The Human Person

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THE HUMAN PERSON

by

Thomas P. Fogarty (Brother Ronald, F.M.S.)

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LIFE

Born in Broken Hill, N.S.W., Australia, Thomas P. Fogarty (Brother Ronald, F.M.S.), did his undergraduate studies (B.A. and B.S.) at the University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. Pursuing post-graduate studies at the same institution, he completed his B.Ed. and Ph.D. in 1957. Later he did further post-graduate work in educational administration (Dip, Ed. Admin.) at the New England University, Armidale, New South Wales.

Coming to the United States in 1966 on a Fullbright scholarship, he pursued a master's program in psychology at Loyola University and then engaged in post-doctoral studies at the Research Center on Psychotherapy and Counseling at the University of Chicago.

Elected a fellow of the Australian College of Education in 1965, Brother Ronald was the recipient of the Britannica Award in 1966 for distinguished contribution to scholarship in Australia. He is the author, among other things, of the definitive work on Catholic education in Australia and the history of religious orders in that country.

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CHAPTER 1
THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE SOCIAL INSTITUTION

The individual today stands over against a rapidly changing society. Sometimes he has the feeling that he is standing alone or that in some way he is rapidly getting out beyond his depth. The prospect alarms him. Contemplating the sphere of his human autonomy being invaded by the encroaching organizational structures of the society in which he lives, and his future being shaped by cultural determinants over which he seems to have less and less control, he becomes uneasy and disquieted. Less confident than formerly in the rapidly expanding limits of his knowledge and the amazingly ingenious skills of his advancing technology, he is more inclined at the moment to pause and question his human values. In this way man is becoming more aware of man; persons, of persons.

This awareness is apparent in many spheres of man's life—in industrial relations, in personnel management, in community planning, in family life, and even in international relations. It was apparent, for example, in the communications media of the world press after the Czechoslovakian affair of 1968, as it was with particular reference to industrial, commercial, and academic institutions in France and the U.S.A. at the end of the Summer of 1968. It was already apparent to a marked degree in the documents of the Second Vatican Council. The basic theme in fact of the first of these documents, the theme which sets the tone for all the rest, is exactly this: the Church's responsibility for upholding the importance, the dignity, and the value of the human person ("Lumen Gentium," referred to below as LG, 41).
In view of this new awareness of the dignity of man and particularly in view of the importance attached to the subject by the documents of Vatican II, this concept of the human person merits further investigation. This is the purpose of the study being undertaken.

Before pursuing the investigation, however, it is important, from the point of view of this study, not to consider the human person alone, but to place him in the social or institutional context within which he lives. In other words, it is important to develop some satisfactory conceptual framework against which the whole study can be projected. One such framework is that developed by Getzels and Guba at the University of Chicago (Getzels, Lipham, Campbell, 1968, p. 105). Based on the broader social theory of Talcott Parsons at Harvard, this framework serves admirably for placing the human person in the role he plays within the institution and then projecting that role against the broader cultural backgrounds of the institution on the one hand and of the individual on the other. For the particular purpose of the study at hand, however, a simpler, more precise framework seems preferable.

This can be developed from a few brief assumptions on the nature of man and his need for others. If it be assumed, first, that the human person is by nature social, that is, needs to relate to others—parents, wife, family, colleagues (professional, religious, political, recreational, cultural, and so on); secondly that he needs these for the full development of his potentialities, for his own fulfillment; and thirdly, as these two assumptions imply, that the sort of relationship envisaged here is a natural institution, and not something artificial or man-made; then, on the basis of these assumptions, it can be argued that the role of the organizational or
administrative structure of the institutions in which man lives is primarily to maintain this right relationship; that is, to maintain it in such a way that the natural ends of the person and the institution are best achieved. These three entities—the person, the institution or community (as we shall tend to call it), and the administration—are thus intimately related to each other.

From figure 1 it is to be noted (from the double arrows) that there is a mutual interdependence between the person and the community, and that this relationship is different in character (indicated by the broken lines) from that which exists between either the person or the community and the administration. From figure 1 it is also apparent that among these three entities there will be raised sooner or later a question of priority: is the person for the community, or vice versa? Or are both subordinate to the administration? Posed this way, the question would appear to be debatable. The answers given vary from place to place, from institution to institution, depending on the philosophy or ideology of the institution or organization concerned. Ultimately, it is a question of values. According to the Vatican documents, it is the person that enjoys the priority. "For the beginning, the subject, and the goal of all social institutions," claims The Church in the Modern World, "is and must be the human person, which for its part and by its very nature stands completely in need of the social life" (i.e., the community) ("Gaudium et Spes," referred to below as GS, 25). This claim does not originate from the document; it is lifted directly from St. Thomas Aquinas who in turn lifted it from Aristotle. The principle, in other words, goes back at least to the classical age of Greece; the
Figure 1: Relationship between person, community, and administration.
significant and, as the document would imply, timely emphasis given it here belongs very much to the present.

In re-affirming it today the Church is not initiating something new. As the Council says, she is merely "scrutinizing the signs of the times" (GS, 4), recognizing and understanding the world in which we live, "its expectations, its longings" (GS, 4). In the 1940s Pope Pius XII, with his finger sensitively on the pulse of society, saw modern man feeling within himself "a new awareness of his own personality, of his duties, of his rights"...and a "respect for the freedom of others (Christmas Discourse, 1945; Abbott, 1966, p. 677). In the years immediately before the Council John XXIII was emphasizing the same awareness (cf. "Pacem in Terris," 11 April 1963, AAS 55, p. 684). The documents of the Council spell it out in explicit terms. "A sense of the dignity of the human person," says the decree on Religious Freedom, "has been imposing itself more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man ("Dignitatis Humanae," referred to below as DH, 1). As a result, "modern man," in the words of The Church in the Modern World, finds himself "on the road to a more thorough development of his own personality, and to a growing discovery and vindication of his own rights" (GS, 41).

Much of this renewed interest in the dignity of the human person pre-dates the Vatican Council by a good number of years. A great deal of it is discernible in the more personalist-oriented philosophers: Kierkegaard, the Dane (1813-1855); the Germans, Husserl (1859-1938) (Spiegelberg, 1960) and Martin Heidegger (1889) (cf. Brock, 1949); and the French, Henri Bergson (1859-1941) (Lindsay, 1911), Gabriel Marcel (1889- ), and Paul Ricoeur; and especially in the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber (1878-1965) whose I and
Thou, appearing in 1923, and its subsequent elaboration in Between Man and Man have exerted wide influence in fields outside of philosophy (Friedman, 1960). The influence of Husserl's though is also discernible in the writings of man others—in the philosophers, Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; and in the existential psychologists, Ludwig Binswanger and F. Buynendijk.

Significant among American thinkers are the social philosopher George Herbert Mead and those whom he influenced at the University of Chicago. Among the psychologists was Otto Rank, one of Freud's Viennese disciples, who settled in America and worked with Jessie Taft at Philadelphia. Thanks to Rank and Alfred Adler, another of Freud's early students, the social or interpersonal dimensions missing in Freud's work were sketched in to the developing psychology of the person. Taken further and given a more practical application in the therapy of Harry Stack Sullivan (cf. Sullivan, 1947), this personalist orientation to therapy and the psychology of the person comes into its own in the personological writings of Karen Horney (cf. Horney, 1950), Erich Fromm (1964, 1968), and E. H. Erikson; and in the thinking and practice of contemporaries like A. W. Combs (Snygg and Combs, 1959), A. H. Maslow (1954), Sidney Jourard (1958), and Carl Rogers (1959).

In the fields of administration and personnel management the same trends are discernible. The personalist orientation is to be strongly noted in the thinking of writers like Chris Argyris (1957, 1962), D. McGregor (1960), Warren G. Bennis (1962), and in the training procedures developed by the National Training Laboratories (1964). Similar preoccupations are apparent in education—at the administration level in the research papers of
Andrew Halpin and Don Croft (1963); and at the actual teaching, pupil-care, and teacher-education levels, in a whole diversity of theorists and practitioners (Miles, 1967).

But this new awakening is not entirely extraneous to the Church. It is due, according to the Council, to something going on inside the Church as well, to the "ferment of the Gospel," which, as the documents claim, "continues to arouse in man's heart the irresistible requirements of his dignity" (GS, 12, 26, 60). Whatever the source, the Church's special task, according to the documents, is to "open up to man the meaning of his own existence... the innermost truth about himself" (GS, 41); to continue to interpret, "in the light of the gospel" and "in language intelligible to each generation" (GS, 41), what each generation is discovering. She does this in numerous places but nowhere more emphatically than in The Church in the Modern World, the whole first chapter of which is devoted to "dignity of the human person" (GS, 12).
CHAPTER 2

THE INTEGRAL PERFECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON: A BRIEF SURVEY

The preceding chapter dealt with some of the key propositions of the Vatican Council on the dignity of the human person. Citations from the conciliar documents drew attention to the new awareness in society at large of the significance of the human person. They also re-iterated the Council's own emphatic underscoring of the same awareness. Numerous references to "dignity of the human person" (GS, 12, 41), his "inviolable rights" (DH, 1), his priority in society (GS, 25), and so on, say a great deal about the importance of the human person, but they say little about the human person himself. When, therefore, The Church in the Modern World speaks of the "integral perfection of the human person" (GS, 59), several pertinent questions immediately spring to mind. First, what is to be understood by the term "human person" in general? Secondly, in particular and especially for the purpose of this essay, what is to be understood by his "integral perfection?" What composes it? What are the signs or attributes by which it can be recognized? Or the conditions under which it can be attained?

The answers to these questions are difficult to find. The documents offer no definition of the human person, neither do they advance any personological theory. Nor is this a lack. Just as the Church has been able to accommodate itself to diverse philosophies, so it can accommodate itself to diverse personologies. On this account it is not necessary, or is it possible, to go searching the documents for any neatly worked out theory. It is sufficient for our purposes to take up the second of the above questions.
and try to arrive at some idea of the "integral perfection" of the human person as conceived by the Vatican Council. In this chapter, therefore, it is proposed to make a rapid, somewhat cursory survey of the Council documents in order to arrive at an over-all picture or model (cf. Arnold, in Arnold and Gasson, 1954, p. 8) of the "integral perfection" of the human person. An outline of the principal characteristics can be sketched in here. Each of these characteristics can be elaborated in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 3-7).

The first of these is the attribute or characteristic of freedom. The documents speak at length about "the human person with his freedom," and advance the propositions that "only in freedom can man direct himself towards goodness" (GS, 17); only through freedom can he attain his true dignity ("Apostolicam Actuositatem," referred to below as AA, 8; and also John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra" in AAS 53 (1961), pp. 440-3). This freedom, moreover, extends to each aspect of his life—his "search for truth," his right to "voice his mind," even to "publicize it" (GS, 59).

A second dimension of our model is that of responsibility. Between it and freedom, there exists a positive linear correlation (DH, 1). The more the one is increased, the more the other is incurred (DH, 1). "Man has an inalienable responsibility for his own decisions and actions;" which responsibility, says an editorial note to the Abbott edition of the Conciliar documents, is "an essential counterpart of his freedom" (Abbott, 1966, p. 679).

A third element of the proposed outline, and one which in a sense follows from the first two, is the competency with which a human person relates to others. A social being by nature, the human person, according to
The Church in the Modern World, cannot approach the perfection of his being unless he has already developed some competence in his interpersonal relationships (GS, 12). The interpersonal competence envisaged here, however, is only an index to, or manifestation of, something far deeper and far more significant—the disposition to give oneself to the service of others (GS, 24).

