The Perceived Threat of Secularism and Militancy Among Religious Fundamentalists

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

THE PERCEIVED THREAT OF SECULARISM
AND MILITANCY AMONG RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISTS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
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MASTERS OF ARTS

PROGRAM IN APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY
CHASE WILSON
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MAY 2014
For my wife, Sarah
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ABSTRACT

Religious fundamentalism has been found to predict endorsement of aggressive counterterrorism techniques, such as the use of severe interrogations and pre-emptive military attacks (e.g. Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012). The present study tested whether a perceived increase in secularism constitutes a psychological threat to American religious fundamentalists, and thus increases endorsement of such counterterrorism tactics. Replicating previous research, religious fundamentalism was found to positively predict endorsement of aggressive counterterrorism techniques, even when controlling for ideology and party identification. Contrary to hypothesis, the secularism prime had no effect. An unpredicted finding of this study was that religious fundamentalism only related to the counterterrorism attitudes of political experts, not political novices. This moderation via expertise suggests that, rather than having a direct psychological effect (such as out-group aggression), fundamentalism’s relationship to such attitudes emerges through the application of political knowledge.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

There are two growing forces shaping American politics today: religious fundamentalism, and secularism. While it may seem wholly unlikely that such contrary ideals could simultaneously gain influence, survey research suggests that this is the case (e.g. Green & Dionne, 2008). Whereas there was once a more moderately-religious mainstream, the current religious landscape is now more polarized. The religiously-unaffiliated and the “less observant” represent the largest religious groups supporting the Democratic Party, while observant Evangelical Protestants and observant Catholics are the most frequent religious identities Republican Party supporters (Green & Dionne, 2008).

The areas where religion explicitly informs political attitudes are numerous: abortion, birth control, same sex marriage, and stem cell research are just a few. In each of these cases, we see ancient scripture pitted against aspects of modernization. But research suggests that the mere salience of secularism could also inform political attitudes of fundamentalists in more unexpected ways.

The presently-proposed study will create a scenario that measures the psychological effect of one growing tendency (secularism) on the other.
(fundamentalism). When primed with the knowledge that secularism is gaining influence in American society, how will fundamentalists react? Does the salience of secularism's rise prompt fundamentalists to adjust their political attitudes and approaches to public policy?

Specifically, I will explore the relationship between two distinct concepts associated with conservatism: religious fundamentalism, and endorsement of militant counterterrorism tactics. American subjects measuring high on Altemeyer and Hunsberger's Revised Religious Fundamentalism scale (2004) will be presented with literature suggesting that the United States is becoming more secular; subsequently, I will measure their attitudes towards a range of potential counter-terrorism tactics. I predict that, among religious fundamentalists, exposure to evidence of increased secularism in the United States will prompt endorsement of more aggressive counterterrorism tactics.

The relationship between “secularism salience” and national security attitudes has not been studied directly in psychological research. The two domains do not appear to logically relate. For instance, politicians are often described as emphasizing social issues (often including religiously-informed attitudes), or national security, and these are not often regarded as overlapping topics. The present research proposes that these two domains can in fact be linked via the concept of psychological threat. Previous research has demonstrated that when feeling psychologically threatened, people’s attitudes may become more oriented toward defensiveness. This defensiveness can “cross” domains: for instance, when threatened with economic uncertainty, people can become more punitive toward criminals (Sales, 1973). The present study predicts that the salience of secularism functions as a threat to a subset of the population (i.e., religious
fundamentalists), and that the activation of this threat can arouse “defensive” attitudes in
the national security domain.

Before addressing the research on threat, it is important to define some terms –
namely, authoritarianism and fundamentalism – and to situate this project among research
on these topics.

**Authoritarianism**

In this study, “authoritarianism” will reflect Altemeyer’s construct of Right Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA), which is defined by three key tendencies: a) willing submission
to traditional authorities; b) conventionalism; and c) hostility to norm-defying cultural
“outsiders” (1981). The term “authoritarian” refers more to those who *willingly submit to
traditional authority*, rather than to those who would conspire to be authoritarian
dictators (that tendency is reflected by the construct of “social dominators” (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999)). Authoritarians value conformity and the status quo. They may be
aggressive, but this aggression is only directed against those who are “lower” in
established social hierarchies. This tendency has been treated as a personality variable
that is relatively stable and present across cultures (Krauss, Hood, Streib, Keller & Silver,
2006). While the construct has been dubbed “right wing” authoritarianism, and in the
United States does correlate with conservative attitudes (Altemeyer, 1996), it could also
manifest as rigid submission to left-wing authorities (such as in communist dictatorships).

Religious fundamentalism has been described as *authoritarianism in the religious
domain* (Altemeyer, 1996). Authoritarianism therefore provides an important link
between fundamentalism and psychological reactions to threat. The threat-
authoritarianism link has been extensively studied — certainly more than the specific
threat-fundamentalism link. By recognizing fundamentalism as a subtype of authoritarianism, it is possible to apply the threat-authoritarianism literature to understanding fundamentalist attitudes.

**Religious Fundamentalism**

“Religious fundamentalism” can refer to at least three things: self-identified fundamentalism, historical Fundamentalism, and fundamentalism as a meta-belief. This study focuses on the latter: fundamentalism as a belief about one’s own religious belief. Providing the basis for much subsequent work, Altemeyer & Hunsberger (1992) defined religious fundamentalism as: “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity” (p. 118). Fundamentalism therefore represents a “black-and-white” attitude toward religion and morality, and a firm conviction that one’s own beliefs constitute the “one true path.” The fundamentalism of interest in the present experiment, as in many other social psychological studies of the subject (e.g. Galen, Smith, Knapp & Wyngarden, 2011; Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009), is less an ideology than an approach to ideology. This is consistent with the conceptualization of religious fundamentalism as a manifestation of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). This definition of fundamentalism treats it as a continuous variable that can be measured by Altemeyer & Hunsberger's

This definition must be distinguished from religious self-identity as a fundamentalist. The “Religion and Daily Life” survey by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life (2011) suggests that less than 1% of the US adult population identifies as “fundamentalist.” But the present experiment, as with others that measure fundamentalism as a meta-belief, approaches fundamentalism in a way that is not confined to a particular denomination, or even to Christianity (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). While only a small percentage of the US population identifies as fundamentalist, many more show signs indicative of what psychologists consider fundamentalism. For instance, a 2010 Gallup poll revealed 40% of Americans agreed with the statement, “God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so” (as opposed to a statement endorsing evolutionary theory), indicating widespread scriptural literalism. Even more indicative of Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s definition of religious fundamentalism, in 2008, 29% of religiously-affiliated Americans stated that their religion was the “one true faith” (notably, this percentage grew from 20% in 2002) (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2008). Among White Evangelicals, the proportion endorsing the “one true faith” statement was 49% (an increase from 39% in 2002) (Pew, 2008).

“Fundamentalism” may also refer to a historical movement associated with the early 20th-century United States. Fundamentalism arose as a Protestant movement to promote “the Fundamentals,” in response to what some viewed as threats to Christian morals. Perceived threats included a) the Modernist tendency to view the Bible “in
context” of the time it was written, rather than literally; and b) Darwinism (Kee, Albu, Lindberg, Frost, & Robert, 1998). While the historical definition is clearly not the subject of this study, it is helpful for contextualizing the beliefs of contemporary fundamentalists. Notably, the fundamentalists of a century ago perceived these facts to be threats: a) that some individuals were straying from “old-fashioned” fundamental beliefs; and b) public policy was favoring secularist ideals over fundamental religious ones. The present study will test whether these circumstances still represent potent instigators for those who measure high in trait fundamentalism.

As noted above, fundamentalism has been described as a manifestation of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Fundamentalism and authoritarianism scales tend to produce correlations of around .70 (Altemeyer, 1996; Hunsberger, 1995). One cross-cultural study comparing the personality dimensions of fundamentalists versus authoritarians in the US, Romania and Germany found no personality dimensions that correlated more strongly with fundamentalism than authoritarianism (Krauss et al., 2006). Because religious fundamentalism is a form of authoritarianism, I will not attempt to demonstrate effects of religious fundamentalism statistically “unique from” or “above and beyond” authoritarianism. Rather, religious fundamentalism is simply the domain-specific form of authoritarianism that is of interest in the case of “secularism salience” effects.

**Threat and Authoritarianism**

Sales (1973) used archival data to demonstrate that economic threat (the Great Depression) positively correlated with more authoritarian behaviors in society, when compared to a more economically stable time period. Theoretically, the instability in the
economic environment provoked the more authoritarian behavior: greater support for the police, more punitive sentencing for sexual crimes, more aggression in literature, more conversions to authoritarian churches, and so on. Doty, Peterson and Winter (1991) compared the economically depressed era of 1978-1982 to the more economically stable period of 1983-1987. Reflecting Sales’ 1973 study, the authors found significant decreases in markers of authoritarianism (popularity of boxing, number of executions, preference for tough dog breeds, etc.) as the country became more economically stable.

