Montalembert: His Idea of Liberty

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MONTALEMBERT: HIS IDEA OF LIBERTY

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INTRODUCTION

I defy anyone to find one word that I write or speak which is not destined to serve liberty. Liberty! ...And I add my name to all the Catholic laymen of the nineteenth century. In the midst of a free people, we refuse to be islands; we are the successors of martyrs and we do not cringe before the successors of Julian the Apostate. We are the sons of the crusaders and we will not recoil before the sons of Voltaire. 1

In disclosing this hidden source which nourished Montalembert's political philosophy, it also explains its strength and, for many concerned nineteenth-century Frenchmen, its irresistible attraction. If Montalembert's "liberty" is integrated in the great Christian experience, it is also clear that it expresses only one aspect of it. Similarly, the road he followed with such determination is, and cannot but be, only one of the converging roads that leads to the common good; the road, maybe, that best answers the expectations of his own days, but that must fail to reach its destination if it claims to be the only road. Montalembert, following up the gifts given to him, explored deeply a part, but only a part, of the domain in which is to be found the common good for French Catholics in the middle of nineteenth-century France.

At the same time, the preceding passage illuminates for us what, underlying the development of an important contribution, and the many-sided activities of a life of continual movement, was Montalembert's preoccupation. Always he strove to bring together his interior vision

of liberty and the teaching he received from outside himself. He never sacrificed one to the other; rather he was certain of their convergence. Yet this certainty caused him and his associates to fail to achieve any synthesis. Why? It is the purpose of this paper to prove that Montalembert's conception of liberty was inadequate and, for the most part, irrelevant to the needs of nineteenth-century France.

Montalembert had to rely on words to be the faithful interpreters of his thought. And he constantly had to try and find a better way of expressing himself through them. This involved an effort of intense reflection and a perpetual return to the same theme, so that all newly acquired knowledge could serve to bring closer the unique object made manifest to him, to integrate all in and under the lordship of liberty. He strove to listen to advice and criticism in order to achieve a more exact balance of thought. And yet all the time he clung tenaciously to the line he was following and spoke with the same note of passionate conviction, for deep within him he always retained his "vision."

Each of the problems that follow seeks to bring out certain aspects of Montalembert's meaning of liberty. The scope is deliberately limited. The first is a brief analysis of the origins of Montalembert's conception of liberty, but considering various points only insofar as they are relevant to deepening his understanding of liberty. In the second part, attention is concentrated on Montalembert's direct role in forming a Catholic party in government and fighting for freedom of teaching. At the same time, I have tried to incorporate one of the central points in Montalembert's thought: the linking, with a critical aim in view, of the contributions of Montalembert's liberal Catholicism to the political milieu of France.
In all, I have made use of numerous articles, letters and personal notes of Montalembert. I am well aware of the caution with which the latter such evidence must be used. Too much weight, even with the best intentions, should not be attributed to what may be a casual allusion. Every letter presupposes a correspondent to whom it is addressed, and who must be borne in mind if we are to interpret the way in which the letter is worded and the shades of meaning intended.
PART I: 1830 - 1840

In the September and October of 1830, while traveling in Ireland, Montalembert received letters from his friend, Leon Cornuet,\(^1\) who told him of the founding of the paper l'Avenir. Reading the projections for the future, Montalembert had enthusiastically written his friend Lacordaire,\(^2\) "Si l'on veut de moi de l'Avenir, j'abandonne tout." Returning home, only twenty years of age, Montalembert arrived at La Chesnaye, La Mennais' country home near Paris, where he was made a member of the staff. He had been traveling in Ireland and had met and admired O'Connell. Enamored by this man's liberation movement which would eventually end up with home rule, Montalembert had found a work whereby his ideas on liberty could find expression. Montalembert failed not to see that the cause of truth and of liberty were one. Sympathizing with the Polish liberal uprising, he translated Le Livre

\(^1\) Leon Cornuet was a life-long friend. In college at Sainte-Barbe, when only seventeen, Montalembert and he bound themselves to God, country and each other, to devote themselves and their talents to God and freedom.

\(^2\) Henri Lacordaire (1802-1861), had come to Paris in 1822 as a sceptic. Through the influence of men like Abbe Gerbet, he became a Roman Catholic, then a priest in the Dominican order in 1830. He met Montalembert in 1830. A gifted man, he remained Montalembert's close friend of thirty-two years. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1846, and retired in 1852 after a rebuke from his Bishop. He then devoted his life to the propagation of the Dominican order in which he had been named French Provincial. His collected works, including discourses, letters, an autobiography, and a life of St. Dominic, were published in 1872. He was elected to the French Academy.
Fulcanino Falonna de Hickelwic, professed by La Mennais, his master and founder of L'Avenir. 1

La Mennais and Lecomte were the two most influential friends of Montalembert's early life. With the watchword of their group being, Dieu et la Liberte, Montalembert was attracted by this little group, "Agence generale pour la defense de la liberte." Their relationship was probably one of the closest yet most painful of Montalembert's life. L'Avenir became the source of many of the liberal Catholics' ideas on the continent. The political, social and religious freedom advocated by the paper was condemned in 1832 by Gregory XVI in his encyclical, Mirari Vos.

Looking to the middle ages, Montalembert, La Mennais and Lecomte esteemed the Church during that era. Then she had her ancient liberties that fell with royal absolutism. To these three in their youthful beginnings, their goal was to destroy any remaining vestiges holding down the final liberation of the Church, by advocating reconciliation of the Church with the modern world. Thus L'Avenir was not totally romantic. It would be unjust to reduce all the youthful ardour of these young men to be a mere prolongation of the romanticism of the 1820's, or a stop-gap for the July Revolution. It was romantic in that L'Avenir provided the spark, the alam to a freedom movement; it had firm speculative foundation in the eighteenth-century political philosophers.

1Felicite Robert de La Mennais (1782-1854) began a brilliant campaign against Gallicanism and anti-Christian philosophy. For long he was the most open ultramontane in France. He felt that the Church could have no real liberty under a royal government, that free speech and a free press were necessary. He sat in the Constituent Assembly in 1848 and in the Legislative Assembly until it was suppressed in 1851. Having long broken with Church authorities, he died in 1854 without religious rites, yet paradoxically he was one of the Church's most avant-garde leaders in creative social thinking.
liberal -- but not a democrat -- far from it:

I thought to defer my trip, he wrote, all my hopes being destroyed, but the times compromised this, my country to whom I was consecrated was plunged in an abyss of evil. Happy those who die, the owners of honor, patriotism, justice, liberty.

As his close friend Lacordaire predicted, he remained an aristocrat the whole of his life. However, the type of aristocracy he advocated was not the old feudalistic sort with its castles and privileges:

I do not think of forming an aristocracy, I would never formulate a system of this genre primarily because I am not this type, and secondly because Catholics have more pressing things to accomplish. As a man, as a Christian, I do not believe in the infallibility of those who live this way and I will not be the courtseam of neither one nor the other.

For Montalembert, a sharp distinction arose between two types of democracy:

The modern world, he wrote, must choose between two forms of democracy, two forms that differ as much as night and day, liberal democracy and collective democracy. The first is characterized by three traits: guarantee of popular rights, representative government, publication of public affairs.

Leaning upon the liberties gained by the Revolution, Montalembert was a genuine liberal, that is, a man who believed in liberalism.

Liberalism has been defined, with profound insight, as an art of government. It consists of a capacity to write the principle of conservatism with that of progress, radical initiative with historical tradition. Liberalism includes methods, political parties, even a form of state organization. All of these descriptions are complimentary.

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2 Montalembert to Lacordaire, September 20, 1839. Ibid., p. 190.

not exclusive and each expresses a particular aspect of the liberal spirit. First and foremost, liberalism appears as the recognition of a fact, the fact of unity. The task which a man may reasonably take upon himself in relation to other men begins with a conviction of the autonomy of every spiritual process, and proceeds by the rare art of arousing within himself, as a demand of his own, that which he would impart to others, and thus in causing these others to impose upon themselves those principles which he wishes to impose upon them. In the world of politics, this method has for partisans the so-called liberal parties, social groups peculiarly interested in the free play of individual forces because, from their own experience, they understand their vital importance and energizing power.¹

Such was the case of Montalembert. He envisioned for society a natural elite which would serve as a coherent avant-garde of service and honor for the masses -- already too heavy and persuaded. Living in an era that was highly individualistic, he felt this elite could successfully combat the excesses of ambition, interests and glorification even of talents by placing themselves in the continuum of a grand tradition. He asked of democracy to be a breaking force which expressed all that was best of the nation in order to oppose absolutism. This latter "disease," whether it appeared in the form of a monarchy or anarchy, was the hereditary enemy of his true aristocracy:

The great evil of absolute governments is precisely that their vices live secretly like a place that is never open, never cleaned, never sterilized. These vices live and infect little by little the whole social body. On the contrary, as I have correctly

said, there is never an irreparable disease in a country that one learns about without fearing to wound the pride of the nation or humiliating the government.¹

Montalembert wrote these lines in 1850, concerning a debate on India in the English parliament. The late date makes little difference, however, for this meaning remained consistent no matter what year of his political life. On the other hand, his thought on democracy would gradually evolve and broaden increasingly. In the 1830's, however, he felt the masses experienced violent power too precociously. His modernism can be contrasted with that of La Massana to show his withdrawal from any association with radical movements. La Massana did not just criticize but suggested constructive programs to help:

A transcendent career will open soon for the priest who is called to serve in new ways the suffering portion of humanity. For it is a fact that they have already produced a system of agricultural colonies with success. It will probably be worked out on an industrial level to the profit of the poor. The principle of association being that this combination of industry and agriculture is a happy one, the intervention of the priest will be always necessary, not only to give these associations the moral character needed for utilitarian politics and material prosperity but also for being a third party that is disinterested except to serve as a link that contracts the two groups: the rich who furnish the ground and the money and the poor who can only merit his work in the common fund.

Needing an authority to base these fundamental and primary principles on, La Massana invoked the authority of Chateaubriand for his position:

A new era has come for humanity, Mgr. Ireland said recently. The traditions of the past have vanished, new forms of society and politics arise... One need not exaggerate to show and impress the government of the Church about these new movements; she must employ new sailors to her ship.²

¹Charles de Montalembert, "Un Débat Sur L'Inde Au Parlement Anglais," Correspondant (October 29, 1858).
²Édouard Lecanuet, op.cit., p. 15a.
³Ibid.
Whereas Montalembert's principles lacked a concrete proposal:

Liberty is not a vague abstraction or a thing impatient with any rule or restraint; but rather, positively defined, liberty conforms to well ordered nature and its laws, its principle of right cannot be reversed without logically destroying all justice upon the earth ... liberty for the family, community, province and the entire nation by administering respectively their particular interests, their common interests.

...a liberal party, as a part or division of a whole, cannot contain within itself, in its limited program of action, the ideal instincts of its opponents... A more comprehensive liberalism would recognize the dialectical ground of the antithesis and would see its resistance and movement, conservation and progress, justified and validated in a higher synthesis which is political life in its concreteness. There was a cleavage between Montalembert and La Mennais in thought only -- not affection. Yet this divisiveness of belief in principles would eventually separate the group. The complete adherence of Montalembert to the Church made him lose sight of the prophetic quality of La Mennais whose:

...interesting, knowledge, theocratic doctrines seemed poorly prepared; but it was the role most suited to him because of his character. No one, in this regard, among the clergy or laymen, was more capable of breaking with the mistakes of the past, with the traditions and prejudices of a clergy elevated in coordination with a declining dynasty that defied liberty.

Because Montalembert failed to grasp the universal social significance of La Mennais' social teachings, Montalembert really did not read the "signs of the times." Perhaps he was not prepared enough. At a young

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age, Montalembert revealed a restless urge to study. Then in college, political questions had always a great fascination for him to the detriment of his classical studies. Philosophy was never his forte; rather politics, as involving the cause of human rights, was the sphere especially to fit him. To give the lie to the calumny that freedom and revelation are antagonistic principles became his goal.

Montalembert was devoted to the study of Burke, whose rich profusion suited Montalembert's style. Nature destined Montalembert for the heat and anger of conflict. The specialisation and erudite research of the intellectual never took precedence over his political activity. Yet he retained a certain balance of "vision" that enabled him to be at least a great political leader. As far back as June 7, 1825, Lacordaire wrote, "I do not like the system of M. de la Mennais because it seems false, nor his political opinions which I find exaggerated." Thus the imprudence of La Mennais' violent and intemperate language even repelled Lacordaire who, more than Montalembert, was very sympathetic to the proletariat.

