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The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and the Santo Domingan Receivership of 1905: Big Stick Or Big Brother?

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THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE
AND THE SANTO DOMINGAN RECEIVERSHIP
OF 1905: BIG STICK OR BIG BROTHER?

by
Ronald Francis Reter

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History
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PREFACE

In formulating this thesis special attention was given to the relevant statements of the principals involved notably Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. Due to the amount of controversy centering on the Corollary and its application, the exact words of the participants are used whenever necessary. The amount and length of the quotations are central to establishing the link between the strategic significance of intervention and humanitarian instincts.

Special assistance was rendered by various libraries and collections in the Chicago area. Included among these are John Crerar Library, the Chicago Public Library, Elizabeth Cudahy Library, the Library of International Relations, Newberry Library, and Harper Library of the University of Chicago.
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PART I

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY:

BIG STICK

Contrary to popular opinion the Roosevelt Corollary, as American imperialism in 1898, did not just suddenly appear. Actually, the principles contained in Roosevelt's pronouncements were the result of an evolution of the Monroe Doctrine that had been going on since its inception. This development was changed and remolded by various forces and emphases throughout its history. It, like history, was the product of its time. A particular aspect was to be maximized or minimized by the historical context in which it was placed. The original message of 1823 and its espousal of the principles of No-Transfer, Non-intervention, and Non-colonization were engendered by a desire to isolate the New World from the political entanglements of Europe, especially wars. The principle of Non-intervention, however, can be clearly linked to the rise of numerous Latin American states and their existence hastened the growth and development of the principle.¹

¹ John A. Logan, Jr., No Transfer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 245
President Polk was later to re-define the Non-colonization in regard to lesser American states.

The reassertion of this principle especially in reference to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a policy which no European power should cherish the disposition to resist. It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent.²

The acquisition of territory is a practical demonstration of the right and power of sovereignty. The Monroe Doctrine closed the American continent to the colonial adventures of Europe which in effect curbed the territorial appetite of the strong and the temptations of the weak. Gradually, these restrictions were to widen from Mexico to Venezuela and finally to Santo Domingo.³ The crisis in Mexico in 1860 caused President Buchanan to enunciate a further refinement of the Monroe Doctrine.

I deem this a most important consideration—European Governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concensus of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved from this obligation of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these Governments to deprive our neighboring Republics of portions of her territory—a duty from which we

³ Talcott Williams, "Europe and the United States in the West Indies," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXVI (1905), p. 42. (Herein after referred to as Annals.)
could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people.4

In addition, the United States legation in Mexico City issued to the diplomatic corps there a manifesto on the projected intervention. In that manifesto the United States denied European governments "the right to interfere, directly or indirectly, with the political independence of the republic of Mexico," and would, "to the extent of its power, defend the nationality and independence of said republic." In response to this statement, a British diplomat clearly envisaged the Roosevelt Corollary: "If the position of the United States . . . is authorized and maintained, I cannot but view it as binding that country to assume the moral obligation toward other nations, of restoring peace and order in Mexico, and of preventing the recurrence of scenes which disgrace humanity and neutralize . . . the international rights and natural commercial relations of civilized nations."

William H. Steward on June 2, 1866 issued the following statement regarding activities in Mexico in particular and Latin America in general.

the republican system (in any South American State) shall not be wantonly assailed and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. We concede to

every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political ambitions, as it think right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral conceding nothing to one belligerent what we allow to the other. 6

President Grant was to emphasize yet another aspect of the Monroe Doctrine in regard to the relations between Latin American territories and European powers.

These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another. When the present relation of colonies ceases they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers. 7

Grant's Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, foreshadowed the Roosevelt Corollary and the Santo Domingan Receivership in his instructions to Minister Partridge on the convention with Venezuela. "You are authorized to propose to the government of Venezuela to place all the customs-houses of the country in the hands of persons to be designated by the United States." 8 Although Fish was primarily concerned with the collection of the claims of American citizens, which he considered entitled to preferential treatment, he was not unwilling to assume the obligation of

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collecting the claims of the Europeans. 9

The concern over possible European acquisition of American territory was again prevalent in the attitude assumed by President Hayes in regard to De Lesseps' attempts to construct a French financed Panaman Canal. In his message to the Senate he took the ground that the smallest measure of political control or protection of the proposed canal by "any European power or any combination of European powers was inadmissible." 10

Intertwined and overriding many of the other considerations of the Monroe Doctrine was the concept of Manifest Destiny and all it entailed. The eminent position of the United States, its special moral mission to the world, and its justification for its actions were essential to the conduct of American affairs. The special role of the United States as the moral guardian of the world was voiced by numerous spokesmen throughout the period.

We are not insensible to the glamor of "Manifest Destiny," which means a destiny of power and control; but there is a higher and no less manifest destiny to extend sound government and stable institutions. 11

Richard Olney, Cleveland's Secretary of State and author of the famous Twenty-Inch Gun Note, provided a combination of all of the elements of the concept of Manifest Destiny because he offered

11 "A Motion To Take From the Table," The Independent, LVI (March 3, 1904), p. 508.
a synthesis of all its components. The realization of American power was intertwined with a concern for lesser states. "The first duty of every nation, as already observed, is to itself - is a promotion and conservation of its own interests. Its position as an active member of the international family does not require it ever to lose sight of that principle." This would tend to be in keeping with the general view of what Manifest Destiny entailed. Olney, however, continues, "But, just weight being given to that principle, and its abilities and resources and opportunities permitting, there is no reason why the United States should not act for the relief of suffering humanity and for the advancement of civilization wherever and whenever such action would be timely and effective."12 Such a statement does not seem in keeping with the author of the now famous quote that "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is laid upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."13

Olney was convinced that "the Primacy of the United States as respects the affairs of the American continents is a principle of its policy which will no doubt hold good and be as firmly asserted in the future as in the past."14 He further elaborated

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13 Clark, p. 159.
14 Olney, p. 298.
this belief in his well known letter of July 20, 1895.

That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are now convinced, therefore, only with that other practical application of the Monroe Doctrine the disregards of which by an European power is to be deemed an art of unfriendliness towards the United States. The precise scope and limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligations from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference between it and other American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American state or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies. 15

The question of territorial aggrandizement in the New World by an European power was construed by Olney to be in opposition to "a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by an European power of political control over an American state." 16 He continued in stating his case in even stronger and more bellicose language.

Hence the message just quoted declared that the American continents were fully occupied and were not the subjects

15 Clark, p. 156.
16 Ibid., p. 160.
for future colonization by European powers. To this spirit and this purpose, also, are to be attributed the passages of the same message which treat any infringement of the rule against interference in American affairs on the part of the powers of Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It was realized that it was futile to lay down such a rule unless its observance could be enforced. It was therefore courageously declared not merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs, but that any European power doing so would be regarded as antagonizing the interest and inviting the opposition of the United States.17

Olney's message prompted much comment both in praise and criticism. The criticism most often assumed stems from the ideas developed by Lord Salisbury in his reply to the letter.

It follows of necessity that, if the Government of the United States will not control the conduct of these communities, neither can it undertake to protect them from the consequences attacking to any misconduct of which they may be guilty towards other nations. If they violate in any way the rights of another State; as of its subjects; it is not alleged that the Monroe Doctrine will assure them the assistance of the United States in escaping from any reparation which they may be bound by international law to give.18

The London Chronicle a semi-official organ of the British government voiced much the same sentiment.

If an enlarged application of a neglected doctrine is to be enforced with all the might of the United States, at least let us be assured that the United States will make itself responsible for the foreign policy of all the petty impetuous little states of the two continents. There is no international right without a corresponding duty.19

17 Ibid., pp. 155-156.
18 Ibid., p. 165.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt's friend and mentor, was of a different opinion regarding the Monroe Doctrine and what could be expected and demanded of it.

It is not a doctrine of international law, and the attempt to discuss it or oppose it on that ground is a waste of words. Like the independence of this country, it is a question of fact and not of law... The Monroe Doctrine... is merely the declaration that no foreign power must establish a new government, acquire new territory by purchase or by any other method whatever, or seek to control existing governments in the Americas. That is the principle which Mr. Monroe declared. If there is any dispute as to the meanings of his language, it is not needful to dwell upon it. That is what the American people believe he meant.20

Theodore Roosevelt realized two important aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. "A navy will sustain the honor of the American flag... I want to see the Monroe Doctrine upheld in its entirety... I believe in these policies with all my heart and soul."21 "Primarily our action is based on national self-interest. In other words, it is patriotic."22 At the same time his long time confidant James Bryce, a British diplomat, wrote to Roosevelt in Jan. 1, 1896: "As to the Monroe Doctrine, I have never been able to see how it applies at all to such a case as this (the Venezuelan affair of 1895-1896); if the United States

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22 Ibid., p. 279.
are going to assume a protectorate over all Central and South America, and see that these so-called Republics behave like civilized States, that is another matter. The other countries will know whom they have to deal with." In order to one day act in the manner advocated by Bryce, Roosevelt felt that American navy had to be strengthened; in fact, it was essential "if we mean to protect the people of the lands who look to us for protection from tyranny and aggression". If this were not the case the United States might as well "abandon all talk of devotion to the Monroe Doctrine or to the honor of the American name." In 1898 he went on to describe the Monroe Doctrine as:

forbidding European encroachment on American soil. It is not desirable to define it so rigidly as to prevent our taking into account the varying degrees of national interest in varying cases. The United States has not the slightest wish to establish a universal protectorate over other American States, or to become involved in an ordinary quarrel with a European power, such quarrel must be settled between them by anyone of the usual methods. But no European state is to be allowed to aggrandize itself on American soil at the expense of an American state. Furthermore, no transfer of an American colony from one European state to another is to be permitted, if, in the judgement of the United States, such transfer would be hostile to its own interests.

Latin America at the turn of the century was a cause for mutual distrust on the part of all contending powers. Roosevelt

24 Pringle, p. 172.
25 Logan, p. 262.
said in 1898 "Germany, and not England, is the power with whom we are most apt to have trouble over the Monroe Doctrine." British mistrust of the United States was voiced by the Review of Reviews in 1899 "the only question asked in England with certain laudable curiosity is as to how it will be before it (Santo Domingo) follows Porto Rico and Cuba in becoming a dependency of Uncle Sam's." In this period of growing bellicose feeling and ever-unceasing fear of encroachment on the principles of the Monroe Doctrine it is not difficult to see Elihu Root's sense of urgency when he stated "no man who carefully watches the signs of the times can fail to see that the American people will within a few years have to either abandon the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it, and we are not going to abandon it." In regard to a possible attempt at British annexation of the Galapagos Islands, he went on to reiterate his position "An attempt to obtain possession of those Islands by a foreign power would raise for the United States the question whether the Monroe Doctrine was to be abandoned or not, for there could be no part of the territory of the American continent to which that Doctrine would apply with greater force,


and, that, in my judgment, the United States would not permit the Islands to be occupied by any other than an American country." 29

The area over which America was to claim sway was severely restricted by the Report of the General Board in 1901 which that "the principles of strategy and the defects of our geographical position make it impracticable successfully to maintain naval control by our force beyond the Amazon unless present conditions are radically changed." 30 This appraisal came into direct conflict with a number of the fears and assumptions of Americans in formulating their policies. The Monroe Doctrine was to foster republicanism throughout all of Latin America, to strengthen the United States position from both a political and economic standpoint. In addition, its opposition to the complication of the Caribbean situation by European control of territory either permanent or temporary would suffer from it lack of sufficient strength to combat possible aggression. 31

Concern over possible German advance at the cost of American primacy was widespread throughout prominent circles in the United States. This fear centered on possible German acquisition of a

29 Ibid., p. 563.
foothold on South American soil and a naval station in South American waters.\textsuperscript{32} The growth of German colonies, especially in southern Brazil, was felt to be an occasion for a possible confrontation over the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{33} This fear was so great that Roosevelt needed no push of public opinion to force him to uphold the Doctrine for both Lodge and himself had long been concerned about Germany and its intent on Venezuela.\textsuperscript{34} In their correspondence much is made of the danger that Germany offered to American interest in the Caribbean. "I find that the Germans regard our failure to go forward in building up the navy this year as a sign that our spasm of preparation, as they think it, has come to an end; that we shall sink back, so that in a few years they will be in a position to take some step in the West Indies or South America which will make us either put up or shut up on the Monroe Doctrine; they are counting upon their ability to trounce us if we try the former horn of the dilemma."

The fear of any European, especially a German, aggrandizement

\textsuperscript{32} "The Venezuelan Crisis And After," \textit{Review of Reviews}, XXVII(1903), p. 145.


\textsuperscript{35} Roosevelt to Lodge, March 27, 1901, Morison, III, pp. 31-2
was the cause of another letter from Roosevelt to Lodge a few months later. "I would do all in power to have the United States take the attitude that no European nation, Germany or any other, should gain a foot of soil in any shape or way in South America, or establish a protectorate under any disguise over any South American country." The Venezuelan crisis served as a practical test for this approach to the Monroe Doctrine. "I was bound that we should not be put in the position of preventing the collection of an honest debt. I was also bound that there should be no territorial aggrandizement by an European power under the cover of the collection of such a debt." 

The question of the collection of debts raised a thorny problem as was demonstrated in the Venezuela crisis. The American minister, Russell, had stated that the Monroe Doctrine would not "serve as protection for rascals, and that the United States would not lift a finger in case of a forcible intervention on the part of Germany in Venezuela." This apparent contradiction is resolved only if consideration is given to Roosevelt's duality regarding the Monroe Doctrine and the mission of civilized Western powers to help civilize the backward people like the Venez-

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36 Roosevelt to Lodge, June 19, 1901, Morison, III, p. 98.
37 Roosevelt to G.W. Hinman, Dec. 29, 1902, Morison, III, p. 400.
uelans. Although the United States sanctioned German actions, there was a qualification to them as Secretary of State Hay noted: "the United States government viewed with regret any resort to force on the part of European powers against the Republics of Central and South America but they could not object to any action taken by them with the view of obtaining redress for injuries inflicted on their subjects, provided such action did not contemplate any territorial acquisition."40

Roosevelt had felt that his policy was a logical continuation of Cleveland's and took time to tell him so. "It seems to me that we have succeeded in accomplishing this time in connection with getting England and Germany explicitly to recognize the Monroe Doctrine in reference to their controversy with Venezuela and in getting all of the parties in interest to accept arbitration by the Hague Court. I congratulate you heartily on the rounding out of your policy."41 Later, he wrote to Albert Shaw "My position has been consistent for a long time on the Monroe Doctrine. I supported President Cleveland in 1896 ... the principles we set forth were explicitly accepted by both Germany and England, and of course nothing that they have done or

39 Beale, p. 405.
or threatened to do so far has in any way or shape conflicted with our contention as to what the Monroe Doctrine means. In effect, the United States had enlarged the ideal of duty to keep peace in America and to prevent European powers from setting up colonies or protectorates in Latin America.

The Venezuela crisis gave birth to one of the numerous controversies surrounding Theodore Roosevelt. This particular one centers on his actions and their motivation during the actual crisis. In a letter to William Roscoe Thayer, Roosevelt explained it thus: "I also became convinced that Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms, on the model of Kiauchan, with a view to exercising some measure of control over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs generally." This seems to be a logical continuation of the thoughts he had expressed to Spring-Rice some fifteen years earlier. "When I first came into the Presidency I was inclined to think the Germans had serious designs upon South America. But I think I succeeded in impressing on the Kaiser, quietly and unofficially, and with equal courtesy and emphasis, that the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by territorial aggrandizement on his part around the Caribbean meant war."

not ultimately, but immediately, and without any delay."45

Roosevelt's second letter to Thayer was more bellicose in tone and has touched off a still raging controversy as to his reasons and recollections. "I answered that I thoroughly counted the cost before I decided on the step, and asked him (Ambassador Holleben) to look at the map, as a glance would show him that there was no spot in the world where Germany in the event of conflict with the United States would be at a greater disadvantage then in the Caribbean sea."46 Critics, however, have noted that this statement was sharpened by the war and also Roosevelt's dislike for Holleben after he had induced him to prepare the way for the blockade by defining the Monroe Doctrine in his message to the Congress as "not intended to guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of acquisition of territory by any non-American Power."47

Roosevelt, however, was quite satisfied with his action in the crisis. In a speech at Chicago April 2, 1903 he noted both Germany and England had expressed in the most explicit terms that

45 Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Morison, V, p. 63.
they had not the slightest intention on their part to violate the Monroe Doctrine, and "this assurance was kept with an honorable good faith which merits full acknowledgement on our part."48

In his annual message of 1903 he stated

It will be remembered that during the second session of the last Congress Great Britain, Germany, and Italy found an alliance for the purpose of blockading the parts of Venezuela and using such other means of pressure as would secure a settlement of claims due, as they alleged certain of their subjects. Their employment of force for the collection of these claims was terminated by an agreement brought about through the offices of the diplomatic representatives of the United States at Caracas and the Government at Washington thereby ending a situation which was bound to cause increasing friction, and which jeopardized the peace of the continent.49

Secretary of State Hay had made clear Washington's position earlier. Advocating and adhering in practice in questions concerning itself to the resort of international arbitration in settlement of controversies not adjustable by the orderly treatment of diplomatic negotiation, the Government of the United States would always be glad to see the questions of the justice of claims by one State against another growing out of individual wrongs or national obligations, as well as the guarantee for the execution of whatever award may be made, left to the decision of an impartial arbitral tribunal before which the litigant nations, weak and strong alike, may stand as equals in the eye of inter-law and mutual duty.50

50 Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 6.
Reaction to Roosevelt's policy was both favorable and unfavorable. Some felt that the United States had conducted itself properly and brought real benefits to the Latin Americans by reducing claims, protecting their territory and in effect, serving the best interests of the United States. Others were of the opinion that Roosevelt himself had precipitated the action as an European test to the statements in his annual messages. Thus this attempt to uphold the Monroe Doctrine had almost resulted in its violation.

The majority of the claims which had brought about the action were based on injuries and losses during the civil wars in which Castro had risen to power and on the violation of contracts by the Venezuelan government. The German government announced to the United States that it along with Great Britain and Italy would establish a pacific blockade of Venezuelan harbors. The United States replied, however, that it did not recognize such blockades which adversely affected third party rights as valid. The powers then proposed to establish a "warlike blockade" but "without a declaration of war" in order for the Germans to stop the approval of the Bundesrath necessary for a formal declaration.

of war.\textsuperscript{54} Roosevelt and Hay while approving such action on the part of the Allies sought to limit it. The tenets of the Drago Doctrine were ignored while the British made political hay of the need for American assumption of the responsibility for the actions of the Latin American republics.\textsuperscript{55}

The concept of allowing certain punitive actions to be taken against delinquent Latin American states opened the way for many undesirable circumstances. The first of these being the sacrifice of the incomes which was necessary to the very existence of the states.\textsuperscript{56} Second, the conditions in most Latin American states would leave all of them open to such action.\textsuperscript{57} Third, it could provide the means for a Latin American rejection of the Monroe Doctrine and a swing to Germany.\textsuperscript{58} Fourth, if such actions as customs houses seizures were allowed by foreign creditors it would almost be impossible to dislodge them and a subsequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine would result.\textsuperscript{59} Finally, such action would render the Monroe Doctrine suspect in Latin America.

