrier was not the optimal system for anti-submarine warfare and its strategic value against a land locked power like Russia was questionable at best:

The relative military value of the large carrier, when compared to other weapons systems procurable with the same resources, is of a low order. This carrier is designed for bombardment purposes. The resources required to make it an operational weapon would produce in land-based aviation capabilities considerably greater than the capability of the carrier. When it is considered that the carrier inherently exposes its bombing capability to attack by three entirely separate weapons systems--the submarine fleet, the surface fleet, and air forces--whereas land-based bombers are exposed to only one of these, an even greater disparity between the relative worth of these two systems is apparent. The carrier not only exposes itself to multiple forms of attack, but also exposes to the same dangers its attendant complex of protective vessels. Even when behind this costly protective screen, I believe the carrier is today a vulnerable weapon.

A cost effective analysis like this was definitely designed to appeal to Secretary Johnson's cost consciousness.

It is General Bradley's reversal of opinion in the third and final vote that is most illustrative of the


pressures that are on the Chiefs. It is doubtful that he was manifesting a specific service position in April of 1949. As an institution, the Army was merely a spectator in the debate over strategic delivery systems, since they had none of their own; although it is true that Bradley realized the finite nature of the budget pie and that any increase in expenditures for one service meant a proportional decrease for the other. Also Bradley's own war experience in Europe would have tended to minimize the role of naval airpower. Since Bradley had admitted subordinating his professional opinion on the earlier carrier vote, it may be assumed that Bradley did it again. This would be true providing Bradley actually favored the carrier. It appears though, that Bradley's true opinion tended to support Vandenberg's position. In a 14 September 1948 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Bradley assailed a Navy proposal to build three additional super-carriers as part of a mobilization strategy. His rejection of the Navy proposal was based on three points. The first was that the carriers would not be completed in time to have any impact on the war effort. Secondly, he questioned the strategic value of the carriers. He argued that "the Naval threat of the USSR would be diminished or a relatively minor threat at that time:"
The CVX's [the super-carrier] cannot be justified exclusively on the Navy's primary roles and missions and the assignment of such a large proportion of our industrial effort toward the accomplishment of a collateral mission is not acceptable.

Finally, in place of the airpower supplied by the carrier, General Bradley foresaw the Air Force being fully deployed. It is true that the General did recommend the continuation of the experimental super-carrier itself, but then one must remember that Secretary Forrestal was still in office. Since Bradley had subordinated himself on two earlier votes, there is no reason to believe that he would oppose the carrier at this time. Once Johnson had replaced Forrestal, the pressures for subordination apparently shifted. If we assume that Bradley was not overly infatuated with the carrier originally, then Johnson merely allowed him to voice his own feelings. In his 22 April 1949 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, in which Bradley outlined his reasons for recommending rejection of the carrier, he repeated much of the same ground covered in his 14 September 1948 memorandum. The super-carrier was simply not cost efficient to accomplish the Navy's primary missions, and the collateral mission of strategic bombardment was covered by the Air Force "which already has adequate means and capabilities.

to perform this function." While Bradley did admit that carrier air power had a role; the land-locked nature of the Soviet Union and its lack of a navy coupled with the limited range of carrier aircraft, minimized that role. In the final analysis, the super-carrier's cost simply outweighed its benefits.

Our analysis of the Chiefs' voting pattern leads us to the second major issue to be discussed, that of the Chiefs' relationship to their services and the administration. As discussed earlier, the Chiefs attempted to play the role of a "front man." The "Revolt" occurred when Denfeld's service constituency, the officer corps, perceived that he was failing to represent them properly to the administration. Under such circumstances they, the officer corps, proceeded to develop alternative means of expressing their grievances. It was not until Denfeld had visibly manifested support for the officer corps that his credibility returned along with his ability to control the officer corps. Unfortunately for Denfeld, the situation had reached a stage where any support for the officer corps was viewed as opposition to the administration and this meant the loss of that vital constituency.

It is very difficult to determine the exact point Denfeld lost the support of Secretary Matthews. Apparently, the release of the Bogan letter was the beginning of the parting of the ways. On 14 September 1949, Denfeld went to Matthews to thank him for his reappointment to another two year term as Chief of Naval Operations. Matthews was reported to have responded that "there's nothing I have done since I have been Secretary that has given me more pleasure than getting you reappointed."\(^{351}\) Three weeks later, after the release of the Bogan letter, Matthews told Denfeld that he was sorry that his endorsement had been put on the letter and that this might impair his value as Chief of Naval Operations; but according to Denfeld, Secretary Matthews immediately added, "I've had worse situations than this confront me, but I'm sure if we work together we can overcome this one."\(^{352}\) Matthews' own comment on the meeting does not include such a conciliatory statement.\(^{353}\)

The confusion over the exact contents of the meeting may exist because Denfeld felt that he had done nothing to cause the loss of the Secretary's support. It appears though

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\(^{351}\) Louis Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," Collier's, Vol. 125, No. 11 (18 March 1950), 15.

\(^{352}\) Ibid; this meeting took place 4 October 1949.

\(^{353}\) New York Times, 28 October 1949. Matthews released a letter in which he said that he told Denfeld that he feared his usefulness had finished.
that the administration had decided before Denfeld's testimony that his value had ended. According to Admiral Richard L. Conolly, he was offered the office of Chief of Naval Operations in return for a pro-administration testimony. Conolly reported that his pro-Navy stand during the hearings destroyed his chances for CNO and that Johnson "hit the roof" when he heard what Conolly had said. The Admiral went on to note that Johnson supposedly turned to Steve Early, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and said, "There goes your candidate..." Whether or not the administration had decided to replace Denfeld before his testimony became unimportant once he had sided with the rest of the officer corps.

The "Revolt of the Admirals," demonstrates some crucial aspects about the interaction of the Joint Chiefs with their two constituencies, their service and the administration. To be an effective "front man," a chief must somehow balance the demands of these two groups. Admiral Denfeld found out that


355 The day after Denfeld testified before the Congress he met with Matthews and they discussed why the Admiral had not cleared the testimony with his service secretary. Denfeld said that he didn't think it mattered because he had to do what he thought was right. Admiral Denfeld reported that "he had been submitting to the pressure to which he had been subjected as Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that he felt that he could not pursue that course any longer; that he had to speak out in justice to himself and the position that he was taking." Memorandum of Record of conversations with Denfeld, 14 October 1949, Presidential Secretary File, box 58, folder, "Cabinet-Navy Secretary: Misc.," Truman Library.
the loss of the support of either one reduced, if not eliminated, his ability to perform this function. It was also rather clear that the administration was the more important of these two constituencies. Denfeld lost his job only after he had lost the support of the administration. The Chiefs as a group acknowledged the supremacy of the administration by subordinating their professional opinion to the administration's desires during the three carrier votes. Even Vandenberg's opposition to the carrier during the second vote was carefully structured along procedural grounds. By doing so, he was able to tread the narrow line between the administration and his service. In this regard Vandenberg was far luckier than Denfeld. The mere act of the Chiefs subordinating themselves to the civilian leadership raises questions about their responsibility to the society. Does their responsibility lie with their service, which they have served for thirty or more years; with the administration, that appointed them; or the society at large, which they have taken an oath to defend. In Matthews' letter to the President, asking for the removal of Denfeld, he emphasized the importance of loyalty as the important link between a service secretary and a chief:

A military establishment is not a political democracy. Integrity of command is indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various official ranks. Inability to conform to such
requirements for military stability would disqualify any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander in Chief.356

In the final analysis, the Chiefs apparently understood that they must give their loyalty to the administration in order to function in any manner.

The civilian leadership of both administrations were correct in linking the organizational structure of the Joint Chiefs to their dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior. In essence the various reorganizations were designed to achieve two goals, eliminate inter-service conflicts and upgrade the Chief's advisory product. Both of these problems were partially the result of the bureaucratic and political manner in which JCS staff papers were written. Career pressures tended to force action officers to either defend service interests or achieve artificial consensus through such means as paperclipping and waffling. It was through the process of consensus building that the bureaucracy flowed smoothly, and the services tried to avoid open confrontation. Eisenhower was correct in noting that the pre-1958 committee nature of the Joint Staff allowed the services too much influence and that this guaranteed the continuation of dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior within the Staff. What he failed to address in his 1958 reorganization was that at

some point in the future, the Joint Staff action officer still had to return to his service and that this allowed the services to continue to influence decisions.

For the Chiefs themselves, the motivations to defend service interest and achieve artificial consensus are just as strong as they are for the staff officer, but for different reasons. At that point in his career a chief is at the pinnacle of his profession, but being there generates different types of pressures on him. For one thing after spending over thirty years in his service it is only natural that he believes that its mission is essential to the defense of the nation. But simple service loyalty does not completely explain the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs. The real problem for the Chiefs is that they are caught between their twin constituencies, their services and the administration, as they attempt to negotiate the complex role of being a front man. Denfeld discovered the fate of a chief who loses the support of either group. In this regard the "Revolt of the Admirals" undermines any notion that the military services are a homogenous authoritarian hierarchy. While the Navy's bureaucratic revolution was unique by virtue of its size and impact, it was by no means a unique phenomenon. General Maxwell Taylor had his "Revolt of the Colonels" during the late 1950s, when certain army officers perceived that the prevailing strategic doctrine was going to destroy the
Although such upheavals are rare, the fear of them prompts some chiefs to initiate preventive action. The selection several years ago of General John Vessey as the Vice Chief of Staff U.S. Army, has led some insiders to suggest that it was motivated by a desire on the part of new Chief of Staff nominee, General Edward "Shy" Meyer, to defuse internal unrest within the service over his selection and the rejection of Vessey.

In reconsidering the reorganization efforts conducted during the period of our study, it is apparent that the criticisms levied against the Chiefs were only half right. Clearly, there were systemic problems that led to inter-service conflict and the dilution of the JCS product, but these two flaws were caused as much by external bureaucratic factors as internal ones. It was true that the Chiefs engaged in extensive horizontal bargaining in order to protect service values and achieve the consensus that a bureaucracy demands, but both presidential administrations either consciously or unconsciously ignored the vertical relationships and pressures that helped magnify these flaws. The Chiefs' role as a front man necessitated such vertical bargaining, but it also resulted in tremendous pressures from above, especially as centralization increased. Quite openly, both

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357 Interview with General Maxwell Taylor, January 1975, Washington, D.C.

358 Interview.
administrations opted for centralization in order to create more consensus, but such consensus would be just as artificial, and thus just as dysfunctional, as the consensus brought about by internal staff pressures. The Chiefs had to defend service interests in order to keep their own bureaucracies in check, and the best means to accomplish this was a unified position that hurt no one's vital interests. Consensus also gave the Chiefs bargaining power vis-a-vis the administration which demanded conformity to its views, and was capable of imposing them through centralized defense management. This combination of pressures put the Chiefs in an untenable position.

One subject that never seemed to be addressed was the nature of the Chiefs' responsibility. Were they responsible to their service, the administration, or the nation. These three were not necessarily synonymous. In order to fully answer that question we must examine it from two perspectives: the administration's perception of what the role of the JCS ought to be, and what the Chiefs thought their own role was. Once we have determined this we will then be in a better position to assess the true role of the Chiefs.
CHAPTER VI

THE CIVILIAN'S PERCEIVED ROLE
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

One of the most important lessons to be derived from the "Revolt of the Admirals," was that the Chiefs had to be concerned with the desires of their civilian superiors. This is especially important because, by its nature, the role of an advisor is vague and relatively unstructured. This allows a great deal of flexibility on the part of both the Chiefs and the political leadership to determine exactly what role the Joint Chiefs would fulfill. Because of this flexibility the perceptions of both the civilian leadership and the Chiefs themselves form the boundaries within which the Chiefs' ultimate role is decided upon. Thus in order to fully understand what role the Chiefs have assumed in policy formulation it must first be determined what role the civilian leadership allocated to the Chiefs and desired that they fulfill.

The role that the Truman administration envisioned for the Joint Chiefs of Staff was by no means clearly determined at the time of the passage of the 1947 legislation. The administration's position, like the legislation itself, evolved as the human and systemic problems inherent within the structure surfaced. Secretary Forrestal's reversal on the powers
of his office reflected such an evolution. Despite this evolutionary process, most of the changes revolved around one basic assumption, that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the administration's professional military advisors. As such, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the reservoir for the military expertise of the nation. This represented more than a mere statutory function; it represented a philosophical conception of professionalism that ultimately molded the civilian's notion of what role the JCS should play.

This assumption was derived from several possible sources. The first was the President's own lack of military expertise, but that was a traditional handicap for the civilian leadership. The second was the President's own good working relationship with the Joint Chiefs, which resulted from his personal high regard for some of its members. The last, and probably the most important, was the President's philosophical concurrence with the traditional compartmentalization of political and military action. While Truman did have an understanding of the interrelationship between war and peace, it tended to be tied to the traditional ideas of civilian control and the automatonical relationship between the American military and the civilian policy maker. This traditional relationship was reaffirmed when the President stated "the policy of the government determines the
policy of the military. The military is always subordinate
to the government." 359

On the surface, the President clearly supported tradi-
tional civilian control of the military, but analyzing it
further, we realize that it also reinforced traditional
American military "radical" professionalism. Central to this
professional ethic was the belief that once the policy had
been determined by the civilian leadership, it would be up
to the military experts to achieve the appropriate results.
Conversely, this Uptonian image of professionalism demanded
that the non-professional (the civilian) exit the scene after
the political decision was made, in order to give full reign
to the expert. More than once during the Korean War, Presi-
dent Truman articulated his support for such a functional
division of labor. In the fall of 1950 he stated that "I
am not a desk strategist and don't pretend to be one. I
leave that to the military men." 360 The following year in
responding to a question on the war effort he stated; "that
is a military matter and the President of the United States
has never interfered with military maneuver in the field and
he doesn't expect to interfere in it now." 361 Such an outlook

359 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New

360 U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry
S. Truman, 1950, 622.

361 Truman, Public Papers, 1951, 154.
may well explain his tolerance of General MacArthur's transgressions during the early stages of the Korean War. 362

The division of labor outlined above denotes support for traditional American military professionalism, which was based on the notion of military expertise and the mutually shared assumption, by both civilian and military alike, of the limits of each other's competency. Since fusionism was the antithesis of traditional American political/military bifurcation, the military professional should not and could not be relied upon to incorporate non-military factors into his cognitive processes, just as the civilians were not expected to deal with technical military issues. For the military to do otherwise would undermine civilian control while violating their own professional ethic.

From the very beginning, this approach was understood by the first two Secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, both of whom perceived themselves primarily as administrators, attempting to implement strategic decisions that had already been made in the White House. 363 It may be suggested that the more the civilian leader perceives himself as an administrator, the more he feels comfortable with the

362 Truman, Memoirs, II, 377-78.

traditional division of labor due to his own lack of expertise in military matters. While this hypothesis may appear valid, we will note shortly that President Eisenhower, a man of tremendous military knowledge, also opted for the traditional bifurcation of functions. Secretary Forrestal, unlike his successor, had enough experience to realize that the only possible way to effectively integrate policy was in some measure to violate this professional ethic. Unfortunately, he failed totally in his efforts to force the Chiefs to incorporate economic and political factors. 364 This effort appears to have been a unilateral attempt on his part and did not signify any major change in the administration's attitude. More typical of the administration's true view was the comment made by former Secretary of the Air Force, Stewart Symington, who recalled that during the National Security Council meetings he attended, he never heard "any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other military figure make any voluntary contributions to discussion in the Council." Mr. Symington went on to say that "they [the members of the JCS] were there to answer questions with respect

364 See my discussion of the FY 50 budget in chapter VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Policy Integration.
to matters that had to do primarily with the military." 365 From Mr. Symington's comments it is apparent that the Truman administration approached political/military policy making in a very traditional manner. Forrestal's successor, Louis Johnson, was far more of a manager than the first Secretary of Defense, and tended to support strict constructionalism to a greater degree. He became so preoccupied with his managerial function that he ignored substantive issues and considered political/military coordination outside his purview. 366 As Professor Lawrence Korb noted, Johnson "saw himself as the President's representative to the Department of Defense enforcing the administration's will on an avaricious military." 367 Such a narrow managerial approach led him to totally compartmentalize the "political" from the "military" and ultimately led him to

365 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Nomination of Arthur William Radford as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Matthew Bunker Ridgway as Chief of Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Operations and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air Force, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 22. (Hereafter referred to as Hearings, Nominations 1953).


direct that all contact with the State Department should be carried on exclusively through his office. This acted as a deterrent to coordination and totally separated the two departments, forcing the Chiefs to develop their own assumptions.

On the other hand, the civilians did not really believe that the Chiefs were capable of incorporating non-military factors in such a way as to supply the civilians with usable input. Apparently belying this assumption, Secretary of State Dean Acheson recalled that during the Korean War there was a close working relationship between the JCS, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. To support this he pointed out that he and General Bradley made an agreement to exclude the phrases "from a military point of view" and from a "political point of view" from their discussions. He went on to note that each agreed that they had their own tactical and strategic problems, but that they "were interconnected, not separate."

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368 Millis, Arms and the State, 234; also see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), 373, for a discussion of how this bifurcation effected the development of NSC/68.

369 Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 244-47.

370 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441
Superficially, it would appear that Forrestal's goal of policy integration had been achieved, but on further examination such a conclusion becomes suspect. Acheson clearly attributes the good working relationship between the State Department and the JCS to the presence of George C. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, in his memoirs, Acheson criticized the Joint Chiefs for maintaining its committee structure and pointed out that because the Chiefs were "burdened by both staff and command duties," it was "extremely difficult for civilian officers engaged in foreign affairs to work with them". He went on to say that:

All too often it [the JCS] produces for those looking for military advice and guidance only oracular utterances. Since it is a committee and its views are the results of votes on formal papers prepared for it, it quite literally is like my favorite old lady who could not say what she thought until she heard what she said. Even on the tentative basis, it is hard for high officials to get military advice in our government. When he does get it, it is apt to be unresponsive to the problems bothering the civilian official.371

While it is true that much of the criticism directed at the JCS was based on its cumbersome organization, and the insertion of a Chairman went a long way toward solving that problem; Acheson was actually addressing the impediments of

371 Ibid., 243 (underline added).
professionalism. Since professional values fostered compartmentalization, it is doubtful that the mere elimination of odious and constrictive terminology would suddenly liberate the Chiefs and allow them to articulate non-military perceptions.

Such a strict-constructionalist approach actually enhanced the perception that the Chiefs were experts within their narrow professional arena. Since they were the President's professional military advisors, he desired to have free communication with them and sought their honest and open advice on military matters. This was precisely the goal that Clifford had in mind when he recommended, in December 1946, that a pluralistic JCS be created. Similarly, it was only through open and frank discussion that the National Security advisory system could work. This did not mean, however, that the President was willing to abdicate any of his prerogatives. In his memoirs, Truman recalled that "I used the council [NSC] only as a place for recommendations to be worked out. The policy has to come down from the President, as all final decisions have to be made by him." The President also understood that these recommendations needed to grow out of an unconstrained environment; thus he absented himself frequently from the NSC's

372 Truman, Memoirs, II, 59.
meetings, in order not to prejudice its advice. Such openness though, demanded some form of institutional linkage between the President and his advisors, or chaos could result. Admiral Leahy had performed such a function for Roosevelt, and Truman continued to use him in the same manner until the Admiral's retirement in 1949. General Eisenhower was brought in to temporarily fill the void, but expediency gave way to institutionalization with the appointment of General Bradley to the chairmanship in 1949. During his tenure as Chairman, Bradley scrupulously avoided imposing his views on the other Chiefs, and attempted to present their opinions faithfully to the President. During the Korean War, Bradley attempted, as Leahy had done in the last war, to act as the bridge between the White House and the JCS. The General's White House briefings and frequent conversations with the President "kept the JCS constantly informed of what was in the mind of the President." 374

Unfortunately, the same inter-service competition that led to the institutionalization of the chairmanship, eroded


374 Wilber Hoar, "Truman," The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief; ed. by Ernest May (New York: George Braziller, 1960), 194.
the administration's confidence in its military experts, and with it the commitment to pluralistic decision making. As the military experts exhibited an increasing amount of service parochialism, the civilian managers became hard pressed to choose between expert testimony. In this regard Admiral Charles D. Griffin, former special assistant to Admiral Radford observed:

I always felt that the Secretary of Defense always had enough power to do darn near anything he wanted to do. It was a question of not having the knowledge to make a determination between contradictory recommendations that were coming up from the various services.\textsuperscript{375}

These differences of opinion increased the administration's difficulty in dealing with congressional opposition to particular segments of the defense program. Dissent within the JCS became even more counter-productive when the experts were needed to rationalize these programs before the Congress. Since the civilian leadership could not receive unified military advice, even on matters that were "purely military in nature," they began to make decisions based on non-military factors, such as the economy. Where dissent did exist a skillful civilian administrator could use it to his advantage, as Secretary Johnson did, when he scrapped the super-carrier United States.\textsuperscript{375}

\textsuperscript{375} Charles D. Griffin, Oral History Transcript, U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program (1973), 395.
Ultimately, these inter-service conflicts lead the administration to believe that a greater degree of unanimity was required, not just to facilitate internal policy formulation, but also to optimize external policy implementation. Even before the passage of the National Security Act, President Truman began to realize the impact disunity could have and warned the Chiefs:

...when the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, sets out a policy, that policy should be supported by the Army and the War Department and the Navy Department. Unanimity would relieve the administration of the difficult task of selecting among expert witnesses and would mend the walls against the administration's opponents. Inherent within this solution, though, is a dilemma that the civilian leadership has yet to solve. The imposition of unanimity on the Chiefs destroys open and honest military advice; yet the lack of it destroys unification.

Experience showed the Truman administration that a decision at the executive level did not necessarily end the debate, but at times even exacerbated it, thus making unanimity even more desirable. Slowly and incrementally disunity among the Chiefs became synonymous with opposition to the administration's policy. Initially, the presence of a Chairman and specifically General Bradley's promotion to five star

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376 Truman, Public Papers, 1946, 194-5.
rank held out the hope that the dilemma could be solved through internal controls. This would result in what President Truman called "Objective Agreements—a true meeting of professional minds."377 Such internal controls would not mitigate the Chiefs' advisory function, for they would still be free to debate openly and honestly the pressing issues of the day. What was "objective," though, would probably be determined by the administration. By 1949, the administration had come to the conclusion that persuasion was an ineffective means of dealing with the problem, thus the decision to opt for the implementation of Forrestal's "Shadow Concept" of concentrating power via the amendments to the National Security Act.

The civilian leadership made no secret of the fact that it expected the Chiefs to be loyal members of the administration's team, especially in regard to their relations with Congress. Secretary Forrestal informed them that if they could not support the President's program they could resign.378 Truman himself informed the Chiefs in May of 1948 that he expected them to support his program "in good spirit and without mental reservations." He emphasized that the time


for debate ceased once a program became official and that he expected "every member of the administration to support it fully, both in public and in private." 379 Despite this directive, less than a year later, in February 1949, the president had to remind the JCS that "complete, undivided loyalty to all such decisions will be demanded at all times and at all places." 380 The fate of Admiral Denfeld was a clear example of the requirement for loyalty. In the final analysis these controls would only be as effective as the men who would implement them. It was with this in mind that James Forrestal "liked to insist that he was not as much interested in the diagram of an organization as he was in the names in the little boxes." 381

It was for this reason that the dual problem of lack of unanimity and public debate on national security issues became inextricably connected to the JCS appointment process. While in theory the President as Commander in Chief can appoint anyone he wishes, reality limits his options. The Chiefs themselves are chosen from a small pool of available flag officers. Lawrence Korb notes in his study of the JCS, the President's "choice is usually limited to a few top men

379 Ibid., 437.
in each branch of the Armed Forces, whose promotion into this elite is rigidly controlled by the individual service." True, the President can reach down into the ranks of more junior flag rank officers for a Chief, but he will have to do so over the protests of the service bureaucracy. Furthermore, the President must remain cognizant of the fact that the Chief maintains a "front man" relationship between the administration that appoints him and the service he represents. Denfeld discovered that the loss of the latter's support may make it impossible for him to carry on his job. Reaching too far down into the ranks may well result in such a degree of animosity being directed against a Chief that it would be counter-productive to appoint him.

While these factors tend to limit the President's choice of potential appointees to the Joint Chiefs, his appointment ability could potentially solve the dual problem presented above. If the balance between the Chiefs' two

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Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31.

The promotion of General Harold Johnson and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt over many senior officers reflected the administration's desire to accomplish specific things. MacNamara wanted an Army Chief of Staff who was attuned to the systems analysis that he advocated; while Zumwalt was brought in to deal with many of the social problems that the Navy was confronting. See Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 44, 64.

An example of such a promotion was Major General Alexander Haig's promotion by President Nixon over 250 other Generals to Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. It resulted in a great deal of animosity toward him and those associated with him.
constituencies was sufficiently disrupted so that the preponderance of loyalty resided toward the administration then unanimity of opinion and loyalty would be achieved. Granted the cost would be the destruction of Clifford's pluralistic JCS, but such pluralism was increasingly perceived as being dysfunctional anyway. At what point the administration realized the advantages of using the selection process to its full advantage is unknown, but an examination of the process may give us some insights.

The membership of the Joint Chiefs during the Truman administration goes through two distinct phases with the "Revolt of the Admirals' acting as a convenient watershed. Up until 1949 the selection tended to conform to Richard Betts' model of a "Routine-Professional" appointment. By this Betts' means that the officer selected was considered to have the highest professional stature within his service, or at least was one of a select group of competitors. Compatibility with the administrations' policies appears to have been of little or no concern, although personality compatibility was still an important criterion. Almost immediately upon the conclusion of the Second World War, Marshall, King, and Arnold retired to be succeeded by the major theater commander from each service, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,

385 Betts, Cold War Crises, 53ff.
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Carl Spaatz. Each had immense public prestige and was clearly perceived as the expert in his respective field. With the passage of the National Security Act in 1947 this group turned over command to officers who, while well qualified, lacked the personal prestige of their predecessors. The one exception to this was Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley. The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld, had spent the majority of the war in personnel management, although after the conflict he was posted to the prestigious billet of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), a position that Admiral Nimitz previously held. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, had been primarily a tactical commander during the war (commanding the IX Tactical Air Force) and afterwards was named the first head of the Central Intelligence Agency. In June of 1947, Vandenberg was named Vice Chief of Staff and thus began a tradition that the Air Force maintained for over two decades—appointing a future Chief of Staff first to the position of Vice Chief. Later, when Bradley was appointed Chairman, his Vice Chief, General

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E. B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press: 1976), 401. Potter in a footnote discusses Forrestal's opposition to Nimitz. Forrestal had a difficult time dealing with the strong willed King and he did not want to continue the difficulties with a strong willed Nimitz. King forced his hand and went to the President with the recommendation that Nimitz succeed him. It is possible that Forrestal wanted Admiral Marc Mitscher, who supposedly declined the offer of CNO.
J. Lawton Collins, was named his successor. Collins also had been a major tactical commander during the war (commanding the VII Corps in Europe). In each case the Chief designee had served his apprenticeship and was among the logical choices for selection.