Then in 1831 the conservative bishops of France condemned *l'Avenir*. Gregory XVI was horrified of liberalism but did not want to lose these men because of their ultramontanist interests. He tried to avoid making an announcement and, in view of his radical tendencies, La Mennais unwisely went to Rome to press for a verdict. But the Church was not ready then to adopt as her program that of the *l'Avenir*, when throughout the world she was, in fact, so organised because the Pope thought her very existence was threatened by the leaders of the revolutionary liberal societies. In Gregory XVI's mind, the Church had to side with "order."

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1Ibid., p. 775.
1832 was the beginning of a tragic year. After hearing of the Holy Father's decision to condemn his book, Montalembert's indignation seethed not so much for the injurious judgment but the consequences of such an act: "pour l'Eglise, pour l'humanité, pour la cause du Christ et de la vérité." Most worrisome was the reactions of the three men. La Mennais declared that "don l'ordre temporeal en est tout à fait independent de la puissance spirituelle." Yet the three men decided that since l'Avenir had over two thousand subscribers, mostly young clergymen, they should make a pilgrimage to Rome to appeal for support. Even before they left, their alarming doctrine of separation of Church and State caused conservative Cardinal de Rohan and the bishops of Chartres and Toulouse to forbid their parishioners to take the journal. All three expected a loyal response since l'Avenir was definitely ultramontane and fighting this Gallican attitude. Unfortunately, they arrived in the midst of a liberal uprising in the Papal States. They were coldly received, told to return to France after a thorough study of their liberal program. Their second audience on March 1, 1832, needed no conversation. The mere presence of Cardinal Rohan spelled defeat. Whereas Montalembert could see no other "... parti a prendre que celui de la soumission la plus absolue."

By November 1832, the future of La Mennais unveiled itself too clearly. On their return from Rome in 1832, the "three pilgrims of God and liberty" had been deflated. Montalembert and La Mennais had stopped at Munich on their way back, to meet with the leaders of

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2 Ibid.
the Bavarian Liberal Catholic Movement. By chance, Lacordaire joined them when they received the encyclical Mirari Vos. Lacordaire officially resigned December 11, 1832, to be replaced by Guerin two days earlier, and left behind an embittered La Mennais. Just the opposite, Montalembert stayed with his beloved friend, the author of L'Essai sur l'indifference. Yet when on August 4, 1833, La Mennais wrote Gregory XVI to ask to be relieved of Church activities, no longer was Montalembert able to stay on. Firm in his conviction he said:

Never could one completely sacrifice the certain for uncertain, the certitude of a peace of a Christian conscience for the uncertainty of an action and doctrine entirely of human making.¹

Montalembert's maturing thought soon revealed itself in his new article, "Vandalism en France." He described a definite cooling in the relations between the July Monarchy and the Church in France. Like all the liberals of the l'Avenir group, he feared that the anti-liberal and anticlerical monarchy would not be successful in keeping the Church's status. This terror was expressed by La Mennais in his violent invectives against the episcopate of France rather than the July Monarchy and its decrees of 1830. These events threw Montalembert into a vortex of contending doubt and faith.

By 1834, unfortunately, La Mennais had drifted into apostasy. His Sentiments of a Believer, an attack on civil authority, was condemned in the encyclical Singulari Vos, 1834. La Mennais never recovered from this second blow. True to his Church, Montalembert could only write with great pathos:

I received a few days ago a fact that can only give me pain; it announced that Catholicism was a dying or dead form of religion, and that you were in perfect accord with this advice. For me

¹Ibid.
this is a terrific blow. I will save you by not writing in
detail all the turmoil this statement raised in my conscience
and mind.

...I wrote to Cardinal Pacca of my complete adherence, pure
and simple, to the Encyclical just as you did last December 8.
I did not elaborate on any details with him. It was necessary
do violence to my most deep-seated convictions in order to
comply with an encyclical like that of August 15 which hurt them
so deeply; but I prefer this violence than to take the chance
of finding myself outside this Church which offers such consolation
for my sufferings which no political or intellectual activity
could ever assuage. 1

When Montalembert left the L'Avenir he watched with fear the
potential of the people:

The proletarians, he confided to his personal notes, lash out
over the Empire like a wave of barbarians. They will destroy in
order to rebuild, no more than the barbarians. ... Catholicism
ought to remain neutral like she did a long time ago. 2

Thus, to guard above all the independence of the ancient sacred values --
this was perhaps the secret weapon Montalembert could use against the
clan of democracy with which his two companions were so enamored.
Montalembert distinguished between two types of democracy, liberal
democracy and universal democracy. The former he characterised by
three traits: guarantee of natural freedoms, representative government,
publication of public affairs. This left a great margin as to the
structure of the State, was not bound to any particular form of
representation or administration and did not entertain any illusions
about the dangerous dogmas that were introduced by the democrates of
1848. On the contrary, universal democracy meant introducing in the
political order universal suffrage, riots and poorly educated men in
government. The subject of universal democracy is said to have

1 Ibid., p. 26h. Pisa, December 13, 1834.
2 Mounier, op. cit., p. 13.
embittered Montalembert. Later, in the 1850's, he would identify it as imperialistic socialism. On the evening of the first great sermon of Lacordaire at Notre-Dame (1835-1836), in the heat of all his enthusiasm for the promoting of the rights of people, Montalembert confided to his diary his inquietude. All the new young clergy were doing now was to substitute the idolatry of the people for the idolatry of the monarchy of the old clergy; both lacked a true turning toward liberation for the Church.

Looking to the Middle Ages, Montalembert, Ozanam, and other friends esteemed the Church of this period. Then she had her ancient liberties that fell with royal absolutism. Always she had been the bulwark against power. She had a place in the written or traditional constitutions, in the laws which reciprocally bound leaders and people together, in those acts that made society regular and durable. Above all, she remained a moral force, uniting men in a controlled, healthy society.

To La Mennais, Lacordaire and Montalembert on the staff of the l'Avenir, in their youthful beginnings, their goal was to destroy any remaining vestiges holding down the final liberation of the Church, by advocating reconciliation of the Church with the modern world. Unlike Lacordaire and La Mennais, Montalembert lacked the burning

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1 Ibid., p. 20.

2 Ibid., p. 11.

3 Antoine Frederic Ozanam (1813-1853) was an associate of Lacordaire. He founded the St. Vincent de Paul Society. In 1844, he was appointed professor at the Sorbonne. He was one of the most influential Catholic thinkers of the century.

devotion which animated the others, to attach the cause of democracy to their cause. Like most of the leaders then, he thought politically, not socially. He did not have the characteristic trust in the "people" that was so common among the romantic contemporaries of his time. Considering the people, Montalembert, thirty years before Proudhon, observed that these honest people were not mature enough yet to exercise power honestly. At best, democracy never evoked new profound virtues unique to the people which could be naturally allied with the Christian leader and chivalrous soldier against all parasitical forces of the nation; on the contrary, they seemed to symbolize the power of the bourgeoisie money and convey the spirit of Proudhon -- the two most devastating forces of irreligion.

To Montalembert, the future of the proletariat did not offer to any imagination an ordered perspective. Unrealistic utopias only were proffered, yet still liberty -- remained above all other values -- even political ones. Politics for him was but a sword for his spiritual ideals. What he asked from a liberal state was a given and guaranteed possibility to all individuals to choose their own destiny; an atmosphere that would distinguish between absolute and relative, or thesis and hypothesis which could make an open door for the liberal Catholics. Many considered these liberal Catholics mere romantics but:

It would be a grave injustice to reduce the ardent initiators and brave champions of the Church to be a mere echo of the romantics or a counter-offensive only of the July Revolution. Such is not our thought; but it is not at all injurious to these valiant spirits to find in them through their language, in their ideas, their hopes, even their illusions, traces of an effort to half erase the effectiveness of the total intellectuals; rather, with romanticism leading them, they made throughout Europe an expansion of heart and spirit that enlarged the horizons of the XVIII
These things combined to make truth which only could reveal itself in a free dialogue of ideas. Montalembert entered the world of politics in the ranks of the liberal parties, a social group peculiarly interested in the free play of forces because from their own experience, they understood their vital importance and energising power. And this is where the ideal and the real grappled in his life. For Liberalism is only in part identical with a Liberal party; to a great extent the two may be divergent and even opposed. For a liberal party, as a part or division of a whole, cannot contain within itself, in its limited program of action, the ideal instincts of its opponents. Because Montalembert’s concept of liberty was limited, he failed to recognise the dialectical ground of the antithesis and he never saw its resistance and movement, conservation and progress validated in a higher synthesis which is political life in the concrete. He needed a party movement that would answer the needs of his times. The revolution of 1848 would prove that he did not have a comprehensive program to meet these demands.

It is to the credit of Montalembert that during the years 1836 to 1842 he was so involved in the struggles of the French Church, one cannot distinguish his personal life from that of the Church. Still young, only twenty-six years old, but thoroughly matured by the collapse of L’Avenir, Montalembert conceived the plan of liberating the Church from the oppressive yoke of the University decrees of Napoleon by giving her freedom to teach. For Montalembert, it was

1Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., pp. 770-771.
essential to the Church's divine mission, and the Revolution and Napoleon had despoiled her. The obstacles against the enterprise were insurmountable. In the Chamber of Peers Montalembert found himself alone; no one thought as he; no communication media expressed his ideas; the Catholics were divided and the bishops obstinately defiant against having any struggle. For six years, from 1836 to 1842, Montalembert nourished his project, became a member of the Chamber, revived the newspaper *l'Univers*, and looked for partisans. This he accomplished by entering politics.
Part II: 1840-1848

Up to 1840 Montalembert had spent most of his life trying to form a Catholic viewpoint. Although not Legitimist, many identified the Catholics with this party. Montalembert did not succeed in separating the two groups. Why? It would be incorrect to classify the purpose of the Liberals to be to disengage the faithful from adherence to a legitimist political position. There would be no problem. But as has been seen, even among those of the l'Avenir, Liberalism was fluid in meaning. The liberal Catholics were not out to destroy Catholic authority, but rather felt themselves to have the right to criticize it. They saw their role as a bridge between a conservative and authoritarian Church and the liberal society of their day.

Secondly, they were not economic liberals yet; they did accept its basic premises. They worked more for rights against the states, not rights through the State. Therefore, the French Catholic liberals faced a perennial problem; they sought the balance between the pursuit of individuality and the acceptance of the decisions of the group. What made this subtle problem more perplexing was that the group of men who were forming themselves around Montalembert were really not philosophers or creative thinkers. On the contrary, they tended to be more romantic and empirical.  

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1 The Legitimists were the political party who supported the House of Bourbon.  

Montalembert took his seat in the House of Peers in 1835. By the rules governing that body he was entitled to a seat on attaining his twenty-fifth year, but could have no determining voice in its deliberations until he was thirty. He could partake in debates. This he did with youthful enthusiasm and eloquence. His indignation at the piecemealing of Belgium was favorably received. They saw in his attitude toward the government -- now one of support, now one of censure -- an absence of all systematic attack. His standard of action seemed to be the universal principles of justice and frank confession of his faith.

Nevertheless, by the time Montalembert was thirty-two, he found himself in almost complete isolation upon the two questions: freedom of the Church and freedom of education, which through his leadership were to fuse Catholic France into a concordant body. Montalembert, in his "The Obligation of Catholics in the Matter of Freedom of Teaching (1843)" urged all Catholics to demand that the government recognize the principle of the freedom of teaching on grounds that the Constitution guaranteed liberty.

M. Guizot was, in reality, favorable to freedom of teaching. In fact, he had deposited the first germ of the law in 1833 to which everyone acclaimed him. But he was intimidated by the stress this question aroused in the country and the opposition within the government led by M. Thiers and those of the left. He was also intimidated because this was an innovation.¹

He initiated this campaign but the cause was agreeable to the conservative Catholics; if the Government had previously refused to permit the establishment of parochial primary schools, perhaps the Government's own creed of laissez-faire could be invoked by the Catholics to secure for the clergymen the right to open parochial primary schools.

¹Ibid.
Montalembert advocated political action to attain this goal. Many of the bishops and especially Louis Cardinal de Bonald of Lyons, reared in the Gallican tradition of merely suggesting opinions to the government in the expectation of action, were aghast at the idea.¹ Montalembert retaliated with:

If Montalembert wanted to complete his army, he need only look around him, following the suggestion of his adversaries, and see himself in the grip of powerless fanatics who only had the one honor of being fearful.²

The blind onlooker of Montalembert ... like the imprudent instigator of schismatic law. The son of Voltaire ... ³

From Madeira, where he had been sojourning with his sick wife, Montalembert sent out his policy: Duty of Catholics in the Question of Educational Freedom. In March, 1844, Montalembert returned to France to take advantage of what had been gained and to thwart the opposition by the formation of a committee to direct the disseminated forces of the Catholic body. Support came from the younger clergy, who, disillusioned by the Church's disastrous alliance with Legitimacy, were ripe for a Catholic party. The Committee for the Defense of Religious Freedom organized affiliated offices in all the districts. Members of the organization did not hold offices themselves, but candidates who endorsed the freedom of teaching would be endorsed.

