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John Wild's Transition to a Philosophy of the Lebenswelt

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Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

As late as 1953 John Wild was a dedicated realist. His two books on Plato and his Introduction to Realistic Philosophy indicate his interest in this type of thinking. But by 1959 his attitude had changed. In that year his book, Human Freedom and Social Order, appeared and he showed himself to be a philosopher of the Lebenswelt, often in opposition to realism.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine why he changed his attitude. To accomplish this I will make an exegesis first of his realism and then of his Lebenswelt philosophy. In this way it will become manifest how they are related and how they differ. Finally, I will show how he criticizes realism from his Lebenswelt position in order to make the difference even more explicit. In thus describing his two positions the reasons for his transition will be laid bare.

His realistic period divides into two phases. He begins as a commentator on Plato and an exponent of the traditional realistic position. I shall indicate his attitude at this time by considering his treatment of Plato as the originator of the natural law theory. But, yet still as a realist, he then takes an interest in the existentialists and writes his book, The Challenge of Existentialism. To explain this phase of his thought I shall show how he thinks of existentialism as an appendage of realism.

Finally, he finds it necessary to leave the realistic position and become a Lebenswelt philosopher. I shall consider his reasons for this when I summarize his book Human Freedom and Social Order in the third part of this
thesis. In the fourth part, I shall show in greater detail just how he philosophizes about the Lebenswelt.

The fifth part of this thesis will be to contrast his conception of realism with that of Lebenswelt philosophy. In seeing how he criticizes Thomism we shall understand even more clearly what his transition has meant. For in criticizing Thomism, Wild II is in effect criticizing Wild I.
CHAPTER I: REALISTIC PERIOD

In his *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy* Wild gives a convenient summary of what he means by realism. He writes that the three basic doctrines of realistic philosophy are: "(1) There is a world of real existence which men have not made or constructed; (2) this real existence can be known by the human conduct, individual and social." Rather than examine what Wild means by each of these statements we shall consider only the last and thus give a sample of his realistic philosophy. In doing this, we shall even further limit our attention to considering why he thought Plato was a natural law ethician. In this way we can understand the type of contribution Wild made to realism.

When treating this question in *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law*, Wild first develops a concept of the Natural Law and then shows how the characteristics of this concept are to be found in Plato's thought. We shall here follow his division.

After describing certain misconceptions of the natural law theory, Wild begins his positive explanation by showing how it is founded on a realistic ontology. Thus he writes,


(3) Ibid. p. 107.
"The philosophers of natural law are moral realists. They hold that certain moral norms are grounded on nature, not merely on human decree. It is this thesis that binds together the various strands into a single tradition and which radically separates all of them from the subjectivist schools of modern thought." (4)

Wild thinks that "its norms are grounded on the inescapable pattern of existence itself." (5) The term 'nature' which refers to this normative order includes five basic characteristics which Wild thinks occur constantly in the natural law tradition. These characteristics are:

"(1) the world is governed by a normative order embedded in the very being of its component entities; (2) each finite entity is marked by an intelligible structure distinguishing it from other entities, and by a universal law; (3) the composite structure of any finite entity also includes an active factor of dynamism or tendency which urges it towards further existence not yet acquired; (4) when a concrete tendency is ordered to act in accordance with the law described under 2, this action is natural or right; and (5) good, in the most general sense, is the realization of tendency, evil the lack of fulfillment." (6)

When these meanings are applied to man

"they entail three moral doctrines which are characteristic of realistic ethics. (1) The moral law, which is the abstract pattern of such activation, is in no sense an arbitrary construction based on human wish or decree. It is founded on the specific nature of man and the essential tendencies determined by this nature. Hence it is not merely a moral law in the usual sense of this word, but a law of nature, applying equally to all men everywhere. (2) Human nature is incomplete or tendential. In order to fulfill these tendencies, human acts must be governed by certain general rules applying to all men alike. In subhuman animals this direction proceeds automatically and for the most part without cognitive activity. But in man it requires the exercise of rational reflection and choice, free from automatic determination and

(5) Ibid., p. 107.
(6) Ibid., p. 137.
physical constraint. Violations of natural law are punished by natural sanctions of distortion and privation. Acts which are in accordance with natural law are commonly referred to as virtues. Such acts are not means to a final value from which they are separate. They are themselves included in this final activation and are, therefore, ends in themselves. Finally, (3) the human good is the existential fulfillment of the human individual. Since each individual shares certain traits with other members of the species, this fulfillment will include two distinguishable aspects:— (a) acts elicited by his peculiar characteristics and circumstances; and (b) acts required for the completion of common tendencies he shares with other members of the species." (7)

In order to verify this theory Wild examines the ethics of the early Stoics, Marcus Aurelius, Aquinas, Hooker, Grotius and Thomas Paine to see if his eight points are there contained. He goes to the texts of these men and offers many quotations in favor of this theory. Thus, he shows in an historical way what the natural law theory is. By way of contrast he considers the case of Hobbes and Locke and points out that neither of them are true natural law ethicians even though they use the terms of the tradition. They fail to conform to the five criteria.

Finally Wild asks himself if these five characteristics can be found within the thought of Plato and if Plato really initiated this type of thinking. Wild begins his treatment of these questions by pointing out that the common opinion attributes the founding of the natural law to the Stoics. He writes that the Opinion can be traced back to the German codifier, Samuel Pufendorf, who initiated it in 1743.

The two primary objections against the Platonic origination of the natural law theory are: (1) the term 'law of nature' occurs but seldom in Plato's works and (2) it is implied that the natural law is a theological rather than a philosophical theory. Wild answers these by explaining that a concept may be expressed in different terms and that Plato could have had a natural law theory even though he rarely used the term 'law of nature'. Next, he argues that the natural law is purely philosophical and points out that Grotius thought a natural law ethic could be established even if it were assumed there was no God.

After treating these objections, Wild shows why he thinks Plato used the concept of nature in the five ways characteristic of the natural law tradition. First he gives a series of quotations from such dialogues as the Protagoras, Phaedo, Parmenides, Gorgias, and Laws, to show that Plato thought of nature as a normative world order. Typical of his treatment is the following:

"Book X of the Laws gives us the final and most explicit statement of Plato's theory of Natural Law. It contains a complex argument for the priority of rational life over lifeless matter as the first moving principle or nature of the cosmos. We are told that the materialists wish to identify this principle (φύσις) with earth, or air, or fire. But they do not use the term rightly since as a matter of fact soul or life is the first moving principle, and therefore, "in a special sense exists by nature." (8)

"This cosmic order of nature carried its own norms within it. That which deviates is eliminated. In the case of men who are capable of exercising choice in the matter, those who would be happy must order their lives in accordance with natural law: those who seek power in the madness of hubris are justly punished by frustration of a natural

(8) Ibid., p. 139.
law founded on the very nature of things and thus enforced by natural sanctions. Nature determines what modes of being are good for a thing, whatever it may be, and also their order of greater or lesser importance. Thus, wealth is to be sought only for the sake of the body, and the welfare of the body for the sake of the soul; and this order of subordination exists by nature." (9)

Second, he develops Plato's concept of nature as the 'eidetic' structure of concrete entities. The burden of his argument here is to point out how Plato uses the term nature to refer to the form or Idea "which determines each thing to be of a certain kind and distinguishes it from other kinds." (10) He shows how Plato uses the term 'nature' in this way in the Phaedrus, Republic and Philebus. For example, in the Phaedrus "when the charioteer sees a very beautiful object, he is reminded of 'the nature of the beautiful.'" (11) Thus, 'nature' in this sense means the essential what-ness of a thing, the structure which determines it, and distinguishes it from other entities." (12)

Third, Wild treats what he calls Plato's concept of nature as a formally determined tendency. Here he argues that Plato uses the term 'nature' to refer to something more than just the form or essence of a thing. He thinks that nature includes other structural factors than form which determines the concrete thing "to change and to interact with other entities in certain appropriate ways." (13) He writes that, "there is hardly a page in

(9) Ibid., p. 139, quoting Plato, Laws 870 B 4-5.
(10) Ibid., p. 140.
(11) Ibid., p. 141, quoting Plato, Phaedrus 254B.
(12) Ibid., p. 141.
(13) Ibid., p. 141.
Plato which does not either explicitly express or imply" (14) the notion that finite things have an unfinished or tendential character. For example,

"Pure forms such as equality and justice are never wholly present in the concrete beings which only partake of them. Nevertheless, the forms are somehow partially present in their imitations, seeking and tending to perfect themselves so far as possible." (15)

So, "In this more inclusive sense, the nature of any entity refers not only to its essential structure, but to the active dispositions and tendencies determined by the structure." (16)

These tendencies can be on the subrational level but reason too has its tendencies. '"By its very nature (φύσει) every human soul beholds real being.'" (17) It alone can lead us to the human good.

Fourth, in order to tell us how this reason is determined, Wild treats nature as the correct ordering of incipient tendency. He begins by telling how virtue (ἀρετή) is a universal ontological category which refers to a thing's excellence. In so far as each thing completes or fulfills itself, it has virtue. Virtue is "'the power of attaining what is good.'" (18) Whereas "virtues are automatic" (19) in subhuman beings, men "must order their initial tendencies by habits which are largely under their own control." (20)

Now the standard of rightness to which men must conform in order to live virtuously is nature. Right action is described as agreeing with

(14) Ibid., p. 141.  (15) Ibid., p. 142.
(16) Ibid., p. 142.  (17) Ibid., p. 143, quoting Plato, Phaedrus 249 E.
(18) Ibid., p. 144, quoting Plato, Meno 78 C 1.
(19) Ibid., p. 144.
(20) Ibid., p. 144.
nature. The ideal community controlled by genuine wisdom is referred to as a
"city which would be established in accordance with nature." (21)

Fifth, Wild asks himself what is the relation between virtue and
goodness in Plato's thought and in order to find his answer he examines nature
as existential fulfillment. He first analyzes a series of passages from Plato
concerning good and evil and concludes that there is an intimate relation
between virtue and goodness. In fact they are so closely fused together that
Plato often considers them as one. But they are distinct. "Goodness is ful-
fillment -- the actual being and full possession of realization." (22) "Virtue
is the inner power to act and exist in accordance with nature." (23) Thus,
virtue is the chief cause of good. Finite goodness is the actualizing of
virtue. "Virtue is included in goodness as its most essential part, as a
power is included in its realization." (24) Goodness is an existential
category of realization and fulfillment made possible by virtue.

But one achieves goodness only when he acts according to a certain
norm. Plato tells us what is meant by such a norm or the real nature of an
entity in the Philebus. Commenting on this Wild writes,

"If we wish to discover the nature (φύσις) of any form--the hard for

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(21) Ibid., p. 145, quoting Rep. 428 E 9. What Plato actually says is that
a city established according to nature would be wise as a whole because
of the wisdom that resides in the city's ruling element.

(22) Ibid., p. 149, quoting Symposium 206 A 6, 205 A. Here Plato is saying that
men are lovers of the good and that they long for it to be theirs for­
ever. Plato does not stress any relation between virtue and goodness
here.

(23) Ibid., p. 149.  (24) Ibid., p. 149.
instance--we should look at the hardest, rather than the least hard.' All changing things are incomplete and tendential. To find out what is at the root of their tendencies, therefore, we should look at those examples which are 'most extreme and most intense.' Human nature will be observed at its best in those individuals who have pushed their capacities to the very breaking point. Here we shall find the most complete and authentic human life.'" (25)

A natural law ethics "must hold that existence is radically good—that evil is privation." (26) Plato has this notion and it is expressed in the fifth way he uses the term 'nature'.