These apparent authoritarian reactions do not logically diffuse the threat of economic instability. What could doling out harsher sentences to prostitutes do to resolve economic uncertainty? More recent research has pointed to different models that can explain the link between threat and more authoritarian attitudes: the Authoritarian Dynamic Theory (Stenner, 2005), Terror Management Theory (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1990), and other motivational theories of conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). The next section of this proposal will provide a brief overview of these theories and how they relate perceived threat to authoritarian behavior.

### Authoritarian Dynamic Theory

Feldman and Stenner (1997) argue for an interactionist approach to the threat-authoritarianism link. Previous research has suggested that transient threat increases the general level of authoritarianism in the public (e.g. Sales, 1973; Doty, Peterson & Winter, 1991). But this view is hard to reconcile with a personality approach, which construes authoritarianism as a stable personal trait (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1981). Feldman and Stenner resolve this apparent contradiction by suggesting there is an interaction between the authoritarian disposition (as a personality variable) and the presence of threat
(a situational context). Only those who are predisposed to authoritarianism will react to threat with the “authoritarian” behavior (e.g. ethnocentrism, punitiveness, etc.). Those who are not predisposed to authoritarianism (“low-authoritarians”) will not behave this way. This theory predicts that authoritarians and non-authoritarians have more similar attitudes under neutral conditions, but diverge during threatening times. Under this framework, the aggregate effects observed by Sales (1973), and Doty, Peterson and Winter (1991) was the result of provoking the authoritarians, not a general increase in authoritarianism in general. Stenner describes this as the authoritarian dynamic theory (2005).

According to Stenner’s authoritarian dynamic theory (2005), those who are “libertarian” (liberal, value diversity and uniqueness) react in an opposite way to those who are “authoritarian” (which she defines as “preference for uniformity and insistence upon group authority” (p. 15)). In a 1997 study, Feldman and Stenner used National Election Survey (NES) data to compare the reactions to threat of those predisposed to authoritarianism against those who were not. They hypothesized that those who were high in authoritarianism would endorse more authoritarian behaviors when threatened than when unthreatened, while those low in authoritarianism (“libertarians”) would not differ across conditions. While the first hypothesis was confirmed by the data, the second was somewhat surprising. Under conditions of threat, “libertarians” became even more liberal in their views, across several measures: ethnocentrism, punitiveness, and so on.

Therefore, threat had a polarizing effect on attitudes. In control conditions, the attitudes of authoritarians and non-authoritarians were more similar than under the condition of threat. The authors note that this interaction pattern reflects findings in a
classic terror management experiment (Greenberg et al., 1990), in which low-authoritarians liked an outgroup member more under conditions of threat (while high-authoritarians liked the outgroup member less) than in the control condition.

**Terror Management Theory**

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that much human behavior is organized around managing death-related anxiety (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1997). As humans, we have the unique ability to foresee and contemplate our own eventual death. From the perspective of terror management theorists, this knowledge contradicts our fundamental instinct for survival, and puts us at risk of experiencing grave anxiety. One primary hypothesis within TMT is that *cultural worldviews*, like patriotism or religious devotion, serve as “anxiety buffers.” Dedication to groups and values larger than the self can replace the fear of personal mortality with the assurance of continued, meaningful existence through group membership (Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel, 2004).

The TMT literature has explicitly identified religious fundamentalism as an “anxiety buffer” (Friedman and Rholes, 2008). The “anxiety buffer hypothesis” states that when a buffer is directly undermined (perhaps by priming the weakness of one’s country or culture), death-related thoughts will become more accessible. Friedman and Rholes (2008) showed that, when reminded of their own mortality, religious fundamentalists were less likely to engage in secular “worldview-defense” than non-fundamentalists were. The authors suggested that the religious belief created enough of a protection against anxiety that fundamentalists did not resort to other defensive techniques. In another study, Friedman and Rholes (2007) exposed Christian students to
texts that demonstrated inconsistencies in Biblical accounts of Christ’s resurrection. Students were also measured on their degree of fundamentalism, through the use of Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s Religious Fundamentalism scale (1992). “High fundamentalists” (those who scored high on the scale), but not “low fundamentalists,” reacted to the “inconsistencies” condition with greater death-thought accessibility (“DTA”, as measured by a word-completion task). The increased DTA provides evidence that the death-thought-suppressing “buffer” – namely, belief in the literal text of the Bible – had been eroded. Neither high nor low fundamentalists demonstrated greater than average death-thought accessibility in the control text condition, which also had religious (though not challenging-to-religion) content. This study provides the most direct evidence of fundamentalists using literal Biblical interpretations as an anxiety buffer.

TMT theorists also argue that when a person’s defenses against mortality thoughts are eroded, he or she can become more ethnocentric and aggressive (McGregor et al., 1998). This suggests a mechanism whereby certain ideas, if they challenge comforting worldviews, can lead to more authoritarian behavior. In the present case, it may be that secularism erodes the fundamentalists’ “buffer” against mortality thoughts, thus leading to endorsement of more aggressive policies.

Need for Closure, Need for Certainty, and Other Motives

Several theorists have proposed that authoritarian behavior stems from the threat of uncertainty. Fromm (1941) argued precisely this, noting that historical movements to gain freedom from oppression often resulted in a relapse towards authoritarian rule. He argued that freedom implies uncertainty, and the threat of this uncertainty can provoke a psychological need for a strong leader and for social conformity. Rokeach was another
early proponent of this general theory, drawing correlations between anxiety and
dogmatism (1960).

Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway summarized a great deal of such theory and
research, drawing connections between authoritarian beliefs and psychological motives in
a meta-analysis (2003). They argued that certain social-cognitive motives drive
conservative beliefs; that is, while conservative beliefs may be rational, principled, and/or
learned, they also “match” with certain psychological motivations. Noting that
ideological beliefs are squarely in a “hot cognitive” domain, they survey research that has
connected conservative attitudes to underlying cognitive motives. For example, Wilson
(1973) argued that certain responses, including religious dogmatism and militarism, were
a result of a need to deal with uncertainty in the environment. To Wilson, environmental
uncertainty included the presence of foreigners or dissenters, as well as social change in
general. Other research they reviewed focused directly on motivational processes that
drive people toward certain types of cognition. For instance, a need for closure (whether
dispositional or situationally manipulated), is associated with “seizing” upon a
comforting conclusion, and a reluctance to change this conclusion. This can result in a
preference for ideological content that promises a lack of ambiguity. As conservatism is
comprised of attitudes that both resist change and reinforce social hierarchies (Jost et al.,
2003), conservatism can represent the ideology of “certainty” rather than ambiguity. In
support of this conclusion, using meta-analysis, the authors found that uncertainty
tolerance was negatively associated with conservatism ($r = -.27$), and need for order,
structure, and closure was positively associated with conservatism ($r = .26$). In the
present study, such a motivational-ideological link supports the hypothesis that
politically-charged information can shift even irrelevant attitudes. If the “secularism”
condition poses a threat to certainty, a motive may be activated towards more
“conservative” attitudes, including endorsement of militarism.

The present research will not test mediation via any of the above mentioned
processes. If the predicted effects are found, follow-up studies measuring death-thought
accessibility, need for closure, etc., might help illuminate specific processes. For present
purposes, these models merely demonstrate the psychological “reasonableness” of the
proposed study, and situate it among relevant research.

The Present Threat: Secularism

The “threat” in question in this proposal is secularism, a construct with multiple
definitions. Philosophical secularism is akin to atheism or agnosticism, “a godless system
of the world” (McClay, 2007). Political secularism refers the separation between the
political realm and the religious realm. The United States, for instance, generally protects
state secularism, with the ideal of a “separation of church and state.” The First
Amendment to the Constitution forbids the establishment of a state religion, for instance.
State secularism provides a “bi-directional” buffer between the state and religious
entities. The state cannot interfere with religious groups, and neither can religious groups
dictate government policy. The United States is not, however, saturated with
“philosophical secularism”: approximately 78% of Americans believe in God, and an
additional 15% believe in a higher spirit (Newport, 2008).

One impetus for the present study is that the “influence of secularism” was the
top-rated “threat to Evangelical Christianity” named by Protestant Evangelical leaders in
a recent Pew Research Center poll (2011). The poll did not specify which definition of
“secularism” this was referring to: growing atheism, church-state separation, or some other dimension of the construct. Therefore, this study will take a general approach to studying the “secularist threat.” That is, the stimulus will be relevant to both of these dimensions: rising atheism, and a lack of fundamentalist dominance in politics.

It is conceivable that both political and philosophical secularism could constitute a threat to fundamentalists. Rising atheism may be seen as evidence of the fallibility or wrongness of religious beliefs, due to a lack of consensus. For example, terror management theorists have explained anxiety-buffering cultural worldviews as “essentially socially constructed fictions” that require “constant social validation” (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989, p. 683). Therefore, evidence of the popularity of philosophical secularism (“godlessness”) may temporarily undermine the social validation the worldview requires. Indeed, whether addressing secular or religious anxiety buffers, several studies have demonstrated an increase in death-thought accessibility after the worldview was challenged (Schimel, Hayes, Williams & Jahrig, 2007).