¹Louis Jacques Maurice de Bonald (1787-1870) was made a Cardinal in 1841 by Gregory XVI. In 1845 he called a provincial synod to remove the remnants of Gallicanism within the French Church.


³Ibid., p. 476.
The Archbishop Affre of Paris\(^1\) was opposed to any committee. Montalembert, seconded by Pere Ravignan\(^2\) of the Jesuits, insisted upon this open committee, of action as well as of consultation. The eloquent Abbé Dupanloup became an advocate of this measure.\(^3\)

Whereas in 1835 Montalembert had found himself in complete isolation upon the question of freedom of education, now his leadership was fusing the talents of Catholic France into a concordant body. The educational laws were outmoded. The University, as the system was called, was a government monopoly of large and powerful patronage, which precluded the existence of any other parallel institution. All schools were public. It alone possessed the power of teaching everything but the most elemental branches, and the so-called "right" to teach these was a licensed right under this system. It alone could confer the baccalaureate degree, which was, by virtue of existing laws, the \textit{sine qua non} to all political and professional preferment. This forced the Catholics to send their child to the government schools. Catholics were in the majority, so their taxes carried the heaviest burden for public school maintenance.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Denis Auguste Affre (1793-1848) was made Archbishop of Paris in 1840 and wrote several philosophical and pastoral studies. As he was pleading for peace during the riots of 1848 he was fired on and slain.

\(^2\)Gustave François Xavier de la Croix de Ravignon (1795-1858) joined the Jesuits in 1822 and was ordained in 1828. He was superior of the Jesuits at Paris (1848-1851) and soon became the target of the anti-Jesuit forces in France. He became embroiled in a disagreement with Archbishop Affre of Paris over the disbandment of the Jesuits in 1844.

\(^3\)Antoine Philibert Dupanloup (1802-1878) was superior of the seminary of St. Nicholas (1837-1845). He worked with Montalembert and M. Thiers in the matter of education laws, writing many tracts while canon at Notre Dame in 1845-1849. In 1849 he was named Bishop of Orleans, and in 1854 he was elected to the French Academy. He strongly opposed the dogma of papal infallibility, but accepted, once it was defined by the Church.

On April 15, 1844, Montalembert had exposed the educational laws. He felt that to force Catholics to send their children to public schools was a violation of the right of conscience — a measure opposed to the most elemental principles of liberty. The Assembly was hostile to his convictions.

On August 23, 1844, Villemain, Minister of Public Instruction, introduced an amendment with even more requirements for the elementary schools. The debate dragged on. Aided by his colleagues, the Marquis de Barthelemy¹ and Count Beugnot,² Montalembert delivered a discourse in defense of religious orders excluded from teaching even elementary branches.

Their bill was defeated in the Chamber of Peers under the leadership of M. Thiers³ who joined the Left in a concerted attack against the Jesuits. This only served to weld the Catholics tighter, causing alarm to the Government. The bill was sent to the Lower House where it remained unacted upon when the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved in June, 1846. The next Chamber saw an increase in Catholic delegates: one hundred and twenty-two deputies pledged themselves to protect Catholic interests.

¹Auguste Marseille Marquis de Barthelemy (1796-1867) was a poet. A political chameleon, he celebrated the revolution of 1830 in *l'Insurrection* only to attack the July Monarchy in his journal *Nemesis*.

²Auguste Arthur Beugnot (1797-1865) was an historian. He entered politics in 1841 and spoke often in favor of the rights of bishops and other citizens to petition and for liberty of teaching and the right of association.

³Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877) joined a group of liberal writers against the government of Charles X. He reflected the views of the middle-of-the-road doctrinaires and of the upper bourgeoisie. He played an important role in the July Revolution of 1830 and held the position of Minister of the Interior under Louis-Philippe. In this post he brutally suppressed the workers insurrection of April 1831 in Paris and Lyons. He became Premier in 1836, then alternated with Guizot in 1840.
The committee had only one avowed goal and no other. It wanted to rally Catholics absorbed in their material interests, dominated only by their human passions back to the Church and religious freedom; it wanted to get them used to serving under the Constitution under which they lived. Half the party were sincere advocates of the July Revolution, the other half, a little less numerous, were legitimists.¹

Montalembert's real thorn:

The great majority of the French clergy were professed to a sovereign power by a submission that is practically servile and a confidence without limits.²

Thus in the election of 1846, one hundred and forty-six such candidates were elected to Parliament. This success, plus the election of "liberal" Pope Pius IX, all augured well for the liberal Catholics.

We do not demand of anyone to abandon his flag or his opinions; but we conjure all those who love religion and liberty to place these two supreme interests, so gravely compromised among us, above any other interest or passion . . . one time these goods were unappreciated and hidden; now each one will take back his real interests, tastes, his duties that recall him.³

The Catholics would not be embarrassed by a revolution of 1848 as they had been in 1830. Then the Revolution was antilegitimist and anticlerical and the groups were practically synonymous; many felt the Church was finished because she had tied herself too closely to the Legitimist cause. Many Gallicans were paralyzed by defeat and many notable bishops even emigrated.

During the last six years of the "July" Monarchy, Montalembert envisaged the Catholic as a movement reaching out for a modus vivendi

with the nineteenth century. He was aided, fortunately, by a most renowned group of men: Le Cardinal de Bonald of Lyons, Mgr. Parisis of Langres, Mgr. Clausel de Montals of Chartres were his companions from the hierarchy; Fathers Lacordaire and de Ravignon from the orders; MM. de Vatimesnil of the Committee; Barthelemy, Beugnot, de Carne in the Chamber; Louise Veuillot of the 1’re Univers and Lenormant of the Correspondant, all recognized Montalembert as their leader.

Toward the end of 1846, l’abbe Dupanloup came to take a place among the eminent Catholics of this group. Despite his recent works — Lettres à M. le duc de Broglie and his pamphlet on the Pacification Religieuse — l’abbe Dupanloup was preoccupied with the minor seminary of Paris, whose educational system he tried to update. Relieved of

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1Pierre Louis Parisis (1795-1866) was the Bishop of Langres, then Arras. He was the first to support Montalembert. Elected to the legislature (1848-1851), he detached from Montalembert and sided with Louis Veuillot.

2 M. de Vatimesnil was a former minister of Public Instruction and vice-president of the Electoral Committee for Religious Liberty.

3Louis Marcien Carne, comte de (1804-1876), a French publicist.

4Louis Veuillot (1813-1883), a journalist, joined the staff of l’Univers Religieux under the recommendation of Montalembert, who contributed articles to the journal. He took over the newspaper and built it into a leading Catholic journal. He was criticized by men of the hierarchy for the violence of his positions, opposed Napoleon III’s war with Austria in 1859, and in 1860 saw the l’Univers suppressed. He began it again in 1867 denouncing Napoleon III’s imperialism and the attempts to deprive the Pope of his Papal States, was a zealous supporter of the Ultramontane party, and vigorously supported the doctrine of papal infallibility. Veuillot had made l’Univers the organ of conservative, ultramontane opinion. Montalembert split from the l’Univers to join the liberal Correspondant in 1855.

5Charles Lenormant (1802-1859) was an archeologist. He lectured at the Sorbonne in 1835, was elected to the Academy in 1839, served as an editor of Correspondant (1846-1855) with M. Foisset, who was Montalembert’s close friend and important intercessor for his joining the staff.
this duty he could carry out the desires laid down in his pamphlet:1

"La liberté pour tous, sans privilège, sans exception, employée par l'archévêque de Tours, était admises de la plupart des évêques."2

Also: religious belief, toleration, real religious, civil and political liberty; he was highly energetic, tended to high piety, yet had a lively intelligence and a dominating personality, but he never could sway Montalembert; he was just a real influence and sympathetic supporter for Montalembert's sake.3

Many criticized Dupanloup for his views: "Dualisme de ses attitudes, non seulement successives mais concomittantes, qui rend la pensée de Dupanloup fluid et insaisissable."4

Such a one was Bishop Dupanloup. In his De la Pacification Religieuse he stated his liberal aims: 1) His goal was religious peace, and this was to be achieved only by 2) toleration and 3) a reversal of Catholic prejudices since 1789 in order to reconcile themselves to modern society. The recognition of liberty was the only way in all realms: religious, civil and political, for this would be a great advantage for all Catholics. As yet this ultramontane teaching, of degrading Gallicanism, was very congenial to Rome, and, during the first two years of the pontificate of Pio Nono, Rome seemed also ready to support these liberal ideas.

1Le camuet, ibid., Vol. II, p. 238.


3Le camuet, ibid.

For a time Pius IX was the idol of many of the nationalists who longed for Italian unity. He himself was attracted by the dream cherished by some of a confederated Italy headed by the Pope. To Italian patriots this hope seemed to be confirmed by the resistance of Pius to an Austrian move in the summer of 1847. In July, 1847, when crowds were celebrating the anniversary of the amnesty of the preceding year, the Austrian commander in Lombardy attempted to forestall outbreaks in Italy by reinforcing the garrison which under the Vienna settlement was maintained in Ferrara, in the Papal States. Popular resistance led to sending in more Austrian troops. When full occupation by Austrian forces followed, the Papal Secretary of State threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Austria and excommunicate the offenders. In December, 1847, the Austrian forces withdrew to the citadel where they clearly had a treaty right to be. This and other Papal actions made Pius IX extremely popular with many who were zealous for a liberal, united Italy. It caused great sympathizing from France: On January 11, 1848, Montalembert asked in the Chamber why the French government was not backing the Pope against the schemes of Metternich. M. Guizot, coming in during the middle of this speech, expressed his respectful admiration for Pius IX and solemnly announced that "la papauté est aujourd'hui tout à la fois l'élément supreme du progrès et la supreme garantie de l'ordre dans les sociétés modernes." For the French, a new era had dawned for the Italians. Pius IX, however, began to see that the expectations cherished by the liberals would involve him in contradictory opinion. He could

1Lecanuet, ibid., p. 360.
scarcely be the head of a united Italy and fulfill his functions as the head of a religious body which transcended national boundaries. His granting of representative liberal political institutions to his subjects in the Papal States was counter to the genius of a Church which was moving away from limitations on the authority of the Pope towards acceptance of Papal absolutism. His first encyclical on doctrinal matters, 

Qui pluribus, issued November 9, 1846, was largely the work of the conservative Lambruschini and upheld the positions of Gregory XVI. It condemned the basic principles of religious liberation.

Moreover, Pius IX began to be alarmed by the direction which events had taken and to which his anti-Austrian stand had contributed. Italian patriots were intent upon clearing Italy of all foreign rule. That meant driving out the Austrians. This the Pope had no intention of doing. The liberal tide was rising, was becoming radical, and here and there was assuming aspects which disturbed him. In 1847, for example, civil war broke out in Switzerland and the Sonderbund, an alliance of Catholic cantons, was defeated. The victors ordered the expulsion of all religious orders. Concerning the Sonderbund revolution, Montalembert was dismayed, angered and melancholic about the enormous easy success of the radicals over the capitulating liberals. Early in 1848, he clarified in his famous speech on the "Sonderbund" that radicalism was the antipode, not the exaggeration of liberalism. To him, radicalism was the exaggeration of despotism. For to Montalembert Liberty was rational and voluntary tolerance, it respected man; accused of being entirely devoted to religious liberty, Montalembert proclaimed his dedication to liberty in its entirety. Soon a new constitution

1bid., pp. 360-369.
inaugurated a federal state with freedom of religion throughout its territory.

Prince Albert de Broglie said a genuine Church could rise at last -- that is, a Church who counted on the free assent of her members. Privilege was dead. The liberals therefore made statements that showed awareness of the change in society, yet the majority of the hierarchy and faithful thought the state would promote a dogmatic nonreligious faith. They were scared.

For too long, the Church had been dependent, Gallicanized. Since the Concordat of 1816 when the Pope's secular power reached its nadir, close ties between Church and State were established along with privileges for Royal authority to interfere with hierarchical matters. Subjected to the king, the Church definitely lost her traditional medieval separation of Church and State. Paradoxically, many bishops gained authority in their districts and thus became jealous of their "Gallican liberties." Vice versa, the royal ministers were glad to eliminate Papal influence. When the royalty lost prestige in the eighteenth century, similarly, so did the Church because of her attachment to the decaying regime. The 1801 concordat proved even more harsh and in reality, the clergy merely became the civil servants of the regime. This concrete event coupled with rationalism enormously weakened the Church. Then it is that De Maitre and La Mennais, influenced by romantic spirit reactionary movement, wrote against Gallicanism. The collapse of the 1830 restoration monarchy only intensified the decline of Gallicanism.