\textsuperscript{54} Latane, \textit{The United States and Latin America}, pp. 251-252.
\textsuperscript{55} Van Alstyne, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{56} A Jeffersonian Democrat, pp. 331-332.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 323.
\textsuperscript{58} "How to Develop the Monroe Doctrine," \textit{Review of Reviews}, XXVII (1903), pp. 231-232.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
as demonstrated in an editorial from the Correio de Manha of Rio de Janeiro on March 30, 1903: "The Monroe Doctrine as such has no value whatever. At best it is simply another document for the benefit of those who would determine the characteristic psychology of the North American."60

The action taken by the Allies sanctioned by the United States was contrary to the Drago Doctrine formulated by the Minister of Argentina. It forbade the forcible collections of public debts based on the contention, "It is an inherent qualification of all sovereignty that no proceedings for the execution of a judgment may be instituted or carried out against it."61 Furthermore, it held that the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations."62 Basically, the doctrine provided first "the capitalist who lends his money to a foreign state always takes into account the resources of the country and the probability, greater or less, that the obligations contracted will be fulfilled with delay. All governments thus enjoy different credit accordingly to their degree of civilization and culture and their con-

duct in business transactions." One of the fundamental principles of international law, the entity and equality of all states, required that acknowledgement of debt and payment must be left to the concerned nation "without discrimination of its inherent rights as a sovereign entity. The collection of loans by military means implies territorial occupation to make them effective, and territorial occupation signifies a suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed."63

The Drago Doctrine was actually an adoption of the Calvo Doctrine which condemned intervention (diplomatic as well as armed) as a legitimate method of enforcing any or all private claims of a pecuniary nature, at least such as are based upon contract or are the result of civil war, insurrection or mob violence.64 America's refusal to prevent the armed intervention of the Allied Powers of necessity make the Calvo and Drago Doctrines stand on their own merits rather than under the sanction of the United States.65 The United States did, however, offer the Porter Resolution to replace the Drago Doctrine. It provided that none of the contracting parties would resort to force in collecting contract debts unless the debtor state should disregard an offer of arbitration or, after

64 Hodges, p. 85.
having accepted the offer, should fail to submit to the award.66

Immediately after the crisis debates took place in Parliament which were to have a profound effect on future British action and on the development of the Monroe Doctrine. Prime Minister Balfour in the course of these debates stated; "I do not deny—in fact, I freely admit—that the bondholders may occupy an international position which may require international action; but I look upon such international action with the gravest doubt and suspicion, and I doubt whether we have in the past ever gone to war for the bondholders, for those of our countrymen who have lent money to a foreign government; and I confess that I should be very sorry to that made a practice in this country."67 In regard to the Monroe Doctrine, Balfour made his position clear in a speech at Liverpool on Feb. 14, 1903. "We welcome any increase of the influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. We desire no colonization, we desire no alteration in the balance of power, we desire no acquisition of territory. We have not the slightest intention of interfering with the mode of government in any portion of the continent. The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, is not really in question at all."68


67 Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 495.

The press in both England and the United States kept up a steady clamor for the enunciation of a new American position to take into account the changing conditions of the day. The most common argument ran very much similar to this. The United States cannot assume to forbid foreign powers from collecting debts due from a South American Republic unless it be willing to assume the responsibility and exercise the authority to enforce the protectorate it claimed to establish. 69 The London Times stated the premise even more succinctly on Jan. 30, 1903 "the Power which holds a shield over the weaker States is under an obligation to compel them to observe their duties in regard to others." 70 Sydney Brooks asked "Have we succeeded in convincing America that the Monroe Doctrine carries with it certain responsibilities?" 71 Thus the idea that Monroe Doctrine was put forward. At least in part due to British urging the Roosevelt Corollary resulted. 72

The question of European occupation of American territory was central to the Venezuela crisis and to the whole concept of the Monroe Doctrine and its relation to the European powers. "The United States was willing to allow European governments to punish

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71 "The Venezuela Crisis and After," p. 145.
72 Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, p. 240
recalcitrant Latin American republics, provided assurance was given that there would be no permanent occupation of territory. 73 From the time of his ascension to the Presidency, Roosevelt had voiced his assent to European action against defaulting governments provided it did not violate the Monroe Doctrine. "I do not want the United States territorially to aggrandize itself in South America, and neither do I want to see any European country so aggrandize itself. If any South American State misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it; but I do not wish the United States or any other country to get additional territory in South America." 74

In a letter to his Secretary of State, John Hay, Roosevelt clearly outlines his policy:

The chief interest of the United States in relation to the other republics upon the American continent is the safety and permanence of the political system which underlies their and our existence as nations, --this system of free self-government by the people. It is, therefore, to be desired that all the freedom under just laws, each sovereign community pursuing its own course of orderly development without external restraint or interference. To this condition of security the peace and prosperity, of all our neighbors will materially contribute. Every failure on their part to maintain social order, every economic distress which might give rise to domestic disturbance, every discord between them which could impede their industries, menace their stability, or bring upon them the calamity of foreign interference could be a misfortune to us . . . the deep interest which the Government of the United States has in the peace and tranquility of all the American states and in their terri-

73 Jessup, p. 497.
74 Roosevelt to Von Sternberg, July 12, 1901, Morison, III, p. 116.
itorial integrity. While no specific engagements or declarations should be made with regard to such questions, it is desirable to cause it to be generally understood that the Government would seriously condemn any attempt to destroy the territorial integrity or to encroach upon the sovereign rights of the existing state, or any conduct on their part which might tend to evoke such a calamity.75

Again in the first year of his Presidency, Roosevelt made his position clear in no uncertain terms. "I regard the Monroe Doctrine as being equivalent to the open door in South America, that is, I do not want the United States or any European power to get territorial possessions in South America but to let South America gradually develop on its own lines, with an open door to all outside nations, same as the individual countries enter into individual treaties with one another. Of course this would not anywhere interfere with transitory intervention on the part of any State outside of South America, when there was a row with same State in South America."76 The Monroe Doctrine was a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It was in no way intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less was it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other. "It is simply a step and a large step, toward assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace

75 Roosevelt to Hay, Oct. 8, 1901, Morison, III, pp. 164-165.
76 Roosevelt to Von Sternberg, Oct. 11, 1901, Morison, III, p. 172.
The Venezuela crisis of 1902-1903 caused Roosevelt to further refine the application of the Monroe Doctrine. "The American people interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as meaning of course that no European power should gain control of any American republic... by any such subterfuge as exercising this control under the color of a pretense to the guarantee or collecting a debt." The very pretense of such action would be removed "if all of the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown all need for us to be the especial champion of the Doctrine will disappear, for no stable and growing American Republic wishes to see some great non-American military power acquire territory in its neighborhood." The United States, however, would not "guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." This policy was to demonstrate that America did not intend to permit the Monroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this Continent as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own mis-

77 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVI.
78 Roosevelt to Hay, March 13, 1903, Morison, III, p. 446.
79 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXVI.
80 Foreign Relations, 1901, pp. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
The policy while not allowing control of territory did not mean that foreign creditors should be denied their just due. Thus, America was to stand for justice and not sanction for the avoidance of honest claims. Many of these countries, however, were in a state of constant economic peril which invited such action as prohibited by the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt felt "if a republic to the south of us commits a tort against a foreign nation, such as an outrage against a citizen of that nation, then the Monroe Doctrine does not force us to interfere to prevent punishment of the tort, save to see that the punishment does not assume the form of territorial occupation in any shape."

Assuming this principle the creditor was placed in a difficult situation. The intervening nation must occupy such territory as appropriated only until it claims have been met and must reject the idea of permanent occupation. On this point Elihu Root in his speech to the New England society noted:

81 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIV.
82 "The United States and Guatemala," Outlook, 104 (May 17, 1913), p. 89.
84 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIV.
85 Hodges, p. 83.
We don't undertake to say that the republics of Central and South America are to be relieved from their international obligations. We don't undertake to say that the Powers of Europe shall not enforce their rights against these members of the sisterhood of states. It is only when enforcement of those rights comes to the point of taking possession of the territory of any American people that we say that it is inconsistent with the peace and safety of the United States. And we can not say it with justice unless we also say that the American republics are themselves to be just.86

In this same regard, he was later to state that "if we are to maintain this Doctrine, which is vital to our national life and safety, at the same time when we say to other Powers of the World, 'You shall not push your remedies for wrong against these republics to the point of occupying their territory'; we are bound to say that 'whenever the wrong cannot be otherwise redressed, we ourselves will see that it is redressed'."87

Roosevelt, himself, was of the opinion that one of the fundamental objects of the Monroe Doctrine was to assist the Latin American republics in their desire for peace and order. The gradual growth of the ethical element in individual relations and the sharing of burdens should be expanded to nations.88 Actually, however, the civilized man can keep peace and obtain justice only if he subdues his barbarian neighbors. Fair dealing must also enter into the relations but force must be the overriding consid-

86 "Our 'Fiscal Protectorate' in Santo Domingo," Literary Digest, XXX(Dec. 28, 1905), p. 120.
88 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXV.
The gains to be realized from such action far outweighed the drawbacks because every expansion of civilization made for peace. Thus the gains of a great civilized power meant the triumph of law, order, and righteousness. In effect, the steady aim of the United States, as of all enlightened nations, was to strive to bring ever nearer the day when there should prevail throughout the world the peace of justice.

Since one of the most effective instruments for peace was the Monroe Doctrine as it had been and was gradually developed by this Nation and accepted by other nations, its extension could result in the hemispheric peace Roosevelt sought. Therefore, it remained America's clear duty to strive in every practicable way to bring nearer the time when the sword would not be the arbiter among nations. During Roosevelt's time, the practical thing to do was to try to minimize the number of cases in which it had to be the arbiter, and to offer, at least to all civilized powers, some substitute for war which would be available in at least a considerable number of instances. One of the major causes of conflict

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., p. XXXI.
in the western hemisphere was the collection of defaulted debts. In his instructions to the representative at the Hague he sought to remove this possible source of confrontation. "It is doubtless true that the non-payment of public debts may be accompanied by such circumstances of fraud and wrongdoing a violation of treaties as to justify the use of force. This Government would be glad to see an international consideration of the subject which shall discriminate between such cases and the simple nonperformance of a contract with a private person and a resolution in favor of reliance upon peaceful means in cases of the latter class."94

American assumption of such a role led to misunderstanding on the part of many Latin Americans. "An idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied, or carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over countries to whose territory that doctrine applies. Nothing could be farther from the truth."95

In reality, Foreign Minister Drago of Argentina pointed out that "the traditional policy of the United States without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, condemned the aggression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great Powers of Europe."96 Elihu Root added "We

94 Foreign Relations, 1906, p. XLIX.
95 Ibid., p. XLVII.
96 Ibid., p. XLVIII.
wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves.\textsuperscript{97} Roosevelt hoping to dispell other rumors wrote to Root "It is not true that the United States has any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards other nations, save as are for their welfare."\textsuperscript{98} Later he was to state again "it must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression."\textsuperscript{99}

President Roosevelt was keenly aware that "the right of freedom and the responsibility for the exercise of that right can not be divorced."\textsuperscript{100} This was especially true for those who profited by the Monroe Doctrine. For they "must accept responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine."\textsuperscript{101} It was a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, that desired to maintain its freedom, its independence must ultimately realize the right of such independence could not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. XLVII.
\textsuperscript{98} Roosevelt to Root, May 20, 1904, Morison, IV, p. 801.
\textsuperscript{100} Foreign Relations, p. XXXIX.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 334.
\textsuperscript{102} Foreign Relations, 1904, p. XLII.
"Not only we, but all American Republics who are benefited by the existence of the Doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less than its duty to insist upon its own rights."\(^{103}\)

If the United States was to insist upon the rights proclaimed under the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt had to undertake the formidable task of re-awakening the American people to its tenets and adaptations. "I am having my hands full also in endeavoring to make our people act on a national interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. No such policy as that of the Monroe Doctrine can remain fossilized while the nation grows. Either it must be abandoned or it must be modified to meet the changing needs of national life."\(^{104}\) He agreed whole-heartedly with Whitelaw Reid that "the things that make the Monroe Doctrine have disappeared . . . we may find, if nobody is opposing, that its extension quite so far beyond the original purpose . . . as the furvor of our patriots has carried it, may prove to be attended with wholly unnecessary inconveniences in the absence of a salutary European pressure, we shall either modify the present extreme extensions of the old doctrine . . . or some day or another we should have to fight for it. Secondly we should limit it to our legitimate sphere of national interest--Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the waters

\(^{103}\) Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIII.
\(^{104}\) Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison, IV, p. 1286.
on both oceans about the Isthmus. Finally, we should apply it with increased stringency in the sphere, beyond it moderated in remote countries which under changed modern conditions are no longer within that sphere."105 Thus, the Doctrine had to be either advanced or expanded to cover the ever increasing number of disputes arising from the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial administration which courted European interventions and to set the limits to which that intervention could reach. 106 "If we had refused to apply the Doctrine to changing conditions it would now be completely outworn, would not meet any of the needs of the present day, and indeed would probably by this time have sunk into complete oblivion. It is useful at home, and is meeting with recognition abroad because we have adopted our application of it to meet the growing and changing needs of the Hemisphere."107

It was because of this ability to change itself to fit the situation that Roosevelt felt "the Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States."108 The extent to which economic concerns governed foreign policy, especially the

105 Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, July 24, 1903, Morison, III, p. 527.
106 Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 327.
107 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIII.
108 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVI.
Monroe Doctrine, has been the cause of many an argument over the motivation behind the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine Roosevelt formulated. In his message of 1901 he stated "this doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that in truth allows each of them to form such as its desires. In other words, it is really a guaranty of the commercial independence of the Americans. We do not ask under this doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state." 109 However, in the same message he gave this admonition to business. "Business concerns which have the largest means at their disposal . . . take the lead in the strife for commercial supremacy among the nations of the world. America has only just begun to assume the commanding position in the international business world which we believe will more and more be hers. It is of the utmost importance that this position be not jeopardized, especially at a time when the overpowering abundance of our own national resources and the skill, business energy, and mechanical aptitude of our people make foreign markets essential.\" 110 Many critics saw more to the Monroe Doctrine than merely economic considerations. 111 "The roots of our Caribbean interests

109 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVI.
run far deeper than that. They are embedded in the very soil of our national life."112 "It seems clear that the motives that inspired its policy were basically political rather than economic."113 Howard Hill goes even further than these statements. "Political rather than economic consideration seem to have determined Roosevelt's course. Nor must it be overlooked that the policy he favored was often opposed by influential financiers and corporation heads."114 Samuel Flagg Bemis also believes that "the strategical requirements of continental security . . . not selfish interests (Wall Street) really explains the Roosevelt Corollary."115 William Appleman Williams, however, clings to an economic interpretation. "The economic and political leader of the country decided that what was good for Americans was also good for foreigners. Humanitarian concern was thus reinforced by hard-headed economic requirements."116

Almost everyone is agreeded that Roosevelt realized that the

112 Henry Kithedge Norton, "The United States in the Carib-
bean," in The United States and the Caribbean by Chester Lloyd
Jones, Henry Kithedge Norton, and Parker T. Koon, (Chicago: The
113 Munro, Intervention, p. 531.
114 Hill, p. 212.
115 Bemis, p. 115.
116 Williams, pp. 57-58.
major determinant in the international world was power. Since the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of international law but a pronouncement of a policy and this could be ignored by anyone who chose to do so, its existence only had meaning as so as the United States could deal from strength. In effect, the Monroe Doctrine amounted to a policy conceived and maintained for its own welfare; in reality, it was a defensive policy of the United States. There was a basic truism in the statement "our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. Whatever our foreign policy happens to be for the moment, it is called the Monroe Doctrine." During this period one of the focal points of American foreign policy was the Caribbean. Its importance was thought to overshadow all others. Charles Evans Hughes said of the Caribbean.

If we had no Monroe Doctrine we should have to create one. And this is not to imply any limitation on the scope of the doctrine, as originally proclaimed and as still maintained, but simply to indicate that new occasions require new applications of an old principle which remains completely effective. What has taken place of late years in the region of the Caribbean has given use to much confusion of thought and misapprehension of purpose. As I have said, the Monroe Doctrine as a particular declaration in no way exhausts American right

118 Chadwick, p. 118.
119 Norton, pp. 85-86.
or policy. The United States has rights and obligations which that doctrine does not define. And it has been necessary to assert these rights and obligations as well as the limited principle of the Monroe Doctrine. 121

Roosevelt stated "the Monroe Doctrine is necessary today to the United States. The Caribbean Sea washes the coast of the richest part of the United States, and it is necessary that it be dominated by them in order to guarantee the independence and security of the United States." 122 The acquisition of the Canal Zone and the construction of the Panama Canal made the Isthmian area one of the greatest of strategic significance in the American defense system. Its importance prompted a move to secure the control of bases requisite for the defense of the canal by the United States and the exclusion of any rival great power from obtaining a foothold in the vicinity of the canal or on the approaches to it. 123 Such feelings were voiced by Elihu Root, "In that region (the Caribbean) the United States must exercise a dominant influence. It is there that the justification and necessity for the Monroe Doctrine is found. We must control the route to the Panama Canal." 124 It was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, Roose-

123 Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 116-117.
124 Munro, Intervention, p. 113.
felt for any non-American power to have any control over the Isthmian canal. Lodge was later to extend this principle to include "any harbor or other place in the American continents that is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States." Roosevelt and the nation were prepared to support the Monroe Doctrine and defend the Caribbean on the grounds of national security. He firmly believed American rights and interests were deeply concerned in the maintenance of the Doctrine so clearly as hardly to need argument. This was especially true in view of the construction of the Panama Canal. "As a mere matter of self-defense we must exercise a close watch over the approaches of this canal, and this means that we must be thoroughly alive to our interests in the Caribbean Sea." Root was cognizant of the fact that "the inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises. In the nature of things, trade and control, and the obligation to keep order which

125 Bemis, p. 144.
128 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIII.
so with them, must come our way."129

In regard to a proposed loan to Costa Rica, he noted the United States required the next door neighbor of panaman to be under the financial control of the United States rather than have it vested in any foreign power.130 The defense of the Panama Canal dominated our Caribbean policy which rested on the primacy of the United States and its interests which were fostered by the existence of the Canal.131 Roosevelt realized "the control, in the interest of the commerce and traffic of the whole civilized world, of the means of undisturbed transit across the Isthmus of Panama has become of transcendent importance to the United States. We have repeatedly exercised this control by intervening in the course of domestic discussion, and by protecting the territory from foreign invasion."132 The Monroe Doctrine had served in this function and was endorsed by the citizens. "Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine and to visit upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western Hemisphere."133

Roosevelt's strong awareness of manly virtue carried over into his consideration of relations between nations.

In foreign affairs this country's steady policy is to behave toward other nations as a strong and self-respecting man

129 Jessup, p. 471.
130 Ibid.
131 Thompson, p. 155.
132 Foreign Relations, 1903, p. XXXIX.
133 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVIII. 134 Omit.
should behave toward the other men with whom he is brought into contact. In other words, our aim is disinterestedly to help other nations where such help can be wisely given without the appearance of meddling with what does not concern us; to be careful to act as a good neighbor; and at the same time in good-natured fashion, to make it evident that we do not intend to be imposed upon. 135

He continued on this train of thought in a letter written later.

In short, my belief is that this nation should judge other nations each on its conduct; and that it should fearlessly and where possible effectively take action against wrong-doing; that it should prepare itself so as to make it unsafe for any other nation to do wrong to it; and that in its turn it should scrupulously do justice to every nation that acts rightly. 136

The Roosevelt of 1901 to 1909 had greater wisdom and more discretion than the Roosevelt who had in 1896 pronounced his theories on patriotism. In reality he had abandoned none of them.137 "I believe with all my heart in the Monroe Doctrine and have, for instance, formally notified Germany to that effect."138

In a speech in Chicago on April 2, 1903 he again voiced his sentiments and gave birth to the title of his policy.