Political secularism speaks to the inability of religion to control behavior on a large scale (failure of religious authority). The desire for religious doctrine to be inserted into public governance appears to be of particular concern for fundamentalists. One reason is that if fundamentalism is itself “a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 116), it should also manifest partially as an attraction to authority, rather than to freedom and tolerance. Therefore, there should be an attraction on the part of fundamentalists to law that asserts scriptural authority, rather than promotes ideological freedom. It is plausible that the secularist threat may relate to
the failure of both authorities (religion and state) to reaffirm the same “laws,” especially because submission to authority is a primary dimension of authoritarian personality (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). If the authorities fail to reach consensus, this undermines the worldview-buffering abilities of both church and state.

**Counter-Terrorism Attitudes as a Dependent Variable**

Attitude towards aggressive counterterrorism policies is a common outcome variable in the psychological study of authoritarianism, terror management, and fundamentalism. This focus is unsurprising, given that measures such as waterboarding detainees, wiretapping citizens, and using unmanned drones to kill targets are among the most controversial and salient political issues of the past decade. Some of these expanded government powers in relation to counterterrorism have spanned both the Bush and Obama administrations, suggesting that their endorsement is more complex than simple party identification.

Interest in aggressive counterterrorism attitudes has inspired a number of studies in social psychological literature. Landau et al. (2004) measured attitudes towards George W. Bush and his counterterrorist policies following mortality salience and 9/11-priming manipulations. Participants rated their agreement with a passage that included lines such as, “I appreciate our President’s wisdom regarding the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power and his Homeland Security Policy is a source of great comfort to me,” and “I endorse the actions of President Bush and the members of his administration who have taken bold action in Iraq” (p. 1440). They found that agreement with this passage increased when participants were primed with either their own mortality, or the events of 9/11. Pyszczynski et al. (2006) investigated the related effects of mortality salience on
endorsement of violence among both Iranians and Americans (towards each other). Their experiments revealed that Americans were more likely to endorse “extreme military measures” (with items such as “If we could capture or kill Osama bin Laden we should do it, even if thousands of civilians are injured or killed in the process” (p. 531)) when primed with mortality (vs. control).

Barnes, Brown and Osterman (2012) examined a different predictor of aggressive military responses: masculine honor ideology. Men studying in the southern United States, a region associated with a “culture of honor” (Cohen, 1998), were more likely to endorse “extreme counterterrorism measures” than their northern counterparts. This “honor ideology” effect persisted even when controlling for patriotism and religiosity. The present study will borrow many “extreme counterterrorism” items from Barnes et al. (2012).

**Research Connecting Fundamentalism to Counterterrorism Attitudes**

Several studies have measured religious fundamentalism (often referred to as “RF”) as a predictor of extreme counterterrorist (or aggressive military) attitudes. The Barnes, Brown and Osterman (2012) article, for instance, measured RF, among other constructs, as covariates in their search for the honor ideology effects described above. They found that RF was significantly positively correlated with support for “severe” interrogations of terrorists ($r = .19, p < .05$) and aggressive counterterrorist military action (e.g., preemptive attacks; $r = .28, p < .01$). However, when entered into a regression model, RF failed to significantly predict any of these attitudes.

A study by Henderson-King et al. (2004) examined some predictors of various responses to terrorism, ranging from sending aid to Afghanistan and seeking
understanding, to attacking enemies with brutal force. Echoing the more recent Barnes et al. article (2012), religious fundamentalism (RF) was found to correlate positively with endorsement of increased domestic surveillance \((r = .12, p < .01)\) and the use of military force against Afghanistan \((r = .14, p < .01)\). RF was negatively correlated with the impetus to “seek understanding” of the terrorist’s grievances \((r = -.17, p < .001)\)\(^1\). These effects reflected the directionality of RWA’s zero-order correlations with the same dependent variables. It is likely that the effects of RF were “driven” by the RWA component of RF. When controlling for RWA, RF was not a significant predictor – and even became a negative predictor – of the “aggressive” dependent variables.

Relevant to the present study, Rothschild, Abdollahi and Pyszczynski (2009) measured a three-way interaction between religious fundamentalism, mortality salience, and the priming of compassionate religious values. Their dependent variable was attitude toward the use of “extreme military interventions” (816). The authors drew from the “dual-component” conceptualization of RF (Laythe et al., 2001), which describes RF as possessing both an authoritarian structure and religious content. The religious content component (“treat thy neighbor as thyself”) may conflict with the authoritarian impetus (hostility toward outgroups). The authors hypothesized that RF could therefore decrease aggressive attitudes, if the compassionate religious component were primed, particularly under a mortality threat. They found that RF generally predicted greater endorsement of aggressive military techniques. The main effect of RF disappeared, however, when fundamentalists were primed with both mortality salience and the compassionate

\(^1\) RF did not significantly correlate with the other two dependent variables in this study, “attack terrorists” and “aid.”
dimension of their religion. Under such conditions, “high-fundamentalists” were no
different from “low-fundamentalists” in their support for these policies.

The Present Study

Many of the studies described above measured both religious fundamentalism and
authoritarianism as they relate to counterterrorist or military attitudes. Again and again,
the effect of religious fundamentalism was eliminated when controlling for RWA.
Therefore it may be tempting to dismiss the effect of RF on counterterrorism attitudes, as
the effects are apparently “redundant” with generic authoritarianism.

While I expect fundamentalism to correlate highly with authoritarianism, I believe
fundamentalism is the more relevant construct for the present study. Fundamentalism
presents an interesting domain-specific “case” of authoritarianism. It is well-established
that environmental threat engenders more aggression and out-group derogation among
authoritarians (e.g. Feldman and Stenner, 1997). But what represents a threat to those
high in RF may not be a threat to less religious authoritarians. Pointing out
contradictions in the Bible, for instance, was sufficient to increase the accessibility of
death-related thoughts among religious fundamentalists (Friedman & Rholes, 2007). In
another study, a strong argument against creationism had a similar effect (Schimel et al.,
2007). The present study will echo this research, but slightly shift the nature of the
stimulus: rather than challenging the truthfulness of the sacred text, it will challenge the
social validation of the religious belief.

Challenges to the “social validation” of religious belief are likely to be frequent
occurrences for fundamentalists -- probably more frequent than direct arguments against
scripture. For instance, any information that same-sex marriage is gaining acceptance
across the US can function as a challenge to the social validation of fundamentalist ideals. And such discussions are frequent in the political domain. Many salient “culture war” issues relate directly to the government enforcement of scripturally-informed policies. Pat Buchanan helped define these “culture war” issues in a famous speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention:

The agenda [Bill] Clinton and [Hillary] Clinton would impose on America — abortion on demand, a litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual rights, discrimination against religious schools, women in combat — that’s change, all right. But it is not the kind of change America wants. It is not the kind of change America needs. And it is not the kind of change we can tolerate in a nation that we still call God's country.

While this speech was over 20 years ago, the themes of abortion, gay rights, women’s rights, and “religious freedom” still play a central role in national politics. The 2012 Republican Party platform still argued for the primacy of heterosexual marriage and opposition to abortion (Republican Party platform of 2012, n.d.) The discourse also shifted towards emphasizing “religious freedom” in general. The campaign for Republican candidate Mitt Romney emphasized the “threat” that an Obama administration would pose to religious Christians. A “robo-call” made by the campaign stated,

Remember when Obama forced Christian organizations to provide insurance coverage that was contrary to their religious beliefs? That's the real Barack Obama. That's the real threat to our religious freedom. Mitt Romney understands the importance of faith and family. That's why so many leaders of the Christian community are supporting Romney. They know we can't underestimate the threat Barack Obama poses to our faith, our values, our freedom (as cited in Terkel, 2012).
We can see from this rhetoric\textsuperscript{2} that religion is perceived as both politically-relevant and vulnerable. Being confronted with American secularization is not likely to be a rare occurrence for religious fundamentalists.

To summarize, research shows that fundamentalists are authoritarian; secularism threatens fundamentalists; and threat activates more aggressive attitudes among authoritarians. If these effects are reflected in the present study, we may see the curious, domain-crossing effect of social information on national security attitudes.

It should be noted that calling policies “aggressive”, “militant” or “extreme” is necessarily subjective. The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that for Americans, the threat of death from acts of terrorism is real. There is no objective standard dictating the way to balance Americans’ safety with civil liberties, or the rights of suspected enemies. None of the items on the present dependent measure (see Appendix B; items such as “If necessary, the United States should use nuclear weapons to defend its interests against those of terrorists”) are intrinsically wrong. All of the items represent controversial issue positions, that when endorsed, represent a more “aggressive” policies or a more “interventionist” role of the government and military in addressing terrorism. Since these policies (such as war; use of nuclear weapons; use of severe interrogations) have the potential to inflict massive harm, how citizens arrive at their stances on these is of great importance.