1Jacques-Victor-Albert duc de Broglie (1821-1901), Mémoires du duc de Broglie (Paris: 1938-1941), p. 278. He was an historian and politician, premier (1873-4; 1877) and a liberal monarchist leader.
After calling Catholics to crusade for freedom of teaching, organizing them, covering France with committees, agitating public opinion by speeches, press, and petition, and in the 1846 elections sending to the Chamber one hundred and forty partisans for this liberty, the Republic deprived Montalembert of his goal. But he clung tenaciously and only after the necessary compromise initiated by Dupanloup and the legislative proposal devised by Falloux, was the law passed in 1880.1 But it could only have been accomplished by the friendship of Dupanloup and Thiers who:

Disengaging neatly the truth and justice from the sophisms of a discussion which had disfigured them, they multiplied their efforts to repulse the arguments of their opponents presenting their own in a way always enlightening, forceful, full of common sense with an eloquence at the service of freedom of conscience and great social interests; thus they finally won a decisive majority.2

This rally for freedom of education by Catholics in the 1840's was more circumstances than convictions. That is, the reshifting of emphasis toward papal control on the part of the Gallican conservative and the liberal ultramontane bias, made these two conflicting forces join opportunistly on a uniting cause. But it masked the deeper divisions on the basic problem of relation of Church and State which would rapidly be consolidated as the Catholic problem of that time.

1Falloux, ibid., p. 423.
2Ibid., p. 565.
France in 1816 was laboring in the throes of an approaching crisis and more violent elements than those of Catholic agitation, which confined itself within constitutional limits, were demanding the attention of the government.

Montalembert's speech on the Sonderbund War was his last speech before the Chamber of Peers. Six weeks later, the radical elements condemned in that speech overthrew this government and added it to the victories of the revolution.

With the monarchy of Louis-Philippe disappeared Montalembert's legal privileges as a Peer; in its stead came the Republic of 1848. At first it seemed the horrors of 1793 were probable. But power fell partly into the hands of men who swayed the clubs. Their influence held the Emeutiers at bay till the rest of society took courage and rallied around Lamartine,¹ who was enjoying a popularity which had been obtained by a skilful middle course during the previous months, and by means of his Girondins, his book which poetized features of the Revolution of 1789.

Recovering from the first shock of the Revolution, Montalembert proceeded to extend and systematize the action of the Catholic body throughout France in the name of public order and settled government.

¹Alphonse de Lamartine (1790-1869) was an author and was elected to the French Academy in 1830 and to the Chamber of Deputies in 1833 and 1837. He opposed Louis-Philippe and in 1847 published History of the Girondists, which was one of the causes of the Revolution of 1848. He retired from politics after the coup d'etat in 1851.
During the first year, he was elected from the department of Doubs. The ensuing years saw radicalism, socialism and red-republicanism rife in Paris, Lyons and Marsaillles. The clubs continued to keep the country in a state of ferment. Montalembert saw in these insurrections the ruin of the whole social fabric, and pledged himself to his constituents to meet these forces with stiff opposition.\(^1\)

Better days for the Church seemed in view with the overthrow of the July Monarchy in 1848, for this revolution could be considered a Catholic victory. As the 1848 crisis evolved, Catholic leaders had several alternatives. They could support and identify with the rising proletarian class. This would mean facing the harsh economic and social facts of the Industrial Revolution, whose reality was that the poor lived in miserable squalid towns. This was a serious challenge to the Catholic Liberals, because it held the promise of material progress for all mankind. Many felt the coming material benefits would be the measure of true progress, and that the Church would perish. In the long run, they merely glimpsed at reform, but never came to grips with the materialism of their opponents. Freedom did not mean democracy, especially when the revolutionaries thundered through the streets destroying all in their path. Socialism became anathema to most Catholic leaders who felt that men must learn to respect property and order. Thus, when the elections arrived, only Cavaignac and Louis-Napoleon seemed dedicated to preserving order; but the Catholics suspected Cavaignac of wanting free and compulsory education, which they were unwilling to sanction, so long as all primary teachers were

\(^{1}\)Lecanuet, ibid., Vol. III, pp. 1-5.
laymen. Louis-Napoleon, on the other hand, promised Montalembert that he would protect religion in France by advocating the principle of freedom to teach. He further guaranteed to protect the freedom and authority of the Pope, who, at that moment, had been chased from Rome by Italian revolutionaries. The Catholic Liberals, as a consequence, voted for Louis-Napoleon, making themselves political bed-fellows of the bourgeoisie in the fight against socialism. They knew they could win the election because democratic suffrage gave predominance to rural and provincial France who were not ready for social experimentation.

While the Liberal Catholics had no program for serious social reform, tolerance for mild welfare proposals at the birth of the Republic were gone by the May and June days of violence. Christian social thought disappeared in an atmosphere of reaction.

A second and more modest aspiration (and, therefore, it might have a better chance?) was, not to create a France that might be, but accommodate themselves to her as she was. This was a more pragmatic than theoretical solution and was more in tune with the social conservatism of the bulk of the French Catholic elite. The goal was to win Catholic acceptance of civil liberties and representative institutions which were the main ingredients of the French political tradition. It would seem best, to this group, to join all the Catholics and Liberals of the time and, therefore, create social stability.

The most attractive view was the defensive third one. It was most evident in the debates on the Falloux law, and would be consolidated by rallying to the Second Empire. This was the reactionary group who felt it impossible to consolidate the second proposal and, therefore, only a regime of privilege could save the situation.
It was the failure of the Liberal Catholics to stem the movement of a majority of Catholic spokesmen to their more progressive views that is the measure of their defeat.

The period of the Republic could be termed the highpoint of Montalembert's career. The religious and educational freedom which preoccupied his political life till now broadened out under the Republic into the domain of the wants of a society racked to its center. Now the universal principles of government were being attacked. Coming from the Chamber of Peers where counter opposition hardly interrupted an orator, in the Assemblies of the Republic he was stopped at almost every sentence by laughter, exclamations, and general commotion. In the Constituent Chamber, he successfully combatted the measure of the Provisional Government for the forced purchase by the State of all the railroad lines in France.1

Likewise he advocated the necessity of constituting two legislative chambers.2 He advocated, too, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on the ground that it was not in sympathy with the new President of the Republic, harmony between the executive and legislative departments being of great importance at that present juncture.3 These speeches gave him a prominent position in the conservative ranks of Mole4

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2 Lecanuet, ibid., Vol. III, pp. 1-5.
3 Ibid.
4 Louis Mathieu Comte Mole (1781-1855) was Premier under Louis-Philippe (1836-1839). Steering a cautious middle course at home and abroad, he lost to parliamentary opposition. Active during the Second Republic, he retired after the coup d'état of Louis-Napoleon in 1851.
Thiers, de Broglie, and Berryer.¹ The Constituent Assembly dissolved and Montalembert was re-elected by his former constituents and also returned by the department of Cotes-du-Nord.

When Rossi, the Pope's minister was assassinated and the next day Monsignore Palma, the Pope's secretary, shot down by his side, and Pius IX was obliged to flee before Italian patriots like those who had overthrown the "Sonderbund" and raised the red flag in Paris, General Cavaignac, then dictator in France, sent to the Pope's assistance thirty-five hundred men. The following year, when the Pope was entering Rome to regain his estates, Napoleon informed him of the conditions upon which he was to resume his authority: "... amnistie générale, sécularization des emplois, promulgation à Rome du Code Napoléon." M. Thiers, head of the commission charged with an examination of the credits relative to the expedition to Rome, pronounced himself in favor of the Pope. Likewise de Tocqueville unequivocally pronounced: "... never has it entered the French Government's mind to use the force in its hands to coerce the Holy Father." He then gave two reasons why. First, they were dealing with a Pontiff, not a Prince, who is head of the religion to which the majority of the French people belong. Secondly, the Sovereign Pontiff's power is immaterial, incomprehensible and intangible. Finally, he only asked that whatever power he did exercise over the Pope be "... to require of it things that are fair, wise and equitable, in conformity with the interests of the Catholic

¹Pierre Antoine Berryer (1790-1868) entered political life as an independent monarchist. In 1855 he was elected to the French Academy. He spoke and wrote widely in defense of the Liberal Church. He advocated that workers had the right to combine and to earn a living wage; this became the basis for his campaign for national acknowledgment of liberty of association.
people. . . to demand them respectfully, but straightforwardly and publically before the whole world." What he did ask for were political institutions that would insure the welfare and civil liberty of the Roman State and at the same time would prepare them for political liberty as well within a reasonable time.¹

Montalembert backed these policies wholeheartedly. He did not dislike liberty any less, but he felt there were large and aggressive masses who would only make an abuse of it and turn it into an engine for overturning society. "Are you aware of what is the greatest of all your crimes before the world? . . . It is that you have disenchanted the world of liberty." He was also elected to a commission of seventeen who worked out a bill to reform the electoral practices.

But it was the vexed problem of education that reached its final solution under the Republic. Immediately after the opening of the new session of 1848, M. de Falloux,² the new Minister of Education, prepared a projet de loi which would respond to the advocates of educational freedom and the exigencies of the constitution. He named a commission, with Thiers as President, and composed of eleven representatives, among whom was Montalembert, three members of the old

¹de Tocqueville, ibid., Appendix B, pp. 313-314.

²Frédéric Alfred Pierre de Falloux de Condray (1811-1885) was a controversial statesman. A member of the Constituent Assembly for Maine et Loire in 1846, he was chairman of the committee which ended the national workshops, an act which resulted in bloodshed and rebellion. He served as Minister of Education in 1848-1849, and drew up the bill for freedom of education, which was passed in 1850 when he was no longer a member of the ministry. De Falloux was elected to the French Academy in 1856.
royal council of the University -- one of whom was Cousin\(^1\) -- and eight other men, among whom was the Abbé Dupanloup.

On June 18, 1849, a *projet* providing for the abolition of all previous authorization for opening a school and of the certificate of studies; a radical reform of primary education; disenfranchisement of the little seminaries in charge of religious, and the freedom of religious congregations interdicted from teaching; and although extending the surveillance of the state over the minor seminaries, as the constitution demanded, limited this surveillance to questions of public order only.

Montalembert accepted this *projet*. The result was a breach between Louis Veuillot and himself -- splitting open the Catholic party by the former's violent attacks in the press. The *projet* was a compromise which circumstances required. Pius IX sent Montalembert and the Comtes Mole and de Falloux a special commendation of satisfaction for their conduct, but Montalembert never regained his widespread popularity again.\(^2\) The most amazing victory was the conversion of Thiers and Cousin as advocates of the *projet* since they had been bitter antagonists under the monarchy. Thiers even thwarted an amendment proposed against the Jesuits.

\(^1\)Victor Cousin (1792-1867) was an educational leader and philosopher. He lectured intermittently at the Sorbonne, 1814-1830. Then he was made a councilor of state and in 1832 became a peer. He became virtually the national arbiter of educational and philosophical matters. His chief work in education was the complete reorganization and centralization of the primary system and the establishment of a policy of philosophical freedom in the universities.

1851 gave warning of another political crisis approaching. The next year the present Assembly would reach the term of its existence and the President of the Republic would be retired, not being re-eligible under the Constitution. The Duc de Broglie proposed that the Constitution be amended in order to make the President eligible and Montalembert supported this proposition. This proposal failed. A large number of conservatives divided off, some coalescing with the Left, others under the standard of the Legitimists. All parties braced themselves for a change. Thiers foresaw autocracy: "L'Empire c'est fait," he said, June 18, 1851. As Montalembert was not a party man, nor did he have strong party affiliations, he supported Louis-Napoleon as the representative of order and authority. Illusioned, he made his speech of February 10, 1851, in favor of the President. It not only displeased Napoleon by its reservations, but it estranged from Montalembert all the chiefs of the majority. He found himself politically isolated.

The state of affairs induced by the opposition between executive and legislative branches led to the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, whereby, with the army at his back, Louis-Napoleon took over the government. Astonished Paris awakened the next morning, and in the placards which covered her walls, read of her latest history.