I am convinced that the immense majority of our fellow-countrymen so believe in it, but I would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster about it, and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting which in the last resort can alone make it respected by any

135 Foreign Relations, 1907, LXI.
137 Pringle, pp. 279-280.
138 Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Korison, IV, p. 1286.
strong foreign power whose interest it may happen to violate it. There is a homely old adage which runs: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." If the American nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch or the highest trainings a thoroughly efficient navy the Monroe Doctrine will go far. 139

His speech was prompted by the realization that the efficacy of the Monroe Doctrine depends, in large measure, upon the material power of the United States. 140 The Chicago address also served to cast him as a typical representative of imperialistic policies, for he systematically expressed national ambitions, offered a global comprehension of what was to be accomplished, and was in complete accord with the elan of his people. 141 The basis of the speech, the Monroism of Roosevelt and Mahan had terminated the evolution of the primitive Monroe Doctrine and resulted in an American hegemony with its own complete nationalization. 142

The urge to increase American influence in the world was due, in part at least, to Roosevelt's desire to extend Anglo-Saxon ideas, practices, and virtues throughout the world. 143 In his winning of the West he implies that the Anglo-Americans enjoyed a

140 Perkins, Hands Off, p. 86.
142 Ibid. p. 131.
143 Williams, p. 57.
biological as well as a cultural supremacy. "Free people can escape being mastered by others only by being able to master themselves. We Americans and you people of the British Isles alike need ever to keep in mind that among the many qualities indispensable to the success of a great democracy, and record only to a high and stern sense of duty or moral obligation, are self-knowledge and self-mastery." The white race was destined to spread its culture across the world. Defined by European geography, the Christian religion, a cultural link with Greece and Rome and a kinship of blood, they were the superior peoples of the modern era. They were ordained to rule because they were endowed with the energy and ability to control other races. This was so because a natural process had best fitted these people for expansion and self-government. It was they who would control the backward regions of the world. Pre-eminent among this select few were the English-speaking races. "In the long run there can be no justification for one race managing or controlling another unless . . . in the interest and for the benefit of that race." 

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147 Ibid., p. 358.
Naturally, the English speaking races could carry out this task.

Roosevelt's doctrine was compounded by a sense of the superiority of the race, particularly by Anglo-Americans, the guardians of democracy. The influence of the West was seen in the urge to dominate and his desire to be the preceptor of lesser civilizations and the champion of unfortunate peoples.\(^{149}\) He contrasted the successful democracy of the white race with the chaos of Santo Domingo. "A hundred years of freedom so from teaching the Santo Domingans how to enjoy freedom and turn it to good account, has resulted so badly that society is on the point of dissolution."\(^{150}\)

His ultimate purpose in imperialism lay in the welfare of mankind and the improvement of the lot of the individual.\(^{151}\) Race was considered in an almost Neo-Lamarckian sense. That is, the acquired characteristics and the effective of geographic environment determined action. In the race of the Latin Americans, this was demonstrated by their weakness and inability to rule themselves effectively.\(^{152}\) Most of the Washington officials were of the same opinion. Latin American representatives were "Dagoes" while Europe was the cradle of culture and civilization. The inevitable


\(^{151}\) Ibid., p. 118.

\(^{152}\) Beale, p. 29.
result was misunderstanding and apprehension. \(^{153}\) "The Yankee believes that his southern neighbors are trivial and childish peoples, and above all incapable of maintaining a proper self-government." \(^{154}\) Root went so far as to say, "All of the Latin Americans have a genius for misrepresentation." \(^{155}\) Roosevelt wrote to Hay "it will do away with the foreign nations having any pretext for interference on this side of the water, and in the next place it will show those Dagoes that they will have to behave decently." \(^{156}\) With such a battery of intellectual assumptions it is quite easy to see how Roosevelt was convinced that the United States would never act unjustly or wrongly. Hence, whatever position America took was right. \(^{157}\) Thus, the system of "prevention intervention" was born to substitute orderly democratic processes for revolt in Latin America, especially the Caribbean and Central American states. \(^{158}\) The decision of the arbitration tribunal was thought to put "a premium on violence" and, therefore, the United States sought an alternative to European naval demonstrations in


\(^{155}\) Jessup, p. 289.

\(^{156}\) Roosevelt to Hay, Sept. 2, 1904, Morison, IV, p. 917.

\(^{157}\) Beale, p. 25.

the Caribbean. "Sooner or later it seems to me inevitable that the United States should assume an attitude of protection and regulation in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean." It was America's duty, when it became absolutely inevitable, "to police these countries in the interest of order and civilization."

Roosevelt made the distinction between civilized and barbarous peoples or states. The civilized or white states were subject to different criteria for the performance of duties and rights. "Wars with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples come in an entirely different category, being merely a most regrettable but necessary international police duty which must be performed for the sake of the welfare of mankind." Where Caribbean states were stable and prosperous they stood on a footing of absolutely equality with all other communities. But some of them were prey to such continuous revolutionary misrule as to have grown impotent either to do their duties to outsiders or to enforce their rights against outsiders. It could not in the long run prove possible for the United States to protect delinquent American nations from punish-

162 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVI.
ments for the nonperformance of their duties unless she undertook to make them perform their duties. 164 Roosevelt was convinced that these were weak and incompetent nations which could not protect rights of foreigners against their own citizens or vice versa. In such cases, it became necessary for some outside power to intervene. 165 As to actual intervention, Roosevelt was of the opinion that "nine-tenths of wisdom is to be wise in time, and at the right time; and my whole foreign policy was based on the exercise of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently far in advance of any likely crisis to make it improbable that we would run into serious trouble." 166

No nation could claim rights without acknowledging the duties that go with the rights. It would be a contemptible thing for a great nation to render itself impotent in international action, whether because of cowardice or sloth, or sheer inability or unwillingness to look into the future. 167 This look into the future included a belief that civilized peoples have definite obligations toward the backward tribes or races of the earth. 168 Concern was raised over South American nations who "will be happy ... if

164 Ibid., pp. 511-512.
165 Ibid., p. 533.
166 Ibid., p. 508.
167 Ibid., p. 502.
168 Hill, p. 204.
only they will be good."169 There will be no peace until the civilized nations had expanded in some shape over the barbarous nations.170 Accepting as he did the equality of nations, Roosevelt emphasized the belief that membership in the family of nations carried with it duties as well as rights, and that nations can enjoy real liberty only if the exercise of their rights takes the consideration of the rights into account. Thus, the rights of sovereignty which a state enjoys cannot be separated from the duties touching the rights of life and property of citizens of foreign states within their borders.171 Failure to perform these duties could result in intervention for a number of reasons.172

I. Policy

A. The right of self-preservation.
B. To uphold the balance of power.
C. To protect neutralized states.
D. To protect neutralized canals or other works of man affecting the world in general.

II. Legality

A. In pursuance of treaty agreements.
B. When acts are committed against the principle of international law.
C. To prevent or abolish another intervention.

III. Non-political

A. Protection of citizens.

169 Fringle, p. 294.
170 Beale, p. 32.
171 Jones, pp. 463-464.
172 Hodges, pp. 23-80 passim.
B. Denial of Justice  
C. Protection of Missionaries  

IV. Conditional  

A. Collection of contract debts  
B. Protection of humanity  
C. Intercession for persecuted Jews, etc.  
D. Right of asylum  

Americans had previously maintained that they had no responsibility for the conduct of Latin American states Europeans judged them liable to supervise. By refusing to acknowledge its duty to establish law and decency in South America, the United States was according to some critics responsible for the anarchy and bloodshed that plagued the area. This was in part due to the workings of the Monroe Doctrine which prohibited Europeans from extracting Latin American dictators from power. Hence many critics assailed the Monroe Doctrine because "it was never logically defensible, for the right to protect any Power when threatened involves a certain responsibility for the acts of that Power, and Washington persistently refuses to acknowledge that responsibility." Thus, the United States had to either to  

right for or give up the Monroe Doctrine. The belief that no European should be allowed a lodgment in the Hemisphere and the actions precipitated by constant debt default would eventually lead to a confrontation.177

The Hague Count decision of Feb. 22, 1904 which sanctioned military means to collect defaulted loans was not necessary to convince President Roosevelt of the need for intervention by the United States.178 "If we are willing to let Germany or England act as a policeman of the Caribbean, then we can afford not to interfere when gross wrongdoing occurs. But if we intend to say 'Hands off' to the powers of Europe, then sooner or later we must keep order ourselves."179 Europeans had always felt that the United States could not enjoy the advantages of the Monroe Doctrine if it do not assume the responsibilities entailed. Since the Americans insisted that disorder should be punished only in a way that is satisfactory to them, they should be under an obligation to prevent disorder.180 Either the United States had to recognize the sanctioned right of intervention to collect debts and the responsibility entailed for intervention by the United States

177 Ibid., p. 586.
178 Bemis, p. 155.
179 Roosevelt to Root, June 7, 1904, Morison, IV, pp. 821-822.
180 Brooks, p. 293.
The London Daily Press remarked that "the United States has assumed paternal responsibility for the whole of the Western Hemisphere resenting any outside interference in the affairs of any part of the territory covered by the Monroe Doctrine. They must accept responsibility for the maintenance of civilization within the compass of their claim." The London Times voiced much the same sentiment. "It has been asked whether the American people are to become the debt collectors for Europe. Certainly not, so long as they do not interfere with other people who want to collect their own debts for themselves; but if for their own ends they threaten a war against a European nation collecting its own debts, by the only means at command among South-American republics, then they must play the policeman of the civilized world in a much less respectable part."

Roosevelt was convinced that the Monroe Doctrine could not be used by southern Republics to shield them from the consequences of their own torts. His passion for law and order was of great importance in formulating his policy as regards the Caribbean.

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181 Bemis, pp. 151-152.
182 Hodges, p. 135.
184 Jessup, p. 496.
185 Hill, p. 197.
The system of law depended upon a competent judge and a responsible officer to carry out the judgment, if necessary, by force. Regrettably this was not the case in international affairs. Each nation had to depend upon itself for its own protection. Thus, the United States needed to adopt a policy that would enable it "to protect ourselves against the strong and as regards our duty always to act only justly but generously toward the weak." 186 Due to this lack of an effective organization in international law, there was no judicial way of enforcing a right. When one nation wronged another or wronged many others, there was no tribunal before which the wrongdoer could be brought. Either it was necessary supinely to acquiesce in the wrong, thereby putting a premium upon brutality and aggression; The other, and more typically American, alternative was for the aggrieved nation valiantly to stand up for its rights. 187

The Monroe Doctrine itself lies outside of international law. Since it was the cardinal principle of American policy, the only difficulty in maintaining it arose when American power was proven weak and delinquent in foreign affairs. 188 Roosevelt went on to state the logical extension of such a position in his annual message of 1904.

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187 Foreign Relations, 1904, P. XL.
188 Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 506.
Therefore it follows that a self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation should on the one hand endeavor by every means to aid in the development of the various movements which tend to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render nations in their actions toward one another, and indeed toward their own peoples, more responsive to the general sentiment of humane and civilized mankind; and on the other hand that it should keep prepared, while scrupulously avoiding wrongdoing itself to repel any wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action which in a more advanced stage of international relations would come under the head of the exercise of the international police.189

"The effective power of civilization must be put back of civilization in collective purpose to secure reasonable justice between nation and nation."190 Thus, even the weakest nations were as safe from insult and injury at American hands as the strongest. For both possessed a knowledge that the United States possessed both the will and the ability to guard itself from wrong or insult at the hands of anyone.191 In order to be a great power, Roosevelt was convinced that the United States must act accordingly. It was, therefore, his duty to take any action that seemed necessary for the security of the United States, although such action could disregard the rights of another nation. After some time, he felt the United States must insist on honest and decent relations between all nations.192 This was especially true in areas of strategic significance, where the major power would in-

189 Foreign Relations, 1904, pp. XL-XLI.
192 Munro, Intervention, p. 65.
tercede by force, assume real administrative functions, and impose order from above according to its own rather than to indigenous criteria. 193

In the Caribbean the United States was the major power. The use of an international police power was never to be considered in cases of prosperous and stable nations, regardless of their size or strength. 194 "This Nation's foreign policy is based on the theory that right must be done between nations precisely as between individual. We have behaved and are behaving, towards other nations as in private life an honorable man would behave towards his fellows." 195 Due to the lack of sufficient international controls to check wrong-doing, Roosevelt felt "it would be both a foolish and an evil thing for a great and free nation to deprive itself of the power to protect its own rights." 196 This was not the sole consideration in regard to the action he espoused "in asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama ... we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at

193 Blum, p. 131.
194 Ibid., p. 132.
196 Blum, p. 137.
Intertwined with this concept was the feeling that "we of the great republic of the north, should make all our sister nations of the American Continent feel that whenever they will permit it we desire to show ourselves disinterestedly and effectively their friend."\(^{198}\)

The actual Roosevelt Corollary was a formula arrived at over a number of years. It was the effort of both Roosevelt and Root, although a question remains as to who its prime author was. The first inkling of such a policy is found in the annual message of 1902.

It is earnestly to be hoped that all of these countries will do as some of them have already done, will signal success, and will invite to their shores commerce and improve their material conditions by recognizing that stability and order are the prerequisites of successful development. No independent nation in America need have the slightest fear of aggression from the United States. It behooves each one to maintain order within its own border and to discharge its just obligations to foreigners. When this is done, they can rest assured that, be they strong or weak, they will have nothing to dread from outside interference. More and more the increasing interdependence and complexity of international political economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.\(^{199}\)

In a speech given to a Cuban group in New York in 1904, he stated

If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in

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197. Foreign Relations, 1904, p. LXII.
198. Foreign Relations, 1902, p. XX.
199. Ibid., pp. XXI-XXII.
industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. All we ask is that they shall govern themselves well and be prosperous and orderly. When this is the case they will find only helpfulness from us. 200

In a letter to Root on May 20, 1904 Roosevelt states almost exactly what is later to be enunciated in his annual message later that year.

All that we desire to see all neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty; but it remains true that our interests, and those of our southern neighbors, are in reality identical. All that we ask is that they shall govern themselves well, and be prosperous and orderly. Where this is the case they will find only helpfulness from us. 201

Roosevelt's now famous Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is found in his annual message of 1904. A quick glance at the message of 1902, the speech to the Cubans, and the letter to Root show a continuity of thought on this matter which has previously escaped a great deal of attention.

All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with

201 Roosevelt to Root, May 20, 1904, Morison, IV, p. 801.
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, or elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. 202

Both Roosevelt and Root were later to state the America's adherence to the Monroe Doctrine required the formulation of such a principle. At Chautauqua, Roosevelt noted, "inasmuch as by this doctrine we prevent other nations from interfering on this side of the water, we shall ourselves in good faith try to help those of our sister republics which need such help upward toward peace and order." 203 Root held the position that if wrongs by a Latin-American state were unredressed, "we ourselves will see that it is redressed . . . . What we will not permit the great powers of Europe to do, we will not permit any American republic to make it necessary for the great Power of Europe to do." 204 A controversy has arisen over the actual authorship of the Corollary with Wilfred Callcott holding Roosevelt responsible—"Roosevelt practically

202 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. XLI.
204 Van Alstyne, p. 168.
ran the State Department"205--and Dana Munro hinting, at least, that Root played an important role in its development. "Root, who directed Latin American policy in Roosevelt's second administration had helped to formulate the President's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and believed in its validity."206 Dexter Perkins, the dean of Monroe Doctrine scholars, remains uncommitted as to its source. "It is not possible to state with certainty where the Roosevelt Corollary with regard to the Monroe Doctrine actually originated. But there are clear signs that an assistant secretary of state had something to do with it."207 For my own part, I am inclined to think that Roosevelt is primarily responsible. The continuity of thought and language in the four examples cited are difficult to overlook. Root most certainly played a role in its formulation while the influence of an assistant secretary of state remains to be demonstrated.

Assuming that intervention was legitimate and necessary, Roosevelt felt morally bound to use America police power since European force was forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine.208 The doctrine of police power was but another derivative of the concept of

205 Calcott, p. 201.
206 Munro, Intervention, p. 532.
manifest destiny. American intervention would be sanctioned due to its special prerogatives derived from special duties involved in the peculiar mission of a nation with preeminent capacities. 209 Actually, American intervention was not limited to legal self-protective measures. Since it was formulated as "police power" it offered any remedy short of complete takeover and loss of independence. The use of broad moral criteria sanctioned intervention not only in cases which had a legal justification but also in any case that the United States disapproved of. What had been called "international police power" was in reality the use of American force solely in the Western Hemisphere. 210 The use of this power was prompted by the defaulting of debts and arbitral awards on the part of the lesser states to the south. Force became a major ingredient in the relations between them and the Colossus of the North. 211 The Monroe Doctrine (originally intended to prevent European intervention in Latin America states) was adapted by the United States into a corollary that justified and even sanctioned American interference in the control of the affairs of the Latin-American republics. 212

As it stood at its enunciation the Corollary was successful,

209 Ibid., p. 415.
210 Ibid., p. 428.
211 Jessup, p. 493.
engendered no new hostility, and was more or less accepted at home and abroad. 213 "The United States was bound sooner or later to accept the exercise of police power as a Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine." 214 It was natural for the United States to initiate such a policy. This resulted in part from the actions of numerous irresponsible military dictators who had used the United States to exempt them from action European powers wished to exert on them to make them comply with their obligations. 215 Prior to that time, the United States had been in the unenviable position of choosing between repeated interventions on the part of European powers in violation of the Monroe Doctrine and assuming responsibility for the actions of the Latin American states, which they were unwilling to do. 216 In effect, the new policy was an acknowledgement of the American responsibility to European governments for the conduct of certain Caribbean states in respect to European nationals. 217

Prior to Roosevelt's administration the Monroe Doctrine was regarded by the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy. It was to be used as a shield to prevent the possibility of

213 Perkins, Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907, p. 455.
214 Horton, p. 91.
215 Ibid., p. 89.
217 Rippy, Caribbean Danger Zone, p. 36.
European interference with the domestic policies of these states. To regulate the conduct of states in regard to Europeans and themselves, was the prime responsibility of its Corollary. The Caribbean countries were warned to act decently in their foreign relationships, pay their debts, and maintain order. Their own security and independence hung in the balance as well as, and more importantly for Washington, the security of the United States.219

The Corollary prompted many criticisms both contemporary and scholarly. "Mr. Roosevelt in laboring under the delusion that this country has a divine mission to keep order abroad, while it can not keep order at home; that it is obligated to compel foreign states to pay their debts, altho it can not compel the domestic States to pay theirs. The Roosevelt doctrine is the Monroe Doctrine turned inside out and stood on its head."220 The Corollary was prompted by fear, justified or not, of possible European takeover due to chronic disorder in the Caribbean. Such a takeover raised the specter of permanent European occupation of some strategic spot in the Caribbean.221 Revolutions and bad financial practices were to be abolished and general economic and social were to be improved, so as to eliminate the causes of in-

218 Latane, The U.S. and Latin America, p. 326.
221 Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean, p. 134.
stability in those states. 222 Although it was not probably that European governments would deliberately set out to conquer a Caribbean state such instability could offer the pretext for an intervention which could jeopardize a country's independence. 223

Some scholars, however, hold that Roosevelt and Hay did not brandish the Monroe Doctrine, the Americans did. In their opinion nothing else was necessary. 224 Elihu Root in an article in Independent recognized that "the Corollary is clear. If we will not allow transatlantic nations to become masters of recalcitrant American nations we must see to it that their obligations are paid; we must collect the debts ourselves; where force is necessary we must use it; we must control, if control is necessary; we must be the policeman, we must wield the 'big stick'; there is no other alternative." 225 Thus, the Roosevelt Corollary altered the Monroe Doctrine from a policy denying the right of European intervention in the Americans to one sanctioning the process when conducted by the United States. 226 Europeans--far from being adverse to the new interpretation were actually quite disposed to it. "The Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which Mr. Roosevelt

222 Munro, Intervention, p. 531.
223 Ibid., p. 5.
224 Rippy, Caribbean Danger Zone, p. 35.
226 Mowry, p. 159.
and Mr. Root have just devised, must if adopted as a standing rule of American policy, enormously lighten Europe's difficulties." Europeans considered the policy to reflect a change of heart in the United States, for she became the policeman rather than the abettor of the so-called criminal activity of the South American states.  