\textsuperscript{2} Notably, the perceived threat here was not that individuals would be prevented from practicing their religion. The threat is that employers would be prevented from using their religious beliefs to restrict birth control coverage to their employees. This example illustrates that the “threat to religious freedom” may actually be a “threat to the free authoritarian exercise of religion.”
Additional Variables Potentially Associated with Counter-Terrorism Attitudes

Political expertise. I measured political expertise as a potential moderator of the two-way fundamentalism by secularism-prime interaction. There are two ways that expertise could moderate the effect that the priming condition has on fundamentalists’ attitudes. The first relates to the classic idea in political psychology that only those who are “experts” in politics organize their attitudes in an ideological (“constrained”) fashion, while political novices have less ideologically-organized attitudes (Converse 1964; Judd and Krosnick 1989; Goren 1997). Experts’ attitudes should be more consistent with ideology across domains, and they may be more likely to interpret information in an ideological manner. According to this line of thought, the pattern of the secularism prime influencing fundamentalists, but not non-fundamentalists, may only emerge for those high in political expertise (thus, a three-way interaction). In this case, only high-fundamentalists who are also high in political expertise should interpret the secularism stimulus as a threat to conservative ideals, and thus react with “exaggerated conservatism” on the counterterrorism measure (i.e. more punitive, aggressive responses). High-fundamentalists who are low in political expertise would not differ between conditions with regard to the DV. In sum, this concept suggests that attitude change as brought about by secularism prime would require both a) religious fundamentalism, and b) political expertise. If this pattern emerges, this would suggest that effect of secularist threat on the DV is related to ideological processing rather than more basic processes (i.e. threat perception and outgroup aggression).
An alternate prediction would follow from research suggesting experts have more crystallized prior attitudes than novices do (e.g. Cacioppo et al., 1992). If this effect influences the present research, then the priming condition should not sway experts (of any level of fundamentalism) as much as it does novices. This would suggest a three-way interaction, with the proposed two-way interaction occurring for novices but not for experts. This is the opposite prediction to what is proposed in the previous paragraph.

**Gender.** Gender has been shown to significantly predict counterterrorism responses (Henderson-King et al., 2004). In the Henderson-King et al. study, women were more likely than men to endorse both attacking terrorists and sending aid to Afghanistan, even when controlling for ideology and worldviews. I therefore measured gender as a potential control.

**Hypotheses**

This study proposes two main hypotheses (1 and 2), and three competing hypotheses regarding moderation (3a, 3b and 3c):

1) Religious fundamentalism will positively predict endorsement of militant counterterrorism policies (main effect of RF).

2) High fundamentalists primed with an article describing “secularization in the United States” will endorse extreme counterterrorism policies more than those who read a control article. Low fundamentalists will not differ between the two conditions (two-way interaction).

---

3 Using regression with interaction terms, “high-fundamentalism” will be represent fundamentalism 1 standard deviation above the mean on the Revised RF Scale. “Low-fundamentalism” will represent scores 1 standard deviation below the mean. The same procedure will be used for political expertise.
3a) The two-way fundamentalism by secularism-threat interaction will only emerge for those high in political expertise (three-way interaction).

3b) The two-way fundamentalism by secularism-threat interaction will only emerge for those low in political expertise (three-way interaction).

3c) The fundamentalism by secularism threat interaction will be equal across levels of political expertise (absence of three-way interaction).
CHAPTER TWO

METHODS AND PROCEDURE

Participants

For this study, I recruited 250 participants online via amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Because the dependent variable in this study is political in nature, and I was primarily interested in the American political climate, I wanted to obtain a sample that was as reflective of the US population as possible. While not completely representative, samples pulled from MTurk have been demonstrated to be more reflective of the US population than typical student samples (Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2011). In order to make impactful conclusions in the political realm, obtaining diversity in age, race, political orientation and geographical region of subjects is important. Via MTurk, I hoped to obtain a sample inclusive of a broad range of levels of religious fundamentalism.

There is some precedence for using North American convenience samples to find variance in levels of fundamentalism (Friedman & Rholes, 2007; Friedman & Rholes, 2008; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Galen, Smith, Knapp & Wyngarden, 2011; Galen & Miller, 2011). Typically, these studies have involved university student samples in the US and Canada (Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s 1992 study also surveyed university students’ parents). Notably, one recent study on fundamentalism, right-wing
authoritarianism and prejudice used MTurk for recruitment, and successfully found a range of fundamentalism (Johnson, Labouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham & Carlisle, 2012).

**Procedure**

I posted the contents of the survey to MTurk, where participants were offered $0.40 for participating in a “study on personality and verbal task performance.” The task was limited to participants in the United States (as determined by IP address).

After providing their worker ID and agreeing to participate in the survey, participants were directed to the experiment hosted by SNAP. Via SNAP, participants were randomly signed to one of two conditions: “secular” and “control.”

In both conditions, subjects were first presented with an introduction that briefly outlined the contents of the survey. The instructions included the suggestion that the experiment constitutes a test of verbal comprehension. The subjects were informed that the survey would involve some personality and attitude measures and handful of brief written tasks, and should take no longer than 30 minutes to complete.

Next, participants were be asked to complete a political expertise measure (5 items measuring political knowledge), the RF short scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) two questions relating to their interest in reading, and to provide their gender, party identification and ideological orientation (see “Materials” section below). These each appeared as questions on a sequence of web pages as the participant moved through the experiment. After completing the questions, the participants were informed that they would be shown two articles. The instructions stated that the participant will be asked to briefly summarize the articles after reading them. This was to facilitate greater attention to the article's content.
Following instructions, the participants were shown an article about major league soccer. This constituted a “filler task” to create some distance between the independent variable measurements, and the stimulus and dependent variable. After reading the soccer article, participants clicked “next,” and were prompted to briefly summarize the article.

Next, those assigned to the experimental condition were asked to read an article entitled “Secularism in the United States.” This material is an adaptation of an article from The Advocate (UK) on rising atheism as a self-identity in the United States, as well as a drifting away from fundamentalist social mores and policies (Harris, 2011). While it had been altered to remove certain irrelevant and contradictory elements, it was presented as though it were a newspaper article in its original form. This is the text of the article:

The United States is often portrayed as a very religious country. Yet in the homeland of many visibly religious celebrities and politicians, atheists are actually part of one of the fastest-growing groups in the US: the godless. The number of atheists, who do not believe in God, and agnostics, who also claim no particular faith, is on the rise. The US is quickly becoming a more secular – that is, less religious - country, some experts say. “It has never been better to be a free-thinker or agnostic in America,” says Annie Laurie Gaylor, co-president of the Freedom from Religion Foundation.

Atheism is one of the fastest-growing major “religious” demographics in the country. The proportion of people calling themselves atheists has increased fivefold over the past seven years, according to a recent WIN-Gallup poll.

Professor Barry Kosmin of Trinity College, who conducts the national Religious Identification Survey, believes up to a quarter of young people in the US have no specific faith, and scoffs at the idea that the country is highly religious or becoming more so. “The trend in American history is away from religion,” Kosmin said.

Kosmin cites social trends as evidence of the changing face of the country. Many Americans are now choosing to get married without any form of religious ceremony, for example. At universities, departments devoted to the study of secularism are starting to appear. Books by atheist authors are bestsellers. National groups, such as the Secular Coalition of America (SCA), have opened branches across the country.

There is little doubt that religious groups still wield some influence in US politics and public life. Yet Kosmin said the attention paid by politicians and the media to religious groups is not necessarily a sign of strength. “When religion was
doing well, it did not need to go into politics. Atheism in our culture is obviously growing and so religion is on the defensive,” he said.

So far, only one member of Congress, Californian Democrat Pete Stark, has publicly stated that he does not believe in God. “Privately, we know that there are 27 members of Congress that have no belief in God. But we don’t ‘out’ people,” said a representative of the SCA.

Many experts think that one day it will become politically mainstream to confess to a lack of faith, as US political life lags behind the society that it represents. “Politicians are just starting to catch up to the changing demographics of our society,” said Gaylor.

Those assigned to the control condition read an article on the topic of low-calorie restaurant menus (see Appendix A). The control article was taken from examiner.com, and approximately reflects the language, difficulty, and length of the stimulus article, without the reactive content.

Again, participants were asked to provide a brief summary of the previous article. This was used as a manipulation check (data from participants whose summary failed to reflect the content of the article whatsoever were excluded from analysis). Following this, the participants were asked to fill out the dependent variable measure, the support for militant counterterrorism policies scale.

After the participants completed these tasks, they were debriefed, with my contact information provided. Participants were then asked to create a 4-digit code, which they typed into a box in the SNAP survey. They were then asked to submit this code on the MTurk interface, which qualified them to receive payment. All participants were paid $0.40 via MTurk within 24 hours of submitting their responses.

