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Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology

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Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology

Richard Allan Berg

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About The Author
Chapter I: Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology

The far horizons of a phenomenological philosophy, the chief structural formations, to speak geographically, have disclosed themselves; the essential groups of problems and the methods of approach on essential lines have been made clear. The author sees the infinite open country of the true philosophy, the "promised land" on which he himself will never set foot. This confidence may wake a smile, but let each see for himself whether it has not some ground in the fragments laid before him as phenomenology in its beginnings. Gladly would he hope that those who come after will take up these first ventures, carry them steadily forward, yes, and improve also their great deficiencies, defects of incompleteness which cannot indeed be avoided in the beginnings of scientific work.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is popularly acknowledged as the father of phenomenology. While alive, he was recognized as the leader of a phenomenological movement. He saw himself as a modern Moses leading his Israelites towards the promised land of a phenomenological philosophy. Like the land promised to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and for which they longed, phenomenology is said to be "the secret longing of the philosophy of modern times;" and Descartes, Hume and Kant are claimed as Husserl's philosophical forefathers. Like Moses who saw his promised land from a lonely mountaintop, Husserl claimed to see the outstanding geographic features of his philosophy. But again like Moses, he was forbidden to enter: he felt obligated to cover only the ground in its immediate vicinity. Phenomenology is said to be a land on which he never set foot.

It must be difficult to live with one's goal in sight while not being able to reach it. We search the hearts of men in situations like this in hopes of discovering something important about their humanity. But the heart of Moses is not open to us. We are told only that after wandering in the wilderness for forty years and almost reaching his destination, "his eye was not dim nor his natural force abated." Husserl, on the other hand, does not present such an enigmatic figure. He too is supposed to have retained his keen eyesight. He also claims to see the humour in our doubting what he sees from his mountaintop, indicating that he appreciates the irony of his situation. He is not without humility and humour himself. His invitation to test the old man's eyesight speaks of quiet confidence and feelings of philosophical solidity and integrity. Let us see to what extent these feelings are justified.
Although Husserl's days of leadership came to an end in 1938, posterity continues to acknowledge him as the father of phenomenology. His paternity endures in the supposedly seminal books he has written. His thoughts are said to germinate in the soil of other minds. But it is not exactly clear to us what he meant by a phenomenological philosophy. What is the promised land towards which he was supposed to be leading other philosophers? How near was he able to approach it himself? This thesis is an attempt to answer these two questions.

Students of phenomenology are fond of defining it as the practice of letting things speak for themselves. "Back to the things themselves!" is their slogan. Husserl's writings may at first seem to lend support to their definition. For example, he writes in the ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology that:

the generalization of the correlative, mutually attached concepts "intuition" and "object" is not a casual whim, but is compellingly demanded by the nature of things.

In The Paris Lectures, he writes that:

science demands proof by reference to the things and facts themselves as they are given in actual experience and intuition. Thus guided, we, the beginning philosophers, make it a rule to judge only by the evidence.

he claims in the Cartesian Meditations that:

the idea of science and philosophy involves... a beginning and a line of advance that... have their basis "in the nature of things themselves."

These passages testify that the popular slogan captures the spirit of Husserl's endeavour. They also indicate its importance as a methodological principle for a philosophy which pretends to be scientific. They do not,
however, champion it as an adequate definition.

Without denying its usefulness in defining phenomenology, it can be pointed out that the popular expression alone is apt to be misleading. The expression "Back to the things themselves!" brings to mind Hume's positivistic doctrine that "all our simple ideas... are derived from simple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they exactly represent." With Hume's picture image theory of ideas in mind, it is tempting to think of phenomenology as an empiricism in the style of Locke's, Berkeley's and Hume's. But actually, it originated in Husserl's and Brentano's criticism of the British empiricists.

Husserl's definition of phenomenology includes more information than the popular slogan. In fact, enough is included to distinguish it from British empiricism. "Phenomenology," Husserl frequently says, "figures as a science within the limits of mere immediate intuition, a pure descriptive science of Essential Being." The words that recur again and again in his definitions are essential being, immediate intuition and descriptive science. To clarify Husserl's definition, it must be shown what kind of things he wanted to return to, how he proposed to get back to them, and what methodological role the commandment to return to the things themselves plays in a scientific description.

(1) Husserl's Idea of Essential Being.

Let us first examine Husserl's idea of Essence or Essential Being (Wesen) to determine what kind of things he wants to return to. Husserl was preoccupied throughout his philosophical career with the problem of how to account for the objectivity of human knowledge. So central was
this problem to his interests that his intellectual development could be described as a growing awareness of the universality of his problem.\textsuperscript{10}

In 1891, seven years after receiving his doctorate in mathematics, Husserl began his philosophical career by publishing the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in which he tried to account for the objectivity of mathematical knowledge by tracing its fundamental concepts to our ability to notice the aggregate character of our perceptions.\textsuperscript{11} Realizing the close connection between mathematics and logic, Husserl made another attempt to explain what makes this type of knowledge possible in his *Logical Investigations*, published 1900-1901, where he repudiated the psychologistic views which he supposedly expressed earlier in the *Arithmetic*.\textsuperscript{12} Nevertheless, in the second volume of the *Investigations* he continued to analyze both logical concepts and our consciousness of them. Finally realizing the universality of his problem, Husserl described his *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, published 1913, as "a fresh formulation of the transcendental problem which forecasts with objective necessity the true meaning of an objective being that is subjectively knowable."\textsuperscript{13} At this point, Husserl recognized that what makes any object subjectively knowable is its Essential Being. In *Ideas I* Husserl attempts to articulate this insight. His later works, *Cartesian Meditations* published 1931 and *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* published 1936, are concerned with the task of extending the application of this insight to the world we live in (Lebenswelt).

The work occupying the pivotal position in Husserl's philosophy is *Ideas I* because there for the first time he realizes the universality of his problem and tries to articulate the notion of Essential Being as its
answer. An examination of the first chapter of Ideas 1, entitled "Fact and Essence", should give us an idea of what Husserl means by the term Essential Being.

The problem of the foundation of objective knowledge seems to demand that Husserl should trace our knowledge of objects to its source. This is precisely what he does. The kind of knowledge he examines in chapter one is our knowledge of facts. Factual or natural knowledge, he says, begins with our experience of individual things. Nature or the world is taken to be nothing more than the sum-total of these individuals. They are first given to us as objects of perception; we have "outer" perception of physical objects, "inner" perception of ourselves and our states of consciousness; and we become acquainted with other people through "empathy" and by perceiving their bodily behavior. We shall later sub-divide the problem of natural knowledge into those of the object of perception, the world of objects, and other people in the world. But for the present our concern is for the common foundation of all three types of knowledge.

All natural knowledge is based on our perception of individual things. What does it mean for something to be perceived as an object? Husserl says that:

An individual object is not simply and quite generally an individual, a "this-there" something unique; but being constituted thus and thus "in itself" it has its own supply of essential predicables which must qualify it (qua "Being as it is in itself"), if other secondary relative determinations are to qualify it also.

A perceived object, for example, an individual tone, is a unique thing existing here and now. Its existence here and now we call its "Real
But there are several things we can say about it that we can say with equal justice about other unique individuals. First of all, it is a part of its being that it should exist under the general rubric of individual, in this case, as an individual sound. It also has its own supply of essential predicables "which can be justly applied to a number of other perceived objects." The "common element" which makes this possible is their "Essential Being". It is part of the meaning of a perceived object that it should have "Essential" as well as "Real" existence.

Any object of perception has essential existence. Its essential being is no more simple than its real existence. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl offers whole and part, subject and quality, individual and species, species and genus as a few of the essential structures in which the existence of an individual object is involved. These essential structures may be divided into two radically different kinds. We may use Husserl's example of a tone to illustrate the distinctive logic of each kind. First, a tone exists as a whole having parts. These parts may, in their turn, be analyzed into yet other parts. The former relationship of a whole to its parts belongs to the kind of essential being Husserl calls formal. By this he means that the relationship applies equally well to any object of perception. It is not peculiar to any class of them.

The individual tone has another kind of essential being besides its formal essence. This kind of essential being can belong to some individuals and not to others. The tone, for example, can be subsumed under a material essence. It can be classified as a sound.

Later, in Ideas I, Husserl especially warns us not to confuse the
subsumption of an individual under an essence with the subordination of
that essence under a higher species or genus. The class of sounds, for
example, can be subordinated to a higher genus, object-of-one-of-our
senses. To confuse the former with the latter would be a case of
confusing a material with a formal relationship.

An object of perception, in the broadest sense possible, is a whole
which can be analyzed into parts; it is also an individual which can be
put into a class with other individuals. Its essential being is both
formal and material.

But factual knowledge is suppose to tell us about unique individuals.
In neither case does the individual seem to be unique. The uniqueness of
an individual can be reconciled with its essential being in the following
way. Using Husserl's example of the tone, we find that it has an element
of "this-hereness". We can fix the time and the place at which it can
be heard. Its uniqueness consists in the fact that at no other time or
in any other place can I hear as I do here and now. A perception is
unique, under no circumstances does it return to me individually the
same. Nevertheless, I and any number of other people can hear the
same tone or the same tonal structure at different times and places.
We do so, for example, whenever we hear an orchestra perform Beethoven's
Ninth Symphony. I know I can listen to the same symphony again and again
even though I can never have the same auditory sensations.

A perceived individual can be both an object and subjectively knowable.
Its uniqueness is due to the unique spatio-temporality of our perceptions,
and its objectivity to the essence under which it is subsumed or into
which it can be divided. This is the meaning of an objective being which can
be subjectively known. The essence of an individual tells us what it is, while the this-thereeness of our perception tells us of its real existence.

Essences are the foundation of factual knowledge in the sense that they make possible our awareness of individuals as objects having part-whole relationships and having membership in certain classes. All factual knowledge, all scientific analysis and classification of perceived individuals depends on the recognition of their essential being. It is the essence of what we perceive that accounts for our awareness of individuals as objects.

When factual knowledge is collected scientifically, the objectivity of the resulting scientific doctrines depends upon the perception of individuals. The most fundamental procedures of a factual science are the analysis and classification of "this" individual perceiver to be "here". All factual sciences share this dependency regardless of whether they are natural sciences like physics, biology, physiology and psychology, or sciences of man like history, anthropology and sociology.

The factual sciences require a justification of their procedure. The analysis and classification of individuals is justified only if "every fact includes an essential factor of a material order." The essential being "must furnish a law that binds the given concrete instance, and generally every possible one as well."

An individual may be said to have essential being in two different ways: formally as a whole having parts, and materially as a member of a class. The subordination of a class to a higher genus is a case of purely formal eidetics not involving the individual at all. Since the
formal relationship of a whole to its parts preclude special reference to any individual, the foundation of the existence of a perceived individual as an object must be its material essence. Husserl says that the most inclusive material essences delimit regions or categories of individuals. These regions are the foundation of all factual knowledge and all factual sciences. If it is really the material essence of what we perceive that accounts for our awareness of individuals as objects, then Husserl's search for the foundation of knowledge should be directed by the question of how he proposes to return to the essences themselves.