Almost a result of the human person's greater freedom, sense of responsibility, and interpersonal skills is his greater human productivity, his greater efficiency in performance (GS, 35). A measure of the degree of perfection he has achieved as a "homo faber," this greater productivity is in many instances, according to The Church in the Modern World, also an index of his greater performance as an integral human person (GS, 35).

The fifth and final factor in this model of the "integral perfection of the human person" is what has been termed fulfillment. Given the due operation of the other four factors, this fulfillment normally follows automatically. In the case of the human person, however, it is different from the satisfaction experienced by the brute. In the latter, satisfaction follows automatically; in the former, it also follows automatically but only upon the proper exercise of the human person's responsibility in the pursuit of his final goal. The human person, Pope Paul VI points out in one of his post-conciliar encyclicals ("Progressio Populorum," referred to below as PP, 15), "endowed with intelligence and freedom," is "responsible for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation." The degree of fulfillment, moreover, is a sufficiently reliable index to the integrity he has achieved as a person.

Arranged in tabular form (see Table 1), these five attributes, along
TABLE 1
MODEL OF THE "INTEGRAL PERFECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON" ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENTS OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL II

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<td>Optatam Totius 11, 19</td>
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<td>EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY</td>
<td>Gaudium et Spes 10, 17, 33-39, 64, 84</td>
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with illustrative references set out in the right-hand column, provide a workable pattern of the human person in the light of the documents of Vatican II. Each of these attributes is developed further in the chapters below.

In view of the fact that the council, in putting forward these propositions on the "integral perfection" of the human person, claims to have been "scrutinizing the signs of the times" (GS, 4), it would be relevant, before rounding off this chapter, to investigate briefly what relationship there is between these propositions and the views of contemporary social scientists in this country.

Before launching into a comparative study of this sort, however, it is necessary to make an important distinction. This is the distinction between person and personality. It is to be noted that, whereas the documents speak generally of the person, some of the scientists in question tend to speak of personality. Strictly speaking, these two terms, person and personality, are not interchangeable. Personality, as Gasson conceives it in Arnold and Gasson's The Human Person (1954, p. 219), is "the patterned totality of powers, activities, and habits, uniquely organized by the person;" or as he points out elsewhere, the "distinctive configuration...of activities which is proper to and characteristic of the individual" (p. 168). This pattern of behavior, however, implies an agent who acts. This agent is the person. Personality, in other words, is not the person; it is what the person makes of himself. As Gasson summarizes it, personality is "the work of the person" (p. 168). From this it is clear that the conciliar documents are not talking generally about personality; they are talking about person. Neither is their use of the term "the integral perfection of the human person" referring
exactly to the uniquely organized qualities or characteristics that distinguish one personality from another. They are referring rather to the basic elements which constitute the conditions necessary for the proper development of the person. Viewed this way, the term personality, as used by the contemporary scientists cited above, refers more to the typical ways in which these conditions are utilized by the person concerned. A few illustrations will make this clear. David Riesman (1950) writes of the "autonomous person;" Abraham Maslow, borrowing from Kurt Goldstein (1939, 1940), speaks of the "self-actualizing" person (1954, p. 199); Carl Rogers, of the "fully-functioning person" (1959, p. 234); while Paul Goodman speaks of the "independent personality" (1965); Erich Fromm, of the "productive personality" (1941); and Snygg and Combs, of the "adequate personality" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 237). As has been shown, these differences in expression represent different ways of conceiving how the person utilizes the requisite conditions in developing his peculiar personality. The extent to which they relate to the conciliar notion of the "integral perfection" of the human person will be seen from a comparison with the views set out below.

For this comparison the views of four American psychologists have been selected. The first two, Donald Snygg and Arthur Combs, represent the American phenomenological viewpoint (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 11; Ford and Urban, 1963, p. 475). Despite a perceptible shift in thinking between the first edition of their work in 1949 and the second, revised edition a decade later, a number of their propositions still remain challengeable. Their influence on American psychological thinking, moreover, has been less than that of the other two.
The third psychologist, Abraham Maslow, is one of the better known protagonists of what is known in this country as humanistic psychology (Maslow, 1954, pp. 2-3).

The fourth psychologist selected for this study is Carl Rogers. Generally regarded as the founder of client-centered therapy, Rogers sets out his theory of the "fully functioning" in a number of propositions (Rogers, 1959) based largely on his experience in therapy. A number of these propositions, especially those dealing with his assumptions on the innate regulatory principle of man's "organismic valuing process" and the resulting "healthy, integrated" behavior, are widely questioned. Rogers, nevertheless, has generated a great deal of research in support of his views (cf. Rogers, 1959); in addition, he has exerted a great deal of influence generally in the related fields of personality theory and psychotherapy in this country (Ford and Urban, 1963, p. 444).

These psychologists have been selected, not because they concur with the views expressed by the conciliar documents, but because they are representative of a rather large segment of psychological opinion in this country. To a degree the documents, in dealing with the human person, cover the same ground as the psychologists, but in many instances they go much further. In some respects the documents and the psychologists concur; in others they do not. These differences will be apparent in the succeeding chapters and even in the brief comparison that follows.

With the introduction, the above sketch of the human person can be considered item by item. Beginning with the item of freedom, for instance, it will be observed that the documents assume free will; some of the
psychologists in question (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1949, p. 24 n.)* do not. The issue here, however, is not whether man has free will but how much of that freedom a person actually enjoys, given his particular personality and the circumstances in which he finds himself on the instant (cf. Arnold, 1954, pp. 9, 10). With this distinction in mind (DH,2) and considering freedom in the latter sense, it will be noted that where the Vatican II documents speak of freedom (on, say, the intra-personal level), Maslow would speak of "autonomy," "detachment," "simplicity" (in the sense of "not easily threatened"), and "resistance to enculturation" (Maslow, 1954, pp. 144-5, 224-228). Snygg and Combs would use words like the "autonomous" person or the person who takes a "more positive (in the sense of realistic) view of self" (1959, p. 240), and the "non-threatened personalities" (pp. 178-89). Carl Rogers is more likely to express himself in words like "being open to one's experience (in the sense of not resorting to defenses), and "experience being available to awareness" (1959, p. 234) in the sense of the person being aware of the deeper emotions or motivations that might impede or in some way distort the exercise of his freedom.

The concept of responsibility and the related concepts of involvement and commitment appearing in the conciliar documents are rendered in a much shallower and almost different way in Snygg and Combs' writings by words like "identification" (i.e., with a cause) (1959, pp. 245, 263, 270); in Maslow's, by "problem-centering" (i.e., commitment to something outside the person) (Maslow, 1954, p. 211); in Rogers' works by terms like "balanced

*In the revised edition of their work (1959, p. 17) the authors seem to have modified their original view.
and realistic" (1961, p. 194), "using the self as the locus of evaluation" (1959, p. 234), accepting the self as a "trustworthy instrument" (1961, p. 195), and the like.

The concept of interpersonal relations, emphasized by the work of Harry Stack Sullivan (1953), is well understood by American psychologists in general. For this concept Snygg and Combs use terms like "acceptance of others" (1959, p. 137) and "compassion," Maslow uses similar terms--"acceptance of self and others" (1954, p. 206), "democratic structure" (p. 219), "Gemeinschaftsgefühl" (p. 217), and simply "interpersonal relations" (p. 218). For the same concept Rogers uses terms like living "with others in maximum harmony" (Rogers, 1959, p. 235). In the Vatican II concept, of course, there are other, theological, connotations leading to considerations of Christian charity which are beyond the scope of this essay.

The notion of greater efficiency and productivity Maslow would see partly as a consequence of better "discrimination" between "means and ends" (1954, p. 220), a "more efficient perception of reality" (p. 257), or simply being "cognitively" efficient (p. 204). Rogers would conceive it as "each situation" being met "with a unique and creative adaptation" (Rogers, 1959, p. 235), while Snygg and Combs would employ the straightforward expression, behaving "more effectively and efficiently" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 250), referring thereby to the effectiveness of the work performed as well as to the efficiency of the performer.

The last factor, fulfillment, is conceived by the psychologists as a sense of well-being or satisfaction, appropriateness or rightness of fit which pervades the organism when its response has been the natural, appropriate
response and tension is at a minimum. To describe this condition Snygg and Combs as well as Maslow use the term "spontaneity" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 252). Rogers is expressing the same phenomenon when he talks of the "self-structure" as being "congruent with experience" but would go further and describe the person living at this level as experiencing a "more sensitive living, with greater range, greater variety, greater richness" (Rogers, 1961, p. 189). Maslow speaks in much the same way but extends this dimension to include the rarer but tremendously more fulfilling experiences that he calls "peak" or "mystic experiences" (Maslow, 1954, p. 216). Where the conciliar concept goes beyond this will be seen in Chapter 7.

Summarizing this psychologists' picture of the human person and comparing it with that of the Vatican documents, we get a composite picture like that set out in Table 2. Along the horizontal axis are the characteristics of the human person as envisaged by the Vatican documents; along the vertical axis, the corresponding characteristics as described by the four psychologists considered above.
TABLE 2

MODEL OF THE "INTEGRAL PERFECTION" OF THE HUMAN PERSON ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II AND THE WRITINGS OF FOUR CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGISTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II</th>
<th>FREEDOM</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVEMENT COMMITMENT</th>
<th>INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCE</th>
<th>EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY</th>
<th>FULFILLMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;THE ADEQUATE PERSONALITY&quot; (SNYGG &amp; COMBS)</td>
<td>&quot;Autonomous Personalities&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Identification&quot; (i.e., with a cause)</td>
<td>&quot;Compassion... Concern for Others&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Behaves More Effectively and Efficiently&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Spontaneous and Creative Behavior&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Positive View of Self&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;SIMPLICITY Not Easily Threatened&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Problem-Centering&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Gemeinschaftsgefühl&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;More Efficient Perception of Reality&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Freshness of Association&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Resistance to Enculturation&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Acceptance of Self and Others&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Cognitively Efficient&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Full Stature&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Mystic Experiences"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS</th>
<th>FREEDOM</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVEMENT COMMITMENT</th>
<th>INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCE</th>
<th>EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY</th>
<th>FULFILLMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;THE FULLY-FUNCTIONING PERSON&quot; (CARL ROGERS)</td>
<td>&quot;Open to Experiences&quot; (No Defenses)</td>
<td>&quot;Balanced and Realistic&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;With Others in Maximum Harmony&quot; Less Need for &quot;Defensive Behavior&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Each Situation Met with a Unique and Creative Adaptation&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Self-Structure Congruent with Experience&quot; &quot;More Sensitive... Greater Variety... Greater Richness&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Symbolizations Accurate&quot;</td>
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CHAPTER 3

FREEDOM

Focusing on the concept of freedom, this chapter will deal with the elements of this concept as they are developed in the documents of Vatican Council II, and, with the corresponding elements as they are developed in the four selected psychologists. Within these two parts it will make the further distinction between "freedom from" (items 1-7, Table 3) and "freedom to or for" (items 8-11, Table 3). In dealing with the former there will be a distinction between the factors that constrain a person from without (items 1-4, Table 3) and those that inhibit him from within (items 5-7, Table 3). Of some of these inhibiting forces man is aware; of others he is largely unaware.

As was shown in Chapter 1, the conciliar documents base many of their propositions on the "integral perfection of the human person" (GS, 59) on man's freedom. A more detailed study of this notion of freedom reveals a distinction between what the documents call "freedom from" and "freedom to:" freedom from those things that constrain or inhibit the exercise of one's freedom (cf. GS, 27, 31), and freedom to do those things that afford one opportunities for self-realization and fulfillment (cf. GS, 17, 31, 62); Gasson in Arnold and Gasson, 1954, p. 194). The concept of "freedom from" is further distinguished into freedom from the inhibiting factors that restrict the person from within (cf. GS, 12, 60); and the constraining factors that constrict him from without (cf. "Inter Mirifica," referred to below as IM, 2, 8; DH, 7, 8; GS, 27).