Reaction to the new policy, however, was not completely in accord with Roosevelt's position. "It is not the duty of the United States to police Latin America, and the sooner we get that idea spread broadcast not only in South America, but also in North America, the better it be for our international repute." Many at home and abroad felt that the new interpretation rather than being a protection against "the burden of militarism" invited it. An effective Doctrine depended on the American preparation for a possible confrontation with one or more of the strongest powers of Europe. The London Outlook questioned the new policy and its extent. "If the Americans answer, as we suspect they will, that the Monroe Doctrine includes the whole of both the Americans and their adjacent islands, and that if they deny that it carries with  

227 Brooks, p. 293.  
228 Ibid.  
230 Brooks, p. 276.
it any responsibilities, we can only hope, by way of reply, that they understand what they are about." The Frankfurter Zeitung noted that the Corollary marked a significant departure from previous American policy. "Roosevelt says: We require foreigners to respect the Monroe Doctrine throughout the whole of America. Therefore, it is only just that we aid the foreigner in obtaining his rights when those rights are disregarded in America. This means that just now the Monroe Doctrine is not conceived in this spirit." Roosevelt went to great length to demonstrate to the Latin Americans that they had nothing to fear from the United States. "It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertained any projects as regards the other nation of the Western Hemisphere save such as one for their welfare." "The United States have enough to care for without appropriating tropical territory." In his annual message for the next year, Roosevelt again disclaimed any sinister designs on Latin American territory. "In the first place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it an any shape or way as an

233 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. XLI.
234 "President Roosevelt's Table Talk," Review of Reviews, XXIX (1904), p. 364.
excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the south." In no uncertain terms, Roosevelt stated
"It must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression." 236

Although America's relations with Latin America have been characterized by a high degree of altruism, the Latin Americans have a much different view. In spite of the fact that United States attempted to be just and upright and for the benefit of her neighbors to the South, its actions have been suspect. This was due to a failure to take into account the view point of the Latin Americans. No consideration was given to whether our actions pleased him or whether our suggestions were formulated in accordance with his views. 237 Our no-transfer principle and the Corollary itself seemed to cause increased disquiet in the Southern continent. 238 This was in part due to the advantages to alien investors rendered greater by the application of the Corollary to defaulting debts. The people and their leaders preferred that foreigners be left to shift for themselves. 239 They further resented

235 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIII.
236 Ibid., p. XXXIV.
237 Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 53-54.
239 Rippy, Caribbean Danger Zone, p. 227.
attempts to manage their affairs in possible cases of failure or violating the sovereignty of independent states and the generally accepted principle of nonintervention.\textsuperscript{240} This resentment and suspicion was in part due to the Monroe Doctrine itself. It had been so effective at eliminating European intervention that Latin Americans no longer feared the military and expansionist powers of Europe. The United States was the natural heir of any suspicion which remained in the Southern continent.\textsuperscript{241} Many of the leaders of these states interpreted the Monroe Doctrine implication of "America for Americans" as demonstrating the United States intention to take possession of their territory.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{240} Blakeslee, pp. 109-110.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., p. 148.
\textsuperscript{242} An American Businessman, p. 526.
PART II

THE SANTO DOMINGAN RECEIVERSHIP: BIG BROTHER?

The first practical application of Roosevelt's policies was the assumption of the Santo Domingo Receivership in 1905. Throughout its history the Caribbean island republic had demonstrated that "chronic wrongdoing and impotence" that were apt to initiate the use of "police power to protect civilization and its principles." The years of Santo Domingan rule had pointed up its great difficulty in establishing an effective democracy without resort to dictatorship. When the occasion arose for the overthrow of these dictators bloody revolutions frequently broke out.

From the earliest moment of its independence the island was racked by internal disorder and conflict. President Baez in 1869 attempted to have the United States in the person of President Grant annex the Republic to the United States. Such action was defeated by the United States Senate and the Republic was left to fend for itself. The period from 1874 to 1882 was another era of interparty conflict: 1882 marked the beginning of the rule of Ulises Heureaux who ruled the island with an iron hand until 1899 when he fell to a revolutionary's hand. This rule was marked by an ever increasing system of financial irresponsibility. It was during his reign that the San Domingo Improvement Company began
its ever increasing influence on the affairs of the island in 1895.  

By 1899 the intensified financial difficulties and growing American interest due to the Improvement Co. prompted Heureaux to propose a secret treaty with the United States. The substance of its intent was the assumption of an American contractual protectorate over the Dominican Republic.  

The ascension of the Jimenez government following a brief period of political maneuvering did not ease the desperate financial condition of the country. In the face of possible French intervention for defaulted loans Hay sent the following message to Powell regarding American claims, especially the Improvement Co.'s as of February 15, 1900.

Owing to the difficult situation which confronts the Dominican Government it is not to be pressed for immediate payment of American claims, although the American Government is necessarily insistent that all rights of American citizens be fully protected.

The Improvement Company itself was the subject of much of the blame and disgust of the people. Rumors were circulated that it was responsible for undermining the credit of the government by making unfavorable appraisals of the Jimenez administration. The entire controversy was laid at its feet because the agreement

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2 Ibid., p. 533.
3 Ibid., p. 558.
entered into by Heureaux provided for company payment of what amounted to the French claims.\(^4\) The Company had now become so entrenched that it was next to impossible to remove it, especially since the government was unable to repay the company's original investment.\(^5\) As a result, a new contract was negotiated providing for the relief of the Government's financial needs, its settlement of the nation's public indebtedness, and elimination of defaulted loan interest. To this end, the contract of March 20, 1900 provided that customs revenues up to \(2,000,000\) except the export duties set aside for conversion of the paper money issued by the National Bank be used for such liquidation.\(^6\) Such an agreement later proved unsuccessful and on January 10, 1901 the Improvement Company was at once excluded from further participation in the collection of the public revenues.\(^7\)

The ouster of Jimenez and the assumption by General Vasquez in May, 1902 marked any shift in the dealings with the Improvement Company. The company's claims were recognized to the amount of \(4,500,000\), \(2,000,000\) of which resulted from the values of the national bonds held by the Company. \(1,500,000\) in claims resulted from its interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago.

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\(^4\) Ibid., p. 560.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 563.
and $1,000,000 from the shares of the bankrupt National Bank and other claims and accounts of the Company. This brief survey serves to demonstrate both the incompetence of the Santo Domingan government and the complexity of its financial problems. 8

The outline of Domingan finances given above serves to illustrate a commonplace occurrence in that country and many of its Latin American neighbors. The history of public debts in this area shows a surprisingly long list of failures of these governments to meet their financial pledge. These failures were demonstrated in many fashions ranging from payment of obligations in debased or fiat money to open repudiation of loans contracted with citizens and foreigners. 9 Amidreades in Las controles financieros intervencionales demonstrates that these young states have practiced nearly all the forms of bankruptcy in the history of finances. 10

The government of President Woss y Gil who succeeded Vasquez ran into further financial difficulty. The customs revenues which were the major source of national wealth were constantly diminished.

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8 Ibid., p. 586. For a more complete treatment of the history of Santo Domingo see Summer Welles' Naboth's Vineyard.


10 M. de J. Tromcoso de la Coucha, La Genesis de la Convencion Dominico-Americana (Santiago: Editorial El Diario, 1946), p. 59. (hereinafter referred to as Tromcoso, p.)
Exemptions granted to merchants loaned money to the Government were the prime cause of this loss of income. Furthermore, the export tax or cacao had been mortgaged to the Italian Government. Specific revenues allotted foreign creditors as security had frequently been repledged to others. The defaulted interest of the Belgian and French bondholders alone amounted to more than $600,000. The Santo Domingo Improvement Company's claim had already been recognized as $4,500,000, in addition other American claims totalled $1,000,000. The debt was growing daily and the Government had no credit with which to stem the tide. As if to add more fuel to an already brightly burning blaze, the revolution of Jiménez from Oct. 24 to Nov. 24, 1903 increased the debt by $700,000.11

The continuing unsettled political state resulted in the ascension of Carlos F. Morales to power with American assistance. According to Captain Dillingham, "the placing of Morales in San Domingo City was my doing."12 Morales while admiring American institutions and desiring its political friendship was strongly opposed to any policy that would render his land a political dependency of the United States, either in the form of annexation or a protectorate. He was firmly convinced of the ability of the Dominicans to administer their own affairs, if his government were

11 Welles, pp. 604-606.

given time to institute the necessary reforms and to straighten out the complicated financial situation it was in. 13

Morales, however, was in difficulty due to an accident of birth—he was a mulatto. His great fear was that the United States would not deal with him but confer its affection on a white man. Although he previously felt that the mulattoes were the best of people, because they possessed the best qualities of both white and black and would attempt to prove it so in his government. 14 Similar feeling, however, was not shared at home or throughout the world. One visitor to Santo Domingo noted that the antipathy of mulatto for white "is responsible for 3/4 of the offenses against Americans and Europeans, ignorance of the duty of a government professedly civilized being the remainder." 15

The large public debt was partly funded, partly floating, of a nominal value in excess of its real value, bearing a high rate of interest, in default both as to interest payments and amortization provisions. The origin and growth of the debt was due largely to:

A. Periodic accumulations of floating debt owing to:

1. Political instability, requiring large outlays


15 William Throp, "Santo Domingo, the 'Isle of Unrest'," Independent, LVI (March 3, 1904), p. 468.
for soldiery, for bribery of potential revolutionists, and for the suppression of actual revolutions.

2. Corruption of officials.
3. "Asignaciones" or pensions to mollify enemies and to reward friends of the existing regime.

B. Usurious interest computations, on account of:
   1. "Bonus" in principal.
   2. Extravagant interest rates.

C. Interest default and compounding accumulations.

D. Recognition and liquidation of excessive or illegal claims as a condition of further advances. 16

The actual debts fell into five categories and total $40,269,404.38.

| Bonded debt  | $17,670,312.25 |
| Liquidated debt | 9,595,530.40 |
| Floating debt  | 1,553,507.79 |
| Declared claims | 7,450,053.89 |
| Undeclared claims | 4,000,000.00 |
| Total indebtedness | $40,269,404.38 |

Here is a table summarizing these debts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Interest %</th>
<th>Term Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>757,700</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Hartmont loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>770,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Westendorp loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Railway loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>2,035,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4% consolidated gold bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4% gold debentures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>French-American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Reclamation consels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>2,736,750</td>
<td>2 3/4</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Dominican unified debt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Liquidated Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Domingo Improvement Co.</td>
<td>$4,403,532.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated internal debt</td>
<td>$1,737,151.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal debt held by the Vicini heirs</td>
<td>$1,598,876.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Foreign debts</td>
<td>$369,183.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sola claim</td>
<td>$356,314.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicini heirs</td>
<td>$242,716.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian protocol</td>
<td>$186,750.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-German protocol</td>
<td>$100,034.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Bancalari</td>
<td>$175,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. B. Vicini Burgos</td>
<td>$55,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ros claim</td>
<td>$39,967.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two cacao contracts</td>
<td>$68,296.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancalari Lample &amp; Co.</td>
<td>$16,733.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 minor contracts</td>
<td>$249,475.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9,595,530.40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Floating Debt

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered deferred debt</td>
<td>$587,710.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered floating debt</td>
<td>$140,850.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privileged revolutionary debt</td>
<td>$79,812.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificates of comptroller's office</td>
<td>$633,124.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certificates of treasury offices</td>
<td>$31,771.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open unsecured accounts</td>
<td>$80,239.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,553,507.79</strong></td>
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### Declared Claims

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American revolutionary claims</td>
<td>$885,258.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$71,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$40,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>$190,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$40,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>$35,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$186,643.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>$3,100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$1,574,647.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>$250,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>$250,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>$812,505.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pont claim</td>
<td>$7,450,053.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heureaux estate claim</td>
<td>$1,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National bank notes</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luberses contract</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West India Public Works Co. claim</td>
<td>$812,505.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincini heirs claim</td>
<td>$7,450,053.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,450,053.89</strong></td>
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### Undeclared Claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>British claims</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italian claims</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The debts just listed were the results primarily of 1) the periodic accumulation of current obligations in consequence of revolutionary disturbances and civil disorder; 2) the extravagant terms upon which such temporary loans have originally been obtained and have subsequently funded; 3) the chronic default in the service of the debt funded and floating, and the consequent rapid increase of principal. The problem of the debt was compounded by Dominican instability and possible foreign intervention to enforce their claims. The fact that Woss Y Gil sought and received refuge on a German warship demonstrated her desire to neutralize the waters and some of the parts of Santo Domingo in the event of war. Such action proved provocative to the United States for it violated the Monroe Doctrine.

America had established a basis for its intervention in Santo Domingo by the Roosevelt Corollary. America's desire to safeguard its security and realize its wishes had been demonstrated in the Panama incident. The Krenz Zeitung ominously pointed out that "the

17 Ibid., pp. 353-365, passim.
subject of the Powers, especially of Germany, have claims to make good in Santo Domingo."\textsuperscript{20} The \textit{Journal des Debats} also reflected the growing European bellicosity regarding their claims in Santo Domingo." Even in Washington they are noting that European Powers are not disposed, out of consideration for the Pan-American hegemony to which the United States pretends, to allow their interests to be compromised by an American state."\textsuperscript{21}

This growing European animosity towards Santo Domingo caused various reactions in the United States. The \textit{Philadelphia North American} commenting on the murder of J. C. Johnson, the engineer on the crusier \textit{Yankee}, noted, "If those rebels had killed a subject of some European Power," the incident would be made the "excuse for assembling of an unwelcome fleet in West Indian waters," and we in the absence of ability to guarantee retribution, nor prevent recurrence of the outrage, could not justly object."\textsuperscript{22} Many felt that the United States was under moral obligations to assist the Santo Domingan people or else abandon the Monroe Doctrine and let them seek assistance from any power that was willing

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{21} "President Roosevelt's Fear of France," \textit{Literary Digest}, XXVIII (January 16, 1904), p. 89.

\textsuperscript{22} "American Interference in Santo Domingo," \textit{Literary Digest}, XXVIII (February 20, 1904), p. 249.
to assume the responsibility of assisting them.\textsuperscript{23} Scholars, such as John Bassett Moore, were opposed to all attempts to secure payment on defaulted loans.

When citizens of a country go abroad and engage in business, they must be held to assume all the risks of disorder and injury in the country to which they go, and can look to the local authorities only, no matter how inefficient or malevolent they may be, for protection; but it suffices to say that no respectable government acts on such theory.\textsuperscript{24}

Theodore Roosevelt as the leader of a self-acclaimed respectable government and the formulator of a policy which sanctioned intervention could not overlook the developments to the South. In a letter to his son Kermit he related the events taking place:

San Domingo is drifting into chaos for after a hundred years of freedom it shows itself utterly incompetent for governmental work. Most reluctantly I have been obliged to take the initial step of interference there. I hope it will be a good while before I will have to go further. But sooner or later it seems to me inevitable that the United States should assume an attitude of protection and regulation in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean. I hope it will be deferred as long as possible but I think it is inevitable.\textsuperscript{25}

In a later letter to his friend J. B. Bishop the inevitable has happened and Roosevelt is caught on the horns of a dilemma.

I have been hoping and praying for these months that the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island,


\textsuperscript{24} Munro, \textit{Intervention}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{25} Bemis, p. 155.
I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to. Is that strong enough. I have asked some of our people to go there because, after having refused for these three months to do anything, the attitude of the Santo Domingans has become one of half chaotic war towards us. If I possibly can I want to do as little as possible. Their government has been bedeviling us to establish some kind of protectorate over the islands, and take charge of their finances. We have been answering them that we could not possibly go into the subject now at all. 26

Some of the Santo Domingan officials who were bedeviling Roosevelt were aware that they were in great danger. The European bondholders, Belgian, French, German, Italian, and Spanish not to mention English, since their interests were in the hands of the United States Government would get tired of waiting for payment. The twenty five million dollars due could not be paid by mere promises. The threat of a possible combination of these Powers to force the Dominican Republic to pay which require the United States to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. If the United States refused to interfere to assist the Dominicans or resist a possible European intervention, a violation of the Monroe Doctrine would result which could impair the security of the United States. 27

The Dominicans felt that "in the proposed treaty with the United States lies the only hope for peace and prosperity in Santo Domingo. A rejection of the treaty would result in international complications for the

26 Bishop, p. 431.

American observers were well aware of these complications. Captain Miller wrote to General Rodriguez, an opponent of Morales and pro-German sympathizer, "the revolution must close and that neither he more than anyone else must think for a moment that Germany or any other foreign power could be situated in any portion of the Dominican territory; that the United States would not for a moment sanction it." Rear Admiral Wise in appraising the situation came to the conclusion that "eventually the United States will have to assume grave responsibility on the island in order to work out the solution of a stable government."  

On June 19, 1904 Morales succeeded in postponing the Belgian and French claims to revenue the customs houses at Santo Domingo and Macoris. The Italians were granted $\frac{1}{10}$ of all customs revenues of the Republic and specific hypothecation of the Samana customs. An arbital commission for the claims of the Improvement Co. consisting of Judge George Gray of the U.S. Court of Appeals, John G. Carlisle, and Don Manuel de Jesus Galvon granted a decision of a $4,500,000 claim to be paid at 4% per annum by monthly installments beginning September, 1904 from customs revenues and port dues of all the ports of the northern coast of the Republic.


29 Rippy, "Initiation," p. 432.

30 Ibid., p. 426.
Judge Abbott, the Financial Agent of the United States, was authorized, in the event of the failure of the Government to make the payments due each month, to take possession of the customs houses at Puerto Plata and undertake the collection of all revenues there. In the event that such sums should still prove insufficient for payment of the amounts due the award, he was to undertake the collection of all customs duties in the other northern parts of the Republic with the same rights and privileges as in Puerto Plata. When the inevitable happened and the Republic forfeited its obligations Abbott conducted himself according to the provisions of the agreement. The other foreign bondholders namely France, Belgium, Italy and Germany protested the infringement on the provisions for their payment. The Italians sent their minister Orestes Savini to investigate the developments. During the presidency of Moss Y Gil he had paid a similar visit and with the assistance of the cruiser Giovanni Banson had concluded an agreement known as the Italian Protocol. Its provisions worked out the regulation of payments of debts contracted by the Republic and those Italians who had claims during the Heureaux reign. The Giovanni Banson remained in the Caribbean while Bartolome Bancalari, an old friend of Heureaux, was placed in Sanchez and Samana to regulate the shipping houses for the Italians and to collect the administrator's debt by regulating the customs houses of the ports.

The French government threatened to do the same thing at the capi-

31 Welles, pp. 614-615.
and sent the Jurien de la Graviere to the Caribbean to enforce its demands. The German cruiser, Vienetta, was also in Caribbean as it had been two years previously when it participated in the bombardment of Maracaibo. This occurred when England, Italy, Germany and France attempted to use force to collect their defaulted debts from Venezuela. The stage was set for a replay of the same situation in Santo Domingo unless the United States intervened to head off such a disaster.