After thus describing the ontological presuppositions of Platonic ethics, Wild now considers the three derived moral principles.

First, he shows that Plato thinks that the natural law is universal for all men. While establishing this thesis, he attacks the accusation of Popper who claims that Plato is a racialist and that Plato thought of the Greeks as masters and the Barbarians as slaves in much the same manner as a Nazi would distinguish Aryan and non-Aryan. This attack makes Wild furious and he sets out to debunk it by commenting on certain Platonic myths. Thus, from pages 25 to 30 and on pages 152 and 153 of Plato' Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, Wild shows in detail what we might summarize by means of some excerpts as follows:

"Thus in the Timaeus all souls are said to have been made according to one formula, and the myth of the Politicus speaks of the whole human flock and of one divine shepherd." (27)

(25) Ibid., pp. 147-148, quoting Philebus 44 E.

(26) Ibid., p. 151. Wild's development of this fifth way seems weak. His quotations concerning virtue and goodness are difficult to substantiate in Plato. It would seem that evil as privation came from St. Augustine.

"In the Meno virtue is applied equally to men and women in general—to young and old, to bond and free, and finally to 'all human creatures.' Plato's discussions of virtue, of philosophy, of law, and of the soul are uniformly permeated with a universal feeling. Thus, the philosopher-king thesis of the Republic asserts that unless philosophers are kings, there will be no end of troubles for all of mankind. The Republic claims to be not merely a Hellenic ideal, but one for man in general, barbarian as well as Greek. The subject of the Phaedo is not the soul of Greeks or Persians but the soul of man. The unwritten laws of nature hold universally and underlie the written positive laws of every genuinely human community." (28)

"Plato certainly believed in the moral unity of man. This is proved by the myths of creation, and by countless passages which may be quoted from his discussions of the human soul and of wisdom and virtue, which are the same everywhere for all men." (29)

Second, Wild shows how Plato thought ethical norms are grounded in nature or how his "conception of virtuous action is founded on his conception of human nature." (30) To accomplish this he comments on Plato's concept of virtue as it is found in the first book of the Republic. First he shows how Plato thinks of virtue as a general ontological category. Any nature which fulfills its proper function (εἰρήνη) is virtuous. Next, he points out that,

"The human soul, the animating principle of the human body, is no exception. It has a certain nature which determines it to certain modes of action, it organ, which it alone can perform, such as managing and deliberating, which are specifically mentioned. The effective performance of these natural functions is virtue: their warping and distortion is vice." (31)

Finally Wild shows how Plato's concept of duty or obligation is based upon his understanding of nature and virtue. Man has a duty to act in such a way that he fulfills his nature. He should fulfill his real needs and for this reason, human society is formed:

(29) Ibid., p. 30.
(30) Ibid., p. 153
(31) Ibid., p. 154.
"The real creator of the city is our human need, a phrase repeated in practically the same words by Hooker and other defenders of natural law. Later on, these common human needs were referred to as human rights, in distinction from incidental appetites. Plato does not use this terminology. But the concept is clearly and unambiguously stated." (32)

Third, Wild shows how Plato thought that man's good lies in the realization of his human nature. He begins his treatment by commenting on Plato's words: "'whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways has no further need of anything, but is completely sufficient.'" (33) Wild tells how Plato thought that original nature is in a state of deficiency and that the good is the overcoming of this deficiency. Thus, the good is always complete or sufficient. Next, he shows how moral vice is analogous to disease in the body and how virtue or goodness is like health. Plato thought of men as complex beings with many functions. None of these functions could be fulfilled properly unless they were all hierarchically subordinated and working in proper order.

"When insubordination and conflict arise, no part can properly perform its organ, and the entity remains in a deprived or evil state. Moral vice or disorder is thus analogous to disease in the body...All of this is clearly exemplified and explicitly stated in an interesting passage at the end of the Fourth Book of the Republic." (34)

In concluding his treatment of Plato and the natural law, Wild writes,

"The texts show that Plato held firmly to three basic tenets of the philosophy of natural law: first, that the general pattern of virtuous action required for this is the same for all men everywhere; second, that certain virtuous modes of action are founded on human nature just as the healthy functioning of the body is founded on its

physical structure; and third, that the end of man is the realization or completion of this nature. Some vague conception of moral law is doubtless as old as man himself. But in the West at least, Plato was the first philosopher to work out an exact and coherent theory of natural law. (35)

Such is a typical example of the work Wild did during the first part of his realistic period. He was primarily an historian and commentator. He tried to explicate the philosophy of what he called the realistic tradition. He usually did this in opposition to philosophers of idealistic or positivistic persuasion.

In the Spring of 1953, Wild delivered the Mahlon Powell Lectures at Indiana University. The argument of these lectures has been published in his book, The Challenge of Existentialism. Here we find a transition stage in his career when he is moving from realism toward a philosophy of the Lebenswelt. However, at this period he is still a convinced realist and even though he has begun to appreciate the discoveries of the existentialists, he criticizes them from a realistic viewpoint.

In this part of my thesis I shall show how Wild was still a realist when he gave the Mahlon Powell Lectures, but how he had moved to the second phase of his realistic period, namely, that of existentialism. I shall show how he considered existentialism to be an appendage of realism. In order to accomplish this, I shall make three considerations. First, I shall examine a series of quotations taken from The Challenge of Existentialism which

(35) Ibid., p. 155, 156.
indicate that he thought existentialism was a part of the realistic tradition. Second, I shall examine his concepts of existentialism and phenomenology to see how he related these to realism. Third, I shall consider his concept of existentialist ontology to see why he thought that this was a new empiricism and a revival of traditional ontology. In limiting myself to these three considerations, I shall have to leave out his treatment of epistemology and ethics. But, in spite of this, I can still accomplish my purpose -- to see why he thought of existentialism as an aspect of realism.

Right from the beginning of his Book, Wild's purpose is clear. He wants to show how philosophy that has been broken down by non-empirical and anti-metaphysical theories can be restored by existentialism and a return to realism. In his first chapter, The Breakdown of Modern Philosophy, he describes metaphysics as he did in the first phase of his realism. He tells that it deals with existence whether potential and actual, or substantial and accidental. (36) Then he writes "at the present time in the universities of England and America, this discipline is dead." (37) Of course, epistemology and ethics have met with a like disaster. Practical awareness which deals with existential problems has been disregarded by those who focus their attention upon pure theory rather than practise, on essence rather than existence. (38) These theories eventually end in skepticism where they are cut off from the concrete world. And in turn this epistemological skepticism

(37) Ibid., p. 17.
(38) Ibid., p. 20.
weakens moral conviction. (39) Some philosophers think "it is a naive mistake to believe that any such thing as ethics exists as a responsible discipline."

(40)

Wild thinks that existentialism and realism can remedy these problems. Existentialism is a rebirth of realism and if it is purified by the traditional philosophy a true metaphysics and its consequent epistemology and ethics will be restored. Wild begins to prove this thesis by showing how Kierkegaard is, in a certain sense, a realist. He points out that even though Kierkegaard made bitter attacks upon theoretical reason and claimed to be an irrationalist, we cannot take this irrationalism seriously, for we would then "have to reject his writings, which are a triumph of theoretical analysis." (41) Wild thinks that even though,

"this irrationalism is the most unfortunate yet one of the most influential factors in Kierkegaard's testament to the modern age... we are now able to see that Kierkegaard's achievements are rather a triumph of rational description and analysis." (42)

Concerning existentialism Wild further writes, "on the continent of Europe this is now the dominant philosophy, and a challenge to all living minds. Its point of view is starkly realistic."(43) However, Wild as a realist is not completely pleased with existentialism and his criticisms of this philosophy indicate that he is still very much a realist at the time he gave the Mahlon Powell Lectures. He writes,

(42) Ibid., p. 54. (43) Ibid., p. 55.
"The existentialist insights are marked by partiality at every one of the four levels we have considered... We shall turn briefly again to the chief sources of existentialist thought for a critical review... We shall consider these (its more serious errors) as they affect the four major aspects of existentialist thought: its method, its metaphysics, its view of knowledge, and finally, its ethics. In each of these phases, we shall find that it suffers from omission, exaggeration, and sometimes from positive error." (44)

He goes on to show in detail how this philosophy is man-centered to the exclusion of the rest of the world, how brute facts are only described and not explained, how it denies the principle of causality, and how Sartre, therefore, has no ethics. He attempts to show how it has slurred over essences in thinking that existence is given without essence and how as a result it is anti-intellectual. He thinks that the germs of skepticism are found in Kierkegaard and that his followers often tend toward moral solipsism and anarchy. "No adequate or even noteworthy social philosophy has as yet come from existentialist sources." (45)

After his criticism he further indicates that he thinks realism and existentialism can be one by showing how existentialism can overcome its weaknesses by becoming allied with realism. Thus he writes,

"In these concluding chapters, we shall make a few suggestions concerning the way in which, as it seems to us, the genuine insights of this new philosophy may be sustained by bringing them into relation with the allied insights of realism." (46)

Wild's equation of realism and existentialism will become more meaningful if we now consider what he meant by phenomenology and existentialism at this point in his career. In order to do this, we shall begin by commenting on three quotations which will indicate how he related phenomenology and

existentialism. Then, we shall consider his idea that existentialism is primarily concerned with human existence. And finally, we shall show how he relates existentialism and realism.

Wild writes that the men who use the phenomenological method are interested

"in the concrete data of immediate experience, and in describing those data so far as possible, exactly as they are given." (47)

Then he writes that the existentialists have

"applied this method to many regions not previously explored, but especially to the pervasive data of existence, awareness, and human value which lie at the root of the disciplines of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics." (48)

And again he writes,

"there is no real reason why phenomenology should be restricted to human existence. Other modes of being can also be described and analyzed." (49)

These quotations are typical of Wild's thought at this time and he constantly repeats the ideas contained within them. If we examine them, we see that he thinks of phenomenology as an attitude of interest in the concrete and as a method of description. Also, the last quotation indicates that phenomenology includes some kind of analysis. The existentialists are phenomenologists in so far as they describe and analyze human existence. Hence, we can see that phenomenology and existentialism are different in that the first is a method the latter uses and which could possibly be used by others. They are alike in that they can both treat the immediate data of human existence.

At this point, Wild does not indicate much appreciation for

(47) Ibid., p. 57. (48) Ibid., p. 57. (49) Ibid., p. 58.
Husserl and his technical meaning of phenomenology. He only mentions Husserl twice by name and the first time he criticizes him for being an essentialist. (50) However, Wild does have one passage wherein he indicates what he means phenomenological description and analysis. He writes,

"The first step in the attainment of such truth is the use of all our cognitive faculties—feeling, sense, and reason—in the description of objects as they are given. The next step is to analyze out the essential aspects of these complex data, and the relation forms in which they are united. These belong to what we call phenomenology. At every stage, our eyes are fixed on the object we are describing. No inference must be allowed to creep into the picture. No fixed interpretation should warp our view. Our attention is focused solely on the existing phenomena as they are present to us, and on the constitutive structure of this presence. When this has been accurately achieved, we have already embarked on the last phase of the process, the quest for explanation in terms of reasons and causes." (51)

Wild goes on to call this last phase an "inferential theory that penetrates far beyond the horizons revealed by our practical activity." (52) Hence, it would seem that Wild pictures philosophical reasoning as having three phases. First, there is description, and second, analysis. These are included within phenomenology. Third, there is inference which the existentialists lack. But, before we consider how realism can provide this, we must first take up Wild's notion that existentialism is primarily concerned with human existence.