The coup d'état of December 2, 1851, was greeted hesitantly by the French hierarchy and Catholic laymen. In December 1848, they had been divided; the majority had supported Louis-Napoleon, but several
bishops had backed Cavaignac. Louis-Napoleon, however, had without doubt taken the political part most favorable to the Church, which the French government had followed since 1849. But these politics had above all been the work of the Legislative Assembly. Although Louis-Napoleon had personally encouraged the Roman Expedition, his writings showed that he would not serve the Pope docily. Montalembert, as head of the Liberal Catholics, appeared sometimes at the L'Élysée, but none of the new ministers of Napoleon could be considered as devoted to the Church. None could be considered hostile. No one knew what would be the religious policy of the new government, nor did they know whether he would be more or less favorable to the Church than the dissolved Assembly. The name "Napoleon" evoked the Restoration of cult in France, but also the captivity of Pius VII.

Among the deputies who signed the December 2nd protestation against the coup d'état were Montalembert and Melun and Falloux. The next day there appeared in the Moniteur a first list of the members of the Consultative Commission who were to assist the new government.

However, the insurrections of the Republicans in several of the Provinces profoundly modified the attitude of the Catholics vis-a-vis the coup d'état. The Assembly was but a memory, and in the impotency manifested by the remaining parties who really formed a majority, two forces drew them: the government of Louis-Napoleon and the menacing revolution.

1Armand de Melun (1807-1877) was a major figure in the Catholic social movement; his Société d'Economie Charitable participated significantly in the international congresses at Malines.

2Moniteur, December 3, 1851.
Several bishops were in Paris: M. Gaston Bonnechose of Rouen, Antoine Dupanloup of Orleans, Thomas Cardinal Goussot of Rheims, and Parisis of Langres. Only Dupanloup, sustained by Lacordaire and Ravigran, declared himself opposed to the coup d'état. All the others decided to support the government and had Montalembert present their consent. On December 5th, Montalembert sent to the President Prince a list of political men that he wished to see on the Consultative Commission.

On December 5th, the principal Catholic journal, l'Univers, which had remained neutral, published the following article by Louis Veuillot:

It was approximately seventy leagues from Paris in a department "sick" with socialism that we received the news of the December 2 events. They were welcomed as a necessity long time foretold. In all the departments of the Central area, the honest people, those who still had the courage to not bow their heads under the yoke of socialism, prepared themselves to combat, no longer in order to defend a political opinion, no longer even to conserve their goods, but in order to save the lives of their wives and children. If the government is overthrown, this will be the situation of all in France.¹

He continued to show how imperative it was to act, and to support the government. The cause was that of the whole social order. The President of the Republic was their general. If they did not succeed with him, they would be conquered with him -- and irreparably conquered.²

Louis-Napoleon, therefore, obtained the support of the Catholics because he maintained order before knowing what would be his policy toward the Church. But, before the plebiscite, he showed a favorable

²Ibid.
disposition toward the Church. He gave Montalembert his assurance that he would maintain the liberties of the Church and the freedom of teaching. 1 He nominated to his Consultative Commission on December 13, 1850, Montalembert, and Merode, his brother-in-law. 2

By a letter of December 12th, published in the l'Univers on the 16th, Montalembert encouraged Catholics to vote "yes" to the December 20th plebiscite. Like Veuillot, he showed above all that Louis-Napoleon was the defender of order, but he hoped to find in him the champion of the Catholic cause:

I begin by confirming that the act of December 2 has ended all revolutionaries, all the socialists, all the bandits of France and of Europe. ... To vote against Louis-Napoleon is to give cause to the socialist revolution... It is to invite the dictatorship of the Reds to replace the dictatorship of a Prince who had rendered three years of incomparable services to the cause of order and Catholicism ... To abstain is ... to abdicate the mission of honest people ... To vote for Louis-Napoleon is not to approve of all that he has done; it is to choose between him and the total ruin of France. It is to arm the temporal power, most possible today, with the necessary force to overthrow the wave of crime, to defend our churches, our homes, our wives against those who respect nothing ... who look on property owners and whose bullets do not spare priests... Note well that I preach neither confidence nor unlimited devotion... If Louis-Napoleon was an unknown, I would hesitate, certainly, to confer upon him such power and responsibility. But without going into an appreciation of his politics of the last three years, I remember certain religious facts which predict that his government will be in accord with the Church's powers: the guarantee of freedom of teaching, the reestablishment of the Pope by the French army, the Church in control of her councils, synodes, the fulness of her dignity, and seeing gradually grow, her works of salvation and charity. 3

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2Frederic Xavier Gualain de Merode (1820-1874) was a prelate appointed minister of war of the Papal State, and grand almoner of the Pope in 1866 by Pius IX.
3Maurain, ibid., pp. 6-7.
He saw only the gaping chasm of victorious socialism. Deliberately, Montalembert pronounced his choice for authority against revolutionists, for society against socialism, for responsible freedom above all other goods.¹

In Rome, the coup d'état was welcomed with joy. The approach of the 1852 elections gave power to the Republicans to end the French occupation, and directly menaced the temporal power of the Pope.

The French occupation had resulted in the revolutionary year of 1848 when Pius IX was forced into the ranks of the conservatives. Events which had come to a climax in 1848 cured Pius IX of his liberal leanings, made him an arch conservative and the continuator of Papal opposition to the revolution, and moved him further towards the affirmation of doctrines which had long been implicit in the faith, and organization of the Roman Catholic Church, and which set it against prevailing trends in the revolutionary Occident.

The year 1848 witnessed the collapse of much of the barrier which the diplomats of 1815 had attempted to build against the tide of revolution. As in 1789 and 1830 the first major breach in the wall was in France. In Austria Metternich resigned and fled in disguise to England. Soon the emperor granted a constitution for Austria. Italian nationalists drove out the Austrians. King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies was forced to accept a liberal constitution. In Germany liberals wrung concessions from several of the princes and took steps towards the unification of the country. While reaction soon set in and some of the gains won by the liberals were lost, the pre-1848 structure of Western Europe was never fully restored.

¹Ibid.
At first Pius IX seemed to bow to the storm. On March 18, 1848, he granted a constitution to the Papal States. It set up a High Council and a Council of Deputies. But these bodies had strictly limited powers and the Pope retained the veto over their measures.\(^1\) The previous month, in a motu proprio (February 10, 1848), Pius appeared to some to give his endorsement to a united Italy, and his words, "O Lord God, bless Italy," were so interpreted by ardent patriots.\(^2\)

In March it looked as though an Italian League would be formed with Rome as a member, the precursor of an Italian federal state, presumably with the Pope as its head. Then the Pope's attitude changed. He shocked those working for the unification of Italy when he refused to join in the war to drive the Austrians out of their holdings in the country.\(^3\) In a decisive allocution on April 29, 1848, he repudiated any share in the scheme to make Italy into a united republic under his presidency and urged Italians to remain loyal to their sovereigns.

Politically, the march of events went sharply against Pius. The defeat of Piedmont, which had led in the effort to oust the Austrians from Italy, and the restoration of Austrian rule were followed by a swing to the extremists, those with Mazzini as their hero, who wished a republic. Four men in quick succession as prime minister attempted to rule in Rome under Pius. The fourth, Rossi, was assassinated by extremists (November, 1848). A few days later the Pope, disguised, secretly fled from Rome and took refuge in Gaeta, some distance south of Rome, in the territories of the King of Naples. The revolutionaries

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 70.
\(^3\)Hales, ibid., pp. 73-77.
set up the Republic of Rome and declared the temporal power of the Pope ended (February, 1849). To Rome came the leading revolutionaries, Mazzini and Garibaldi. Pius denounced the republic, forbade Catholics to cooperate with it, and called upon France, Austria, Spain, and Naples to restore Papal rule. To forestall action by Austria and Naples and to prevent the augmentation of Austrian power in Italy, France responded and sent troops.

They took possession of Rome, the republic collapsed, and Pius IX returned to the city. Quite disillusioned with political liberalism, he was resolved to govern both the Papal States and the Church as absolute monarch.¹

Pius IX and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli,² showed themselves very favorable to Louis-Napoleon now that he had energetically fought against the revolutionaries. Contraditorially, the motivations of the French occupational army were split. As Thiers declared: "It was not for the sake of the Roman people, or the Pope, or Catholicism, that we went to Rome; it was for the sake of France ... to maintain our right to have one half of Italy if Austria seized the other."³

Therefore, in France now the government was informed of these dispositions on December 15th, and with more details on the 21st. The public only knew this before the plebiscite by an article that appeared in the L'Univers on December 16th. But the heads of the Catholic party were personally informed about the Pope's decision.

¹Ibid., pp. 101-133; Aubert, Le Pontificat de Pie IX, pp. 35-38.

²Giacomo Antonelli (1806-1876), though not a priest, was made a Cardinal by Pius IX in 1847. He was made Secretary of State in 1848, which office he held until he died.

Louis-Napoleon had on his side, then, the Pope, nearly all the bishops of France, Montalembert and l'Univers, that is: the hierarchy, the Catholic liberal party and the newspaper that exerted the greatest influence on French Catholics.

Lacordaire and Dupanloup were strangers now to the masses of the clergy — and to an imperialist regime based upon military force. They remained isolated and without influence. The clergy, on the other hand, was united by a traditional alliance to the Legitimists who were now hesitant and divided. The committee for the Legitimists of Paris asked unanimously to abstain from politics. In reality, two problems confronted this party: they could tend toward Berryer and his newspaper la Gazette de France, quite hostile to the new regime, or that of Falloux and his l'Union who was much less intransigent. Falloux decided to vote "yes." His attitude was certain.¹

For most, political life had been dominated since 1849 by the struggle between the Republicans and the party of Order, sustained by the clergy.

In the first months of 1852, Louis-Napoleon promulgated the constitution and organic decrees. During these first weeks of his government, he was going to decide what would be the legal position of the Church in his new regime. Religious questions were foreign to him and interested him little. His ideas generally rested on an article which he had written while captive at Ham, "Le Clergé et l'Etat." The French clergy, he wrote, were hostile to democracy, freedom and the spirit of revolution. There is therefore, a divergence of opinions, ideas and

sentiments between the government and the Church. It is this he wished to repair without breaking the bonds that already held them together. It was necessary that the clergy become liberal. A priest taught morals and charity, was united with those who are oppressed, preached justice and tolerance; he predicted the reign of equality; political redemption always followed the religious one. The state in her turn would have to reapproach the Church. By the union of priests and laymen, they would be a double force of good for society. The priests would become citizens and the citizens would become more religious. Men would know from the bottom of their heart a faith and a love to believe in the good and to dare to love. These vague tendencies and utopian promises that one often finds among the men of the 1848 period explains how one can easily find in Louis-Napoleon ample material to form contradictory opinions. One can hardly agree about his negative statements. He was neither hostile nor clerical nor Gallican; he was never stopped by ecclesiastical politics. Nearly all the collaborators of Louis-Napoleon were of the same mould in their attitudes toward the Church: neither convictions nor principles were their basis of action, but mere opportunism. They felt the loyalties of the clergy useful for the government in order to conciliate the Legitimists and above all to resist revolutionary propaganda.

On the other hand, relations between Louis-Napoleon and Montalembert became frozen. Montalembert appeared for the last time at l'Elysée on December 26, 1851. He gave up his position on the Consultative Commission and became more and more hostile to the government.

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The interests of the Church were safeguarded for the clergy and the Catholics, while simultaneously the abolition of the parliamentary regime and natural liberties slipped away. Catholics feared the facilities they offered to revolutionary and irreligious doctrines. Certain freedoms, like liberty of the press, had been formally condemned by the Church; all were contrary to her tendency to be traditionally authoritarian.

Only Montalembert, Falloux, Dupanloup and their friends truly regretted the end of parliamentary government. Although written earlier, Montalembert expressed his opinion about freedom of the press:

The makers of the law seem to have said: we are rich. Let us therefore declare that propriety is a holy thing; we must dominate or neutralize scrupulous consciences. Let us make the oath whatever, no matter to whom, it is, a thing inviolable; we must above all remain as we are.¹

The Catholic liberals remained ostracized by the regime, but could do nothing that would help. In a brochure called, "Les Intérêts Catholiques au XIXe siècle," Montalembert affirmed that liberty, and the struggle made possible by liberty, had been during the first half of the nineteenth century and helped bring forth the best resources of the Church, where an authoritarian rule, necessarily temporary, could only secure precarious temporary advantages. But the government was able to neglect these attacks by the Liberal Catholics. The powers of the legislature had been reduced to a minimum by December 6, 1852 -- the Imperial Constitution -- and the clergy received no attention. The tentative opposition Montalembert initiated in the 1852 session was never reviewed. By 1857 the government's method of controlling elections effectively ended Montalembert's holding of public office by his defeat in Besançon.²

¹Lecanuet, ibid., t. 2, p. 11.
There had been a general election in 1857, and Adolphe Billaut, 1 Minister of the Interior, was running the Emperor's campaign. Who was the government to choose as the official candidates? If it chose the sitting members of Parliament, it would close its ranks to many men willing to rally if given a chance, and drive youthful talent into the opposition. The target became the independents, those who dared to vote against the government.