To avoid the possible development of what would in effect be an indefinite occupation of American territory by non-American political interests, the United States inquired as to the disposition of the Dominican government to accept American cooperation. In action at this stage of developments, Roosevelt realized would result in a violation of the Monroe Doctrine by what could amount to be a permanent occupation and control of the Republic by an European power or a combination of European powers. American action was complicated by aggressive intent and action of Germany most notably of all of the powers involved. Minister Powell noted on October 3, 1904, "I find that the German Government is fully acquainted with all my movements." The obstacles confronting

32 Troncoso, pp. 30-31.

33 Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects, p. 258.

34 Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 546.

American action prompted Captain Dillingham to report on December 6, 1904. "We must govern the country as well as its finances, till the people of Santo Domingo can learn to govern themselves." In an attempt to arrange such an American control of the island Hay wrote to Dawson on December 28, 1904.

You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly but earnestly and in perfect friendly spirit, touching the disquieting situation which is developing owing to the pressures of other Governments having arbitral awards in their favor and who regard our award as conflicting with their rights. Already one European Government strongly intimates that it may resort to occupation of some Dominican customs parts to secure its own payment. There appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo, would be disposed to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Governments and the several claimants. We have ground to think that such an arrangement would satisfy the other powers, besides serving as a practical guarantee of the peace of Santo Domingo, from external influence or internal disturbances.

The agreement settled on was amenable to both Presidents involved as they urged their respective Congresses to take action. President Morales told his Congress on February 27, 1905, "The protocol is the result of necessity and means the reaching of an agreement which may place the country in a position to solve the problem of its debt. In submitting it to your high approbation, I am confident that your patriotism . . . will gather inspiration from the reality of existing circumstances. The only kind of pa-

36 Ibid., p. 427.
37 Ibid., pp. 436-437.
triotism which is useful is that which shows results in works of practical utility."38 His counterpart in the United States, Roosevelt, urged his Congress to action far but for a different reason. "Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust that we are willing, to bestow. She has asked for this aid, and the expression of friendship repeatedly sanctioned by the people and the Government of the United States warrant her in believing that it will not be withheld in the hour of her need."39 In a letter to a high State department official he stated the justification for his position: "the treaty now before the Senate was concluded with South Domingo at Santo Domingo's earnest request repeatedly pressed upon us and was submitted to the Senate because in my judgment it was our duty to our less fortunate neighbor to respond to her call for aid, inasmuch as we were the only power who could give this aid, and inasmuch as her need for it was very great."40

The United States was to assume control over the customs houses of Santo Domingo in order to render the debt amortized. This action was initiated in mid-March and Minister Powell reported. "According to your instructions the President agrees to place Custom Houses in the custody of the Government of the United

38 Welles, p. 630.
39 Bishop, p. 432.
40 Roosevelt to A. A. Adee, March 28, 1905, Morison IV, p.1149.
This action was not undertaken at the mere whim of the President but only after serious discussions with his most trusted advisors. "Morales asked us to take over the custom houses pending action by the Senate. I decided to do so, but first of all consulted Spooner, Foraker, Lodge and Knox. All heartily agreed that it was necessary for me to take this action." In a letter to Hay, Roosevelt noted

In Santo Domingo we have taken the necessary step; but it was one of those cases, whether from action or from inaction, I felt that much less trouble would come from action; but beyond a doubt we shall have flurries in connection with revolutionary uprising and filibustering enterprises, as we assume the protection of the customs houses. I do not think that Santo Domingo itself will give us much trouble, but the fool vote and the timid vote will both be greatly alarmed at home, and divers knaves will play skillfully on this alarm from time to time.

The Monroe Doctrine, especially Roosevelt's interpretation of it, which required European abstinence from American affairs necessitated the United States to exercise its "police power" in regard to these states. In a letter to Spring-Rice on July 24, 1905, he stated his position regarding American action and intention in the Caribbean. "We must make it evident on the one hand that we do not intend to use the Monroe Doctrine as a pretense for self-aggrandizement at the expense of the Latin American republics, and

41 Rippy, "Initiation," p. 443.

42 Roosevelt to Hay, March 30, 1905, Morison IV, p. 1150.

43 Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905, Morison IV, p. 1156.
on the other that we do not intend it to be used as a warrant for letting any of these republics remain as small bandit nests of a wicked and inefficient type. This means that we must in good faith try to help them as we are now trying to help Santo Domingo, and be ready if the worst comes to worse to chastise them.\(^4\) In a speech at Chautauqua he reiterated that the United States did not intend to let the Monroe Doctrine be used as "a shield to protect that republic from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations."\(^5\)

In his annual message for that year, 1905, Roosevelt made an appeal to factors other than the Monroe Doctrine in the case of the proposed action in regard to Santo Domingo. "Santo Domingo, in her turn, has now made an appeal to us to help her, and not only every principle of wisdom but every generous instinct within us bids us respond to the appeal. It is not of the slightest consequence whether we grant the aid needed by Santo Domingo as an incident to the wise development of the Monroe Doctrine or because we regard the case of Santo Domingo as standing wholly by itself, and to be treated as such, and not on general principles or with any reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The important point is to give the needed aid, and the case is certainly sufficiently pecu-

\(^4\) Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison, IV, p. 1286.

lier to deserve to be judged purely on its own merits." 46

The overriding consideration, however, was one of fear of a possible European takeover in Santo Domingo. In the Protocol Roosevelt points out that "in view of our past experience and our knowledge of the actual situation of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the United States Government to take any effective action looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to the discharge of its own duty under the Monroe Doctrine can only be considered as a acquiescence in some such action by another government." 47 For "in the case of one of these nations, only the actual opening of negotiations to this end by our Government prevented the seizure of territory in Santo Domingo by a European power." 48 The proposed agreement with the United States would avoid any such possibility for "it is for better that this country should put through such an arrangement, rather than allow any foreign country to undertake it." 49 Root shared this concern and so stated in a letter to Lodge on December 7, 1905. "The important thing is that a request from the Congress of San Domingo should be inserted as a condition to the general sweeping power of interfer-

46 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. xxxv.


48 Ibid., p. xxxvi.

49 Callcott, p. 208.
ence. The unconditional power of interference would practically destroy Dominican sovereignty which, of course, none of us wishes to do."

Opposed to such an occurrence, Roosevelt remarked in his annual message "under the proposed treaty the independence of the island is scrupulously respected, the danger of violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the intervention of foreign powers vanishes, and the interference of our Government is minimized, so that we shall only act in conjunction with the Santo Domingo authorities to secure the proper administration of the customs, and therefore to secure the payments of just debts and secure the Dominican Governments against demands for unjust debts." In effect, the United States was to do three things: (1) to adjust the Dominican debt, foreign and domestic, and to ascertain the validity and amount of all pending claims; (2) to administer the Dominican customs houses and to deliver 45% of the receipts to the Dominican government, applying the net remainder to the interest upon and the amortization of the debts and claims so adjusted; and (3) to afford the Dominican Republic such further assistance as needed to maintain orderly and efficient government.

50 Jessup, p. 546.

51 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. xxxvii.

It seems clear that neither Roosevelt nor Elihu Root, whose work was in part responsible for the action, thought the United States should intervene more than was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of stable government.\(^\text{53}\) Roosevelt could have had one of four possible reasons for intervention according to J. Fred Rippy: (1) fear of European intervention of a more or less permanent nature in the Dominican Republic; (2) the desire to protect the lives and promote as well as protect the economic interests of the citizens of the United States; (3) willingness to gratify certain expansionist influences; and (4) a disposition to give aid to the inhabitants of the Dominican Republic, many of whom desired or were supposed to desire the assistance of the United States.\(^\text{54}\) I would tend to dismiss the third reason and minimize the second.

The first was, in my opinion, the overriding consideration. In regard to the fourth, Roosevelt himself said of the action, "it was strictly an instance of working out the Monroe Doctrine in the interest of the United States, in the interest of all people dealing with Santo Domingo, and above all, in the interest of Santo Domingo itself."\(^\text{55}\)

Root stated in regard to the proposed action, "our treatment

\(^{53}\) Munro, Intervention, p. 531.

\(^{54}\) Rippy, "Initiation," p. 419.

\(^{55}\) Roosevelt, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine," p. 583.
of Santo Domingo, ... is but a part of the working out of the 
policy of peace and righteousness as the basis for wealth and 
prosperity, in place of the policy of force, of plunder, of con-
quest, as the means of acquiring wealth." 56 The chief material 
advantage that came from the action would be to Santo Domingo and 
its creditors. The United States would gain some indirect advan-
tages by making the communities to the south stable and prosperous 
and "therefore not merely in name, but in fact independent and 
self-governing." 57

The specter of an unfriendly European nation entrenched in 
one of the Caribbean islands haunted many Americans and made them 
angry for a quick settlement of the agreement. 58 Roosevelt held 
to his principle that "an aggrieved nation can without interfering 
with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the ad-
justment of its disputes with American States, provided that ac-
tion does not take the shape of interference with their form of 
government or of the despoilment of their territory under any dis-
 guise." 59 Threatened European military action, however, prompted

56 Elihu Root, Latin America and the United States, ed., Ro-
 bert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University 

57 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 342.

58 Henry J. Hancock, "The Situation in Santo Domingo," Annals, 
XXVI (1905), p. 52.

the United States to assume a new position. The United States thus became a party in interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it could not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics, and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, offered the only way in which the power in question could collect any debts, unless there was interference on the part of the United States. 60 Thus, it was realized that the United States Government could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occupation of Dominican territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of action, or else virtually saying to European governments that they would not be allowed to collect their claims. 61 Roosevelt therefore, concluded that "either we must submit to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe Doctrine or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement that herewith submitted to the Senate." 62 Therefore "this protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine." 63 The Monroe Doctrine mentioned here can be interpreted as meaning two things. First, the Monroe Doctrine refers to the

60 Ibid., p. 335.
61 Ibid., p. 337.
62 Ibid., p. 341.
63 Ibid., p. 342.
traditional policy of opposition to European control of American territory. Second, the Monroe Doctrine can also refer to the Rooseveltian concept of the policy of "police power" in cases of wrongdoing, such as Santo Domingo, whose efficacy was also being tested by the crisis.

The long standing fear of possible American takeover and annexation in Latin American countries had to be once more dispelled. "It can not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part." 64 Hay received this letter from J. N. Leger on March 5, 1904. "In the course of the interview you did me the honor to grant me on the 3rd instant you were as good as to tell me that the United States had no intention to take advantage of the events now taking place in the Dominican Republic either to annex that Republic or to force a protectorate upon it, or to acquire any part of its territory, Samana in particular." 65 Part of the objection to the protocol itself would have been removed if the obligations were more rigously defined and a demonstration that no annexation of the Dominican Republic was contem-

64 Ibid., p. 334.

65 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 371.
The control of finances was passed to the United States. It was to collect the principal revenues of the Republic, arrange the settlement of the national debt and readjust the tariff. Latin Americans believed that "the Power that controls the purse rules the State." Hence to them the United States was in control of all of the affairs of the Republic. Loomis, however, was quick to point out:

There is no thought or possibility of the annexation of Santo Domingo to the United States, in the minds of either the Administration or of the representatives of Santo Domingo, now in Washington. It has not come into consideration and will not. It is simply an effort which is being made to arrive at some plan which shall safeguard all interests, and put a stop to the outrageous state of affairs now existing in those islands.

The correspondence between the State Department and Minister Powell will serve to demonstrate how meticulously the question of Santo Dominigan sovereignty was discussed.

Loomis to Dawson Jan. 31, 1905

You will substitute for the second clause of the preamble sent you in our draft of protocol Jan. 25, beginning, "Whereas the Government of the United States of America," the following, which is to take the place of the paragraph of the preamble containing the territorial guaranty:


67 "When is a Protectorate not a Protectorate?," Review of Reviews, XXXI (1905), p. 118.

Whereas the Government of the United States, viewing any attempt on the part of the government of this hemisphere to oppress or control the destiny of the Dominican Republic as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States, is in compliance with the request of the Dominican Government, disposed to lend its assistance toward effecting a satisfactory arrangement with the creditors of the Dominican Government. 69

Dawson to State Department, Feb. 4, 1905

Minister of finance insists on insertion after the word "assessing," in the first paragraph preamble, of following "the territorial integrity of the Republic." 70

Dawson to State Department, Feb. 5, 1905

Dominican Government insists that suggested guaranty is effective only against European power and not against the United States itself. The Vice-President has received a telegram from Dominican consul-general at New York, which convinces him that that change in preamble means ultimate annexation. Dominican authorities suspicious and alarmed as to our intentions. They insist on inserting at the end of second paragraph preamble: "agreeing to respect the complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic." 71

May to Dawson, Feb. 6, 1905

You may add at end of second paragraph of preamble the words "agreeing to respect the complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic." 72

May to Dawson, Feb. 6, 1905

The President regrets his inability to consent to any further changes in protocol. The words "without the consent of the President of the United States " at the

69 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 320.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 322.
72 Ibid.
end of article 6 are indispensable to the success of the plan to relieve the Dominican Republic from its hopeless financial conditions, which is rapidly growing worse and threatens serious disasters. Other governments have repeatedly threatened to intervene and the United States cannot extend financial protection unless it can have the confidence of the Dominican Government and of other parties concerned, so as to enable the United States to carry out the plan successfully.73

In the case of Santo Domingo, the United States intervention was a moderating element to the European claims and the pressure due to its debt the occupation of its custom houses resulted in responsible clerks distributing the income among the creditors on the agreed prorated basis.74 But in accordance with the American Constitution the treaty had to be submitted to the Senate for its approval. Dawson proposed a means which eluded a treaty and its requirement to be placed before the Senate of both the United States and Santo Domingo.75

The means arrived at for circumventing the Senate approval of the proposed agreement would be a Presidential resolution to use the good offices to attain their ends. The need to adopt this modus vivendi was even more pronounced after the Senate rejection of the treaty form. This particular aspect, however, will be discussed at a later time. The modus vivendi and the treaty were practically alike with two exceptions. The American collectors of

73 Ibid., p. 323.
74 Pereyra, p. 121.
75 Troncoso, p. 35.
customs were to be appointed by Morales, Roosevelt using only his
good offices to recommend, and our warships maintaining, the Amer-
ican collectors in the custom-houses. Secondly, instead of the 55
percent of the revenue going to creditors it was deposited in the
National City Bank of New York to await Senate approval after
treaty. At such time, the money would be paid to the creditors as
originally intended, otherwise it would be returned to the Domini-
can Government. Root noted "the modus vivendi ... consists
merely in a plan or way of getting along, pursued by the Government
of San Domingo on its own responsibility but with the acquiescence
and unofficial good offices of the President." Dawson noted the
solution "for the present at least, absolutely eliminates Santo
Domingo as a potentially disturbing international factor." Roosevelt
wrote to the Secretary of the Navy on Sept. 5, 1905, "tell
Admiral Bradford to stop any revolution. I intend to keep the is-
land in statu quo until the Senate has had time to act on the
treaty, and I shall treat any revolutionary movement to upset the
modus vivendi. That this is ethically right, I am sure, even
though there may be some technical or red tape difficulty." One

76 Eugene P. Lyle Jr., "Our Mix-up In Santo Domingo," World's
York, 10 (1905), p. 6748.

77 Jessup, p. 543.

78 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 380.

79 Bishop, p. 434.
of the major problems facing the Dominigan people was the growth of violence to resolve differences. Minister Velasquez noted in his annual report of 1906:

So contrary to order are the customs, so inveterate in general has become the habit of disorder, that many of the men who theoretically express enthusiasm for the establishment of regular and systematic order understanding that only in that way in the salvation of the possible, when it comes to actual practice, when they find that such a state of affairs would be imposed upon them, subjecting their life to certain limitations not in accord with customs already rooted, in opposition to certain interests created, rebel against the saving reform, accusing the person in charge of its execution for his perserverance and faith in executing the same. 80

George Colton remarked that "these conditions as noted are indicative of the apparently insurmountable obstacles which have confronted these patriotic Dominicans who seem now, with the assistance of the modus vivendi, about to place their country permanently upon a safe footing." 81 These tendencies prompted other critics to realize that the weakness of Santo Domingo was its strength, since to attack it seems the part of a bully. The social environment was primarily responsible and it must be changed if good government were to prevail. President Morales believed this to be true and spoke for many Dominicans.

I believe it the only successful method under the existing

80 Foreign Relations, 1907, pp. 333-334.

81 Ibid., p. 334.

conditions, of upholding my government or any government which aspires to a decent and orderly administration of the republic's affairs. If it fails anarchy and warfare will inevitably ensue. This country will accept the convention. I will see to that. With the exception of a few disgruntled political leaders, professional revolutionists, all the intelligent peoples are in favor of it.

Others, however, were of a different mind as early as 1904 de Rosas in Landu said of possible financial control by the United States. "The Dominican government attempted to escape the consequences of the sentence: for a diplomatic intervention succeeds an armed intervention." For the majority of the people the convention was a disgrace and united the patriotic interests of all and the political interests of most. Those opposed to it, attacked it as an infringement on Dominican sovereignty. Those who defended it called for the avoidance of circumstances that would lead to its extension or repetition. The outcome was attributed to their own misadventures, the ambition of the United States, and a series of their own sorrowful and irreparable errors, mostly financial.

The Nueno Paris extolled the virtues of the modus vivendi "the United States will guarantee the Dominicans protection against themselves and against foreign cupidity. Now they may indeed boast

83 Packard, p. 122.
84 Troncoso, p. 62.
85 Ibid., p. 55.
86 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
that they are on the road to civilized existence." Many felt the people would be in sympathy with the agreement because it provided for the integrity of the territory of the republic and assured peaceful conditions under which they could work and prosper.

Thus, in conformance with the decision and advise of the government, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Juan Francisco Sanchez, and the Minister of the Commerce House, Federic Velazquez Hernandez, had signed the agreement to establish the assistance of the United States in the form of a loan and regulation of the debt.

In the main, the reaction throughout the world was one that accepted the tenets of the Roosevelt Corollary and there was no widespread or flaming indignation. Las Ultimas Noticias appraised the Roosevelt corollary and the action in Santo Domingo as follows:

It is in our hands to avoid this intervention, but it is not a menace to the established governments which take part with pride in the concert of nations. That intervention refers only to those republics which are in a perpetual state of anarchy, which disregard international laws, which do not meet their monetary or other obligations, which have, in fact, done everything possible to lose their character as


89 Troncoso, pp. 34-35.

90 Perkins, History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 90.
civilized nations. 91

It quoted Roosevelt as saying "It is regrettable that all the South American republics do not have, like Chile, a suitable form of government, which might give guarantees and be able to inspire the respect of the whole world . . . . If all the South American countries would follow in the footsteps of Chile, we should have no reason to regret the events which on several occasions have forced us to intervene actively in the policy of our continent." 92 Thus, it concluded that "the peril of the North is only a myth if the South does not provoke the North with interval disturbances or violations of international law and break its word in financial matters." 93

Laneta, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, had this appraisal of Roosevelt and his policy. "In regard to the United States of America, they are for us an example of peace and progress. The Monroe Doctrine I have understood in no other way than as a doctrine of friendship between the republics of this continent and our great model of the north, which has reached its place - I say it with American pride - at height of the most powerful nations of

92 Ibid., p. 158.
93 Ibid.
It had been charged that the agreement reached between Santo Domingo and the United States was one contrived by the Americans for their own designs. It was, indeed, forced on the Dominicans; but by circumstance rather than by any imperialistic program of the United States. It was, as Melvin Knight pointed out, "A free and spontaneous decision . . . for avoiding the dismemberment of the Republic." 96

Critics of the policy attacked the plan on various fronts. The Boston Herald felt that the situation should have been left alone for "the still disturbed countries are paying for the penalty for their folly in being shunned by foreign capital." 97 Others were aware that to many Latin Americans the difference between annexing territory and controlling the finances seemed immaterial. The American attitude of dismissing them as "lesser breeds" who lived in what O. Henry called the "banana-stand republics" who had to be supervised was also assailed. 98 Thus, many Latin Americans felt

94 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 49.