It is within this framework that the firing of Admiral Louis Denfeld becomes important. As discussed earlier, the administration hoped that internal controls and organizational reform would mitigate the worst aspects of inter-service conflict. When Denfeld became too great a political liability he was removed from office and replaced by Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman. On the surface, Sherman's appointment seems to follow Betts' routine professional model. During the war Sherman had been Nimitz's Chief of Staff and afterwards he had held important fleet commands. He was universally admired within the service, specifically recommended by Nimitz, and despite his apparent junior three star rank was still the 11th ranking officer in the Navy. But behind Sherman's obvious military qualifications there were other credentials that were of equal, if not greater, importance. Admiral Sherman was acknowledged as a pro-unification officer, who had helped write the 1947 legislation. He thus was politically attuned to the desires of the administration. Nimitz acknowledged this when he recommended Sherman. After narrowing the field to Sherman and Admiral Richard Connolly, Nimitz told the President "Sherman is younger and even less involved in
Furthermore, since Sherman was probably the Navy's foremost aviator, his selection would heal some of the wounds caused by the cancellation of the United States. I think it can safely be asserted that these non-professional qualifications guaranteed his appointment over other qualified naval officers such as Admirals Connolly or Blandy.

It would appear that the administration decided to reinforce the notion of loyalty that had been explicitly articulated and implicitly contained within the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. While Truman had previously appointed officers on a routine professional basis, the appointment of Sherman may easily be interpreted as a step toward the politicization of the Chiefs, or to borrow Betts' label, a "professional-political" appointment. This is not politicization in the most crass terms. Instead it is the selection of an officer based upon professional qualifications, but with an appreciation to the political potential of the individual, especially in regard to the notion of loyalty to the administration's policies.

It was not accidental that upon the death of Admiral Sherman in 1951, his successor was the Commander-in-Chief Potter, Nimitz, 448. Sherman originally was against unification and argued, as did Leahy and other Navy officers that unification already existed in the form of the President as Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, we cannot document the source of his transformation to a unification advocate. Haynes, Awesome Power, 96.
of the Atlantic, Admiral William Fechteler. To replace the very able Sherman was a difficult task and Truman deferred the choice to his newly appointed Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball, under the assumption that Kimball would have to be able to work with the new CNO. Among the pool of senior admirals only Fechteler had been untainted by the "Revolt." Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, was allegedly Sherman's own choice as his successor, but he took himself out of contention "for the good of the service." Kimball himself recalled that this, among other things, had been crucial in determining his choice of Fechteler. Shortly after Fechteler's nomination he met with the President who emphasized the necessity for the "success of unification of the Armed Forces." Clearly the correct selection of the Chiefs, combined with the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, would guarantee that success.

The requirement of loyalty to the administration became increasingly important during the last years of the Truman administration and changed the role of the Joint Chiefs substantially. As the Democratic administration was attacked for its foreign policy decisions, it was forced to rely more


and more on the JCS to rationalize and defend its programs. Bradley, more than any of the other Chiefs, became a stalking horse for the administration's policies, especially as its civilian policy makers, such as Acheson, lost all credibility with the Republicans. The role of the Chairman, because of his theoretical lack of service affiliation and his close ties to the administration, seems to have developed a collateral function to support the administration's policies. Forrestal may have been alluding to this function when he used the word "agent" to describe the relationship between the Chairman and the Secretary. Unfortunately, even General Bradley could only trade on his prestige for a short time. In the end he also lost credibility. Senator Taft pointed this out in 1951:

I have come to the point where I do not accept them [the JCS] as experts, particularly when General Bradley makes a foreign policy speech. I suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are absolutely under the control of the administration.

Under such circumstances it was impossible to keep the illusion of traditional professionalism.

The role the Chiefs were playing in 1953 was a far cry from the pluralistic model of traditional professionalism that Truman, Clifford and Forrestal originally envisioned, but

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pluralism had failed in the face of inter-service conflict and the new demands of the post-war world. The administration's reaction was to opt for more centralization and to demand greater unanimity. This unanimity would result in "objective agreements" to support the administration's policies. The firing of Denfeld, followed by the appointments of Sherman and Fechteler, and the relief of MacArthur, reminded the Chiefs that civilian control of the military was becoming a euphemism for administration control of the military. But the Truman administration had not completely forgotten the ideal of the pluralistic structure. Bradley carefully played the honest broker in his dealings with the other Chiefs. This was undoubtedly the intention of the President, but the administration was caught between the ideal and the realities of the bureaucratic and political world. The changing of the nature of the JCS had begun and would continue into the next administration.

The Eisenhower administration's perception of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed fundamentally from that of its predecessor, primarily due to a differing perception of the Chiefs' advisory function and with it the concept and limitations of what "military expertise" entailed. Since Eisenhower's own military experience and prestige far overshadowed that of his Chiefs, he was in a very real sense his own military expert. As Sherman Adams wrote:
In fact, Eisenhower's personal experience as a professional soldier and as the wartime commander of the greatest expeditionary force that the world has ever seen made him if anything harder to deal with when fear-inspired pressures came from Congress... 392

With the President as the administration's resident military expert, it was only natural that the Defense Department's civilian leadership tended to be resource managers as opposed to military planners. Eisenhower's first two selections for the office of Secretary of Defense, Charles E. (Engine Charlie) Wilson and Neil McElroy, respectively the presidents of General Motors and Proctor & Gamble, enhanced this perspective. Although neither had any experience in defense decision making, the administration believed that the management skills they possessed were readily transferable. One White House insider was reported to have said, "anyone who can run General Motors can run anything." 393 Wilson himself described his role in that light:

Actually the current trend in all big enterprises--private business as well as the Department of Defense--is to decentralize actual operations thus leaving top management free to establish and clarify policy and follow up on performance. 394

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394 Summary of Secretary Wilson's letter of June 17, 1957 regarding the O'Mahoney amendment to the FY 58 appropriations bill. Harlow Papers, box 7, folder "DoD Budget 1958," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Library.)
The fact that the Eisenhower administration did not have to rely on the Joint Chiefs for military expertise also had a profound impact on their role. While Truman had politicized the Chiefs in order to offset criticism of his administration, Eisenhower neither needed nor desired such support. Instead he "desired only their agreement as members of a team." In fact, shortly after Eisenhower assumed office Robert Cutler, the President's advisor on national security affairs, informed the JCS that the President did not like uniformed military officers publicly discussing policy. Cutler quoted the President as saying "I don't like it a damn bit. If it doesn't stop I know what to do about it." Cutler was obviously conveying the President's dislike of Bradley voicing his support for Truman's policy.

The President was committed to the team concept as the backbone of any organization, especially the military, since he felt that unification could never be achieved without it. Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs had to cease being service spokesmen and that they had to rise above service parochialism, but as a former Chief he fully understood the service commitment. In August of 1953 he called for an independent examination of the service roles and missions,


396 Memorandum of Conversation between General Cutler and General Matthews, 5 February 1953, Record Group 218, box 5, folder '091, China,' National Archives, Washington, D.C.
and their relationship to atomic war. Sadly, he lamented, "such a study cannot be accomplished in a truly objective way by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of the understandable inclination of military men to protect the prerogatives of their respective services." 397 Eisenhower feared that if the Chiefs failed to rise above their service interests, the JCS would become "little more than an agency for eliminating from proposals and projects un consequential differences." 398 As long as the Chiefs continued to represent their services they could never be molded into the team that the President wanted. Such a team concept was the nucleus of the staff model that Eisenhower was familiar with.

The President endeavored to achieve the team concept through several media. One was to require the Chiefs to consider non-military factors while developing their advisory input. This requirement was levied on the Chiefs in a directive from Secretary Wilson during the summer of 1954. Wilson called on the Chiefs to "avail themselves of the most competent and considered thinking that can be obtained representing every pertinent point of view, including military,

397 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Carl Heinshaw, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1 August 1953, Central File, folder "OF 108-8(1)," Eisenhower Library.

scientific, industrial and economic." Ostensibly, this directive seemed to institutionalize the key recommendations of the 1953 Rockefeller Report, that called for the Chiefs to draw upon a broader base of knowledge while developing their war plans; although the Report acknowledged that those plans should be "based primarily on military factors." The Wilson Directive seemed to reject traditional military professionalism and to demand a higher degree of fusion than previously had been espoused, but it is questionable whether the President actually wanted such fusion. His own background seemed to indicate a preference for traditionalism. He manifested this in his criticism of Bradley's actions and in his campaign promise to limit the JCS to "purely military decisions." In a 1958 staff meeting he reaffirmed this position by stating that "it is necessary [that the JCS supply] purely military advice and real agreements on the implementation of strategy, planning and forces." 

399 Quoted in Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 395.

400 Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, 11 April 1953 (printed for use of the Committee on Armed Services, 83rd Congress, 1st Session), 4.

401 New York Times, 23 April 1953, 16; for a further discussion of Eisenhower's traditionalism see Chapter VII, The Joint Chiefs' Own Perceived Role.

Given this general outlook by the President, the real intention of Wilson's directive seems a bit confusing. I would suggest that it was an effort to get the Chiefs to leave their service parochialism behind and take a broader perspective. Admiral Radford's observation, "these damn so and so's, why can't they look at the broad picture," seems to support the contention that the Chiefs were viewed as being overly narrow in their outlook. Forcing the Chiefs to take such a broad perspective had inherent advantages. If the Chiefs could be forced to take the same perspective as the administration, then it was probable that the Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as the administration on strategic and economic matters. If that occurred, it could also be anticipated that all the Chiefs would support the "New Look" proposals. This hypothesis seems to be supported by General Maxwell Taylor's recollection that the Chiefs were told to consider the views of their superiors and not submit contentious recommendations. Thus the directive's issuance shortly after the administration's first year in office may well have been one effort to achieve unanimity. This approach only differs in degree from Truman's demand for unanimity on the part of his Chiefs. Truman allowed the Chiefs to differ with the administration prior to

403 Griffin, Oral History, 343.

the final decision. It was only after the decision had been reached that the administration sought to enforce loyalty. One can argue that the creation of the chairmanship was a definite move by the Truman administration to require the Chiefs to consider the views of their civilian superiors prior to their giving official advice, this had been one of Leahy's main functions during the war, but that approach was never institutionalized afterwards in the form of a directive until the Eisenhower administration.

A second method of guaranteeing that the team concept permeated the Joint Chiefs was to demand that they submit unified positions. This was what the President meant when he said "real agreements on the implementation of strategy, planning and forces." He specifically forbade the Chiefs to send split decisions forward, apparently believing that the elimination of split decisions would also eliminate inter-service rivalry. Unfortunately, this demand merely increased the Chiefs' natural inclination to compromise. As Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961, pointed out, "if you compromise, you compromise to get something that is not very good." However, the motivation of the President went further than merely the elimination of service rivalries; it was aimed at the idea of the

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405 Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 53-56.

406 Ibid.
responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supply military advice. The President accurately understood that when the Chiefs split on an issue, the decision was thrust up one level higher in the bureaucracy—in this case to the civilian Secretary of Defense. With the experts split, the Secretary can make any decision he wants, and the Chiefs have effectively taken themselves out of the decision making process. Moreover, it is probable that the Secretary will make the decision from a position of relative ignorance, because he has no other "military" experts to advise him. This was the position that Forrestal found himself in prior to 1949.

Admiral Burke recalled that the President was afraid that if the Chiefs could not make up their minds "somebody else will make theirs up who doesn't know as much about the military requirements as the Chiefs do." 407

Responsibility, though, was only part of Eisenhower's rationale for unanimity. Implicitly, the idea of being a member of the team was foremost in the President's mind. Like Truman, the importance of loyalty was also very prevalent, but for different reasons. His military experience left an indelible impression upon him as to the proper mode of decision making and the relationship of the commander to his staff. There is little doubt that the President perceived the Joint Chiefs as his, the Commander-in-Chief's, military

407 Ibid.
staff. This would explain his expectation of loyalty. This was pointed out by Secretary McElroy when he said, "they [the JCS] should have their opportunity to say to the President what they think...," but once the decision has been made then all discussion must cease.\textsuperscript{408} The cessation of discussion did not simply mean compliance through silence, but whole-hearted support for the program. Any form of dissent was not only dysfunctional, but disloyal as well. It followed from this that when there were differences of opinion within the Defense Department team, those differences should remain within the confines of the team and not be publicized. This included the Chiefs' requirement to go before Congressional Committees, which usually resulted in bringing any differences out into the open. This was a phenomenon that Eisenhower characteristically labeled "legalized insubordination." Secretary McElroy expressed the administration's dislike for this form of legislative appeal, when he said, "the right is contrary to the normal relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of the government, it creates a divisive situation not found in any other executive department."\textsuperscript{409}

\textsuperscript{408}Neil McElroy, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 84-85.

Eisenhower had never liked the existence of this type of appeal arrangement and had noted so in his 1948 memorandum. Later when he became President its continued existence countered his idea of a defense team making policy in unity. In an effort to halt such "insubordination" he ordered that differences within the defense team should not be made public, even to Congress. As he once told Admiral Burke, "once I approve a budget I don't want you people [the Chiefs] going up there [to Congress] and undercutting my budget." He never did understand why the Chiefs could not simply acknowledge support for the President's program without allowing the differences to surface. His dislike for such "legalized insubordination" was such that he even considered legislation that would have negated the Chiefs' requirement to go before Congress.

410 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ferdinand Eberstadt, 20 September 1948, 1916-1952 File, box 34, folder "Eberstadt," Eisenhower Library. Specifically Eisenhower wrote "what is important under this point is the practice of the separate services going individually to Congressional Committees. Until we get firmly established the intent of Congress to act, in matters of basic legislation and the budget, on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to any partisan recommendations of any of the Services, trouble is bound to exist."

411 Burke, Oral History, 53-56.


413 Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 109.
Another method by which the administration sought to achieve unanimity was through the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointment process. In his 1949 memorandum Eisenhower had recommended to President Truman that he use such a process to facilitate unification:

While the Law of 1947 was expected to relieve the President of the necessity of giving personal attention to the details of national security problems, yet we are now facing, not a detail of organization, but the problem of energizing the whole system so that it will start to move effectively. In my opinion, this cannot now be done without a certain amount of Presidential intervention, for the reason that inter-service struggles have been carried to the point where only the official who has the appointive and assignment power can sufficiently emphasize his and your determination to secure teamwork. 414

By the time Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the attacks upon the Joint Chiefs by the Republican leadership had reached such proportions that it was doubtful that the new President could have kept the incumbents in office even if he had wanted to. 415 As luck would have it, three of the four Chiefs, Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg, were completing their four year term that summer; and the remaining Chief,

414 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 February 1949, 1916-1952 File, box 38 folder "Forrestal (2)," Eisenhower Library (referred hereafter as 1949 Memorandum). Eisenhower selected his cabinet in much the same manner, he even did it without senatorial courtesy under the assumption that a staff should be loyal members of his administration, individuals that he could work with, and that he was the only one who should make the final decision; see Adams, First Hand Report, 59.

415 Aside from the pressure from the Republicans, Secretary designee Wilson also wanted a new team of Chiefs; New York Times, 13 May 1953, 1; Newsweek, 25 May 1953.
Admiral Fechteler, would complete his first two year term during the same time period. Thus the opportunity presented itself to change completely the membership of the JCS.

In selecting the new Chiefs the President appears to have used three criteria. First, the new Chiefs had to have greater global perspective than their predecessors. If nothing else the incumbents were primarily European in orientation; while the Republicans perceived Asia as a focal point for American policy.416 Secondly, the nominee had to be acceptable to key members of the administration and to the Republican Party leadership. This criterion was based on political reality and the President's notion of the staff model. Finally, the President desired to have loyal Chiefs, who not only had a global perspective, but who would work effectively in the joint arena. His 1949 recommendation that "joint work take precedence over any personal or individual service matter,"417 encapsulated his ideas on the subject. With these three criteria as a gauge the selection process began.

The four officers whom the President nominated for membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Arthur


417 1949 Memorandum.
Radford as Chairman, and General Matthew Ridgway, General Nathan Twining, and Admiral Robert Carney as Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of Naval Operations, respectively. Each brought with him a wealth of military experience in different theaters of operations, and all had commanded one of the unified commands, which theoretically better prepared them for their joint duties. 418

The new Chairman was Admiral Arthur W. Radford, a central figure in the "Revolt of the Admirals" and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific. His previous record of service parochialism would appear to have removed him from contention. In fact, while Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, he had such a dislike for Radford that he told Admiral Nimitz that if he "brings along that so-and-so Radford" again to a JCS meeting he, Eisenhower, would refuse to attend. 419 But the President's personal feelings were mitigated by the fact that Radford fit all the administration's criteria. His experience in the Pacific, as well as his strategic outlook, was totally compatible with the Republican's asian orientation and the doctrine of massive retaliation. As John Donovan noted:


His view was that American military power was overextended, with too many forces committed, notably in Asia, to positions in which the Communists could pin them down. Instead of such scattered deployment, Radford favored concentrating American power in a strategic reserve in or near North America. Under this arrangement the main reliance for holding the front lines would rest on the indigenous forces being built up in non-communist countries, while the mobile power of the United States remained poised.  

Such strategic thinking made Radford completely acceptable to the Republican leadership, especially Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who was becoming very sympathetic to the notion that air and sea power could replace American ground forces. Taft even suggested that the new Chiefs be appointed immediately so that they could begin their reappraisal of American strategic posture before they officially took over. After the administration's bitter fight over the confirmation of Secretary of Labor, the desires of the Ohio Senator were taken very much into consideration. When the final list of nominees for the Joint Chiefs was decided upon it was given to Taft for his approval. In regard to the selection of

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424 Donovan, Inside Story, 325.
Radford, Taft said "I am glad to have for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a man who has said we are capable of fighting an aggressive war in the Pacific." 425

While it was undoubtedly the Republican connection that made Radford attractive for the chairmanship, it was Secretary of Defense nominee Wilson who guaranteed his nomination. Eisenhower's commitment to the staff model meant that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be totally acceptable to Mr. Wilson, since they were his military advisors as well as the President's. 426 During Eisenhower's pre-inaugural trip to Korea, he and Wilson met with Radford aboard his flagship, the U.S.S. Helena. 427 Both men were very impressed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and as soon as Admiral Radford had repented for his earlier transgressions against unification the way was paved for his nomination. 428


427 Admiral Fechteler claims that he arranged the Helena meeting and that Eisenhower had not planned to meet Radford. Fechteler, Oral History, 117.

428 Adams, First Hand Report, 403-4. See Wilson's letter to Eisenhower recommending Radford for the Chairmanship, 12 May 1953, Central File/Official File, box 100, folder "OF 3G-JCS, 5 January-March 1955," Eisenhower Library. Also see Life magazine, 25 May 1953; Life correspondent Richard MacMillan reported that the key point was Radford's presentation during a dinner on Iwo Jima, on the Asian
The rest of Eisenhower's new Chiefs were all equally acceptable under the various criteria that the administration established. All had vast experience as unified commanders—Ridgway as the United Nations Commander in Korea and then as Eisenhower's own successor as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Twining was Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, and Carney was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCAFSOUTH). Carney, in particular, had Eisenhower's respect, having gone with him to Europe, in 1951, as his deputy and having been given the Mediterranean command by Eisenhower shortly before the General retired to run for the Presidency. While Carney was CINCAFSOUTH he began to embrace the strategic ideas that would eventually be the basis for the New Look. Until Radford's name was announced as the new Chairman, Carney was considered the leading candidate. Eisenhower may well have promised the job to him, only to find out that Wilson wanted Radford. Thus the only compensation the President could offer Carney was that of Chief of Naval Operations. In due course Carney was nominated situation. Secretary Wilson was deeply impressed and Radford was asked to accompany the group to Korea. According to MacMillan, Eisenhower asked his aide, "Is there room on our airplane for Admiral Radford?" "No Sir," was the response. Eisenhower then said "then see who can be left behind."


430 Fechteler, Oral History, 124.
for CNO and the incumbent, Admiral Fechteler, replaced him in the Mediterranean command.

General Ridgway's selection as Army Chief of Staff was by no means as clear cut as Carney's selection for Chief of Naval Operations. Aside from Ridgway, the two other officers considered to have the best chance to be Collins' successor were General Mark Clark, the United Nations Commander in Korea, and General Alfred Gruenther, Ridgway's own Chief of Staff in Europe. Clark's name was also prominently mentioned as a possible Chairman, but his appointment for any position was opposed by Texas Republicans. Their opposition to Clark stemmed from the annihilation of the 36th Infantry Division during the crossing of the Rapido River during the Italian Campaign. The 36th was a Texas National Guard Division, and the Texans blamed Clark who, as 5th Army Commander, ordered the attack. Given the importance of the Texas delegation at the Republican Convention it is not surprising that Clark was passed over. General Gruenther's non-selection is a far different and more complicated matter. Undoubtedly, one of the most


capable officers in the Army, he had been the first Director of the Joint Staff and had gone with Eisenhower to Europe in 1951 as his Chief of Staff. He continued in that capacity when Ridgway succeeded Eisenhower in 1952. Ridgway's own appointment to SACEUR is clouded by the rumor that the State Department wanted him out of Tokyo while the Japanese Peace Treaty was being negotiated. If that is true, then what does one do with a successful army commander? Gruenther, was unquestionably very qualified to succeed Eisenhower in Europe, but his identification with his former commander resulted in disfavor among Democrats. I would suggest that a temporary solution may have been found with the appointment of Ridgway to SACEUR. Eisenhower still considered Gruenther "the best qualified man in the service of the United States for the post," and may well have seen the nomination of Ridgway to Chief of Staff as a means of elevating Gruenther to the post of the NATO commander, which he did upon Ridgway's return to Washington.

The final member of Eisenhower's new team of Chiefs was Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan S. Twining. His selection appears to be free of the political machinations that proceeded the selections of Carney, Ridgway, and Radford.


435 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 449.
Twining had been Air Force Vice Chief of Staff since 1950 and was acting Chief of Staff during the last months of the Truman administration due to Vandenberg's ill health. Despite his presence on the JCS, he seems to have escaped unscathed from the political controversy that surrounded the Joint Chiefs. He was even considered a non-controversial figure within the Air Force and managed to avoid the intra-service conflicts of the period. Despite his low profile, there is little doubt that the Air Force was sympathetic to the new administration's strategic outlook. All of these factors seem to have combined to gain the favor of Secretary Wilson and Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott.

In the final analysis the "new" Chiefs were selected because they fit the administration's criteria of joint experience, global outlook and acceptability. It was only natural that such a wholesale replacement of the Joint Chiefs would raise cries of politicization of the military. Admiral Fechteler later charged that the "Eisenhower administration deliberately injected the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the political arena," but one must place this action in

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437 New York Times, 29 April 1953, 13. Twining's only possible competitor was General Loris Norstadt who at this time was assigned in Europe where he would eventually succeed Gruenther as the Supreme Allied Commander.

438 Fechteler, Oral History, 124.
the context of the historical evolution of the JCS as an institution. President Truman had moved away from routine professional appointments after 1949 as one component of his program to create greater unanimity among the Chiefs; the other component being the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. During Eisenhower's tour as acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he had also emphasized the need for unanimity, so it was only natural that as President he would use whatever means were at his disposal to eliminate dysfunctional competition. The President's rejection of split decisions, the demand that the Chiefs take into account their superiors' views, and the administration's selection criteria were all part of the President's program to implement the unanimity that he desired. In 1953, it was merely a difference in degree, not in intent. In this regard former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup recalled:

....both Ike and succeeding Presidents have always felt that they wanted to appoint the Chief of service for a period of two years. In that way, they would get a chance to take a look at them and throw them out on the street if they didn't like them and get somebody else in their own administration.439

During the Eisenhower administration one does not find examples of the dramatic firing of a Chief as in the case of Denfeld; instead the President carefully examined his options before renominating an incumbent. By 1955, two

of the "new" Chiefs, Carney and Ridgway, had failed their first two year loyalty test. Admiral Carney's transgressions were three in number. First, he was not getting along with the Secretary of the Navy and the Marine Corps Commandant, General Lemuel Shepherd. Second, at times he sided with General Ridgway in criticizing the New Look. Finally, the Admiral made some off-the-record remarks about the likelihood of a Red Chinese invasion of the off-shore islands. Unfortunately for Carney, those remarks made their way into the press, causing the administration considerable embarrassment. According to former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Carney was removed because of his problems with Navy's civilian leadership and the China speech. As Gates put it, "the question of his loyalty to the administration was involved."

Ridgway, on the other hand, had a history of opposition to the administration's programs. In 1958 the President was reported to have remarked to Representative John McCormick that "I have never been rough with a service Chief of Staff, with the possible exception of one man whom I told, when he served out his time, that his usefulness was

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440 New York Times, 1 June 1955, 16; also see Adams, First Hand Report, 133 and Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 478, for a further discussion of Carney's remarks and their impact.

Since the only two Chiefs the President failed to renominate were Ridgway and Carney he probably had to be referring to one of them. Sherman Adams reports that the conflict between the President and the Army Chief of Staff "had personal overtones to it." Adams goes on to recall that "Ridgway had been the President's successor in the command of NATO forces and Eisenhower's comments about Ridgway's service in that assignment had been less than glowing." If that is true, then why did not Eisenhower simply fire Ridgway, or even Carney, for their obvious disloyal actions? The answer is Presidential style:

Before I [Sherman Adams] worked for him, I assumed Eisenhower would be a hard taskmaster. He did have a penchant for orderly thinking and procedures and particularly, for careful follow-through on his assignments. But he seldom called anybody down when he was displeased with his work and I never knew him to punish anybody. When General Matthew Ridgway split with him on the question of armed forces manpower levels and when General Maxwell Taylor questioned the government's anti-missile program, the President was deeply embarrassed but did little more than provide for the early retirement of these officers.