The latter are listed in some detail. Speaking broadly, The Church in the Modern World asserts that "whatever violates the integrity of the human
### TABLE 3
FREEDOM—SUMMARIZING THE VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND THE CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VATICAN DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>SNYGG AND COMBS</th>
<th>ABRAHAM MASLOW</th>
<th>CARL ROGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTRAINTS FROM WITHOUT:</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Higher degree of independence of social and physical forces&quot;</td>
<td>Relative independence of physical and social environment&quot;</td>
<td>Natural simplicity that is not easily threatened&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Social, economic, racial, religious discrimination.</td>
<td>&quot;Break loose from many of the petty tyrannies of their surroundings&quot;</td>
<td>More easily &quot;resist enculturation and maintain a certain inner detachment from the culture in which they are immersed.&quot;</td>
<td>Less &quot;vulnerable...threatened...anxious&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public opinion, political preconceptions. IM 8.</td>
<td>&quot;Less need to defend themselves from external attack&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Open to his experiences...exhibiting no defensiveness&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Open to his experiences...exhibiting no defensiveness&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Encroachment of state. DH 1.</td>
<td>&quot;Break with tradition and orthodoxy&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Distorting nothing, denying nothing...all experiences open to awareness&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Distorting nothing, denying nothing...all experiences open to awareness&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Socio-psychological factors. IM 8, DH 2.</td>
<td>&quot;No great need to defend themselves against experience&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Emotional imbalance. GS 10.</td>
<td>&quot;Cope with life openly and directly with a minimum of threat and fear&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTRAINTS FROM WITHIN:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Towards his own goodness. GS 17.</td>
<td>&quot;Positive view of self&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Spontaneous choice of the good. GS 17.</td>
<td>&quot;Respond more to the inner wellsprings of understanding and motivation&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Motivated from within. GS 17.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FREEDOM TO/FOR:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
person...attempts to coerce the will itself" (GS, 27), and then goes on to spell out some of the more specific factors it has in mind. Among these "infamies" (GS, 26), as it labels them, are included "every...type of discrimination, social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, colour, social condition, or religion" (GS, 29)—on what The Church in the Modern World calls "the fundamental," or The Declaration on Religious Freedom "the inviolable" (DH, 1), "rights of the human person" (GS, 29).

Particularizing on some of these constraints, the latter document cites society in general as a constraining factor upon the use of man's freedom. "Many pressures," it declares, "are brought to bear upon men of today, to the point where the danger arises lest they lose the possibility of acting on their own judgment" (DH, 8). The Decree of Communication draws attention to the fact that through contemporary instruments of communication "public opinion exerts massive force and authority over the private and public life of every class of citizen" (IM, 8). One sphere of life where this massive force of public opinion is significant is the political sphere. The Church in the Modern World singles this sphere out as one where what it calls the "national procedures" should allow the "largest possible number of citizens to participate in public affairs with genuine freedom" (GS, 31).

This brings up questions like the abuse of authority. Beginning with admonitions against what they term "the encroachments of the State" (DH, 1) and other forms of civil government, the documents deal successively with similar abuses in ecclesiastical, religious and even family institutions. Priests, in dealing with the laity, are urged "scrupulously...(to) honour that just freedom which is due to everyone in this earthly city"
(Presbyterorum Ordinis," referred to below as PO, 9); while religious
superiors are exhorted to govern in a way that will cultivate in their
religious "that enlarged freedom which belongs to the sons of God" ("Perfectae
Caritatis," referred to below as PC, 14). The same safeguards of personal
freedom are advocated in the exercise of domestic authority within the
family (cf. "Apostolicam Actuositatem," referred to below as AA, 11, 12) and,
indeed, in all other spheres where men relate to one another, whether it be
on an industrial, commercial, recreational, or more general social basis.
These relations, declares the decree on the laity, "should not be stained by
any quest for personal advantage or by any thirst for dominations" (AA, 8).

Looking to other likely factors which might impose constraints upon man
in the legitimate use of his freedom, The Church in the Modern World draws
attention to the harmful effects of great poverty. "Human freedom," it
claims, "is often crippled when a man falls into extreme poverty, just as it
withers when he indulges in too many of life's comforts" (GS, 31). The
Declaration on Religious Freedom sees the possibility of further harmful
constraints in the culturally determined patterns of our society—prevailing
fashions, modes of recreation, entertainment, patterns of family life, sexual
behavior, and the like. "The usages of society," says the document, referring
to such factors, "are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These
require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed
only when and in so far as necessary" (DH, 7).

Determining the limits of this necessity is a matter of extreme
importance. In fact, this whole question of the "freedom and dignity" of
the person is one which comes up in almost every document. It is, to sum up
in the words of the decree on the laity, a matter "of the utmost delicacy" (AA, 8).

Leaving this enumeration of external factors which constrain the freedom of the human person from without, we can pass on to a consideration of the factors operating from within. These are the factors that inhibit the use of what the documents describe as man's "psychological freedom" (DH, 2). Emphasis on the external or coercive limitations on the exercise of freedom has been marked in Roman documents especially since the time of Leo XIII. Only in recent years, however, has much recognition been given to the factors influencing man from within. Pius XII's reference, for instance, to the man who "feels within himself a consciousness of his own personality" draws attention to these more strictly intra-personal forces in man which in some instances drastically curtail his freedom.

The older moral theology, it is true, contained the classical treatise "on the obstacles (impedimenta) to freedom," but as a model to cope with the more recent findings of the behavioral sciences it is somewhat inadequate. It assumes that man enjoys a perfectly autonomous power of decision which is hindered only occasionally, accidentally, and exceptionally by certain disturbing factors which operate from within man and largely beyond his control (Monden, 1965, pp. 34-40). Quite different is the picture presented by contemporary psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Here the dialectic of freedom and determinism is seen, not merely as accidental, but as essential to almost every human act. Some of the determining factors, particularly the biological: the opiates, the tranquilizers, the psychedelics, the "police drugs," the truth serums, and the more recent discoveries of neuro-
surgery and endocrinology are well known and from time to time thrust themselves dramatically before the public eye. Less well known are the more strictly social and psychological factors.

These need further consideration. Many men, it is claimed, are prevented from acting with any great degree of real autonomy. To a large extent they are mass products, strongly influenced by what the document on communication, quoted above, described as the "massive force and authority" of the prevailing opinions and propaganda canvassed by the new instruments of communication (IM, 1). More and more, it seems, they tend to react as a mass, judge as a mass, and feel as a mass, without any adequate defense against the powerful socio-psychological pressures operating within and around them (IM, 8). Many women, for instance, have not been able to resist the strong influence of these socio-psychological pressures on questions like that of birth control, nor for that matter have juries sitting on this and related matters. Pressures like these, declares the same document, seem "all too easily" able to "trigger" forces which remain in man "wounded as he is by original sin" (IM, 7) and "split within himself" (GS, 13).

Equally powerful in curtailing man's freedom has been his emotional imbalance (GS, 10) or what The Church in the Modern World describes as the lack of "harmony with himself, with others, and with all created things" (GS, 13). The deep need, at times scarcely emerging into consciousness, for security, love, esteem and other affective relationships on the one hand, and the half-recognized aggressiveness, hostility, and competitiveness on the other hand; and, above all, what the documents term the nagging doubts and uncertainties (GS, 12) about oneself—all these have a decided
influence on man's attitudes and actions. Of such inhibiting forces man is most of the time all too painfully aware. In this respect the documents see him as captive (GS, 17).

More painfully inhibiting still, however, are those forces of which he is less clearly aware. They remain deep within his own psyche. Functioning at more unconscious levels, these forces, remnants largely of his past, can bind him more strongly than the others. Fixated in his mind as a host of unassimilated and, to that extent, paralyzing deformations, these are the lurking anxieties (GS, 12), the blinding ignorances and prejudices (GS, 16, 60), the tyrannical automatizations, bondages, and obsessive impulses (GS, 41), the debilitating frustrations, uneasy feelings of guilt and other equally intimidating fears (GS, 12), which time and time again intrude into what should be free, mature, adult decisions, reducing them repeatedly to the level of the immature, the blase', or even the infantile (GS, 4, 60; AA, 12; cf. Monden, 24-6).

From this condition the human person has to be constantly rescued. Only in so far as he is liberated from tyrannies like these is he capable of enjoying the freedom to which his personhood entitles him. For that reason, it seems, the conciliar documents are as much concerned with the question of "freedom from" as they are with the more positive question of "freedom to" or "freedom for." Only when man is freed from the things that bind him is he free to "direct himself towards goodness" (GS, 17). Let us pass on then to this new question of "freedom for." In what precisely does it consist and how will man use it? Will he use it "perversely," asks The Church in the Modern World, after the fashion of certain contemporaries? Or "as a license
for doing whatever pleases him, even if it is evil" (GS, 17)? This would hardly be the "authentic freedom" which the documents see as an exceptional sign of the divine image within man" (GS, 17). The conciliar Fathers are more optimistic. Left "in the hand of his own counsel," they say, quoting Sirach (15:14), man "can seek his own Creator spontaneously" (GS, 17). But the freedom to choose, which is herein implied, must be present as a condition. Human dignity, say the Fathers, "demands that (man) act according to a knowing and free choice." And this choice, it is emphatically pointed out, "is personally motivated and prompted from within. It does not result from blind internal impulses nor mere external pressure" (GS, 17).

This spontaneity which, according to the documents, characterizes the "freed" man's behavior will be taken up again subsequently in the chapter on fulfillment (cf. Chapter 7). For the moment it is important to return to the question of how man uses this freedom.

The documents conceive this use in terms of means and ends. Liberated from the constraints and limitations that once bound him, man now "pursues his goal," according to The Church in the Modern World, "in a spontaneous choice of what is good, and procures for himself, through effective and skilful action, apt means and end" (GS, 17).

The means are diverse. First, man is to use his freedom, not as an escape from the demands of society, but as a means rather of integrating with and better adjusting to it. "Freedom," says one of the documents, "acquires new strength...when a man consents to the unavoidable requirements of social life" (GS, 31). Secondly, man is to enjoy freedom of inquiry, thought, and expression. "Within the limits of morality, and the general
welfare," says The Church in the Modern World, "man is free to search for
truth, voice his mind, and publicize it" (GS, 59). In a later paragraph the
document affirms this same freedom to the scholar in the Church. "Let it be
recognized that all the faithful, clerical and lay, possess a lawful freedom
of inquiry and of thought, and the freedom to express their minds humbly
and courageously about those matters in which they enjoy competence" (GS,
62). Thirdly, man's freedom extends even into the realms of spirituality,
liturgical worship, and theological speculation. "While preserving unity in
essentials," says the document on ecumenism, "let all the members of the
Church, according to the office entrusted to each, preserve a proper freedom
in the various forms of spiritual life and discipline, in the variety of
liturgical rites, and even in theological elaborations of revealed truth"
("Unitatis Redintegratio," referred to below as UR, 4).

Daring in its liberality, as it may appear to some, this third point
goes no further than the pre-conciliar recommendations of Pope John XXIII
and Cardinal Bea. It merely spells out some of the more specific applications
implicit in the principles already laid down. Though mainly theological in
their orientation or point of view, these principles find corroboration in
the more psychologically oriented principles of the contemporary American
psychologists to whom reference has already been made and to whose works it
might be relevant at this moment to turn.

Taking first the writings of Snygg and Combs, it may be useful to
recall their earlier position (1949, p. 24n.) on free will (supra,
Chapter 2). Although this position has been subsequently modified (1959,
p. 17), the gap between their basic assumptions and those of the Vatican
documents is still obvious. Even so, several relevant parallels are to be noted.