95 Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds, p. 258.

96 Troncoso, p. 37.


to counter Roosevelt's interventionist tendencies they had no recourse but to follow the slogan "Against foreign interference let us oppose domestic virtue." Thus Elihu Root was prompted to write Senator Ben Tillman on December 13, 1905. "The South Americans now hate us largely because they think we despise them and try to bully them. I really like them and intend to show it. I think their friendship is really important to the United States, and the best way to secure it is by treating them like gentlemen. If you want to make a man your friend, it does not pay to treat him like a yellow dog." 100

Ex-President Jimenez struck another note in his letter of Jan., 1906. "The present historic epoch peremptorily demands that the United States the only protector of these small nations, decide to exert their influence over them, for the role of civilization, and lift them up from the anarchy and prostration in which they lie." 101 He found a responsive Roosevelt who adopted much the same attitude in his annual message of 1907.

The United States are now, and will be for a long time, the natural protectors of the weak Spanish-American republics, and in the hearts of the patriots of those countries there is a wound that bleeds when they remember the humiliations and impositions inflicted upon them whenever that protection has been diminished, or

100 Jessup, p. 469.
when it could not be requested or granted. 102

The wounds seemed healed, at least temporarily, when Root made his visit to South America. The journey was the cause for much good-will and praise of the United States and Roosevelt's policies. Jose Marcelino de Souza on July 24, 1906 at Bahia made this statement. "This policy of concord, therefore, accomplishes good. I repeat, America must prosper. It is necessary that the Monroe Doctrine triumph, not to the exclusion of the civilization of the Old World, but to the benefit of all humanity." 103 Luis Drago on Aug. 17, 1906 made his contribution to the outpouring of faith and trust in the United States and its ability to live up to its potential and promises.

It is consequently our sacred duty to preserve the integrity of America, material and moral, against the menaces and artifices, very real and effective, that unfortunately surround it. It is not long since one of the most eminent of living juris consults of Great Britain denounced the possibility of the danger. "The enemies of light and freedom," he said, "all neither dead nor sleeping; they are vigilant, active, militant, and astute." And it was in obedience to that sentiment of common defense that in a critical moment the Argentine Republic proclaimed the impropriety of the forcible collection of public debts by European nations not as an abstract principle of academic value or as a legal rule of universal application outside of this continent (which it is not incumbent on us to maintain), but as a principle of American diplomacy which, whilst being founded on equity and justice, has for its exclusive object to spare the peoples of this continent the calamities of conquest, disguised under the mask of

102 Foreign Relations, 1907, p. 354.

financial interventions, in the same way as the traditional policy of the United States, without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, condemned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great powers of Europe.\textsuperscript{104}

Lisentiate Manuel Calero on Oct. 3, 1907 pointed up another important aspect of Rooseveltian policy. "The integrity of the nations of this continent is of vital interest to all, collectively, and not alone to the country immediately affected. Any attack on this integrity should constitute an offense in the eyes of the other nations of America."\textsuperscript{105}

The European effects of Rooseveltian actions were mixed and emphasized different aspects of the policies as they changed the course of European affairs. Economically, the bonds issued by states bordering on the Caribbean rapidly increased in value. As an after effect of American attempts to determine the validity many European creditors protested as they felt such action endangered their just claims.\textsuperscript{106} The 32nd Annual Report of the Council of British Bondholders best summed up general European economic reaction.

It became evident that in order to evade payment of their obligations the dishonest Republics were taking deliberate advantage of the hostility displayed by the United States Government towards the attempts of European Governments to obtain redress for their subjects. It was contended,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Root, \textit{Latin America and the U.S.}, pp. 95-96.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 172.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Talcott Williams, p. 35.
\end{itemize}
therefore, that our responsibilities towards those to whom interference they were so strongly opposed, that this contention was well founded, has been admitted by the present distinguished President of the United States. 107

Strategic and hegemonic consideration prompted the Kreuz Zeitung to note that the new American policies mean "that the Union sets up a claim to supremacy over all Central and South American republics without having made so much as a thrust of the sword to attain it." 108

The American reaction to the customs receivership was divided with each side as bitter in opposition to the other's conclusions. The New York Evening Post noted "the Monroe Doctrine is too much like a great swelling word of vanity, which we utilize as an excuse for doing whatever we wish. When the President says that it is the Doctrine which inhibits foreign governments from demanding payment of Santo Domingo, he actually means that he does not want them to do it." 109 The opposition of the Senate to the proposed agreement was assailed by the Hartford Times. "It is a narrow view which shuts the eye to the manner in which Panama was detached from Columbia, and the way by which American rule has been started


109 "Santo Domingo Customs and Senate Customs," Literary Digest, XXX (February 25, 1905), p. 271.
in Santo Domingo, and praises the President as safer, saner, or more patriotic than the Senate." The New York Press was even more vehement in its denunciation of the opposition to Roosevelt's policies. "Any club to hit President Roosevelt is all right for the Senate to use. It is all the same to the Senate whether the blow hurts the cause of world peace, but leaves the President unhurt, or whether the blow puts the life of the Monroe Doctrine in danger if it is armed at the head of the Senate's opponent ... If war ever comes with a European Power in Santo Domingo the U.S. Senate will be to blame not President Roosevelt." In a letter to W. G. Tiffany Roosevelt sought to explain his position.

Under the proposed protocol we could collect debts only in the sense that Collector Stranahan in New York collects debts for the creditors of the U.S. All that would be done would be to put men that were honest and capable within their sphere into Santo Domingan parts, honestly to collect the customs duties in accordance with the request of Santo Domingo; to turn over half to help run the government and to turn over the other half to a commission of high-minded men who would examine into the claims of the various creditors and oppositions them on their merits. It will indeed be an infamy if a majority of the Senate, from purely partisan reasons, refuses to do its clear duty and grant the relief to Santo Domingo which Santo Domingo needs. Every man who votes against this treaty by his vote invites foreign nations to violate the Monroe Doctrine, and refuses relief and protection to a struggling American republic which has appealed to us for aid.


112 Roosevelt to W. G. Tiffany, March 14, 1905, Morison, IV, p. 1139.
The Senate, however, was determined to control in an ever more
effective manner the foreign policy of the United States. In effect, the President's action had prompted the Senate into asserting
more strongly the right of decision in regard to question of foreign policy granted it by the Constitution. The most caustic remarks opposing Rooseveltian policies were made by The Nation which kept a string of tirades against Roosevelt which ranged from judging that "too much Monroe Doctrine hath make him mad." To extending the concept of adopting the Monroe Doctrine to keep it from being "fossilized" to conclude "the Doctrine is a conjurer's hat, out of which anything he pleases may be pulled." In addition it judged American action was used to keep a compliant Morales regime in power. His present action was deemed inconsistent with his performance in the Venezuela crisis of 1902 and the whole concept of Monroeism was assailed. He was charged with attempting

113 "Europe's Discontent With the United States Senate," Literary Digest, XXX (March 11, 1905), p. 370.

114 "President Roosevelt and the Senate," Spectator, 94 (February 18, 1905), p. 242.

115 Nation, LXXX (February 2, 1905).

116 Nation, LXXXI (August 17, 1905).

117 Nation, LXXX (February 2, 1905).

118 Nation, LXXX (February 23, 1905).
to stir up an emotional reaction in his favor,\textsuperscript{119} while at the same time running of risk of possible confrontation with European powers over the validity of their claims.\textsuperscript{120} It concluded "the first swing of the Big Stick has simply banged the shins of its rash wielder."\textsuperscript{121}

There was, however, much support for the receivership as proposed by Roosevelt. Many extolled the virtues of any agreement could promise to effective word off a possible European intervention with a subsequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine and solve the rising problem of the Dominican debt justly.\textsuperscript{122} The action afforded a demonstration of what hoped to be a new and dramatic approach to the problems of Latin American states. Such a new policy would be of a predetermined consistent nature as opposed to a previous policy that had been accidental and vacillating.\textsuperscript{123} This new era of policy would be marked by the Rooseveltian interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, "police power," and its tenets would serve as deterents to possible threats which could result in

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Nation}, LXXX (March 23, 1905).
\item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{Nation}, LXXXI (August 17, 1905).
\item \textsuperscript{121} \textit{Nation}, LXXX (March 23, 1905).
\item \textsuperscript{122} Hancock, p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{123} "A Motion to Take from the Table," p. 507.
\end{enumerate}
The Senate's failure to ratify the treaty was viewed as unfortunate, its failure to consider the restrictions and limitations, however, was tragic. Santo Domingo itself was to maintain the status quo not the United States "so that if the treaty be ratified it can be executed." The policy included American interest and self-protection over and above its humanitarian aspects. This concern for the material well-being of the United States was vitally concerned with the passage of the agreement. Actually, Roosevelt was merely using his good offices to assist Santo Domingo rather than operating in opposition to the Senate.

The supporters of the agreement felt the Senate should be called in special session to notify an amended agreement since they earlier rejected what was considered to be a vital document.

In a letter to Jacob H. Hollander, Roosevelt made note of the caution with which he had to conduct himself in these matters.

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126 "Mr. Roosevelt and Santo Domingo," Independent, LVIII (April 6, 1905), p. 792.

127 Hancock, p. 127.

128 "Mr. Roosevelt and Santo Domingo," p. 792.

129 Ibid., p. 793.
lest he be accused of backing the "money interest" in its demands. "I am always afraid of seeming to back any big company which has financial interests in one of these South American states, and can only do so under the narrowest restrictions and most sharply defined conditions. On the other hand, there are real advantages in not having a treaty but some such arrangement as we suggested."¹³⁰

Root in his speeches on his Latin American term made two positions very clear. First, the use of force for debt collection was a serious cause of possible trouble in the relations between the nations of the Old and New Worlds.¹³¹ Second, he reiterated the Rooseveltian position that America sought no territory aggrandizement in the Hemisphere to the detriment of any of the States to its South. "No act of unjust aggression by the United States against any smaller and weaker power would be forgiven by the people to whom the Government is responsible."¹³²

Senatorial critics rejected the Roosevelt-Root interpretation of Latin American affairs. Santo Domingo was the representative case of all of the South and Central American Republics. Most were inclined to violence and disorder and used the Monroe Doctrine.

¹³¹ Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Root, p. 158.
¹³² Ibid, pp. 206-207.
to shield their repudiation of their financial and other obligations. America's historical tradition repudiated the use of force for the collection of its debts, contending that American citizens who made foreign investments surrendered himself to the protection of that country and could rely only upon American good offices in attempt to secure just treatment. Senator Rayner felt that such notions should be made to "realize that they must perform the obligations of a civilized society, and that if their property is rightfully seized upon their failure to do so, we do not intend to intervene unless an attempt is made to subvert their institution . . . . We repudiate the doctrine that the flag follows a contract." The American people would then declare that the Monroe Doctrine places upon them no obligation to protect such states when they have arbitrarily done wrong to foreign countries or their citizens. However, when the action taken by European powers to redress such grievances took the form of territorial occupation or acquisition the United States was opposed to its continuation.

134 Ibid., p. 893.
136 Newlands, p. 895.
The treaty proposed by Roosevelt according to Senator Newlands "involves a new departure in our policy and active participation in the affairs of the Republics of South and Central America and of the Caribbean Sea - a protectorate over all of them." In plainer language Senator Tillman of South Carolina evaluated the treaty as saying, "Here we are, your big brother; you are not behaving right, you have got to settle and if you do not settle, we will whip you and make you settle." Additional opposition was mounted because Roosevelt attempted to eliminate the Senate as much as possible from regulation of the conducts of foreign affairs. Newlands feared "if we once entered on a policy of active intervention, we might become involved in such intervention perplexities as to drift us away from the domestic problems that concern us."

Roosevelt complained to Steffens, "the treaty is so obviously in the interest of the United States, in the interest of Santo Domingo, and in the interest of the entire civilized world that no substantial opposition could by any possibility have been aroused save on purely factional grounds." Later Representative Babcock related that Roosevelt confided to him that party lines had

137 Ibid., p. 888.
138 Adams, p. 20.
139 Newlands, p. 886.
140 Roosevelt to Stephens, February 6, 1906, Morison, V, p. 147.
been drawn in the Senate on the treaty and the defiant attitude of Venezuela could be attributed to lack of senatorial support of his policies.\textsuperscript{141} The entire Roosevelt Corollary was to be disavowed by the Senate's erasure of the Santo Domingo treaty and the failure to ratify even its amended form.\textsuperscript{142} He wrote to Carnegie, "Gradually we are coming to a condition which will insure permanent peace in the Western Hemisphere. If only the Senate will ratify the Santo Domingo treaty, we shall have taken another stride in this direction."\textsuperscript{143} Later in a letter to Taft, he confessed "the opposition to Santo Domingo is opposition to Panama."\textsuperscript{144} In a letter to James E. Watson he elaborated on this point. "The opposition to the adoption of the treaty by which our right to build the Panama Canal was secured, a part at least of the opposition even now being made to the ratification of the Santo Domingo treaty, which is one more step in the effort to make peaceful and secure the waters through which the route of the canal leads."\textsuperscript{145}

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\item \textsuperscript{141} "The Situation in Santo Domingo," \textit{Independent}, LVIII (March 30, 1905), p. 688.
\item \textsuperscript{142} "Where the Santo Domingo Affair Leaves the President and the Monroe Doctrine," \textit{Harper's Weekly}, XLIX (April, 1905), p. 457.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Roosevelt to Carnegie, August 6, 1906, Morison, V, p. 346.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Roosevelt to Taft, August 17, 1906, Morison, V, p. 365.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Roosevelt to J. E. Watson, August 18, 1906, Morison, V, p. 374.
\end{itemize}
In answer to critics of the Constitutionality of his actions, Roosevelt was quick to point out "the Constitution did not explicitly give me the power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did not forbid me to do what I did."\(^{146}\) Reflecting on the difficulties he faced in securing the passage of the treaty, he recognized one of the fundamental characteristics of the American people who "will, for instance, flame up about the Monroe Doctrine the minute they think it menaced in the concrete, but will be utterly indifferent while I am struggling to get through arrangements with Santo Domingo, or the Central American States, which, if adopted, would put the Monroe Doctrine beyond the possibility of jeopardy, because they would enable us to see that no possible excuse existed for violating it."\(^{147}\) He also stated to Taft, "it took me two years to get through the Santo Domingan treaty - a treaty which was of unlimited benefit to this country - simply because the people as a whole would not bother their heads about the situation."\(^{148}\)

The eventual successful passage of the treaty in 1907 was due in large measure to the efforts of Elihu Root. Roosevelt wrote of him, "it was he who finally got the Senate to accept the Santo Do-


\(^{147}\) Roosevelt to A. H. Lee, June 27, 1911, Morison, VII, p.295

\(^{148}\) Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907, Morison, V, p. 761.
mengo treaty, which secured an extraordinary increase in peace and prosperity in Santo Domingo and may prove literally invaluable in pointing out the way for introducing peace and order in the Caribbean and around its borders. 149 His success was due in large part to the mutual respect and cooperation he maintained with the legislature and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in particular. 150 Passage of this policy was due in part to the Progressives who failed to cast a single dissenting vote against the treaty. 151 The Progressive, like Herbert Croly, felt the first task of a truly national foreign policy was to develop hemispheric solidarity. 152 Roosevelt evaluated his policies at a speaking engagement at the Howard Union, February 13, 1907.

I was immensely amused when at a professional peace meeting the other day, they incidentally alluded to me as having made "war" on Santo Domingo. The war I have war made literally consists in having them a collection of customs, at their request. We now give them 45% of the customs to the Government, and the other 55% is put up to pay those of their debts which are found to be righteous. The arrangement has gone on for two years now, while the coordinate branch of the Government discussed whether or not I had

149 Roosevelt to Carnegie, February 20, 1909, Morison, VI, p. 1539.


152 Ibid., p. 501.
usurped power in the matter, and finally concluded I had not, and ratified the treaty of the 55% we have been able to put $2,500,000 toward paying their debts; and with the 45% that we collected for them they have received more money than they even got when they collected 100% themselves; and the island has prospered as never before. I feel like paraphrasing Patrick Henry: "If this is war, make the most of it." 153

Roosevelt wrote Lodge and expressed himself in the same vein.

We have interfered any at the request of the Santo Domingo people. We have interfered with the hearty approval of the foreign debt holders, because our interference benefits them somewhat, although it benefits the Santo Domingo people much more. Its benefits are chiefly by preventing chaos and misery in an island so near to us that its welfare must always cause us some concern. 154

Root wrote to Hollander concerning the treaty on May 7, 1907.

The present treaty ... contains, not only a proposition that the United States shall ensure the service of the debt by collecting and applying the revenues, but also that the United States shall adjust the debt to which the revenues are to be applied.

The question has arisen in my mind whether the two questions could not be separated, the debt being adjusted on a fair and reasonable basis by someone acting under the authority of Santo Domingo, and making the adjustment conditional upon the United States ensuing the service of the debt substantially as provided by the pending treaty. We would have a different proposition to present the Senate; that is, the simple proposition of answering the service of the debt already adjusted. This, perhaps, might be free from some of the objections which are made to the pending treaty. 155

Root at the 3rd Conference of American Republics at Rio de

153 Bishop, pp. 434-435.

154 Roosevelt to Lodge, April 30, 1906, Morison, V, p. 256.

155 Jessup, pp. 546-547.
Jenaro on July 31, 1906 reiterated the American position regarding its southern neighbors.

We wish for no victories but those of peace, for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to expend our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together. 156

Roosevelt voiced much the same sentiments in a letter to Carnegie.

With Santo Domingo we have just negotiated a treaty especially designed to prevent the need of any interference either by us or by any foreign nation with the internal affairs of the island, while at the same time securing the honest creditors their debts and to the government of the island an assured income, and giving to the islanders themselves the chance, if they take advantage of it, to achieve the internal peace they so sorely need. 157

The powers granted the United States by the above mentioned Customs Convention of 1907 did not constitute a greater infringement on the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic than when Huerreux had first alienated the customs houses. This action still granted the protection of the modus vivendi from European intervention and thus continued Dominican credit and revenue. Such action also abolished permanently the danger of infringement of the

156 Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Root, p. 12.
157 Roosevelt to Carnegie, April 5, 1907, Morison, V, p. 640.
Monroe Doctrine by European to collect their claims.\textsuperscript{158} The convention was different from the old agreement that United States did not undertake to adjust or determine the Dominican debt but merely to administer the customs of the republic for the service of a new loan. The proceeds of the customs were devoted to the amortization of all the recognized debts and claims at a level acceptable to both republics and the creditors. The responsibility for such action was limited to fifty years and could be ended earlier incident to the amortization of the debt. During this period the Dominican Republic was not be increase its public debt nor modify its import duties unless agreed upon by the United States.\textsuperscript{159}

After his presidency Roosevelt maintained his interest in the conduct of Latin American affairs. He voiced hope that "all of the self-government, of material prosperity, of potential strength, and of political and social conduct as to make the Monroe Doctrine in the sense of being merely a unilateral doctrine, a thing of the past and to substitute for it a common agreement among all the free republics of the New World."\textsuperscript{160} At Rio de Janeiro he reiterated his desire that Latin American nations "sufficiently advanced" should participate on an absolute equality in the responsibilities and development" of the Monroe Doctrine and that it must be made a

\textsuperscript{158} Welles, pp. 918-191.