Wild thinks that the primary characteristic of existentialism is its concern for human existence. Thus he writes,

"When we regard man from an ontological point of view, we find that he is marked off from other beings not merely by certain determinate traits (essences), but by a peculiar mode of being which marks him

(50) Ibid., p. 73.  (51) Ibid., p. 193.  (52) Ibid. p. 194.
off even more radically. This human way of being is now called existence, and has given its name to the new philosophy we are studying." (53)

In order to understand what he means by this we must now examine his concept of existential ontology. In so doing, we will see in more detail why he thinks existentialism and realism can be one and we will be able to see how he thinks realism can help existentialism to be even more ontological.

He begins his treatment of existential metaphysics by showing how it is a radical empiricism. By this label, he designates a philosophical position which is neither pan-objectivistic (e.g. positivism) nor pan-subjectivistic (e.g. Cartesianism). The new empiricism explicitly rejects the reduction of everything to either object or subject. Instead it insists upon an intentional notion of consciousness such that there must always be a subject and object pole. In order to prove this statement, Wild quotes certain passages from Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel. Then, he comments on these passages to show how these existentialists are true empiricists as opposed to pseudo-empiricists such as Russell. Finally, he shows how their radical empiricism at least enables them to begin philosophizing in a correct way since they are treating being as it is. But, I will not give the detail of Wild's argument since one example will suffice to show his method. Rather, I will give that detail now in showing how he thinks existentialism has revived ontology.

Wild begins the part of his book entitled The Revival of Ontology

(53) Ibid., pp. 84-85.
with the words,

"One result of the new empiricism is the rediscovery of those pervasive protocols which require ontological analysis and explanation. This means that metaphysics can no longer be dismissed as a jumble of purely speculative theories which are subject to no empirical check." (54)

The existential protocols which Wild explains by commenting on the words of the five leading existentialists are: essence and existence, existential vectors, truth as identity, good and evil, contradiction and contingency, potency and change. As an example of the method by which Wild proceeds throughout the book we shall now consider his treatment of essence and existence. He begins,

"The existentialists clearly recognize the classical distinction between determinate structure, or essence, and the act of existing. But in violent reaction against the essentialism of modern thought, these thinkers all place an extreme emphasis on existence, and agree in asserting its priority over essence. Thus, Heidegger says that 'the 'essence' of man lies in his existence.' He uses the term Dasein in order to express not a determinate whatness (essence) but rather a mode of being (sein) always proceeding from a certain position (da) into which he has been thrown." (55)

Such is the way in which Wild begins to argue that Heidegger has contributed to the revival of ontology. However, I think that in Wild's interpretation, there is a fundamental misunderstanding. Wild would seem to equate Heidegger’s use of existence with the traditional use of existence. However, Heidegger writes explicitly that he does not make such an equation.

"But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as 'existence' (Existenz), this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term 'existentia'; ontologically, existentia is

(54) Ibid., p. 64. (55) Ibid., p.65, quoting Sein und Zeit, p. 42.
tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character." (56)

Furthermore, it seems that Heidegger would be an essentialist in the way that Wild is using the term, for when he writes "the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence" he means that he is setting man off from other entities by means of this characteristic of existence. Even though this ability to-be-there is not a 'what', it is still more like the traditional essence than the traditional existence.

I do not mean to say that I think that Heidegger has not promoted a revival of ontology. However, I think that concerning this issue, Wild has misrepresented him.

Next, Wild shows how Heidegger thinks that man's existence is prior to what he is. He writes, "Dasein is always ahead of himself. He is his possibilities, and in his being somehow understands them. He chooses how he is going to be." (57) But, Wild feels uneasy with Heidegger's notion that Dasein has no determinate structure. He writes,

"Heidegger does not explain fully why the realistic notion of essence or nature is inadequate to express these existential characteristics. He simply states dogmatically that it applies only to inert things that are simply there on hand before us." (58)

Two observations are in order here. First, Wild might understand Heidegger on this issue if he saw that Heidegger does not equate the


(57) Ibid., p. 66.  

(58) Ibid., p. 66.
existence of Dasein with the existence of traditional realism. In short, as Wild writes but does not understand, "the 'essence of Dasein lies in its existence." Dasein does have an essence, a determining characteristic. Dasein is distinct from other entities in that he is indetermined, he is free to determine himself.

Second, it can again be pointed out how Wild is here a realist. In so far as the existentialist fits into the mold of realism, Wild praises him. In so far as he does not Wild criticizes him. Sometimes, as in this case, Wild, in his eagerness to have the existentialist promoting the cause of realism, is even unfair in his treatment of the existentialist. He sees too much of traditional realism in his thought.

After showing Heidegger's thought on the distinction between essence and existence, Wild then quotes Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel and attempts to show how they too recognize the distinction. He criticizes Sartre and Jaspers in the same way he did Heidegger and then he shows how Marcel has "come out with a qualified defense of the notion of essence." (59) He quotes Marcel as saying,

"'It is clear that reflection on the meanings of words must be directed, just as Plato wanted it to be, towards a grasp of what traditional philosophers used to call essences. One cannot protest too strongly against a kind of existentialism, or a kind of caricature of existentialism which claims to deprive the notion of essence of its old value and to allow it only a subordinate position.'" (60)

Then Wild writes,

"This is a significant criticism by one who has a thorough command of the literature. Determinate structure is certainly found in experience. This pervasive factor cannot be permanently evaded and ignored by any philosophy which seriously hopes to be really empirical and to achieve even a minimum degree of intelligibility." (61)

Wild treats the other existential protocols in this same way. By existential vectors he refers to 'Being-in-the-world', 'Being-with-others', and 'Being-towards-my-death'. He thinks that these are "new complex concepts which express the relational structure of being." (62) The existentialists forged these because of their respect for concrete data and in so doing they have rejected on phenomenological grounds that monistic idealism which is incompatible with "that personal existence and freedom which is a primary object of existentialist study." (63) Thus in refuting a form of idealism, existentialism has furthered the cause of traditional realism. Wild argues in the same way concerning the existentialist treatment of truth, goodness, contingency and change.

Throughout his entire book, Wild treats four aspects of philosophy: method, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. He attempts to show in each case how the findings of the existentialists have contributed to the traditional realistic understanding of these aspects of philosophy. Whenever, the existentialists do not agree with that tradition, Wild criticizes them. We have seen an example of his approach in our consideration of his treatment

(61) Ibid., p. 66.  (62) Ibid., p. 67.  (63) Ibid., p. 68
of the existentialist metaphysics. We have seen why he thinks that existen-
tialism and phenomenology can be compatible with the realistic tradition. We
have seen how at the time he wrote The Challenge of Existentialism, he
considered existentialism to be an appendage of realism.
Upon reading Wild's next book, *Human Freedom and Social Order*, we find ourselves in another philosophical world. Gone is his interest in the world of change which he explained by such categories as potency and act, substance and accident and causality. Instead, we find him dealing with the lived world of the person and using such categories as self conscious activity, global meanings and transcendence. In this book he explicates his philosophy of the Lebenswelt and has stepped out of the realistic tradition. In order to show how he had one this, we shall first describe what Wild means by a philosophy of the Lebenswelt and then take up his new position in ethics.

We might begin with his statement, "the purpose of philosophy is to gain an understanding of the Lebenswelt which avoids the errors of partiality, inaccuracy and superficiality." (64) To understand this, we must first know what Wild means by the Lebenswelt and only afterwards, can we hope to understand his philosophy of the Lebenswelt.

Lebenswelt is a German word made popular in philosophic circles by the contemporary phenomenologists. It refers to the lived-world of everyday human existence as opposed to the objective world of the scientist. According to Wild, the three most important aspects of its structure are: self conscious activity, global meaning and transcendence. (65)

As he points out self conscious activity has three chief


(65) Ibid., p. 137.
characteristics: each person is the center of his own Lebenswelt; this center is constituted by his acts, and in performing these actions the person has a direct awareness of himself. Following Husserl, Wild holds that the Lebenswelt is always relative to the person who constitutes it by his actions. As a result each person has an immediate and certain knowledge of himself as subject when he acts, and it is only in his action that he can know himself as subject. For when he tries to know himself objectively, he knows only an object. Hence, as we shall later see, this structure of the Lebenswelt enables the philosopher to have a knowledge of existential depth by which he can escape the superficial attitude which knows not the subject. (66)

At the same time, "the Lebenswelt is pervaded by global meanings which unlike facts, are to some degree subject to individual choice and control." (67) These meanings or values—cared—about give order to the lived-world of both individual and culture. They link together in harmonious unity the several parts of the world. Hence, an individual's world is ordered by his basic orientation or set of values. For the miser, all things will have meaning in that they point toward money. The hypochondriac, on the other hand, has a lived-world ordered by health getting. Of course, these global meanings are also characteristic of any given culture. For every human group has an ultimate value for which it strives, giving meaning to all else.

(66) Ibid., p. 137. (67) Ibid., p. 137.
These global meanings have an intimate relation with the phenomena of human space and human time which strictly speaking might be called structures of the Lebenswelt themselves. Together with the objects of his care, each person is involved in a structure of human temporality very different from objective time. Hence, time differs from lived-world to lived-world. An hour is much longer for the patient in a dentist's chair then for the boy fishing. So human space is much different than geometric space. It is not just miles that separate the home-sick farmer from his land but miles of effort and care. (68)

It should be mentioned that the lived body has an important role in this value structure of skeleton of meaning which links the component parts of the Lebenswelt. It is the center of the Lebenswelt or medium of action. In the manner of Merleau-Ponty, Wild shows why "care will be reflected in my body and its attitudes to surrounding objects." (69) Even a given culture is highly influenced by the geographical region in which it is found. "One's body is the center of human space, and is surrounded by objects at hand for use." (70)

But within the Lebenswelt, there is also the experience of transcendence. For besides the global meanings which order and pervade the world, there are also persons and things which one experiences as being completely independent of himself. (71) These persons and things transcend me

(68) Ibid., p. 139.  (69) Ibid., p. 138.
(70) Ibid., p. 140.  (71) Ibid., p. 141.
but not completely. There is also the experience of the holy or mysterious which has even a more radical transcendence. both individual and culture has this experience.

We can become aware of the transcendent by self conscious pathways or by objective pathways. In the first way, we have but to concentrate "on our self-conscious meanings, choices, and feelings." (72) In the second way, we note "the checks of objective reason, or confront symbolic phenomena such as the holy." (73) By our awareness of the ultimate horizon of mystery, we are able to recognize all human worlds as being views of the world that transcends them all. Hence, we are aware of the unity of the world.

Such then is the structure of the human life-world. But before considering Wild's philosophy of the Lebenswelt, perhaps we could better understand it by seeing how he contrasts it with the objective world of the scientist. In doing this, he uses Plato's allegory of the cave to show that the Lebenswelt is both prior to the objective world and even more inclusive.

Of course, the intellectualist Plato contends that the upper world of the intellect is prior to the lived-world of the cave. But to fit the facts as he interprets them, Wild inverts the myth. For him, the cave is the world of the intellect into which the intellectualist descends from the lived-world. Every thinker is first a citizen of the Lebenswelt, and every culture first has years of concrete experience before the period of reflection.