**Measured Variables**

**Independent Variable: Trait Fundamentalism**

Trait fundamentalism was measured with Altemeyer’s and Hunsberger’s Revised
Religious Fundamentalism scale (2004). This 12-item scale was developed in order to shorten and refine the original 20-item Religious Fundamentalism scale published by same authors in 1992. When describing the impetus for designing the new scale, Altemeyer and Hunsberger stated that the original 20-item scale overemphasized the adherence to “one true religion” aspect of religious fundamentalism. The Revised scale removes the bias towards this dimension, with several items removed and others rephrased to have a broader meaning. The revised scale was found to be just as internally reliable as the original (over .90 alpha coefficient), and more accurately reflects the construct as intended (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). I therefore found this to be the most appropriate measure for this experiment.

**Potential Moderator: Political Expertise**

Political expertise was measured with five knowledge questions relating to U.S. government in an open-ended format (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990; example: “Which party currently controls the U.S. Senate?”). The answers were scored dichotomously as right or wrong, and the number of correct answers were used to estimate political expertise.

**Control Variables**

**Gender.** Participants were asked to state their gender.

**Party identification.** Participants were asked to select their party identification from a drop-down menu. The options provided were Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, Green, Reform, Constitution, None, or Other.

**Ideology.** Participants were asked to state their ideological orientation on a 7-point scale from “Extremely Liberal” to “Extremely Conservative.”
**Dependent Variable: Endorsement of Militant Counterterrorism Policies**

The dependent variable consisted of an eleven-item scale that measured endorsement of a variety of counterterrorist practices. Items for this scale were largely borrowed, and in some cases modified, from items used by Barnes, Brown and Osterman (2012) and Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen & Weise (2006). The questions address topics such as support for war, deportations, and severe interrogations. See Appendix B for the complete list of items.
CHAPTER THREE

RESULTS

Statistical Treatment Overview

Except where otherwise indicated, these results were analyzed using linear multiple regression with interaction terms. The continuous independent variables (religious fundamentalism [RF], political expertise [PE], ideology [IDEO]) were centered by subtracting the mean from each score, and standardized by dividing scores by their standard deviation. Condition was effect coded such that the control condition was coded as -1 and secularism prime condition was coded as 1. Party identification was dummy coded, with “none” serving as the baseline condition. Interaction terms were created by multiplying the relevant scores together.

Results were analyzed two ways: first, with no controls entered; and second with party identification and ideology entered as controls. For analyses without controls, religious fundamentalism (RF), political expertise (PE), and condition (CON) were entered at step 1; the two-way interactions between these variables were entered at step 2 (RFxCON, RFxPE, PExCON); and the three-way interaction between the three variables (RFxPExCON) was entered at step 3. The analyses with controls were the same, except that party identification dummy codes\(^1\) and ideology were entered at step 1 along with the other variables. Following Cohen and Cohen (1983), the effects of religious

\(^1\) Party identification was dummy coded such that four new variables were formed: Democrats (1) vs. None (0); Republicans (1) vs. None (0); Libertarians (1) vs. None (0); and Others (1) vs. None (0).
fundamentalism, political expertise and condition are tested at step 1, the two-way interactions are tested at step 2, and the 3-way interaction is tested at step 3. Therefore Hypothesis 1 was tested at step 1, Hypothesis 2 was tested at step 2, and Hypothesis 3a, 3b and 3c were tested at step 3. Simple slope analyses were used to test significant interactions.

**Preliminary Analyses**

A total of 250 responses were collected. 29 responses were omitted due to repeat-participation or failure on “attention-check” items. This left a sample size of 221 for analysis. A summary of the characteristics of this sample can be found in Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 1.Descriptive Characteristics of Categorical Variables

| Gender | 128 female, 93 male (57.9% female) |
| Party Identification | 102 Democrat (46.2%) |
| | 41 Republican (18.6%) |
| | 18 Libertarian (8.1%) |
| | 43 None (19.5%) |
| | 17 Other (9 “Other”, 5 “Constitution”, 3 “Green”) (7.7%) |
| Religious identification | 40 Christian-Protestant (18.1%) |
| | 23 Christian-Catholic (10.4%) |
| | 34 Christian-Other (15.4%) |
| | 4 Jewish (1.8%) |
| | 4 Muslim (1.8%) |
| | 48 Atheist (21.7%) |
| | 32 Agnostic (14.5%) |
| | 17 No Affiliation (7.7%) |
Table 2. Descriptive Characteristics of Continuous Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (range: low, high)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Chronbach’s Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious fundamentalism (RF)</td>
<td>3.32 (1,9)</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Expertise (PE)</td>
<td>4.05 (1,5)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (IDE)</td>
<td>3.21 (1,7)</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of militaristic counterterrorism policies (EP)</td>
<td>3.47 (1,9)</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reliability Analyses

Three multi-item measures were included in this analysis: religious fundamentalism, political expertise, and endorsement of militaristic counterterrorism policies. For these, composite scores were created by averaging the item scores.

Reliability analyses were performed on each scale. The Revised Religious Fundamentalism scale was internally reliable (alpha = .96). The dependent variable, endorsement of militaristic counterterrorism policies (which I will refer to as “EP” for “endorsement of policies”), was also quite internally reliable (alpha = .96). The political expertise measure was less reliable (alpha = .50). This low reliability was not unexpected, as this was a factual knowledge test of only five items, where each item was scored simply as 1 or 0 (correct vs. incorrect; $M=4.05$). None of the three scales’ reliability could be substantially improved by removing any items. Therefore, all originally-presented items remained in analysis.
Invariance of Sample between Conditions

T-tests were performed on measured variables to determine whether the sample was invariant across conditions. These analyses revealed that the control and experimental groups did not differ with regard to ideology, level of fundamentalism, or level of political expertise (all $P_s > .5$). The groups were also equivalent in terms of gender and party identification ($P_s > .1$). Therefore, random assignment was successful in creating invariant samples between conditions.

Inter-Relations between Predictor Variables

**Correlations between continuous predictors.** Correlations were determined between the three continuous predictor variables: religious fundamentalism, ideology, and political expertise. The full correlation matrix is displayed in Table 3.

Table 3: Correlations between Continuous Predictors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religious Fundamentalism (“RF”)</th>
<th>Ideology (larger = more conservative)</th>
<th>Political Expertise (“PE”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RF</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.495**</td>
<td>-.272**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.198**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05, **p<.01

Political expertise was negatively correlated with both religious fundamentalism ($r = -.272, r^2 = .074, p < .001$) and conservative ideology ($r = -.198, r^2 = .039, p = .003$). This suggests that people with more political knowledge tend to be less fundamentalist and more liberal. The association is small (<8% of variance explained in each case), but it is significant. Religious fundamentalism was also positively correlated with conservative
ideology ($r = .495, r^2 = .245, p < .001$). This suggests that conservatives tend to be substantially more oriented toward fundamentalism than liberals are.

**Relationship between categorical predictors and continuous predictors.** I ran multiple univariate ANOVAs to determine the relationship between each categorical variable and each continuous variable. For these analyses, a single categorical predictor served as the independent variable, using a single continuous variable as the DV. If significant differences were found at the $p < .05$ level, I followed up the analysis with a post-hoc Tukey HSD test. Any significant ($p < .05$) mean differences between groups are reported.

**Gender.** Gender was determined to be unrelated to religious fundamentalism, $F(1, 219) = .096, p = .757$; ideology, $F(1, 219) = .307, p = .580$; and political expertise $F(1, 219) = 1.34, p = .249$.

**Party identification.** A univariate ANOVA was run on party identification to determine the relationship of party to the continuous predictors. Of the eight party options provided, several groups were too small for meaningful analysis. Those with $N < 5$ (Green, $N = 3$; Constitution, $N = 5$; Reform, $N = 0$) were combined into the “Other” category (original $N = 9$; with other groups added, $N = 17$). This reduced the number of selected party identifications from eight to five: Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, Other, and None.

Religious fundamentalism significantly varied between parties, $F(4, 216) = 8.75, p < .001$. A follow-up Tukey HSD test determined that numerous significant differences existed at the $p < .05$ level: Republicans ($M = 4.74, SD = 1.95$) scored significantly higher on
the religious fundamentalism scale than did Democrats ($M=2.74$, $SD=1.85$), Libertarians ($M=2.91$, $SD=1.36$), and those who chose “None” as their party identification ($M=3.17$, $SD=2.26$). Republicans did not differ from those in the “Other” group ($M=4.19$, $SD=2.25$). In addition to differing from Republicans, Democrats also had significantly lower religious fundamentalism than did those in the “Other” group. No other significant inter-party differences were found.

Predictably, ideology also significantly varied by party identification, $F(4, 216) = 43.06, p<.001$. A follow-up Tukey HSD test was run to determine what significant group-level differences existed. Republicans ($M=5.22$, $SD=1.46$) were significantly more conservative than all of the other four groups: Democrats ($M=2.28$, $SD=0.93$), Libertarians ($M=3.72$, $SD=1.13$), “None” ($M=3.35$, $SD=1.40$) and “Other” ($M=3.00$, $SD=1.77$). Additionally, Democrats were significantly less conservative than the “None” group and the Libertarian group, but did not significantly differ from the “Other” group. No other significant differences were found.