\textsuperscript{159} Hollander, "The U.S. and the Dominican Republic," p. 295.

\textsuperscript{160} Blakeslee, p. 82.
continental and not a unilateral doctrine." In Uruguay he added:

It is in no sense a doctrine of one-sided advantage; it is to involve only in the interest of our commonwealth of the Western Hemisphere. It should be invoked by all our nations in a spirit of mutual self-respect and on a footing of complete equality of both right and obligation. I congratulate the countries of South America that I have visited that their progress is such in justice, political stability and national prosperity as to make them also the sponsor of the Monroe Doctrine, so that, as regards them, all that the United States has to do is to stand ready as one of the great brotherhood of American nations to join with them in upholding the Monroe Doctrine.

In a letter to A. D. White Roosevelt evaluated the Monroe Doctrine as having done "more for the peace of the Western Hemisphere, and if lived up to will do more in the future for the peace of the Western Hemisphere, than everything done by the ultra-peace at-any-price men during the last sixty years taken together."

The Administrations immediately following Roosevelt adopted his general policies. The period was marked by an ever increasing fear that the lands bordering the Panama Canal would fail to meet their obligations and fall prey to European interventions.


163 Roosevelt to A. D. White, Nov. 2, 1914, Morison, VIII, p. 928.

Americans desired to promote public order, along with sound economic and political development. The Domingan formula was expanded to other of the Caribbean states with equal success. Taft's administration was marked by outright military intervention to safeguard the security of the Canal region. Taft felt it was essential "that the countries within that sphere shall be removed from the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and chaotic national finances and from the ever present danger of international complications due to disorders at home." The Wilson administration also accepted the principles of the Roosevelt Corollary. While both the Taft and Wilson administrations adopted the Roosevelt Corollary they did little to adapt it to their own situations. That is to say, the Corollary was used exactly as it had been described by Roosevelt and the succeeding two administrations offered no new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and are not sufficiently significant to merit further discussion.

The Rooseveltian interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine gave

167 Bemis, p. 164.
168 Weinberg, p. 432.
169 Munro, *Intervention*, p. 331.
the United States a hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. In his address delivered on April 2, 1903, Roosevelt referred more to hegemony than the Monroe Doctrine when he said that it is only a principle and expressed the hope that some day it would be a part of international law. Both, however, are recognized lines of conduct respected by the States and, despite exceptions, have been constantly applied and have force behind them. Root was conscious of the fact that the doctrine was not international law but rested upon the right of self-protection which was so recognized. It was a derivative of the concept of sovereignty and was recognized as extending beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. If the doctrine had never been declared, however, limitations would still have been placed on the activities of the American states by each other. Such restrictions devolve from treaty obligations to which states are subject and the duties imposed under international law. The Venezuela crisis offered an example of both the obligations involved

170 Blakeslee, p. 77.

171 Alvorez, p. 228.

172 Ibid., p. 172.


174 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
and European Powers adherence to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. 175

The right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which could injure it was also recognized by international law. Such action, however, would be as effective as the power behind it. 176 This right, just as the Monroe Doctrine, did not impose any responsibility on the United States or any other country to exercise it. Therefore the United States did not have a need, other than its own considerations, to intervene on the behalf of European Powers to collect debts, coerce conduct, redress wrongs, or revenge injuries suffered at the hands of the Latin American states. 177 The Monroe Doctrine did not assert, imply or involve any rights on the part of the United States to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any American state as this sovereignty is the basis of international law. 178 Root noted that:

A false conception of what the Monroe Doctrine is, of what it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its limits, has invaded the public press and affected public opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes of national expansion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Interested


176 Root, Addresses on International Subjects, p. 111.

177 Ibid., p. 119.

178 Ibid., p. 113.
motives to compel Central or South America countries to do or refrain from doing something by which individual Americans may profit invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Clamors for national glory from minds too shallow to grasp at the same time a sense of national duty invoke the Monroe Doctrine. The intolerance which demands that control over the conduct and the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyranny invokes the Monroe Doctrine. Thoughtless people who see no difference between lawful right and physical power assume that the Monroe Doctrine is a warrant for interference in the internal affairs of all weaker nations in the New World. Against this suppositious doctrine, many protests both in the United States and in South America have been made, and justly made. To the real Monroe Doctrine these protests have no application.  

The Roosevelt Corollary was no inevitable deduction from the language of President Monroe according to Perkins. He goes on to say that it was revolutionary for it transformed the doctrine intended for the protection of the New World states against intervention by Europeans into a doctrine of American interventions. Perkins criticized Roosevelt for adopting the principle of international police power as a general principle and to relate such an obligation to the Doctrine. He based his opinion on a belief that the United States must not be tied down to any such generalization. Other critics had noted that Roosevelt made two assumptions not found in Monroe's message; first that the doctrine prevented other nations from interfering in America, second, that backward or impotent countries must be policed and helped by some

179 Jessup, p. 561.


181 Ibid., p. 464.
advanced nation. Moon concluded the first assumption is false and the second is the fundamental dogma of modern imperialism. 182

In the movement toward the reversal of the Roosevelt Corollary, Summer Welles, author of the famed work in Santo Domingan affairs, Maboth's Vineyard, was one of the prime movers. 183 His influence in the State Department was still felt when he published his book two years previous to the time the Clark Memorandum signalled the repudiation of the Roosevelt Corollary. According to Clark "the so-called 'Roosevelt Corollary' was to the effect, as generally understood, that in case of financial or other difficulties in weak Latin American countries, the United States should attempt an adjustment thereof lest European Governments should intervene, and intervening should occupy territory—an act which would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine." 184 The Doctrine Clark holds "states a case of the United States vs. Europe, not of the United States vs. Latin America." 185 Therefore he concludes "It is not believed that the Corollary is justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however, much it may be justi-

182 Moon, p. 162.

183 Perkins, Approach, p. 182.

184 Clark, p. xxiii.

185 Ibid., p. xix.
ried by the application of the Doctrine of self-preservation." The Clark Memorandum marked the repudiation of the Roosevelt Corollary and signalled what was later to develop as the Good Neighbor Policy. The basis of this policy was the abstinence from force on the part of the United States and that its action should be controlled by international agreement. One of these agreements was concluded at the Special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936. It provided that:

The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties.

The policy of intervention was laid to rest by the Good Neighbor Policy. It was to be resurrected in spirit, at least, less than twenty years later. A new form of foreign intervention, Communism, now threatened to initiate an alienation of American territory. In Caracas, in 1954, John Foster Dulles sounded the call that would mean an adoption of Roosevelt's principles to a new era.

"The domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international communist movement . . . would

186 Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv.


188 Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment, p. 323.
constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American states." The result of this new concern for American security in effect broke up the family of nations concept that was the basis of the Good Neighbor Policy. The entire concept, however, was not dear to the hearts of Latin Americans to begin with.

The often-used metaphor of an inter-American "family" permitted the United States to consider itself as big brother, rich uncle, or even head of the family. Historically, we asserted, under the Monroe Doctrine, the right and duty to protect the junior members of the family, and under the Theodore Roosevelt corollary, to chasten them as necessary. Such an attitude was perhaps accepted in the early years, but it became increasingly galling to junior members as the disparity of wealth and power widened and as the United States grew more patronizing and assertive and the Latin Americans more sensitive of their lag. This sensitivity was aggravated by suspicions that—contradictory but mutually reinforcing—on the one hand that North American expansion was to blame for the slower progress of the Latin peoples, and on the other—that they themselves had failed, that perhaps in some way they were inferior to the gringos.

The Castro revolution personified the specter that had haunted the Americans. A communist regime had been installed a mere ninety miles off the American coast. This revolution was to significantly alter American policy. After Castro all insurrections were assumed to involve automatically the danger of a communist take-over, and thereby required direct military intervention by the United States. The equation "insurrection = communism = peril


190 Ibid., p. 193.
to the United States was a direct consequence of Castro's take-over. 191

The abortive Bay of Pigs invasion to remove Castro prompted President Kennedy to make this appraisal of America's position in Latin America.

Our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action—if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of this nation. 192

Kennedy was later to state: "We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere." 193 His successor phrased the same sentiments in a more homely fashion. "We don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the communists set up any government in the western hemisphere." 194 Both those administrations paid little more than lip service to the ideals of the Alliance for Progress. It had been their policy to make formal avowals of anti-communism within the context of the

191 Ibid., pp. 219-220.

192 Ibid., p. 234.


194 Steel, p. 232.
inter-American "family," of good neighborliness, and the principles of the OAS. The instruments it used however, had been based on the big stick, the Monroe Doctrine, and its own refinement of the Roosevelt Corollary— the Johnson Doctrine. 195

Ironically, it was the Dominican Republic which prompted the declaration of the Johnson Doctrine, just as, it had provided the occasion for the first application of the Roosevelt Corollary. The outbreak of trouble in the Dominican Republic in late April and early May, 1965 served as the vehicle for a re-affirmation of the policy of intervention by the United States to prevent the take-over of a Latin American country by forces hostile to the interests of the United States. A subtle change had taken place, an ideological enemy was substituted for an Old World military power. Ambassador Bennett in his report to Washington raised the specter of a communist take-over in the Dominican Republic very much similar to the reports circulated about a possible European take-over in 1905.

I regret that we may have to impose a military solution to a political problem . . . . While leftist propaganda will fuzz this up as a fight between those who want a Castro-type solution and those who oppose it.

I don't want to overdramatize, but if we deny the communications equipment, and if the opposition to the leftists lose heart, we may be asking in the near future for a landing of marines to protect United States interests

195 Ibid., p. 231.
and for other purposes. What does Washington prefer? 196

Other sources indicated that captured documents and various secret reports in the hands of the C. I. A. showed the crisis to be merely the first on a long Communist timetable for the takeover of Latin America. 197 Senator Clark was sure the junta sent word to Ambassador Bennett that "you had better send American troops in because a Communist takeover threatens." 198

President Johnson reacted in a series of speeches on April 30 to May 2, 1965. In the April 30 speech he first intimated that the revolutionary struggle was more than a civil upheaval. "There are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. Thus the legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people and most of their leaders for progress, democracy and social justice are threatened and so are the principles of the inter-American system." 199 The May 1 speech linked the responsibilities of this inter-American system and its advesion to communism. "Today, forced with a threat to the principle of the Inter-American system and the peace of the hemisphere, the OAS acted decisively." This action was due to the fact that "neither the


197 Ibid., p. 47.

198 Ibid., p. 50.

United States, nor any nation, can want or permit a return to that brutal and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and punishment of this hemisphere and of all civilized humanity. We intend to carry on the struggle against tyranny no matter in what ideology it cloaks itself. This is our mutual responsibility under the agreements we have signed and the common values which bind us together."\(^{200}\)

The May 2 speech was very much pointed and more bellicose than any of the President's previous statements. The allegation of Communist infiltration was again voiced. "The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators."\(^{201}\) Although "revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with "this overriding circumstance made it a "matter for hemispheric action only when the object is the establishment of a communist dictatorship."\(^{202}\) The fear of such a development prompted Johnson to formulate what has been called his

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\(^{200}\) Ibid., p. 743.

\(^{201}\) Ibid., p. 745.

\(^{202}\) Steel, p. 232.
I want you to know, and I want the world to know, that as long as I am President of this country, we are going to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against attackers. We will honor our treaties. We will keep our commitments. We will defend our nation against all those who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere. We do not want to bury anyone, as I said so many times before. But we do not intend to be buried.203

Johnson's actions and justification for them prompted both praise and criticism as had Roosevelt and on much the same principle: America's right to intervene in another State's affairs. Undersecretary of State Ball justified such action as it was designed "to carry out the fundamental decision of the American states that the extension of Marxist-Leninist power is incompatible with the inter-American system."204 Senator Russell of Georgia agreed with Johnson when he had consulted him regarding Dominican developments. Russell was convinced Johnson "had no alternative other to proceed to send the Armed Forces to Santo Domingo to avoid another Cuba."205

Senator J. William Fulbright led the opposition to American intervention. He based his dissent on the basis that the justification for United States rested on "ambiguous evidence, assumed

| 205 | Diaper, p. 54. |
almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated or would certainly become so."206 The sending of the troops to protect American lives was dismissed in turn as being a ploy to ease home reaction to the troops' invasion. "In mid-afternoon of April 28, Col. Pedro B. Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta or inability to protect American lives."207 Fulbright continued that this request was rejected by Washington and Benoit informed that the U.S. would not intervene unless American lives were endangered by a continued action. Thus, if he claimed that American lives were in danger, the U.S. would intervene, which is what happened.208 Thus, Fulbright concluded that "the U.S. intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated. On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of Communism rather than danger to American lives was his primary reason for recommending military intervention."209

206 Ibid., p. 40. For Senator Fulbright's view of the intervention see his The Arrogance of Power.

207 Ibid., p. 50.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid.
Other critics held that the OAS had granted approval to unilateral intervention by the United States, and as a result had abandoned its role as a juridical organization and a force for harmony and law in the Western Hemisphere. Johnson's actions, others felt, resulted not from Communist strength in the Dominican Republic but a weak non-Communist element. The non-Communist forces were too weak, too lacking in political sophistication, and too little skilled in the arts of government to withstand Communist infiltration and subsequent control.

Undersecretary of State Mann reacted violently to charges that non-intervention had become obsolete.

I know of no Washington officials who think this way. On the contrary, I believe unilateral intervention by one American state in the internal political affairs of another is proscribed in the OAS Charter but that non-intervention is a keystone of the structure of the inter-American system. American states have a treaty as well as a sovereign right to choose their political, social, and economic systems free of all outside interference.

Johnson, as Roosevelt before him, made his position unmistakably clear. "Our goal is to help to prevent another communist

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Draper, p. 60.

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state in this hemisphere." 213 The actual formulation of new American intervention policy, like Roosevelt, was based on broad principles which could be interpreted in many various meanings and degrees depending upon the disposition of the United States. To Johnson threats to order included not only insurrection, but even subversion and infiltration. He held "when a communist group seeks to exploit misery, the entire free American system is put in deadly danger." The degree of deadly danger the mere presence of communist groups involved or who was to determine when such a potential danger had become a deadly danger was not specified. Actually, the United States was again given a carte blanche in deciding when, where, and to what degree she chose to intervene with troops in Latin America, just it had done over sixty years previously. 214

The similarity between Roosevelt and Johnson is even more vividly seen in this statement which could have been made by either but was made by Johnson. "We seek no territory. We do not seek to impose our will on anyone. We intend to work for the self-determination of the peoples of the Americas within the framework of freedom." 215 The Johnson Doctrine "although regarded by some as a 'new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine' was nothing more than

213 Steel, p. 235.

214 Ibid., p. 233.

a case of self-defense for protecting the security of the U.S."\(^2\)\(^{16}\)

If this be true, Clark's criteria for judging the Roosevelt Corollary is just as applicable to the Johnson Doctrine. "It is not believed that the corollary is justified by the application of the doctrine of self-preservation."\(^2\)\(^{17}\)

The Johnson Doctrine is representative of two of the important innovations of Theodore Roosevelt in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. The first of these, armed American intervention to prevent the implantation of a foreign power hostile to the interests of the United States in Latin America, was resurrected and adopted for modern use. The fear of a Communist takeover was substituted for the fear of a European intervention of sixty years previously. The Roosevelt Corollary was liberated from the grave it had been laid into by the Clark Memorandum and the successive Good Neighbor Policy. Its adapted form shows its lasting impact on American diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.

Its very adaption is the second Rooseveltian innovation. Roosevelt had earlier stated, "No such policy as that of the Monroe Doctrine can remain fossilized while the nation grows. Either it must be abandoned or it must be modified to meet the changing


\(^{217}\) Clark, p. xxiii to xxiv.
needs of national life.\textsuperscript{218} The Johnson Doctrine as it modified the Monroe Doctrine to meet the problems and threats of a new era, Communism, vindicated this position.

The Roosevelt Corollary as it developed through the annual message of 1902, the letter to the Cubans in 1904, Roosevelt's letter to Root on May 20, 1904, and the actual pronunciation in the annual message of 1904 ranks as one of the major milestones in American diplomacy, or lack of it. From its inception it ruled the conduct of foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, through the administrations of Taft and Wilson it gained acceptance and a wider application. Its renunciation by the Clark Memorandum did not extinguish its impact on Latin American affairs. Throughout the era of the Good Neighbor Policy the Big Stick was still suspect in all American dealings with their neighbors to the South. The reincarnation of the Roosevelt Corollary in the adapted form of the Johnson Doctrine only served to give substance to such doubts and suspicions.

The question of whether Roosevelt was merely an imperialist bent on wielding the "Big Stick" over the heads of less powerful neighbors or whether he was one of the humanitarians of his days need further study and refinement. In the two episodes I selected for this study, these two elements are essentially involved. To say that they are equally represented would be to miss the point.

\textsuperscript{218} Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison, IV, p. 1286.
and probably the truth. Roosevelt was first and above all else
concerned with America's security and its position as a world power.
His training and intellectual assumptions further demonstrated
this concern with America's world reputation and responsibilities.
Inherent in many of his beliefs, however, was a desire and concern
to improve the lot of those less-fortunate than himself. The concept of Manifest Destiny which recognized American preponderances
in the Western Hemisphere also implied what has been called "The
White Man's Burden."

The precept of Anglo-American superiority he accepted in both
the Darwinian and Neo-Lamarckian sense. That is both a natural
selection which resulted in the biological superiority of the white
Northern Hemisphere dweller and the debilitating effects of the
Southern Hemisphere influenced the preponderance of this ruling
class. In order to maintain their position, it was necessary for
them to oversee these people but to treat them fairly and eventu-
ally instruct them in the art of self-government.

Roosevelt's actions demonstrate this dual influence on his
policy making decisions. The Corollary itself points out this
duality. For strategic reasons it was necessary to prevent Euro-
pean intervention and to uphold America's international reputation
(it could not permit disorder at its very door). The use of force
to bring about responsible government implied a teaching process
in its application. Intervention would be required until respon-
sible mature leaders could be found. Such action could take place
only if the people themselves were educated in the art of self-
government. This intervention was necessary as long as education and self-improvement were denied the natives, even if by their own actions. To end the need for intervention, the causes for it must be eradicated. It fell upon the intervening power to take such measures as necessary to alleviate the situation. In Latin America, the United States was the sole intervener under the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. It was, therefore, its responsibility to educate the inhabitants in conduct proper to the maintenance of order.

Roosevelt was the wielder of the Big Stick and to a significant degree the Big Brother of the South American states.
APPENDIX I

Message from the President of the United States, transmitting a protocol of an agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic, providing for the collection and disbursement by the United States of the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, signed on February 7, 1905.

To the Senate:

I submit herewith a protocol concluded between the Dominican Republic and the United States.

The conditions in the Republic of Santo Domingo have been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been many disturbances and revolutions, and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of these debts were properly contracted and are held by those who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are without question improper or exorbitant, constituting claims which should never be paid in full and perhaps only to the extent of a very small portion of their nominal value.

Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved because of the nonpayment of debts due their citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the customs-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking possession of a certain amount of territory.

It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine. It cannot be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement, on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors.
of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps.