(2) Husserl's Idea of Immediate Intuition.

Husserl claims that the possibility of the seeing of essences (Wesenschau) is involved in our perception of individuals. Our seeing of a class, for example the class of tones, is involved in our perception of one of its class members (i.e., this tone here). Husserl suggests that any empirical intuition can be transformed into an essential insight:

Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed into essential insight (ideation)—a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential possibility. The object of such insight is then the corresponding pure essence or eidos, whether it be the highest category or one of its specializations, right down to the fully "concrete."

Any empirical intuition which gives an individual object to consciousness can be transformed into an essential insight. The transformation is accomplished by an act of ideation, or to use the same example, by thinking of the class of which the individual is perceived to be a member. The act of ideation has the character of a dator act, that is, it gives an object to consciousness. Its object is one of the classes of which
the individual is a member. Husserl does not say so, but presumably the seeing of each higher degree of generality is the product of another higher act of ideation.

Immediate intuition presents an object to consciousness. There are two kinds of intuition, the perception of individuals and the essential intuition of generalities of a class of individuals for example. One kind of intuition can be transformed into another. But the two kinds remain distinct because they are directed towards particular and general objects respectively.

Essential intuition, however, can be confused with the procedures of induction and formalization because all three of them operate within the realm of the universal. As a result of this confusion, the essences or things themselves of Husserl's phenomenology may be mistaken for inductive or formal generalities. When these three kinds of knowledge are distinguished, Husserl's ideas of essence and essential intuition will be made clearer.

Husserl warns us not to confuse the inductive generality of natural laws with the essential generality of eidetic judgments. He offers the proposition "all bodies are heavy" as an example of such a law, and he contrasts it with the eidetic generality of the claim that "all bodies are extended". These differ on three counts. First, natural laws must refer to individuals having real existence, while eidetic judgments like the geometrical one used in Husserl's example need not.

Furthermore, the inductive generality of natural laws is founded on the actual perception of individuals, while eidetic generalities are grounded in essential intuitions, for example, of the classes of which
the perceived individual is a member. We can infer that all bodies are heavy only after feeling the weight of several objects. On the other hand, we do not need the perception of several objects to tell us that all bodies are extended. The foundation of this statement is the intuition of several essences. Having had intuitions of the essences 'material thing' and 'extension', we are compelled to recognize that the class 'material thing' must be subordinated under the larger class 'extended thing'. The objects of these intuitions are necessarily connected. Induction differs from essential intuition and is founded upon it. 32

The intuition of a necessary connection between essences in our example points to another difference between induction and essential intuition that Husserl never fully articulates. He says that the latter have an unconditioned generality while the former do not. 33 This means that eidetic judgments based on the intuition of enough essences are necessarily true, while inductive judgments based on the perception of a reasonable number of individuals may not be true at all. It is standard procedure in the nature sciences to test a hypothesis by experimenting with individuals. When enough experiments confirm the hypothesis and none disconfirm it, then induction gives it the status of a natural law until another hypothesis which explains the same facts more elegantly can be established in the same inductive manner. More experiments increase the likelihood that a hypothesis is true. But the possibility that it is false always remains in spite of the most precise observations, because of the restricted range of things observed. If at any time a natural phenomenon "violates" a natural law, then its lawfulness is annulled.
Laws of nature at best describe it. They have no prescriptive power. On the other hand, an eidetic judgment based on the intuition of the essences involved in the judgment must be true. It is no accident that the observation of real objects confirms its truth. The intuition of their essential nature tells us that it could not be otherwise. Because, in Husserl's example, the essence 'material thing' must be subordinated to the essence 'extended thing', we will never find a material object which is not extended in space.

Similarly essential intuition and formalization can be clearly distinguished. Phenomenology is not an inductive empirical science, but it is not a formal deductive one either.

Essential intuition and formalization differ in one respect. Essential intuition allows us to see formal and material essences, while formalization allows us to see only those of the formal kind. Formalization precludes individuals and classes which have individual members. Its lowest classes (infimae species) have no "material content." The generalization of material essences, on the other hand, does not. Let us use Husserl's example of lived space to illustrate the difference between formalization and the intuition of essences. Formalization of space produces an idea which reduces space to its Euclidean counterpart. When we treat lived space purely quantitatively and according to Euclid's rules, we abstract from some of its essential features. Lived space, for example, is full of colour; but a formalized idea of space does not distinguish red from blue spaces. Generalization of space, on the other hand, distinguishes coloured from uncoloured spaces, specifics sub-classes of coloured space like red and blue, and offers yet more distinctions within
Generalization and formalization are two species of essential intuition. Formalization is distinguished from the intuition of essences as a species is distinguished from its genus.

(3) Husserl's Idea of a Descriptive Science.

The intuition of essences is the foundation of the science of phenomenology. To reveal the scientific structure of phenomenology, we must specify what his idea of a science is, and how he proposes to construct a science upon his foundation. His Logos essay, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," published in 1911, remains the clearest articulation of his scientific ideal. Husserl contrasts his idea of philosophy as a rigorous science with the kind of philosophy he calls a "world-view" (Weltanschauung). 37 A true science, he says, has "scientific" foundations, "scientific" problems, "scientific" methods, and there is a certain logical harmony amongst the three of them. 38

Let us first examine Husserl's idea of a scientific foundation. The foundation of a Weltanschauung is not the accomplishment of an individual person. It has its roots in the cultural community of his time, and its fruits in the collective consciousness of his contemporaries who try to persuade him that it offers an objectively valid view of the world. 40 Weltanschauung philosophy has a social foundation. It is offered to the individual as a whole, and he must come to terms with it in his lifetime. 41 The steps of a truly scientific philosophy take it in the opposite direction. Its foundation is the observations (Anschauungen) of the individual. 42 As we have seen, the seeing of essences (Wesenschau) is the kind of Anschauung that Husserl's phenomenology is based on. Each person can add only modest building blocks to the structure of a science which must
always remain incomplete. Finally, individual research leads to a community of scholars. The dynamics of the two philosophical tendencies may co-exist in the same person and in the same community. While naively accepting much of his Weltanschauung, the scientific researcher continues to construct "new fragments of strict doctrine" on the basis of his observations. Once in a while they may conflict, as for example the Aristotelian world-view and Galileo's "strict doctrines" did in the seventeenth century.

Scientific problems also differ from those of a Weltanschauung. The latter are dictated by a tradition. Galileo's strict doctrines had to be problematic for the world-view of his contemporaries. Truly scientific research, on the other hand, does not begin with a tradition, but with a dedication to the problems and the problematic demands stemming from them. Galileo dealt with the problematic nature of the moon, for example, by observing it through a telescope. Something with an observable nature demands to be observed. A scientific problem, then, is one which is allowed to dictate the researcher's methods of investigation. This is the source of the logical harmony which exists between the problems and methods of a science.

The methods of a science are dictated by the sense of its problems. The self-awareness required for the satisfaction of these demands distinguishes scientific methods from those of a Weltanschauung. The method of modern physics, for example, is hypothesis, followed by experimental verification and induction from the results of the experiment. On the other hand, no one could say exactly how he got his world-view. Husserl realizes that a self-reflective method is the mark of all sciences.
"Every bit of completed science," he says, "is a whole composed of thought-steps each of which is immediately understood."

Before Husserl's phenomenology can be recognized as the science he claims it is, a harmony between its foundations and methods must be discovered. The exact nature of this harmony must be specified.
Chapter II: Methodology

Existentialism may be on the trail of more vital, more fruitful insights than pure phenomenology. But it has still to learn a few lessons from the older phenomenology, particularly from Husserl. One of these is the injunction which I heard him address to an informal group of students when he criticized Max Scheler's much more rapid, but not equally solid production, "One needs bright ideas, but one must not publish them." Another lesson is his insistence on the need of making sure of the epistemological groundwork: "One must not consider oneself too good to work on the foundations." It is such lessons, lessons of philosophical solidity, integrity, and humanity, which both phenomenologists and existentialists still have to learn or to relearn.

If Husserl's phenomenology is to be called a science, it must exhibit all of these characteristics: a foundation in the immediate intuition of objects, a dedication to the demands stemming from the problematic nature of the objects intuited, and a method dictated by the demanding nature of its problems. The foundation of phenomenology in the immediate intuition of objects has already been sufficiently illuminated.

A science must exhibit a dedication to the demands stemming from the problematic nature of its objects. The natural sciences, geometry, mathematics, logic, each discipline must be sensitive to the object of its own special interest. Husserl says that phenomenology supplies the definitive criticism of every fundamentally distinct science, and in particular, the determination of the sense in which their objects can be said to be. His distinction of objects into individuals, material essences, and formal essences exhibits a dedication suited to this task.

What remains undetermined is the nature of the harmony between the foundation and the methods of phenomenology. The question of whether Husserl's phenomenology can be called a science will be decided by the degree to which his method has become self-reflective.

Herbert Spiegelberg's personal memories of Husserl indicate that the father of phenomenology was keenly aware of foundational problems, and that he did not consider himself too good to work on them. It was likely this feeling of humility that prevented him from entering the promised land of a phenomenological philosophy. He seems to have felt compelled to dedicate his life to its groundwork. We should expect him to have done a considerable amount of work on the foundation of his method. Let us see how he articulates a theory of scientific method on the foundation
of the intuition of essences.

(1) The Principle of All Principles.

The guiding question of this chapter is how Husserl can use the intuition of essences as a methodological foundation. Its usefulness is described in the second chapter of Ideas I under the heading "the principle of all principles" which Husserl expresses in the following manner:

"...primordial dator intuition is source of authority for knowledge... whatever presents itself in intuition in primordial form... is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself... every statement which does nothing more than give expression to such data... is thus really an absolute beginning... a principium. But this holds in special measure of the essential judgements of this class that are general in form, and it is to these that the term "principle" is normally applied."

In this passage Husserl addresses the connection amongst intuitive, reductive, and expressive endeavours. He says that when objects are first intuitively given to consciousness, they are simply to be accepted for what they appear to be. Conversely they are not to be accepted as anything they do not present themselves as being. The resulting phenomenological description is nothing more than an expression "general in form" of what has been observed.

The first principle of Husserl's method is a two-fold injunction: describe that which has been observed; do not speculate about the unseen. "Back to the things themselves!", the popular slogan of Husserl's followers, only expresses half of his first principle. The foundation of phenomenology as a science on the immediate intuition of objects really generates two demands. They, in turn, give rise to others. Husserl's reductive project should be interpreted as a technique for systematically anticipating and
preventing all forms of speculation. Its various steps have their source in the demand not to speculate about the unseen. Similarly Husserl's descriptive project and its various steps are derived from the injunction to describe everything that appears exactly as it presents itself.

Husserl's ability to derive both projects from his first principle of method depends on its having a double nature. Its two demands must be incontrovertably different. Otherwise the scientific nature of his endeavour will not be appreciated. Some of Husserl's interpreters, J.M. Bochenski and Quentin Lauer for example, seem not to recognize the difference between them or the correspondingly different reductive and descriptive projects. However, one philosopher who appreciates the difference between Husserl's two principles and explains its methodological importance is William James.