In order to replace Carney, Ridgway, and all subsequent Chiefs, the Eisenhower administration used to varying degree the same careful methodology that it had used in 1953. The criteria used in selecting the "new" Chiefs had not only

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442 Adams, First Hand Report, 421.

443 Ibid., 399-400.

444 Ibid., 27. Adams is wrong about Taylor. He retired after a second term as Chief of Staff.
remained valid, but the requirement to have a joint outlook had increased in importance. The one criterion that seems to have diminished in importance, if not completely disappeared, was the requirement to be accepted by the Republican Party leadership. Whether this was the result of the President's increased confidence, the death of Robert Taft, or the decline in the power of Senator Joseph McCarthy is difficult to say, but it did cease to be an important ingredient in the selection process. Replacing it as the most important criterion was being a loyal team player.

Robert Carney's successor as Chief of Naval Operations was the only two star flag officer ever appointed to the Joint Chiefs, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. (31 Knot) Burke. Burke's nickname, acquired during the Second World War, reflected the drive and intensity of this officer. Despite his ability and high standing within the service, his junior rank and earlier involvement in the "Revolt of the Admirals" probably would have excluded him from

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Burke received his nickname while commanding Destroyer Squadron 23, the "Little Beavers," during the Solomons campaign. During one particular action he radioed ahead to some transports to stand aside "I'm coming through at 31 knots." Admiral Halsey then gave him that nickname. During the "Revolt of the Admirals" Captain Burke was a special assistant to Denfeld and head of the Organizational Research and Policy Division, known as OP-23. Its purpose was to prepare the Navy's case for the hearings. As a result of his activities, Burke's name was removed from the promotion list to Rear Admiral, until pressures from House Republicans got it reinstated.
consideration if he had not been supported by the Navy's civilian leadership. 446

Matthew Ridgway's successor, Maxwell D. Taylor, had a brilliant combat record, was a charter member of the "airborne club," commander of the 101st Airborne Division, and later commander of the 8th Army. Subsequently, he was given command of all United Nations Forces in Korea. Aside from his combat commands, Taylor had been the Superintendent of West Point, the Commandant of Berlin, and the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Taylor was obviously well qualified for the position of Chief of Staff, but appointments to the JCS had ceased to be of the routine-professional variety since 1949. Despite Eisenhower's efforts to eliminate inter-service fighting through the selection process, it continued to plague his administration. Ridgway had been the key source of disharmony by his attacks upon the administration's New Look proposals.

In essence the administration's New Look posture was based upon a reevaluation of American military capabilities and commitments. This evaluation in turn was based upon certain assumptions as to the nature of the threat. In the first place, the administration believed that the possibility of economic destruction, through overspending, was as

dangerous as the military threat itself. Thus the Republicans sought to balance the budget, which meant that military appropriations had to be cut or at least not substantially increased. Secondly, the administration rejected the hypothesis that there was a year of maximum danger in which the United States must prepare to repel a Russian attack. Instead the President felt that the nation must prepare for a long period of potential danger, and that instead of maximizing expenditures in response to the year of maximum danger, the nation should spread its military expenditures out over the "long haul." Finally, the administration perceived that there were certain lessons to be learned from the Korean War. Most noticeable was that such a war was extremely expensive in terms of money, manpower, and domestic politics. The kind of mid-range war in the third world that Korea represented must be avoided because it drained the nation's military strength and detracted from its primary missions, the defense of the Continental United States and Europe. Instead, indigenous populations would supply the ground combat power for such future wars, while the United States supplied high technology and if necessary nuclear firepower. Technology would be a substitute for manpower both in the third world and in Europe. Under this "bigger-bang for the buck" philosophy the Army found itself at a disadvantage in competing for resources with the Air Force and the Navy. As a result the Army was continually
cut in size during this period, primarily due to fiscal restraints and the lack of a mission.

Whether Ridgway's attacks were motivated by service parochialism or patriotic fear of the weaknesses of the strategy, the results were the same perceived dysfunctional behavior. The President may well have felt that he had made a mistake by selecting Ridgway and he was not going to let it happen again. With this in mind, prior to his nomination, General Taylor was recalled from the Far East for an interview with the President and Secretary Wilson. This process was not unfamiliar to Taylor, who had been interviewed in 1953 prior to his original assignment to command the 8th Army. At that time the discussion was conducted in the shadow of the Truman-MacArthur controversy and had concentrated on Taylor's willingness to carry out his civilian leaders' directives and follow the prevailing defensive strategy. After that experience General Taylor wrote, "having apparently passed the tests in Washington, I departed for the Far East." 447

The issues were now much broader than whether General Taylor was going to be a loyal theater commander. The selection of the right Chief of Staff was as important to the Army as it was for the administration. The Eisenhower-

Ridgway conflict had created a deep rift between the Commander-in-Chief and his former service. It would be up to the new Chief of Staff to bridge that gap. Taylor's own recollection of the interview was as follows:

During the two years as Chief of Staff, General Ridgway had had a very difficult time in the atmosphere of the new administration with its commitment to the strategy of massive retaliation. Although I admired his staunch opposition to this strategic fallacy and doubted that my attitude would be significantly different from his, I had no difficulty with the questions addressed to me by the President and Wilson. Oddly, they were not interested in my views on world strategy, but wished to be assured of my willingness to accept and carry out the orders of my civilian superiors....

The President's lack of interest in General Taylor's strategic views is not all that surprising when one goes into a detailed analysis of the contents of the interview. The memorandum for record written afterwards reveals that the President wanted more than mere assurances that Taylor's Constitutional oath would be kept. First, Taylor was told that he had to "understand and wholeheartedly accept that his primary responsibility related to his joint duties." Second, his strategic views must be "in accord with those of the President." Finally, the President informed him that "loyalty in spirit as well as letter was necessary."
These precepts reflected the President's efforts to institutionalize the ideas he had been advocating since 1948. In his 1949 memorandum to Forrestal, Eisenhower felt that loyalty should be required "both as to letter and to spirit." Admiral Burke recalled a series of meetings with the President, shortly before he assumed the office of Chief of Naval Operations, in which the President emphasized the Chief's joint responsibilities and he told Burke that his primary job as a Chief was not to present the Navy's point of view, but to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

While loyalty was by no means a new requirement for a Chief, concurrence with the administration's strategic view was. Previously, the Chiefs were required to support the administration's position after it had been decided upon; now that would be obviated by the fact that both the administration and the Chiefs approached strategic problems from a mutually agreed upon perspective. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that Eisenhower was unconcerned about Taylor's strategic views, because he expected them to be the same as his. The unanimity the President sought would finally be achieved, but the penalty would
be the Chief's objectivity. It was explicit, as Hanson Baldwin suggested, that the Chiefs maintain the party line in order to keep their jobs.⁴⁵² One is reminded of Admiral Carney's admonition to General Taylor upon the latter's assumption of office, "You're one of the good new Chiefs now but you'll be surprised how soon you become one of the bad old Chiefs."⁴⁵³

Loyalty continued to be a crucial prerequisite for nomination to the Joint Chiefs all through the Eisenhower period. When General Taylor retired after two terms in office his Vice-Chief, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, succeeded him. Lemnitzer was almost 60 years old at the time of his appointment and was the oldest man ever to be nominated for the JCS. A very effective officer who had built a reputation as a planner, Lemnitzer had held numerous high level assignments to include the Far East command in the wake of Ridgway and Taylor. Furthermore, his background indicated a broad joint outlook. As one Pentagon insider noted:

Lemnitzer isn't a yes-man, but you won't see him bucking Ike on policy. He will present his requirements effectively, but he'll accept higher decisions as the final word. He's a team worker all the way.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵² New York Times, 1 June 1955, 16.
⁴⁵³ Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 171.
⁴⁵⁴ Newsweek, 30 March 1959, 25.
In 1960 when Lemnitzer was promoted to the chairmanship, his Vice-Chief, General George Decker was nominated Chief of Staff of the Army. Decker's whole career appears to be an anomaly. An ROTC product who fought in the Pacific during the Second World War, Decker made his fame primarily as a logistics and fiscal specialist rather than as a troop commander, although he did have the appropriate troop commands, which included succeeding Lemnitzer in the Far East. Later when Lemnitzer became Chief, Decker moved to Washington as Vice-Chief. Decker was a classic case of the competent journeyman officer who methodically punched all the right tickets and moved up through the hierarchy. He was not a member of the "airborne club," nor was he a Marshall protege, an apparent requirement for all the preceding postwar Chiefs of Staff of the Army. The only other Chief to be appointed during the remainder of the Eisenhower administration was Air Force General Thomas White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force when General Twining became Chairman in 1957.

In the case of both White and Decker the administration appears to have reverted to something along the line of a routine-professional appointment. Part of the reason may lie in the fact that both officers were Vice-Chiefs. This position allowed the administration the advantage of seeing them in operation before nominating them. Secondly, there

appears to have been a lessening of tension between the Army and the administration during Lemnitzer's tour as Chief. While the President was obviously very careful in the selection of Taylor following on the heels of Ridgway, the relatively good experience with Lemnitzer may have paved the way for Decker. On the other hand, the Air Force, which gained the most from the New Look posture, was not a problem during this period, thus making White's promotion even more natural.

While loyalty was important for a member of the Joint Chiefs, it was absolutely essential for the Chairman. This perspective was not unique to the Eisenhower presidency. Bradley showed great loyalty to the Truman administration, even to the point of risking his own professionalism. Eisenhower expected his Chairmen to make sure that the JCS not only considered the problems that were brought to their attention, but that he should insure that the Chiefs "reach, whenever possible, joint conclusions and recommendations." Furthermore, it would be up to the Chairman to make sure that the Secretary was provided with sufficient information to make a decision if the Chiefs split on an issue. 456

While Admiral Radford personified these expectations, they generally applied to all the Chairmen after 1949. As the power of the Chairman increased, it became apparent that

456 1949 Memorandum.
he was the administration's man within the Joint Chiefs.\textsuperscript{457} Since the Chairman had no service constituency to worry about, unlike the other members of the JCS, he could play the role of the civilian leadership's front man. During his nomination hearing Admiral Radford pointed out that "...the Chairman, as an individual, is expected to divorce himself completely from any service affiliation. He is supposed to be a member of the defense team under the Secretary of Defense." \textsuperscript{458}

The requirement to be above service interest is essential if the Chairman is to represent the administration before the Chiefs. Furthermore, it supported Eisenhower's view of the primacy of the Chiefs' joint orientation. But this requirement brought about some strange transformations as indicated by the following testimony by General Lemnitzer:

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I would have no service affiliation, Senator. I would deal with all the services in exactly the same way and apply my best judgement to the problems as they arise.

As Chief of the Army and throughout my service, I have been an ardent advocate of the role of the Army and the importance of the mission of the Army and naturally I still feel that way today.

But as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would not

\textsuperscript{457} For a further discussion of this relationship see Peter F. Witteried, "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: An Evolving Institution," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1964.

\textsuperscript{458} \textit{Hearings Nomination}, 1953, 5.
advocate any one service position over any other service position. I would like to make that clear. General Lemnitzer's testimony reflects the transformation that must occur within an officer when he ceases being a service spokesman and becomes a neutral Chairman. It may be suggested, though, that such a sudden change is only a matter of self-delusion and that it would be impossible for the Chairman to forget the values he had acquired over a whole career. Despite this problem, the Chairman must attempt to maintain at least the facade of neutrality in order to expedite his relations with the other Chiefs.

With loyalty and joint orientation the prime requisites, the President selected his Chairman with the same care that went into the selection of the Chiefs. The chairmanship was first filled by Radford who was followed successively by Twining and then Lemnitzer. The fact the chairmanship rotated among the services was more of an accident than a plan. As the President recalled in his memoirs:

I had not felt any strong obligation to adhere to any unwritten understanding that the position of Chairman be rotated among the services--Army, Navy, Air--but I felt that such rotation, all other things being equal, was desirable. Happily, I felt that each individual appointed

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459 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Nomination of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for Appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General George Henry Decker for Appointment as Chief of Staff, United States Army, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, p. 12.
during my administrations to the Chairman's position—Radford, Twining, and Lemnitzer—was the best qualified men available in any of the services. 460

What was left unsaid by the President was that all of his Chairman were loyal team players. Twining was the only one of the original service Chiefs to be renominated in 1955, which alone is convincing evidence of his loyalty. The Air Force was hurt least by the administration's New Look proposals, thus Twining did not have to fight for his service like Ridgway did. Furthermore, Twining's anti-communist attitudes paralleled those of Radford. In 1960 when illness forced him to retire, the President appointed General Lemnitzer to succeed him. The same qualifications that made Lemnitzer a desirable Chief of Staff held him in good stead for the Chairman's position. He had a relatively tranquil tour as Army Chief, especially in the wake of Ridgway and Taylor; and he was a leader in promoting unity within the JCS. When asked about the differences that existed between the Chiefs during this time, he remarked that there were no substantial problems. 461 This is indicative of his emphasis on the team approach to defense matters.

Another factor that seemed to impact upon the selection of a Chairman was the correlation of his service to the

460 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 255.

prevailing strategy of the administration. During periods of
time when the administration's strategy relied most heavily
on nuclear retaliation, the Chairman was either an Air Force
or a Navy officer. The reason was that these two services
were directly involved in that mission. When the prevailing
strategy called for the introduction of ground forces as it
did during the period of flexible response, the Chairman was
an Army officer. Thus Lemnitzer's selection as Chairman not
only indicated his loyalty to Eisenhower's defense team, but
the slow movement toward the acceptance of a posture of
flexible response.462

The selection of the Chairman was important to the
administration because of the vast power that resided within
that office. Since the position was created in 1949, there
had been no substantive increase in the Chairman's power. Even
the acquisition of the right to vote was a meaningless ges-
ture, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a democracy,
but that right did symbolize the fulfillment of Forrestal's
belief that the Chairman should act as the administration's
"agent" within the Joint Chiefs or to use Maxwell Taylor's
phrase "a sort of party whip." 463

462 See Table 2 for a matrix correlating the appoint-
ment of the chairman to the national strategy.

463 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110.
### TABLE 2: CORRELATION OF SELECTION OF CJCS, SERVICE OF ORIGIN AND NATIONAL STRATEGIC POSTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Service)</th>
<th>Primary Geographic or Military Concern of the Administration</th>
<th>Administration's Strategic Posture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradley (USA)</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>F.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radford (USN)</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>M.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twining (USAF)</td>
<td>Europe/Nuclear</td>
<td>M.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemnitzer (USA)</td>
<td>Europe/Third World</td>
<td>toward F.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor (USA)</td>
<td>Asia/Third World</td>
<td>F.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler (USA)</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>F.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moorer (USN)</td>
<td>Asia/Europe/Strategic Nuclear</td>
<td>F.R.-M.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown (USAF)</td>
<td>Europe/SALT</td>
<td>M.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones (USAF)</td>
<td>Europe/SALT</td>
<td>M.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessey (USA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. F.R. refers to a flexible response type strategy, while M.R. refers to a massive retaliation type strategy.

2. During General Lemnitzer's term as Chairman the Eisenhower administration began to move in the direction of flexible response and away from the massive retaliation posture of earlier years. Lemnitzer was also the Chairman during the first two years of the Kennedy administration when flexible response became the prevailing strategy.

3. The first Nixon administration was marked by a movement away from flexible response and a return to massive retaliation. This was the basis of the so called Nixon Doctrine.

4. The Reagan Administration does not seem to be marked by a specific geographic concern, but instead a desire to meet Soviet expansionism wherever it presents itself. This includes both the nuclear and conventional arenas.
The source of the Chairman's power is two distinct, but inextricably connected, factors. The first is the fact that, for the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been managers and not military planners. Secretary Wilson, in particular, came into office ignorant of defense matters. Lieutenant General James Gavin reports that one Chief of Staff described him as "the most uninformed man and the most determined to remain so that has ever been Secretary." 464

The second factor is the nature of the bureaucratic system. Since the Chairman is the Secretary's primary advisor on defense matters, the Secretary's inexperience will naturally force him to rely upon the Chairman for advice. This natural tendency is exacerbated by conflicting opinions among the Chiefs. As Admiral Radford noted before Congress:

I think the responsibility and the authority of the Chairman is greater than appears in law. I have often pointed out to the Chiefs that the more they disagree the more power they hand to the Chairman. 465

In a case of a split decision, the Chairman is in a position to articulate his views to the Secretary or the President, either personally or through a written memorandum.

464 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, 155.

465 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Study of Air Power, Hearings before the subcommittee on the Air Force, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, 1457.
The latter was the style of Admiral Radford.\textsuperscript{466} Because the Chairman is the administration's representative to the JCS, his opinion will have far greater impact than that of a single Chief. This phenomenon was observed by Robert Bowie, President Eisenhower's Special Advisor for National Security Affairs:

\ldots Admiral Radford... held a very influential position. In part the differences of opinion among the Chiefs enhanced the influence of the Chairman as spokesman for the military point of view. And since Admiral Radford attended the NSC meetings, this gave him an opportunity really to exercise that role.\textsuperscript{467}

Bowie's analysis of Radford's power validates the bureaucratic theory that power increases in proportion to a player's access to the decision maker. Eisenhower understood this clearly in 1949 when he wrote:

His [the Chairman's] mere presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the trusted assistant of the Secretary of Defense, should do much to induce, if not compel, the attainment of unanimous recommendations and conclusions.\textsuperscript{468}

This is not to say that the Chiefs did not have access to the Secretary of Defense or to the President. On the contrary, the Chiefs apparently had all the access they wanted, though some by virtue of their commitment to vertical loyalty

\textsuperscript{466} Taylor, \textit{Uncertain Trumpet}, 106.

\textsuperscript{467} Robert Bowie, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 10.

\textsuperscript{468} 1949 Memorandum.
did not avail themselves of this opportunity as much as others. 469 In the end though, it was the constant and institutionalized contact that gave the Chairman the advantage. Radford, himself, pointed out to the President that because the Chairman sees the President and the Secretary of Defense regularly, he generally has a "closer association with these officials than the other Chiefs." 470

This combination of factors led the Chairman to become the administration's "party whip." He was in a position not only to attempt to achieve unanimity, but to enforce it, by virtue of his "clout" with the administration. In his book The Uncertain Trumpet, General Taylor described how the Chairman's position prevailed in 18 out of 21 split decisions sent forward to the Secretary of Defense. 471 Clark and Legere, in their study of national security management, suggest that the increasing power of the Chairman was only partially attributable to the desires of the civilian

469 During the private interviews both Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer said they had as much access to the President as they desired. General Decker, while admitting that he had access felt that he should not go directly to the President, especially to fight for an issue that had already been decided upon by the Secretary of Defense.


471 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110.
leadership, but that the Chiefs were also to blame by deferring power to the Chairman. The historical evidence seems to indicate that the Chiefs had no real choice in the matter and that the gravitation of power into the hands of the Chairman was the result of civilian directives and bureaucratic realities. Granted some Chairmen have been more even handed in their use of power than others, but this evaluation appears to depend on whose ox is being gored. We have very little data on whether or not the Chairmen have truly divested themselves of their service affiliation, though Taylor supplies us with some evidence that indicates that the Chairmen tended to support their service of origin. Unfortunately, since Taylor's data only covers the 1955-1959 period more research is needed in order to develop any hypothesis.


473 Navy officers familiar with the working of Admiral Radford maintain that he was more than fair and that he was, if anything, tougher on the Navy than on the other services; Burke, interview; Griffin, Oral History. Admiral George Anderson who was Radford's special assistant, feels that Radford was exactly what the Chairman was supposed to be, Anderson, interview. For the opposite view see Gavin, War and Peace, 260-61 or Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 106-110.

474 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 107.
Ironically, the unanimity the President sought came about toward the end of his administration through the return to a more pluralistic JCS. The vehicle for this transformation was a 29 December 1959 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This document, called the Gates-JCS Memorandum announced that the Secretary of Defense would attend all JCS meetings in which split issues were being discussed. It rejected the notion that all differences of opinion within the Joint Chiefs were necessarily dysfunctional and considered instead that many of them were "understandable." Unanimity, for the sake of unanimity was rejected. Gates discovered that attending JCS meetings was so advantageous that he institutionalized weekly meetings. He thus was the first Secretary of Defense to meet with the Joint Chiefs on a regular basis. This resulted in far less tension between the administration and the Joint Chiefs, and less dramatic public displays of disunity. Gates had vast experience in the Department of Defense, at both the OSD level and within the services. This apparently gave him confidence that he could make the hard decisions within a pluralistic environment. As such, he approached the Chiefs, not as competitors as Wilson had, but more like partners. He attempted to maintain the image of the honest broker, and he

fully understood the pressures that were playing on the Chiefs:

I saw to it that everyone, particularly the Chiefs, had their innings. They have leadership problems of their own. They cannot afford to lose face with their own people. It's worth taking the time to listen before you do something, even when you know at the onset what you are going to do.\(^{476}\)

In the final analysis the role the Eisenhower administration envisioned for the JCS was surprisingly congruent with the role envisioned by its predecessor. Eisenhower, like Truman before him, sought unanimity among the Chiefs in order to facilitate the decision making process; and like Forrestal, came to look upon the Chairman as a means of expediting this unanimity. The reason for the requirement for unanimity was several fold. First, it was perceived to be the key to eliminating inter-service conflicts. Secondly, because senior civilian defense managers did not have the expertise to choose rationally between alternative advice, it was felt that a consensus JCS position was better than a pluralistic one. Eisenhower, in particular, was aware of the dangers inherent in allowing the non-experts free reign over defense matters. Finally, unanimity was a political asset, especially in the administration's dealings with Congress. Thus in terms of the Chiefs' external input into the policy process, both administrations wanted unified military advice.

\(^{476}\) Quoted in Borklund, *The Department of Defense*, 118.
The notion of unanimity among the Chiefs led directly to the question of how it would be imposed. After 1948 both Truman and Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs should be in total concurrence with the administration's position on defense matters. The only difference was the degree concurrence would be forced. Since allowing the Chiefs to generate their own positions had only spawned more divisiveness, the easy solution was to make the major decisions at the top. This guaranteed the integrity of the defense team, a concept that was prevalent among the civilian leadership all through the period of our study. By a strange kind of irresponsible logic it was assumed that the administration's position on defense matters was the best possible position, simply because it was not distorted by service parochialism. The result was the belief, that if the Chiefs could rise above their service interests, they would see the correctness of the administration's approach. This was what President Truman meant when he called for "Objective Agreements--A true meeting of professional minds" and what President Eisenhower was attempting to achieve by requiring that the Chiefs incorporate "non-military" factors. President Eisenhower's directive that the Chiefs consider the views of their superiors encapsulated this notion of democratic centralism that was accepted by both administrations.
In order to achieve this unanimity of ideas two vehicles were used. The first was the centralization of power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. The latter was the crucial means by which the Chiefs were forced into unanimity. The second vehicle was the selection of the Chiefs themselves. At about the same time that Truman and Eisenhower came to the conclusion that centralization and unanimity were important, the selection of Chiefs changed from the "Routine-Professional" model to the "Professional-Political" model. Aside from this transformation it is difficult to identify any clear cut pattern in the selection process. Truman had the luxury of maintaining the "Routine-Professional" model during most of his administration. The only major exception was the selection of the Chief of Naval Operations, where loyalty to the concept of unification was paramount. Eisenhower seems to have been primarily concerned with selecting Chiefs who were loyal team players. Despite this requirement, Eisenhower never did move in the direction of a purely political appointment. Even Admiral Radford, who was undoubtedly the most political of his Chiefs, was still a very senior four star admiral and held probably the most important field command in the Navy. Furthermore, the President's prior experience with the military staff model led him simply to assume that loyalty would automatically be forthcoming from the members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff—whom he believed were his staff. The establishment of this commander-staff relationship was the heart of Eisenhower's 1958 reforms.

It was in the external role of the Chiefs that the Republicans differed fundamentally from their Democratic predecessors. While the political realities in Washington had forced Truman to use the Chiefs to rationalize his policies, Eisenhower sought only internal concurrence from the Chiefs. Although his familiarity with the military staff model led him to expect vertical loyalty from his Chiefs which translated into public concurrence with the administration's policies, he did not seek the kind of overt advocacy that Bradley was involved in. To have done so would have been a violation of the military ethic that the President, as a former professional soldier, adhered to.

Ironically, the more the civilian defense managers subordinated the Chiefs to the administration's views the more they destroyed any chance for the professional military to show responsibility. One can appreciate the civilian leadership's perspective on the issue. Their experience had shown that the Chiefs were incapable of fulfilling their advisory role. Instead of unified and usable advice which could guide the civilian leadership, they received split decisions, fostered by service parochialism; diluted, "waffled," and "paperclipped" position papers; and useless
exaggerated demands that were politically or economically impracticable. From the civilian's viewpoint the Chiefs had excluded themselves from the decision making process. This was why Eisenhower so desperately wanted the Chiefs to show unanimity. Unfortunately, in his desire to make the Chiefs a responsible and integral part of the defense team, he was destroying the very independence which was the basis of objective advice. Making the Chiefs into a series of "yes" men removed a vital source of expertise that was an essential part of the policy process.

Part of the problem was an inability on the part of the civilian leadership to understand what the real source of the trouble was. They kept looking for organizational solutions to an organizational problem, when in fact the problem was not completely organizational. A great deal of the trouble lay in the Chiefs own interpretation of what their role was to be and how they should act as professionals. If the organizational structure of the national security policy making system and the nature of the bureaucracy outlined two of the parameters within which the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs defined their relationship with each other, the civilian's perceptions of the Chiefs' proper role and the Chiefs' own self-perceptions completed the framework. With this in mind we now turn our attention to the last of these parameters, the Chiefs' self-perception of their role and their view of professionalism.
CHAPTER VII

THE JOINT CHIEFS' OWN PERCEIVED ROLE

In attempting to ascertain the Chiefs' perception of their role one must first attempt to separate their bureaucratic role from their normative ethical values. While such methodology will help supply empirical data on various perceptual components, such compartmentalization is for heuristic reasons only. In reality a Chief's bureaucratic role and his ethical norms constantly interact. The former is a result of his placement within the hierarchical structure, while the latter is a product of over thirty years of assimilated values. They become inextricably connected through the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military staff officers.