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of Government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the custom-houses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such seizures of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question, can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States.

One of the difficult and increasingly complicated problems, which often arise in Santo Domingo, grows out of the violations of contracts and concessions, sometimes improvidently granted, with valuable privileges and exemptions stipulated for upon grossly inadequate considerations which were burdensome to the State, and which are not infrequently disregarded and violated by the governing authorities. Citizens of the United States and of other governments holding these concessions and contracts appeal to their respective governments for active participation, protection and intervention. Except for arbitrary wrong, done or sanctioned by superior authority, to persons or to vested property rights, the United States Government, following its traditional usage in such cases, aims to go no further than the mere use of its good offices, a measure which frequently proves ineffective. On the other hand, there are governments which do sometimes take energetic action for the protection of their subjects in the enforcement of merely contractual claims, and thereupon American concessionaries, supported by powerful influences, make loud appeal to the United States Government in similar cases for similar action. They complain that in the actual posture of affairs their valuable properties are practically confiscated, that American enterprise is paralyzed, and that unless they are fully protected, even
by the enforcement of their merely contractual rights, it means the abandonment to the subjects of other governments of the interests of American trade and commerce through the sacrifice of their investments by excessive taxes imposed in violation of contract, and by other devices, and the sacrifice of the output of their mines and other industries, and even of their railway and exploitation of their concessions. Thus the attempted solution of the complex problem by the ordinary methods of diplomacy reacts injuriously upon the United States Government itself, and in a measure paralyzes the action of the Executive in the direction of a sound and consistent policy. The United States Government is embarrassed in its efforts to foster American enterprise and the growth of our commerce through the cultivation of friendly relations with Santo Domingo, by the irritating effects on those relations, and the consequent injurious influence upon that commerce, of frequent interventions. As a method of solution of the complicated problem arbitration has become nugatory, inasmuch as, in the condition of its finances, an award against the Republic is worthless unless its payment is secured by the pledge of at least some portion of the customs revenues. This pledge is ineffectual without actual delivery over of the custom-houses to secure the appropriation of the pledged revenues to the payment of the award. This situation again reacts injuriously upon the relations of the United States with other nations. For when an award and such security are thus obtained, as in the case of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, some foreign government complains that the award conflicts with its rights, as a creditor, to some portion of these revenues under an alleged prior pledge; and still other governments complain that an award in any considerable sum, secured by pledges of the customs revenues, is prejudicial to the payment of their equally meritorious claims out of the ordinary revenues; and thus controversies are begotten between the United States and other creditor nations, because of the apparent sacrifice of some of their claims, which may be just or may be grossly exaggerated, but which the United States Government can not inquire into without giving grounds of offense to other friendly creditor nations. Still further illustrations might easily be furnished of the hopelessness of the present situation growing out of the social disorders and the bankrupt finances of the Dominican Republic, where for considerable periods during recent years the bonds of civil society have been practically dissolved.

Under the accepted law of nations foreign governments are within their right, if they choose to exercise it, when they actively intervene in support of the contractual claims of their subjects. They sometimes exercise
this power, and on account of commercial rivalries there is a growing tendency on the part of other governments more and more to aid diplomatically in the enforcement of the claims of their subjects. In view of the dilemma in which the Government of the United States is thus placed, it must either adhere to its usual attitude of nonintervention in such cases—an attitude proper under normal conditions, but one which in this particular kind of case results to the disadvantage of its citizens in comparison with those of other States—or else it must, in order to be consistent in its policy, actively intervene to protect the contracts and concessions of its citizens engaged in agriculture, commerce, and transportation in competition with the subjects and citizens of other States. This course would render the United States the insurer of all the speculative risks of its citizens in the public securities and franchises of Santo Domingo.

Under the plan in the protocol herewith submitted to the Senate, insuring a faithful collection and application of the revenues to the specified objects, we are well assured that this difficult task can be accomplished with the friendly cooperation and good will of all the parties concerned, and to the great relief of the Dominican Republic.

The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the people of the island, as well as the security of American interests, and they are intimately associated with the interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction. At one time, and that only a year ago, three revolutions were in progress in the island at the same time.

It is impossible to state with anything like approximate accuracy the present population of the Dominican Republic. In the report of the commission appointed by President Grant in 1871, the population was estimated at not over 150,000 souls, but according to the Statesman's Yearbook for 1904 the estimated population in 1888 is given as 610,000. The Bureau of the American Republics considers this the best estimate at the present population of the Republic. As shown by the unanimous report of the Grant commission the public debt of the Dominican Republic, including claims, was $1,565,831.59. The total revenues were $772,684.75. The public indebtedness of the Dominican Republic, not including all claims, was on September 12 last, as the Department of State is advised, $32,280,000; the estimated revenues under Dominican management of custom-houses were $1,850,000; the proposed budget for current administration was $1,300,000, leaving only $550,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and
payments on these latter will amount during the ensuing year to $1,700,000, besides $900,000 of arrearages of payments overdue, amounting in all to $2,600,000. It is therefore impossible under existing conditions, which are chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the Republic, which during the last decade have averaged approximately $1,600,000, to defray the ordinary expenses of the government and to meet its obligations.

The Dominican debt owed to European creditors is about $22,000,000, and of this sum over $18,000,000 is more or less formally recognized. The representatives of European governments have several times approached the Secretary of State, setting forth the wrongs and intolerable delays to which they have been subjected at the hands of the successive governments of Santo Domingo in the collection of their just claims, and intimating that unless the Dominican Government should receive some assistance from the United States in the way of regulating its finances, the creditor governments in Europe would be forced to resort to more effective measures of compulsion to secure the satisfaction of their claims.

If the United States Government declines to take action and other foreign governments resort to action to secure payment of their claims, the latter would be entitled, according to the decision of the Hague tribunal in the Venezuelan cases, to the preferential payment of their claims; and this would absorb all the Dominican revenues and would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and interests in the island. If, moreover, any such action should be taken by them, the only method to enable them to secure the payment of their claims would be to take possession of the custom-houses, and considering the state of the Dominican finances this would mean a definite and very possibly permanent occupation of Dominican territory, for no period could be set to the time which would be necessarily required for the payment of their obligations and unliquidated claims. The United States Government could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occupation of Dominican territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of action, or else virtually saying to European governments that they would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would be an unfortunate attitude for the Government of the United States to be forced to maintain at present. It can not with propriety say that it will protect its own citizens and interests, on the one hand, and yet on the other hand refuse to allow other governments to protect their citizens and interests.

The actual situation in the Dominican Republic can not, perhaps, be more forcibly stated than by giving a brief account of the case of the San Domingo Improvement
From 1869 to 1897 the Dominican Government issued successive series of bonds, the majority of which were in the hands of European holders. Successive issues bore interest at rates ranging from 2 3/4 to 6 per cent, and what with commissions and other deductions and the heavy discount in the market the government probably did not receive over 50 to 75 per cent of their nominal value. Other portions of the debt were created by loans, for which the government received only one-half of the amount it was nominally to repay, and these obligations bore interest at the rate of 1 to 2 per cent a month on their face, some of them compound interest monthly.

The improvidence of the government in its financial management was due to its weakness, to its impaired credit and to its pecuniary needs, occasioned by frequent insurrections and revolutionary changes and by its inability to collect its revenues.

In 1888 the government, in order to secure the payment of an issue of bonds, placed the custom-houses and the collection of its customs duties, which are substantially the only revenues of the Republic, in the hands of the Westendorps, bankers of Amsterdam, Holland. But the national debt continued to grow and the government finally intrusted the collection of its revenues to an American corporation, the San Domingo Improvement Company, which was to take over the bonds of the Westendorps. The Dominican Government finally became dissatisfied with this arrangement, and, in 1901, ousted the Improvement Company from its custom-houses and took into its own hands the collection of its revenues. The company thereupon appealed to the United States Government to maintain them in their position, but their request was refused. The Dominican Government then sent its minister of foreign affairs to Washington to negotiate a settlement. He admitted that the improvement company had equities which ought not to be disregarded; and the Department of State suggested that the Dominican Government and the Improvement Company should effect by private negotiation a satisfactory settlement between them. They accordingly entered into an arrangement for a settlement, which was mutually satisfactory to the parties. A similar arrangement was likewise made between the Dominican Government and the European bondholders. The latter arrangement was carried into execution by the Dominican Government and payments made toward the liquidation of the bonds held by the European holders. The Dominican Congress refused to ratify the similar arrangement made with the improvement company, and the government refused to provide for the payment of the American claimants. In this state of the case it was evident that a continuance of this treatment of the American creditors, and its repetition in other
cases, would, if allowed to run its course, result in handing over the island to European creditors, and in time would ripen into serious controversies between the United States and other governments, unless the United States should deliberately and finally abandon its interests in the island.

The improvement company and its allied companies held, besides bonds, certain banking and railway interests in the island. The Dominican Government, desirous to own and possess these properties, agreed with the companies that the value of their bonds and properties was $4,500,000, and they submitted to arbitration the question as to the installments in which this sum should be paid and the security that should be given. The Hon. George Gray, judge of the United States circuit court of appeals, and the Hon. Manuel de J. Galvan, both named by the Dominican Republic, and the Hon. John G. Carlisle, named by the United States, were the arbitrators and rendered their award on July 14, 1904. By its terms the Dominican Government was to pay the above-mentioned sum of $4,500,000, with 4 per cent interest per annum, in monthly installments of $37,500 each during two years, and of $41,666.66 each month thereafter, beginning with the month of September, 1904, said award to be secured by the customs revenues and port dues of all the ports on the northern coast of Santo Domingo. The award further provides for the appointment of a financial agent of the United States, who was authorized in case of failure during any month to receive the sum then due to enter into possession of the custom-house at Puerto Plata in the first instance and assume charge of the collection of customs duties and port dues and to fix and determine these duties and dues and secure their payment; in case the sums collected at Puerto Plata should at any time be insufficient for the payment of the amounts due under the award, or in case of any other manifest necessity, or in case the Dominican Government should so request, the financial agent of the United States was authorized to have and exercise at any and all of the other ports above described all the rights and power vested in him by the award in respect of Puerto Plata. Under the award the financial agent could only apply the revenues collected toward the payment after he had first paid the expenses of collection and certain other obligations styled "apardos," which constituted prior charges on the revenues assigned. These prior charges are specified in the award. The Dominican Government defaulted in their payments; and in virtue of the award and the authority conferred by the Dominican Government, and at its request, possession was delivered of the custom-house of Puerto Plata to the fiscal agent appointed by the United States to collect the revenues
assigned by the arbitrators for the payment of the award; and in virtue of the same authority possession of the custom-house of Monte Christi has also been handed over. I submit herewith a report of Mr. John B. Moore, agent of the United States in this case, and a copy of the award of the arbitrators.

During the past two years the European claimants, except the English, whose interests were embraced in those of the American companies, have, with the support of their respective governments, been growing more and more im-portunate in pressing their unsatisfied demands. The French and the Belgians in 1901 had entered into a contract with the Dominican Government, but after a few payments were made on account it fell into neglect. Other governments also obliged the Dominican Government to enter into arrangements of various kinds by which the revenues of the Republic were in large part sequestrated, and under one of the agreements, which was concluded with Italy in 1903, the minister of that government was empowered directly to collect from the importers and exporters that portion of the customs revenues assigned to him as security. As the result of chronic disorders, attendant with a constant increase of debt, the state of things in Santo Domingo has become hopeless, unless the United States or some other strong government shall interpose to bring order out of the Chaos. The custom-houses, with the exception of the two in the possession of the financial agent appointed by the United States, have become unproductive for the discharge of indebtedness, except as to persons making emergency loans to the government or to its enemies for the purpose of carrying on political contests by force. They have, in fact, become the nuclei of the various revolutions. The first effort of revolutionists is to take possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds, which are then disposed of at the absolute discretion of those who are collecting them. The chronic disorders prevailing in Santo Domingo have, moreover, become exceedingly dangerous to the interests of Americans holding property in that country. Constant complaints have been received of the injuries and inconveniences to which they have been subjected. As an evidence of the increasing aggravation of conditions the fact may be mentioned that about a year ago the American railway, which had previously been exempt from such attacks, was seized, its tracks torn up, and a station destroyed by revolutionary bands.

The ordinary resources of diplomacy and international arbitration are absolutely impotent to deal wisely and effectively with the situation in the Dominican Republic, which can only be met by organizing its finances on a sound basis and by placing the custom-houses beyond the temptation of insurgent chieftains. Either we must abandon our
duty under our traditional policy toward the Dominican people, who aspire to a republican form of government while they are actually drifting into a condition of permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some other government to adopt its own measures in order to safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves take seasonable and appropriate action.

Again and again has the Dominican Government invoked on its own behalf the aid of the United States. It has repeatedly done so of recent years. In 1899 it sought to enter into treaty relations by which it would be placed under the protection of the United States Government. The request was refused. Again, in January, 1904, its minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and besought the help of the United States Government to enable it to escape from its financial and social disorders. Compliance with this request was again declined, for this government has been most reluctant to interfere in any way, and has finally concluded to take action only because it has become evident that failure to do so may result in a situation fraught with grave danger to the cause of international peace.

In 1903 a representative of a foreign government proposed to the United States the joint fiscal control of the Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations, and that the latter should take charge of the custom-houses and revenues and give to the Dominican Government a certain percentage and apply the residue to the payment ratably of claims of foreign creditors. The United States Government declined to approve or to enter into such an arrangement. But it has now become evident that decided action of some kind can not be much longer delayed. In view of our past experience and our knowledge of the actual situation of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the United States Government to take any effective action looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to the discharge of its own duty under the Monroe Doctrine can only be considered as an acquiescence in some such action by another government.

That most wise measure of international statesmanship, the Platt amendment, has provided a method for preventing such difficulties from arising in the new Republic of Cuba. In accordance with the terms of this amendment the Republic of Cuba, can not issue any bonds which can be collected from Cuba, save as a matter of grace, unless with the consent of the United States, which is at liberty at all times to take measures to prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Platt amendment. If a similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to them and to all other peoples, for under such an arrange-
ment no larger debt would be incurred than could be honestly paid, and those who took debts not thus authorized would, by the mere fact of taking them, put themselves in the category of speculators or gamblers, who deserved no consideration and who would be permitted to receive none; so that the honest creditor would on the one hand be safe while on the other hand the Republic would be safeguarded against molestation in the interest of mere speculators.

But no such plan at present exists; and under existing circumstances, when the condition of affairs becomes such as it has become in Santo Domingo, either we must submit to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe Doctrine or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement as that herewith submitted to the Senate. In this case, fortunately, the prudent and far-seeing statesmanship of the Dominican Government has relieved us of all trouble. At their request we have entered into the agreement herewith submitted. Under it the custom-houses will be administered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 per cent of the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Government and the remainder being used by the United States to pay what proportion of the debts it is possible to pay on an equitable basis. The Republic will be secured against over-seas aggression. This in reality entails no new obligation upon us, for the Monroe doctrine means precisely such a guaranty on our part.

It is perhaps unnecessary to state that no step of any kind has been taken by the Administration under the terms of the protocol which is herewith submitted.

The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol wisely and patriotically accepted the responsibilities as well as the privileges of liberty, and is showing with evident good faith its purpose to pay all that its resources will permit of its obligations. More than this it can not do, and when it has done this we should not permit it to be molested. We on our part are simply performing in peaceful manner, not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in accordance with the earnest request of the government concerned, part of that international duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the Monroe doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform this duty in good faith and without any intention of aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our weaker neighbors or of conducting ourselves otherwise than so as to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European powers which may be brought into contact with them. It is in the highest degree necessary that we should prove by our action that the world may trust in our good faith and may understand that this international duty will be performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not merely of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with
strict justice toward all. If this is done, a general acceptance of the Monroe doctrine will in the end surely follow; and this will mean an increase of the sphere in which peaceful measures for the settlement of international difficulties gradually displace those of a warlike character.

We can point with just pride to what we have done in Cuba as a guaranty of our good faith. We stayed in Cuba only so long as to start her aright on the road to self-government, which she has since trod with such marked and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island we exacted no conditions save such as would prevent her from ever becoming the prey of the stranger. Our purpose in Santo Domingo is as beneficient. The good that this country got from its action in Cuba was indirect rather than direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The chief material advantage that will come from the action proposed to be taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and to Santo Domingo's creditors. The advantages that will come to the United States will be indirect, but nevertheless great, for it is supremely to our interest that all the communities immediately south of us should be or become prosperous and stable, and therefore not merely in name, but in fact independent and self-governing.

I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on this matter. We now have a great opportunity to secure peace and stability in the island, without friction or bloodshed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of the governmental authorities themselves. It will be unfortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp this opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increasing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very possibly embarrassing foreign complications in addition. This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe doctrine.

Theodore Roosevelt

The White House, February 15, 1905.
To the Senate:

I wish to call the attention of the Senate at this executive session to the treaty with Santo Domingo. I feel that I ought to state to the Senate that the condition of affairs in Santo Domingo is such that it is very much for the interest of that Republic that action on the treaty should be had at as early a moment as the Senate, after giving the matter full consideration, may find practicable.

I call attention to the following facts:

1. This treaty was entered into at the earnest request of Santo Domingo itself, and is designed to afford Santo Domingo relief and assistance. Its primary benefit will be to Santo Domingo. It offers the method most likely to secure peace and to prevent war in the island.

2. The benefit to the United States will consist chiefly in the tendency under the treaty to secure stability, order, and prosperity in Santo Domingo, and the removal of the apprehension lest foreign powers make aggressions on Santo Domingo in the course of collecting claims due their citizens; for it is greatly to our interest that all the islands in the Caribbean Sea should enjoy peace and prosperity and feel good will toward this country. The benefit to honest creditors will come from the fact that for the first time under this treaty a practicable method of attempting to settle the debts due them will be inaugurated.

3. Many of the debts alleged to be due from Santo Domingo to outside creditors unquestionably on their face represent far more money than ever was actually given Santo Domingo. The proposed treaty provides for a process by which impartial experts will determine what debts are valid and what are in whole or in part invalid and will apportion accordingly the surplus revenue available for the payment of the debts. This treaty offers the only method for preventing the collection of
fraudulent debts, whether owed to Americans or to citizens of other nations.

4. This treaty affords the most practicable means of obtaining payment for the just claims of American citizens.

5. If the treaty is ratified, creditors belonging to other nations will have exactly as good treatment as creditors who are citizens of the United States, and at the same time Santo Domingo will be protected against unjust and exorbitant claims. If it is not ratified, the chances are that American creditors will fare ill as compared with those of other nations; for foreign nations, being denied the opportunity to get what is rightfully due their citizens under the proposed arrangement, will be right to collect the debts due their citizens as they see fit, provided, of course, there is not permanent occupancy of Dominican territory. As is such case the United States will have nothing to say as to what debts should or should not be collected, and as Santo Domingo will be left without aid, assistance, or protection, it is impossible to state that the sums collected from it will not be improper in amount. In such event, whatever is collected by means of forcible intervention will be applied to the creditors of foreign nations in preference to creditors who are citizens of the United States.

6. The correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Minister of Haiti, submitted to the Senate several days ago, shows that our position is explicitly and unreservedly that under no circumstances do we intend to acquire territory in or possession of either Haiti or Santo Domingo, it being stated in these letters that even if the two republics desired to become a part of the United States the United States would certainly refuse its assent.

7. Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust that we are willing, to bestow. She has asked for this aid, and the expressions of friendship, repeatedly sanctioned by the people and the Government of the United States, warrant her in believing that it will not be withheld in the hour of her need.

Theodore Roosevelt.
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