The first is the question of freedom from constraints which come from outside the person. On this the authors assert that "adequate" personalities, as they describe those acting at this level, feel in no way deprived, and on that account have "far less need to defend themselves from external attack" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 243). Neither do they have "great need to defend themselves against their experience" (p. 243). As a result they are seen as being able to "break loose from many of the petty tyrannies of their surroundings," thereby achieving a certain "autonomy" which, the authors claim, appears to be a "direct outgrowth of the individual's openness to experience and trust in self" (p. 254). This sort of freedom manifests itself in diverse ways. It is observed, for example, in the "higher degree of independence of social and physical forces which," according to Snygg and Combs, "bind many of the rest of us" (p. 254). It is observed also in the basic security and courage which enable people who enjoy greater liberty to "break with" what the documents (e.g., PC, 3) term the outmoded customs and regulations that over the years have come to be taken for tradition or orthodoxy (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 253).

With reference more particularly to freedom from within, the same people are viewed as seeing themselves in "essentially positive ways." In this way they are "free and open to their experience." Such people apparently feel "strong and safe enough to cope with life openly and directly with a minimum of threat and fear" (p. 239). They view the world in which they live as exciting and challenging, yet well within their own capacities to
deal with. On that account, claim the authors, they might almost equally well be described as "nonthreatened personalities" (p. 240).

Freed thus from the things that threaten them and finding themselves less in the grip of external events and things beyond their control, these people seem able to "respond more" to what Snygg and Combs would describe as "the inner wellsprings of understanding and motivation" (p. 254; cf. promptings of Holy Spirit, LG, 15; GS, 92; "Optatam Totius," referred to below as OT, 3).

Maslow's concept of freedom in the "self-actualizing" person is almost parallel. Referring to constraints upon the person from without, Maslow shows how the person enjoying this sort of freedom maintains his freedom even when dealing with or acting as an authority figure. The specific paradigm he uses is the teacher-student relationship. Teachers of this type, he maintains, behave in a "very unneurotic" way." Instead of viewing the classroom situation as a "clash of wills, or authority, of dignity, etc." they view it as a "pleasant collaboration" (Maslow, 1954, p. 231). The win-lose" model just does not apply. In this way, Maslow claims, "the artificial dignity that is easily threatened" is replaced by "the natural simplicity that is not easily threatened."

Similarly in regard to freedom from the demands of the environment, culture and society at large: a characteristic of people enjoying this sort of freedom, Maslow claims, is their "relative independence of the physical and social environment" (p. 213). The same holds true in regard to the somewhat more interiorized cultural patterns: these people, observes Maslow, more easily "resist enculturation and maintain a certain inner detachment
from the culture in which they are immersed" (p. 224).

Freer from environmental and cultural determinations on the outside, these people are also freer on the inside. Maslow observes this in the greater reliability of their perception. The limiting or distorting effects of "wish, desire, and prejudice," he avers, are very much less marked in the person who has achieved this sort of freedom (p. 205). In the samples he investigated self-actualizing people distinguished "far more easily than most the fresh, concrete, and idiographic from the generic, abstract, and rubricized." As a result they live "more in the real world of nature than in the man-made mass of concepts, abstractions, expectations, beliefs and stereotypes that most people confuse with the real world" (p. 205). The same reality factor distinguishes the characteristic way they experience guilt. Unlike those psychologists who would regard all guilt as pathological, Maslow does not claim that in his subjects there is an "absolute" absence of guilt--of shame, sadness, anxiety, defensiveness--but merely an absence of what he calls "unnecessary (because unrealistic) guilt." The animal processes of sex, urination, pregnancy, menstruation, growing old, and the like, are seen, he claims, as "part of reality and so must be accepted." No healthy woman then need feel constrained in her freedom or inhibited through having to feel guilt about "being female or about any of the female processes" (p. 208). As a consequence many of the so-called problems of conscience and morals are seen not to be problems at all: they are unreal ones and exist only in the minds of the narrow, rigid, unfree persons who create them; when seen differently--and more realistically--they disappear (p. 230).
This concept of freedom is presented in similar terms in the Rogerian description of the "fully-functioning" person. The person who is not functioning fully is the one who is not yet sufficiently free and as a consequence, according to Rogers, "denies to awareness or distorts in awareness significant experiences" (Rogers, 1959, p. 204). Such a person is said to be "vulnerable" or "threatened" or "anxious," according to the point of view from which he is considered—-from the outside or from his own inside point of view. The well adjusted person, on the other hand, the person enjoying proper freedom, will be—to use Rogerian terms—"open to his experiences," exhibiting "no defensiveness," distorting nothing, denying nothing; and, as a consequence, making "all experiences available to awareness" (p. 234).

A person who has attained this degree of freedom, Rogers claims, will be less susceptible to the influence of his environment, less dependent upon the judgment of others. Instead he will "experience himself as the law of evaluation" (p. 234). In this way, as he tends to become more immune to the approval or disapproval of others, to impose upon himself, in Rogerian language, fewer "conditions of worth" (p. 235), and to function instead from an interior motivation or experience more "unconditional self-regard."

It is clear that the psychologists in question have addressed themselves mainly to the intrapersonal factors limiting freedom. This is so for several reasons. With the exception of Maslow there is a tendency to generalize from data drawn largely from pathological cases. In some instances, too, the human person seems to have been credited with few degrees of freedom above the rest of the organic world (cf. Gasson, 1954, p. 167); or, as Arnold says, it
is too readily assumed that what the human person does is determined by his "temperament, upbringing, environment, and cultural milieu." Given that this is true in part, it is also true, Arnold adds, that the person has "aims and purposes" that rise above this, that "he thinks, that he can make deductions, can reason" and, as a consequence, "can decide for or against any given action" (Arnold, 1954, p. 9). On these accounts it is not surprising to find in the psychologists' treatment of freedom certain limitations not found in the conciliar treatment. These limitations not withstanding, the psychologists' treatment is relevant.
CHAPTER 4
RESPONSIBILITY—A BALANCED VIEW

An immediate consequence of the freedom advocated for man in the preceding chapter is his responsibility. A person can be responsible only inasmuch as he is free. Between freedom and responsibility, in other words, there is a direct proportion. This can be expressed in many ways: a person can be responsible only inasmuch as he is free; or, increase a person's freedom and you thereby increase his responsibility. The one follows from and is coterminous with the other. "Man," says an editorial note in the Abbott edition of the documents of Vatican II, "has an inalienable responsibility for his own decisions and actions which is the essential counterpart of his freedom" (Abbott, p. 679 n.). This doctrine is not new, but appears, from the increasing numbers of references to it in recent papal writings—of Pius XI (cf. "Mit Brennender Sorge," 1937), for example, Pius XII and John XXIII (cf. "Pacem in Terris," 1963)—to have assumed an altogether new significance. That significance would seem to be on the order of a new phenomenological awareness of what it means to be a person. The Declaration on Religious Freedom catches this a little when it speaks of this sort of responsibility as being associated with the dignity of personhood. "Beings endowed with reason and free will," it claims, "are privileged to bear personal responsibility" (DH, 2). In other words, as this document sees it, responsibility follows from the fact of freedom.

The argument is much the same as it was in presenting the case for freedom. In dealing with the human person's right to freedom the documents begin by considering first the constraints that hamper man in the exercise
of his freedom and then pass on to the more positive aspect of what man's freedom is for and what the exercise of it is to being him. Similarly in dealing with the human person's responsibility, the documents begin by considering the obstacles to the exercise of responsibility and then go on to consider what this exercise means to man.

The "demand is increasingly made," says the Declaration on Religious Freedom that men should make full use of their "responsible freedom," acting on "their own judgment," and being motivated from within and "not driven by coercion" (DH, 1). The Church in the Modern World and particularly the post-conciliar documents (cf. Paul VI's Progress of the Peoples, 1967, n. 9) draw attention to the fact that some are "deprived of the opportunity to exercise responsibility;" others cannot exercise it because they are "culturally poor" (GS, 57). For that reason the conciliar document claims that for the discharge of their responsibilities with "greater exactness" people must be "carefully educated to a higher degree." For this purpose, argues the document, "immense resources are available."

"Children and young people," it is stressed, "have a right to be encouraged" to make "personal choices" (GS, 17) in order thereby to experience a sense of responsibility. Educators are urged to "form men... who will come to decisions with their own judgment and... govern their activities with a sense of responsibility" (DH, 8).

A part of this general sense of responsibility is the more specific sense of one's responsibility to others and the consequent needs for "fulfilling one's duties in community life" and "joining with others in co-operative effort" (DH, 8). The Decree on the Renewal of the Religious
Life makes a big thing of this responsibility in religious. "They (religious) all have contributions to make." "Some exercise a ministry of service," says the decree, quoting St. Paul to the Romans (12:5-8) and to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 12:4); "some teach doctrine, some encourage through exhortation, some give in simplicity, or bring cheerfulness to the sorrowful" (PC, 8). But all have a responsibility and all should be afforded the opportunity to exercise it by being listened to "willingly" and "encouraged to make a personal contribution" (PC, 14).

Associated with this notion of responsibility are the related phenomena of involvement and commitment. The decree on Renewal would see religious with such a strong sense of responsibility that they become completely involved, "spending themselves increasingly for Christ" (i.e., for His corporate body, the Church—cf Col. 1:24), and going all the way to sacrifice "through a surrender involving their entire lives" (PC, 1). In this way not only does the individual religious grow in authentic adult commitment, but the Church, the congregation to which he belongs also stand to benefit (GS, 64; cf. Monden, 28).

This sort of responsibility, this sort of commitment, can also benefit society at large. It can reveal to other men a meaning for their own existence (GS, 4). Religious, when discharging their responsibility and displaying the degree of commitment envisaged here, are viewed by the documents as the witnesses needed in the world today—responsible enough, committed enough, strong enough "to provide coming generations with reasons for living and hoping." In that sense the "future of humanity" is seen as lying in their hands (GS, 31).
The view expressed above in the conciliar documents—that the responsibility exercised by the human person is directly proportional to the freedom he enjoys—is also shared by the psychologists being considered in this essay.

Snygg and Combs, reviewing this question, draw attention to two widely held views. The first and earlier view is that man is completely responsible, entirely and independently of anything outside of him. The second view is the opposite: that man is not responsible but that he is completely the victim of his environment (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 309), almost a physical object whose behavior is determined by forces acting upon him. Between these two extremes Snygg and Combs, in their later work (1959, p. 310; cf. 1954, p. 24 n. and Chapter 2 above), choose the middle position. In this respect they approach the position taken by the Vatican documents, namely, that the human person is neither so completely responsible as the first view suggests nor so inevitably and irrevocably at the mercy of his environment or the forces within him as the second view claims he is. They see man as in part controlling and in part controlled (p. 310). The more effectively he can be set free from the forces that encroach upon the exercise of his freedom, the more completely he can assume the responsibility that goes with his integrity as a person.

The view held by Rogers is little different. The human person, "when functioning freely," is "constructive and trustworthy" or, in the terminology used in other parts of this chapter, responsible. After a quarter of a century of experience in psychotherapy Rogers comes to what he calls an "inescapable" conclusion, namely, that "when we are able to free the individual from defensiveness, so that he is open to the wide range of his own needs, as
well as the wide range of environmental and social demands, his reactions must be trusted to be positive, forward-moving, constructive" (Rogers, 1961, p. 194). The position Rogers is assuming here, as Arnold* points out, is a form of angelism. Whether Rogers is aware of this implication in his statement is not clear from the context. What is clear is that, although he expects the human person to approach this level of freedom and responsibility, he does not expect him to attain it completely.