In our earlier analysis of defense organizations we noted the relationship of a Chief's bureaucratic role with his dual function as the military head of a service and a member of the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This duality was assessed by most outside analysis as the primary cause for conflict within the JCS with the separation of the Chiefs from their services deemed the solution.\(^{477}\)

The Chiefs, however, perceive this duality as not only inherent within their role, but functional. The basis for this is their belief that the planning and the operational command functions should be combined in the same person. For the Chiefs, the planning function is a corollary of their corporate role and the command function is a corollary of their service role. As a group, the Chiefs have a great fear of "ivory tower" planning if the plans are developed by nonresponsible staffs, who do not have to be concerned with implementing them. In a secret 1958 Joint Chiefs of Staff self-study conducted under the leadership of Major General Earl Wheeler, the following points were listed as disadvantages to be incurred if the Chiefs were separated from their services:

1. Tends to remove the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from current intimate knowledge of the capabilities of their service.

2. Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for planning and execution of joint operations without the concomitant authority and responsibility to budget for and control all the means required.

2. Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for planning and execution of joint operations without the concomitant authority and responsibility to budget for and control all the means required.

3. Would reduce the responsibility, authority and prerogatives of the Service Chiefs to the functional areas of administration, logistics and training.

Even though the report pointed out that separation would allow the Chiefs to devote full time to their JCS duties and increase their knowledge about the capabilities of other services, the Wheeler Report concluded that "the separation of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their service affiliations and command responsibilities would be unwise." While the Joint Chiefs of Staff never officially commented on the study, their private views tended to corroborate the Wheeler Report's position. The one exception was General Maxwell Taylor, who advocated separation in his book *The Uncertain Trumpet*.

A corollary to the unification of planning and command was a tendency on the part of the Chiefs to minimize the actual conflict resulting from these dual roles. Admiral Burke saw them as basically two aspects of the same role:

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478 Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization of the Department of Defense, 24 January 1958. (Hereafter referred to as the *Wheeler Report*).

How do you handle a wife and yourself, it's no more complicated than that. What would he [the Chief] represent if he didn't represent his service...the ability of a Joint Chief is dependent on his background.\textsuperscript{480}

General Lemnitzer went even further and rejected the notion that the two functions were even separable.\textsuperscript{481} While most of the Chiefs admit that the duality exists, they feel that they have reconciled any conflict to the point that one role does not impinge on the other. General Ridgway in his Farewell Report to the Secretary of Defense expressed the relationship in symbiotic terms:

As Chief of Staff, United States Army, it has been my duty to seek to maintain the capability of the Army to fulfill the Army's assigned commitments. However, both as Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it has also been my duty to advance the primary interests of United States security over and above Service interests.\textsuperscript{482}

General George Decker expressed similar views in an interview:

As service representative...I had the job of trying to get my service as much of the resources available in the National Defense kitty as I could...As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...I had the responsibility for the overall military preparedness of the country.\textsuperscript{483}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{480} Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
\item \textsuperscript{481} Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
\item \textsuperscript{482} Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 131.
\item \textsuperscript{483} Interview with General George H. Decker, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
\end{itemize}
Generals Ridgway's and Decker's explanation of responsibility to the nation is similar to our earlier discussion of General Lemnitzer's account of his transformation upon being appointed Chairman of the JCS.

The almost mystical manner in which the Chiefs look upon their command function is more than just the result of their desire to combine authority and responsibility. It is a product of the social values of the military services. Command is considered the ultimate achievement and epitomizes the true soldier. Furthermore, it is a requirement for further promotion. Among the post-World War II Chiefs only Army Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson (1964-1968), did not command at the flag rank. Command is considered so important that one Chief even took a demotion from a three star billet to a two star billet in order to command at the appropriate level. Within this atmosphere it is easy to see how a Chief, who is the senior officer in his service and its spokesman, could look upon his role as analogous to that of command. This situation is complicated by the statutory confusion that designated some service Chiefs as commanders.

484 In 1958 Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, 1961-63, reverted back to the rank of rear admiral from vice admiral in order to command Carrier Division 6. He needed command at that level in the hierarchy. See Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 60-61.
If a Chief has problems identifying his own role, the officer corps of his service has even greater difficulty understanding his role. They look toward their Chief as the defender of their interests and the head of their professional organization. He is, in their mind, their commander. Admiral Denfeld's greatest failing was that he failed as the commander in the eyes of the Navy's officer corps. The combination of bureaucratic imperatives to represent the service and socialized values lead the Chiefs to act as commanders and defend their prerogatives.

Closely related to the Chiefs' perception that their dual role is functional is a concomitant diminution of the dysfunctional nature of inter-service conflict. This is not to say that the Chiefs consider divergence of opinion to be a positive good. The Wheeler Report identified it as a potential area of deficiency. But from the Chiefs' perspective such divergence can result in a pluralistic

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485 Wheeler Report; General Bradley also realized the potential area involved in split decisions based primarily on service parochialism. In this regard he had a special study made "to document cases where individual Chiefs of Staff took positions which were obviously dictated by prejudicial Service views." The study concluded that "There will continue to be disagreement as long as: (1) There are separate Services with differing opinions on the philosophy of war, and; (2) The Chiefs of those Services are charged collectively with the function of exercising strategic direction of the Armed Forces." Memorandum for General Bradley, 16 December 1952, subject: Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder "020 JCS". National Archives.
decision making structure. Even the most critical of the former Chiefs, General Taylor, maintained "that while each Chief had unavoidably a 'cast' in favor of his service, it could not be fairly called a 'bias' and that the advantages of that 'cast' outweighed the disadvantages." General Taylor was articulating the belief that each Chief comes into office with specialized service related expertise and that this will naturally lead to differing solutions to problems. The interaction of these differences, however, can ultimately result in the best advice surfacing. Thus each Chief attempts to translate into his own terms Admiral King's adage that what is good for the Navy is good for the United States. Admiral Burke amply described the phenomenon when he said "I was responsible for doing my best with my background for the security of the United States and every Chief knew this...they were chosen because of their knowledge in a certain type of war." This expertise was the basis of Clark Clifford's advocacy of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs of Staff back in 1946. It appears, though, that this faith in such systemic rationalism is in direct proportion to the success that one's service has in achieving its goals. It

486 Memorandum to Nelson A. Rockefeller from Charles A. Coolidge, 7 March 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(1)", Eisenhower Library.

487 Burke, Interview.
is not accidental that the most vocal critics of the JCS system are former Army generals Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin.

As long as the Chiefs failed to realize that bureaucratic imperatives resulted in inter-service conflict, they never could understand the motivation of the civilian leadership. While both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations perceived dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs seemed to believe that their actions were not only to be expected but were actually beneficial. Whether or not this was the actual view of the Chiefs or merely a means of rationalizing bureaucratic realities is impossible to determine, but as long as they believed this, the various organizational reforms would have no results. Taking the Chiefs out of the chain-of-command would not change their services nor their own view that they were commanders.

The admonition that differences of opinion were not intrinsically bad did not lead the Chiefs to the conclusion that artificial unanimity was to be avoided. On the contrary, for two good reasons, unanimity was still a goal to be attained. The first was the bureaucratic reality that when the JCS split they effectively lost any control they had over the decision. Not that unanimity means control over a decision—though it is rare for the civilian leadership to completely disregard it—but unanimity does allow the Chiefs a degree of leverage in dealing with the administration.
This harkens back to Admiral Radford's statement that the more the Chiefs differed, the greater his power as Chairman became. The same was applicable to the increase in the administration's power. This led the Chiefs at times to project the image of unanimity even though there may be deep seated differences. In 1956 after the so-called "Revolt of the Colonels," in which army officers leaked information about major disagreements within the JCS, the Chiefs held a news conference that was designed to dispel any doubt as to the Chiefs' collegiality. According to one Chief, the news conference was self-generated, with the sole purpose of projecting an image of unanimity and destroying the image of divisiveness that the "Revolt" created.\footnote{Interview with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Washington D. C., January 1975.} The second was that the Chiefs clearly perceived themselves as military professionals. How these two factors become interconnected is revealed in the following response by Air Force Chief of Staff, Thomas D. White, to the charge that split decisions and inter-service rivalry is dysfunctional.

Split decisions, though rare, occur whenever a basic principle or procedure is involved on which the Chiefs are unable to agree. This results in passing upward responsibility for decision. On strategic and military operations, however, the Service Chiefs are the experts. It is therefore a disadvantage for the Chiefs to seek others to make decisions on such matters. The advantage of a split decision is that a view or a principle is not submerged and hidden merely because a numerical majority
may oppose it. I feel that numbers do not necessarily make for correct decisions. There can be good results from JCS splits provided higher authority resolves the issue with unequivocal decision....There is always tremendous self-imposed pressure to do the best job possible because agreement among the Chiefs on military matters ought ordinarily to result in the best solution of the problem. Based on past experience, I consider that a compromise solution of a military problem arrived at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is usually better than a compromise decision made by civilian authority. Moreover, it has been apparent to me that when the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward split views there is a tendency to regard such action as a manifestation of "inter-service rivalry" although such is definitely not the fundamental basis for the action.489

The fact that General White described the Joint Chiefs as "experts" is essential in understanding their perception of their role. As professional experts, the Chiefs seek autonomy within their sphere of expertise. Thus the belief that a compromise arrived at by the JCS is better than one arrived at by the civilian leadership. White very clearly denotes the disadvantage of forcing an issue higher in bureaucracy and thus outside the control of the experts. A similar desire is indicated by the following 1953 statement by General Vandenberg, when he asserted "judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the strength of the military forces the country is to maintain must have overriding importance."490 Likewise, President Eisenhower sought unanimity

489 Letter, White to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 January 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(3)", Eisenhower Library.

among his chiefs because he perceived them as having the military expertise while the civilian managers did not.\textsuperscript{491} The Chiefs' desire to achieve professional autonomy is also reflected in the Wheeler Report. As part of the study the report examined various organizational options for the Defense Department. One particular option gave the Joint Chiefs direct operational responsibility of military forces. The advantage of this option was that it would "raise the stature" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus impedes undesirable civilian encroachment into the field of strictly military operations.\textsuperscript{492} This option was not only the opposite of the President's 1958 plan, but it reflected the Chiefs growing concern for their loss of autonomy, in the face of ever increasing centralization.

White's statement also directs us to another salient issue within the Chiefs' self-perceptions. As military professionals they automatically embraced those traditional values that required them to limit their view to those "purely military" aspects of any issue. This demand for autonomy in military matters was the corollary to this restrictive caveat. It was not only the Chiefs' rationalization to combat the domination of military matters by the

\textsuperscript{491} Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History, Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 53-56.

\textsuperscript{492} Wheeler Report, (underline added).
civilian managers, but it was also as much a part of their world view as the love of their service.

The American military leader before the Second World War, could and did for the most part, live in a world that bifurcated the political from the military. With the conclusion of the Second World War and the advent of the semi-war, semi-peace environment of the Cold War, that traditional value was strained to the limit. The civilians were the first to break with traditionalism by attempting to institutionalize political/military planning; unfortunately they never could go all the way and opt completely for fusion. Even their half-way efforts, however, put great pressures on the traditional ethics of the Chiefs. Ostensibly, the Chiefs gave the appearance of attempting to surmount the dilemma involved in making their traditional professionalism compatible with the new realities of the Cold War. On the one hand, the national security system forced them to become involved in the budget and foreign policy process, while on the other hand, they had been inculcated over a thirty-year career with a set of professional values that traced its lineage back to Upton. The nature of the dilemma was articulated by General Omar Bradley in an article written for Look magazine in 1952:

In these next trying years, I predict that as emergencies arise, the military will be called upon for advice and perhaps initially to take charge of problems. I also am sure that as soon as civilian agencies are organized to
take over such civilian problems, the military will gladly withdraw to its purely professional duties.\textsuperscript{493} Such an apologetic position explicitly identified the fact that the boundaries in which a professional officer should operate had been transgressed and that, as good professionals, the Chiefs sought the return to their restricted role.

But what were those "purely professional duties" that General Bradley alluded to? To fit into the traditionalist mold, they should emphasize the automatonical nature of the military profession, the bifurcation of the political from the military point of view, and ultimately maintain that as professionals they should restrict their advice to that which is "purely military" in nature, to the exclusion of other factors. Such an approach would be totally compatible with a narrow perception of civilian control that characterized any appreciation of non-military factors by the professional officer as undermining that American value.

As good traditionalists, they exhibited all of these traits to varying degrees. The notional bifurcation of various power factors, most noticeably the political from the military, is a pillar of traditionalism. Theoretically, such compartmentalization stems from the lack of expertise in these areas. Practically, it will result in misunderstanding, if not outright antagonism, toward the use of those

non-military determinants. General J. Lawton Collins' sympathy for the problems of General MacArthur and his own difficulty in identifying the main threads in US policy in Asia exemplified such compartmentalization. General Twining's resentment over political restrictions on the use of airpower in Korea is another. But a bifurcated or compartmentalized approach does not always have to lead to conflict; it can lead to a simple division of labor along functional lines based on expertise. Earlier we noted General Bradley posited such a functional division with his suggestion that there were "civilian problems" that should be solved by "civilian agencies." Bradley elaborated on this approach in an article he wrote in 1950:

> As a soldier, I have no desire to invade the field of foreign policy. The conduct of foreign affairs is a civilian responsibility. Military policy in our democratic America must always remain the servant of national aims.

Despite compartmentalization, it is the exclusion of non-military factors that form the philosophical underpinning of traditionalism. Institutionally, the Chiefs projected this by placing the restrictive caveat "from the military point of view" on almost all their documents; and institutional philosophy that was reinforced by the personal


perceptions of the Chiefs. In 1953 Bradley reaffirmed the idea that traditionalism was the only way for a professional to act:

Generally...we should confine our part to pointing out the military implications and military capabilities... Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a national policy which we would prefer, but to date, I have not yet been convinced that this is the proper role for the military leader.497

During the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs continued to project the perception that this was the proper role. Admiral Arthur Radford, Eisenhower's first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, specifically stated that the Chiefs gave only military advice. 498 This point was further emphasized by General Matthew Ridgway in his retirement letter:

I view the military advisory role of a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: he should give his competent professional advice on the military aspects of the problem referred to him, based on his fearless, honest, objective estimate of the national interest and regardless of administration policy at any particular time. He should confine his advice to essentially the military aspects.499

According to the traditionalist interpretation, the basis for exclusion lies in the realm of expertise. This was pointed out very clearly by General Eisenhower in a statement before Congress in 1947:

497 Quoted in Ridgway, Soldier, 330.


499 Ridgway, Soldier, 330 (Underline added).
I appear before you only as a professional soldier, to give you a soldier's advice regarding the national defense. I am not qualified to proceed beyond that field; and I do not intend to do so...

It should be noted that he did not change his views upon entering the White House. Despite the fact that publicly the Chiefs were supposed to incorporate economic factors into their military analysis, the President privately informed them they were to give him "purely military advice." 501

Ostensibly, it would appear that the Chiefs manifested all the attributes of traditionalism; yet there are certain contradictions that haunt us. While some of the Chiefs appear to manifest a bifurcated approach to policy formulation others fully appreciated the interrelationship of the political and military arenas. Rather incongruently, Admiral Radford said in the same paragraph, that although the JCS gave only advice from the military point of view:

There is often no clear line of demarcation between foreign and military policy. Instead, there is an overlap. There are military implications in foreign policy and conversely, political implications in military policy. 502

500 Quoted in Ridgway, Soldier, 331.


502 U.S. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45. Admiral Burke also noted the interaction between military and political factors. See Admiral Burke's opening statement to the Seminar on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Naval Academy, 8 January 1975.
One must question the feasibility of bifurcating political/military policy when their interrelationship is so well understood. Bradley's actions as Chairman as well as his earlier quoted apology attests to this. The complicated nature of the dilemma is revealed by General Ridgway in his memoirs.

If the objective the statesman wishes to achieve is a costly one, that is not the soldier's business. If it is greater than the political leaders wish to support, or think the economy of the country can bear, that is not his business. It is the constitutional responsibility of the civilian authority to decide these questions. If, of course, on first inspection, the cost is obviously fantastic, the soldier should make that point clear. But within the broad area of reasonable appropriations—within the bracket of what a reasonable man would say the country could afford—he should scrupulously eschew any opinion as to whether the cost is beyond the reach of the national purse or not. He is without competence in that field. If civilian authority finds the cost to be greater than the country can bear, then either the objectives themselves should be modified or the responsibility for the risks involved should be forthrightly accepted. Under no circumstances, regardless of pressures from whatever source or motive, should the professional military man yield, or compromise his judgment for other than convincing military reasons. To do otherwise would be to destroy his usefulness.

The nature of the dilemma outlined by General Ridgway appears to be the incompatibility of a Chief's perceived normative role with the reality of his job. He decidedly projected an image of traditionalism which demanded he restrict his attention to purely military matters and exclude non-military factors. In reality, though, the "traditionalist"

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503 Ridgway, Soldier, 272.
realized that this was impossible. Whether or not they were projecting this image as a result of a professional ethic or in order to be congruent with the desires of their civilian leadership is impossible to say. Probably it was a combination of both. Undoubtedly, the concept of civilian control played a decisive role. This facet of the professional ethic, was in the words of General Ridgway, "so universally accepted throughout the officer corps that it needed no elaboration;" yet the incorporation of non-military factors seemed somehow to undermine this value system. What is apparent is that the traditionalists were not as pure in their traditionalism as had been supposed. They understood the importance of non-military factors and this led them at least to consider their incorporation. The source of the dilution of their purity has not been explored, but by examining the professional perceptions of General Maxwell D. Taylor we may well find the answer.

Upon assuming the office of Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, General Taylor perceived his role in very traditional terms. He recalled that he was the product of a socialized professional view that he should restrict his interests to that which was "predominately military" in nature and as such he should "stick to his native" when dealing

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504 Ibid, 269.
with the civilian leadership. He believed that this was also the prevalent view of his two immediate predecessors, Generals Collins and Ridgway. This traditionalist view eroded, however, as General Taylor became exposed to the political/military realities of his office. Later when he came back as Military Advisor to the President it eroded further. He became an advocate of the view that the professional officer had to have a broader appreciation of non-military factors than had previously been proposed. It should be made clear that this broadening was in addition to the traditional military expertise, not a replacement for it. Essential to Taylor's conversion to the "new professionalism" lay in his redefinition of the word "military."

While he still believed that his primary mission was to articulate effectively the military aspects of a particular problem, the term "military" took on a broader meaning, to include the economic, social, and political aspects. In his mind, for the Chiefs to give a "purely military" opinion on a matter was intellectually dishonest. It may also be suggested that Taylor's advocacy for the "new professionalism" had a bureaucratic origin. While Eisenhower hoped that the Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as the administration did on economic and political issues if they examined them from the same perspective; Taylor may

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505 Taylor, Interview.
have seen the incorporation of these non-military factors as a tool to increase his bargaining position vis-a-vis the administration. Furthermore, there was an ironic and possibly unrealized implication in his advocacy for the incorporation of non-military factors. If successful, the military officer would achieve a higher degree of autonomy in the military field than ever before. While previously bifurcation enforced limits on the military professional, the elimination of that bifurcation would also break down those limits. The fusionist officer could claim complete autonomy based on his analysis of all possible factors. Such a breakdown would necessitate a restructuring of the traditional American approach to civilian control of the military, if not completely destroy it.

While we do not have the data base, we can extrapolate from Taylor's experience that a similar evolutionary process may have led other Chiefs to gain an appreciation for the importance of non-military factors and to a varying degree to internalize them. Forsaking the danger of belaboring the point, there appears to be a subtle, but very distinct difference in the minds of former Chiefs between understanding the importance of non-military factors and actually incorporating them into their intellectual process. The former implies a continued version of traditionalism. The
officer somehow manages to keep the military aspect of the issue separate, he understands that non-military factors may affect his plans, and he may even be willing to comment on those non-military factors if pressed on the matter. Unfortunately, the exact nature of this distinction becomes muddled when we attempt to examine it. However, this distinction is evident in the ideas of many former Chiefs as exemplified by General Lemnitzer:

Their [the Chiefs'] job is to look at it from the military point of view, but recognizing, and not being oblivious of economic, psychological, political, and other aspects, but it's not their primary business to trim their estimates of requirements based upon whether there is going to be this amount of money available... 506

By gaining an appreciation for the importance of non-military factors and their interrelationship, the professional is better prepared to deal with the inevitable reevaluation of his plans and to integrate them into a policy package by interfacing with non-military agencies. Yet the Chiefs attempted with a high degree of regularity to maintain their traditionalism. In the final analysis how could they claim professional autonomy if they advocated expertise outside their professional sphere? This was one of the main themes of the Wheeler Report, which cited civilian encroachment and the use of non-military determinants as areas of deficiency. Aside from their traditional values, another reason

506 Lemnitzer, Interview.
for the Chiefs' continuing grasp of traditionalism was their own perception of themselves as military staff officers.

For the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the role of a staff officer was by no means a new experience. The preponderance of their careers from the rank of Major/LT. Commander had been in that role, rather than in the more glamorous role of the commander. During these assignments they acquired a set of norms as to what a good staff officer does and does not do, and how he should operate. Staff officers are functional experts who develop plans, give advice, and carry out the decisions of the commander. Loyalty to the commander is implicit within the staff officer's role. In fact this vertical loyalty is the very foundation upon which the feudal nature of military society rests. The self-perception of the Chiefs as staff officers goes back to the very origin of the organization during the Second World War, when Admiral Leahy said "we [the JCS] were the staff of the President of the United States." General Eisenhower alluded to the same kind of relationship in 1949 when he referred to his role in the development of the FY 51 budget as that of "the carpenter and someone else was

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the architect." 508 But it is probably General Taylor who most explicitly explained this aspect of the Chiefs' role when he noted "as staff officers, we do what we are accustomed to in the military service. We give our best advice to the commanding general. Then he makes the decision." 509

For the members of the JCS the commanding general is the Commander-in-Chief.

What General Taylor left unsaid was that a good staff officer not only carries out the orders of the commander, but does so without question. This explains why the Chiefs tended to support the administration's programs in the public forum. As General Ridgway said upon the assumption of his office, "Now loyalty-loyalty is a state or condition like pregnancy, it either does exist or does not exist." He then went on to say how that relates to his own staff:

I shall expect the officers of this staff to present their own honest views fearlessly, forthrightly, but objectively in light of their own conclusions as to what best serves the Army's overall interests. The most dangerous advisor to have around is the yes-man, and the most useless is one who thinks of self instead of service. I shall also expect, at all levels, that having once expressed his opinions and having heard the decision, the

508 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriation, Hearings, Fiscal 1951, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 609.

509 U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed Services and the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Services, Hearings, Missile and Space Activity, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, 107.
officer's entire support will then be put behind the execution of that decision regardless of what his views had been. 510

While Ridgway was referring to his own Army staff, the ideal of vertical loyalty can easily be extrapolated and placed within the context of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ridgway, himself, combined the factors of professionalism and loyalty in his Farewell Report:

If the military advisor's unrestricted advice is solicited, he should give his considered opinion, for in today's climate national security planning is broad and encompasses many aspects.... However, in my opinion, the military advisor should be neither expected nor required to give public endorsement to military courses of action against which he previously recommended. His responsibility should be solely that of loyal vigorous execution of decisions by proper authority. 511

It was undoubtedly this notion of loyalty that prompted Truman's Chiefs to come very close to violating their professionalism by defending the administration. It was apparently this concept of loyalty that was so prevalent during the votes on the super-carrier. Furthermore, it is this notion of loyalty that tends to keep the Chiefs from politicizing their differences with the administration and making them public. For some Chiefs even the idea of going to the President to fight a Secretarial decision was considered "kicking over the traces." 512  

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510  Ridgway, Soldier, 350-51.
511  Ibid., 331.
512  Decker, Interview.
felt that once a decision had been made then discussion of it had ended, even within the confines of the National Security Council.\footnote{U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Nomination on Arthur William Radford as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Matthew Bunker Ridgway as Chief of Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Operations and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air Force, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 30.} General Decker was exhibiting vertical loyalty when he said that when the Chiefs go before a Congressional Committee they are not about to volunteer any information.\footnote{Decker, Interview. General Taylor indicated that the Chiefs got together after President Eisenhower's heart attack and decided to minimize the number of split decisions they would send forward so as not to task the ailing commander-in-chief; Taylor, Interview.} As for carrying the fight outside the halls of the Pentagon, General White's comment before Congress seems to reflect the norm:

I think it would be wrong for me to step out of line as a member of the team, in defiance you might say of my legally constituted superiors and raise an issue...I might resign and then carry it to the Congress.\footnote{U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1958, Hearings on H.R. 12541, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 100.}

Loyalty precluded an open attack upon the commander in chief at least while the chief was in uniform. In a feudal hierarchical system like the military, in which fealty is all important, the staff officer has two choices,
capitulation or resignation. For a chief of staff, transfer is impossible. This explains why Ridgway and Taylor waited until they had retired before they launched their attacks upon the administration. Why did they not use resignation though, as a means of attracting public attention to the issues under debate? When specifically asked this question, General Taylor responded that "a Chief does not resign, he retires." 516 I would suggest that this is not merely a semantical distinction, but reflected a fundamental ethical value which is part of the staff officer's commitment to loyalty. Just as a loyal staff officer should expedite the commander's decisions, so he should refrain from politicizing his differences with the commander until he has gracefully retired. Then, as General White noted he would be free to carry them to the public. This perception is part of what General Taylor called the "ethics of behavior in the military service." 517

This ethic of military behavior creates a great deal of strain on a Chief, especially if his service has been on the losing side of disagreements with the administration. Since open capitulation would not only result in his service's animosity, but would be a rejection of his professional belief as to what is in the best interest of the

516 Taylor, Interview.

517 Senate, Hearings, Missile and Space Activity, 107.
nation, and since resignation or open opposition is simply not considered, the Chief is forced to express his disfavor in such a manner as to prevent an open break with the administration. General Vandenberg's dissent on the second super-carrier vote is illustrative of this process. He could not openly attack the administration's program, yet he had to defend his service's interests. His use of a procedural means to reject the carrier accomplished both goals and appeared to support both of his constituencies. Such waffling on issues is not unknown among the Chiefs. One of the best examples occurred in December 1958 during the development of the Fiscal Year 1960 Defense Budget. The Chiefs opposed the budget levels that the administration thought appropriate. Before the National Security Council only the Chairman, General Twining, endorsed the budget. Secretary of Defense McElroy continued to press the Chiefs for a unanimous endorsement. The result was the following statement:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the FY 1960 proposed expenditure figure of $40,945,000,000 is adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense of the nation for the period under consideration. They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the budget in its present form, but all have reservations with respect to the funding of some segments of their respective service programs.518

While such waffles allow the Chiefs to display directly a certain amount of dissatisfaction with an

518 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 72.
administration policy, they also use indirect means to achieve their goals. One such indirect means is the widely used "leak," either to the press or to the Congress. A so-called leak in 1956 undercut Admiral Radford's efforts to substantially cut American ground forces. When it was published in the New York Times, the West German government reacted quickly to this threat to lower the number of United States forces in Europe and forced the Eisenhower administration to drop the proposal. Congress is a particularly fertile ground for a leak to be planted, and may be inextricably linked to an indirect means of expressing dissatisfaction through Congressional testimony. While it may be true that a Chief will not volunteer information to the Congress, he will happily respond to direct questions that will allow him an opportunity to discuss his dissenting views. It is not difficult to guarantee that the appropriate questions are asked. In most cases a leak is not even needed because the members of the congressional committee know full well the major points of disagreement between the Chiefs and the administration. This was the reason President Eisenhower sought to eliminate the Chiefs' requirement to go before congressional committees. During the debate over the rearmament of Germany, the Chiefs used their testimony to put pressure on the State Department to support their

519 Ibid., 72.
A third means of expressing dissatisfaction is through private pressure groups and former members of the JCS. These individuals and groups are in a position to convey to the public the views of the JCS, without the Chiefs formally announcing their position. In either case these indirect means allow the Chiefs to avoid direct confrontation with the administration.