Political expertise was also found to differ between groups, $F(4, 216) = 2.94$, $p=.021$). The follow-up Tukey HSD test determined that Democrats ($M=4.29$, $SD=.88$) scored significantly higher on the political expertise measure than did Republicans ($M=3.68$, $SD=1.13$). This echoes the similar negative correlation found between conservatism and political expertise (see Table 3). No other significant between-group differences were found.

Religious identification. As with party identification, there were several religious groups with $N<5$ (Hindu, $N=0$; Jewish, $N=4$; Muslim, $N=4$). For this analysis, these small
groups were combined with the “Other” religious group (original $N=9$, with groups added, $N=17$). This left eight groups for analysis: Christian (Catholic); Christian (Protestant); Christian (Other); Buddhist; no affiliation; atheist; agnostic, and “other.”

Religious fundamentalism significantly varied by religious orientation, $F(7, 213) = 31.356, p<.001$. A post-hoc Tukey HSD test determined there were numerous group differences, so these are displayed in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Mean Religious Fundamentalism by Religious Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Orientation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Affiliation</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (Catholic)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (Other)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (Protestant)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean religious fundamentalism is displayed in columns 1, 2, and 3. Means within the same column do no significantly differ. Means each column significantly differ from means in other columns (with the exception of the Buddhist category, which differs only from the means in Column 3).

As displayed in Table 4, three significantly differing groups emerged: a “low fundamentalism” group (column 1) consisting of atheists, agnostics, those with no affiliation, and Buddhists; a “moderate fundamentalism” group consisting of Buddhists, Catholics, and those with “Other” religious identity, and a “high fundamentalism” group (column 3) that consists of Protestant Christians and those who identified with “Christian (Other).”
Ideology also significantly differed by religious identity, \( F(7, 213) = 7.527, p<.001 \). Protestant Christians were significantly more conservative (\( M=4.23, SD=1.72 \)) than those with no religious affiliation (\( M=2.35, SD=1.41 \)), atheists (\( M=2.31, SD=1.22 \)), and agnostics (\( M=2.84, SD=1.42 \)). Atheists were also significantly less conservative than Catholic Christians (\( M=3.57, SD=1.44 \)), and “other” Christians (\( M=3.88, SD=1.67 \)). No other between-religion differences in ideology were found.

Finally, political expertise was determined to significantly vary by religion, \( F(7, 213) = 2.676, p=.011 \). The only significant between-group difference was that atheists (\( M=4.39, SD=.75 \)) displayed higher political expertise than “Other Christians” (\( M=3.59, SD=1.50 \)). No other groups significantly differed in political expertise.

*Condition.* Religious fundamentalism did not differ by condition, \( F(1, 219) <.001, p=.993 \). Condition was also unrelated to ideology, \( F(1, 219) = .109, p=.74 \); and political expertise \( F(1, 219) = .391, p=.533 \).

**Bivariate Relations between Each Predictor and the Dependent Measure**

**Continuous predictors and the dependent measure.** Each of the three continuous predictors was significantly related to the dependent measure, support for militant counterterrorism policies (“EP”). Conservative ideology was positively associated with EP, \( r(219)= .475, r^2=.226, p<.001 \), while political expertise correlated negatively with EP, \( r(219)= -.212, r^2=.045, p=.002 \). Lending preliminary support to Hypothesis 1, religious fundamentalism was positively correlated with the dependent variable, \( r(219)= .370, r^2=.137, p<.001 \).
Categorical predictors and the dependent measure.

**Gender.** Gender was unrelated to EP, \( F(1, 219) = .469, p = .494 \). Because of its non-effects on the dependent measure and other relevant variables, it is not included in subsequent regression analyses.

**Party.** Responses to the dependent measure significantly varied by party, \( F(4, 216) = 17.23, p < .001 \). Republicans (\( M=5.56, SD=1.68 \)) scored higher on the dependent measure than did all other groups: Democrats (\( M=3.06, SD=1.75 \)), Libertarians (\( M=3.93, SD=2.01 \)), those who identified “None” as their party identification (\( M= 2.81, SD=1.61 \)), and those who indicated an “other” party identification (\( M=3.30, SD=2.28 \)). Aside from Republicans, none of these groups significantly differed from each other.

**Religion.** There were also significant differences in EP scores by religious identity, \( F(7, 213) = 5.39, p < .001 \). Atheists (\( M=2.49, SD=1.54 \)) scored lower than did Protestant Christians (\( M=4.34, SD=2.21 \)), Catholic Christians (\( M=4.57, SD=1.52 \)), and Other Christians (\( M=4.35, SD=2.15 \)). No other mean differences between groups were significant.

**Condition.** There were no differences on EP scores by condition, \( F(1, 219)= .007, p=.934 \).

**Main Results**

Three models were tested using regression: the first examined the main effects of religious fundamentalism, expertise, and condition; the second tested the significance of the two-way interaction between these variables; the third tested the significance of a three-way interaction between these three. The dependent variable was the mean score on
the support for militant counterterrorism policies measure (Appendix B). This set of regression models was run twice, first without any controls, and then with ideology and party identification entered as controls.

**Results at Step 1**

Full regression results are presented without controls in Regression Model A (see Table 5), and with controls in Regression Model B (see Table 6).

Table 5. Regression Model A: Hypothesis-Testing Regression Model without Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious fundamentalism (RRF)</td>
<td>.682 (.132)**</td>
<td>.676 (.134)**</td>
<td>.678 (.135)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition (CON) [-1 to +1]</td>
<td>-.001 (.128)</td>
<td>.015 (.127)</td>
<td>.005 (.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Expertise (PE)</td>
<td>-.244 (.132)+</td>
<td>-.320 (.138)*</td>
<td>-.318 (.139)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CON x RRF</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.001 (.134)</td>
<td>0.00 (.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CON x PE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.114 (.136)</td>
<td>-.108 (.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE X RRF</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.290 (.154)+</td>
<td>.282 (.160)+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE X RRF X CON</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.033 (.160)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10  *p<.05  **p<.01  
Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors presented in parentheses.
### Table 6. Regression Model B: Hypothesis-Testing Regression Model with Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (Main Effects)</th>
<th>Model 2 (2-way interaction)</th>
<th>Model 3 (3-way interaction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>2.749 (.262)**</td>
<td>2.836 (.263)**</td>
<td>2.783 (.269)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party ID (control)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat vs. none</td>
<td>.716 (.326)*</td>
<td>.772 (.329)*</td>
<td>.772 (.329)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican vs. none</td>
<td>1.932 (.410)**</td>
<td>1.968 (.412)**</td>
<td>1.968 (.412)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian vs. none</td>
<td>1.056 (.476)*</td>
<td>1.025 (.477)*</td>
<td>1.025 (.477)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party vs. none</td>
<td>.447 (.491)</td>
<td>.464 (.493)</td>
<td>.464 (.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology (control)</strong></td>
<td>.496 (.166)**</td>
<td>.508 (.166)**</td>
<td>.508 (.166)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious fundamentalism (RF)</strong></td>
<td>.302 (.137)*</td>
<td>.287 (.139)*</td>
<td>.287 (.139)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condition (CON) [-1 to 1]</strong></td>
<td>-.044 (.116)</td>
<td>-.071 (.124)</td>
<td>-.071 (.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Expertise (PE)</strong></td>
<td>-.188 (.120)</td>
<td>-.265 (.126)*</td>
<td>-.265 (.126)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CON x RF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.059 (.121)</td>
<td>-.057 (.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CON x PE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.137 (.123)</td>
<td>-.114 (.126)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PE X RF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.276 (.139)*</td>
<td>.240 (.144)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PE X RF X CON</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.137 (.146)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10  *p<.05  **p<.01

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors presented in parentheses.

**Main Effects at Step 1**

At step 1, religious fundamentalism was a significant predictor of the dependent variable when controls were omitted, $b=.682, SE=.132, t(217)=5.181, p<.001$. It remained a significant predictor even in the model controlling for ideology and party identification, $b=.302, SE=.137, t(212)=2.211, p=.028$. These findings support Hypothesis 1: religious fundamentalism positively predicts militaristic policy attitudes. The finding that this
effect persisted, even when controlling for ideology and party, suggests that religious fundamentalism’s effects cannot be fully explained via liberal-conservative ideology or party identification.

While not predicted, there was also a marginally significant negative effect of political expertise on the dependent variable at step 1 in regression Model A, $b=-.244$, $SE=.132$, $t(217)=-1.853$, $p=.065$. This marginal effect was attenuated when controls were entered, $b=-.188$, $SE=.120$, $t(212)=-1.567$, $p=.119$. This suggests that political experts are less likely than novices to endorse militaristic counterterrorism policies, but this effect may be partially due to ideological and partisan differences.