(72) Ibid., p.141. (73) Ibid., p. 141.
Hence, the lived-world is prior to and independent of the objective universe. (74)

But also, it is richer and far more inclusive. Science by nature can deal only with an abstracted segment of the universe. "The universe of science does not encompass and precede the world of life. It is rather the concrete world of human existence from which science takes its origin, and in which it lives and has its being...The cave cannot include the upper world." (75)

The Lebenswelt then is structured of self conscious activity, global meaning and transcendence. It is prior to and more inclusive than the objective world. With this in mind, we are now prepared to see what Wild means by "philosophy of the Lebenswelt."

To do this, we shall first examine what he calls the three criteria of philosophy or wholeness, analytic clarity and existential depth. These three criteria, of course, are the opposite of the three errors which we saw in his statement quoted earlier, "the purpose of philosophy is to gain an understanding of the Lebenswelt which avoids these errors of partiality, inaccuracy and superficiality." (76)

Wholeness or lack of partiality refers to the "global view which leaves out no essential structure of this concrete world. In order to

(74) Ibid., p. 63.  (75) Ibid., p. 66.  (76) Ibid., p. 116.
achieve this, the philosopher must make an effort to get outside of himself, and even to arrive at a standpoint which is outside the world." (77) Plato's effort is an example of seeking this holoscopic view for he sought to view "the world in the light of the good which is beyond our human existence, and even beyond all being." (78)

But also the forte of Aristotle or analytic clarity is necessary for a good philosophy of the Lebenswelt. For looking at the world from a distance may result in a certain inaccuracy or the second error of philosophy. To prevent this, attention must be devoted to "a careful scrutiny of essential parts, one by one, in order to attain a detailed accuracy." (79)

But then, this objective accuracy may cause in the philosopher a superficial attitude in which he does not consider the subjective. He may lack existential depth in that he views himself and others only as objects and not as subjects. Hence, these three: wholeness, analytic clarity and existential depth, are the criteria to which a philosophy of the Lebenswelt must conform.

While following these criteria, philosophy has a twofold task, namely its primary function of revealing structures of the Lebenswelt and its secondary function of sweeping synthetic speculation. Strictly speaking, the first is the philosophy of the Lebenswelt and the second is traditional realism. Hence, traditional realism is but a secondary phase of the

philosophy of the Lebenswelt. In its first task of describing and analyzing the world of concrete experience, philosophy is "concerned with the direct evidence of lived experience which is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective, but both together in one." (80) In the light of this evidence and using the phenomenological method, its primary task is to reveal such structures as lived space, lived time and historicity. In the next part, we shall treat this phenomenological method in detail.

However, in revealing these basic phenomena certain notions will be encountered "whose clarification involves overarching speculation and interpretation of the kind traditionally referred to as ontology or metaphysics." (81) Questions such as those concerning being, meaning, truth, and transcendence bring forth the second function of philosophy. The experience of such phenomena "enable us to grasp the life world as a whole, and call forth a total interpretation." (82)

In comparing these two functions of philosophy, Wild says that the first is "an understanding of freedom and its conditions" and the second is the "actual exercise of noetic freedom." (83) I shall treat this special problem in the next section.

Because of its freedom philosophy is not in the ancillary service of either science or religion. (84) In fact it "should bring philosophers into

(80) Ibid., p. 89.  (81) Ibid., p. 145.  (82) Ibid., p. 89.  
(84) Ibid., p. 87.
close touch with other disciplines...and should act as a bond linking the members of a faculty together in a common task to which all can contribute." (85) But on the other hand, the evidence for the speculative function of philosophy is "ambiguous and open to divergent interpretations." (86) And hence, any attempt to clarify such basic notions as being, truth and value "must rest upon faith in a guiding image of some sort that cannot be conclusively confirmed by any available evidence." (87)

This brings us to the third part of this section or the relation between Christian faith and the philosophy of the Lebenswelt. We have seen what Wild means by the Lebenswelt and the philosophy of it. Now we shall examine his definition of Christian philosophy or that "purely human discipline striving to take account of the evidence accessible to all, but ultimately inspired by the guiding image of Christian faith." (88) Hence, we seek to understand two new ideas: what is his concept of Christian Faith? and how is it a guiding image for the philosophy of the Lebenswelt?

Wild defines religion as "the ultimate devotion to a transcendent mystery directly encountered in the concrete world of existence." (89) It is "a dimension of human existence," and "due to a recognition of transcendence." (90) "As concern for an ultimate mystery, religion cannot be essentially identified with rational theology." (91) Of course, the Christian faith is a type of religion and, hence, it also differs from reason. For faith is "the

(85) Ibid., p. 145. (86) Ibid., p. 89. (87) Ibid., p. 90.
(88) Ibid., p. viii. (89) Ibid., p. 34. (90) Ibid. p. 39.
(91) Ibid., p. 85.
ultimate concern for which we are ready to make real sacrifices in ordering our existence and reason is the exact understanding of things around us and of our changing situation in history." (91)

But the Christian faith not only differs from reason it also differs from myth. For unlike myth it,

"is addressed to free, self-conscious persons;...it is essentially involved in human events that occurred in human history, and it exists in this history;...It can meet the serious questioning of rational reflection, and even requires a full development of reason for mastery over the animals and the earth;...It is free and open not only to a deepening self-correction of itself, but to a development and renewal of all human fields and occupations." (92)

Now the Christian faith which is neither reason nor myth exists in the Lebenswelt. "Its initial acts are not rational hypotheses or propositions subject to proof or disproof by objective evidence." (93) Instead "the Bible is concerned with human existence in the world of man...and it expresses many insights into the nature of this existence in the ordinary language of mankind." (94) Hence, the Bible coupled with the tradition of the church, which is also part of the Christian faith, contains historic events.

At this point, we can begin to see the relation between faith and the philosophy of the Lebenswelt. For faith with "Its own kind of evidence, and its own distinctive modes of understanding" (95) while not to be confused with philosophy, should be related to it. As we have seen the philosophy of

(91) Ibid., p. 85.  (92) Ibid., p. 42.  (93) Ibid., p. 72.
(94) Ibid., p. 43.  (95) Ibid., p. 44.
the Lebenswelt has two functions, namely the analysis of the concrete lived-world and then the speculation concerning the transcendent, which is a structure of the lived-world. Now, Wild contends that in the history of philosophy this speculation has always been guided by certain images. Plato saw "everything in the light of the transcendent idea of the good." (96) St. Augustine had "God's living presence...communicating to him a sense of His eternal and timeless truths." (97) Kant and Hegel had their images. But Wild argues that the Philosophy of the Lebenswelt should be guided by the image of Christian Faith. The Christian philosopher should "openly accept the guiding image of his faith in making ultimate clarifications where the evidence falls short." (98)

Wild calls the relation between Christian faith and reason one of dialectical tension. In this relation "the organic content of the faith is considered not as a set of propositions from which, with the aid of rational first principles, philosophic conclusions can be deduced, but rather as a guiding image, indirectly indicating ideas, atmospheres, and modes of approach that can be worked out in a purely secular way, and tested by secular evidence available to all, without jeopardizing the autonomy of the field in question." (99)

Such is Wild's philosophy of the Lebenswelt as presented in

Human Freedom and Social Order. Now in that same book, we shall examine his consequent ethical position. To do this, it will be necessary to consider the subject from the two aspects of individual and social ethics. For in social ethics, he still holds the natural law position of self realization ethics. However, in individual ethics, this position is rejected for a person centered affirmative ethics.

In taking up this new position, we shall see first why Wild rejected a self realization ethics for the individual and second, we shall examine the characteristics of this new ethics. In carrying out the first of these tasks, we shall summarize Wild's contrast of the five characteristics of self realization ethics with the five of personal ethics.

The first characteristic of traditional ethics is objective calculation. This deliberation about means to an end "presupposes an objective understanding of the laws of nature and the natural consequences of different kinds of acts, as well as a grasp of the final end which must be already understood theoretically before the process can begin." (100) However, such a process is not used by a free human person as he makes his basic decisions. Personal understanding is not restricted merely to acts within a fixed world framework. Instead, the person often uses a type of existential reflection which "also makes use of feeling, passion, expressive discourse, and every revealing power to which we have access." (101)

(100) Ibid., p. 156.  
(101) Ibid., p. 168.
Then too, "traditional ethics has been based upon universal laws or principles which can be understood in the very same way by different minds." (102) For, once a moral end has been determined which is based on a true account of human nature and its properties, "rules which must be followed by everyman if he is to realize this final end must be clearly formulated." (103) But, "personal ethics requires something more than the universal prescriptions of social and moral law." (104) Universal rules only mark the limits of a person's finite freedom and apply to him negatively. "if he is to be given any helpful guidance, a very different kind of ethics is required." (105) An ethics which treats the whole person in his concrete situation would not focus its attention on the general pattern by which human life can be realized but upon the radical exercise of human freedom.

Self realization ethics is based on a concept of the fixed self which as an enduring substance maintains certain essential properties as it progresses toward its end. Virtues and vices are considered accidents which this substance acquires as it moves from potency to act. But this theory leaves no room for essential growth and creativity. (106) "Serious questions may be raised as to whether the traditional thing categories do justice to existential becoming." (107) If attention is focused on becoming and giving rather than resting and possessing there would be categories to better explain the phenomena of divine grace and direct love. A person is his history.

His acts cannot rightly be understood "as accidents added to a fixed essence." (108)

Of course, it is a fact that the person does have works which he can look upon as objects different from himself. If these works conform to an objective standard, he is deserving of merit; if they do not he is guilty. But objective works, norms and merits are not the only facts. (109) There also exists a self revealing activity which proceeds sporadically and authentically over long intervals of time. Hence, there should be a deeper ethics of my own existence in its full integrity which recognizes these acts as well as works.

From what has been written it can be seen that self realization ethics asserts the priority of the past. It looks back to an "already given nature, or self, that is to be realized." (110) The general nature of the end toward which this self should strive is also predetermined. "Even grace itself must remain within the limits prescribed by this objective nature." (111)

"All justifiable hope for the future is based on a memory of the past." (112) But as the person is his history, so ethics should be historically oriented. It should be based on a priority of the future, which is bathed in mystery and continually open to further creative understanding.

Such are five reasons which Wild gave for rejecting a natural law

(111) Ibid., p. 164. (112) Ibid., p. 178.
ethics for the individual. He does not think that a self realization theory based upon objective calculation, universal law, the self as world center, works and the priority of the past fully accounts for the existential facts of personal life. In place of this theory, he proposes a new Christian, existential ethics. As we have seen, it is based instead upon existential thought, the existing person, becoming and giving, acts and the priority of the future. We shall now examine this new ethics in more detail.

Perhaps we should begin by pointing out the radical difference of this ethics from all traditional theories. In one place, Wild shows how all previous theories have a common pattern of end, means, etc. (113) Then, he mentions that this new theory is totally different. In fact, he even writes "this is not an ethics at all, but a way of existing in the world. It does not provide us with a method of calculating the success and failure of our works, but suggests a way of interpreting our life in the world as a whole that arises from the self-revealing of our lived existence. It is concerned not so much with abstract laws and principles as with the concrete persons for the sake of whom all laws and principles are laid down. It leads us not toward self-satisfaction but toward freedom and self-transcendence. It presupposes a realization of the conditions required for personal existence." (114)

However, in spite of this description of the difference between his theory and traditional ethics, Wild still calls his thought "the Christian ethics of love and self-transcendence which is open to the individual

(113) Ibid., p. 156   (114) Ibid., p. 182
person." (115) While his theory cannot be reduced to any systematic order, it still has the following features: "First, it is a mode of revealing thought which is acutely self-conscious all the while it is conscious of objects. Second, it must be aware of the norms it is presupposing. Finally, third, it must be concerned with self-world structure as a whole and with those clashes between divergent world interpretations which occur in what we now call philosophical discourse." (116)

This new ethics is especially sensitive to the freedom of the person. His being-open-to-otherness is that freedom which lies at the root of his being. Reason is but an expression of this freedom. In no way does a universal determinism destroy personal freedom in this theory. For here a person is free to love another directly and even to sacrifice without self interest. We might say that the chief motive of this theory is to save the fact of human freedom.