The idea of staff loyalty also helps explain the metamorphosis that occurs when an individual is appointed Chairman. The role model upon which the chairmanship is built is that of a chief of staff of any large military organization. The chief of staff's primary responsibility is representing the commander to the various subordinate staff agencies and coordinating their actions. In that position he mitigates conflict between the various agencies. Only when the issues are irreconcilable does it go to the commander for him to choose between alternatives. Normally, if the staff work has been done effectively, the decision paper will have only one recommendation on it. In practice, the Chairman is the President's chief of staff, which was Admiral Leahy's formal title; but fear of "Prussianization" effectively eliminated the possibility of using that title.

The role model of the chief of staff as the commander's representative also explains General Bradley's politicization in support of the Truman administration.

Over the decade and a half that covered the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the Chiefs exhibited a surprising consistency in the way they perceived their role. This was true both in regards to their bureaucratic position as well as their normative values.

In terms of the bureaucracy, all the Chiefs acknowledged that there were inherent problems and strains placed on them by dual and conflicting functions. While the civilian leadership saw the conflict between the Chiefs' corporate and service roles, and their planning and command functions as a source of dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs perceived them as an integral part of their role. The Chiefs rationalized their inextricability based upon the belief that responsibility and authority should go hand in hand.

The source of this rationalization, though, goes deeper than an organizational relationship between responsibility and authority. Part of it stems from the Chiefs own belief that they are both commanders of their services and a staff officer to the commander-in-chief. This is the crucial dichotomy upon which the other conflicts are built. Unfortunately, it was the more superficial dualities, such
as planning versus commanding, that caught the attention of the organizational reformers. In the role of the commander, the service chief is forced to defend his service's interests. Ironically, this leads the Chiefs to accept a certain amount of inter-service conflict as at least theoretically functional. The Chief's staff officer role motivates him to defend the administration's programs. This is, in reality, just another manifestation of the Chiefs' front man role.

Another source of this rationalization comes from the Chiefs' perception of themselves as professionals. For them, the concept of professionalism and its relationship to the client society was similar to that of other professionals. Most of all they perceived themselves as the military experts and, as such, they demanded autonomy within their sphere of expertise. The Wheeler Report's linkage of ending civilian encroachment in "strictly military operations" to regaining the Chiefs operational responsibility is illustrative of the relationship of professionalism to the Chiefs' perceived role. Clearly, the Chiefs were opposed to the process of centralization that had been occurring since 1949. Such centralization made them into automatons and destroyed their cherished command roles, but more importantly the very nature of their professionalism was under attack.
These attitudes, especially the requirement for autonomy in military matters, were the central themes in their traditional world view. Despite the fact they realized the importance of non-military factors, they simply could not let themselves consider them. This retention of traditional compartmentalization of the political from the military was the non-organizational flaw within the Chiefs. This had nothing to do with their place within the formal chain of command. The continuing claim that the JCS product was not as useful to the civilian leadership as it should be, was directly tied to the Chiefs' professionalism. While inter-service competition did result in a diluted product, the inability to consider non-military factors resulted in the production of a potentially useless product. Pragmatism was the means of eliminating this flaw, but both the civilian and the military leadership opposed it. The former, out of a fear for civilian control, and the latter, out of a fear for their professionalism. The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by virtue of their status as the administration's "agent" appeared to have been less stringent in maintaining a purely "radical" approach, but even then pragmatism was not fully embraced. Merely mouthing foreign policy statements, as Bradley did, did not represent a shift to pragmatism. Instead even he, as well as the other Chairmen, retained his radical philosophy.
In the final analysis the Chiefs were caught between bureaucratic imperatives and ethical norms. Their dual role as commander of a service and staff officer to the President resulted in tremendous tensions. The development of informal means of affecting decisions, while allowing the Chiefs some flexibility, would only achieve marginal or incidental success. In the end they had to deal with their own conscience and their own professional notion of responsibility. Responsibility to the nation was the foundation upon which their professionalism rested. That responsibility became intertwined with the belief that their service was essential to the defense of the nation. By a convoluted logic, what appeared to the civilians to be service parochialism was to the Chiefs the fulfillment of their obligation. Furthermore, that sense of responsibility led them to bifurcate war and politics which had disastrous results on the JCS product. Since the civilians were not getting the product that they felt they needed, they began to make the decisions without the advantage of integrated input that would lead to an integrated policy. The nature of that integrated policy is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND POLICY INTEGRATION

Up to this point in our study we have examined the Chiefs' self-perception of their role and those of their civilian superiors. We have also seen how the various reorganization efforts within the Department of Defense received their impetus from the civilian manager's desire to more effectively integrate political/military policy planning. But effective integration is more than a mere manifestation of interface on an organization chart; it is the merging of the organizational structure and the individual player's roles. In short, it is as Clausewitz noted "where all the other threads meet."

Policy integration in its simplest form guarantees the balancing of the state's capabilities and the state's commitments, which for our purpose means that the state has sufficient military power, not only in size, but in composition, to achieve its political goals. The passage of the 1947 legislation was predicated upon the desire to optimize such policy integration and to create an institutional framework to achieve that goal. That framework presupposed a nexus between the nation's foreign policy, the military planning process, and the development of the defense
budget. Each of these factors in turn become inextricably related stages in the policy integration process. Although the National Security Act never outlined in specific detail how this nexus would be achieved, the formation of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requisite elements in a process that would ultimately result in the maintenance of a military establishment that could support the nation's political goals.

From the practical viewpoint, the balance between commitments and capabilities occurs during the budget process, since "planning can be useless and operations impossible if the necessary funds are not authorized and allocated." In the final analysis the budget is a fiscal expression of those forces and plans which are deemed necessary for the security of the nation. The structure of those military forces represents a constraint upon the foreign policy planner that he ignores only at his nation's peril. The defense budget process thus contains all the major elements to be found in the integration of national security policy, and as such may be used as a heuristic tool to examine the process and determine its effectiveness.

Examining the problem of policy integration from a total systems approach, the first step in a hypothetical

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model is the establishment of foreign policy goals, which will act as a catalyst for the subsequent development of the military's operations plans and finally the defense budget. On a superficial level, these three stages—national policy, military plans, and the defense budget—appear to flow in a logical sequential pattern, but such an assumption fails to make the transition from the ideal model to the real world. Our hypothetical model ignores the reality of bureaucratic conflict and the necessity for fiscal feasibility. The defense budget in an unconstrained ideal environment becomes merely the conversion of military force postures into monetary amounts. In the real world, though, defense dollars are in direct competition with other national priorities, forcing budget considerations to be addressed at the offset of the policy process. Furthermore, in order to effectively determine a viable foreign policy the nation's commitments and capabilities must be assessed. Likewise, military operations plans are not based solely on combat effectiveness, but on technical, fiscal, political, and bureaucratic realities. This model also fails to consider post-executive phases of the budget process, such as congressional review, that are part of the American political system, but beyond the purview of this study.

The result is that when our nicely structured hypothetical model is placed in reality, it becomes a complex
process in which the theoretically sequential stages become so inextricably connected that it is difficult to separate one stage from the next. The linear nature of the model is replaced by a cyclical one in which the budgetary process becomes an integral part of the balancing of capabilities and commitments. This, as we noted from our earlier discussion of Clausewitz, requires the fusion of the political and the military aspects of national policy, which presupposes an intellectual fusion on the part of the decision maker, not merely bureaucratic interface. Although such interface is an essential part of the policy making process, it can only help facilitate and not replace fusion. Despite these difficulties, a hypothetical model is heuristically useful in examining the process of policy integration.

With this ideal model in mind we will examine historically how the policy integration process developed during the Truman administration and how the budget process became the means of achieving integration. Particular attention will be given to how the military professionals perceived the process in comparison to their civilian superiors. The traditional difficulty of bifurcating political from military policy is an essential aspect of these perceptual differences, and they clearly surfaced during the first effort at formulating an integrated budget for fiscal year 1950. As such FY 50 is an especially useful vehicle for examining these problems. The lessons learned from FY 50 resulted in massive
structural changes within the NSC and the JCS, as both organizations developed planning systems that more effectively fulfilled their missions and enhanced, at least theoretically, their ability to work with each other. These changes will be traced as the effectiveness of the policy integration process is evaluated during the Eisenhower administration.

Organizationally, it was the movement toward unification that acted as a catalyst for policy integration. The Army based its advocacy for unification on the advantages to be gained through unity of command, which theoretically would maximize the efficient management of resources. Implicit within this argument was the assumption that as war became more complex, the management of resources became more critical and thus needed to be more effectively rationalized. In peacetime, unification would result in a more equitable distribution of resources, as well as greater stability in total allocations. This was the basis of Root's reforms in 1903, which created the General Staff to eliminate the more dysfunctional elements of the bureau system. The correctness of this organizational approach was reinforced by the War Department's reforms in March 1942, that created the Operations Division. After the war, polemical studies like Major General Otto Nelson's National Security and the General Staff seemed to prove the necessity for staff centralization and the "need for an improved General Staff
organization with more effective techniques of control." One of the central functions of such an improved General Staff would be to facilitate political/military integration to include the budget process. Nelson was harkening back to the increased efficiency of the restructured General Staff during both world wars and its coordination with the War Industries Board during World War I and the War Production Board during World War II.

The history of the unification controversy is essentially a history of conflicting approaches to policy integration. Whatever difficulties existed between the services, the civilian leadership definitely wanted legislation that would bring about policy integration, and do it in such a manner as to make the Joint Chiefs active participants. It was with this in mind that the service secretaries bemoaned, in 1944, the lack of any "established agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic and fiscal

The service proposals for unification offered differing solutions to this problem, but for the most part those differences flowed along service lines, with the Navy apparently more cognizant of the nature of policy integration than the Army. Specifically, the Army's proposals tended to reflect confidence in a vertical, highly centralized structure, which exhibited traditional compartmentalization of civilian from military functions. While this approach detracted from the total integration effort, it supported the Army's own perception of its professionalism.

It is the nature of this professionalism that helps explain the primacy of the Army's position, dominating even the JCS's own Richardson Plan, written in April 1945. 

Ironically, one of the Plan's primary conclusions was that greater policy integration was needed, especially between the military services and the State Department. I would suggest that this particular recommendation was a result

523 Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject: Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, William B. Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc. Memos," U.S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as U.S. Naval Archives).

524 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense (Hereafter referred to as the Richardson Report), Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of the National Defense Structure and Comments: October and November, 1945," U.S. Naval Archives.
of the Chiefs' perception that there was a lack of political guidance forthcoming from the civilian leadership. Although the Richardson Report recommended policy integration, it did not specifically link the commitments generated through political/military consultation to a force structure upon which the budget would be based. In a rather convoluted manner, the Report did point out that the President would be concerned with budgetary matters and that "the nation should maintain in time of peace, military forces adequate to support its foreign policy," but how that would be translated into dollars and cents was not very clear. A partial solution was suggested in the formation of a U.S. Chiefs of Staff who would advise the President on the overall budget requirements for each service. This advice would be transmitted to the President by the Commander of the Armed Forces, who would double as the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief. Concurrently, the request would also be transmitted by the civilian Secretary of the Armed Forces, who sat with the Chiefs during their deliberations. Although, the Secretary sat in with the Chiefs, his primary function was not as an arbitrator of competing resource demands, but as a cabinet level advocate for the military budget.

525 Ibid., 21.
The crucial issues of procurement and mobilization planning also were discussed in the Richardson Report. These functions were placed under the purview of a civilian Under Secretary of the Armed Forces, who was to guarantee the compatibility of the Chiefs' military plans to civilian industrial mobilization. Unfortunately, there was built into the system a degree of compartmentalization that mere bureaucratic coordination could not easily rectify. This point was revealed in the observation that the military would be the only agency really concerned with military matters, while the Under Secretary would take care of the civilian or business matters. 526

On the issue of balancing requirements and resources, the Richardson Report naively stated that this was only a wartime problem. It was presumed that "in peacetime resources will normally be adequate." 527 This statement reflected more than a naive approach to peacetime policy integration, it was based on the assumption that military requirements would drive the budget process. If this was correct, then the Chiefs could safely assume that peacetime resources would be adequate. Furthermore, given the Chiefs' view of professionalism, they probably also assumed that

526 Ibid., 23-24. Specifically the Report said "the Under Secretary of his office will initiate action on business matters and that the commander of the Armed Forces on the military matters."

527 Ibid., 26.
they themselves would establish those requirements and that they would be based exclusively upon military imperatives. It seemed logical to the Chiefs, as military experts, to generate their own budget requests and forward them to the president, unaltered by either the civilian Under Secretary or Secretary of the Armed Forces.

This organizational assumption was incorporated into both the McNarney and the Collins plans. Both of these Army proposals gave the budgetary responsibility to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the civilian secretary acted merely as a conduit of the budget estimates to the President. Although, both plans emphasized the elimination of waste and duplication through unification, neither plan considered the relationship of political/military planning to the budget process. In defending the Collins Plan, Secretary of War Patterson testified that its objective was "to establish an integrated program of national security," and that this would best be accomplished by allowing the military experts to formulate the strategic options upon which this program would be based. In practice this would mean that the military experts, the JCS, would formulate the defense budget. General Collins went even further than Patterson in outlining the nature of military autonomy in budgetary matters:

528 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, Hearings. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 12.
One of the most valuable functions that the United States Chiefs of Staff should perform in time of peace is the development of a balanced military program with which budgetary requirements are thoroughly integrated. After the President has approved the over-all military policy, the budget requirements to implement this policy would be initiated by the three components, the Air, Army and Navy, essentially as at present. These individual requirements would be reviewed and integrated by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Each Chief of Staff of a major component would be expected to present his case to the United States Chiefs of Staff with full freedom and vigor. The U.S. Chiefs would have to weigh any conflicting demands and finally come out with an integrated program of requirements to submit to the President. It is believed that legislation should require that these recommendations be submitted through the Secretary of the Armed Forces, who should be required to transmit them without modification to the President, together with his comments thereon.  

Clearly, both the JCS's Richardson Report and the Army's unification plans manifested traditional bifurcation of political and military functions, and used professionalism and expertise as the basis for the military's assertion of autonomy.

The reason for the similarity among the various plans was that their central ideas appear to have had a common source, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. Palmer, who was George C. Marshall's mentor, had been intimately involved in planning a War Department reorganization immediately after World War I. Although retired, he was brought back on active duty in November 1941 to help with the nationalization of the National Guard. With the outbreak

529Ibid., 157-8.
of war, he turned his attention to the dual problems of demobilization and post-war military organization. In 1943, the Special Planning Division (SPD) was created to coordinate the planning efforts on both of these issues, and Palmer was named advisor to its director. The SPD became the focal point for the Army's reorganization effort and its director, Major General W.F. Tompkins, was the Army's representative on the Richardson Committee. Because of Palmer's elder statesmen status, he was in a position to intellectually dominate the SPD. The key component of all the plans so far discussed was the compartmentalization and the isolation of military and civilian functions from one another. This compartmentalization was an essential part of the organization plans that Palmer helped write after the First World War; one of which was for a unified military. In these plans industrial mobilization and procurement was under the control of civilian managers, while war plans

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530 For a detailed study of the role of the SPD see Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Post War Defense, 1941-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Nelson, National Security and the Staff, 548-551; Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 235-240; and "History of the Special Planning Division," file No. 2-3.12, Office of the Chief of Military History; a microfilm copy is held in the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College Library. As for Palmer's role in the SPD, Professor I.B. Holly of Duke University, who is preparing a biography of Palmer, claims that Palmer's ideas "infected" the young officers around him.
were generated solely by the military staffs. The incorporation of this approach in the National Defense Act of 1920 led to the development of military plans without regard to their industrial feasibility.

Despite organizational shortcomings and structural flaws, the Army's unification plans conformed to that service's traditional sense of professionalism. The effect of this traditionalism is substantiated by an executive branch analysis of the views of such Army unification proponents as Secretary of War Patterson, and Generals Marshall, Collins, Arnold, McNarney, and Eisenhower. Of particular importance was the analysis' evaluation of these individuals' views on two specific points: the military's need for "specific integration with foreign policy" and whether or not "control of [the] budget [should be in the hands of a] civilian secretary." With the noticeable exception of General McNarney, all of those listed were identified as opposing the specific integration of military policy with foreign policy and all, including McNarney, were identified as unanimously opposing a civilian exercising control over the

military budget. A further example of the impact of such traditional values is illustrated in a memorandum written by Forrestal to Clark Clifford on 7 September 1946. In this memorandum, Forrestal conveyed his impressions of a dinner meeting with Patterson, Eberstadt, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Handy. The purpose of the meeting was to reduce the points of service disagreement over unification. In his description of the discussion that ensued, the Secretary of the Navy reported that the Army was "still wedded to the concept that a chart and 'straight-line of command' will solve all problems." This of course ran counter to Forrestal's own belief in a decentralized structure and that an organization was only as good as the men who made it up. However, the Army's fascination in a "straight-line of command" reflected more than an organizational preference; Forrestal realized that it reflected the very nature of Army professionalism:

The Army's real purpose is to draw a sharp black and white line between civilian and military functions. It is my view, and nobody can shake it, that the operation must be a mixed one; that there is no black and white line because diplomacy and military power are inextricably associated. Both Patterson and Handy took the view that the civilian secretaries should not sit

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with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which I responded, "how otherwise can military policy be tied in with national policy?"

Forrestal went on to write that he had great apprehension for the unification bill if it followed the "army thinking on these lines," because such an approach would fail to achieve the true integration of "the whole complex of our national, economic, military, and political power." 533

Secretary Forrestal had hoped that the Eberstadt Plan would eliminate or at least avoid some of these organizational problems. The National Security Council offered a means to "ensure that there was a balance between our foreign commitments and (military) forces." 534 As the National Security Act began to take form it became more apparent to the administration that it was the budget process that guaranteed this balance. 535 However, if integration was to occur, it required a mitigation of the military's autonomy in budget matters, and the appointment of a civilian superior to act as an arbitrator between conflicting

533 Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September 1946, Clark Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unification Correspondence-General," Truman Library.

534 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for the National Security. 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945. (Hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt Plan), 55.

demands for resources.

While there seems to have been a general agreement that the budget was the crucial aspect of unification, it was not at all clear how the budget would be developed, or what role, if any, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would play. On the surface, it appears that the Navy had a greater understanding of policy integration than the Army, but that may be more attributable to the attitude of James Forrestal than to the attitude of the Navy's officer corps. We can gain some insight into the perceptions of Navy professionals by examining the ideas of Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Navy officer most closely connected with the writing of the National Security Act. In January 1947, just prior to the drafting of the legislation, Sherman sent a memorandum to his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Loris Norstad, expressing his views on how an ideal integrated budget could be developed:

   (1) Based on a study of the broad factors involved, the War Council would determine the national policies under which the Armed Forces would expect to function;

Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, box 156, folder "Cabinet Defense Secretary", Truman Library. Clifford noted that the budget issue was one "of the major purposes of the bill." Earlier President Truman had noted that unification "will help the budget to a large extent," Memo for Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, 20 April 1946, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, box 145, folder, "Agencies-Military, Army, Navy Unification," Truman Library.
(2) In light of these policies and their military estimate of the strategic situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would formulate strategic requirements for the Armed Forces. In the event of disagreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of the Armed Forces would exercise such powers of decision as may be delegated to him by the President;

(3) The above strategic requirements would then be translated into terms of men, supplies and money by the three military departments;

(4) The translated requirements of the military departments would then be reviewed and integrated by the War Council under the supervision of the Secretary of the Armed Forces, who would have powers of decision in the event of disagreement. The facilities of the budget officers of the military departments would be utilized for this if necessary;

(5) The military budgets would then be presented to the Bureau of the Budget by the Secretary of the Armed Forces and their details directly to that body by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;

(6) After action on the integrated military budgets is taken by the Bureau of the Budget and the President, their broader aspects would, if necessary, be justified before the Congress by the Secretary of the Armed Forces and their details directly by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  

Although the power that Sherman was willing to invest in the civilian Secretary of the Armed Forces was the very antithesis of the Army's demand for autonomy, one should not assume that Sherman was being motivated by a totally different set of professional imperatives than his army counterparts. A careful examination of the process outlined

by Sherman, reveals that the Joint Chiefs would take the civilian leadership's guidance and develop the strategic plans that would ultimately be converted into "men, supplies, and money by the three services." Only after these plans had been developed would they be measured against fiscal feasibility.

The model that Sherman apparently used when he developed this budget process was that of the military operations plan. Within the military planning system an organization is first given a mission. The commander will then take that mission and make what is known as the estimate of the situation. This is the thought process by which the commander analyzes his mission, evaluates both enemy and friendly forces, considers alternative courses of action, and finally reaches a decision on how to proceed. Once this decision has been made, an operations plan is drawn up detailing the execution of the mission, which in turn becomes the basis of mission statements directed to subordinate units. Within Sherman's budget process the original mission statement was the political guidance provided to the Joint Chiefs by the civilian leadership. The Chiefs then would proceed to make their estimate of the situation and develop an operations plan.

This approach was structurally identical to the "National War Planning System," the JCS considered in
1942. The first step in that system was the determination by the political leadership of the nation's strategy or concept of war, followed by the military's structuring of a strategy and operations plan to accomplish those goals. Since this type of planning process was universally accepted within the services, it was only natural that senior military leaders would apply it to the problem of policy integration and budget development. The application of this mode of reasoning was seen in a 1949 statement before Congress by General George C. Marshall. He stated that "the estimate of the situation" should determine the formulation of the budget, and that such an estimate should be made once a year "entirely outside of...civilian control." The demand that the generation of the estimate of the situation be exclusively a military function should not be looked upon as an attack upon civilian control, but instead a call for autonomy within a professional sphere of expertise. Obviously, this estimate would be linked to the political mission statement so that the Chiefs would have a framework within which to develop their force lists. While Marshall never did discuss the relationship of that mission statement to the estimate of the situation, the military staff logic

537Vernon Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Development (Historical Division: Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), II, 380.
process presupposes a mission statement from some higher headquarters or authority. 538

The methodology incorporated in Sherman's approach to policy integration was nothing more than a simplified version of what would later be called program budgeting. Forrestal was also enamored with this approach and felt that it ought to be the basis of a "new principle" that would govern the Military Establishment's budgetary structure. In his First Report of the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal outlined a budget system that was very similar to that of Sherman's:

The National Security Council will "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of these evaluations, will maintain long-range strategic plans and correlate these with an "annual operating plan," indicating such matters as the composition, size, organization, and general deployment of the forces, the general requirements of the material programs and the required levels of operations, training, maintenance, construction, and other major programs. Initially such plans should be based solely upon military considerations.539

Forrestal's assumption that the operation plans would be based exclusively on military considerations reveals a


surprising degree of traditionalism on the part of the great advocate of policy integration. This paradox is explained when one realizes that Forrestal viewed policy integration as a continual process that would occur during the development of guidance and later during the balancing process. The Secretary's commitment to military autonomy during the actual planning phase indicates a faith in the military and an understanding that the military had unique expertise in certain areas. The Joint Chiefs had a crucial role in the development of the budget because they were the only ones who could make the analysis of military considerations. As Senator Edward V. Robertson said during the 1947 hearings, "the Joint Chiefs are the key to the whole thing." 540

The early drafts of the National Security Act specifically named the Chiefs as advisors "in the integration of the military budget." Rather inexplicably, this function was expunged from the final draft. 541 Nevertheless, the Chiefs remained an integral part of the budget process because they were the ones that actually prepared the strategic and logistics plans. Possibly realizing the confusion that could result from this omission, Forrestal had a budget

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541 Ibid., 2.
function inserted along with the various other service and JCS functions enumerated in the Key West Agreement of 1948. This was the nature of that budget function:

Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for his information and consideration in furnishing guidance to the Departments for preparation of their annual budgetary estimates and in coordinating these budgets, a statement of military requirements which is based upon agreed strategic considerations, joint outline war plans, and current national security commitments.\(^{542}\)

Simply assumed by both Forrestal and Sherman was the existence of coherent policy guidance emanating from the civilian leadership. This was the crucial step in our hypothetical model and was the reason the National Security Council was established. Without such guidance the Joint Chiefs would have nothing upon which to base their strategic plans. Unfortunately, the format in which that guidance would be disseminated was never covered in the National Security Act. This external communications problem reflected internal organizational and perceptual problems on the part of the National Security Council.