In his essay, "The Will to Believe", published in 1897, James anticipates Husserl's first principle of method. He approaches the problem of religious belief by writing that there are:

two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion—ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error—these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separate laws...

Believe truth! Shun error! —these we see are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by colouring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may... treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance.

Both James and Husserl appreciate the real nature of the difference between the demands to know the truth and to avoid error. Both
philosophers recognize them as the first and most fundamental principles of method. The differences between the pragmatism of James and Husserl's phenomenology are ultimately due to the fact that James gave primacy to the former, and Husserl to the latter. In his essay James argues that in spite of the risk that it might be wrong, "we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will." Husserl, on the other hand, strove to establish a philosophy without presuppositions, and claimed for phenomenology the unique function of criticizing all other sciences and itself at the same time.

We may conclude from this that there is a real difference between the two demands of Husserl's first principle: that the two projects stemming from them are really different; that the commandment not to speculate about the unseen has priority over the injunction to describe what has been observed; and that the reductive project should precede the descriptive one. With the two projects sufficiently distinguished, it now becomes possible to see how they are grounded in Husserl's first principle.

(2) The Reductive Project.

Husserl's remarks about the famous reductions of phenomenology are scattered throughout Ideas I. His reductions are techniques for anticipating and preventing all forms of speculation. Even though they follow from Husserl's desire to avoid error, their purpose is not purely negative. Besides directing the philosopher away from speculation and its inevitable errors, they also point towards something else Husserl calls transcendental subjectivity. Husserl seems to mention four different types of brackets. They are philosophical, eidetic, phenomenological and
transcendental. But the transcendental and the phenomenological reductions are really the same one seen from two different points of view. So, in theory, there are really only three different reductions. Let us examine them individually before trying to explain how they are derived from the commandment not to speculate about the unseen.

The philosophical reduction is mentioned only once and then only briefly. It leads the phenomenologist away from philosophical theories and points towards the observation of objects as they appear in intuition. Philosophical speculation about the ultimate source of individuals, their unperceived existence, etc. are eliminated. They are irrelevant to the project of searching for the foundation of objective knowledge. Husserl thinks that this kind of reduction will allow him to address his problems outside of the tradition of philosophical speculation. He seems to consider himself here as a scientific researcher separating himself as much as possible from the Weltanschauung of philosophy. This reduction does not mean that the phenomenologist is not allowed to speak of philosophy or to entertain various philosophical theories. He must not, however allow these theories to influence the description of what he has seen.

The eidetic reduction also performs a negative and a positive task. On the negative side, all reference to the individual and particular are to be omitted from phenomenological description after the eidetic reduction is performed. Speculations about the existence, the source, and the existential status of universals are eliminated. Positively considered, this reduction specifies the kind of intuited object which should receive special attention. Phenomenological description may start with the observation or imagination of individuals, but thereafter should concentrate
Eidetic reduction is absolutely essential to phenomenology because it is the operation that distinguishes it from British empiricism. Hume, for example, says that simple ideas are caused by simple impressions which they faintly copy. Husserl, on the other hand, is unalterably opposed to any theory which fails to recognize that the object of perception and the object of ideation differ, not in degree, but in kind. Individuals and essences are different kinds of things. The eiditic reduction ensures that their difference is recognized. Spiegelberg would say that Hume and anyone else refusing to make the eiditic reduction commit what he calls the sense-organ fallacy:

Another obstruction to an open-eyed approach to the phenomena might be called the sense-organ bias. It could be formulated as a principle: nothing is to be recognized as a datum unless it can be assigned to a specific sense organ (in the biological organism) as its receptor. A good many positivistic rejections of phenomenological data, such as the denial of distance perception, may well be ascribed to some such negativistic prejudice.

Hume's copy theory of ideas is a good illustration of the sense-organ fallacy. It asks us to believe that each of our simple ideas copies one of our impressions and therefore can be assigned to a specific sense organ. This kind of "empiricism" also impoverishes our experience by suggesting that each of our impressions of the world we live in has its own proper sense organ. British empiricism fails to recognize the rich diversity of the kinds of human knowledge and their various objects. Husserl will settle for nothing less than a theory of knowledge which recognizes the intuition of essences.
Finally the phenomenological reduction, much like the other ones, performs a dual purpose. After its application there should be no more reference even to the essence of intuited objects. The phenomenological reduction ensures that intuited essences will not be reified, hypostatized, or spoken of as if they had substantial existence apart from anyone who classifies individuals or formalizes their relationships. The phenomenologist must not claim that essences are anything more than intuition presents them to be. The ultimate reduction refers the phenomenologist away from objects and towards transcendental subjectivity or the stream of consciousness which is supposed to be the ultimate goal of phenomenology.

The reductive project of Husserl's philosophy, as a systematic attempt to anticipate and avoid all types of speculation, is grounded in the methodological principle which demands that there should be no speculation about the unseen. Husserl's first principle of method calls for the reduction of theories to individuals, of individuals to essences, and of essences to the stream of consciousness in which they are constituted. The reductive project is systematic in the sense that the philosophical apokhe should be applied first, followed by the eiditic, and finally the phenomenological reductions. When properly understood, the reductive project is seen to be a propadeutic to the descriptive one.

(3) The Descriptive Project.

Husserl shuns error by refusing to speculate about that which he cannot see. His first principle also demands that he should seek the truth as far as he can by describing things as they appear to him. The second of these demands also generates a complete project involving several operations. If Husserl's descriptive methods are as scientific as his reductive
techniques, each operation must be distinct from the others, and all of them must have their foundation in the intuition of objects.

Let us first distinguish each operation of the descriptive project in the same way that Husserl would. In a section of "Ideas I" entitled "The Reference of Phenomenology Back to its Own Self," Husserl says that phenomenology:

has to place before its own eyes as instances certain pure consciousness events, to bring these to complete clearness, and within this zone of clearness to subject them to analysis and the apprehension of their essences, to follow up the essential connections that can be clearly understood, to grasp what is momentarily perceived in conceptual expressions, of which the meaning is prescribed purely by the object perceived or in some way transparently understood. ¹⁶

The five techniques of which Husserl speaks can be distinguished and elaborated in the following way:

(1) Individual pure consciousness events (i.e., intuitions of objects) are to be regarded as instantiations of essences (that is, as members of classes).

(2) The class memberships of each individual are to be made completely clear and distinct. (Anything clearly presented to consciousness can be noticed. Things distinctively presented are so noticeable that they cannot be confused with anything else.)

(3) Each clearly and distinctly presented essence (or class) is to be apprehended.

(4) The noticeable connections amongst intuited essences (i.e., the subordination of a species to its genus) should be followed up (i.e., to their highest genus).

(5) The foregoing intuitions and their objects should be described
"in faithful conceptual expressions" exactly as they have presented themselves.

There are five distinct techniques, four of them involving intuition, and one of them the expression of what has been intuited. There can be no doubt that each of the five is different.

The last and most crucial of these techniques deserves special attention. Having overcome one kind of positivism with its eidetic reduction, Husserl's phenomenology must not fall victim to another. There is an empirical positivism of which the philosophy of David Hume is a good example. According to its tenets, intuition only of individual objects is possible, and then only those which can be assigned to a specific sense-organ in the biological organism as its receptor. Against this kind of positivism Husserl maintains that we have intuitions of essences as objects which differ in kind from individual ones, and which eidetic reduction makes it possible to see. But there is also a positivism of expression whose basic assumptions are that discursive language is the only means of expression, and that anything which cannot be expressed discursively is meaningless. Suzanne Langer attributes this kind of positivism to Bertrand Russell, Rudolph Carnap and some other analysts of language. From their point of view, the various arts say nothing which discursive language cannot say better, and anything which resists translation is meaningless. Because this doctrine impoverishes the realm of expression in much the same way that Hume's sense-organ fallacy impoverishes the empirical one, we could call it the fallacy of impoverishing expression. There are other varieties of "faithful conceptual expressions" besides "judgments general in form." We must expand our notion of expression to include all of them, for instance,
the musical expression of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*, or the poetic expression of James Joyce's novel *Ulysses*. But that is not a project we can undertake here.

For our purpose it will be sufficient to say in general that the expression of what has been seen, along with the intuitive parts of the descriptive project, must be grounded in the demand to describe things exactly as they present themselves for observation. After individuals are perceived or imagined, it becomes possible to concentrate on their essences or class memberships. When these become sufficiently clear, they can be recognized. Then essential connections can be recognized amongst them. Finally it becomes possible to describe everything that has been seen. Each step in the descriptive project is founded on the insightfulness of the step which preceded it. All of them have their ultimate foundation in the intuition of objects.

For a complete view of Husserl's theory of method, the relationship between reductive and descriptive projects must be outlined. Each reduction is a section of the handrail that helps us up the stairs of insight one step at a time. The philosophical reduction makes the intuition of objects possible by eliminating speculations about them. The eidetic reduction makes the intuition of essences and essential connections possible by putting the uniqueness of individuals into brackets. Finally the phenomenological reduction makes the description of intuited objects possible by eliminating reference to anything beyond the stream of consciousness.

The examination of Husserl's theory of method has established that, theoretically, his method deserves to be called scientific. Husserl seems
highly aware of what he is doing when he speaks of the practices of phenomenology. His theory of phenomenological method can be re-constructed on the basis of his principle of principles. Theoretically, there is a certain harmony between the foundations and methods of phenomenology. It remains for us to discover whether Husserl's philosophy is actually as scientific as his theory of method represents it to be. Let us see how near husserl has been able to approach his promised land.
Chapter III: Method

If this procedure in its unsophisticated form serves at first only to make one at home in a new domain, to practice seeing, apprehending, analyzing generally within it and to encourage some acquaintance with its data, (then) scientific reflection upon the essential nature of the types of presentation which play their part within it, upon essence, performance, conditions of complete clearness and insight, as well as of completely true and steady conceptual expression, and more of the same kind, undertakes the function of a general and logically rigorous methodic grounding. Followed up deliberately, it takes on the character and rank of scientific method; and this in any given case, in the application of rigorously formulated methodic standards, permits of the practice of a limiting and improving criticism.

—Edmund Husserl
Ideas I, p. 174
Husserl's phenomenological method, as he describes it, can be divided into two different projects and their guiding principle. The principle of all principles is the injunction not to speculate about the unobservable, but only to describe that which can be seen. It is the most elemental of the three and the source of the other two. Secondly, the graded reduction is supposed to eliminate the possibility of speculation with the result that the phenomenologist's eyes are directed towards something which can be observed. The descriptive project is an attempt to clarify and describe exactly what is there to be seen.

Not only does Husserl's methodology prescribe a definite order in the use of principles and projects, it also suggests a further order in the steps of each of them. The principle of principles comes first: it provides the impetus for all phenomenological endeavour. The reductive project should follow since nothing can be observed and described before it has been pointed out. Finally whatever is seen can be described.