Because of this concern for freedom "It may be said of this Christian philosophy, as is said of Kantian ethics, that it is purely formalistic and tells us nothing about precisely what we ought to do." (117) Instead of a closed system which tells us what we ought to do, this ethics will be in a world of love which is beyond the law. The person will be concerned not so much with what to do as with how to do it. This ethics has been lived by those who "put persons above the law, and have risked their lives for freedom." (118)

It has the spirit of freedom in faith. (119)

Such then is the Christian ethics of the Lebenswelt. Its principle concern is to promote the freedom of the person. Hence, it differs radically from an ethics concerned with perfection of a nature. But still there remains the problem of social ethics and its relation to individual ethics. Hence, in the following part of our summary of Wild's new philosophy, we shall first consider what he calls "the gap between individual and social action," and then, we shall consider his plan for "bridging the gap."

One has but to look around in order to see the gap between individual and social action. Wild describes the insurmountable chasm which yawns between social and individual ethics in the following manner, "personal action is open to a radical choice of ends as well as means. It is concerned with the individual in his concrete integrity. It is a dialectical becoming which involves the sacrifice of a past self, as well as the coming of a new self to be born, and is centered in something transcendent rather than in a structure already formed. It expresses itself in acts where the self is totally present rather than in works form which the self can stand aside and is guided by a forward-looking historicity. Political action, on the other hand, follows a calculation of means exclusively, not ends. It is centered in a fixed constitution already understood and objectified, and is governed by abstract principles and laws. It issues in works that can be objectified and compared with extrinsic norms, and is governed by a backward looking hope." (120)

He then mentions how the "Christian ethics of love and sacrifice, expressed in the sermon on the mount...is still alive in the hearts of western individuals, and is still used as a standard for judging the significance of individual conduct." (121) But, on the other hand, he points out that it would seem absurd for any political group to love its enemies. If a nation was not anxious for its life, it would be gobbled up in the struggle for power. In short, political ethics is not Christian. There is a gap between individual and social ethics.

The causes of this gap are: (1) "Our personal acts arise from the depths of our being and express a way of existing in the world to which not only objective thought, but feeling and every revealing power at our disposal have made essential contributions." (122) "Political action, on the other hand, arises from a process of deliberate calculation which is restricted to definite intervals of time." (123) (2) "My personal action grows not merely from detached observations of myself and others as objects but from revealing powers that inhabit it." (124) "Political action, on the other hand, is governed by a calculation which abstracts from the subjective, and is directed exclusively toward what can be brought before the mind as an object." (125) (3) "Free personal action must be ultimately moved by a faith in something transcending it. Otherwise, the person will become enslaved to what he is, and lose his freedom." (126) "Political action, on the other hand, must be

grounded in a common agreement of many individuals concerning a possible common end for the realization of which there is ground for hope." (127) (4) "Personal action is clearly aware of the historic past, which weighs it down and limits its possibilities. But it is precisely this past which is risked in a project for the future." (128) "Political calculation, on the other hand, is based upon a priority of the past. Its aim is to realize a nature that has already been agreed upon in the form of an accepted constitution." (129)

In bridging this gap, Wild first considers the nature of person and group. Then, he points out how past theories have tried to solve the problem by reducing the person into the group. And finally, he proposes a new bridge as viewed by phenomenology.

In his treatment of person and group, he looks at group patterns from the standpoint of personal freedom. His aim is "to suggest the relational interdependence of the individual and the group, and the way in which they exist in and for each other. (130) He concludes that the person alone, while existing objectively for others, exists in and for himself in a concrete world of his own, ordered toward his ultimate concern. All groups except the primary I-Thou group are imperfect and potential and exist only for the free person. The ultimate meaning of groups, therefore, must be understood in terms of the role they play in this personal existence.

(127) Ibid., p. 206.  
(129) Ibid., p. 207.  
(128) Ibid., p. 207.  
(130) Ibid., p. 207.
However, individuals do belong to groups and in so far as they do they function and think for others. As opposed to the dynamic and creative life of the individual the world of society is relatively fixed and static. It moves according to patterns and can be explained causally as a thing. Of course, the free person cannot be explained in this way but instead is understood by a disciplined, revealing sympathy. (131) Hence, persons and groups have different traits and properties. They exist and are understood in different ways. Neither can exist without the other. But because they are so radically distinct a gap is grounded in their very being.

In the past philosophers have tried to bridge it by "adopting an objective point of view and subordinating the individual to the group." (132) They have never sharply distinguished individual and social ethics. They have not taken into account the free individual. Instead, they have been content to strive for order and peace as the end of ethics.

However, "the tradition has been wrong in maintaining that the end of social justice is a reign of peace and order in which freedom has only an abstract right to express itself." (133) For, "the aim of social justice is not the abstract possibility of personal freedom but the actual practise of it." (134) Hence, "every human institution should be judged by the degree to which it is open to the actual practise of freedom." (135)

In the end, Wild means to bridge the gap by using natural law social ethics in order to promote the freedom of the individual. And it is precisely this concrete freedom of the individual which has replaced the natural law ethics of the individual. For Wild's new ethics (if you can call it that) of the individual is not a theory at all. In fact, his theory is that you cannot have a theory concerning the ethics of the individual.

Hence, there are two types of ethics, the one of objective group behaviour and the other of subjective freedom. The gap between them can be bridged if it is seen that "neither one can exist without the other. Apart from realization, freedom cannot even exist. But apart from freedom, self-realization becomes a dead repetition of lofty principles that reeks of righteousness." (136)

So society which is encased in natural law principles supports an individual freedom which is understood by an entirely different set of categories. "Instead of good and evil, we find choice or the failure to choose. Instead of right and wrong, we find personal integrity and disintegration. Instead of obligation, we find love; instead of justification, understatement and humility; instead of justice, forgiveness; and instead of self-realization, generosity and sacrifice." (137)

So much then, for a general summary of the new position of John Wild. Now we are ready to forge ahead and seek a deeper penetration of his transition by a consideration of detail.

We have already considered in general the various meanings of philosophy which Wild has entertained. But now we shall consider in detail his latest understanding of philosophy or the philosophy of the Lebenswelt. In order not to be repetitious we shall take up five details which we have not yet developed. First, we shall consider Wild's recent explanation of the merger between phenomenology and existentialism; second, his appreciation of William James as phenomenologist and existentialist; third, philosophy as therapeautic; fourth, philosophy as human process; and fifth, Wild's contrast of philosophy with science and with the humanities.

In his most recent book, *Existence and the World of Freedom*, Wild sets out to solve the problem of how phenomenology and existentialism can be one even though they were started by different men, in different places and at different times. Kierkegaard, who is generally recognized as the Father of existentialism, lived in Denmark from 1813 to 1858. The phenomenological movement began at the turn of the century in Germany with Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Today Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre are phenomenological existentialists. Kierkegaard was primarily concerned with subjective existence; Husserl with essences and the things themselves. How then can one speak of a phenomenological existentialist? Was Kierkegaard a phenomenologist? Was Husserl an existentialist? Are Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre true followers of both Kierkegaard and Husserl? These are questions which occur even to the beginner and Wild, who skimmed over them in previous works, now takes them up in the second chapter of *Existence and the World of Freedom* which he entitles Human Existence and
Wild points out a common negative attitude at the origin of both existentialism and phenomenology. They each grew out of dissatisfaction with a philosophy too far removed from lived experience. Kierkegaard, when meditating on Hegel's claim to have reduced the whole of Christian life to a system, realized that Christianity is very different when studied from the outside as an object than it is when lived from within. He discovered that existence could be adequately grasped only from within and other knowledge was but observance of essences. Thus, he became concerned with the affective knowledge which reveals existence by such feelings as boredom, melancholy, anxiety, despair, etc. Thus, Wild writes,

"By existentialism, we shall mean a new mode of thought, initiated by Kierkegaard, which attempts to approach the problem of being by a careful study of personal existence as concretely lived. It differs from classical realism in denying that such existence can be adequately understood by the use of objective categories such as thing, time, and space in their traditional senses. It differs from modern idealism in holding that the transcendent self is the human person in the concrete, and that he and his human world are open to disciplined empirical study." (138)

Brentano and Husserl in criticizing British Empiricism discovered the intentional notion of consciousness. They did away with the dichotomy between subject and object by discovering that every consciousness is consciousness of something. No longer could the subject be seen as a substance enclosed within itself which could contain atomic units of experience. This

notion of intentionality "led Husserl and Heidegger to their discovery of the human life world, or Lebenswelt, as Husserl called it." (139)

Thus, existentialism and phenomenology each began with a dissatisfaction with abstract, removed-from-life philosophy. They were each concerned with consciousness and the lived-world which could be known in another way than as mere object. But Husserl thought that in order for each man to understand his Lebenswelt, there must be a transcendent consciousness which could be related to us intentionally. Thus, he posited the transcendental ego which could observe the world as a whole. But this and the bracketing of existence in order to know the thing as object has been rejected by Heidegger and other phenomenologists.

The French especially maintain that we can know our self in self conscious activity. Thus,

The living phenomenology of our time is precisely the disciplined cultivation of this type of awareness which dwells in our lived existence, attending to it, developing it, and clarifying it without objectifying it and placing it in an alien frame. This is what phenomenology means to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; and even Heidegger, strongly influenced by the German, transcendental tradition, has abandoned the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction. (140)

He further writes that "the aim of phenomenology is to penetrate through all these disguises and concealments (of ordinary language) to the things themselves, to uncover them, and to discover what they really mean." (141)

In describing how the phenomenologist does this work of discovery, Wild explains three epochés or bracketings which are original with him and

(139) Ibid., p. 31. (140) Ibid., p. 34. (141) Ibid., p. 34.
quite different from the three bracketings of Husserl. First, we must bracket our own personal feelings whenever we want to discover the individual or cultural event of another. We must go directly to the thing itself without being hampered by personal bias. Second, we must move from an individual or cultural event to the meaning of this event for the human world. We must bracket the individual and examine the meaning of the thing for all men. Third, we must even bracket, our opinion about the human world and become open to a wider horizon which Wild calls "the world". In this epoche, he seeks to get beyond Human meaning to the meaning of a possible transcendent other. As we shall see in part four of this section, this is his natural theology or way to God.

Thus, philosophy can be both existential and phenomenological for Wild. As we see how he treats existence, freedom, and God this will become more clear. But for the moment, we shall briefly see why Wild appreciates William James as phenomenologist and existentialist in order to better understand Wild's philosophy.