Prior to the Korean War, the National Security Council was viewed as having a narrow advisory role with no operational or implementation mission. The complex NSC infrastructure that we now take for granted simply did not exist,

because the Council was not charged with following up on decisions. Only as the demands upon the organization increased during the Korean War did the staff of the National Security Council begin to take form. One consequence of this organizational and functional problem was the lack of systematic and continuous guidance. Another, was that the analyses that were produced tended to be overly narrow in focus, dealing only with a specific issue. It was not until November 1948 that "the first paper of a broad overall character dealing with the basic national security problems facing the United States," was adopted by the NSC and could be used as guidance for the JCS. That document, NSC 20/4 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," would be the major source of policy guidance until the Korean War. These problems exacerbated the Chiefs' perception that they were forced to work within a policy vacuum and that plans had to be made based upon their own assumptions.


544 Memorandum for the National Security Council, 16 November 1948, subject: US Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, NSC, box 204, folder "Meeting #27," Truman Library. This folder actually contains an earlier draft NSC 20/3, which with only minor revisions was formally accepted as 20/4.
Was there any validity to the Chiefs' perception? Instead of being produced as a routine matter, NSC papers tended to be reactive documents, promulgated by perceived changes in the political/military environment. Furthermore, there was no JCS representation on the Council's staff during this early period. This situation, according to the National Security Council Organizational History, "made it difficult to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their formal written views." Thus the lack of institutional linkages meant a total breakdown in communication. This was exemplified during the Berlin Blockade when the JCS advice was not sought until it was too late for them to have any substantial influence. Part of this problem undoubtedly was the result of the Chiefs not being named the principle military advisors to the NSC, a problem that was alleviated by the 1949 amendment to the National Security Act.

Unfortunately for Secretary Forrestal, his model of policy integration was predicated upon institutional interface that could only occur if there was continual

545 Jackson Committee, II, 432.

bureaucratic linkages. In place of these formal linkages, the Secretary of Defense sought the Chiefs' advice informally based upon their statutory relationship to him. These informal efforts apparently did not remove the belief, on the part of the Chiefs, that there was a policy vacuum in existence. The 1948 Hoover Commission study reaffirmed the Chiefs' fears in this regard when it noted that "the want of firm and clear top level national policy direction on which to base strategic plans leave the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do their planning in something of a vacuum."\textsuperscript{547}

This situation presented a real problem for Forrestal since his integration model was built upon the assumption that the military would take the NSC's guidance and convert it into strategic plans. At this stage of the process the military would develop their plans completely unconstrained by resource limitations or other mitigating factors. In other words, the Chiefs would base their plans solely on "military considerations." This was the same approach that Sherman had advocated. After the plans were developed, they would be measured against fiscal feasibility. Only then would changes be made to balance plans against available

resources. It was essential though, that the original policy statement should not be developed exclusive of military considerations.

As noted earlier, the logic of Forrestal's model paralleled that of the military's concept of plans being driven by the mission statement. The problem was that the mission statement could only be derived from the National Security Council's guidance, and that agency was remiss in producing it. Since regularized guidance was not forthcoming, the Chiefs began to generate their own assumptions upon which to base their plans. The Hoover Commission, although appreciating that the Chiefs were working within a policy vacuum, criticized them for these self-generated assumptions because they did not always have any correlation with reality. The Commission's Eberstadt Task Group pointed out that many of the JCS's strategic plans "are based upon incomplete and unrealistic assumptions," and that:

The JCS have not done enough to relate their military plans to the national productive capacity in terms of manpower, materials, power, transportation, and facilities. These vital elements of modern strategy appear to be too lightly considered in the strategic planning of the JCS. 548

In other words, the Chiefs were not incorporating crucial non-military factors into their planning process. Naturally,

548 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 28 January 1949, subject: Comments contained in Detailed Studies of the Eberstadt Committee, Chapter VI, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, USACGSC Library C-17073, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
Eberstadt laid much of the blame upon the lack of guidance from the NSC, probably because this was an easily identifiable cause. What Eberstadt and his task group failed to understand was that the Chiefs' professionalism was as much a cause as the organizational problems. Thus Forrestal was confronted with a total organizational breakdown as he prepared to implement his "new principle."

There was one preliminary problem that had to be dealt with before any headway could be achieved in the budget arena. That problem was getting the Chiefs to agree on the services' various roles and missions. Until this was accomplished the "deep-seated disagreements," between the services "made effective planning extremely difficult if not impossible." 549 The National Security Act of 1947 and its implementing Executive Order 9877 had merely allocated to the services missions based on environmental primacy. Thus the Army was concerned with land operations, the Navy conducted operations that were at sea, and the Air Force operated in the air. Such an environmental division did not address those areas where missions clashed. In particular the role of the Marine Corps and the Navy's carrier-based air arm became points of contention. In an effort to eliminate these and other problem areas Forrestal called the Chiefs together for a meeting at the Key West Naval Base in March, 1948. The ensuing memorandum of agreement, called

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549 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 157.
the "Functions Paper," was issued by the President on 21 April 1948 as a replacement for E.O. 9877. 550

While the "Functions Paper" did eliminate some of the points of service antagonism, it unfortunately defined the services' primary and collateral missions only in general terms, leaving the actual implementation open to interpretation and technological feasibility. Thus while the Navy was given the collateral mission, "to be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," how this would be accomplished was left unspecified. During the pre-missile era, the only means available to the Navy to participate in a nuclear retaliation operation was the carrier-based aircraft; but the Navy lacked a plane with the requisite range and payload capability to deliver the nuclear weapons of the period, as well as a carrier that was large enough to launch such a plane if it were developed. The U.S.S. United States was designed to be such an aircraft carrier, which explains why its cancellation caused the "Revolt of the Admirals." 551 Some

550 Ibid., 157-183, for a full discussion of the formulation of the Functions Papers.

of the remaining problems were solved at a follow-up conference held at the United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Still the over-all issue of roles and missions continued to be one of the major causes for inter-service rivalry. Despite, his failure to completely solve the roles and missions issue, Forrestal was correct in believing that service roles and missions had to be defined before the budget process could proceed. Only after the services had determined their relationship with one another could they begin to translate the political mission statement into a cohesive and unified military plan. The fact that there were still unresolved aspects of the issue remaining was one of the primary reasons that Forrestal's "new principle" failed.

With the roles and missions issue behind him, Forrestal proceeded to bring the Chiefs into the budget process. On 30 March 1948, the Secretary of Defense asked the Chiefs to express themselves on the allocation of a three billion dollar supplement to the fiscal year 1949 defense budget. The Chiefs responded with varying force levels and a total fiscal requirement of over nine billion dollars. The administration simply would not accept this three fold increase and held fast to a ceiling of three billion.552 This first

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552 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 183-205.
effort at implementing the "new principle" not only had failed, but foreshadowed the problems that would follow. Within weeks after the administration decided to hold the line on the FY 49 supplemental budget, planning began for the FY 50 defense budget. This would be the first budget that the Chiefs would be involved in from its inception. Again the administration began with a pre-conceived budgetary ceiling, this time at 14.4 billion dollars. Although the Chiefs were now part of the budget process, they had not yet developed a systematic approach to formulate their budget advice, this, despite the fact that they had always claimed that they should be the ones to develop the actual figures. The result was that the Chiefs sent forward a compilation of all three services' unilateral budget estimates, without any integration. This "paperclipped" budget totaled almost 30 billion dollars, a figure twice the amount the administration was willing to spend.


554 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 219-224. In October 1947 General Gruenther suggested that the Chiefs develop a strategic plan upon which the budget would be based. Unfortunately, this effort had not come to fruition when the Chiefs were asked for their input into the FY 50 budget.
On June 23, 1948, Forrestal reacted to this situation by asking the Chiefs to set up a special board of senior officers to help develop the budget. This board of budgetary advisors, chaired by Air Force General Joseph T. McNarney, had by August managed to cut the total requirement down to 23.6 billion dollars, but at that level the services appeared to be stalemated. From that point until early October, attempts to break the impasse met with little success.

Despite these problems, Forrestal was still convinced that the Chiefs had to take it upon themselves to divide the monies. On 4 October he verbally informed the Chiefs that they were to "recommend a subdivision of a 14.4 billion dollar appropriation for the fiscal year 1950." He followed up this verbal guidance with a memorandum to the same effect two days later. The Chiefs responded on the 7th

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555 James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 450. The other members of the board were Major General George J. Richards, U.S.A., and Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N.

556 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 224-225.


558 Forrestal, Diaries, 499.
of October that they "found it impossible to reach an agreement on the recommendation as to the allocation of the funds to the respective services." The political machinations surrounding the Chiefs' October 7th response brought into sharp focus all of the inter-service problems that had haunted the JCS during the previous months of negotiations. The split recommendation that was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense revealed a newly formed alliance between the Air Force and the Army against the Navy. While the former two services recommended the division of funds to be along the following lines: 4.9 billion to the Army, 4.4 to the Navy, and 5.1 to the Air Force; the Navy recommended figures of 4.9 billion, 4.9 billion, and 4.6 billion to each service respectively. Leahy recommended either dividing the 14.4 billion dollars equally among all three services, or simply taking the .5 billion dollar increase over the FY 49 budget and dividing that equally among the services.

559 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October 1948, subject Memorandum dated 6 October 1948 from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1949-1950 Budget, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS outgoing correspondence, October 1948 - January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives. Enclosed were copies of the individual Chief's recommendations. Although Leahy went along with Bradley and Vandenberg, he also recommended equally dividing up the .5 billion dollar increase which would mean the Army would get 4.467 billion, the Navy 5.067 billion, and the Air Force 4.867. Leahy may well have gone along with the Army and the Air Force in order not to appear to be siding with the Navy. According to the official JCS history the suggestion to merely divide up the 14.4 billion dollars equally was made by Leahy and rejected on 5 October 1948, yet in a working
The differences in the budget figures reflected more than service bureaucratic imperatives; they also reflected fundamental differences over the strategic approach to the next war. All three services agreed that the ceiling resulted in insufficient forces to "meet the D-day demands on the Services in a war with Russia," and all three services tended to agree that the next war would in its general strategic aspects resemble the Second World War. None of the services seriously thought in terms of defending Western Europe by becoming involved in a land campaign with Russia. The forces available in the West were simply insufficient for this purpose. Instead, those forces that existed would be concentrated on protecting Great Britain and the Mediterranean Littoral. During the early stages of the war the allies would retreat across the Channel to England and across the Mediterranean to North Africa, returning to the continent only after they had sufficiently built up their strength. While the allies and particularly the United States were mobilizing their forces, the enemy would be subjected to

draft of the 6 October Memorandum, this division is mentioned again and is annotated with the notation "proposed by Navy." This would suggest that it was not totally dropped by the Navy at least as of 6 October. Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. Also see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 233-236.

a devastating air attack consisting of both conventional
and nuclear weapons. How much money each service received
was inextricably connected to its role in the short range
Joint Emergency War Plan "HALF-MOON/FLEETWOOD." 561

Under "FLEETWOOD" the Navy's two primary missions
were to protect the lines of communication (LOC) between
North America and Great Britain and to maintain access through
the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, just as the Royal
Navy had done during the Second World War. As part of the
Navy's Mediterranean mission, carrier-based airpower would
attempt to cut the enemy's lines of communication, thus
impeding his advance. Besides these two specific missions,
the Navy retained its collateral mission to support the
Air Force's offensive air operations against the Russian
homeland. According to "FLEETWOOD," "carrier task groups
will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent
practically consistent with their (the Navy's) primary
task." 562 In reality, that task was to protect allied logis-
tics and communications lines and not to be in direct contact
with enemy forces.

561 JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR 3/2/46, National Archives, Washington, D.C. For a discussion of
the evolution of the war plan "HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD/DOUBLESTAR,
see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
224-231, 275-301.

562 JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR-
From the Navy's perspective, retaining and accomplishing both its primary and collateral missions under "FLEETWOOD" were not only essential to the defense of the nation, but a matter of bureaucratic survival. The Navy's force levels were predicated upon those missions. If its nuclear retaliatory mission was eliminated or its role in the Mediterranean minimized, then its force levels and in particular the number of carrier task groups that were to accomplish those missions would be appropriately lowered. Thus the issues that surrounded the development of the FY 50 budget were the same ones that caused the "Revolt of the Admirals" almost a year later.

Once Forrestal had ordered the Chiefs to produce a 14.4 billion dollar budget, the Chiefs were forced to reconsider their estimate of the situation. The heart of the Army-Air Force alliance was the elimination of the Navy's Mediterranean mission. As part of the 7 October budget debate General Bradley attacked the viability of this aspect of the "FLEETWOOD" plan:

It is my opinion that to place a fleet in the Mediterranean without taking in ground troops to hold a base, or bases, makes no significant contribution to our initial offensive effort. It is my contention that the idea that Navy Air can stop any ground troop advance is contrary to all previous experiences.

I believe that the Navy should have whatever air force is necessary to carry out its naval mission, but when there is a limited amount of money available, I think we must consider primary missions first. The
Navy concept of a carrier task force in the Mediterranean by itself is primarily designed to fight an air battle and stop any Army movement. Both of these functions have been assigned to the Air Force and the Army. If the Army-Air Force position was sustained then the United States would have to rely, at least in the short term, solely on an atomic air attack based out of Great Britain. Hopefully, this would buy enough time for the Army to mobilize a force capable of invading the continent. The Navy would be relegated to protecting the lines of communication between England and North America, the role it had played in the European Theater of Operations during the Second World War.

Why Bradley sided with the Air Force on this crucial issue is not difficult to determine. Undoubtedly, his experience in Europe during the war had something to do with it. More importantly, it was clear to everyone, that "FLEETWOOD" could not be conducted within the constraints of the administration's ceiling. Looking at it realistically, the forces the Navy needed to operate in the Mediterranean would have to come at the expense of the Air Force's atomic capability or the Army's mobilization posture. These same arguments


564 This view is substantiated by General Bradley's comments during the 5 October 1948 meeting of the JCS. "I think it is up to us to make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense of the 14.4 [billion dollars] based on what
were advanced by Bradley at other times to explain his anti-carrier recommendations.565

Whatever the reasons behind the service's actions, the political machinations emanating from the Joint Chiefs completely exasperated Forrestal. It was during this time that he became convinced that the Military Establishment needed to be completely restructured. On October 5th, he wrote in his diary that he was going to recommend to the Hoover Commission that the powers of the Secretary of Defense needed to be strengthened. He also added that he was thinking of making General Alfred Gruenther "my principle military advisor...."566 His request that the JCS establish the McNarney Board was just another example of his desire to find alternative sources of military advice. The fact that he requested the formation of the McNarney Board as early as June, reveals that he might have already been having second thoughts about the effectiveness of the JCS. As part of his desire to develop alternative sources of advice, the Secretary wrote Eisenhower on October 8th and asked him to come to a meeting in which they would "talk fundamentals: policy, budget and our whole military-diplomatic

we consider the relative importance of the three Services in fighting the war against Russia." Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 234. Also see Schilling. "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," 171.

565 See my discussion of Bradley's rationale in his vote against the U.S.S. United States in Chapter V.

566 Forrestal, Diaries, 497.
positions."\textsuperscript{567} This request laid the groundwork for Eisenhower's temporary assignment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As we noted in Chapter IV, Forrestal's disenchantment with the JCS reached such proportions that he even considered abolishing it.

Aside from looking for alternative sources of military advice, Forrestal also realized that his original approach to the budget process was now bankrupt. Still he was opposed to imposing a division of funds upon the Chiefs because he agreed with their contention that the 14.4 billion dollar ceiling was insufficient. He also disliked having to accept a strategy based exclusively upon a British based Air Force atomic assault. Since it was apparent, though, that the Chiefs had reached a total impasse on the division of the funds, Forrestal realized that he needed a whole new approach. On 5 October 1948, he met with President Truman and outlined his plan to ask the Chiefs to draw up an alternative force structure based upon a figure in the 18.5 billion dollar range. This would allow the administration the opportunity to choose between alternative force postures.\textsuperscript{568}

This new approach was revealed to the Chiefs in a memorandum dated 8 October 1948. This same memorandum also

\textsuperscript{567} Ibid., 500.
\textsuperscript{568} Ibid., 498.
revealed just how far his disenchantment with the Chiefs had gone. The secretary began by outlining the two tasks that he had placed before the Chiefs:

1. State the forces which, in your judgment, should be maintained during the fiscal year 1950.

2. State the forces which, in your judgment, should be maintained during the fiscal year 1950 in light of probable fiscal limitations.

Contained within these two tasks was the essence of the JCS's role under Forrestal's "new principle." The first task called for the development of an unconstrained budget, while the second task outlined the Chiefs' obligation in the balancing of commitments and capabilities. In regard to this latter point Forrestal added that the Chiefs should have supplied an assessment as to the impact the budget ceiling would have on their strategic plans. Such an assessment was necessary in order to make the balancing of capabilities and commitments a rational process. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that he was satisfied with the Chiefs' efforts to perform the first task, but that he felt they had failed in their second task:

The results of your work in carrying out the second phase of your instructions has been inadequate, apparently because there has been a departure from the primary JCS task of developing a statement of lesser force requirements, within fiscal limitations, which would still provide for relative readiness of the forces to be
maintained for the fiscal year 1950. By not pursuing the primary initial objective in this second stage it would appear that our efforts have degenerated into a competition for dollars.

Forrestal went on to inform the Chiefs that they were to begin work on "force requirements that can be supported in the general area of 14.4 billion." 569

It was at this point that Forrestal offered the Chiefs an opportunity to develop a force posture at a higher funding level, but he was not going to let them evade their responsibilities. He told the Chiefs that he wanted a "statement of force requirements on a basis of military necessity." In essence the Chiefs were still to produce a plan based on their best analysis of military requirements, but the plan had to be within the President's ceiling. Even though alternative force postures could be considered, the President's ceiling was still the goal to be strived for. The following week he called in the Chiefs to outline the specifics of his new proposal. He started by emphasizing the importance of the Chiefs' credibility and its relation to the budget process:

It is vitally important that the concept of the JCS not lose face with the country....I think it is a dangerous thing for the country if it does. You accept, to some extent, a confession of inability to get away from

569 Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October 1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.
service interests and look at the whole business in the light of what national interest is. That will be the public interpretation of it.\footnote{570}

On the surface, Forrestal was suggesting that the Chiefs return a budget within the President's ceiling, even if it meant accepting a "very minimum" atomic air assault force stationed in Great Britain. Forrestal wanted the Chiefs to point out the "absurdity" of such a posture, so that he could argue for raising the ceiling. On a deeper level, though, Forrestal seemed to be asking the Chiefs to consider non-military factors, such as the nation's financial stability, when they prepared their force analysis. By doing so they would be conducting themselves in a responsible manner and producing a budget that would be in the national interest.

On the 3rd of November, the Chiefs met to decide how to respond to Forrestal. The Secretary had imposed upon them an 8 November deadline, and warned them that if they could not divide the funds themselves, he would impose a division upon them.\footnote{571} Since the October 15 meeting in Forrestal's office, the JCS had been trying to come to some kind of compromise on the budget issue. They had returned the budget to the McNarney Board with the twin goals of producing a budget within the Presidential guidelines and

\footnote{570}{Forrestal Diaries, 504 ff.}
\footnote{571}{Condit, \textit{The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy}, 238.}
producing an alternative budget as outlined by Forrestal. In regard to the Board's first goal, no substantial improvement had been made since the 7th of October. According to the Army's representative, Major General George Richards, there was "no material change in the views previously held by [the services]." In an effort seemingly to substantiate this statement, Richards recommended a budget distribution that was identical to the Army's position on October 7th. He freely acknowledged that such a division of funds would result in an exclusive reliance on a Great Britain or North African based Air Force atomic assault, and that it would eliminate the Navy's ability to implement the Mediterranean portion of "FLEETWOOD." In terms of force structuring, this lack of a mission could lead to the reduction in the size of the Navy's carrier task groups.\footnote{572} The basic strategic differences that had inhibited the budget process from the start were still very much in evidence.

With the budget assistants still stalemated over the October figures, the Chiefs themselves moved to formulate a compromise position. Sometime between the 3rd

\footnote{572} Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 November 1948, subject: Force and Fund Allocations under the 14.4 billion Program, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives; for General McNarney's view, which was similar to Richards', see Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 November 1948, subject: Analyses of Force Requirements for Budget Estimates, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 114, folder "Bradley," Truman Library.
and the 8th of November, the Chiefs realized that since they could not come to an agreement on a rational division of the monies based on an integrated strategy, that the best alternative was simply to scale down their requests so that they fell under the ceiling. This kind of simple quick fix solution was exactly the opposite of what Forrestal wanted. Warner Schilling, in his study of the development of the FY 50 budget, points out that neither the Army nor the Navy were tempted by Forrestal's suggestion to accept an unbalanced strategy with the hope of increased service allocations. They did not believe that the Secretary of Defense could prove the "absurdity" of the 14.4 billion dollar strategy to the President; but that once the Chiefs had agreed to the strategy, they would have to live with it. The Air Force also apparently came to the conclusion that without the support of the other services, no JCS sponsored budget would be accepted at all. It is probable that the Chiefs realized that if they did not act quickly, they might be cut out of the budget process altogether, and possibly permanently. On the 8th of November, the Chiefs sent a memorandum to Forrestal outlining a division of funds within the ceiling's requirements. The Army would receive 4.8 billion, the Navy 4.6 billion, and the Air Force 5.0

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billion. Despite this agreement on the general breakdown of the monies, the memorandum pointed out that there still remained a difference of opinion as to the number of aircraft carriers the Navy needed. The Army recommended six, the Navy wanted nine, and the Air Force felt that four was sufficient. Without some kind of agreement on an integrated strategy the division of FY 50 funds had not really solved anything, and the Chiefs were no closer to being prepared to truly participate in the budget process than they were before.

Shortly afterwards, the Chiefs submitted a 16.9 billion dollar alternative budget. As they probably expected the administration kept within its ceiling, thus negating the value of the alternative budget.

The development of the FY 50 budget reflected most of the problems that would continue to hamper efforts at effective policy integration during the remainder of the period of our study. From the very beginning, the Chiefs

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574 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 8 November 1948, subject: Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. The fact that this was somewhat of a pyrrhic victory for Forrestal is indicated in a 9 November letter to Truman in which he outlined his problems with the Chiefs and that he wanted Eisenhower's help in the future, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 120, folder "Forrestal - General," Truman Library.

575 Letter, Forrestal to Truman, 1 December 1948, Clifford Papers, box 17, folder, "Unification - Secretary of Defense," Truman Library.
were working under the twin handicaps of lacking a systematic means of developing their own unified plans, and working within a policy vacuum. The political mission statement, which was the essential first step in Forrestal's "new principle," was not forthcoming. Early in the FY 50 process, Forrestal had asked the National Security Council for guidance upon which the Joint Chiefs could base their budget assumptions:

I believe that it is imperative that a comprehensive statement of national policy be prepared, particularly as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this statement specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives, and outline the measures to be followed in achieving them....such a statement is needed to guide the National Military Establishment in determining the level and character of armament which it should seek and, I believe, to assist the President in determining the proportion of our resources which should be dedicated to military purposes. I also believe that it is fundamental to decisions concerning the size of, and relative emphasis in, our national budget.

While Forrestal's request may be construed as a ploy to raise the budget ceiling, it also clearly was an effort to refocus the budget process in the direction that he originally envisioned it. Although the NSC began to work on a response, the President informed his Secretary of Defense that it was his responsibility to "establish a program within the budget limits which have been allowed," and that the effort should not wait on the NSC. 576

576 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary National Security Council, 10 July 1948, subject: Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required
Forrestal's failure to elicit specific guidance from the NSC forced the Chiefs, as individuals and as a corporate group, to generate their own assumptions and to determine certain strategic priorities which were reflected in their war plans. Ultimately, however, the Chiefs did have an opportunity to become involved in the NSC policy integration process, when they were asked to comment on a draft of NSC 20/3. On May 25, 1948, the JCS were formally asked to develop a catalog of American commitments "involving the use or possible use of Armed Forces." Such a list would be an integral part in the development of the political mission statement. In putting together the catalog, the Chiefs interpreted the term "commitments" in its broadest context "to include not only actual assignments of force, ... but also commitments of a less tangible nature, such as those implicit in pledges, pacts, contingent military actions and our foreign policies." The conclusion drawn from this study was to be expected:

It is clear from the above summary of commitments and their implications and from the attitude and capabilities of the USSR, together with the determination of the United States to resist communist aggression, an over-all commitment which in itself is all-inclusive
and with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly in agreement, that it is essential to our national security to bring our military strength to a level commensurate with the distinct possibility of global warfare.577

The obvious solution to the imbalance between national capabilities and national commitments was to increase the size of the military. Thus the catalog supplied the Chiefs with a perfect weapon with which to attack the budget ceiling. The trouble with this approach, was that the Chiefs waited too long before releasing the document. It was not sent to Forrestal until 2 November 1948, and was referred to in their formal comments on NSC 20/3 two weeks later. Again, the Chiefs pointed out "the dangers inherent in undue disparity between the nation's capabilities and commitments."578

In effect the Chiefs were charging the civilian leadership to carefully point out exactly what they wanted to accomplish with America's military forces. On the one hand, this would allow the military to shift the blame to the civilians for an inadequate force posture, and reinforce the Chiefs' claim to autonomy in the budget process. On the other hand, if


the administration failed to effectively outline their military goals, then the Chiefs would again be in a position to claim autonomy. This was the reverse of what appeared to be the President's approach in which the Chiefs were asked to define what they could accomplish within the budget ceiling. If the Chiefs actually intended to use their catalog and NSC 20/3 as a means of changing the budget ceiling, it failed primarily due to the fact that the document was issued too late in the process to have any effect. By then Forrestal had already issued his ultimatum to the Chiefs and whatever credibility they may have had as a corporate entity had been lost. Had it been available earlier, it might have forced the administration into rethinking the rationale behind the ceiling, or at least would have served as a focus for Forrestal's desire to restructure the budget process in the way he originally envisioned.