Billault acted here without any systematic principles. The men of substance who could lead and sustain, who had taken a foremost part in opposition in the last session, and who were to direct it in later years, these for the most part were left alone. Their local or Paris positions were too strong. Montalembert alone of the leaders was abandoned. On a visit to his constituency in 1856, he found everyone personally kind, but "icyly cold in politics. No one says anything to encourage me to hope for a re-election and even do not hide from me the difficulty which the clergy will have to fight for me against the government." 2

The local newspaper alone fought for Montalembert, but the government, underestimating its strength, sent out a salaried editor to establish a paper to fight him. The clergy would not support him because he opposed the government. Thus, some obscure chamberlain, with none of Montalembert's brilliant qualities, defeated him by 17,000 to 4,000.3

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1 Adolphe Billault (1805-1863) was Minister of the Interior from 1854 to 1858 under Napoleon III.


3 Ibid.
The great majority of Catholics and clergy had rallied to the Empire. Veuillot in L'Univers and many bishops in their discourses or public statements published during or immediately after the plebiscite, not only praised the new regime, but lauded Napoleon as benefactor of the Church and an agent of Providence. As supporters of the regime, these men successfully ostracized the Liberal Catholics. The Liberal Catholics were to be of importance only in their role as members of L'Académie Française.

L'Académie Française, hostile to the Empire, successively elected: Montalembert in 1852, Dupanloup in 1854, Berruyer in 1855, Falloux in 1857, Lacordaire in 1861, and de Broglie in 1857. In this position Catholics were united to Protestants like Guizot and the liberal thinkers, Thiers and Victor Cousin; this Institute formed a liberal club. Veuillot accused the Liberal Catholics of losing their sense of Catholicism in such a milieu.

They in turn judged L'Univers too devoted to the Empire, which was campaigning against liberal institutions, and was drifting away from protecting the Church. In October of 1855, several among the opposition, like Falloux, Orleanists like the Prince de Broglie, liberals unattached to the monarchy like Montalembert and Cochin took over the direction of an old Catholic review: Le Correspondant.

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1 Maurin, ibid., p. 45.
2 Lecanuet, ibid., Vol. III, pp. 135-139.
3 François Guizot (1787-1874) came from a Protestant family of Nimes and was a professor of history. He was sympathetic to the Royal Monarchists and was in opposition to the bourgeois July Monarchy. By 1840 Guizot was becoming more and more conservative.
4 Pierre S.A. Cochin (1823-1872) wrote articles on the Christian view of industry, the condition of French workers, and poverty in England. Then he joined Montalembert and Lacordaire.
With the baptism of the imperial Prince on June 14, 1856, there was the solemn announcement of alliance between the Pope, the French hierarchy and Napoleonic dynasty. This relationship had reached its apogee. But with the issuing of the bull on the Immaculate Conception, the episcopal nominations in 1856 were markedly ultramontanist. By 1858, the government disapproved more and more with L'Univers for its ultramontanism. L'Ange de la Religion and Le Correspondant were always hostile to the empire. A rift seemed to be appearing between the Empire and all the Catholics.

Montalembert was condemned to six months in prison for an article which appeared in Le Correspondant, October 29, 1858, "A Debate on India in the English Parliament." In it was compared the liberal politics of England as opposed to those of the empire.

I honestly confess that I am one of those persons; and I add that for this evil -- from which it is so little the fashion to suffer now-a-days -- I have found a remedy. When I feel that the stifling malady is gaining on me, when my ears ring, now with the buzz of the gossips of the antechamber, now with the din of the fanatics who think themselves our masters, and of the hypocrites who think us their dupes; when I choke with the weight of an atmosphere charged with the pestilential vapours of servility and corruption, I hurry to breathe a purer air, and take a bath of life in free England. 1

For such sayings, the book became the ground of a prosecution by the Government against Montalembert for exciting people to the hatred and contempt of the Emperor's Government. He was "graciously" reprieved on the anniversary of the Second Empire. He would not give the publicity to the Emperor. As stated in the Debate:

Political liberty whose sole goal is to guarantee civil and moral freedom, is only a reaction, often distracted in its form,

but profoundly legitimate in the long run against the triumphant exaggeration of the doctrine of power.

While, under the impact of revolutionary forces, Italian nationalism and democratic ideas were undermining his political power in the Papal States, Pius IX was expanding the authority of his office in the Roman Catholic Church. This he did in at least two ways; one was by extending his administrative control of the ecclesiastical structure and enhancing that structure where it had previously been weak. The other was by proclaiming by his own act the Immaculate Conception as dogma to be believed by all the faithful.

The extension of Papal administrative control and initiative was seen in several lands and areas. In France in the 1840's and 1850's, the swing to ultramontanism was pronounced. In his textbooks on theology, which were widely read, Gousset, Archbishop of the important see of Reims from 1840 to 1846, came out strongly against Gallicanism. In the very year of his flight from Rome, Pius IX had all but decided on the restoration of the hierarchy in England. In 1850 the formal step was taken: it was by Papal act and the bishops were Papal appointees.  

On December 8, 1854, Pius IX solemnly proclaimed, on his sole authority, in the bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary as a doctrine revealed by God and to be believed firmly and constantly by all the faithful.  

At a time when the threat to the autonomy of the Papal States was mounting, that a Pontiff could win general acceptance in his Church for

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1Mounier, *op. cit.*, p. 79; Montalembert, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, pp. 593-596

2Hales, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-142; Aubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-71.
a statement of such importance on a matter of faith was evidence of
the growing acquiescence of the Roman Catholics to the assertions of
Papal authority. The act was severely criticized by Christians in
other churches and tended to widen the gulf between them and the
Roman Catholic Church.

In the continuing sweep of the political phases of the revolution
the majority of the Papal States were lost. Pius IX returned to Rome
in 1849 under the protection of the troops of Louis Napoleon without
compromising himself with pledges to his benefactor, and he did not
adopt the program which Napoleon desired. However, he did carry
through some changes in the administration of the Papal States, such as
an increasing proportion of laymen in the government.¹

In the administration of his territories and in his diplomatic
dealings with other governments, Pius IX had the able assistance of
his Secretary of State, Giacome Cardinal Antonelli. Although thoroughly
secular in his attitude, avaricious, and seeking to promote the
interests of the members of his family and of his illegitimate children,
Antonelli was loyal to the Pope, courageous, able, and a shrewd
diplomat.²

Neither Pius IX nor Antonelli was a match for the mounting
sentiment for the unification of Italy and the skill with which Cavour,
as Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, a realm with its main
strength in Piedmont in the Northwest and often referred to by that
name, was preparing the way for the integration of Italy as a constitu­
tional monarchy under the rule of the House of Savoy. Sardinian forces

¹Hales, ibid., pp. 152-166.
²Ibid., pp. 151, 152; Aubert, ibid., pp. 85, 86.
invaded the Papal States, defeated the Papal troops, and marched on Naples. Garibaldi agreed to the annexation of the Bourbon domain by Sardinia. Over the protests of Pius the Papal States except Rome and the territory immediately around it were also annexed by Sardinia.

In March, 1861, Victor Emmanuel exchanged the title of King of Sardinia for that of King of Italy. Italian nationalists wished Rome as the capital of the country, but Napoleon, while not opposing the annexation of the rest of the Papal territories, would not consent and kept French troops in the city. This he did to placate Catholic sentiment in Europe, especially in France, and to continue French influence in Italy.

In France the ultramontane party clamored for immediate military intervention. Napoleon held out for a time in the hope that the Italian government, in accordance with its obligations under the September Convention, would disperse the Garibaldians. But he finally yielded, and late in October a strong force sailed from Toulon for Civitavecchia.

The Battle of Montana, early in November, 1867, brought the campaign to a sudden close. The undisciplined, poorly equipped troops of Garibaldi wilted before the murderous fire of the new French chassepotis and fled in confusion. Rome was held by the French.

The reaction of the French Catholics was a united effort to sustain the Pope. Montalembert retaliated against the Emperor's policy by pen from his chateau de la Roche en Bremy. He began: *Pie IX et la France en 1849 et en 1859*1. Remembering the great debate which arose ten years earlier over sending an expedition to Rome, he contrasted

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what went on then and in the year 1859. "C'est la France qui a sauve
l'indépendance temporelle du Saint-Siège en 1849, et c'est celle qui le
laisse amoindrir et diminuer en 1859. Voila le fait, voile la verite,
que des aveugles seuls peuvent nier."

Italy and France were following a fatal dream and violating
their ancient political truths. If they persisted in destroying this
state of the Pope, so ancient, "nous aurons toujours le droit de dire,
... qu'ils ont fait mal." For Montalembert, France saved the temporal
independence of the Holy See in 1849, and in 1859 she permitted it to
totter and decline. This is a fact and a truth which nothing but
blindness can gainsay. France, indeed, is not alone implicated in
these measures; but her irresistible ascendancy renders her influence
preponderant, and causes the great and chief responsibility to fall
upon her. We know how justly and how bitterly Piedmont and England
may be reproached with their conduct; but, if France had willed it,
Piedmont would not have dared to encroach upon the Holy See, and England
would have been forever consigned to a malicious impotency.

The origin of this, so recent and flagrant an evil, dates
especially from the Congress of Paris in 1856, from the diplomatic
reunion which, after having solemnly declared that none of the contracting
powers had the right to intervene, either collectively or individually,
in the relations of a sovereign with his subjects (Protocol of March 18th)
after having proclaimed the principle of the absolute independence of
a sovereign, in favor of the Turkish sultan, against his Christian
subjects, did not hesitate to declare, in its protocol of April 8th
(and in the absence of any representative of the august accused), that
the condition of the pontifical states was anomalous and irregular.
This accusation, which was discussed and exaggerated by Lord Palmerston and Count Cavour, in the legislative chamber and elsewhere, was not the less brought forward in France by the influence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and consequently France is mainly answerable to the Church and to Europe.¹

It is not enough to admit, in a people, the right to will, and to express their will; the people should be in the right; their will should be just; and the expression of it should be legalized by necessity and social utility; otherwise, we should relapse into the barbarous maxims of Rousseau: "It is not necessary for a people to be in the right."

Have the inhabitants of the Romagna a just cause of rebellion against the pontifical authority? This is the whole question for them, as for us. Is their insurrection sufficiently founded in right and in fact, to impose upon France, whose policy and victories have furnished the occasion and the pretext for revolt, the obligation of allowing it to triumph, and this in utter disregard of another right, based upon all the rules of good faith and diplomacy, justified by the best political reasons, and consecrated by the traditions of ten centuries of our history.²

On October 25, 1859, this article appeared in Le Correspondant. Several days later, this article published in a brochure, Montalembert was seized by the police, but he was not imprisoned. To his great consolation, he received at the same time:

Je bénis avec une paternelle affection le Comte de Montalembert. Je desire que le Seigneur lui accorde la sante du corps, et qu'il le comble surtout de ses célestes bénédictions, avec toute son excellente famille. Pie IX, pape.³

Napoleon did not altogether relish the responsibility which he had resumed. He now sought to throw some of it upon his fellow sovereigns. He proposed a conference of the powers to arbitrate

¹Charles de Montalembert, Plus IX and France: 1849-1859 (Boston: Patrick Donahoe, 1861), pp. 16-17.
²Ibid., pp. 34-35.
between the Vatican and Italy.\(^1\) It was his aim to secure an international guarantee of the papal territory which would effectively restrain Italy and permit France to recall her troops from Civita Vecchia. His overtures, however, met with no success, largely because of Bismarck's opposition. The latter, who had rejected the Emperor's earlier suggestion that France and Prussia jointly undertake to safeguard the temporal power, had no desire to help the French disentangle themselves from the Roman imbroglio.

The Roman Question had indeed become Napoleon's nemesis. During the following years it contributed heavily to defeat his own efforts to induce Austria and Italy to join France in a triple alliance against Prussia. The refusal of Count Beust, the Austrian chancellor, to bind his government except in the event of war arising out of a clash of interests in the Near East, was one insurmountable obstacle. The other was Napoleon's unwillingness to surrender Rome. The Italians made their withdrawal of the French garrison the condition of their participation in the proposed alliance. The Emperor, however, did not feel that he could afford an open break with his ultramontane subjects. He needed their support more than ever after the liberal reforms of 1869. This was the situation until the summer of 1870, when the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to the Spanish throne precipitated the long-impending Franco-Prussian crisis.

In 1870, engaged in his disastrous war with Prussia, Napoleon, in dire need of all his troops, recalled the French garrison. Thereupon Victor Emmanuel, on the pretext of maintaining order in what was left of the Papal States, against Papal protests sent troops to occupy Rome.