The graded reduction consists of a series of reductions which are meant to follow each other in a definite order. Individual objects cannot be observed unless he disregards theories about their ultimate source, their unperceived existence, etc. Husserl calls the exclusion of these theories the philosophical reduction. Nor can the common essence of individuals be discerned before their uniqueness is eliminated from consideration. The elimination of individuality Husserl calls the eidyotic reduction. In order to describe the common features discerned, the phenomenologist must restrain himself from speaking about anything more than the constitution of objects in the stream of consciousness. Husserl calls this type of restraint phenomenological or transcendental. It seems that the philosophical reduction
should be followed by the eidetic which should be followed by the phenomenological one.

Similarly, Husserl's injunction to describe that which can be seen prescribes a definite order in the five steps of the descriptive project. An individual should be observed first. Its presence may then be clarified and analysed. When it has been clearly and distinctly presented, its essential features will reveal themselves. Then they can be observed. Then the individual may reveal itself as essentially connected to other individuals. This too should be noticed. Finally the observer should accurately express everything which has been seen. Any variation in the order of steps would destroy their insightfulness since each of them builds on the insight of the step which preceded it.

Although we may construct a complete theory of method on the basis of Husserl's scattered methodological remarks in Ideas 1, we cannot be sure of our interpretation until we verify that the intentions of this theory are actually fulfilled in practice. Husserl says apologetically that his procedure in its unsophisticated form may serve at first only to make us at home in the phenomenological domain; but that if we think deliberately about what he has done, we may be able to understand, limit, and improve his techniques.

Let us make ourselves at home with Husserl's techniques for dealing with the problem of objective knowledge. Let us sub-divide the problem into those of the objects of perception, the world in which they are perceived to exist, and the other people in the world who perceive them. After familiarizing ourselves with his phenomenological treatment of these problems, we may be able to point out some of its limitations and perhaps
even suggest a few improvements.

(1) The object of perception

"We perceive things." This simple claim engenders one of the perennial problems of philosophy. What do we mean by the expression "to perceive" something? What do we mean by saying that "something" is perceived? The history of philosophy bears witness to the difficulty of these questions. They have been approached from idealistic and realistic points of view. Both schools of thought have "explained" what an object of perception is and how we come to know such a thing. But philosophy is embarrassed by this profusion of thought. Because the competing "explanations" are incompatible with each other, a doubt is cast upon both of them. If Husserl's phenomenological approach can cut this Gordian knot, the ground will have been cleared for genuine understanding. I propose to examine the fourth chapter of his Ideas where he does the groundwork.¹

But first the problem should be given an historical context. Its formal statement is too vague to serve a philosophical purpose. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) will serve to illustrate the realistic position, and George Berkeley (1685-1753) the idealistic one.

(i) Descartes on the problem.

Two questionable statements about the object of perception may be derived from the philosophy of Rene Descartes. One is metaphysical; the other is part of a theory of knowledge.

According to Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy (published 1641) we do not directly acquaint ourselves with an object through our senses. Descartes tries to verify this claim by examining a piece of wax he has taken from a beehive.² It is sweet-tasting, smells of flowers,
feels hard and cold; when struck, it emits a sound; and it has a definite shape. These perceptions compel him at first to think that the piece of wax is a sweet tasting, flowery smelling, hard, cold, sound emitting, definitely shaped object.

But after moving the piece of wax towards his fireplace, he finds that it has become a tastless, odourless, hot fluid which cannot be struck to produce a sound in the way that it formerly could; it seems to be an indefinitely shaped puddle. Descartes' senses tell him that what he sees now differs completely from what he had noticed before. And yet, not unsurprisingly, he knows that he is looking at the same piece of wax.

Descartes draws a conclusion from his meditation on the wax, one which no one would doubt or disagree with. An object perceived to be completely different is nevertheless known to be the same. From this indubitable fact Descartes concludes:

I must therefore admit that I cannot by way of images comprehend what this wax is, and that it by the mind alone that I (adequately) apprehend it... What was especially to be noted is that our (adequate) apprehension of it is not a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imaging... but is solely an inspection of the mind... bodies are not cognized by the senses or by the imagination, but by the understanding alone.

Descartes believes that consciousness does not reach out to its objects through our senses or imagination; only abstract thought unmixed with sensations or images can reveal their true nature.

The metaphysical corollary of Descartes' epistemological doctrine is that perceivable qualities are not real properties of an object. According to him, objects appear to have simple and complex properties, but only the simples (extension and other mathematical properties) which we can...
perceive should be attributed to the object as it is in itself. Speaking of the objects we seem to perceive, Descartes claims that:

they are not perhaps exactly such as we apprehend by way of the senses; in many instances they are apprehended only obscurely and confusedly. But we must at least admit that whatever I there clearly and distinctly apprehend, ie; generally speaking, everything comprised in the object of pure mathematics, is to be found in them... sensuous apprehensions have been given me by nature only as testifying to my mind what things are beneficial or harmful... For this they are... sufficiently clear and distinct. But what I have done is to use them as rules sufficiently reliable to be employed in the immediate determination of the essence of bodies external to me; and as so employed, their testimony cannot be other than obscure and confused.

It seemed to Descartes that the absolute clarity and distinctness of simple mathematical properties mark them as real properties of an object; only pure mathematics can be used to determine exactly what a given object is. Descartes thought that the other properties of objects, those which we perceive, merely indicate the effect an object has on us. They too appear clearly and distinctly, but only sufficiently so as to determine whether the perceived object can benefit or harm the perceiver.

The property which best illustrates Descartes' metaphysical doctrine is probably the sweet taste of the wax. He would likely have argued that its sweet taste indicates the possible presence of something beneficial. But the nourishing benefit we may gather from it is something distinct from its tastiness which merely points to our needs and their possible satisfaction. The taste of the wax therefore does not reveal anything essential about its nature.

Descartes sought to make it possible for modern science to describe natural objects by means only of pure mathematics. His search ended with
these metaphysical and epistemological doctrines: only mathematical properties are real qualities of an object; we become acquainted with them only by means of abstract thought. On the other hand, sensible qualities are not real properties of an object; and we cannot directly acquaint ourselves with an object through our senses. Cartesian realism, with its distinction between mathematical and complex sensible qualities, has ever since the time of Descartes enjoyed the same degree of prestige and popularity as modern science itself.

(ii) Berkeley on the problem

The idealistic philosophy of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was unlike Descartes' in that it attracted no following. Indeed, at first it attracted hardly even any critical attention. Nevertheless his metaphysical and epistemological doctrines and their supporting arguments present the greatest problem for Descartes in particular and the philosophy of science in general, for according to Berkeley, a perceivable object is nothing more than the sum of its sensible qualities; therefore, we acquire knowledge of an object only through our senses.

Berkeley tried to support his claims through several different lines of argument. The most important of these may be found in his Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (published 1713), a work he was careful to preface with a warning against the "common principles of philosophers" who would teach us to distinguish the "real nature" of things from "that which falls under our senses". From this distinction, he suggests, arises nothing but scepticism and paradox. One of his declared purposes in writing the Dialogues is to return men from these paradoxes to their natural attitude. He claims to be the spokesman for
8 common sense.

At first both Hylas and Philonous seem to express common sense views as they agree that sensible things are "nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities." Hylas, however, will not agree to the additional Berkeleyan view (proposed by Philonous) that sensible qualities are nothing but "ideas in the mind" because he thinks that it endangers "the reality of sensible things". Consequently he makes two attempts to avoid the danger.

First he tries to distinguish amongst sensible qualities, saying that some are really properties of an object while others are not:

sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into primary and secondary: The former are extension; figure, solidity, gravity, motion, and rest, and these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are... all sensible qualities beside the primary; which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind.

It is significant that the qualities Hylas wants to attribute to the objects of perception tend to be mathematical ones. The tendency he expresses here approaches the metaphysics of modern science. But he cannot think of an adequate reply to Philonous who argues that perceived extension and all other primary qualities of an object vary with the position and condition of the perceiver as much as the secondary ones do. Philonous argues, for example, that the object of perception grows or diminishes in size as the observer approaches or retreats from it. Perspectives variations in the size of a perceived object are subjective, nothing but "ideas in the mind."

Finally Hylas can see no other alternative than to withdraw from the original agreement that sensible things are nothing more than the sum of
their sensible qualities:

It has just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now though it be acknowledged that great and small, consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves. Yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to absolute extension.\(^{12}\)

Similarly he distinguishes absolute from perceivable motion and suggests that the same distinction should be applied to the other primary qualities of an object. Hylas' distinction results in the idea of an object not only as something more, but as something completely other than its sensible qualities. It is now completely mathematical. There is no longer any difference between his concept of an object and Descartes'. This distinction amongst qualities is not unlike the one Newton (1642-1727) makes in his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (published 1687).\(^{13}\)

Let us now examine what is probably Berkeley's strongest argument that an object is nothing more than that which falls under our senses.\(^{14}\)

The following line of reasoning can be abstracted from Berkeley's dialogue form:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Extended objects can be divided into parts.
\item They are divisible if and only if their parts can be distinguished from each other.
\item Distinctions amongst parts are made possible by something sensible
\item Absolute extension is insensible.
\item Extended objects are absolutely extended or they are not.
\item If they are, they are not divisible into parts, (by 2 and 3);
\item But extended objects are divisible into parts.
\item Therefore it is impossible to think that absolute extension is a property of extended objects.
\end{enumerate}

After being led to this conclusion by Philonous, Hylas claims that he has not had enough time to think about fallacies they may have committed while
arguing. But we can be sure that Berkeley means to present an irrefutable
chain of thought. In arguments such as this one, Berkeley has presented great
problems in the philosophy of science. The argument suggests not only that
extended objects could have no parts if they were absolutely extended,
but also that there could be no individual objects! In absolute space,
none of them could be divided from the rest. He concludes that the
extension of perceivable objects is nothing more than the sum of its
sensible qualities; and he would certainly have wanted to say that the
same holds true for the rest of its primary qualities.

Because of his doctrine that an object of perception is the sum
of its sensible qualities, Berkeley believed that "sensible things are
only to be perceived by sense or represented by the imagination." 15

Now we find that the arguments of Berkeley and Descartes have
produced a stalemate. Berkeley cannot cope with Descartes' argument from
change: if an extended object (i.e., a piece of wax) is no more than
the sum of its sensible qualities, and if all the ones it has at a given
moment are replaced by others, then the result must be a different object.
But the same object remains. Therefore it must be wrong to suppose that
an object is the sum of its sensible qualities. Nor could Descartes have
responded to Berkeley's argument from the divisibility of objects: if an
extended object is something more than that which falls under our senses
(i.e., if it is absolutely extended), and if anything insensible is
indivisible, then extended objects cannot be divided into parts. But
extended objects can be divided into parts. Therefore it must be wrong to
suppose that extended objects do not fall under our senses. If both men
have argued rightly, then their contradictory theses vitiate each other and
a valid concept of the object is impossible.

(iii) Husserl's Solution

The fourth chapter of Husserl's *Ideas I* begins with the announcement that the possibility of his bracketing technique has yet to be established. He claims to be involved in the general project of explaining what is means to be conscious of something. The examples he uses to illustrate the possibility of reduction in his project are his perception of a piece of paper on the table in front of him, and his perception of the table itself. His choice of examples involves him in Descartes' and Berkeley's problem.