There was no effect of condition whether controls were omitted ($b=-.001$, $SE=.128$, $t(217)=-.004$, $p=.997$) or entered ($b=-.044$, $SE=.116$, $t(212)=-.382$, $p=.703$).

At Step 1 presented in Regression Model B, where ideology, political expertise, and fundamentalism were controlled for, party identification also exerted an effect. Endorsement of militant tactics remained significantly higher among Republicans $b=1.932$, $SE=.410$, $t(212)=4.711$, $p<.001$ and Libertarians $b=1.056$, $SE=.476$, $t(112)=2.219$, $p=.028$. Democratic Party identification was also a positive predictor of endorsement of militant tactics, $b=.716$, $SE=.326$, $t(212)=2.198$, $p=.029$. This suggests that, when holding ideology constant, identification with the Democratic Party (vs. no party identification) relates to greater endorsement of militaristic tactics. Ideology also was a significant predictor of the DV, even when controlling for party identification, with

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2 As in the previous ANOVA analysis, Party identifications with $N<5$ (Green, Constitution, Reform) were combined with the “Other” group.
conservative self-placement relating to higher endorsement of militaristic tactics, $b=.304$, $SE=.102$, $t(2.985), p=.003$.

**Two-way Interactions at Step 2**

The hypothesized two-way interaction between condition and religious fundamentalism did not emerge when controls were omitted, $b=-.001$, $SE=.134$, $t(214)=-.005, p=.996$. It also was not significant when controls were included, $b=-.059$, $SE=.121$, $t(209)=-.484, p=.629$. This result supports the null hypothesis that the priming manipulation did not differentially influence high- versus low-fundamentalists. This result could also be consistent with a three-way interaction between fundamentalism, condition, and expertise, wherein political expertise moderates a differential effect of the prime on fundamentalists. There was no two-way interaction between political expertise and condition in either model, Regression Model A: $B=-.114$, $SE=.136$, $t(214)=-.838$, $p=.403$; Regression Model B: $B=-.137$, $SE=.123$, $t(209)=-1.109$, $p=.269$.

There was, however, a significant two-way interaction between religious fundamentalism and political expertise in Regression Model B, $b=.276$, $SE=.139$, $t(209)=1.992, p=.048$. In Model A, this was a marginally-significant interaction: $b=.290$, $SE=.154$, $t(214)=1.882, p=.061$. While this interaction was not formally predicted, it is consistent with the assumptions of Hypothesis 3a: that the effects of religious fundamentalism on counterterrorism attitudes differs between political experts and novices.

The significant interaction between fundamentalism and expertise in Regression Model B was further examined. Following Aiken and West (1991), a regression model...
identical to Regression Model B was run, except replacing the political expertise with a variable representing high political expertise (computed by subtracting one standard deviation from each political expertise score). The two interaction terms that included political expertise were also recalculated using the new “high political expertise” variable. This model demonstrates the effect of religious fundamentalism among those high in political expertise. A similar model was created to demonstrate the effect of religious fundamentalism among political novices, using a variable that represented low political expertise. Among political experts, religious fundamentalism was a significant positive predictor of the dependent variable, \( b = .556, SE = .194, t(209) = 2.861, p = .005 \). Among political novices, religious fundamentalism did not significantly predict the dependent variable, \( b = .004, SE = .197, t(209) = -.021, p = .983 \). Therefore, when controlling for ideology and party identification, the relationship between religious fundamentalism and support for militant tactics only emerged among political experts. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. Endorsement of Militant Policies by Political Expertise and Religious Fundamentalism

Note: In this figure, the term “Political Novices” represents those who score one standard deviation below the mean on the political expertise measure; “Political Experts” represents those who score one standard deviation above the mean on the political expertise measure.

At step 2 in Regression Model B, the effect of political expertise also became significant, $b= -.270$, $SE=.126$, $t(209)=-2.147$, $p=.033$. This suggests that when the other variables and their two-way interactions are accounted for, political experts are less likely to endorse militant techniques.

**Three-Way Interaction at Step 3**

The three-way interaction between political expertise, condition, and religious fundamentalism was not significant either when controls were entered ($b= -.137$, $SE=.146$, $t(208)=-.939$, $p=.349$) or omitted ($b= -.033$, $SE=.160$, $t(213)=-.088$, $p=.895$). Therefore there is no support for either of the competing predictions of Hypothesis 3a and 3b. This
also confirms that there was no two-way interaction between fundamentalism and condition that was being “masked” by a crossover interaction with political expertise at step 3.
CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussion

Null Effects of Prime

The intent of this study was to study how religious fundamentalism affected attitudes towards such controversial policies as harsh interrogations and the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, a secularism prime was predicted to differentially affect attitudes of people high and low in fundamentalism. This priming manipulation turned out to have no effect, either as a main effect or interacting with measured variables.

The null effect of the secularism article can be interpreted as an encouraging finding. These participants’ attitudes to the presented controversial techniques were not swayed by an incidental prime. It suggests that such attitudes are “fixed” and not easily situationally manipulated. However, previous research has found that a mortality salience prime was sufficient to shift attitudes toward violence and military interventions (e.g. Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Rothschild, Abdollahi and Pyszczynski, 2009). Similarly, research indicates that societal economic threat causes shifts in attitudes among certain people to be more authoritarian (e.g. Sales, 1973; Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

It is important to consider how this experiment differed from previous research, and why it did not produce the predicted effect. A simple explanation for the present null effects is that the present secularism prime did not function as a threat akin to previously-
studied ones, like economic insecurity or mortality. One potential reason for this is that the article was insufficiently attended to or understood by the participants. This is unlikely. All subjects whose responses were analyzed were able to report a reasonable summary of the article after reading it. Also, these results do not show even a non-significant trend in the predicted direction. It does not seem that the stimulus was simply insufficiently understood.

It is possible that the secularism prime was a threatening stimulus for fundamentalists, but that it did not cause shifts in counterterrorism attitudes as predicted. Perhaps given a different dependent variable, such as death-thought accessibility, the expected interaction would have been observed. Political attitudes in a more explicitly religion-relevant domain (such as abortion, or construction of an Islamic center in lower Manhattan) may be more likely to be shifted by the prime. A larger study with an array of dependent variables would best be able to explore this possibility.

Finally, the conclusion of particular theoretical interest may be that rising atheism in society simply does not constitute a threat to fundamentalists. It does not cue the same processes that economic instability, mortality salience, or direct critiques of scripture do. According to this explanation, the knowledge that others lack faith simply does not prevent fundamentalists from being secure in their own faith. As Friedman and Rholes (2007) found, religious fundamentalists were less likely to use worldview-defensive techniques when under a mortality threat than non-fundamentalists were. It may be that for fundamentalists, social validation in the political realm is not a prerequisite for psychological security.
Finally, fundamentalists in the US may, indeed, already perceive themselves to be a shrinking minority. The “news” provided in this study that the country is becoming saturated with atheism may be seen as “old news” by fundamentalists. If fundamentalists chronically perceive this to be the case, then it is unsurprising that the prime delivered no effect.

**Support for Hypothesis 1 (Even with Controls)**

As predicted, religious fundamentalism was found to be a significant predictor of endorsing extreme counterterrorism policies. Because religious fundamentalism correlates with conservatism and Republican Party identification, this was not a surprising finding. However, it is interesting that it remained a significant predictor even when controlling for ideology and party identification. It suggests that there is a relationship between one’s attitude toward their religion and their attitude toward defense policies, and that this relationship cannot fully be explained by political group membership.

**Interaction between Expertise and Religious Fundamentalism**

Perhaps the most interesting result of this study was the two-way interaction that emerged between political expertise and religious fundamentalism. The interaction revealed that when controlling for party identification and ideology, religious fundamentalism is only associated with counterterrorism attitudes among political experts. Among political novices, religious fundamentalism did not explain any unique variance in endorsement. This pattern of results was not explicitly predicted, but was implied by Hypothesis 3a. Instead of moderating a 2-way interaction between condition
and fundamentalism (which did not emerge), expertise moderated the primary effect of fundamentalism.

Expertise was proposed as a moderator because it affects the degree to which political attitudes are "constrained" ideologically. That is, people who score high in political expertise tend to have political attitudes more organized in typical "conservative" or "liberal" packages (e.g. Converse, 1964). Political novices tend to have less ideologically-organized attitudes, perhaps due to a limited understanding of mainstream ideologies, or due to the use of some rubric other than ideology to organize their attitudes. Religious fundamentalism, however, is not construed as a political attitude per se, but as a "pre-political" psychological construct (in the family of constructs occupied by Social Dominance Orientation, authoritarianism, need for closure, etc.).

This finding offers some clues as to how religious fundamentalism influences political attitudes. One hypothesis would be that religious fundamentalism is a psychological predisposition that has a direct effect on the measured attitudes. Someone who is high in fundamentalism is more likely to derogate outgroup members, for example, and find it easier to endorse harsh policies against them. This explanation would require no understanding of ideology -- it would exist even in the absence of the constructs of liberalism and conservatism.