Wild now understands "philosophy as a description and interpretation of our existence as it is lived in the concrete, and, therefore, in closer touch with the actual philosophic process that is ever proceeding in living men." (142) He thinks that James understood philosophy in this way also and thus, "in his own way contributed to every one of the major phases of existentialist thought that we have mentioned." (143) Wild observes how

(142) Ibid., p. 28. (143) Ibid., p. 29.
James protested also against Hegel and that ivory tower philosophy which is separated from concrete and subjective existence. Wild's appreciation of James is well put in his own words:

Constantly on his guard against subjectivism, he was able to describe these phenomena and to catch their tone and existential style. Like other existential thinkers before and after him, he realized that freedom lay deeper in our human being than any mere difference of a single faculty, the will; he devoted a lifelong attention to it, and in his Psychology identified it basically with the direction of mental attention to a single object of Concern. Always skeptical of the traditional dualism of mind vs. body, he struggled constantly to grasp human behaviour integrally in a way that would do justice to both its "mental" as well as its "physical" aspects, and often used the word "existence" to grasp them in their being together.

Perceiving rightly that we cannot get outside our lived existence to make up propositions which may agree or disagree with it, he worked out many penetrating criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth. While he never arrived at a satisfactory formulation of his own pragmatic theory, he was right in groping for a more primordial kind of truth, which directly reveals our existence in the world as we live it, and which is confirmed by its historical fruitfulness. Like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and other existential philosophers, he recognized the fragility and essential finitude of our human existence of any guiding faith. Though in his own country, James's ideas have been buried by different trends of thought associated with the word "pragmatism," they have been deeply studied and cultivated in Europe where, as we shall see, they have contributed to the movement now known as phenomenology.(144)

Having seen the relation between Wild's philosophy and that of James, we shall now examine what Wild means by philosophy as therapeutic. Consider his statement "Academic philosophy, as we can see in the Platonic portrait of Socrates, was first conceived as a therapeutic discipline which should try to clarify and to purify this process of primary thinking that constantly goes on in every man." (145) In order to understand the therapeutic value of philosophy let us begin with the difference between primary thinking

(144) Ibid., p. 30.  
(145) Ibid., p. 89.
and secondary reflection.

Wild writes,

Primary thought is spontaneous, always concerned and interested, often creative, but uncritical. It is to this type of thought that we owe the first original answers that have been given to the ambiguities and agonies of life. But when left to itself, without criticism, this style of reflection becomes provincial, fanatical, and closed to what is universally human. Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is reflective and disinterested, self-conscious, critical, and open to the universal. It is through this type of secondary reflection, when it is in touch with the former, that fanaticism is avoided, and our existence in the life-world is kept open and free. When left to itself, however, it becomes abstract sterile, and uncreative. (146)

Now notice the words "when it is in touch with the former."

Wild is scandalized by philosophy or secondary reflection when it separates itself from the world of primary thought and seeks to construct a world of its own. Philosophy should be a clarification and criticism of the vital processes of the Lebenswelt. It should not reject the data of lived experience as sloppy and confused and if it does it must become artificial and sterile. According to Wild the philosopher phenomenologically performs his three epoches and thus, reflects on the primary thought of the Lebenswelt. To become abstracted from this life world is the philosophical error. The philosopher, therefore, must not be a system builder but a describer of life's process.

In fact, following James, Wild even speaks of a "primary philosophic process that actually goes on in every living man throughout the

(146) Ibid., p. 62.
waking hours, and as we now know, often through the sleeping hours of his
daily life." (147) Thus, Wild considers philosophy not only to be on the
level of secondary reflection but also on the level of primary thought. He
writes that there is an "actual philosophic process which is always proceeding
in the lives of living men." (148) As a result, Philosophy can have "vital
contact with art, literature, and religion, and with the other living
institutions of our culture." (149)

At this point, we might ask how does Wild's philosophy differ
from art, literature, religion, etc? Since we have an implicit primary
knowledge in our very activity and since this is made explicit in art,
literature, etc., why aren't these also philosophy? Wild tries to answer
this by showing that philosophy is neither sciencenor merely art, literature,
etc. He writes that philosophy "is not concerned with scientific facts of
nature but, like history, literature, and the fine arts, with world-facts of
the Lebenswelt. Unlike these disciplines, however, it is not so much
concerned with individual acts of freedom, and particular views of the
world, as with those general limiting conditions under which freedom is
always exercised, and the structure of the world itself, such as world-space,
world-time, historicity, choice, and death." (150)

That philosophy is not science is quite understandable in Wild's
context and will become even more clear when we consider the philosophic study
of existence. However, it is now time to consider Wild's concept of freedom

(147) Ibid., p. 62.       (148) Ibid., p. 79.       (149) Ibid., p. 79.
(150) Ibid., p. 228.
and this consideration will, I think, shed new light on the difference between Wild's philosophy and art, literature, etc.

Wild claims that Philosophy is "the discipline of freedom." (151) In order to understand this, we shall begin by seeing why he considers world understanding to be free. At this point, we shall not see in detail what Wild means by lived-world since that is to be taken up in the next part. However, he thinks that everyone has a lived-world which he has freely constituted and which, therefore, "requires a free method of active participation and interpretation" (152) if it is to be understood. In his own words:

This method has always been used, at least half-consciously, by the best practitioners of the human disciplines, but recently it has been further refined and clarified by Husserl and his followers. As we have observed, in order to understand any human phenomenon, like the magic and myths of a primitive people, a critical decision on the part of a living person, or even a past experience of his own, the phenomenologist must first free himself from his present biases and preferences bracketing them, as is said, or putting them out of action so far as this is possible. Only by exercising this free act of self-negation or epoche, as it is called, do we gain access to the phenomenon as it was lived and understood by the agents themselves. But this is not the whole story. After this, another epoche is necessary. Once again, we must try to free ourselves from the limitations of these difference versions by gaining a distance from them, and by asking the question: what do they really mean? Only in this way can we finally open ourselves to the sense of the phenomenon as it really is in the world. We cannot understand the free acts of men without ourselves participating in this same freedom.

I believe that this exercise of free understanding is the peculiar characteristic of philosophy among the other academic sciences and subjects. Many of them are concerned with the construction of pure theories which should correspond with the objective facts. Others, more practical and technological, are concerned with the control over nature. But philosophy is concerned with the life-world of man

(152) Ibid., p. 122.
and its free constitution. It is, in a special sense, the discipline of freedom. Making use of the phenomenological method we have just described, we see that it attempts to understand this world of man, its common structures, its varying modes, and its multiple manifestation. (153)

I find it difficult to understand what Wild means here. The difficulty begins with his interpretation of the phenomenological method. If we experience existence and the lived-world on the level of primary thought, how are we going to keep from distorting them if we seek to understand them phenomenologically by means of the three epoches. It seems to me that this secondary reflection is the very objectification of the thing which Wild is trying to avoid. It seems that the very distance from the thing which the second bracketing implies is a failure to be with the thing itself as it really is.

Secondly, I fail to see how we can understand the free acts of other men if we stand back from them. Wild says we must participate in their freedom and as he indicates in other places, this must be by means of the imagination which we employ with the bracketing. However, it would seem that we must become involved with them more completely than by just the imagination.

At this point, I think a major weakness in Wild's method begins to show itself. Because he doesn't really appreciate intersubjectivity, his few statements which creep in such as the last sentence of this paragraph, lack meaning. He cannot really explain participation in terms of bracketing. He hasn't really merged the risky plunge into being with the bracketing and

(153) Ibid., p. 122-123.
But getting back to our subject, Wild would maintain that philosophy is free because world understanding is free. World understanding is free because the life world of man is freely constituted. We give meaning to our worlds. The philosopher "is especially concerned with the process of free understanding by which these world-versions are constituted, and by the common conditions such as life-space, human time, history, death, meaning, and existence itself, under which this freedom is exercised." (154) But what is freedom?

Wild associates the words spontaneous, active and indeterminate with freedom. A free act must be spontaneous or "independent and self originating within the agent." (155) It must not be merely passive and receptive. If I am pushed about, restricted or obsessed, I am to that degree not free. Also, freedom is indeterminant. There must be alternatives. If I can do only one thing then I am not free. Wild defines freedom as an active-being-open-to-what-is-other.

Wild claims that philosophy is the discipline of freedom and singles out three of its characteristics in order to show how each is free. First, philosophy is free because it is speculative and systematic. In working out his own version of the world the philosopher must keep himself free from assumptions and presuppositions. To exist unwittingly in the world frame of another is to be a mental slave. Philosophy in its speculative

(154) Ibid., p. 124.  
(155) Ibid., p. 127.
aspect is also free because it is the guardian of Freedom and independence. "Philosophy is not an objective science. It is rather the guardian of human integrity and independence. When understood in this way, the history of philosophy appears neither as a mere chaos of conflicting views nor as a procession of unrivaled dogmatisms. It is rather a perpetual search for world-understanding, and that personal freedom of mind on which such understanding depends." (156)

Next, philosophy should be free in its linguistic and logical functions. The philosopher should be open to the worlds of others and thus, the importance of public discourse and communication. "The existence of a free society depends on communication in depth by free men. The difficulties here are basically of a philosophical order. Of all the different academic disciplines, philosophy is in the most favorable position to give us aid. Once again these facts suggest that philosophy is the discipline of freedom." (157)

Philosophy is also free in its critical function. Men like Socrates and Kant question every supposition and every manifestation of dogmatism in order to keep philosophy open and free. Philosophy "represents neither life, nor truth, nor goodness, nor beauty; nothing, indeed, but the spirit of freedom on earth, the self-transcendence of man." (158) Whenever philosophy claims to have arrived at an absolute, unchangeable truth or system it becomes scandalous. Its goal is to free men for progressive understanding.

Philosophy is distinguished from the other arts and sciences because of its special relation to freedom. They all have a more confined goal and are concerned with something more narrow than the freedom of man. Philosophy seeks spontaneously, actively and indeterminately to grasp the whole of the life-world and not merely a fragment of it.

From this it is evident that Wild does not reduce freedom to a characteristic of the will. It is also a characteristic of understanding. Freedom does not depend on understanding alone but freedom is the very source of understanding. Man can creatively construct his life world because he is free. Because man is open to the other, he can go beyond himself. He is open not only to facts but also to meaning. The Academy has as its duty to protect this freedom of man. It should defend and result in a fuller life world. In its therapeutic function it purifies primary understanding and frees one from its suppositions. Thus, philosophy freely constitutes and maintains the life world. But now to better understand this free philosophy, let us examine the world it knows or the existence it creates.

Wild is interested in existence in the Kierkegaardian sense of "subjective" lived experience. Hence, it cannot be known objectively from without but only from within. He approaches the problem of being by a study of personal existence as concretely lived. This person is always the center of a world which is permeated by care, human space, human time and other structures which Wild thinks can be known philosophically. But before we consider these structures individually, we shall first study what he means by lived-world, world fact, world meaning and world truth.
He develops his idea of the lived-world by contrasting it with the objective or scientific world. He thinks the lived-world has been rejected as an object of philosophic study since the time of Plato who considered it to be the shadow world. Until the present day, Wild thinks that philosophy has been scientific by which he means that philosophers have abstracted from the whole of experience in order to understand a certain objective segment. These scientific philosophers have rejected the subjective and reduced all being to an object. But the lived-world, which even every scientist lives in, is not a things, it is "an ultimate horizon within which all such objects and the individual person himself are actually understood in the 'natural attitude' of everyday life." (159)

This 'natural attitude' includes all kinds of primary knowing such as feeling, thought, imagination and any natural power. The primary aspect of this attitude is the care which constitutes the order of the world. This pen is for writing; that shovel for digging. If an object is for something, it is part of the lived-world. In order to better understand this lived-world, we shall follow Wild in his distinction between scientific facts and world facts.