Rogers is not particularly concerned about how the person is taught to be responsible. There is no need, he claims, to be overly concerned about how man will relate to others, for one of his deepest needs is "for affiliation and communication with others." As the person becomes more fully himself he will more easily and naturally relate. Neither is there need to be overly concerned about how he will control his aggression: as he becomes open to all his impulses, his need to receive and express affection will be as strong as his need to "strike out and seize for himself" (Rogers, 1961, p. 194). In other words, as the person advances to the position of "being open to all his experiences," he will become more responsible. His behavior, as Rogers says, will be more "balanced and realistic."

For the widely held view that man is not responsible and that he is basically irrational Rogers has little sympathy. The human person's behaviour, he would maintain, is "exquisitely rational" (Rogers, 1961, p. 195). The tragedy for most is that their "defenses" keep them from being aware of

*In a note to the writer.
the fact: consciously they are moving in one direction, organismically they are moving in another. Decrease the number of these defenses, Rogers argues; and you increase a person's participation in what he calls the "rationality of his organism." The necessary control of impulses, he believes, would be found in the "natural and internal balancing of one need against another" (Rogers, 1961). Participating this way in what Rogers calls the "vastly complex self-regulatory activities of his organism" (1961, p. 195), the human person achieves a greater yet easier balance. He is freer, in other words, to be more responsible.

From the evidence provided in this chapter it would appear that responsibility as conceived by the psychologists is different from the fuller concept expressed by the Vatican documents. Seen by the latter as a consequence or concomitant of the fact that the person has a purpose in life which he is free to pursue, responsibility is viewed as both a duty and a privilege; it is not reduced, as it may appear in Rogers, to a balanced response to organismic needs; or, in Snygg and Combs, to a successful adjustment to environmental conditions (cf. Arnold in Arnold and Gasson, 1954, p. 9). In the conciliar concept of "responsible freedom" there are several important implications which have to be spelled out. The first is the necessity of providing opportunities for the personal exercise of responsibility (item 2, Table 4); the second, the contribution this exercise of responsibility can make to the life of the community at large (item 3, Table 4); and third, the witness and significance of this exercise of responsibility for those seeking a meaning in life (item 4, Table 4).

Allowing for these differences between the conciliar understanding of
| TABLE 4 |
| RESPONSIBILITY--SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VATICAN DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>SNYGG AND COMBS</th>
<th>CARL ROGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. PRIVILEGE TO EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITY</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Part controlled...part controlling&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Balanced and realistic&quot; &quot;Exquisitely rational&quot; &quot;Rationality of his organism&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- &quot;Inalienable responsibility for own decisions and actions (Abbot)&quot;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- &quot;Privilege to bear personal responsibility&quot; DH 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>- &quot;Responsible freedom&quot; DH 1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. OPPORTUNITY FOR RESPONSIBILITY:</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Set free...in order to assume responsibility&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Reactions must be trusted to be positive, forward-moving, constructive&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- &quot;Opportunity to exercise responsibility&quot; GS 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>- &quot;Personal choices&quot; GS 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>- &quot;Govern actions with a sense of responsibility&quot; DH 8</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Need for affiliation and communication with others&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- &quot;Fulfilling one's duties in community life&quot; DH 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- &quot;Personal contribution&quot; PC 14 DH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. MEANING FOR EXISTENCE, FOR &quot;LIVING AND HOPING&quot; GS 4, 13</strong></td>
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responsibility and that of the psychologists, the latter nevertheless make interesting observations. Syngg and Combs, as has been shown, depart from their earlier views and take a position leading towards that of the documents. Rogers, as indicated, approaches a certain angelism. His view of the person participating in the "rationality of his organism" even recalls the view of St. Thomas Aquinas, where man's organism, through his internal senses, participates in his rationality. The difference is that Roger has it in reverse: for him, it is the organism that is rational, and not the person!
CHAPTER 5

COMPETENCE IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

A third characteristic of the integral perfection of the human person is relatedness to others or what may be more appropriately termed competence in interpersonal relations. In a sense this is a consequence of the two elements already treated. The significance of this characteristic for the proper functioning of the human person can be demonstrated from both theoretical and practical considerations.

Taking with the documents call "enlarged freedom" (item 1, Table 5) as a basis, this chapter will deal successively with the ways in which greater competence in interpersonal relationships makes possible a greater development of human resources (item 2, Table 5), assures greater personal awareness of others (item 3, Table 5), and lays the foundation for the growth of friendship and love among men (item 4, Table 5). In view of the present trends towards greater socialization in society this growth in friendship and love among men is assuming more and more importance in the world today (item 5, Table 5). For this reason the chapter will draw attention to the emphasis the documents place on the need for cultivating more adequate interpersonal relations among men (item 5, Table 5).

Theoretically, it could be argued that the less need a person has for defenses, the less crippled he is by feelings of worthlessness, the less restricted he is by repressions and inhibitions of his own making (cf. GS, 12, 13) and by the physical, social and economic limitations imposed by his environment (GS, 27, 63; PP, 9), the freer he is to experience and cultivate those emotions which facilitate adequate relations with others. These
### TABLE 5
INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCE--SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VATICAN DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>SNYGG AND COMBS</th>
<th>ABRAHAM MASLOW</th>
<th>CARL ROGERS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. &quot;ENLARGED FREEDOM&quot; PC 14 AS BASIS</td>
<td>&quot;Less feelings of guilt and failure&quot; &quot;Does not deny or distort feelings&quot; &quot;Less compulsion to prove oneself&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Accept themselves at all levels&quot; &quot;Relative lack of overriding guilt, of crippling shame, and of any extreme of severe anxiety&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Less need for &quot;defensive distortion of perception&quot; &quot;Exhibiting defensive behavior&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCES:</td>
<td>&quot;Dependent on good will and cooperation of others&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Deep feeling of identification&quot;</td>
<td>Need of &quot;unconditional positive regard from significative others&quot;</td>
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<td>-Making available &quot;resources of their minds and wills&quot; PC 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Man, a social being, needs others to &quot;live and develop own potential&quot; GS 12</td>
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<td>3. INCREASING PERSONAL AWARENESS:</td>
<td>&quot;Living effectively with others&quot; &quot;Living efficiently with others&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Feeling of . . . sympathy and fusion, greater love, and . . . perfect identification&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Living with others in &quot;maximum possible harmony&quot;</td>
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<td>-&quot;Socialization...personalization&quot; GS 12</td>
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<td>-&quot;Truly personal relationships&quot; GS 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>-&quot;Increasing sense of solidarity&quot; AA 14</td>
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<td>4. FOUNDATION FOR GROWTH OF FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE:</td>
<td>&quot;An open accepting relationship with the world about him&quot; &quot;Characteristic concern for his fellows&quot; &quot;To appreciate, accept and love&quot; &quot;Actualization of those with whom one is identified&quot; . . . &quot;Give of themselves&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>-&quot;Helping one another through friendship&quot; AA 17</td>
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<td>-&quot;Sign of love&quot; AA 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>-&quot;Finding self through sincere gift of self&quot; GS 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. CULTIVATION OF INTERPERSONAL SKILLS AND QUALITIES AA 14; GS 6, 12</td>
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emotions, "variations of human love," as Arnold calls them, are considered absolutely essential to the growth of those relationships without which it is very difficult for the human person to develop properly (Arnold, 1963, II, p. 312). It is within this context, it seems, that the documents speak of the necessity of helping men and women (religious especially) achieve in their interpersonal relations that sense of "enlarged freedom" which releases, as it were, or makes available for themselves and others all the "resources of their minds and wills...their gifts of nature and of grace" (PC, 14).

With the foundations for sound interpersonal relations thus laid, the documents go on to establish other practical reasons for developing competence in this area.

The first is the need men have of one another for the full development of their capacities. "By his innermost nature," argues The Church in the Modern World, "man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he can neither live nor develop his own potential" (GS, 12). The second is the need arising from the developing pattern of social life. Here the document is arguing for the same interpersonal competency, basing its argument this time on the fact of the increasing socialization of human life throughout history and what it terms the increasing "personalization" of organizational relationships. "A man's ties with his fellows," runs the argument, "are constantly being multiplied," a reality of contemporary life which the present day trend towards "socialization" is making more obvious. Given this trend, the document concludes, and the "further ties" it develops between men, the promotion of what it calls "appropriate personal development
and truly personal relationships" becomes imperative (GS, 6). The same argument is resumed in the document on the laity where the emphasis is placed, not directly on interpersonal relationships themselves but rather on the virtues thought to underly them—"honesty, justice, sincerity, kindness, and courage" (AA, 4).

A third reason arises from the nature of the true Christian life. The lay people in the Church are urged to observe "among the signs of the time the irresistibly increasing sense of solidarity among all peoples" and therefore to "co-operate with all men...to promote whatever is true and just" (AA, 14). Especially are they to "help one another through friendship." In this way, says the document on the laity, they will "gain strength to overcome the disadvantages of an increasingly isolated life and activity and to make their apostolate more productive" (AA, 17). Even children, argues the document, must be educated "to transcend the family circle...to open their minds" and to go out warmly and confidently to others (AA, 30). This, concludes the document, is the very sign by which Christians are known, "the sign of love" (AA, 8).

A fourth reason is the nature of the basis dyadic human relationship found in marriage. It is not for nothing, especially in view of what has been said above in the three preceding paragraphs, that the documents begin to conceive marriage fundamentally as an interpersonal communion. The relationship, or rather the "companionship" of the two married partners, provides in the mind of The Church in the Modern World, the model of "the primary form of interpersonal communion" (GS, 12). The mutual surrender of one person to the other in this sort of union becomes the prototype, so
to speak, for the sort of relationship that completes man. The human person, who, according to the documents, is "the only creature on earth which God willed for itself cannot," it seems, "fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self" (GS, 24).

For these reasons the documents lay heavy stress on the cultivation of competence in interpersonal relations, not only in lay people (AA, 14; GS, 6) and partners in marriage particularly (GS, 12, 48), but also in those living in a celibate community as religious (PC, 14, 18) and especially in the clergy. The latter are urged to acquire those virtues which are, as the document on priests says, "deservedly esteemed in human affairs...goodness of heart, sincerity, strength, and constancy of character, zealous pursuit of justice, civility," and the like (PO, 3). But the acquisition of these virtues is not to be left to chance; it is to be initiated in the seminary, where the proper interpersonal dimension is to be emphasized right from the start. What is required, says the document on the formation of the clergy, are "the abilities most appropriate for the promotion of dialogue with men...a capacity to listen to other people and to open their hearts in a spirit of charity to the various circumstances of human need" (OT, 11, 19).

Passing now, as has been done in the preceding chapters, to a comparison between the conciliar image of the human person along this dimension of interpersonal relations and the image presented by our representative four contemporary psychologists, significant parallels are to be noted.

Beginning with Snygg and Combs concept, it is to be noted that a certain degree of interpersonal competence is not only characteristic of the "adequate" personality but also necessary for normal functioning of any
person. "We are so entirely dependent upon the goodwill and co-operation of others," claim these psychologists, "that it would be impossible to achieve feelings of adequacy without some effective relationship with them (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 246). As a consequence a man, quite plainly, "must be capable of living effectively and efficiently with his fellows" (p. 246). Living "effectively" with others implies the possession of the normal skills, the "know how," so to speak, of relating to other people. Living "efficiently" with others, however, implies much more. It implies not only the skills but also the dispositions that enable the possessor of them to relate in such a way that his experience of these interpersonal relationships and acceptance of others is enriching and rewarding both for himself and others.