On the other hand, it may be that high-religious fundamentalists tend to adopt a certain branch of conservative ideology (and low-fundamentalists a different ideology), and then apply this ideological "rubric" to their attitudes. According to this hypothesis, the low-fundamentalist opposition to harsh interrogation, for example, is mediated by ideological understanding. The present interaction supports this hypothesis. If there were
a direct effect of fundamentalism on counterterrorism attitudes, political expertise should have no bearing on the degree to which the two variables correlate. Similarly, if fundamentalism primarily motivated the politically unsophisticated, its effects should be most pronounced among those low in political expertise. Instead, we find a clear relationship between fundamentalism and counterterrorism policy attitudes only among those high in political expertise. This suggests that religious fundamentalism’s effects are mediated by an ideological understanding that is more nuanced than a simple liberal-conservative dichotomy, as this was controlled for.

This pattern of results reflects recent research conducted by Federico, Fisher and Deason (2011) on American National Election Studies data from 2000 and 2004. The authors found that, consistent with much other research, authoritarianism was correlated with conservative ideology. But they also found this relationship was stronger among political experts than novices. The authors concluded that political expertise may be necessary for pre-political personality dimensions to be tied together with ideological attitudes. Authoritarianism, rather than being an irrational disposition used primarily the unsophisticated (e.g. Christie, 1954), seems to have its largest effect among the most knowledgeable. As fundamentalism so closely relates to authoritarianism, the findings of the present study lend support to Federico et al.’s (2011) conclusions.

Interestingly, a look at the pattern of results (Figure 6, above) reveals that the true "outliers" in terms of counterterrorism attitudes are the low-fundamentalists who are high in expertise. Controlling for party and ideology, the other three groups (high-expertise high-fundamentalists, low-expertise high-fundamentalists, low-expertise low-fundamentalists) had equivalent attitudes toward the dependent variable. Strong
opposition to these policies (above and beyond ideology and party identification) seems to result from a combination of both high expertise and low fundamentalism.

**Limitations and Future Research**

A big limitation of this study is the narrowly constructed dependent variable, along with the lack of manipulation checks. Because this specifically-construed study presented null results, we are unable to conclude what part of the theoretical predictions were unsupported (was the stimulus non-threatening? Or was a threat perceived, but that threat did not induce attitude change in this domain?). In future research, it would be beneficial to present the stimulus with a variety of different dependent measures. A good candidate would be an explicit mood measurement, to see if people’s conscious affective reactions to secularism vary by their level of fundamentalism. Another should be a simple “death thought accessibility” measure using word completion (e.g. Schimel et al., 2007). This measure can assess whether a mortality threat has occurred on an unconscious level. These measures assess more directly whether secularism information is perceived as “threatening” to a subset of the population. This may be wise to do, before testing again whether such a threat (if it exists) affects policy stances.

Additionally, it would be beneficial to present participants with more of an array of policy options. Research suggests a variety of counterterrorism strategies Americans have endorsed, including “seeking understanding” (Henderson-King et al., 2004) and “cooperative internationalism” (Guth, 2009). If effects were found on the dependent measure, it would be important to distinguish militarism from these other constructs. If only militarism is measured (as it was in this study), it could be argued that the prime simply induced differences in *interventionism* or *acquiescence* to policies. Measuring
multiple types of counterterrorism responses would allow us to draw conclusions about the type of response that is particularly elicited under certain conditions.

While this study was designed to explore the effects of a certain, potentially threatening prime, its most interesting result was the moderating role of political expertise. Future studies should explore this role of political expertise in constraining national security attitudes. The present study used a “short form”, 5-item test of political expertise, on which there was not a wide variation in performance. A longer, more sensitive instrument may reveal stronger effects. Also, more constructs relating to political knowledge, such as political interest, political news consumption, and perhaps general education level, should be measured. This may help refine our understanding of why political knowledge seems to exert the observed constraining effect.

**General Conclusion**

This study proposed an unusual intertwining of religion and politics: that news in the domestic, religious domain would affect attitudes in a realm that is ostensibly secular: how to deter terrorism. This unusual effect was not found, offering the encouraging idea that counterterrorism attitudes are resistant to this sort of priming. This research did, however, demonstrate that religious fundamentalism does “entangle” with such attitudes, even when controlling for self-placement on an ideological scale. That this special relationship seems to hold true only for political experts suggests that political knowledge is instrumental in tying religious attitudes to policy preferences. Just how and why that process occurs, particularly when controlling for ideology, should be the subject of further inquiry.
APPENDIX A

CONTROL STIMULUS
Low-Calorie Menus Gaining Popularity

Diners are increasingly seeking out restaurants that offer lower-calorie main dishes, sides and even cocktails, according to a Hudson Institute study released Thursday. For restaurants it's a profitable move. And for health-minded diners, it's an easy way to keep those New Year's promises to eat healthier, and be able to eat out at the same time.

According to the Hudson Institute, lower-calorie items accounted for 37.5 percent of all servings sold at the surveyed restaurants in 2011. “Consumers are voting with their feet. Nobody’s selling these items very hard. Demand is showing up here. You can’t ignore the consumer,” said Henry J. Cardello, a senior fellow and director at the Washington, D.C.-based Hudson Institute Obesity Solutions Initiative. The study included large chains like McDonald’s, Applebee’s, Denny’s Outback and Olive Garden.

One example is Cheesecake Factory, a restaurant known for out-of-control portion sizes. The company added a SkinnyLicious menu in 2011, with 50 items less than 590 calories. They sponsored a New Year’s resolution twitter contest with prices like running shoes and yoga classes. Based on the company twitter feed #skinnylicious, it’s popular among fitness followers and families.

Overall, restaurants that increased their lower-calorie offerings saw an increase in total traffic of 10.9 percent between 2006 and 2011. Brands that didn’t increase their lower-calorie offerings, or decreased them, saw foot traffic drop 14.7 percent and same-store sales dip 5.5 percent during the five-year period.

“We found that those restaurant chains that were growing their lower-calorie time on the menu…demonstrate business advantages,” said Cardello. “They’re seeing their same-store sales grow. They’re seeing customer traffic increase.”

As restaurants add calorie counts and nutrition labeling to menus, this trend is predicted to gain even more popularity. “We could see the growth in lower-calorie items accelerate even faster,” said Dr. James Marks, senior vice president and director of the health group at Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, during a press conference discussing the findings.
APPENDIX B

DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURE
Support for Militant Counterterrorism Policies (Except where indicated, these items are from Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012)
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree).
I am in favor of the United States’ war against terrorism.
Not enough of the United States’ money is spent battling terrorism.
It is entirely appropriate to engage in preemptive attacks on countries that are suspected of harboring or supporting terrorists.*
Any person affiliated with fundamentalist Muslim sects in the United States should be deported from the country.*
If necessary, the United States should use nuclear weapons to defend its interests against those of terrorists.*
If necessary, the United States should use chemical weapons to defend its interests against those of terrorists.*
Interrogators should be able to query suspected terrorists using any questioning technique at their disposal, no matter how extreme it is.
Interrogators should do everything in their power to draw information out of suspected terrorists, even if it means using methods that cause those persons lasting physical or psychological problems.
Interrogators should assume there are "no holds barred" when they question suspected terrorists; whatever they must do to guarantee the safety of the nation is acceptable.
Interrogators' efforts to obtain information from suspected terrorists should not be restricted in any way.
Interrogators should abide by international laws that protect the rights and welfare of detainees, even if those detainees are suspected terrorists.**

**Edited for clarity by Chase Wilson. Original (Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012) read: “Interrogators should not be exempt from abiding by international laws that protect the rights and welfare of detainees, even if those detainees are suspected terrorists”
APPENDIX C

ENDORSEMENT OF MILITANT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES

BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Identification</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No party</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>221</td>
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APPENDIX D

ENDORSEMENT OF MILITANT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES

BY RELIGION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Orientation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>Christian-Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian-Other</td>
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<td>2.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
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<td>Muslim</td>
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<td>Buddhist</td>
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<td>Atheist</td>
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<td>Agnostic</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>1.65</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1.31</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>2.02</td>
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APPENDIX E

ENDORSEMENT OF MILITANT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES

BY GENDER
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Standard Error of the Mean</th>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>.180</td>
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REFERENCES


VITA

Chase Wilson is from Plymouth, New Hampshire. He attended Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, where he received a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology in 2006. In addition to psychology, he studied poetry, anthropology, and Russian literature.

Between 2006 and 2010, Wilson was mostly absent from academia while he worked for non-profits in Burlington, VT and Detroit, MI. In 2011, Wilson enrolled in Loyola University Chicago’s Applied Social Psychology terminal master’s program. In 2013, he was accepted into the doctoral program in the same department.

At Loyola, Wilson has taken classes in statistics, program evaluation, research methods, attitudes, and public policy. He is a member of the Social Psychology of Politics and Religion Laboratory under the leadership of Dr. Victor Ottati. His current research interests include the situational determinants of open-mindedness, and the consequences of essentialist thinking.