Although Husserl's operations in chapter four correspond roughly to his theory of method, they are in some respects at variance with one another. The first principle of method is not to speculate about the unknown, but only to describe what can be seen. His description of consciousness is an exact application of the rule telling him to describe what he can see. But it also calls for the suppression of speculative theories before anything is described; and in Husserl's own words, "we start with a series of observations within which we are not troubled with any phenomenological epokhe." He did not explicitly bracket anything before he began his description. We shall reconsider this methodological problem after verifying his theory of description.

According to Husserl's theory of phenomenological description, consciousness of something should be described in five steps. They should appear in the following order: first the observation of individual conscious events, followed by the clarification and analysis of what has been observed, the apprehension of their essence, the following up of their essential connections, and finally the exact description of everything that
has been seen.

Husserl begins by describing his experience of a piece of paper, "in its pure singularity". He distinguishes the cogitatio (perceptual experience) from the cogitatum (thing perceived). The piece of paper lay on the table in front of him. Around and about it were books, pencils, and an ink well. His perceptual experience, on the other hand, was a "turning towards" it, a "singling out" from the background of other objects; his perception of the paper had "a zone of background intuitions." The paper was singled out by "a free turning of the look," whereupon his perception of the paper was transferred from a non-actual consciousness to an actual orientation, from dormancy to wakefulness. Husserl sees that the transference occurs as a "stream of experience." This observation completes the analysis of his perception.

Closer examination reveals that the singular characteristics of Husserl's perception of a piece of paper also belong to other modes of consciousness. We are similarly aware of things in memory, imagination, expectation, and in various other ways. Husserl observes that in spite of all variations in modes of consciousness, "all that we have stated concerning perceptual experiences holds good, obviously of these other experiences, essentially different as they are." Therefore, the singling out, the figure on a background, the free turning of the look, the dormancy-wakefulness structure, and the stream of experience are essential structures of consciousness.

Further variations of consciousness establish that it is essentially connected to something. When Husserl turned towards something, singling it out from a background, he was aware of an object. "It belongs as a general
feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something." But when he was no longer actually aware of it, when it was present only in the background of something else he had turned towards, he was still conscious of the same thing; only then he was aware of it in a different way. Consciousness of an object survives variations from actual to non-actual modes of consciousness. Therefore consciousness is essentially related to an object. Husserl calls this property its intentional relationship.

Further descriptive efforts establish that the essential connections between perception and the object perceived is not yet clear enough to be followed up. Husserl asks what we mean when we say (as Descartes did) that perception and extended objects each have their own essence; he asks how they can be cognitively interwoven if they are different. And finally he asks whether perception and thinghood (as Berkeley asserted) share anything in common. Husserl tries three times to reply to his questions: first from the natural point of view, then as modern scientist; finally he succeeds when the application of brackets allows him to take the phenomenological standpoint. Presumably his success illustrates the possibility of, and the proper place for, the epokhe in phenomenological description.

Husserl tries to observe and describe the essence of perceptual intention while remaining in the natural standpoint. However, perception appears only to be an empty essenceless looking-towards an object full of properties with which it comes into contact in some astonishing way. The natural standpoint has earlier exhausted its material. There is nothing to be discovered about the intentional lity of consciousness from
this point of view. Its failure signals the need for a new approach.

Husserl tries to carry on the description from the viewpoint of modern science by distinguishing the object of perception from the object of physics. While the object of perception has sensible qualities and is essentially connected to consciousness in some mysterious way through them, the physical object is qualified by atomic elements, ions, energies, and space-filling processes which can be approached only by means of mathematical expressions. The perceived object in sensible space is only a sign of the true thing, the physical object. Likewise, perceivable space is to be distinguished from, and recognized as only a sign of, the mathematical space studied by modern physics.

The distinction, however, does not prove to be an illuminating one. The relationship between perception and its object remains mysterious. And now the real object is thought to be even more remote from perceptual consciousness. We are confronted by the additional problem of the relationship between the object of perception and the object of physics. And the question of the connection between pure mathematical reasoning and the physical object also remains unanswered.

Husserl seeks to win a deeper insight into the intentionality of consciousness through the technique of phenomenological reduction. Its possibility in the project of describing the awareness of objects soon becomes evident. The application of brackets means that:

we shut off the whole of physics and the whole domain of theoretical thought. We remain within the framework of plain intuition and the syntheses that belong to it, including perception. Although this passage stresses the elimination of the theoretical object
studied by modern physics, we should not allow its emphasis to overshadow the fact that all other theories of the object are also eliminated. Nor, apparently, can we address even the object of perception. Husserl says that we can only observe the framework of intuition and the syntheses that belong to it.

Although it seems that relation to an object cannot be described within these limits, this is precisely what Husserl does. He constructs a framework by rising and walking around the table at which he was seated. By keeping it steadily in view as he walks around it, he finds that his perception of the table never stops changing. It is a continuum of changing perceptions, or as he has said before, a stream of experience. Nevertheless he knew that the table remained the table:

Only the table is the same, known as identical through the synthetic consciousness which connects the new perception with the recollection.

Husserl's circular framework of intuition establishes the identity of the table through syntheses of perception and recollection. The same synthesis which produces a continuum of changing perceptions also produces awareness of an object which appears with ever increasing completeness. Since the table is known to be continuously the same while Husserl's perception continually changes, it must be something more than "idea in the mind."

Even if Berkeley was right to think that an object is nothing more than the sum of its sensible qualities, he was wrong to think that they are purely subjective. By extending the same careful description to the colour of the table, Husserl proves they are not.

The perceived thing in general, and all its parts, aspects, and phases, whether the quality be primary
or secondary, are necessarily transcendent to the perception, and on the same grounds everywhere. The colour of the thing seen is not in principle a real phase of the consciousness of colour; it appears, but even while it is appearing the appearance can and must be continually changing, as experience shows. The same colour appears in continuously varying patterns of perspective colour variations. Similarly for every sensory quality and every spatial shape. 32

Since the sensible properties of an object can also be known to remain the same while our perception of them varies, Berkeley was wrong to argue that sensible qualities are purely subjective.

Berkeley's argument that a perceived object grows or diminishes as an observer approaches or retreats from it exhibits a fundamental error in theory of perception. If we wanted to give it a name, we might call it the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival variations. Husserl explains very clearly the difference between the two:

We must keep this point clearly before our eyes, that the sensory data which exercise the function of presenting colour, smoothness, shape, and so forth perspectivally... differ wholly and in principle from colour, smoothness, shape... The perspective variation is an experience. But experience is possible only as experience, and not as something spatial. The perspected variable, however, is in principle possible only as spatial (it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not possible as experience. 33

Secondary or sensible qualities of an object belong to it, not to consciousness. Like the object they belong to, they are given in experience, but differ in principle from it. Failure to distinguish between them can only end in paradox and scepticism.

It is no less a fundamental error to suppose, as Descartes did,
that perception fails to come into contact with the thing itself. Husserl sheds some light on this fundamental error when he observes that perception of an object is not an image or a sign of its presence. We collapse into nonsense when we confuse these different modes of presentation. The perception of things does not present something that is not present. There is nothing (i.e., no sign vehicle) mediating consciousness and its object. We do not observe two things, a sign vehicle and its meaning. We are simply aware of an object, only one thing.

(iv) Husserl's Method

Husserl's description addresses itself to Berkeley's and Descartes' problem with no small measure of success. He has established (contra Berkeley) that experience and its object are essentially different, and (contra Descartes) that they are intentionally related.

Husserl's search for the essence of consciousness follows his theory of description fairly closely. But his use of brackets seems to repudiate his theory of reductions. Nor on the basis of what he has done can we say that the relationship which is supposed to hold between the reductive and descriptive projects has been completely verified.

Husserl says that consciousness is essentially related to an object. He took five steps to reach this conclusion. He reflected upon his perception of a piece of paper. He observed the perception in its pure singularity. Theoretically, its clarification and analysis are supposed to follow. First he analysed it, distinguishing several structural elements. After varying his modes of consciousness of the paper and discovering that the same structural elements persisted, he concluded that they belong to the essence of consciousness. The observation of essential connections required
a special effort. Husserl concluded that consciousness is essentially connected to an object only after observing that it persists throughout the various parts of a structure. Then he specified the synthetic nature of their connection. Lastly, and not without some rhetorical clumsiness, he recorded everything he saw.

His apparent use of brackets fails to correspond with his theory of bracketing. Theoretically, there are philosophical, eidetic, and phenomenological reductions; and they should be applied in the order demanded by the principle of principles.

Closer examination of Husserl's method reveals that although he mentioned only the phenomenological reduction by name, he seemed to use the other two as well. Their use, however, does not follow the order prescribed by his theory. First he seemed to make use of the eidetic reduction. He reflected upon his perception of a piece of paper in its pure singularity. But his analysis of that pure conscious event is expressed in general terms which could apply equally well to other modes of consciousness. His description does not have special reference to the unique historical event of Husserl perceiving a piece of paper. Since special reference to the individual is precisely what is eliminated by the eidetic reduction, we must conclude from this that Husserl has covertly made use of it.

Secondly, the phenomenological epokhe mentioned and used just before Husserl's final descriptive effort conceals two separate reductions. He used it to eliminate all metaphysical theories about the object of perception and its properties. Earlier in Ideas I he gave the name "philosophical reduction" to this usage. After refusing to address any
theories of the object, he also refused to address the intentional object. Instead he proposed to describe only the framework of his intuitions of it. The latter refusal is an instance of phenomenological bracketing. So it appears that, all three reductions have been used, they were not applied in the order theoretically prescribed.

Furthermore, Husserl's last reduction bears a disquieting resemblance to an operation which occurs at the very beginning of his project. After distinguishing his perception of a paper from the paper he perceived, he excluded the paper from further consideration. Are we not bound to consider this also as an application of phenomenological brackets? If so, then the theoretical order of the brackets has been completely reversed, the phenomenological one being used first, the eidetic next, followed by the philosophical, and then the phenomenological brackets again.

Theoretically, the application of brackets should precede phenomenological description. Contrary to theory, Husserl claims to have made a series of observations without troubling himself with the phenomenological epokhe. How can theory and practice be reconciled? The principle of all principles directs the phenomenologist not to speculate about the unseen, but only to describe what he has observed. Since this law should be applied to every step in Husserl's descriptive procedure, we have good reason to think each of his observations is preceded by a reduction of some sort.

In spite of his claim to the contrary, he does seem to apply brackets before each observation. But observations and brackets are not coupled in the way that Husserl's theory of method leads us to believe that they should. Husserl's exclusive preoccupation with the pure conscious event
of his perception presupposes the exclusion of the thing perceived. His earliest observation must have been preceded by a phenomenological reduction, not the philosophical one his theory seems to require.

Secondly, the analysis of his purely singular act of perception is expressed in general terms which apply equally well to other modes of consciousness. Furthermore, even when applied to perception, they do not have special reference to the unique historical event of Husserl perceiving the paper. Since the eidetic reduction eliminates special reference to the individual, it is safe to conclude that Husserl's analysis presupposes it.