\(^1\)Maurain, ibid., pp. 506-510.
In September, 1870, Victor Emmanuel's troops took possession. By a strange irony, this was slightly over two months after Papal infallibility had been formally proclaimed. Pius refused to consent to the elimination of his temporal rule, but he was impotent. Through much of the Roman Catholic world vigorous protests were made. However, they were ineffective in stimulating effective intervention by foreign governments.1

The hostility between the "Veuillotists" (heirs to La Mennais' Ultramontanism) and Montalembert's friends (heirs to La Mennais' Liberalism) was temporarily obscured by their common denunciation of the Piedmontese aggression, and of Napoleon's part in it -- Lacordaire and Cochin were the only French Liberal-Catholic leaders who allowed their principles about political liberty to cool their ardour for the Temporal Power. But the two French groups were thrown into still worse conflict in the early sixties by the determined and often violently expressed support given by men of Veuillot's way of thinking to absolutist principles in politics, in religious history, and in the realm of thought. Both schools of opinion were staunchly Papal when there was any question of conflict between Church and State, such as occurred over the independence of the Church schools, or the nomination of Bishops. But on the issue of liberty, both inside and outside the Church, they differed irreconcilably.

Pio Nono, from the time of his return from Gaeta, in 1850, had acquired the absolutist viewpoint, a viewpoint closely analogous to Veuillot's, in matters political and intellectual, as well as in the government of the Church. This absolutism, like Napoleon III's, should

1 Hales, ibid., pp. 184-252, 313-317; Aubert, ibid., pp. 79-106, 359, 360.
be distinguished from mere reaction. It took account of the positive achievement even of the Revolution. Pius was a convert to absolutism primarily on account of the murder of Rossi and the Roman Revolution of 1848-49, and secondarily on account of the religious and political aggression of Piedmont. He was guided in his thinking partly by the pseudo-intellectual Jesuits who edited the Civiltà Cattolica at Rome, and partly by Louis Veuillot himself, to whom he might on occasion recommend moderation, but who was welcomed for months at a time at Rome, and whose Illusion Libérale (1865) the Pope regarded as fully expressing his own views.

So it was that in 1864 he would write a Syllabus of condemnations concerned with Church and State, freedom of expression that would be the natural reflection of the Pope's policy since 1850, being designed to safeguard Catholicism and to protect the faithful in countries predominantly Catholic. They did not rule out toleration, a free press, and disestablishment; but they did say that it was erroneous to assert that such concepts were the ideal universal prescription.

But, unfortunately, that was exactly what the French Liberal-Catholics had decided that they were. Montalembert had reached the conclusion that toleration, a free press, and disestablishment were absolutely desirable in the modern world, and that the Church had everywhere everything to gain from them; and, carrying over his enthusiasm for liberty into the political sphere, he was condemning Napoleon III, praising Belgian liberties, and extolling the British Constitution—though he was scornful enough of British politicians for censuring the Papal Government while supporting the Sultan and for themselves tyrannising in Ireland and India. The greatest orator in France, he
was the critic whom Napoleon found most embarrassing; but he was beginning to be something of an embarrassment, too, to the Pope.

Pio Nono, however little he might like some of Montalembert's views, was profoundly aware that the orator had done more than any other man to win back a position for the faith in France, so he was prodigal in his congratulations and thanks and was even ready to support him, on occasion, against Veuillot. He recognized that the Count's pamphlet, Pie IX et Lord Palmerston (1856), and his Pie IX et la France en 1849 et en 1859 were political advocacy as timely and as powerful as his Temporal Power ever received. But the advocacy of toleration and freedom, which Montalembert crystallised in 1860 into the phrase Cavour borrowed, "free Church in a free State," ran counter to the Pope's policy; while the French orator's enormous enthusiasm for the constitutions of Belgium and England contrasted somewhat with Pio Nono's dislike of the constitutions that had come his way at Rome and Turin.

Matters came to a head when Montalembert was invited to address a big Catholic Congress at Malines in the summer of 1863. The invitation was very natural, because, although he never enjoyed a following numerically comparable to that of Veuillot (Le Correspondant, a monthly, sold about three thousand copies), he had the profound respect of the greatest French and Belgian political and religious thinkers of his time, whether Bishops, like Dupanloup or Wiseman, or politicians, like Cochin or de Broglie. Since the aim of the Congress was to reconcile the Church with civilization in northwestern Europe he was the obvious man to invite.

Yet he hesitated for long. It was very painful to him to think that what he would say would be likely enough to cause further pain to
a long-suffering Pope. But he could hardly refuse the invitation of the veteran minister, Adolphe Dechamps. Leading figures in the Church, the cardinals of Malines and of Westminster, bishops of Namur, Gand and Tournai plus the regulars, and laymen would be present. They were to confer together, the Archbishop explained, on the means to be adopted to defend the common faith in this hour of danger: "It is of the very highest importance that the result should be liberal and that the program that emerges should be yours: Catholicism and liberty..." So he promised to go and express his whole mind on the "future of the Church and of modern society." Montalembert and his friends, de Broglie, Cochin and Leopold de Gaillard arrived in Malines, August 20, 1863. That afternoon his speech was about "a formula already famous: a free Church in a free State," which, though used by Cavour, nevertheless was the symbol of his hope and convictions. The ancient regime of absolute monarchies and privileges guaranteed by concordats "had its great and beautiful side. I do not pretend to judge it here, still less to condemn it. It suffices for me to recognize in it one defect, but that is a capital one: it is dead..." To him, what he formulated, Belgium put into action: the Belgian Catholics and the liberals had affected the solution of one of the most difficult problems of the modern world. Thus to him:

The future of modern society depends upon two problems: to correct democracy and to conciliate democracy with Catholicism. It is not necessary to compare the problems of the nineteenth century with that of the twelfth, but it is imperative that we struggle against the forces of our times, and I add with perfect confidence that we can conquer them.

1 Adolphe Dechamps (1807-1875) was the founder of Revue de Bruxelles. From 1817 to 1864 he was leader of the Catholic minority in the Chamber.


The imminent role of the Christian was to counterweight that perpetual tendency of democracy to establish the cult of man believing himself God.\(^1\)

His second address given on the second day, was dedicated to religious toleration. He denied that the principle was non-Catholic in origin. Many Protestant countries were more guilty than Catholic countries by using the power of the state to suppress religious liberty, but he quoted Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the more recent policies of Charles-Albert's Piedmont "as the scandal and the despair of all Catholic hearts." He criticized Veuillot's *l'Univers* with its liberty for all in March, 1848, and liberty only for the Church in March, 1853. Yet he did not mean absolute separation of Church from State which is impossible; or hostility between the two. The Papal States were an exception. The identity of Church and State in that unique case was the guarantee of freedom everywhere.\(^2\)

Montalembert was careful to make it clear that he did not regard a society in which religious beliefs were in conflict as an ideal society; on that point he was at one with the "thèses" of the Syllabus of Errors, which appeared in the following year. But he was very clear indeed that intolerance, and in particular, reliance upon the strong arm of the State, were immensely prejudicial to the health of Catholicism and were rooted in false principle, whereas the Syllabus would imply, at the very least, that in some circumstances they were proper. Cardinal Wiseman of Westminster, who was at Malines, was well aware, not only that Montalembert's thesis ran counter to Pio Nono's practice, but that the Pope was planning a Syllabus which would put modern liberties into a

\(^1\)Ibid.

very different light. Though Dupanloup tried hard at Rome to prevent it,¹ a condemnation of Montalembert was really inevitable, and it duly arrived, courteous, confidential, and friendly, in February, 1864, pointing out that in 1791 Pius VI had condemned the Edict of Nantes, and reminding the orator of Gregory XVI's Mirari vos. Dupanloup had done all he could for his friend; but Mgr. Pie, Bishop of Poitiers, and a host of others had used their influence in the opposite sense. The l'Univers had not printed the speeches, but it had denounced the principles.

As the years passed, Pius IX was strengthened in the conviction that many features of the revolution through which the Occident was passing were a threat to the Christian faith. He believed that, as the head on earth of the Church, he must stand against them. Particularly had his conflicts with Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Piedmont, and in France with Napoleon III, deepened his concern and his belief that acquiescence or compromise would be a violation of the obligations of his high office. But they were not the only occasions or the sole causes. He was acutely aware of trends in other lands which were highlighted by his experience with Italy and France. Moreover, he had been deeply involved in the

¹Lecanuet, ibid., Vol. III, p. 371, etc. Pio Nono received Dupanloup fourteen times during the winter of 1863-64, and the Bishop attended almost daily upon Antonelli. Werner de Merode, Xavier's brother, writing to Montalembert at the end of November, reports a conversation he had with the Pope: "I did my best to defend you. I maintained that you only intended to speak of civil liberty, of political tolerance, and in no sense of dogmatic and theological indifference ... He replied, "Oh! There is nothing to be said about that; but, my dear friend, it is a sin not to believe that there is no assurance of salvation outside the Church"... You see around what a misunderstanding the conversation always turns, dogmatic indifference confused with civil tolerance..." Pio Nono's viewpoint was, however, clearly expressed in October, 1863, to a visitor: "The Church will never admit it as a benefit and a principle that error and heresy should be preached to Catholic peoples."
consideration of the intellectual formulations by which some of the Church's sons were attempting to reconcile the Christian faith with the current climate of opinion. Some of these efforts he or his immediate predecessors had condemned. Social theories existed which challenged the Church and its faith. Again and again he spoke out.

Even before the climax brought about by the loss of Rome, Pius IX issued a sweeping indictment of what seemed to him evil in contemporary attitudes and governmental policies. This was on December 8, 1864, the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of the Immaculate Conception. It took the form of an encyclical, Quanta cura, which announced a jubilee year for 1865, and an accompanying document, Syllabus errorum. The latter was particularly formidable. It was directed to the bishops and was a brief digest of allocutions, encyclicals, and apostolic letters of Pius IX. Although it did not bear the signature of the Pope and he may have been neither its originator nor its compiler, the responsibility for its publication was clearly his.¹

The Syllabus was mainly negative, stating emphatically what the Pope disapproved. By implication the positive affirmations of the Papacy were clear. In eighty succinct paragraphs the position of Rome on issues then much in controversy was set forth.²

At the outset pantheism, naturalism, and absolute rationalism were denounced. Then followed the listing as error of what was denominated moderate rationalism. The Syllabus next turned its attention to what it labelled indifferentism and latitudinarianism. In this it included as errors the teaching that every man is free to embrace and profess the

¹Hales, ibid., pp. 256, 257; Aubert, ibid., pp. 253-255.
²Hales, ibid., pp. 274-278.
religion which, guided by the light of reason, he believes to be true. The Syllabus lumped together Socialism, Communism, secret societies, Bible societies, and clerico-liberal societies and called attention to the various encyclicals and allocutions in which "pests of this kind" had been excoriated.

Next were taken up what were regarded as errors about the civil society, both in itself and in its relations with the Church. Among them were that the civil state is the origin and source of all rights; that the teaching of the Catholic Church is opposed to the well-being and interests of human society; that in a conflict of laws between the two powers the civil law should prevail; that the civil authority may intervene in matters of religion, morals, and spiritual government and hence can pass judgment on instructions issued by pastors for the guidance of consciences; that the entire direction of public schools in which the youth of Christian states are educated, except to a certain extent episcopal seminaries, must appertain to the civil power, that in clerical seminaries the method of study is subject to the civil power; that a system separating instruction from the Catholic faith and the power of the Church may be approved by Catholics; that the civil power has the right to prevent ministers of religion and the faithful from communicating freely with one another and the Roman Pontiff; that the secular power possesses the right to present bishops and to require them to take possession of their dioceses before having received canonical institution from the Holy See; that the secular authority has the right to depose bishops; that kings and princes are not only exempt from the jurisdiction of the Church but are also superior to it in litigated questions of jurisdiction; and that the Church should be separated from the state and the state from the Church.
What were regarded as errors concerning natural and Christian ethics were described as follows: that moral laws do not need divine sanction; that philosophy and morals and also civil laws may and must depart from divine and ecclesiastical authority; that no other forces are to be recognized than those which reside in matter, and all moral teaching and excellence should consist in the increase of riches by every possible means and in the enjoyment of pleasure; that all human duties are but vain words; that authority is nothing but the sum of numerical superiority and material force; that the principle of non-intervention by the Church should be proclaimed and observed, that it is permissible to refuse obedience to legitimate princes and to rebel against them; and that the violation of a solemn oath and every wicked action repugnant to the eternal law are worthy of the highest praise if done for the love of country.