A collateral factor that impeded the effective formulation of FY 50 was Forrestal's desire that the Chiefs develop their proposals based solely upon military requirements. This was made very specific in his October 8th memorandum to the Chiefs, in which he outlined his goal of an alternative budget:

In carrying out this assignment, I do not feel that it is necessary for you to consider such matters as

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579 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy, 232.
political complications, possible commitments made in earlier Congressional testimony, etc. In other words, I want from you a statement of force requirements on a basis of military necessity. Other considerations will, of course, be taken into account in the making of final decisions, but in the final analysis the responsibility for taking such considerations into account will be that of the President, assisted to the extent he deems necessary by the suggestions of his political advisers.580

There is an apparent paradox in the Secretary's desire on the one hand to have the Chiefs retain their traditionalism, while on the other hand, understand the budget limitations and work within them. This paradox is explained when one recalls Forrestal's original outline of his "new principle." The Chiefs would take the administration's policy guidance and convert it into an integrated military plan initially based "solely on military considerations."581 Once that had been accomplished it would then be evaluated against fiscal and political feasibility. The result would be a force structure that would achieve the greatest degree of military security within the limits of those constraints. As important as it was to have the Chiefs involved in this stage of the process, it was even more important that they be involved during the first stage, the formulation of the political mission statement. If the Chiefs' military advice

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580 Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October 1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.

581 First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 41.
was effectively integrated into the system during the first stage, then it made sense to restrict the Chiefs to solely military considerations at the later stage. The evaluation of fiscal and political feasibility would be merely a check stage to guarantee that the JCS's military plans did in fact support the political goals that were agreed upon earlier and were within the fiscal limitations also agreed to.

Ultimately, the problem of the stage at which the Chiefs should be participants was the cause of Forrestal's efforts being ruined. The first stage of the process, that of developing an integrated and balanced policy never did occur. The formulation of NSC 20/3 and the JCS's catalog of commitments were never directly connected with the budget process, despite Forrestal's and the Chief's efforts. These two documents should have been an integral part in determining the political mission statement. Instead the Chiefs were brought into the process much later, after the parameters of that mission statement had been established. Thus the Chiefs lacked an understanding of the rationale behind the setting of priorities that led to the ceiling. Without this understanding, this requirement that they develop their military plans "based solely on military considerations," had a different meaning than Forrestal envisioned. The Chiefs' analysis of the situation from the military
perspective naturally resulted in a budget in excess of the administration's ceiling. Expecting the Chiefs to somehow remain within their professional limits, yet conscious of the non-military issues, when they had not participated in the decision making process, resulted in a high degree of organizational frustration. The Chiefs believed that they were expected to give their professional imprimatur to a force posture that had been arrived at without any professional input.

The fact that the Chiefs could not "objectively" arrive at the administration's budget ceiling for both the FY 49 supplement and the FY 50 budget pointed out to the administration the dangers of allowing the Chiefs budgetary autonomy. From that time on, during the remainder of the Truman administration and during the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs would have to endure budget ceilings at the onset of the planning cycle. Professor Lawrence Korb's research into the budget process clearly substantiates the Chiefs' own view that as a result of these ceilings, they had "virtually no impact upon determining the actual size of the military budget."582 While individual Chiefs such as Ridgway and Taylor voiced their disapproval of this mode

of operation, it was the Wheeler Report that captured the JCS's institutional dissidence on this matter:

The manner and timing in which the Services' budgets are justified, appropriated, and apportioned sometimes unduly determine military policy and strategy on the basis of peacetime economy and management rather than the readiness for war.

Determinations which are essentially military have been affected by means of fiscal controls and adjustments so that the resulting military funds, as finally apportioned, are often askew from the military requirements upon which the budget was originally predicated.

The end result of the use of these non-military determinants and the imposition of the budget ceilings was to prevent "the objective determination of requirements based upon directed roles, missions and plans followed by a tailoring to fit a feasible financial plan."\(^{583}\)

Clearly, the Chiefs appeared to be calling for a return to Forrestal's original concept of the budget process which they assumed would allow them a greater degree of autonomy over matters they considered "essentially military."

But a careful examination of the Wheeler Report's attack upon imposed budget ceilings reveal fundamental differences between the Forrestal model of policy integration and the military's model. Forrestal presupposed the Chief's participation during the early stages of the process, when

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\(^{583}\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization of the Department of Defense, 24 January 1958 (Hereafter referred to as the Wheeler Report), 13-14.
political and fiscal guidelines would be established. This was the basis of his criticism of the Army's "straight-line of command" and its sharp black and white distinctions between military and civilian functions.\(^584\) Those guidelines, which were the result of integrating political and military policy, would become the mission statement which would drive the remainder of the process. The military's integration process as outlined in the Wheeler Report assumes that there would be no consideration of fiscal feasibility until the Chiefs' had submitted their requirements statement. The notion of tailoring the force structure at that point implies that the Chiefs were not involved at an earlier stage when fiscal limitations of a non-military variety would naturally be discussed. They, in essence, were expecting the civilians to develop political guidance without fiscal considerations, while they themselves would develop their military requirements in a similar vacuum. Ironically, this was precisely the pattern that was exhibited during FY 50, with the one exception, that the civilians did consider financial matters from the start. Under the military's integration process model, the Chiefs would constantly be producing military plans that were divorced from reality, as they did in FY 50. It was this very inability to develop plans that was in tune with reality that resulted in their exclusion from

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\(^{584}\) Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September 1946, Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unification Correspondence - General," Truman Library.
the budget process. The only other option would have been for the Chiefs to have considered non-military factors when they developed their force requirements, but this may have been impossible given their professionalism and the civilian's fear of subverting civilian control of the military.

The only other time the Chiefs were allowed the opportunity to redeem themselves occurred a decade later during the formulation of the Fiscal Year 1959 budget. Again the Chiefs based their requirements on their professional analysis of the situation, excluded non-military factors, and produced a budgetary requirement 10 billion dollars in excess of the administration's desires.\textsuperscript{585} Ironically, the Wheeler Report attacked the FY 59 budget as an example of an imposed budget ceiling, claiming that it was "contrary to accepted budgetary practices."\textsuperscript{586} Ignoring the fact that budget ceilings had been the norm for a decade, the sequencing of events actually conformed to the Chiefs' process model, in that after the Chiefs had developed their requirements, they were measured against "financial feasibility."

The primary lesson learned from the formulation of FY 50, and reinforced during the development of FY 59, was that the Chiefs' desire for budgetary autonomy was incompatible with the civilian leadership's obligation to consider

\textsuperscript{585}Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 106-7.

\textsuperscript{586}Wheeler Report, 13.
a broad spectrum of factors influencing national security. The Chiefs' concept of professionalism demanded autonomy and any attenuation of their estimates meant an affront to their professional capability and a violation of traditionalism. In an effort to get around this traditional professionalism, the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations reorganized the Department of Defense. It was hoped that if the Chiefs achieved unanimity, the kinds of dysfunctional inter-service rivalry that took place during the formulation of the first budget would be eliminated. The establishment of budgetary ceilings was simply one approach to dealing with the unrealistic estimates that were being produced by the JCS. While it is true that "realism" is relative, in this case the lack of it had the effect of removing the Joint Chiefs from any meaningful role in the budgetary process. The fact that the Chiefs, themselves, were at least partially at fault was never understood by the military professionals.

While the lessons of FY 50 had a negative effect, at least in terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's future role in the formulation of the defense budget, they also had a positive effect on the political and the military planning systems. After the failure of the budget, the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs apparently agreed that it was necessary for both the NSC and the JCS to
develop cohesive planning systems within their own structures and that these newly formed systems would merge their products together to form a unified integrated political/military plan. This would remove the twin handicaps that had faced the Chiefs during the formulation of FY 50: the lack of policy guidance, and the lack of a unified military plan.

In an effort to fill the vacuum in policy direction a process of codifying national security policy began during the Korean War and continued on vigorously during the Eisenhower administration. This process had two facets. First, the National Security Council Staff expanded into a more structured system in order to process guidance. Second, the NSC formalized and regularized its guidance. This movement culminated, during the Eisenhower administration, in the publication of an annual document entitled Basic National Security Policy (BNSP). According to Lawrence Legere, the BNSP "broadly defined U.S. interests and objectives, analyzed the major trends in world affairs that might affect them, and set forth a national strategy for achieving them, covering political, economic, and military elements thereof." 587

The BNSP was the result of the President's own inclination to structure things in a military staff manner. Maxwell

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Taylor recalled that "it was just like his [Eisenhower's] old staff at SHAEF; all the committees of the NSC were like his general staff divisions." Undoubtedly, Eisenhower looked upon the BNSP as the operations order upon which the JCS would base its planning.

As the National Security Council began to codify its own product and establish communication with other governmental agencies, it was apparent that the JCS would have to do likewise. In 1950, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added to the NSC staff, but still the communications problems remained. Until the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a system that produced a unified military plan it would be almost impossible for them to supply useful advice to the NSC. The lack of such a system had contributed significantly toward the failure of the FY 50 budget. It was with this in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff established their "program for planning" in July 1952.

This concept was first outlined by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Taylor, the Director of the Joint Staff, in 1949. Rather


589 Jackson Committee, 432; for a discussion of how the JCS and NSC ultimately developed very effective linkages during the Viet Nam War see William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).
inexplicably, although the Korean War had to have had some impact, the program was not put into effect until almost three years later. In its final form, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) #84 outlined the formulation of three basic policy planning documents, the short range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the mid-ranged Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), and the long-ranged Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE). The JSCP was the successor to the short range Joint Emergency War Plans that were the only integrated planning documents prior to the Korean War. The JSCP dealt with the contemporary world situation, outlined the services' capabilities and described how they would react to certain contingencies. The JLRSE (at times identified as the Joint Long Range Strategic Study, JLRSS) is a long range study, ten years or more in advance, which emphasized broad trends rather than attempting to outline specific operational plans. The JLRSE was particularly valuable in the area of research and development where lead times of a decade or more are normally required.

While both of these documents are important in the planning process, it is the JSOP that is the focal point of the JCS interface with the budget process. According to the official definition, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan is:
A mid-range objectives plan which translates U.S. national objectives and policies from the time frame 5-8 years in the future into terms of military objectives and strategic concepts and defines basic undertakings for cold, limited, and general war which may be accomplished with the objective force levels.

The JSOP filled the crucial void in the Forrestal/Sherman approach to the budget process. It was this document that translated the NSC's political mission statement into a military force posture. The JSOP was exactly the type of document that Forrestal wanted the JCS to develop during the formulation of FY 50, and as such it should be the central document in the policy integration effort.

The JSOP, however, can only be as good as the guidance the Joint Chiefs received from the National Security Council. Despite the Council's vigorous efforts, the Chiefs all through the Eisenhower administration felt that the NSC's guidance was still insufficient. This view was reinforced by independent analysis such as the Task Force on Procurement of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government which conducted its study in 1955. This continued criticism of the political guidance is central to

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590 Dictionary of United States Army Terms, Army Regulation 310-325 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1972), 290.

understanding why the Chiefs continued to believe that the policy integration process was a failure and that they were operating in a policy vacuum. Probably, the foremost military critic of the BNSP was General Maxwell Taylor. General Taylor described that the BNSP "should be the blueprint for the security programs of all departments of the government and provide the JCS with a firm point of departure for their strategic planning:"

Unfortunately, such is not the case. The end product... has thus far been a document so broad in nature and so general in language as to provide limited guidance in practical application. In the course of its development, the sharp issues in national defense which confront our leaders have been blurred in conference and in negotiation. The final text thus permits many different interpretations. The protagonists of Massive Retaliation or of Flexible Response, the partisans of the importance of air power or of limited war, as well as the defenders of other shades of military opinion, we are able to find language supporting their divergent points of view. The "Basic National Security Policy" document means all things to all people and settles nothing.592

Since the Chiefs perceived that the BNSP failed to supply them with appropriate guidance, they, according to Generals Taylor and Decker, were forced to generate their own assumptions upon which they based the JSOP.593 In a cyclical kind of scenario, this resulted in the Chiefs supplying useless advice to the civilians. While the Task Force on Procurement was criticizing the NSC for its guidance, it


593 Interview with Generals Taylor and Decker, January 1975, Washington, D.C.
was also pointing out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed to develop a coordinated and integrated war plan and that "efforts to bring non-military advice into the process had been relatively unfruitful."  

The fact that the Chiefs had to generate their own assumptions when they wrote their first Joint Emergency War Plans, "BROLIER/FROLIC", in 1946, was explicable; but once the NSC became operational it was dysfunctional. This was partially the cause of the continual disparity between the JCS generated force requirements and the fiscal constraints outlined by the civilian leadership. Granted, the JCS did supply input during the writing of the BNSP, but from the Chiefs perception it was simply "feeding the paper mill over at the NSC." Conversely, one can get a sense of what Eisenhower thought of the JCS input by recalling that in 1958 he not only restructured the Department of Defense, but specifically reorganized the internal staffing structure of the Joint Chiefs.

The failure of the policy integration program that General Taylor noted was reflected in the continual existence of the budget ceilings, which in turn meant that the JSOP


595 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 276-77.

596 Interview with General Taylor, January 1975, Washington, D.C.
was not being considered in the generation of a force posture. Forrestal realized that a JSOP type document was essential to the budget process, because it would translate the political mission statement into forces, missions, and dollars; but the budget ceilings superceded the political mission statement and reversed the process by which force levels were determined. This reversal effectively took the Chiefs out of the decision making process, and led General Taylor to write that "nowhere in the machinery of government is there a procedure for checking military capabilities and political commitments." 597

With the Chiefs' efforts at attaining autonomy in the budget process blocked by the imposition of budget ceilings, they apparently tried the next best thing; to influence the formulation of the political mission statement in such a manner that it would allow for the force levels the Chiefs' sought. This effort met with mixed success in regards to the three major policy statements written during the period, NSC 20/3, NSC 68 (written in 1949-50), and NSC 162/2 (written in 1953). In all three cases the Chiefs attempted to create the image of a disjuncture between the nation's strategic commitments and its military capabilities. This was obviously

597 Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 83. General Taylor tried to get Secretary of State Dulles to meet regularly with the Chiefs. While he did meet with the Secretary informally, there never were established regular meetings. Taylor, interview.
the intention of the Chiefs in their use of the catalog of commitments to criticize NSC 20/3. While their efforts failed in 1943, they met with greater success the following year during the writing of NSC 63. This document was written in response to the shocks of the Russian explosion of an atomic bomb and the fall of China, and was designed to lay the foundation for future American mobilization. Although the Chiefs remained conspicuously aloof from the document's actual development, a representative of the Joint Staff's Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Major General Truman H. Landon, was deeply involved in its writing. When the strategic implications of NSC 68 were translated into dollars and cents it came surprisingly close to the Chiefs' original recommendations for FY 50. NSC 68 was never put into effect because of the advent of the Korean War.

While the Chiefs met with mixed success in their first two efforts to substantially influence policy, they were far more successful during the formulation of the NSC 162/2. Shortly after his election, President Eisenhower called his new Chiefs together and asked them to examine America's strategic posture and generate supporting budget estimates. Their first efforts resulted in estimates that were six to seven billion dollars in excess of the administration's

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figures. The Chiefs argued through their spokesman, Admiral Radford, that since the military had not been notified of an official administration position on the use of nuclear weapons, they had to plan for every possible contingency across the whole spectrum of war. According to policy analyst Glenn Snyder, Admiral Radford maintained that if the Chiefs "were told what kind [of war] they were to prepare for, and, in particular, if they were given permission to use nuclear weapons whenever it was technically advantageous to do so, then the costs of defense would be lower." 599 Radford's position that nuclear firepower could substitute for manpower became one of the pillars of the New Look.

These three examples seem to indicate, at least superficially, that the Chiefs were being drawn into the policy process and were capable of influencing the formulation of strategic guidance, but the Chiefs were successful only when their goals were in congruence with the goals of the administration. In 1949 the Truman administration and especially the State Department was very interested in redeveloping the military option. This created the situation for a re-evaluation of the whole strategic force structure in NSC 68. In 1953 Radford's arguments for replacing expensive

manpower with firepower was supported by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was already committed to the use of nuclear weapons. When there was a lack of congruence, as in the case of the development of NSC 20/3, the JCS had little impact.

The essence of a process to produce an integrated political/military policy was to achieve a nexus between the nation's political goals, the military planning process, and the development of the defense budget. As management specialist Fredrick Mosher pointed out in his 1954 study of the defense budget process, "military plans are ineffective unless they are supported by the budget; and the budgets are meaningless unless they are based upon sound military planning, itself built upon approved objectives in foreign policy." It was in an effort to achieve this nexus that the rationalism of program budgeting was first introduced. The problem was that this logical and rational process broke down with each side blaming the other for the failure to produce an integrated political/military policy with neither

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side fully understanding why the breakdown occurred. The civilian leadership's experience, first during FY 50 and later with FY 59, convinced them that the Chiefs could never be allowed the budget autonomy that they demanded. The constant interse warfare over weapons systems acquisition reinforced this assumption.\footnote{For a discussion of the debates over weapons systems see Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); John Medaris, Countdown for Decision (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1960); James Baar and William E. Howard, Polaris: The Concept and Creation of a New and Mighty Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960); Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).} Thus both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations established budget ceilings, which seemed to substantiate the Chief's contention that the nation's capabilities and commitments were not being effectively analyzed and balanced. Unfortunately, such a superficial examination of the breakdown fails to tell us actually what happened. In order to understand what did happen we must go through the process and analytically compare it to our hypothetical model.

First let us examine the nature of the political mission statement that starts the budget process. The Chiefs claimed that these statements were ineffectual, forcing them to operate in a policy vacuum. While such a perception is quite understandable when there was a lack of institutional linkage between the JCS and the NSC, the creation of the
BNSP should have changed that. One possible explanation for the continuation of this perception may have been the Chief's own experience with the military's mission statement. Within the military logic process, the mission statement is the essential ingredient, since the commander's "estimate of the situation" cannot begin without it. Only after he has received the mission statement is it possible to begin to look at the enemy situation, the forces available to him, the terrain, and so forth. The primacy of the mission statement is clearly noted in the following extract from the 1940 edition of the United States Army Staff Officer's Field Manual:

> Every military operation should have a definite aim. All missions assigned incident to an operation are contributory to that end. A commander's mission as conveyed in orders or instructions from higher authority should require the adoption of a definite course of action in meeting the situation which confronts his command.

It is essential that the mission statement define with great precision the exact objective of the operation. Conversely, according to one military commentator, "a complex and vaguely worded objective induces inefficiency and ineffectiveness." Compared to the specificity of the typical military mission statement, the NSC's general policy statements epitomized

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603 War Department, Staff Officer Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders (F.M. 101-5) (Washington, D.C.: 1940), 125.

vagueness and complexity. This represented a problem when one realizes that the Chiefs apparently were looking to the leadership of the Defense Department or to the NSC to supply them with a military-like mission statement upon which they could base their planning. In the formulation of both NSC 20/3 and NSC 162/2 the Chiefs went back to the administration and asked for greater precision in what was desired of the military forces. This explains why the Chiefs opposed the use of ceilings which in effect asked them what they could accomplish within certain budgetary limitations. Their opposition to budget ceilings loses credibility, though, in the face of further examination of the mission statement model. One of the normal elements of the mission statement is the allocation of forces to accomplish the mission. If the commander feels that the forces given to him are insufficient he can request more, but if that fails he must attempt to carry out the mission with the forces at his disposal. The budget ceiling may be viewed as merely the allocation of forces to the military, and thus fits perfectly within the mission statement model. Since the Chiefs were opposed to it, there must have been another reason. Most likely it was the fact it was developed by non-military professionals and based upon non-military factors.

It is the use of the military mission statement model that clarifies the differences between the military's
approach to policy integration from that of Forrestal's. The military wanted to receive a political mission statement from the civilians that would be specific enough for the development of supporting military plans, but not too specific as to infringe upon their professional prerogative. The Chiefs would proceed to generate technical military plans in an economically unconstrained environment with the only yardstick of effectiveness being the achievement of the political goals. Most likely, those goals would have to be framed in geopolitical terms (e.g., the containment of communism or the defense of Europe) in order to facilitate their translation into military operations orders. Only then would they be measured against economic feasibility. In practice this balancing stage would have no meaningful affect on the process, since the plans were professionally developed. If the costs proved unrealistic, then the fault lay in the original mission statement, which required that too much be accomplished. It would be the original mission that would have to be rewritten, either excluding certain items or becoming more specific (e.g., allowing the use of nuclear weapons as in the case of NSC 162/2).

Forrestal's approach was fundamentally different, especially in the first stage. For the first Secretary of Defense, it was the development of the political mission statement that was the heart of the policy integration process.
It could not and would not be made exclusively by civilians without military considerations being included. Thus the Chiefs had to be involved in writing their own mission order. Such a process would include consideration of all determinants to include economic and budget factors. Once the mission statement had been written, the Chiefs would then apply their expertise and develop a strategic program to support that mission. The development of this plan would be unconstrained, except for the constraints that were already included in the mission statement. Under this approach, Forrestal was as against the establishment of budget ceilings without military input, as the Chiefs were, but for obviously different reasons.

The perceptual difference about the first stage of the integration process was the tragic flaw that ruined the best efforts at making the system work. Since the Chiefs apparently could not work within the framework supplied by the vague and clearly non-military political mission statements, they generated their own assumptions upon which to start the planning process. Naturally, these assumptions were laced with service perspectives. One example of this occurred during the writing of NSC 162/2. Radford had built his argument for the freedom to use nuclear weapons upon a dysjuncture between commitments and capabilities. This of course had been the approach taken by the Chiefs in 1948,
but Radford and his supporters defined commitments very narrowly to mean only agreements in which military force was actually committed. This would allow for a much smaller force structure than if the definition would include all possible commitments as the Chiefs used in their 1948 catalog and Ridgway argued for in 1953. This broader definition would allow for a larger force structure, especially for the Army. It was differences like this that resulted in paperclipped budgets that far exceeded the civilian's expectations. Although the Chiefs may have differed on service matters, they all agreed that the budget should only consider military expediency. The Chiefs did not consider this to be dysfunctional because this was the way their professional and organizational ethic was structured. Autonomy in the budget process meant the exclusion of non-military considerations.

The Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to bridge this gap between the Chief's military requirements and reality by requiring that the Chiefs take economic factors into consideration. Forrestal tried this in his 8 October memorandum, and Wilson tried it with his 1954 Directive, but this only created a potentially greater problem and a major dilemma for the Chiefs. If the military professionals

began to take into account non-military factors, then the foundation of American civilian-control of the military would be undermined. Only a truly integrated and fusionist approach during the first stage of the process could solve this problem. Fusionism, if understood correctly by both the civilians and the professional military would not endanger civilian control, and possibly would reinforce it. From the Chiefs' perspective, to submit to the administration's desires and incorporate economic factors not only violated their professionalism, but also made them vulnerable to attack since they lacked the expertise to generate economic assumptions. Furthermore, any conclusion that differed from the administration's would be deemed wrong and further weaken their credibility. Another factor that the Chiefs undoubtedly considered was that the development of alternative force structures would allow the civilians to make crucial military decisions. In the bifurcated world of the military professional, only the expert should be allowed to make those decisions. The Chiefs did not seem to understand that their rejection of fusionism allowed the civilians to exclude them totally from the budget process, leaving the non-military leaders of the administration to make the important military decisions anyway. Given their professional
 ethic, it was only natural for the Chiefs to posit these non-experts could never adequately balance the nation's capabilities and commitments. While the placement of blame might be at least partially wrong, the Chiefs were right that policy integration had failed.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

In January 1961, a new Democratic administration came into office, and like his two predecessors, President Kennedy understood the necessity of having an effectively managed defense structure. With this in mind, Kennedy asked former Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington, to form a committee to examine restructuring the Department of Defense. The Symington Committee reported that the reorganizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958 had not fundamentally altered the original 1947 structure and that these reorganizations had "failed to bring the organizational structure of the Department [of Defense] into line with the requirements of today's military conditions."

The fundamental structural problem the Committee pointed out was the confusion that arose from having both a service and a Department of Defense chain of command. The solution to this duality was to eliminate the service secretaries. Their functions would be absorbed by two new super-directorates that would be formed within the Defense Department: one for Weapons Systems, and the other for

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Administration. Each would be headed by an Under Secretary of Defense. This same duality was also pointed out as impeding the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it forced the Chiefs to assume a "two-hatted character" which resulted in inter-service rivalry. The solution was to eliminate the JCS as it was then configured and to replace it with a new Military Advisory Council consisting of senior officers, possibly retired, who would have no service responsibility. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be redesignated the Chairman of the Joint Staff (which would be expanded in size) and named the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. While the chiefs of service would still exist they would not be a member of the expanded Joint Staff nor on the Advisory Council, and their precise role was left rather unclear. In regard to the defense budget, the professional military's role was never mentioned, foreshadowing Robert McNamara's total assumption of this responsibility when he came into office. The logic of this further concentration of power was reaffirmed by Secretary McNamara who discovered upon assuming office "that the three military departments had been establishing their requirements independently of each other" and that these "so-called requirements bore almost no relation to the real world."  

The problems that both the Symington Committee and Secretary McNamara described were by no means new ones. Every staff analysis since Forrestal's First Report of the Secretary of Defense had repeatedly pointed out that the JCS was not effectively coordinating its plans with other agencies and that their plans tended to be divorced from reality. Furthermore, these studies had continually maintained that there was a relationship between dysfunctional inter-service rivalry and the fact that the Chiefs had to assume both the role of a service commander and a planner within the corporate structure of the JCS. Yet, three reorganizations later, these problems still remained and the panacea of earlier reorganizations, greater centralization into the hands of the civilian defense managers, was again offered as the solution.

The reason for this constant reinvention of the organizational wheel was that the civilian leaders did not understand that there were two root causes to these problems and not just one. The first cause, which was more readily identifiable, was organizational and bureaucratic. It was manifested symptomatically by inter-service rivalry and became the primary target for reform. Furthermore, concentrating on the organizational and bureaucratic causes had the advantage of dealing exclusively with structural matters and avoiding having to address the more complex and
controversial fundamental values and relationships that existed between the civilian leadership and the military professional. The second cause, which was less apparent, but inextricably related to those values and relationships that were untouched by organizational reform, was the nature of military professionalism. The civilian defense managers never did understand that they could not totally solve the first problem without understanding the second.