Theoretically, the eidetic reduction is supposed to precede and make possible the intuition of essences. But actually, it has preceded and made possible the analysis of a perception, albeit in general terms. Its analysed elements are recognized as essential to consciousness only after surviving variations in its modes. If the eidetic brackets have made the intuition of essences possible, it is the variation in modes of consciousness which made it possible for them to be recognized as such.

Finally Husserl is able to follow up the essential connection between consciousness and its object only after performing philosophical and phenomenological reductions. Although the situation seems to call for the suspension of essences not essentially related to each other, Husserl's theory of method supplies no such thing. Nor does he use it here. His use of the philosophical and phenomenological brackets is eminently successful, but no reason for, or justification of this usage is offered.

Husserl's theory of phenomenological description accurately outlines his descriptive method. The relationship which is theoretically supposed
to hold between the descriptive and reductive projects has garnered less supporting evidence. Finally his theory of reductions seems almost to be repudiated by his use of brackets. However, it may yet be redeemed in other phenomenological investigations.

(2) The world of Objects

given Husserl's doctrine of the object, the problem of the world is a problem which he must face. If we want to know the essence of an object, that which will tell us what an object of perception is, Husserl says that we must describe it exactly as it is given to consciousness. One of its essential features, as we have seen, is to be found amongst other objects. No object of perception is an object simpliciter: it is never simply given by itself. Every object that we can perceive is an object in the world. If Husserl is to make us understand what he means by an object perceived to be in the world, he must tell us what he means by world or "background". So if the problem of the world goes unanswered, his earlier philosophical endeavours in Ideas I will remain incomplete.

The problem of the world, however, is not a special problem for the phenomenologist alone. It is a universal philosophical problem, albeit one which should hold a special interest for a philosopher of science. Such a man is Alfred North Whitehead, whose exegesis of Husserl's problem establishes it as something more than a problem which must be faced simply because one chooses to take the phenomenological approach in philosophy.

(1) Whitehead on the problem.

Whitehead begins by pointing out the inevitability of the problem. To live in a world we must try to understand it and communicate our
understanding to others. Each succeeding generation discovers that former views of nature were mistaken. The passage of time throws a doubt on all laws of nature.

Nevertheless, most people cling to the fundamental view of nature from which these divergent laws arise. Nature, first of all, is characterized as the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory experiences, visual, auditory and tactile. What we clearly and distinctly see are material objects supporting "various qualifications such as shape, locomotion, colour, or smell, etc." These material objects are connected purely through spatial relations like being next to, a long distance from, or actually contacting, and so forth. Natural events are changes of the qualities of objects, or changes in their spatial relations.

This is the grand doctrine of Nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless complex of facts. It is the doctrine of the autonomy of physical science.

This view of nature is consonant with common sense, and can be verified at any moment of our existence. Yet modern thought has been forced to abandon every one of these notions while retaining the idea that scientific views of nature are autonomous. The result, Whitehead says, is a complete muddle in scientific thought.

The first tenet of our common sense view of nature to be abandoned by modern science is the belief that natural objects have sensible qualities like colour, sound, and scent. Since Galileo (1514-1602) distinguished the sensible from the mathematical properties of an object, and designated the latter as the proper subject for scientific investigation, physics has concerned itself only with the quantitative aspects of nature.
qualities of natural objects are no longer regarded as a part of the world, as Whitehead says, they are thought to be the mental reactions of the percipient to internal bodily motions. The conclusion that Whitehead draws from this change in viewpoint is that "sense perception, for all its practical importance, is very superficial in its disclosure of the nature of things." The notion that physical objects exhibit only spatial relationships is another common sense belief that has been abandoned by the sciences. Sir Robert Boyle's (1627-1691) theories of motion and magnetism accounted for these phenomena by postulating a medium for their transmission. Transmission theories of light and sound also demand a medium for their waves and particles. So, in spite of its empty appearance, space was supposed to be occupied by subtle kinds of matter called ether. The modern physicist regards the world as a plenum, a field of force and activity whose energy and actions can be expressed in mathematical formulae. A corollary of the new view is the elimination of physical objects. If there is no empty space, then there are no distinct material things supporting the mathematical properties which the physicist tries to discover. The whole world is full of material which is usually rarified, but can be exceptionally dense in some places. The so-called material objects we perceive, on this theory, are merely "knots in the ether", or exceptional places where matter is more dense than usual. The physicist is now able to explain the interconnectedness of more natural events. But he has done so at the expense of contradicting our most fundamental common sense ideas about nature. Physical sciences contradicts the evidence of our senses. This contradiction leads Whitehead to point out what he thinks
is "the extreme superficiality of the broad generalizations which mankind acquires on the basis of sense perception." 50

The muddle in scientific thought of which Whitehead speaks occurs for two reasons: the scientist has retained the doctrine of the autonomy of the sciences; and he can no longer verify scientific theories at any given moment of his existence. The doctrines of modern science have ceased to be consonant with common sense. The man in the streets "sees" that nature is the sum-total of material objects which have perceivable qualities and exhibit spatial relations amongst themselves. Modern theories of physics, on the other hand, compel us to say that the world is an imperceptible process, a complex of activity which exhibits constant patterns that are mathematically describable. 51

If we should demand proof that the common sense notion of the world is the correct one, it seems that we need look no farther than what we have immediately before us. The common sense idea of the world appears to be true because we seem to see a world which corresponds exactly to the idea that we have of it. Here we are appealing to something like a correspondence criterion for determining truth. We know that ideas are true when they describe exactly what we see.

Physical theories of the world, of course, can make no such appeal. As Whitehead correctly points out, since physics and common sense have parted company, scientific theories cannot claim to be verifiable at any given moment of our experience. Yet the scientific world view retains its autonomy for other reasons. The scientist has had great success in predicting and even controlling the course of nature. Current scientific ideas appeal to us because they work. We say that they are true because they are useful.
The same pragmatic criterion will lead us to say that they are false when we find other ones that work better. This is why succeeding generations of scientists say that the world views of their predecessors were mistaken.

We have two competing notions of the world then: an unchanging natural one, and a varying scientific one. They seem to be drifting farther and farther apart with the development of modern science. Each of them appeals to a different standard to verify its truthfulness. And both satisfy the demands of their respective criteria. There seems to be no theory or common standard that can be used to mediate or to choose between them. So long as we remain within the domain of theory, we can only wonder how such a choice can be made, and wonder further if it is not a choice that can be avoided.

(ii) Husserl's solution

Husserl, I maintain, is addressing a genuine philosophical problem of no small importance in the third and fifth chapters of *Ideas I*, where he sets out to discover the "shifting but ever-present horizon through which the world-thesis receives its essential meaning." Important though the problem is in itself, we must not lose sight of our methodological concern.

Husserl always has it in mind:

We should remark in conclusion that the generality with which we have stated these last reflections concerning the constituting of the natural world in absolute consciousness should give no offence... our aim has not been to provide a detailed theory of such transcendental constituting... What is essential for our purpose is to see upon evidence that the phenomenological reduction... is possible... and that when carried out, the absolute or pure transcendental consciousness is left over as residuum...

Here Husserl explicitly states that his main concern in treating this
problem is a methodological one. He offers only the bare outline of a solution because he wants more than anything else to demonstrate what it means to bracket something. Careful observation should also tell us whether his method corresponds with his methodology.

Husserl finds that science and common sense offer us only derivative ideas about nature. In chapter three (The Thesis of the Natural Standpoint and Its Suspension), he proposes to make clear to us what we mean by saying that we look at the world "from the natural standpoint" or in a common sense way. It should then also be clear what he means by suspending the natural viewpoint. In the same chapter he scrutinizes the scientific viewpoint, by examining the world of mathematics.

In Chapter five (The Region of Pure Consciousness), he tries to point out the logical possibility, "but real absurdity" of a (mathematical) world outside our own. Finally he tries to determine what kind of meaning we can give on phenomenological grounds to the statement that there is a world.

Genuine phenomenological description, according to Husserl's theory, becomes possible only after a reduction has directed our attention to what should be observed. However, in this case, before the application of brackets, Husserl tries to show how the world presents itself to us when we look at it from the natural standpoint; he outlines the backgrounds on which perceived and intuited objects appear; and he tries to describe the essential connections which hold amongst the world, the intuitive background, and the field of perception. How can we reconcile this practice with his theory of method?

Husserl says that from the natural standpoint we are aware of a world
without spatial or temporal limit. At first glance this seems to be a bald
statement that we live in an infinite world. But his subsequent analyses reveal
that this is not what he meant. Experience tells us that this world is
inhabited by individuals -- corporeal things, animals and people. Every
object of knowledge presents itself as a figure on a background of
perception. "What is actually perceived... is partly pervaded, partly
girded about with a dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate
reality." This indeterminate background or perceptual field is very
limited.

But we can transcend its limits. Husserl observes that "he can... let
his attention wander through unseen portions of his room behind his back, to
the veranda, the garden, and children outdoors." As he successively directs
his attention to each of these things, it presents itself as an object on
the intuitive background of the others. This gradually constituted field
of intuition can form "a continuous ring around the actual field of
perception." The field of intuitive presence, although larger than that
of perception, is limited by one's intuitive and retentive powers.

It still remains to be explained what Husserl means by saying that we are
aware of a world without spatial limit. The clue to this explanation can be
found in Husserl's notion of the intuitive field, According to him, the
field of intuitive presence is composed not only of formerly intuited objects,
but also all those things to which we have not yet directed our attention.

Husserl says that objects, animals and men

are present in my field of intuition even when I
pay them no attention... For me real objects are
there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing
with what is actually perceived without being
themselves perceived or even intuitively present.
At this point Husserl is plainly suggesting that our common sense notion of the world is not a constitutive concept, the sum-total of material objects, etc., is a "misty horizon that can never be completely outlined". 

It is the horizon from which things appear when we become aware of them. What can Husserl mean by saying that we are naturally aware of a world without any spatial limits? What more than that we are aware of our cognitive limitations? Every single thing that we know has been selected from the sum-total of all things. Ultimately it stands out from this background, but it appears to us on a background which is limited by our cognitive powers. And yet no one mistakes the limits of this background for the end of the world. 

We use our common sense notion of the world to regulate the constitutive process we call knowledge. By directing our attention to several different objects, we can constitute a picture of them all. We "see" that the world is something more than what we know after any given amount of cognition. This "something more" points always toward the ideal of knowing all things, an ideal which is impossible to realize completely, but necessary for the advancement of knowledge. 

It belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint to think that the world, or sum-total of objects is "out there", waiting to be discovered. 

All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint. "The" world is... always there; at the most it is at odd points "other" than I supposed... but the "it" remains ever in the senses of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there. 

We may be mistaken now and then about one thing or another, but our faith that the world is "out there" remains unshaken. This natural attitude is the source of our common sense notion of the world.
we are now in a position to understand what Husserl means by a suspension of the natural attitude. He means precisely to "suspend" our belief that the sum-total of all objects is out there. This "suspension" of belief, however, does not require us to believe that the world does not exist. As Husserl says of the suspension:

It is not a transformation of the thesis into its antithesis; it is also not a transformation into... indecision...doubt,... Rather it is something quite unique. We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no changes in our conviction.64

Odd though it may sound, Husserl is suggesting that we can "suspend" our common sense notion of the world without changing our conviction that it exists.