A group of what were labeled as errors was concerned with Christian marriage. The civil power of the Pope inevitably was also a matter of concern. Two assertions were described as errors, namely, that Catholics differed among themselves on the compatibility of the temporal with the spiritual power and the abolition of the civil power possessed by the Apostolic See would contribute to the liberty and prosperity of the Church. A concluding blast was directed against what were adjudged errors of modern liberalism. These were that it was no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be the only religion of the state to the exclusion of other forms of worship; that in some countries called Catholic, immigrants should be permitted the public exercise of their own religion; and that religious liberty does not corrupt the morals of the people.
The final paragraph in this section and in the Syllabus is so significant and created such a stir that it should be quoted in full. It was declared to be an error that "Romanus Pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo at cum recenti civilitate sese reconciliare at componere." ("the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile himself to and agree with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.")

The Syllabus summarized as does no other single document the attitude of Pius IX towards the revolution sweeping across Christendom. Some of the issues with which it dealt had been chronic for centuries: to those familiar with the earlier course of Christian history they have a familiar ring. Most of the issues arose out of the revolution in which the Roman Catholic Church was set.

The Syllabus aroused a storm of criticism in the secular and Protestant press. It produced something like consternation among many who wished to remain within the Roman Catholic Church, but were seeking ways of reconciling the Christian faith with the currents of thought and the political theories and movements which were a part of the revolution. In denouncing the ideal of a "free Church in a free State", Pius IX was slapping down those who wished by that device to make secure a place for the Roman Catholic Church in the revolutionary world. In condemning the demand that as head of the Roman Catholic Church the Pope take the lead in adjusting the Christian faith to the revolution, Pius seemed to many to be piloting the bark of Peter towards shipwreck.

Yet in contrast with the criticism and the sorrowful protests with which it was greeted, the Syllabus had its staunch defenders. They welcomed it as a courageous attempt to stem the tide towards unbelief.

1 For a summary of the reaction, see Aubert, Le Pontificat de Pie IX, pp. 255-261.
The net effect of the Syllabus of Errors was to widen and deepen the gulf between the Roman Catholic Church and the revolution and to rally the faithful to the defense and support of the Christian faith as interpreted by that church. In the main Pius IX was keeping the bark of Peter to the course which it had held across the centuries. He was applying to current conditions principles and claims which earlier Popes had been asserting as of the essence of the Christian Faith.

The next Pope sought to find points of contact with the world and to influence it in ways consistent with the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, but the positions taken so frankly by Pius IX were never explicitly repudiated. The document was not an ex cathedra utterance, and so was not officially infallible. But coming from the Pope it could not be disregarded.

In the pontificate of Pius IX a further important step was taken toward knitting the Roman Catholic Church more firmly together under the Pope. That was through the Vatican Council of 1869-1870. This gathering, denominated by the Roman Catholic Church the twentieth ecumenical council in direct succession to the one held in Nicea in 325, formulated in forthright fashion what were regarded by the majority as implicit from the beginning of the Church -- the administrative supremacy of the Pope within the Church and the infallibility of ex cathedra pronouncements of the Pope on matters of faith and morals.

As has been repeatedly noted, since 1815 ultramontanism, namely, the enhancement of the position of the Papacy in the Roman Catholic Church, had been mounting. Pius IX strongly encouraged it. He added to the trend by summoning bishops for ad limina -- official -- visits to

\[1\text{Ibid., pp. 262-277.}\]
Rome more frequently than had his predecessors (visits facilitated by
the improved means of transportation which were a phase of the revolution),
by promoting the spread of Roman rites, liturgy, and clerical costume,
by distributing Roman titles, and by intervening in disputes between
bishops and their clergy. He created a number of non-Italian Cardinals,
thus broadening the geographic base of that body as a symbol of the
universality of the Roman Catholic Church.¹

More serious than the hostility which the Syllabus aroused among
governments, or in anti-Catholic circles, was the embittering effect
which it had upon the Liberal-Catholics, and notably upon Montalembert,
Dollinger,² and Acton.³ It ended the hope of these men that Rome would
embrace liberal principles, at least in Pio Nono's lifetime.

Malines was repeated in the following year, when Dupanloup
achieved something of the personal success of Montalembert, though only
in the less controversial field of Catholic education.

The Syllabus embittered Montalembert, and so frightened his
friends of Le Correspondant that they eschewed their previous line of

¹Hales, ibid., p. 280.

²Johann Joseph Ignaz von Dollinger (1799-1890) was ordained in
1822 and taught ecclesiastical history at the University of Munich. He
served in the Landtag where he defended the liberties of the Church.
The doctrine of papal infallibility pronounced at the Vatican Council
created a crisis in his life. He refused to accept it and was excommuni-
cated in 1871.

³John Emerich Acton (1834-1902) studied under Nicolas Wiseman
and Dollinger. He was a Liberal party member of Parliament and succeeded
John Henry Newman as editor of The Rambler. He objected bitterly to the
strictures of the Syllabus of Pius IX and actively opposed the definition
of papal infallibility, although he never left the Church as his friend
Dollinger did.
Liberal-Catholic propaganda; \(^1\) it diverted Acton from reconciling the ways of God to man into pursuing, instead, the paths of secular history; and it drove Dollinger far along that road which was eventually to lead to his apostasy.

These were serious results, and their cost to the Church would be hard to count. Was it necessary to checkmate in this way these Liberal-Catholic initiatives? Pio Nono thought that it was.

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\(^1\) In 1868 Montalembert wrote a long article on the revolution of that year in Spain. In it he blamed the close association of the Church in that country with absolute monarchy, but he blamed equally the revolutionaries who, in their turn, had shown their intolerance by expelling the Jesuits. His friends of Le Correspondant, however, unanimously refused to publish the article, on the grounds that he was "reviving the programme of Malines." (Lecanuet, III, p. 349, etc.)
CONCLUSION

Liberalism is relative. On many matters, Montalembert was not as far advanced as certain reformers would have wished. Most of the time he spoke the language of his group — that is, of the French aristocrats. If Montalembert did not rise to what would now be considered the full measure of liberalism, it should be remembered that the decades of his political activity had their limitations. Liberalism was associated with democracy, and democracy requires moderation. Montalembert believed in a conservative progress. In 1860 he could write: "I accept without reserve and regret, the State which is the product of the French Revolution and which, under the name of democracy, reigns and will reign more and more in this world."

The subject of the Roman Question is an example to show the manner in which Montalembert's "conservatism" can be overstated or superficially presented. What is needed is something deeper than superficial indications. It is partly a matter of the use of terms. What does "conservatism" mean? If it means caution, prudent adherence to tested values, avoidance of rashness and reliance upon unhurried, peaceable evolution, Montalembert was a conservative. If, however, the word "conservatism" comes with an alloy as with the word "polities," if it has a reactionary connotation, if it casts an aura of respectability over tendencies that are exploitive and unprogressive, or if it signifies indifferent apathy toward human problems, then the
term could be a misnomer. Acquiescing to Louis-Napoleon's plebiscite could be classified as the latter meaning.

To think of Montalembert's conservatism then, is to think of selected facets of his policy. But the deeply searching mind of Montalembert had more in it than static acquiescence. It had motivating sympathy, enthusiasm for effective popular government -- qualities appropriately denoted by the word liberal. If in procedure he wanted to be sure of his ground, in the content and purpose of his program, he wanted liberal causes to succeed, then he was against violence. Thus it would not be going far wrong to say that the liberal credo was the key to Montalembert's view of man and church and state. Just how far Montalembert "would have" gone in extending the function of government, and in using the government to promote the welfare of the country, is difficult to say.

His basic ideas were those of an aristocrat. More a man of action than a thinker or theoretician, his character had detrimental effects. De Tocqueville perceptively observed him during a speech in the assembly: "He made a vigorous attack without being as peevish and outrageous as usual. A certain fear tempered his natural insolence, and set a limit to his paradoxical and querulous humor; for, like so many other men of words, he had more temerity of language than stoutness of heart."¹

Montalembert did fail to thwart successfully the movement of French Catholics toward the extreme conservatives. In November, 1852, he felt his political career at that present time closed. Little did

¹de Tocqueville, ibid., p. 152.
he realize that his twenty days of illusion would result in eighteen years of disgrace and three trials.

But by 1869, Montalembert could judge that liberty reigned without religion because the leaders of the Catholic world had allowed it to happen. They had rendered orthodoxy incompatible with common sense. Thus Montalembert was caught between the government of the Church and the most natural and legitimate aspirations of the nineteenth century man.

The result was a drift from ultramontanism which was the hallmark of the liberals during the Restoration because of the unifying effect it had on the faith and Rome's centralizing tendencies. But by 1860, Montalembert had serious doubts about pontifical centralism. By then, Rome had made ultramontanism as "opposition to any accommodation with the spirit of the age." No wonder Montalembert could write, "J'ai vu les vingt plus belles années de ma vie à ma chimère."¹

From 1845-1865 there was a rapprochement between the liberals and the Gallicans because they were attached to Rome. Pius IX used all he could to promote this ultramontanism: influencing individuals, in his charming way playing the role of the martyr, listening sympathetically to priests who were "rebels."

On the whole the French liberals were ambivalent to the Pope but they did support his temporal power and created themselves as suspect among French non-Catholics. Naturally, the Roman Question was the most painful dilemma for the nineteenth-century Catholic. They did not want the Pope to lose his independence or universality yet their logic clearly showed them the absurdity of keeping large temporal power in a

¹Mounier, ibid., p. 16.
world power struggle of great nations. Temporal power was an anachronism. Even more distressing in the 1840's was the old regime in Italy but not at home.

A growing pessimism about the French government can be observed in Montalembert's writings after 1852. The pretense to electoral freedom was more galling than the despotism. Plaintively, without bitterness, Montalembert wrote: "La véritable exile n'est pas d'être arraché à son pays; c'est d'y vivre et de n'y plus rien trouver de ce qui le faisait aimés."

What conclusions then can be drawn from the work of Montalembert and his confrères of French Liberal Catholicism? First of all they were sincere and talented men. The seminary training of the priests, Lacordaire, Dupanloup and La Mennais was outdated and poor. Although they were elevated to the French Academy, not one of these men was a real scholar. The education of Montalembert, Cochin, or a man like de Broglie was adequate but not specialized. Not one of these Frenchmen could match the erudition of a man like Dollinger in Germany. Although they clung to a belief in political freedom they never systematized or rationalized it. This gave cause to inaccuracy, rhetorical as opposed to scholarly research, and a certain air of romanticism which made facts seem nebulous. Their forte, then, lay in their gifts of oratory.

Secondly, Montalembert stuck too closely to the Church of his youth, that is, one that was stable and fighting. Whereas, with time, the Church found herself in a more defensive posture and experiencing the throes of transformation which came about through improved technology, mass populations growth rates, urbanization, and scientific advancements.

1 Ibid., p. 18.
Montalembert, exiled at his chateau Roche en Bregny, with all it symbolized of cultivated tastes and living, failed to penetrate these new forces.

Thirdly, he could not bring himself to join with new ideas: popular education, active government programs that participated in a nation's economy, an essential change in the social structure of the nation, and public money to help the masses. Even in rural areas there were no changes, no real gulf (that should exist) between country and urbanization.

One could state that the goal of Montalembert, therefore, was a moderate monarchy modeled after the British and Belgian kind -- and this was impossible. It was paternalistic and solidly based upon a landowning nobility and gentry. Democracy had arrived -- too fast for Montalembert to accept its meaningful reality. With the pressures from Louis Veuillot and Rome, Catholicism would prove itself irrelevant to the times.

In contrast to these major defects, the work of Montalembert did give to the sensitive and intelligent Catholic a place of refuge. The liberals' parliamentary action was a model to be followed and even their opposition against Rome can only be applauded for its prudence and tact. Through their influence clerical education was made more relevant because of the continuing stress upon the pluralism of French society made by the Liberals. Who could have forseen:

... the permanent triumph of those lay theologians of absolutism who have begun by making a sacrifice of all our liberties, of all our principles, of all our earlier ideas, before Napoleon III, in order, in due course, to offer up justice and truth, reason and history, as a holocaust to the idol which they are erecting at the Vatican?

1Lecanuet, ibid., Vol. III, p. 467.
Within a week of writing this letter Montalembert was dead.

In the last week of his life, the greatest champion of the Church in the long pontificate of Pio Nono had bitterly offended the Pope, who characterised his attitude as full of rashness, folly, unreasonableness, imprudence, hatred, and violence. And such, as his own friends have admitted, it was; but then he was a deeply suffering and a dying man.
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The thesis submitted by Mother Louise Flick has been read and approved by the director of the thesis. Furthermore, the final copies have been examined by the director and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

\[\text{Date: Sept. 4, 1968} \quad \text{Signature of Advisers: Walter Gray}\]