World facts are concrete, independent of any special mode of approach and subjectively experienced from within. Scientific facts on the other hand, are abstract, partially dependent on special modes of observation and purely objective. This, of course, is in keeping with Wild's distinction

(159) Ibid., p. 41
between primary knowledge and secondary reflection. World facts are known by primary knowledge; scientific facts by secondary reflection. Wild calls the first type of facts world facts because they appear on the unlimited horizon of the world. Science has more restricted horizon which in its quest for objectivity deprives world facts of their ambiguity and openness. It doesn't see them as stretched out in time but it is content with broken off segments. The facts of science are not temporal and existential.

But there are more than world facts; there are world meanings. By a fact Wild refers to "any bit of evidence that is forced upon our attention, whether we will or not...They are disparate and disorganized." (160) Meaning, on the other hand, is "the result of a unique interchange between man and the independent things and persons around him." (161) By this understanding of meaning, Wild rejects both the traditional realistic and idealistic understanding of meaning. Meaning does not exist independently in nature to be received by an empty and passive mind nor is it created do novo by the human mind.

As with facts, there are two kinds of meanings: the world and the scientific. Scientific meanings are again abstract and partial rather than global. They are causal and allow for predictability. But world meaning or interpretation does not aim at prediction and causal control; it seeks merely to understand.

This world understanding begins with world facts in their

(160) Ibid., p. 66. (161) Ibid., p. 69.
immediacy, but it goes beyond them. According to Wild, it is achieved by the second epi-phase which we previously mentioned. Here the phenomenologist seeks to clarify "those structures like time, history, freedom, death, and world itself, which seem to belong necessarily to human existence, and thus, to make any human world version possible." (162) World meanings are called forth in our daily struggle with alien forces "by a creative factor in man, which takes account of the facts and yet goes on beyond them." (163) Meanings are always open to further questioning, clarification, deepening and reinterpretation.

Now, together with world fact and world meaning, there is also world truth. Wild thinks that a certain understanding of the facts can be called true if it will hold up in time, if it is fruitful, if it calls forth authentic existence in history. Thus, the criterion for world truth is not correspondence as it is for objective truth but rather authenticity. World truth depends on how we hold the patterns of world meaning and how we live them through.

Thus, the existence which Wild is interested in as a philosopher has the three levels of world fact, world meaning and world truth. But, this type of existence cannot be spoken of as the object of his philosophy. For it is precisely not an objective existence. Wild is interested in an unobjectified existence, in existence as it is lived, rather than as it is studied by the scientist. In order to see how he approaches this unobjectified existence, we shall single out the theme of anxiety from that list which

(162) Ibid., p. 73.       (163) Ibid., p. 73.
which includes: world, body, situationality, guilt, death, etc.

Following Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Wild points out what anxiety is by contrasting it with fear. I am afraid of a definite thing for a definite reason. But when the anxious person is questioned what he is anxious about, he answers 'nothing' and he is right. One is anxious about no-thing but about the whole of his existence in the world. It reveals the difference between oneself as a function and as a person.

However, anxiety is a state which can be evaded. One can replace his anxiety by derived forms of fear. In short, he can flee his personal existence. He can escape from that which threatens the whole of his being-to-the-end (in Heidegger's words) by deciding to be sensible and to go about his business. If he, thus, becomes a 'business man' rather than a person, he loses the anxiety and also the freedom to which anxiety is the gateway.

Wild doesn't develop in detail the relation between anxiety and freedom but seems to expect one to go to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. In fact, he merely hints at the meaning of all the structures of the lived-world. In fact, this regard he never goes beyond the summary work that he did in The Challenge of Existentialism.

However, he has worked out a type of existential proof for the existence of God based upon the dialectical tension between freedom and order, which we should now examine in order to further understand the basic notions of his philosophy. We shall examine this proof under three aspects: first, we shall see that it is the only type of proof which Wild thinks will
arrive at a personal God. Second, we shall see that Wild means by existential proof. Third, we shall state his proof.

Before beginning his proof, Wild comments on the distinction of Pascal between the God of the Philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. He agrees with Pascal that these two Gods are not the same. He states specifically that the approach to God of the Cartesians and the Idealists is irrelevant and reductionistic. By this, he means that because of their objective, rationalistic, reasoning process, they do not really prove the existence of the real personal God of the religious man. They reduce this personal God to a thing. It seems that he would also level this critique against Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas. However, in the next section when we take up his critique of Thomism, we shall consider this in detail. But for now let it suffice to say that Wild doesn’t think that previous philosophic arguments for the existence of God are valid because they reduce God to a thing and, therefore, do not really reach Him.

However, Wild thinks that the task of proving God's existence is not hopeless for the philosophers. He thinks that the phenomenological existentialist is able to do this. This is so because his method is not objectively rationalistic and reductive in the traditional manner. But what is this method? What is an existential proof?

Wild states that this kind of argument has two parts. First, the philosopher states and describes as accurately as he can certain facts which are familiar in some degree to almost all men. Second, he reflects on
these facts and sees that they point to what he is proving. In his own words,

The following argument will proceed in this manner. It will start with certain lived experiences, or world facts, as we have called them, with which we are all familiar. It will then attempt to clarify the meaning of these facts. This is what is meant by an existential argument. (164)

The world fact with which Wild begins is "the restlessness of our existence-in-the-world, which drives us beyond any fixed form or pattern and works in us as a first, creative ferment in our human history." (165) Wild describes the history of philosophy as an example of this restlessness. There is a quest for meaning which works at the center of human history. This quest results in a theory which man hopes will enable him to interpret all the facts. But as soon as the order of the theory is established other facts are seen which are unexplained and revolution sets in. Because of his openness to these other facts men is in search of a new system. Thus, man's history is marked by a dialectic between freedom and order.

The next fact which he considers is one that has been learned from this history of creative disillusionment.

It has been discovered that forms of undiluted tyranny and those of anarchic freedom are unworkable. Only those patterns which combine a maximum of freedom together with a maximum of order seem to be authentically human. But these words express an ideal that can be only remotely approximated, and no institutional order that has ever been, or ever will be actually established, seems likely to escape from the force of creative criticism. (166)

Stating this in another way, he writes,

Pure freedom, after negating every fixed pattern, becomes uncreative, and wastes itself away. Unity, on the other hand, as soon as it is established and freed from tension, becomes rigid and dies. Freedom needs order, and unity needs freedom, but in the imperfect modes which we can achieve, neither can bear the other. And yet as long as we remain human, we are lured toward a perfect order and a perfect freedom which would somehow coincide. (167)

Next, Wild asks himself what is the ultimate sense of this restless tension between freedom and unity. In answer to this question, he writes that "that being-open-to-otherness which lies at the heart of this dialectic leads toward what is wholly other—radically transcendent... It is moving from the passive, uncreative, determinate, and multiple toward an infinite which is active, creative, indeterminate, and purely one."(168)

In concluding, he writes,

The conclusion of the argument is this: the free action which lies at the heart of cultural, and even more of individual history, points to a transcendent unity, which is the ultimate, creative source of meaning and being, and of the unity of the world. (169)

Wild calls this an argument of motion rather than notion. In order to be convinced by it, one must experience it. He thinks that many men do and he cites examples of it such as religious conversion, or the appreciation of a new and wider philosophic viewpoint.

In concluding this section, I would remark that this argument of Wild's seems to be colored with a certain optimism. It seems that he is arguing from a felt need to a fact. He seems to say that we have a need for
the transcendent and infinite other and, therefore, it is. Maybe there wouldn't even by any meaning unless this ultimate ground of meaning existed. But Wild seems to assume that things do have meaning. I would agree with him in this. But, I doubt if Sartre would. This argument merely reaffirms the conviction of the believer in meaning.

Having examined Wild's realism and his Lebenswelt philosophy, we shall now consider the relation between these two positions by observing how he criticizes realism as a Lebenswelt philosopher. In order to do this, we shall see how he criticizes St. Thomas and two contemporary Thomists. For this information, we shall use his essay, *Christian Rationalism*. We shall divide his criticism of St. Thomas into four parts concerning knowledge, being, God and man.

Wild begins his essay by writing that St. Thomas' purpose was to synthesize Greek philosophy and Christian faith. He describes how these two traditions differed and how they converged in St. Thomas. St. Augustine was the chief representative of Christian theology. In many ways, he was an existentialist. He held that faith, not reason, was the foundation of Christianity. Religion was not to be understood as a theory but as a way of life. However, when the philosophical texts of the Greeks and Arabians were translated into Latin the scholars of Western Europe saw a new vision. "This opened their minds to the possibility of a purely rational exploration of the realm of nature, unfettered by any dogmas of faith, and inaugurated
a long and bitter struggle between rational science and faith." (170) Wild
goes on to argue that St. Thomas was deeply influenced by the Greek scientific
spirit and as a result "his great synthesis was weighted heavily on the
Aristotelian side and there were few Augustinians, familiar with his works,
who failed to see that it was inspired by Athens rather than by Jerusalem." (171)

St. Thomas' procedure was guided from beginning to end by the
Aristotelian concept of science. Wild writes that,

"Aquinas follows Aristotle in defending the notion of an absolutely
empty reason which can assimilate the natures of all things and
apprehend the whole cosmic order from a detached point of view
outside the world." (172)

Of course, Wild puts special emphasis on the detachment of science. Since
it disregards the knowledge of involvement because it considers it to be
unscientific, Wild is opposed to the scientific procedure of St. Thomas.
He thinks, as we have seen, that man has a type of knowledge as a result of
his being involved in the world that can be philosophic even though it isn't
scientific. As a result of this knowledge of involvement, the Lebenswelt
philosopher thinks that he alone can justly treat human existence, freedom,
time, etc.

Thus, Wild argues that this "pure, theoretical knowledge" (173)
of St. Thomas receives only the formal structures of things. It is incapable
of grasping existence. Wild writes, St. Thomas' "approach is basically

(171) Ibid., p. 44. (172) Ibid., p. 45. (173) Ibid., p. 45.
formalistic, and he starts with a definition, not a description." (174)

For this reason,

"his major writings lack any vital flavor of concrete existence and are remote from the facts of history. In his theology, it is the Platonism of Augustine rather than his biblical thinking that he follows. In spite of many alternations and adaptations in a Christian direction, his system is a great expression of Greek rationalism." (175)

Also Wild thinks that this scientific knowledge of St. Thomas is purely passive. It only

"Absorbs the forms of things as they already are and must be, and then expresses them in the form of objective judgments. When functioning properly, it is never active in the sense of being original or creative." (176)

Wild also thinks that this

"theoretical assimilation even plays an essential role in what Aristotle called practical reason, for it determines the whole world frame in which the action is to take place, and sets the end. We choose and deliberate only about the means, never justifiably about the natural end." (177)

So Wild levels the charges of formalism and rationalism against Thomas' scientific approach to philosophy. He thinks that Thomas has restricted himself to a merely passive type of knowledge which will not adequately treat the lived-world and the life of faith. He thinks that Thomas in some way hinders practical reason by restricting it with theoretical reason. Thus, he is hinting at a weakness in Thomas' ethics. Of course, Wild will also criticize his theories of being, God and man because they are based on this

(174) Ibid., p. 50.  
(175) Ibid., p. 51.  
(176) Ibid., p. 45.  
(177) Ibid., p. 45.
faulty concept of philosophic knowledge.