It was the issue of inter-service rivalry that captured the attention of critics of the defense planning system. Unfortunately, that rivalry was all too easily attributed to the Chiefs having a "two-hatted" role. Once it became dogma that there was a cause and effect relationship between the Chief's placement within the chain of command and inter-service rivalry, it was axiomatic that the removal of the former would eliminate the latter. This explains why excluding the Chiefs from the chain of command became the organizational panacea for both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations. But this over-concentration on the chain of command issue merely obfuscated the fact that it was the services that were in conflict, not just the Chiefs.

The military services, like any large bureaucratic organization, had vital interests to protect. Those interests were generally outlined in the service's roles and missions, and were more specifically identified in the allocation
of combat missions under the various war plans. Any change in one of these missions had far-reaching fiscal and organizational consequences. The protection of these vital interests led the Chiefs to engage in the same type of bureaucratic decision making that was occurring all over Washington. While considered quite acceptable behavior when conducted by civilian decision makers, it was looked upon as dysfunctional when exhibited by the professional military.

This double standard also ignored the reality that inter-service rivalry was not just the result of petty bureaucrats fighting among themselves for a larger slice of the budget. The Chiefs, as representatives of military services that had totally different approaches to waging war, honestly believed that their service was essential to the nation's defense. Since the military budget was a reflection of the problems associated with inter-service rivalry, any objective evaluation of service representation was impossible. It was forgotten that the Chiefs were appointed because of their service experience and their ability to advise based on experience. From the Chief's perspective, that advisory ability was directly tied to their command function. One is reminded of Admiral Burke's statement that "if the Chiefs didn't represent their services who were they to represent."

Most of the Chiefs saw divergencies of opinion,
resulting from service representation, in a positive light. The Truman administration, plagued with service conflict, rejected such pluralism almost from the start. Furthermore, the civilian leadership did not seem to appreciate the fact that the Chiefs performed a valuable function while playing the service "front man" for the administration. They not only added authoritative support to the administration's position, they also channeled service discontent. Admiral Denfeld lost control of his service's officer corps when it was felt that he could no longer be trusted to defend the Navy's vital interests. As a result, the officer corps believed that it had no choice but to seek alternate means of expression, such as the Congress or the press. Thus a certain amount of rivalry was necessary, if for nothing more than constituent consumption.

A related organizational problem was that of the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Staff. Within the Joint Staff the problem of service bureaucratic imperatives was exacerbated by its interconnection with individual career enhancement. During both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, there were organizational efforts to elevate the Joint Staff above service interests. The expansion of the Armed Forces Staff College and the creation of the National War College was designed to broaden the base of understanding by America's future military leaders, and
to minimize service parochialism. This latter goal was the rationale behind Secretary Gates' requirement that all officers serve a tour at the joint level prior to promotion to flag rank. President Eisenhower's reorganization of the Joint Staff in 1958 was also aimed at limiting the service's impact on the Joint Staff, by eliminating the committee system. Unfortunately, none of these efforts had the desired results.

What the civilian defense managers really wanted was the independence and analytic skills of a professional general staff. Such an institution would not only be compatible with their management styles, but would also be theoretically above service interests. Fear of Prussianization made such a military general staff anathema to the civilian leadership, so they proceeded to create a civilian general staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Once the decision had been reached by Forrestal and Truman to abandon the notion of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs, because it apparently led to conflict, the basic pattern for defense reorganization was set. In the place of pluralistic divergency, the Chiefs would be required to supply only unanimous advice. In order to guarantee this unanimity, the power of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was increased, the politicization of the selection process occurred, and the chain of command
was restructured to make the JCS into more of a planning agency. This latter reform was all important because it directly related to the Chief's advisory function which was the real reason for the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal knew he had to have sound military advice on political/military matters. The failure of the Chiefs to agree forced Forrestal to consider disbanding the JCS, just as the Symington Committee recommended, and ultimately to decide upon making the Chairman his "agent" within the institution.

Complicating this problem even further, was the Chiefs' desire not to abdicate their advisory function simply because they could not come to an agreement. Fully understanding the realities of the bureaucracy, they tried to use artificial means to facilitate agreement. This only exasperated the civilian leadership further. In a paradox of logic, the civilian managers thought that unanimity would eliminate all this dysfunctional behavior. What they failed to realize was that while such unanimity did present a solid front to Congress, the more it was forced, the more the Chiefs' advisory function dissipated.

Despite these massive organizational efforts, the reforms failed to address the other fundamental problem, military professionalism, that plagued the Chiefs' effectiveness. Of the three elements of professionalism: corporateness,
responsibility, and expertise; it was the latter one that had the greatest impact. There is little doubt that the Chiefs perceived themselves to be the administration's military experts, a role that the administration normally granted them. Such a perception impacted on the Chiefs' effectiveness in two ways. First, the nature of a profession required that the professional demand autonomy within his area of expertise. Second, the demand for autonomy meant that the expert could not consider factors that were outside his expertise in the development of professional advice. Thus, expertise clearly defined the parameters within which the Chiefs could operate and excluded the incorporation of non-military factors in the process of developing advice for their civilian superiors. The result was the domination of the Huntington/absolutist model. One hundred and fifty years ago Clausewitz suggested that it was absurd to ask that the military professional limit his advice to the military point of view. The advent of nuclear weapons and the cold war have made it all the more absurd. The problem was that pragmatism or fusionism appeared to be incompatible with America's traditional notions of civilian control.

This apparent incompatibility is at the heart of the failure of the policy integration process. The assumption that fusionism was somehow anti-American was taken
for granted by both the civilian leadership and the military professionals. Furthermore, the parameters determined by professional expertise were also accepted by all the parties concerned. Even Forrestal seemed to accept the notion that the Chiefs were to look at things only from the military point of view. The difficulties confronting both groups were more than semantical, they were based on fundamental, historical, social, and professional beliefs.

Aside from the demand for unanimity and the politicization of the selection process, the ultimate result of the constant disunity among the Chiefs was to impede, if not eliminate, their ability to have any meaningful impact upon such important defense matters as the budget. Without effective military participation, the administration's imposed budget ceilings became the main means of molding defense policy. This is not to say that the amounts allocated were insufficient, just that the process by which they were derived was divorced from professional military input. From the Chief's perspective, this use of non-military determinants failed to analyze and balance capabilities and commitments in a meaningful way, forcing the Chiefs to tailor their force levels and war plans to fit fiscal criteria, and increasing their institutional frustration.

While technically the Chief's criticism of the budget process was correct, it failed to take into consideration
the fact that their own actions had, to a great extent, led to their exclusion. Instead, the Chiefs blamed the civilians for the flaws within the NSC structure and vague policy directives. To be sure, there was substance to their claims, but a more fundamental cause for the breakdown of communication was a lack of understanding on the part of the Chief's civilian superiors about the nature of military professionalism.

As military professionals the Chiefs sought autonomy within their sphere of professional competency. Based upon the concept of expertise they claimed exclusive control over military matters, and conversely excluded non-military considerations. This striving for autonomy, as well as their own career experiences, led the Chiefs to expect that the budget process would follow the steps of the operations plan model; a model that both Admiral Sherman and Secretary Forrestal advanced. Under this model the political leadership would determine the long-range political goals of the state, while the military determined the most effective military means of attaining those goals. The major point of contention occurred when fiscal reality was balanced against military effectiveness. The creation of ceilings meant that the administration had determined the level of the balance prior to the military's involvement.

Another problem that emanated from the military's
professional experience was the relationship of specific mission statements to the operations plan model. Within the military such mission statements were quite specific in order to facilitate planning. Structural flaws and the natural tendency of political statements to be general, led to vague and imprecise directions being given the military. From the Chiefs' point of view, they were operating within a policy vacuum that they were forced to fill themselves. It was only natural that as they generated their own assumptions upon which to base their planning, those assumptions would be based exclusively on military factors. This, of course, led to what the civilians characterized as unrealistic plans and programs. Thus, each side blamed the other for the breakdown in political-military planning.

To achieve real policy integration required a reinterpretation of the liberal definition of civilian control, and the military's perception of the nature of professionalism which relegated the soldier to that of an automaton, and demanded the exclusion of all non-military factors from consideration. Instead the traditional interpretations of both civilian control and military professionalism prevailed, creating an obstacle to policy integration. The more the soldier strove for the type of autonomy in policy formulation that his professionalism demanded,
the more he produced highly professional, but dysfunctional advice. This advice not only excluded many of the non-military factors that the civilian leadership considered important, but it also excluded many factors that were critical to military planning. This undermined the Chiefs' credibility and forced the civilian leadership to seek alternative sources of military advice. The more these alternative sources of advice became dominant, the more the Chiefs became alienated from the policy system, and the more they attacked the system for not considering their professional input.

As each side simply blamed the other, they proceeded to offer new organizational structures that merely papered over the problem. The civilians were afraid to upset the traditional soldier-client relationship that was the basis for the American version of civilian control. The military was equally reluctant to break down the delimitating barriers of traditionalism. The soldier's whole ethical background had instilled in him a reverence for those barriers, and his whole career had prepared him for his place within the staff structure. He would fulfill his role as the Le Grande Brut, and await for the issuance of the political mission statement.

This is not to say that both sides were unaware of the real cause of the policy bifurcation. The professional soldier was fully aware of the political, social, and
economic consequences of his actions, but to articulate that understanding or project the image that those factors were taken into consideration might be interpreted as a challenge to civilian control. Maxwell Taylor's "new professionalism" came precariously close to such a pronouncement, but even he stayed within the pale. The civilians also understood the problem or at least diagnosed the symptoms. One after another of the independent DoD studies came up with the same conclusions in regard to the JCS; but like a doctor who has no theoretical foundation behind his medical knowledge, they merely treated the symptoms hoping that it would cure the disease. All of these studies recommended new organizational panaceas that led to further centralization, and all called for better coordination between the national command authority and its military advisors. Never once did they address the issue of coordination outside the context of an organizational chart. It was as if they had never heard of Secretary Forrestal's admonition on the importance of the men who make up that organizational chart. Coordination and policy integration was viewed only in bureaucratic and managerial terms. They never addressed the necessity for both the civilians and the military to have mutually shared values, and an appreciation for the complete spectrum of the military, political, social, and economic issues at stake.
While the scope of this study ends with the completion of President Eisenhower's second term, the problems that have been discussed continued to exist. During the 1970s, two major studies of the Defense Department were completed and they confirmed the hypothesis that treating the symptoms would not cure the disease. The first of these studies was the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. While the Panel's report identified the recurring problems of interservice rivalry, the committee nature of the JCS, and the Chiefs' dual and conflicting role as planner and commander, this study, unlike its predecessors delved deep enough to actually find the source of the disease.

Ideally, the JCS must be fully prepared to provide competent professional technical military advice, while recognizing and giving full due weight to non-military considerations, the political, economic, and social realities of national security affairs. They should accept the fact that professional military advice must be balanced and tempered by higher authority with fuller cognizance of those other factors. Nevertheless, the prime mission of the JCS, in their view, is to point up the hard military risks which may arise from decisions weighted more heavily, as will happen, toward non-military factors. The JCS, in short, must be ready to make clear the national security consequences of alternative top-level decisions. Their deep conviction, born of their professionalism and their statutory responsibilities, is that military viewpoints and security risk assessments should not become submerged at the point of decision by political or economic factors; overweighed, perhaps, but not submerged.608

Surprisingly, the Blue Ribbon Panel offered no organizational

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solutions. Instead, it seemed to have faith that the Chiefs were evolving toward the ideal. How this evolution would occur or how it could be facilitated was rather unclear, but the Panel indicated that the "new professionalism" and total policy integration was at hand.

A second major study conducted during the 1970s was the Steadman Report, published in 1978 under the direction of President Carter. Generally speaking, this report showed that the Blue Ribbon Panel's optimistic view was unwarranted. The same problems that had been observed since the passage of the National Security Act remained unchanged, despite thirty years of structural efforts to eliminate them. Although the Blue Ribbon Panel had been unduly optimistic, it at least had identified the narrow military point of view as an obstacle to policy integration. Unfortunately, the Steadman Report, while implicitly substantiating this contention, never followed through with an analysis and offered no solution other than traditional procedural panaceas: changing the make up of the Joint Staff, changing the method by which the JCS produce their paperwork, and creating a separate group of national military advisors composed of former chiefs or CinCs. This is almost identical to the ideas that Forrestal flirted with.

After examining the various organizational recommendations, as well as the underlying factors that led to the breakdown in effective policy integration, the obvious question is what is the solution. I find unpersuasive the more radical solutions that would replace the Chiefs with a committee of senior military advisors who would have no command responsibility. While removing the duality that exists within the JCS, I believe the cure can be just as bad as the disease. In the first place, there is no guarantee that senior advisors, whether retired or simply relieved of command responsibility, would be immune from service parochialism. As we noted earlier, inter-service rivalry is at least partially derived from a real commitment to one's service and a belief in the importance of that mode of fighting wars. After nearly forty years in a single service, it is doubtful that such loyalty would be eliminated by virtue of retirement. The real drawback to this suggestion though is the separation of planning from command responsibility. The dangers that can result from irrational ivory tower planning is every bit as dangerous, if not more so, than an over-concentration on purely operational realities. The total elimination of the Chiefs would remove a valuable counter-balance in the planning process. This is not to say that there are not a number of major changes that could be implemented that would increase the Joint
Chiefs effectiveness. Among those possible changes the following would be my recommendations.

1) Give the Chairman a fifth star and make him the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. This would give him the status and the leverage to more effectively deal with inter-service rivalry, as well as be in a better position to articulate the Chief's views to the civilian leadership. A strong argument can be made for making him a full member of the NSC or at least its sole military advisor. Obviously, the selection of the Chairman is important in order to guarantee that he is above service interests. In order that he understands the internal workings of the JCS, he should formerly have been either a Chief, the Director of the Joint Staff, of the Assistant to the Chairman. Historically, with the exception of Admiral Radford, all of the Chairman have had experience somewhere within the JCS. The Chairman should be looked upon as an objective professional and not a creature of the administration. If the JCS staffing process becomes more responsive to the goals of the administration and the Chiefs input more usable, then the motivation behind making the Chairman the administration's "agent" will have ended. Thus I would oppose having the Chairman's term expire automatically upon the advent of a new administration. Such a policy would totally politicize the position
and erode his credibility as a professional advisor.

2) The procedures by which the Joint Staff generates its product need to be totally revamped, eliminating the "flimsy, buff, green, red striped nightmare." The key element that made it such a nightmare was the requirement for service concurrence at every level, which if removed short of the green stage, would minimize the waffled positions that have become the hallmark of the JCS. Obviously, some service input is required at the initial filmsy stage; but between then and the final Joint Staff product, the Joint Staff should work apart from the service staffs. While this will probably result in more split decisions being forwarded, it will be positive in the sense that the issues will be clarified and the opportunity to choose between real alternatives will be at hand. This had been the Truman administration's original intent until inter-service rivalry forced it to replace pluralism with unanimity. This recommendation will only work if the civilian leadership is willing to accept more split decisions and not seek unanimity as a means of escaping their constitutional obligations.

3) With the implementation of the previous recommendation, the role of the Joint Staff will have been enhanced and reliance upon the service staffs minimized; nevertheless, two internal structural changes are needed to increase its effectiveness. First, the Joint Staff needs to develop
its own analytical capabilities, especially in the budget and costing areas. It was the lack of this capability that cost the JCS its influence during the McNamara period. Since the services have developed their own capability, the Chiefs are forced to rely to a great extent on that self-serving data.

Secondly, since the JCS plans are criticized for being divorced from non-military reality, I would suggest the establishment of a small independent think tank designed to develop military positions that incorporate non-military perspectives. Such a think tank would be staffed by bright young officers selected for their ability to bridge the gap between the military and the non-military points of view. Their independence would be guaranteed by making the assignment permanent, along the lines used by the permanent faculty at the military academies. The members of this think tank would have given up the opportunity for higher command within their service in exchange for the opportunity to analyze complex political-military issues and have an impact on policy formulation. Since, they would never return to their service of origin, the pressure to conform to a service viewpoint would be eliminated. They would, in effect, be a mini-General Staff along the Prussian model. Two factors would work to mitigate the danger of ivory tower planning. First, new officers would periodically
be brought in so that the group would not stagnate. Second, the staff would have no command function. The sole purpose of the think tank would be to develop alternative analysis on the issues the Chiefs examine. By having such analysis the Chiefs might be better able to impact effectively on policy development.

4) Aside from the major changes within the Joint Staff outlined above, there are several minor changes that would enhance the Staff's effectiveness. One would be to increase the length of time an officer can stay on the staff. This would increase the institutional memory of the organization. Second, assign a small number of civilians to the Joint Staff. While their number should remain small so as not to become dominant, they would form a permanent nucleus of the staff and broaden the base of the Joint Staff's experience. Some of the civilians could be rotated from other agencies within DoD, State or the CIA, thus increasing the institutional linkages between those organizations and the JCS. Such a procedure would go a long way toward eroding the isolation that the Joint Chiefs have been so correctly criticized for. It is axiomatic to say that the officers assigned to the Joint Staff should exhibit a "purple suit mentality" and that such an approach should be rewarded in the officers' next assignment. Promotion above the rank of colonel/captain should be predicated upon assignment
on a joint staff. Such mandatory exposure to the joint arena and the problems related to other services will do much to minimize service parochialism.

5) The Director of the Joint Staff should be given a fourth star and made a full member of the JCS. This would reflect the increased responsibilities of the Joint Staff, and allow him to more effectively argue for the Joint Staff's product, especially since concurrence would not be sought during the product's development. He should also serve as acting chairman if the incumbent is not available. Under the present structure the senior Chief takes over and naturally brings with him his service biases at possibly crucial times. It is essential that the Director be considered an honest broker and that the job not simply be a ticket to be punched for higher command. To preclude the Director protecting his ties to his own service, he should not be considered for the position of a Chief after leaving the Joint Staff. Given his joint experience and the prominence of his former position, the only realistic position that would be available to a former Director would be that of Chairman or a commander in chief of a unified command. His background should emphasize joint planning with at least one prior tour on the Joint Staff and some experience at the unified command level.
6) Consideration should be given to the creation of a joint general staff. Such a staff would consist of a small number of officers, who upon graduation from their service staff colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College would be permanently assigned to the joint general staff. Such officers would make up a substantial portion of the Joint Staff and the joint staffs of the various unified commands. They would have their own promotion system, with the goal being the Director of the Joint Staff. There would be fundamental differences between this organization and the basic Prussian model. First of all, the members of the joint general staff would not all be working for the Director of the Joint Staff. Those that were assigned to unified commands would be working for that commander in chief. The reason for their assignment to the unified commands would not be to guarantee continuity of implementation, but to bring joint staffing expertise. Second, members of the joint general staff are not expected under any circumstances to command, nor would they be assigned at echelons lower than the unified commands. Finally, the continued existence of the service chiefs and their own staff would act as a check against the joint general staff becoming too dominate and act to counter-balance any ivory tower planning. While this is obviously, the most radical of my recommendations, in the long run it may be the most
The above recommendations have totally focused on the organizational aspect of the problem, despite the fact that the major thesis of this study is that it is the narrow perceptual basis of professionalism that led the Chiefs to exclude non-military factors from their planning process. The reason is that value transformation does not lend itself to the same type of itemized recommendations that organizational changes do. Since this aspect of the problem focuses on the value system of the officer corps, the only effective way to deal with it is to change that value system. It needs to be carefully pointed out that the incorporation of non-military factors does not destroy the experts knowledge. On the contrary, fusionism is simply the use of differing data to develop the most useful military advice. The officer must always remember that an overconcentration on any one factor will be as dysfunctional as the compartmentalization that has plagued the national security system since the end of World War II. To say that fusionistic balancing would be easy is to totally underestimate the problem.

Clearly, the attainment of a new value system is easier said than done. A value system is acquired slowly over time as a result of role modeling, peer pressure, and value inculcation. Despite the problems, there are several
ways it can be accomplished. First, the curriculum of the service schools offers an invaluable tool in fostering pragmatism. Second, role modeling by senior officers would have a great effect on junior and middle-grade officers, especially if they realize the relationship between promotion, and maintaining a joint perspective and incorporating non-military factors. Finally, the belief on the part of the civilian leadership that such an approach is in the national interest is essential to its success. In this regard Forrestal's plan of asking the Chiefs to develop an unconstrained and then a constrained budget, can serve as a model for future administrations. The breakdown in Forrestal's system occurred when the Chiefs failed to handle the second assignment.

Mere acceptance of fusionism would have little or no value if the Chiefs' input was ignored or the institutional linkages non-existent. The civilian leaders must bring the Chiefs into the policy process at the earliest possible stage. The administration must carefully outline its political goals so that the Chiefs can generate a strategy and a force structure to achieve those goals.

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610 For a discussion of the absolutist position in the service staff college curriculum see John Binkley and Donald Vought, "Fort Apache or Executive Suite: The United States Army Enters the 1980s," Parameters, Journal of the United States Army War College, 8 (June 1978).
That force structure then must be balanced against fiscal and political realities. As part of this balancing the original assumptions and goals must be reexamined and all alternatives fully and rationally explored. It is at this stage that a pluralistic JCS is essential because it will supply viable alternatives from which the administration can choose. At every stage it must be a joint effort or dysfunctional compartmentalization will occur.

Without such an approach the American government will continue as it has for over thirty-five years, attempting to resolve through structural means a problem that is essentially intellectual and perceptual. True policy integration will never be attained until it is finally agreed that "indeed it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely military opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do."
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APPENDIX A

MEMBERSHIP OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy</td>
<td>20 Jul 42 - 21 Mar 49</td>
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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
<td>16 Aug 49 - 14 Aug 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Nathan F. Twining, USAF</td>
<td>15 Aug 57 - 30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
<td>1 Oct 62 - 2 Jul 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
<td>3 Jul 64 - 1 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN</td>
<td>1 Jul 70 - 1 Jul 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General George S. Brown, USAF</td>
<td>1 Jul 74 - 20 Jun 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General David C. Jones, USAF</td>
<td>20 Jun 78 - 1 Jul 82</td>
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<tr>
<td>General John Vessey, USA</td>
<td>1 Jul 82 -</td>
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Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

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<td>General of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td>9 Feb 42* - 18 Nov 45</td>
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<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>19 Nov 45 - 7 Feb 48</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Omar N. Bradley</td>
<td>7 Feb 48 - 15 Aug 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General J. Lawton Collins</td>
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* Date of the first formal JCS meeting
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
(Continued)

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<td>General Matthew B. Ridgway</td>
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<tr>
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<td>General George H. Decker</td>
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<td>General Earle G. Wheeler</td>
<td>1 Oct 62 - 2 Jul 64</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Harold K. Johnson</td>
<td>3 Jul 64 - 2 Jul 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>General William Westmoreland</td>
<td>3 Jul 68 - 30 Jun 72</td>
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<td>General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (Acting)</td>
<td>1 Jul 72 - 15 Oct 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Creighton W. Abrams (Died in Office)</td>
<td>16 Oct 72 - 4 Sep 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Fredrick Weyand</td>
<td>7 Oct 74 - 30 Sep 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Bernard Rogers</td>
<td>1 Oct 76 - 21 Jun 79</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Edward C. Myer</td>
<td>22 Jun 79 - 21 Jun 83</td>
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<tr>
<td>General John A. Wickham</td>
<td>22 Jun 83 -</td>
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Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Harold R. Stark</td>
<td>9 Feb 42* - 12 Mar 42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (also Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet)</td>
<td>9 Feb 42* - 15 Dec 45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz</td>
<td>15 Dec 45 - 15 Dec 47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Louis E. Denfeld</td>
<td>15 Dec 47 - 2 Nov 49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Forrest P. Sherman (Died in Office)</td>
<td>2 Nov 49 - 22 Jul 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral William M. Fechteler</td>
<td>16 Aug 51 - 16 Aug 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Robert B. Carney</td>
<td>16 Aug 53 - 17 Aug 55</td>
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* Date of the first formal JCS meeting.
Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, Continued

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke 17 Aug 55 - 31 Jul 61
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. 1 Aug 61 - 1 Aug 63
Admiral David L. McDonald 1 Aug 63 - 1 Aug 67
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 1 Aug 67 - 1 Jul 70
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. 1 Jul 70 - 30 Jun 74
Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr. 1 Jul 74 - 1 Jul 78
Admiral Thomas B. Haywood 1 Jul 78 - 1 Jul 82
Admiral James D. Watkins 1 Jul 82

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

General of the Army Henry H. Arnold (Commanding General, Army Air Forces) 9 Feb 42* - 28 Feb 46
General Carl Spaatz (Commanding General Army Air Forces, until 26 Sep 47) 1 Mar 46 - 30 Apr 48
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 30 Apr 48 - 30 Jun 53
General Nathan F. Twining 30 Jun 53 - 30 Jun 57
General Thomas D. White 1 Jul 57 - 30 Jun 61
General Curtis E. LeMay 1 Jul 61 - 31 Jan 65
General John P. McConnell 1 Feb 65 - 31 Jul 69
General John D. Ryan 1 Aug 69 - 31 Jul 73
General George S. Brown 1 Aug 73 - 30 Jun 74
General David C. Jones 1 Jul 74 - 20 Jun 78
General Lew Allen 1 Jul 78 - 1 Jul 82
General Charles A. Gabriel 1 Jul 82 -

* Date of the first formal JCS meeting.
<table>
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<th>Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.</td>
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<td>General Randolph McC. Pate</td>
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<td>General David M. Shoup</td>
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<td>General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.</td>
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<td>General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.</td>
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<td>General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.</td>
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<td>General Lewis H. Wilson</td>
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<td>General Robert H. Barrow</td>
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<td>General Paul X. Kelley</td>
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* Date of statute providing for Marine Corps membership.
The dissertation submitted by John Charles Binkley has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. James L. Penick, Director
Professor, History, Loyola

Dr. Robert McCluggage
Professor, History, Loyola

Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian
Professor, Political Science, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

4/2/85
Date

[Signature]
Director's Signature