This sort of acceptance of others generally presupposes a wholesome self-image and acceptance of self as prerequisites. Characteristically, according to Snygg and Combs, the self-accepting person "accepts praise or criticism objectively," "does not deny or distort feelings, motives, or abilities in self," "sees self as a person of worth on an equal plane with others," "does not expect others to reject him," "does not regard self as queer or abnormal," "is not shy or self-conscious," and so on (p. 257). The self-acceptant person acts this way, it seems, because he has "less feelings of guilt and failure." This freedom from pathological guilt, as Snygg and Combs seem to be conceiving it, apparently "releases the individual," and places him under "less compulsion to prove himself at the expense of others." This makes possible for the individual what the authors would describe as "an open accepting relationship with the world about him" (ibid., p. 258. Cf. Scheler, 1923, as quoted in Arnold, 1963, II, p. 312).
The one seems to follow from the other. Syngg and Combs are of the opinion that, "when one is strongly identified with others what he does to actualize self is likely to contribute also to the actualization of those with whom he is identified" (p. 257). With less pressing need, as we have indicated above, to demonstrate his adequacy or to thrust himself forward in areas where he feels deprived, he is free to take on this "characteristic concern for his fellows" (p. 258), to "accept, appreciate and love" them (p. 257). Such a person, as these psychologists describe him, "does not hate, reject, or pass judgment on others" when they differ from him; he "does not attempt to dominate," nor "assume responsibility for others." He "does not deny the worth or equality of others;" in fact, in his "active interest in others" he demonstrates a "desire to serve" them and to create "mutually satisfactory relationships." Should he seem to be advancing self—and at times he may seem to be by some—he is "careful not to infringe the rights of others." Not only do such persons find it unnecessary and even repulsive to use others for solely personal gratification, they actually devote themselves to others in such a way that they can be said literally to "give of themselves" (p. 257).

Maslow argues the same way. He sees this concern for others as a characteristic of the interpersonal relationships not only of his self-actualizing persons, but also as an important element in the life of any person. He sees it as stemming largely from a basic acceptance of self. Self-actualizers, he claims, "accept themselves at all levels—love, safety, belongingness, honour, self-respect" (Maslow, 1954, p. 207). They can do this, he believes, because they can take what he calls "the frailties and sin,
weaknesses and evils of human nature" in the same unquestioning spirit with which they accept nature itself. They accept nature "as it is, and not as they would prefer it to be" (p. 207). Many of these qualities—self-acceptance, feeling of security, sense of belongingness, and the like, which may seem at first sight to be largely unconnected, tend to be regarded by Maslow as they were also by Snygg and Combs, as deriving from a more basic condition, namely, a relative absence of pathological guilt, of a sense of worthlessness, and of "extreme or severe anxiety" (p. 219). It is the basically deprived man, the anxious man that considers the world a dangerous place, a "jungle," as Maslow would put it, "an enemy territory populated by (1) those whom he can dominate and (2) those who can dominate him" (p. 232).

Persons functioning more normally see the world differently. They have, in Maslowian terms, "a deep feeling of identification, sympathy, and affection" (Maslow, p. 217) in spite of the occasional hostility, anger, or disgust which, as Maslow explains, quoting Erich Fromm, is not character-based but more likely reactive or situational (p. 219). To catch more precisely the particular flavour of these feelings for mankind that Maslow finds in his self-actualizers he uses the word Gemeinschaftsgefühl, invented for the purpose by Alfred Adler (p. 217). These people, Maslow claims, have "deeper and more profound interpersonal relations" than others. On that account they are capable of "more fusion, greater love, and more perfect identification" with others, together with a greater sense of mutual enrichment, than many people would consider possible (p. 219).

Rogers, though considerably briefer and more technical (1959, pp. 234-
40) in his treatment of this characteristic of interpersonal relationships, proceeds in much the same way. Because his "fully-functioning" person enjoys a better self-image he has less need for what is described as a "defensive distortion of perception" and less need therefore of "exhibiting defensive behavior" (p. 237); consequently he will be more open to others. In this way he stands to experience the "unconditional positive regard from significant others" which, according to Rogers, is a characteristic condition of his growth and development as a person (p. 234). But, says Rogers, because this positive regard is "reciprocal" and tremendously rewarding, this person will "live with others in the maximum possible harmony" (p. 235).

It is clear that the documents of Vatican II are pointing out implications for interpersonal relations that go far beyond those envisaged by the psychologists. Restricting their study more to the obstacles impeding healthy interpersonal relationships, some of them, Snygg and Combs particularly, tend to concentrate on questions of anxiety and guilt. This, coupled with the tendency to regard all guilt as pathological, tends to put them in conflict (cf. Arnold, 1954, p. 515; 1960, II, pp. 291-297; 302-6) with the position taken by the documents (cf. GS, 28), and indeed with the other psychologists, particularly Maslow (1954, p. 207).
CHAPTER 6

PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY

A fourth characteristic of the human person which the conciliar documents seem to stress is that of man the producer—the productive person. This is a picture of the person who can cope with life, whose manner of acting is positive and constructive, who enjoys a certain measure of self-confidence, entertains positive feelings about himself, accepts himself, is uncomplicated and straightforward in his handling of situations; whose whole response to life, in short, can be best described by words like efficiency, productivity, or even creativity. Some of these characteristics could bear lengthier elaboration.

Concentrating on the dimension of productivity and efficiency, this chapter will attempt to compare the way this characteristic of the human person is presented in the Vatican documents with the way it is presented in the selected group of psychologists. Noting first that, when man is functioning efficiently and productively, he not only copes better with life but also becomes himself more effective in the process (item 1, Table 6), it will then consider the question of how this comes about. It will show in turn that in this condition the person, being less defensive and more open to reality (item 2a, Table 6), becomes a more reliable instrument (item 2b, Table 6); that, because he is more open and more reliable as an instrument, he has more access to data and is therefore likely to come up with better solutions to his problems (item 3, Table 6); and that, as a result, he is generally more straightforward and uncomplicated (item 4, Table 6) in his general response to life.
### TABLE 6

**EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY—SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VATICAN DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>SNYGG AND COMBS</th>
<th>ABRAMH MASLOW</th>
<th>CARL ROGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. MORE EFFICIENT AND PRODUCTIVE | -Productive GS 35  
-Copes effectively GS 10, 33-39, 84 | "Behaves more effectively and efficiently" | Predictions of future...more correct" | |
| 2. MORE DATA AVAILABLE: | -Less defensive GS 17 | "Open to all experiences  
"More data available"  
"Capable of seeing relationships not seen by others"  
"Behaves from choice rather than from necessity"  
-Efficient instrument OT 11 | Larger horizon, wider breadth of vision, living in widest frame of reference"  
"Perceptions less based upon wish, desire, fear, or upon generalized character-determined optimism"  
"Cognitively efficient" | "More open to experience"  
"Accurate symbolization in awareness" |
| 3. BETTER SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS UP 11 | | | "Self as locus of evaluation"  
"Organismic valuing a trustworthy guide to most satisfying behavior" |
| 4. STRAIGHTFORWARD, UNCOMPLICATED WAY OF ACTING OT 11 | "Wider, less complicated, more precise and accurate perception of events" | | "Unique and creative Adaptation to the newness of that moment" |
The question of productivity can be considered first. The notion conveyed here by the documents is that of the person who is productive, not in the sense of producing things but in the sense of improving himself. "When a man works," says The Church in the Modern World, "he not only alters things and society, he develops himself as well" (GS, 35). In the thought of the document, the person enjoys priority over the things he produces, be these things material things, "technical advantages" or even more spiritual things like the "more humane ordering of social relationships." "A man is more precious," claims the document "for what he is than for what he has" (GS, 35). What he has accumulated is by no means insignificant, but what is more significant is the fact that in the process of accumulation man also, as the document concludes, "learns much...cultivates his resources...goes outside and beyond himself."

In going "outside and beyond himself" man escapes from the prison of his own self and is left free to cope more effectively with the situation around him. But this is not always easy for, as The Church in the Modern World says, "the imbalances under which the modern world labours are linked with that more basic imbalance rooted in the heart of man" (GS, 10). "In man himself," the document continues, "many elements wrestle with one another;" on that account he "experiences...limitations in a multitude of ways," yet at the same time he is "boundless in his desires" to tackle the problems beyond himself. This, in fact, is one of the main preoccupations of the document—to dispel the many false conceptions of the Christian attitude towards involvement (GS, 33-39). Man is not expected to remain turned in upon himself, but to accept himself and his limitations and then to get out
and go beyond himself, to learn to cope with the problems of the day (GS, 10), whether they be the pressing needs of establishing deeper international understanding and co-operation on the one hand (GS, 83-90) or the less spectacular but equally pressing needs of providing "food, supplies, health, education, and labour" on the other (GS, 84).

This apparently is what the Council means by seeking for solutions which it describes as "fully human" (GS, 40). By thus imbuing the "everyday activity of men with a deeper meaning and importance" the Council sees every undertaking as a means, not merely of overcoming a difficulty but also, and especially, of bringing man to his full stature as a human person, of "making the family of man and its history," as the document puts it, more human." This, the Council believes, is to be one of its greatest contributions ---its "healing and elevating impact on the dignity of the person" (GS, 40).

A third note in this concept of the productive man is the increased capacity he enjoys for studying the problems confronting him. Given that he has been liberated from the things that put constraints upon his freedom; given also that he enjoys a greater sense of responsibility and that he is less defensive in his relations with others; given all these things, then it might be expected that he would be more capable of making an objective appraisal of the data before him. When a man has been emancipated from "all captivity to passion," as the documents have it, the means he chooses will be more "apt," his action will be more "effective and skilful," and the goal he proposes will be pursued with a more "spontaneous choice" (GS, 17). All of which implies, according to the document on the formation of the clergy, a "degree of human maturity...a certain emotional stability..."(and) an ability
to make considered decisions;" which in turn implies a certain positive, acceptant view of oneself, and a readiness to rely on oneself as a reliable and efficient instrument; in short, "a solid maturity of personality" (OT, 11).

Related notes are the originality of the productive man, his greater energy, and relatively simple, straightforward way of acting (OT, 11). Freed from the things that bind him from within, man now finds himself directing his energies to things outside him, to improving the environmental conditions under which he lives and particularly those under which he works. He demands greater participation in the conduct of the institutions which touch his life; a greater share in the administration and profits of the enterprises in which he earns his bread (GS, 68); then he begins to direct his attention to improving the socio-politico-juridical order of the country in which he lives (GS, 93). Finally he turns himself to the world at large, attempting, by his labour and knowledge, to bring the whole of it "under his control" (GS, 53, 63).

Man, in other words, attempts to make his history rather than passively have it happen to him. But what the documents are saying here about man in his history and in his culture generally (GS, 53-72) can be said about any man in particular. Free him so that he can act more from choice than from necessity, develop his facility for relating with others, make him more aware of his responsibility, and he will discover for himself a way of acting which will not only make him more effective and productive but also leave him with a feeling of what it is to perform efficiently.

Turning from the conciliar documents to the writings of our four psychologists we find the same theme of the human person as the efficient,
productive and creative agent extensively elaborated by contemporary psychology.

On the dimension of efficiency the "adequate personality" rates very high. This personality, claim Snygg and Combs, "behaves more effectively and more efficiently than his less adequate fellows (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 246). The reason given is that, freer in himself, he is "open to all experience." Being under "no great necessity for self-defense, he has less need," explain these writers, "to distort his perceptions or to select them in terms of his peculiar unfulfilled goals or desires." Thus equipped, he is freer to devote "much greater time and attention to wider fields of experience" (p. 252), to examine things that are perhaps intimidating or unpleasant to others, and so cope better with life and its demands (p. 239). Such a person, claims the authors, is "capable of seeing relationships not seen by others" and, as a result is less likely to "confuse means and ends" (p. 253). With this wider and more reliable perspective on which to base a response, he is able to behave more "from choice than from necessity" (p. 250).