How can such a thing be possible? Although the procedure seems to be self-contradictory, a closer examination reveals that it is not. Husserl merely means to suggest that we can retain our belief as long as we leave it unexpressed during phenomenological investigation:

this entire natural world therefore which is continually "there for us", "present to our hand" and will ever remain there, is a "fact-world" of which we will continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it into rackets.

... I do not then deny the world as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the "phenomenological" epoke which bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence.65

The phenomenological suspension is unlike the eristical argument a sophist might use to make it appear that there is and is not a world out there. Nor is it like the denial of the sceptic who disbelieves that there is a world. As long as the natural attitude is supposed to be suspended, the phenomenologist simply refrains from expressing any opinion at all about the sum-total of individual things, or any individual thereof. However, it remains for
Husserl to show that there is anything left to talk about. What else has existence besides individuals?

Husserl postpones this question until he has scrutinized the scientific worldview. This he does in two stages. First he refers to the "ideal worlds" about him. Then he undertakes to show the logical possibility but real absurdity of a mathematical "world" outside our own.

Husserl's investigation of the ideal worlds about him is an attempt to articulate in phenomenological terms the world view of modern science; he tries to show how the world of arithmetic presents itself; he shows that it is much like our world of common sense. But in the end he is forced to admit that the world views of common sense and science cannot be reconciled on phenomenological grounds.

Modern science would have us believe that the world is an imperceptible process exhibiting mathematical patterns. The ideal world of mathematics manifests itself when we are occupied with numbers. In a way it is much like the world of perception. Each number stands out from the background of those we have been paying attention to. The focus of our vision is surrounded by the sum-total of all number combinations, a mathematical horizon which is partly defined, and partly not, but obviously there.

There is, however, one important difference. The natural world is always present in the background of consciousness. On the other hand, the world of arithmetic is present only so long as we busy ourselves with numbers. When we cease mathematical operations, the world of numbers is suspended, while the natural world remains.

There seems not to be any connection between them. The natural world and the world of mathematics may present themselves to us together, but they
are not one and the same. 70

A phenomenological investigation has failed to reconcile the two
competitive world views. 71 The only alternative is to disregard them and
search for a more basic one which undercuts their dichotomy. Circumstances
would seem to call for a straightforward procedure; Husserl has suspended the
natural viewpoint; and the mathematical one has suspended itself. But in
spite of the transitory nature of its mathematical "world", modern science
would have us believe that nature is an imperceptible process exhibiting
mathematical patterns. So Husserl is compelled to show the "real absurdity"
of the idea of a world existing outside the one we perceive. Only
afterwards can he produce a recognizably better idea.

Husserl says there is no formal contradiction in supposing that there
exists a "Real Something" outside the world we perceive. 72 But if we should
ask what kind of evidence is needed to establish the truth of the supposition,
there can be only one answer: it must be established on the basis of what
we can experience. 73 If the hypothesis of a world outside our own is
contradicted by this evidence, then it is nonsensical and cannot be made.

Experience tells us that there is no mathematical world out there.
Husserl has already shown us that it can offer no evidence of an abiding world
of pure numbers. Nor can it be argued that the perceived and the
mathematical "worlds" are integrated. We do perceive things quantitatively.
But the vague quantities—like smaller or larger, higher or lower, nearer
or farther—which pervade our fields of experience do not correspond to the
refined notions the modern scientist uses. Since the scientific notion of a
mathematical world is contradicted by our experience, it is "really nonsense",
it is a supposition which cannot be made despite its usefulness. 74
The supposition that objects exist "outside" the world of perception is fundamentally mistaken. The realism of Descartes and of modern science is the product of the same fallacy that produced Berkeley's idealism. Berkeley believed that an object of perception grows or diminishes as its observer approaches or retreats from it because he confused his perception with the object perceived. They varied while the object did not. Berkeley committed the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival variations. Similarly, Husserl says, realism confuses the objects of perception with the absolute experiences which constitute them when the objects of perception are thought to be perceptions themselves, it becomes necessary to posit a world of objects "beyond" the world of perception.

With the elimination of the scientific world view, it becomes possible for Husserl to propose a more basic one. This he does in two steps. After noticing that there is a horizon through which the world-thesis receives its essential meaning, he examines this horizon. Then he proposes to tell us what kind of meaning can be ascribed to the term "world" on its grounds.

Besides the sum-total of all perceivable objects and all possible number combinations, we know that there exists also our consciousness of them. Husserl suggests that consciousness would persist even if the world did not.

What does it mean to say that we are aware of the world from a phenomenological standpoint? It means we know that our experience exhibits certain coherent patterns. By restricting our attention to the fields of consciousness and the objects constituted therein, we find that we can speak of a world because those things are "put together" harmoniously. Husserl says that when we bracket our common sense notion of the world, we admit:
it is conceivable that our experiencing function
swarms with oppositions that cannot be evened
out... that the things it puts together should
persist harmoniously..., and that its connectedness...,
---that a world, in short, exists no longer.78

Our experience exhibits coherence, harmony, and connectedness. Through them
we come to be aware of the world. Without them, it could not be said to exist.

This horizon through which we become aware of the world directs Husserl
towards something that is more fundamental than the totality of existent
things. The perception of a totality of things is possible only if they can
be seen to co-exist harmoniously. The epistemological priority of such a
harmony prompts Husserl to say that:

Reality and world, here used are just the titles for
certain valid unities of meaning, namely, unities of
meaning related to certain organizations of pure
absolute consciousness which dispense meaning and
show forth its validity in certain essentially fixed,
specific ways.
... the whole being of the world consists in a certain
"meaning" which presupposes absolute consciousness
as the field from which its meaning is derived.79

Husserl uses the term "meaning" to refer to the harmonious experience which
occurs when we turn our attention from an object to single another out from its background.80 The notion of the world as the harmoniously constituted
appearance of things, therefore, is more fundamental than any regulative
notion of a totality, whether it be a totality of numbers, or of perceivable
things. Both views presuppose that members of each totality can be harmon-
iously constituted. An object perceived to be in the world is one which can
be selected from the background of another object, and perceived to exist
harmoniously with it.

(iv) Husserl's Method.

Husserl's description of things harmoniously putting themselves together
addresses Whitehead's problem fairly successfully. He has established (against common sense) that there cannot be a totality of perceivable things that does not put itself together harmoniously, and (against modern physics) that the idea of a purely mathematical world is really absurd.

Again, Husserl's method of treating the problem corresponds roughly to his methodology. His theory of description is verified once more. But in spite of our hopes to the contrary, his use of brackets does not completely illustrate his theory of reductions. Nor does it clarify the relationship between descriptive and reductive projects.

Husserl describes the world as the "meaning", or harmonious persistence of objects. He took five steps to reach this conclusion. First, he observed that the world is composed of individuals. He clarified his awareness of the world by observing objects in front of him, and by thinking of others behind his back. He analysed his awareness of the world by distinguishing his perception of those in front of him from his intuition of those behind him. After perceiving and intuiting a variety of the individuals that compose the world, he found that his awareness of all of them retained the structure of a figure on a background. Because of its persistence, it is thought to be essential to our awareness of it. Finally, he noticed that things known to exist together, composing the world, are essentially connected. They put themselves together harmoniously in his field of attention as he turned from one object to another. Finally he is able to say what he thinks the world is. Although his description could have been more straightforward, it follows the general lines indicated by his theory.

The suspension of the natural viewpoint contributes little to Husserl's theory of reduction. Although his methodology distinguishes philosophical,
eidetic, and phenomenological reductions, and suggests that they should be applied consecutively, husserl's suspension of the natural viewpoint displays characteristics of all three of them. It eliminates the common sense theory that the world is the sum total of individuals, as a philosophical reduction should. Like an eidetic reduction, it tells us that the existence of individuals can be ignored. And like a phenomenological reduction, it bars us from using judgments about a spatio-temporality. Only one interpretation can restore a semblance of theoretical order to Husserl's procedure. We cannot suppose that the suspensions were meant to be used one after the other. They must be interpreted as three different aspects of the same technique. This interpretation, of course, is very generous to Husserl.

But speculation such as this is very damaging to the relationship which is supposed to hold between descriptive and reductive projects in Husserl's theory of method. Brackets are supposed to direct the phenomenologist to something which can be observed and described. The principle of all principles leads us to believe that each step in the phenomenological description should be preceded by a reduction of some sort. Actually, this time it holds true only of Husserl's observation of essential connections between objects harmoniously constituting the world. It seems to be preceded, not by one, but by three of them.

Husserl's theory of reductions, as well as the theoretical relationship between phenomenological projects, must be verified elsewhere. On the whole, Husserl's method has proven to be much less well organized than his theory of method and scientific ideal would lead us to believe.

(3) Other People in the World.

We perceive that the world is composed of individuals--objects, animals,
Husserl identified the world with their harmonious composition. We can turn our attention from one individual to another in an unbroken stream of consciousness. The unbroken stream is possible because the two "put themselves together" harmoniously. Husserl calls their harmony a meaning. Individuals have meaning for a perceiver. If the world of the perceiver were a world of inanimate objects only, Husserl's thumbnail sketch would be complete.

But the world is also a world of animate things—of animals and people. It is part of the "meaning" of my world that other people should "put themselves together" in it, and that it should "put itself together" for them. Until Husserl can explain how we know that other people in the world exist, his world-view is incomplete.

As a final test of Husserl's phenomenological method, I propose to examine the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations where he tries to add to his world-view by explaining how we know that other people in the world exist. The problem is especially interesting for two reason. The first of these is that the problem and Husserl's method of dealing with philosophical problems seem to be incommensurable. While the other person exists ambiguously, being at the same time a perceiving subject and an object of perception, Husserl's first principle of method demands that only the giving of objects to consciousness should be described. Can we know another person as a perceiving subject? If so, can the phenomenon of knowing another person as perceiving subject be described? These and other related questions attest to the fundamental importance of the problem in Husserl's philosophy.

Husserl's treatment of the problem is also intrinsically interesting
because it is so difficult to interpret. On the one hand, it has been claimed that Husserl's treatment of the problem is very much like John Stuart Mill's (1800-1873). According to Mill, no one directly perceives another person as subject: the existence of another subject is deduced from the behavior of a body which resembles the perceiver's own. On the other hand, Husserl's work on the problem in Ideas 2 has been compared to Edith Stein's (1891-1942). Since she claimed that we perceive other people as subjects by empathizing with them and since Husserl believed that empathy gives us knowledge of other people, it is difficult to reconcile Ideas 2 where he justifies his belief with the fifth cartesian meditation. Why should we infer the existence of something we can directly perceive? Does Husserl really resort to inference in the fifth cartesian meditation? To answer these questions, I propose to examine Mill's, Stein's and then Husserl's treatment of the problem.

(i) John Stuart Mill on the problem.

John Stuart Mill examined Sir William Hamilton's philosophy with the purpose of trying to ascertain what evidence it has to offer for the existence of other people. According to Hamilton, the self is nothing but a series of feelings, and the mind is either the actual succession of feeling or its mere possibility. So Mill finds that for Hamilton, self and mind are practically the same thing.