In a manner which reminds one of Heidegger's theme concerning the forgetfulness of being, Wild summarizes in a short paragraph all that he thinks St. Thomas had to say about being and concludes,

"Aside from this, Aquinas has little to say about being, though he pays it high compliments. He conceives of it as an objective presence before the mind or as the possibility of such a presence. That which cannot be brought before the mind or the senses in this way does not exist." (178)

Thus, Wild thinks that Thomas has objectified being. Thomas says that it is the first and widest of all concepts and that it cannot be defined. It is a concept which even includes God by analogy. "In the case of finite entities, it is the act which brings them out of the imperfect state of potency and places them among things." (179) But to Wild this type of meditation on being is sterile. It is blind to the being of the lived-world. St. Thomas' philosophical and theological writings "are highly impersonal, objective, and abstract and convey little sense of passion, or, indeed, of any human existential feeling." (180) In short, Wild thinks that,

"Aquinas says that being is very important, and he even implies in certain statements that it is more important than essence (whatness). But they are hard to reconcile with his apparently unqualified acceptance of Aristotelian rationalism and formalism." (181)

Wild also criticizes St. Thomas' proofs for the existence of God and his theory concerning the attributes of God. He begins with a few remarks concerning Thomas' concept of the world. Since these are so individual, I shall quote them in full.

"Aquinas, like Aristotle, was never able to understand how any finite being, even a living organism, can move itself. Hence, every finite motion and every finite act which realizes a potentiality must have an external cause that is already in act. Otherwise, something would happen without a reason, the cosmos would be reduced to chaos, and ultimately the law of contradiction would be violated. These rules of objective human thinking are regarded by Aquinas as ontological principles which actually govern all the events of nature and history. This consistent application of the Aristotelian causal principle leads to a strangely static conception of a universe heavily guarded and hemmed in by formal chains. Nothing can be brought into existence unless there is a definite essence already there in potency and ready to receive it. And even while it exists, it cannot move unless there are causes already thereto bring it into act. In this strictly ordered cosmos, existence seems to be dealt out grudgingly and only under carefully restricted conditions." (182)

Then, he writes,

"God is the single exception. He alone can act without restriction. In fact, He must necessarily do so, for His essence is the pure act of being." (183)

Next, Wild states that according to Thomas the existence of God "can be syllogistically demonstrated." (184) After very briefly stating the nature of such demonstration, Wild writes,

"But is the act of existing always predetermined by a prior whatness? How do we know that the universe is rational? Must it correspond exactly to our habits of objective, logical reflection? Except for references to the authority of the philosopher, Aquinas gives us no answer to these questions. As Pascal noted, they make no contact with the intuitive feeling of our lived existence and are, therefore, singularly lacking in persuasive power." (185)

Only in the light of this last statement, can I understand some of the statements which Wild just made above. Perhaps, his point is that objective reasoning and demonstration is not personally moving. Perhaps, he

is saying there is another type of ontology which describes the world we know in experience more aptly. Perhaps he is merely trying to emphasize in a phetorical way that there is another philosophical way of knowing the existence of God which is more convincing.

Wild is also critical concerning of St. Thomas' notion of the divine attributes. First, he thinks that Thomas' notion of analogy leads to anthropomorphism and a diluting of divine transcendence. Concerning Thomas' theory, he asks, "is man made in the image of this divinity, or is it not rather true, as Feuerbach suggested, that God is a great construction made in the image of man?" (186) Wild thinks that Thomas' lack of respect on the philosophic level for God's transcendence is again the result of Greek influence. After naming the various attributes which Thomas deduces from the conclusion of his causal arguments Wild writes,

"He is even referred to in strictly Aristotelian terms as the unmoved mover. This Greek emphasis on immobile changelessness is hard to reconcile with the living God of Christian faith, and the cautious hemming-in of existential activity by essences and causes, as we have noted, seems out of key with the Christian conceptions of generosity and love." (187)

Again Wild writes Aquinas',

"God does not speak to us from remote heights far beyond our knowledge. He does not lure us on to new thoughts and creative endeavor. He seems to think very much like Plato and Aristotle, and instead of urging us to break our chains and to go on our way, he seems rather to tighten them and to admonish us to look back and stay as we were." (188)

Thus, Wild thinks that Thomas' philosophy does not allow him to do justice to the God of his faith and experience. Because of his scientific

approach Thomas could not treat of a personal God. Wild writes that, "While Aquinas expressed a deep sense of mystery in his famous hymns and in cryptic statements about his life work, this is not evident in his philosophical and theological writings." (189)

Of course, this Greek rationalism also had an effect on Thomas' theory of man. It allowed Thomas to treat of man only as a thing. Wild writes:

"Thus, in his treatise on man in the *Summa Theologiae*, he pays little or no attention to human existence in the world and makes little effort to catch the feeling and atmosphere of this existence. As he sees it, this is too confused and variable, and he follows his master, Aristotle, in holding that there is no science of the individual. His approach is basically formalistic, and he starts with a definition, not a description." (190)

Thus, again Wild makes the same basic criticism. Thomas would not allow himself as a philosopher to use affective knowledge of the Lebenswelt and thus, his treatment of man was inadequate. Wild writes that for Thomas, "Man is not a world. He is rather a material substance, or thing, in the world among other things, which is living, animal, and finally rational." (191)

Wild thinks Thomas too scientific. He never really meets Thomas.

After making these criticisms, Wild is quick to urge that he greatly respects the penetrating and wide-ranging mind of Aquinas. He tells how he admires his "shrewd capacity for making fine distinctions with some basis in observation." (192) But then, he reminds us that we should not

(189) Ibid., p. 48.  (190) Ibid., p. 49.  (191) Ibid., p. 50.
(192) Ibid., p. 51.
follow Aquinas in his mistakes and with this launches an attack upon Maritain and Gibson whom he thinks have done this.

Wild begins by pointing out how Gilson and Maritain have referred to Thomism as "the only authentic existentialism." In order to show what they mean by this, he gives a short review of Maritain's book *Existence and the Existent*. Here Maritain states that Thomism is "the only authentic existentialism" because of "'the primacy which authentic Thomism accords to existence and to the intuition of existential being' over essence and because of the many defects he finds in contemporary existentialism." (193) Wild describes the two most basic charges which Maritain brings against existentialism, namely, "an exclusive concern with the subjective and a rebellion against the light of reason." (194) Then, Wild points out that Maritain opposes the existentialist ethics because "'by repudiating speculation in favor of action...it becomes voluntaristic', that is, it encourages a blind action with no concern for its natural end." (195) Also Maritain thinks that "the moral teaching of existentialism is "'an absurd abyss of pure and formless liberty." (196)

Next, Wild refutes Maritain's refutation of existentialism. He begins by pointing out Maritain has misunderstood the term 'existence' as the existentialists are using it. Maritain distinguishes essence and existence and then in opposition to certain essentialists emphasizes existence. But the

existentialists do not use existence in this way at all. In fact, they even cut below the very distinction between essence and existence. When they use the term 'existence' they refer to a human way of being which is temporal and ecstatic.

"Maritain has not seen that it is the traditional concept of being as objective presence before the mind that is being questioned. The issue is far more basic than he believes." (197)

So according to Wild, Thomism is not "the only authentic existentialism". In fact, it is not an existentialism at all. Maritain has misused the term.

In answer to Maritain's objection that existentialism is a subjectivist philosophy Wild points out that according to the examination of the phenomenologists there is no such thing as a subjective objective dichotomy. On the contrary "human existence is intentional or relational in character, stretched out spatially and temporally into a moving field of care." (198)

"I am where my attention is riveted, where my care is taking me, in some region of the human world. I am in this world not objectively, as a paper is in the drawer or as a drop of water is in a glass. I am in this world as a field of care, as say that a young doctor is in medicine or that a boy is in love.

"I am not first locked up in a private subjectivity from which I emerge by special process of "knowledge" which take me out of myself. This subjectivist picture, which M. Maritain shares with the central tradition of Western thought, has led only to absurd and unanswerable questions as to whether there is any external world at all. The existential thinkers have not merely rejected this false construction; they have lucidly described many phases of our relational existence in the light of constraining evidence. They have shown that man is stretched out into a world from which, as long as he exists, he can never be separated. Theoretical knowing and speaking presuppose this world. They are themselves special ways of being in the world.

"...Not only is existential philosophy not subjectivist; it has now gone further in working out a radically non-subjectivist view of human..."

(197) Ibid., p. 57. (198) Ibid., p. 57.
existence in the world than all those traditional forms of objectivism which have a kernel of subjectivism at their very root." (199)

Concerning Maritain's charge that existentialism is a rebellion against the light of reason Wild shows how he thinks "that this world of our lived existence is an 'unknowable abyss' and that the disciplined attempt to explore it by the so-called methods of phenomenology leads to a 'destruction of the intellect!" (200) Then Wild indicates that such a statement of Maritain merely shows the weakness of his philosophical position. The existentialists have shown that subjective existence can be explored. They have done it.

Maritain thinks that existentialism is irrational because of the way in which he defines reason. For him it is the "examination and analysis of objects that can be brought before the mind and senses." (201) However, Wild thinks that reason is "Discovering and bringing into the light the truth of things and existents, wherever and however they are." (202) Consequently, "the disciplined exploration of the life-world, which has only recently begun, is an eminently rational enterprise." (203)

Concerning Maritain's objections to existentialist ethics, Wild begins by saying that as a result of certain findings of clinical psychology the existentialists oppose the traditional distinction between intellect and will. Then, he goes on to argue that "freedom is by no means restricted to a single faculty, the will." (204) The history of philosophy itself shows that

man has a certain freedom of mind "which enables him to rebel against crystallized ideologies and to work out a way of life and understanding for himself, responsibly." (205) Even the lived-world is pervaded with freedom and just because,

"existential thinking has found no evidence sufficient to support the claim that there are objective norms and principles valid for all mankind, irrespective of the different histories and circumstances of different groups, ... there is no reason to say that it advocates 'a pure and formless liberty.'" (206)

The existentialist idea of freedom does imply responsibility in a definite way.

"Value is to be found in existing. Therefore, we can say that any personal existence that evades or suppresses the lasting limits and conditions of this existence is not truly human or authentic." (207)

In conclusion Wild writes,

"This must suffice as a brief indication of the kind of answer that might be given, in a fuller discussion, to the moral charges made by M. Maritain against existential philosophy." (208)

Thus, we have seen how Wild attacks the old position which he once defended. Even as late as his second phase of realism when he wrote The Challenge of Existentialism he argued much like Maritain with his distinction between essence and existence, essentialism and existentialism. As a result of our examination of his objections to realism, we can see how the two periods of Wild's career differ.

In ending we must say a word about Wild's critique of Thomism. St. Thomas clearly saw the difference between what Wild calls Lebenswelt

(205) Ibid., p. 63.  (206) Ibid., p. 63  (207) Ibid., p. 63.  
(208) Ibid., p. 62.
knowledge and rational knowledge. But Thomas never thought that the former could be philosophical. But his reason for this was not just a simple acceptance of Greek rationalism. In fact, as Thomas clearly points out in his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius he himself disagrees with the very rationalism of the Greeks which Wild accuses him of. He tries to go beyond them and discover a way of exploring existence philosophically. (209) Wild does not appreciate this.

(209) Ibid.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by David Goicoechea has been read and approved by the director of the thesis. Furthermore, the final copies have been examined by the director and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jan 26, 1969
Date

[Signature]
Signature of Adviser