The gains from this are considerable. The greater reliability in perception and the resulting effectiveness in behavior are likely to produce in the individual over a suitable period of time an increased "trust in himself and his own capacities and perceptions" (p. 254). Gradually, according to Snygg and Combs, he discovers that "his feelings, attitudes, beliefs and understandings are more often than not effective and efficient guides to behaving" (p. 255). In this way and with the appreciation and approval of those who note and admire his more effective behavior, he learns to accept himself as a more reliable instrument, an "on-going, sensitive, trustworthy.
process" (p. 255). The accumulation of these positive perceptions about himself enable him to build up such a reservoir of positive feelings which, say the psychologists, can serve as a shock-absorber or security base against which the "damaging experiences" of one's day-to-day existence can be reflected (p. 242).

Besides coming to accept himself as a more trustworthy and spontaneous instrument, the person who is functioning well will come up with solutions to life's problems that are at once "more adequate, creative and original" (p. 253). This is a consequence, it seems, of what Snygg and Combs see as the person's capacity to "penetrate more directly and sharply to the heart of problems" (p. 251). Since his perception of reality is apparently "wider, less complicated, more precise and accurate," his response to life and life's situations is likewise more straightforward and uncomplicated (p. 254). This straightforward, uncomplicated relationship to life in turn makes possible an even "greater awareness, a quicker perception, and a more accurate judgment of all aspects of experience, including self" (p. 255). All of which gives this person an enormous advantage in dealing with life.

Virtually the same conclusion is reached by Maslow in discussing the efficiency dimension of his self-actualizing person. His argument is also roughly the same: because of this person's greater openness to wider and better data, he is more likely to come up with better solutions to his problems. Beginning at the perceptual behavior of this sort of person, Maslow argues that his "predictions of the future from whatever facts were in hand at the time seemed to be more often correct because less based upon wish, desire, anxiety, fear, or upon generalized character-determined
optimism" (p. 204). Citing the English psychoanalyst, Money-Kyrle, he argues that it is possible to call the neurotic person not only "relatively but absolutely inefficient" simply because he fails to perceive reality as accurately or efficiently as the healthy person. The neurotic, Maslow concludes, is "not only emotionally sick, he is cognitively wrong" (p. 204).

Pushing his discussion to the higher cognitive levels of behavior, Maslow advances two further arguments. In one place he argues that "a priori considerations encourage the hypothesis that this superiority in the perception of reality eventuates in a superior ability to reason, to perceive the truth, to come to conclusions, to be logical, and to be cognitively efficient in general" (p. 205). In another place he argues that "the impression of being above small things, of having a larger horizon, a wider breadth of vision, of living in the widest frame of reference, sub specie aeternitatis, is of the utmost social and interpersonal importance" (p. 212).

Rogers has little to say on the question of efficiency. His understanding of efficiency in the fully functioning person is similar to that of Snygg and Combs and Maslow. Not only are his conclusions similar but his premises are also much the same. The fully functioning person is efficient because, being more open to his experience, he has greater access to available data—"the social demands, his own complex and possibly conflicting needs, his memories of similar situations, and his perception of the uniqueness of this situation." All this data, Rogers admits, "would be very complex indeed," were it not that the person could permit "his total organism (sense impressions...previous learnings...visceral and internal states and so on), his consciousness participating, to consider each stimulus, need,
and demand, its relative intensity and importance, and out of this complex weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation" (Rogers, 1961, p. 190). The defects which, according to Rogers, render this process sometimes untrustworthy are the inclusion of information which is irrelevant to the situation at hand, or the exclusion of information which is relevant. It is when "memories and previous learnings" are fed into the judging process as "if they were this reality," and not just memories and learnings; or, as Rogers continues, when certain "threatening experiences are inhibited from awareness," and hence withheld from the judging process or fed into it in distorted form, that the wrong responses are forthcoming. If, on the other hand, people can remain open to all their experiences and trust their own reactions, they stand to be surprised at the appropriateness of their own behavioral responses. They will come to meet each new situation with a response which Rogers would describe as "a unique and creative adaptation to the newness of that moment" (1959, p. 235).
CHAPTER 7
FULFILLMENT

This chapter deals with the last of the characteristics of the human person as described by the Vatican documents—fulfillment. They focus on the nature of this experience, describing it as a certain joy or satisfaction (item 1, Table 7), a certain feeling of dignity and worth (item 2, Table 7), or a certain openness to change and fullness of personality (item 3, Table 7). This experience is seen as natural and is expressed in spontaneous behavior (item 4, Table 7). It seems clear that these psychologists often miss the implications of the Vatican II documents that fulfillment is the result of productive and effective living. Instead, they describe the subjective feelings that indicate mental health or self-actualization and that make it possible to live productive and fulfilled lives. Thus it is possible that feelings arising from a "living out" of one's drives (cf. Arnold, 1954, p. 7), unrestrained and without reference to one's objective final goal, may be mistaken for fulfillment. Likewise spontaneity (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 252) is sometimes taken to indicate fulfillment (cf. Gasson, p. 167). But neither of these concepts concurs fully with the wider implications of the documents.

On the supposition that a man can be freed from most of the things that impede the exercise of his freedom; that he has acquired a proper sense of responsibility; that his relations with others are mutually sustaining, stimulating, edifying; that he is more efficient, more productive and so achieve more; on the supposition that these conditions are present, the documents then seem to say that the person is more satisfied, more joyful,
## TABLE 7

FULFILLMENT—SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VATICAN DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>SNYGG AND COMBS</th>
<th>ABRAMHAM MASLOW</th>
<th>CARL ROGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. JOY, SATISFACTION, FULFILLMENT GS 9, 13, 14, 35, 75</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Capacity to appreciate freshly and naively&quot; Facility for &quot;enjoying life&quot; &quot;Fulfilling themselves&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. FEELING OF DIGNITY AND WORTH GS 15, 33</td>
<td>&quot;Dignity and worth...self-actualization...&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Problem centered vs. ego centered&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. OPENNESS AND FULL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY GS 9, PC 18, LG 46</td>
<td>&quot;Rich self...can afford to be extravagant&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Developing to their full stature&quot; &quot;Potentialities and latent resources&quot; &quot;A superior awareness of own subjective reactions&quot; &quot;Pleasant and ecstatic&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SPONTANEOUS—&quot;IMPELLED BY NATURE&quot; DH 2</td>
<td>&quot;Spontaneous and creative behavior&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Process...vs. static condition&quot; &quot;Wider range of...increasing openness to...experience&quot; &quot;More sensitive...greater variety...greater richness&quot; &quot;Maximum adaptability&quot; &quot;Flowing, changing organization of self-personality&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. OWN RESPONSIBILITY (Encyclical on the Development of Peoples)</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Philosophic acceptance of the nature of his self&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;It feels right&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
experiences a greater self-worth; in short, is fulfilled (GS, 9, 13, 35, 75).

Fulfillment and joy in the sense of mere blissfulness or contentment do not quite catch the meaning implied in the documents. What is intended is something stronger, something enriching, rewarding. Joy or fulfillment, in the sense intended here, is more like the feeling that accompanies the best exercise of one's capacities (GS, 15). With this experience comes the feeling that one can cope adequately with his environment and successfully meet the challenge that life confronts him with. From this experience there develops also a certain confidence in oneself: a trust in one's capacities, a reliance in the validity of one's feelings, and a sureness and sense of appropriateness in the time and manner of expressing them. In short, he begins to experience himself as a significant, competent, trustworthy, acceptable and lovable person (GS, 14). All of which gives rise, not only to a feeling of integrity, well-being and worthwhileness in himself (GS, 26), but also to sustaining and fruitful relations with his fellows (GS, 25).

This sort of fulfillment is something which all men seek. The desire for it is universal. It is discernible too at all levels, whether it be in man himself, say, in an achievement like learning to walk; in his technology, say, in learning to fly; or in his broader socio-political life. On the latter level, for example, it is recently and even dramatically apparent in the undeveloped yet emerging countries of the world. "Persons and societies," says The Church in the Modern World, "thirst for a full and free life worthy of man" (GS, 9); and this is true for the lower, uneducated classes. "Laborers and farmers (in these undeveloped countries) seek not only to
provide for the necessities of life but to develop (also) the gifts of their personality by their labors" or by what the same document calls elsewhere "culture—the cultivation of natural goods and values" (GS, 53).

This cultivation of the gifts of personality and the achievement thereby of "an authentic and full humanity" are held up as a goal for all people (GS, 53). Religious are urged to seek it "earnestly" in all places or aspects of their development—"spiritual, doctrinal, and professional" (PC, 18). The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church asserts, for example, that "the profession of the evangelical counsels, though entailing renunciation of certain values which undoubtedly merit high esteem, does not detract from a genuine development of human perfection (LG, 46). Likewise the document on the renewal of the religious life asserts that it is not enough that celibate religious "only be warned of the dangers confronting chastity;" they should also be "trained to make a celibate life consecrated to God part of the richness of their whole personality" (PC, 12). The same goal of fulfillment is seen in all other aspects of man's life—in his marriage (GS, 52), in his cultural life (GS, 60), in his socio-economic life (GS, 63-72), in his political life (GS, 73-76), and above all in himself, with the reminder of the impossibility of this "fulfillment apart from God" (GS, 13).

All this is urged upon man because it is natural. This seeking for enrichment and fulfillment represents a legitimate longing of the human heart. Man is "impelled" to seek it "by nature" and also by the internalized values and standards of his own society. By the very fact of its being natural, however, man is also bound to it, as the document on religious freedom points out, by a "moral obligation" (DH, 18). Paradoxical though it
may seem to speak of an obligation to fulfillment, the documents insist. Because sin has, in their view, "diminished man" thereby "blocking his path to fulfillment" (GS, 13), it is necessary that from time to time he be reminded of it. Even civil authority can help--"by bringing about conditions," as The Church in the Modern World says, "more likely to help citizens and groups freely to attain to complete human fulfillment with greater effect" (GS, 75). In the last analysis, however, and notwithstanding the nudgings of civil authorities or the reminders of the Church man is ultimately responsible for his own fulfillment. "Endowed with intelligence and freedom, he (every man)," says Paul VI in an encyclical statement quoted above (Chapter 2, 1), "is responsible for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation. He is aided, or sometimes impeded, by those who educate him and those with whom he lives, but each one remains, whatever be the influences affecting him, the principal agent of his own success or failure." It is up to the individual himself. "By the unaided effort of his own intelligence and his will," concludes the encyclical, "each man can grow in humanity, can enhance his personal worth, can become more a person" (PP, 15).

The above excerpt from Paul VI's encyclical goes further than our contemporary psychologists on this question of fulfillment. Where the documents are objective, the psychologists tend to concentrate on subjective experience. While, for instance, the conciliar term "fulfillment" is the result of effective and efficient living, in view of man's objective final goal, for Snygg and Combs it would imply something more subjective--"personal feelings of dignity and integrity, feelings of worth and self-actualization." People who experience these feelings, according to these authors, are thought
to live more integrally complete lives.

In the first place, Snygg and Combs point out, these people seem to be able to "utilize themselves and their experience as the basic frame of reference for much of their behavior" (p. 254). In the second place, their behavior is much freer and more spontaneous. Growing out of the same basic characteristics--respect for their own dignity and integrity--is a greater capacity for what the psychologists call "spontaneous creative behavior" (p. 252). With less need to be defensive, these people who enjoy a greater fulfillment do not have to "maintain rigid and narrow lines of operation." Whereas the "poor self must shelter and protect his investments with scrupulous care and conservatism," the "rich self" by contrast "can afford to be extravagant." Such is the inner strength and security of these people that they could, according to Snygg and Combs, even "risk themselves in experimentation" (p. 253).

Maslow also cites this spontaneity or facility for "enjoying life" as one of the more noticeable characteristics of the people he would consider to be most completely alive. Closer to the conciliar documents than Snygg and Combs, he observes this quality in diverse areas of the lives of his subjects.

He notices it first in their own sense of dignity and worth. These people, he claims, seem to be "fulfilling themselves and to be doing the best they are capable of doing;" they "have...developed" or "are developing" to their "full stature" (Maslow, 1954, p. 201). For this "development and continued growth," he explains, they are dependent not so much on the world and people outside them as on the "potentialities and latent resources"
within them (p. 214). That does not mean, however, that they customarily turn away from the world and introspectively turn in on themselves; characteristically, they are "strongly focused" in the opposite direction, on "some mission in life, some task to fulfill, some problem outside themselves." As Maslow puts it, they are "problem centred rather than ego-centred" (p. 211).

Notwithstanding this outward orientation in their lives, these people seem to be in extraordinarily close touch with their own feelings. Maslow remarks upon this as a second distinguishing characteristic. In fact, he asserts that the one implies the other. "Their (these people's) ease of penetration to reality" implies, he believes, "a superior awareness of their own...subjective reactions in general" (p. 210). This awareness, he claims, can at times be "so pleasant or even ecstatic" that it would seem "almost sacrilegious" to cut it off; at other times it can be experienced with such tremendous intensification, absorption in the task or experience, and transcendence of self as to merit the title of what Maslow calls a "mystic experience" (p. 217). Another and perhaps more common version of this sort of experience is what he describes as the "wonderful capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life, with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy" (p. 215).

At the opposite end of the scale from these so-called mystic experiences is a third characteristic of this sort of fulfillment in life. This is the person's basic acceptance of reality as it is. The "philosophic acceptance of the nature of his self, of human nature, of much of social life, and of nature and physical reality" is, in Maslow's view, the very foundation
of the person's whole value system. What he approves or disapproves of, what he is loyal to or opposes, what pleases or displeases him can, Maslow claims, "often be understood as surface derivations of this source trait of acceptance" (p. 230).

Rogers, like Maslow, seems to be searching for a higher order variable to explain the characteristic the conciliar documents have been designating as fulfillment. The nearest he comes to it is describing a set of subjective feelings which, though not fulfillment, may accompany it. Eschewing feelings like pleasure, joy, satisfaction, he fastens on a set which he describes by words like "enriching, exciting, rewarding, challenging, meaningful" (Rogers, 1961, p. 186). But even these terms, he says, can be misleading: they are too static, suggesting that the person has already arrived at or achieved this condition of excitement or meaningfulness. To Rogers, this condition is not so much a state of being as a process: in this respect the person is continually changing (Rogers, 1959, p. 235).

In the process certain things happen to him. But again Rogers describes these things only at the level of subjective feeling--that is, not the characteristic itself but the subjective awareness ("experience," as he terms it [1961, p. 195])--which still fails to describe adequately the fulfillment spoken of by the conciliar documents.

He speaks, for example, of a fuller and more immediate awareness of self. This implies for Rogers a "wider range of" (1961, p. 195) and an "increasing openness to" experience (p. 189) than that afforded by a more constricting or less fulfilling way of living. Entering more fully into this process means getting involved in what Rogers describes as the "frequently
frightening and frequently satisfying experience of a more sensitive living, with greater range, greater variety, greater richness" (p. 195). In practice this would mean living more intimately with and more sensitively aware of one's feelings of pain, anger, fear, courage, love, joy; a growing readiness to expose oneself to these feelings, to place oneself in jeopardy almost in order to discover and express more of oneself in the process.

Putting this differently, Rogers describes it as an increasing tendency to live more fully in each moment. In his terms living in the moment means an absence of "rigidity," of "tight organization," of the "imposition of structure on experience." It means instead a "maximum of adaptability," a discovery of "structure in experience," a "flowing, changing organization of self and personality" (1961, p. 189). Or, to put it another way altogether, it means becoming a "participant in the ongoing process of organismic experience," as Rogers phrases it, rather than being outside of it as an observer or "in control of it." For this is a special additional quality is required.

This is a certain confidence in oneself as a trustworthy instrument for facing up to life. This is the third characteristic. Living in the moment, in the sense implied above, involves a certain readiness to risk, which, unless one is to expose himself to the charge of rashness, demands a greater trust in one's own organism, in its capacity to experience and to perceive reliably and its capacity to direct. Given this trust, the criterion of what is the good and the appropriate thing to do is simply that "it feels right." Responding thus in a certain way or doing a certain thing for the sufficient and good reason that "it feels right" will prove in the end, according to
Rogers, a "component and trustworthy guide to behavior which is truly satisfying" (1961, p. 189).
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND APPLICATION

This essay has a twofold objective. In view of the tremendous importance attached to the human person in the documents of Vatican Council II it sought first to develop some notion of the human person as described in the documents. Then, in view of the importance accorded to the contributions of the social sciences by the documents and their own claim that they themselves had been so open to those sciences, the essay sought secondly to compare this notion with those of four contemporary American psychologists.

An outline of the whole work is sketched out in Chapter 2. The picture of the human person is briefly presented in the first part of the chapter (see Table 1); the parallel pictures presented by the contemporary psychologists in the second part (see Table 2). Each dimension of the original conciliar picture is elaborated in the subsequent chapters (Chapters 3-7) and then compared or contrasted with the picture presented by the psychologists. These comparisons are summarized in tabular form in Tables 3-7.

This presentation of the human person gives rise to two questions. One refers to the worth of such a presentation or the practical uses to which it can be put; the other, to the necessity of a more critical evaluation of the two pictures of the human person.

The latter can be considered first. Given the claim of the conciliar documents (supra, Chapter 2) that they are "scrutinizing the signs of the times" and that they are responding in "language intelligible to each
generation" (GS, 4) to the perennial questions man has asked about himself, it was to be expected that there would be many similarities between the picture of the human person presented in the documents and that presented by the contemporary psychologists. These similarities, it is believed, have been pointed out. But there are also differences. Some of these are obvious and have already been touched upon; others are perhaps less obvious and need to be resumed here.

On the nature of man, for instance, the documents are explicit, particularly The Church in the Modern World (GS, 11-15, 24-32). But the same explicitness is missing from the writings of the psychologists. Understandably, it may not be their intention to treat this question; in many instances, however, there are implicit assumptions which reveal their position. Snygg and Combs, as has been pointed out (supra, Chapters 3-4), have removed from their later writings the more explicit statements on determinism and free will that were found in their earlier work; but certain implicit assumptions (of determinism) still linger in parts (cf. pp. 17, 310). In Rogers, too, as has been indicated, there lurks a certain trace either of angelism or of a Rousseau-like conception of the nature of man. Implications of these differences are discernible in many ways. The conciliar concept of responsibility, for example, with its emphasis on the inalienable responsibility of the human person for his own decisions and actions, goes much further than the pleas of some of the psychologists to trust the "rationality" of the organism. Likewise in the category of interpersonal relations, the conciliar concept goes beyond that of the psychologists. It emphasizes goals of these relations, which extend far beyond the immediate
pleasure of the person concerned. In the category of fulfillment the gap between the two concepts is more pronounced. The description of this fulfillment in terms of "rich," "exciting," "spontaneous" subjective feelings, as presented by the psychologists, does not carry the weight of the sober, objective description given in the documents. Likewise with the concept of spontaneity: as it is described by the psychologists, it is at times quite comparable with the rigid determinism of the brute (cf. Gasson, 1954, p. 167); on that account it falls short of the description of human fulfillment found in the documents.

There are differences still. One is the tendency on the part of some of the psychologists to substitute metaphor for reality. Metaphorical expressions like the "flowing, changing organizations of personality" and figurative language like the breaking with "tradition and orthodoxy" leave the impression of a certain vagueness. A second difference is the tendency, of Maslow especially, to write at times as if, instead of reporting objective observations, he were merely expressing wishes. Statements like rising to one's "full stature" and maintaining a "certain inner detachment from the culture in which" and is "immersed" have a certain exhortatory or rhetorical ring. Some of these differences, it is true, tend to be exaggerated by the way in which citations from the psychologists have been made. Whilst it is true that the method of quoting their exact words and short expressions preserves a certain flavor of verisimilitude and authenticity, it introduces at the same time a certain artificiality. Aptness or felicity of phrase is no substitute for substance or depth of thought, yet the very methodology used in this essay has tended to favor the former over
the latter.

Leaving aside this critical evaluation, let us return to the earlier question—the practical uses to which the concept of the human person as presented here can be put. The main ones suggest themselves.

The first is that it could be used as a pattern or goal of the human person towards which those responsible for the education or formation of young people might work. The second is that it could also serve as an heuristic concept which could well be utilized as an analytic instrument for the interpretation and understanding of much of the unrest, dissatisfaction, longing and groping for answers that is to be found in institutional life today, especially within the Church. Each of these uses merit further elaboration.

First, the conciliar picture as a pattern of the human person. This pattern of the human person would, it seems, enter into most consideration of education, personal growth and development, religious formation, and administration:

1) **Education.** The picture could be of use to parents and those engaged in the education of young people. It could serve as a pattern or guide for the sort of person they are trying to educate.

2) **Personal Development.** The picture could likewise serve as a guide for those interested in their own development as they live and develop within the existing institutional structures.

3) **Religious formation.** The picture is, it seems, of particular relevance to those responsible for the formation of religious.
Without some such model of the human person an adequate understanding of a life of consecration under vows would seem very difficult to come by.

4) **Administration.** The picture is also relevant to the administrator—educational, religious, ecclesiastical, civil, or any other where human persons are concerned. This follows from the objective of administration which, according to well established practice in this country, is making all the human and material resources of the organization available and effective. A moment's reflection will produce abundant evidence of the failure in many instances to make the best use of the human resources available. The "drop-outs" from school and the religious life, the underachievers in school and the "non-producers" in industry, and the thousands who live impoverished, stunted, soured and embittered lives as a result will indicate the losses entailed for the individuals themselves, for religious orders, for the Church, and for society at large.

Second, the use of the picture as an heuristic concept. The unrest and dissatisfaction experienced in organizational life generally has been a subject of interest in recent years; but few have been able to bring any critical understanding to the phenomenon. So too with the longing, alienation, frustration and groping expressed in the writings and words of the more articulate and in the pained looks of those less so—in educational, industrial, religious, ecclesiastical, and civil institutional life. Much of this has been either misinterpreted and mis-labelled indifference, defiance, rebellion; or just simply misunderstood and ignored—all because of the lack of a
sufficiently reliable analytical instrument with which to interpret the data. To meet this need the heuristic concept (see the grid in Table 2) might be adapted as a guide for rendering the data intelligible and then, as a start at least, for facilitating or procuring the suitable remedies.
APPENDIX I

ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR VATICAN DOCUMENTS

AA -- Apostolicam Actuositatem (Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity, 1965)
DH -- Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom, 1965)
GS -- Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, 1965)
IM -- Inter Mirifica (Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication, 1963)
LG -- Lumen Gentium (Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, 1964)
OT -- Optatam Totius (Decree on Priestly Formation, 1965)
PC -- Perfectae Caritatis (Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life, 1965)
PO -- Presbyterorum Ordinis (Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, 1965)
PP -- Progressio Populorum (The Progress of the Peoples, 1967)
UR -- Unitatis Redintegratio (Decree on Ecumenism, 1964)


CROFT, Don B., and HALPIN, A. W. The Organizational Climate of Schools. Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1963.


The thesis submitted by Thomas P. Fogarty (Brother Ronald, F.M.S.) has been read and approved by members of the Department of Psychology.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

1-19-70
Date

Signature of Advisor