What evidence can Hamilton offer for the existence of other people while he holds this doctrine of the self? Mill finds that Hamilton's doctrine of the self allows only one kind of evidence for the existence of other people. His manner of posing the problem is particularly important because it points towards a particular kind of solution, one which has been adopted
by many modern philosophers. Mill asks:

By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or, in other words, possess minds? The most strenuous Intuitionist does not include this among the things that I know by direct intuition. I conclude it from certain things, which my experiences of my own states of feeling proves to me to be marks of it.87

The problem of knowing other people, for Hamilton, for Mill, and for their modern successors is the problem of knowing other minds.

Furthermore, Mill construes mind in a way that makes direct knowledge of other minds impossible: a mind is only a series of states of feeling. While one mind may think or feel similarly about the same thing as another, neither can have the thought or feeling that the other has. What would it be like for you to think my thoughts or for me to feel your feelings? Such an idea does violence to the notion of two separate minds. Mill claims that we are not directly aware of other minds and, therefore, are not directly aware of other people. We can see only "marks" or signs of their existence.

Mill's experience of his own states of feeling provide him with two signs of the existence of others. He perceives that his own subjective feelings always occur in the middle of a series of events which begins with the modification of his body and ends with bodily behavior. Suppose, for example, that someone is sitting awkwardly in a chair. This modification of his body causes him to feel uncomfortable. Because of his discomfort, he assumes a different position. Mill would say that feelings of discomfort are private, but the awkward position of one's body and the assumption of another position are publicly observable. Mill believes that other people have feelings because they have bodies like his and they act as he does.
The bodies of others and their bodily activity, the antecedents and consequences of private feelings, are publicly observable.

Mill claims he can prove inductively the existence of other people on the basis of these two observations. In his own case, Mill thinks he can see a series of causes: modifications of body cause subjective feelings which cause bodily activity. In the case of other people, he only claims to see the first and last in the series. Inductive inferences establishes that the series he cannot see are exactly like the ones he can. Other people look and act like him. For an exact likeness it is necessary that they should also have feelings like his. Therefore, Mill thinks that the bodies of others and their bodily behavior indicate the presence of subjective feelings in others. This proof, he claims, is at least certain as laws of physics which rest on the foundation of inductive inference.

According to Mill, the possession of subjective feelings is the same thing as having a mind which is the same thing as having a self. Therefore, Mill thinks he has evidence sufficient to prove that other people exist even though he does not think that he can see them.

(ii) Edith Stein on the problem.

Mill thought that the most strenuous intuitionist would never claim to have immediate knowledge of other people's feelings. This is precisely what Edith Stein claims we have. She says that the world in which we live is not only a world of physical bodies, but also of experiencing subjects external to us, whose experiences we know. Although we are sometimes mistaken or deceived, we can usually grasp the feelings of other people. She designates the acts in which foreign experience is grasped as acts of empathy, and she makes it her task to observe and describe acts of empathy.
in their greatest essential generality. 91

The essence of empathy is compared with those of other acts of consciousness. Miss Stein frames the example of a friend who tells her he has lost his brother. She becomes aware of his pain. The important thing is not to know how she arrived at this awareness, but what it itself is. 92

It cannot be an outer perception because pain is not a spatial object. Nevertheless, empathy resembles outer perception in that it presents an object here and now, though one of a different kind. 93 In this respect it is also like seeing a geometrical axiom, holding a value, 94 or reflecting upon something. Each of these acts present its own kind of object. Empathy is the awareness of an object of a particular kind, namely the experiences of other people.

Edith Stein's description of empathy seems not to prove that we are directly acquainted with other people as subjects. Other people exist ambivalently, being at the same time perceiving subjects and objects of perception. The pain of Edith Stein's friend seems to have been given her as an object of consciousness. It remains unclear how she can know him empathically as a perceiving subject.

Further observations reveals that the experience of empathy has three grades or modes of accomplishment. Edith Stein confesses that when the experience of another, for example the sadness of her friend, first arises before her, it faces her as an intentional object. 95 When she tries to clarify the feeling of sadness, she imagines herself in her friend's situation turned towards the thing that made him sad. The fulfilled meaning of sadness then becomes clear to her and she has knowledge of her friend as a subject. 96

After an imaginative moment, the fulfillment of feeling can also be made in
Edith Stein thinks that we can know another person, not only as an object, but also as a subject. In either case she finds it difficult to see how anyone could advocate the view that we see nothing around us but physical soulless and lifeless bodies.

(iii) Husserl's solution of the problem.

Husserl approaches the problem of other people as though it were an objection against the phenomenological method of philosophizing, or to be more specific, against the phenomenological epokhe. The epokhe reduces a living person like Edmund Husserl to the status of an impersonal ego. If the phenomenological reduction must precede all genuinely phenomenological philosophy, then its proper field of study is the transcendental ego and its conscious life. Other people are not merely part of an impersonal ego's consciousness. A part of one's consciousness does not account for another's otherness or for his personality. It seems that phenomenological method cannot do justice to the existence of other people.

Husserl responds to this objection by showing that the phenomenological reduction is necessary for a fundamental understanding of human relationships: he reduces his existence to that of a transcendental ego; he observes it, its essential relationship to an alter ego, and their essential connection with the world in which all people live (Lebenswelt). His description uncovers the most essential structure of any person's awareness of another. Its procedure suggests that instead of preventing an understanding of interpersonal relationships, the epokhe is required to make it possible. He claims to have refuted the claim that phenomenology must be solipsistic.
as objects in the world and at the same time as subjects who experience the same world what he does. He also knows that they are aware of him in the same way. He exists, and other people exist in the same objective world, yet each person has his own private experiences. Husserl wants to understand his existence in a world of other people.

After applying the epokhe, Husserl can no longer differentiate himself from and contrast himself with others. For descriptive purpose, he is no longer the usual I, this man Edmund Husserl. He is an essentially epistemological subject. The same holds true of other people. The reduction abstracts an essential structure from the concrete relationships which he as a person has with other people. It eliminates methodological concern for individuals and makes it possible for him to concentrate on essential structures in which the knowing subject lives his life.

To characterize the ego's own essential sphere, Husserl performs another epokhe which is even more abstract than the phenomenological one. The other knowing subjects to which Husserl's ego is essentially related are removed from further consideration. Their living being, their cultural predicates, and their characteristic of belonging to the world of the ego are removed. The world of the transcendental ego is no longer a world perceived by them. At this point Husserl parts company with Edith Stein. His procedure suggests that in his eyes, empathic experience is not the ultimate foundation of our experience of other people. Husserl seems to be searching for the foundation which makes acts of empathy possible.

After the extra reduction, Husserl still finds it possible to experience something. There remains a "substratum" of the world more basic than that which puts itself together for all knowing subjects, namely that which puts
itself together for all knowing subjects, namely that which puts itself
together for only one of them.\footnote{108} The psychic life of the ego with all its
actual and possible experiences is completely unaffected by the brackets.\footnote{109}
It remains for Husserl to show that our experience of other people and an
objective world rest on this foundation.

His transcendental ego perceives not only other objects but also its own
identity.\footnote{110} It belongs to the concrete essence of the ego to be made
an object in his own world. The transcendental ego is given to himself in
perception as an object. His body stands out from all other objects because
only in it do consciousness and its object coincide. The animated body
is a subject which is kinesthetically aware of itself as a moving thing.\footnote{111}
But perception is given with temporal horizons. It gives awareness only of
events which occur in the living present.

For this reason, the essence of the ego is experienced mostly in acts of
consciousness which are not perceptions.\footnote{112} The ego, past and future, is not
livingly present. Yet the ego retains its identity through time. Recollection
and anticipation appresent the ego’s past and future so that it may be
identified with his living presence. The ego which existed in the past
is the one which exists now and will continue to exist in the future. The
identity of the ego depends upon acts of consciousness which render
something else present besides the object of perception. Husserl says
that these acts are appresentative.\footnote{113}

The transcendental ego is essentially a body-subject. It has the
essential structure of a figure on a background, standing out as an
animated body which is kinesthetically aware of itself as a moving object.

With the passage of time, it retains its identity through acts of appresent-
Husserl begins to outline the essence of interpersonal relationships by asking us to imagine that another person enters the perceptual sphere of the ego.\textsuperscript{114} The reduced or essential significance of this event is that a body appears. The perceived body has two essential characteristics: it is a part of the ego's world of experience; and it resembles another object in that world—the ego's own body. The latter of these two properties in the foundation of interpersonal relationships.

Husserl says that only a similarity connecting that body over there with the ego's body can serve as the basis for identifying that body as another person.\textsuperscript{115} Their similarity makes them a pair, two members of a kind. They belong to a plurality of distinct but similar objects.\textsuperscript{116} The membership of individuals in groups like this one is a universal phenomenon of the transcendental sphere. Membership in the same group allows one individual to be understood in terms of another. As Husserl says, in members of a group we find "an overlaying of each with the sense of the other."\textsuperscript{117} When a body with determinations similar to his is paired with it as a member of the same group, it appropriates in virtue of its membership the sense of a living, moving organism.\textsuperscript{118} The body of the ego and the body of the other are essentially related on the basis of their similar determinations.

Because of the similar determinations of the two bodies, there is an essential relationship "overlaying" them. The body of the other is intended as a member of the class of living, moving things. Its membership is verified by "its changing but incessantly harmonious behavior."\textsuperscript{119}

The essential connection between the two bodies does not yet provide
us with the foundation of our knowledge of other people. The other person exists ambivalently, being at the same time a perceiving subject and the object of a perception, while Husserl's transcendental ego seems to know the other only as an object. To prove that this knowledge is the foundation of our knowledge of other people, he must explain how, on its basis, the other is apperceived as a subject who is a perceiver.

The key to the problem of knowing another subjectively is Husserl's idea of the body-subject. Every living, moving body is kinesthetically aware of itself. No matter where it moves, the body-subject always perceives itself "Here" in the centre of its reduced world. The other is always perceived "Over There." Nevertheless, the transcendental ego can vary its position to that of the other. Furthermore, he can freely imagine what the objects in his world look like from the other side without actually going there. It is possible to know the far side of things without actually moving over there because the front of any object of perception apperresents a rear aspect and prescribes a determination to it. Husserl claims to know the other ego, not merely as a perceived object like himself, but as an apperceived subject having the same structure of experience he should have if he were to go over there and be where he is. At this point Husserl has dissociated himself from Mill. Apperception is not an inference or even a reflective act.

The transcendental ego and any other are essentially related as subjects who perceive the same things in the same way from any given position. On the basis of this relationship we are supposed to know one another as people living in the same world. But Husserl can say that his transcendental ego and any other exist in the same world only if he can show how the same
object can be perceived by both of them.

Again, the key to the problem is Husserl's notion of the body-subject. Husserl states the problem of knowing the same object in terms of the body of the other. He asks how we can say that the body which appears "Over There" to him is the same one which appears "Here" for the other subject. The problem, he suggests, is essentially the same as the problem of the identity of the transcendental ego which moves here and there as time passes. It is proven to be the same by acts of appresentation. Similarly, the body of the other, perceived to be "Over There" by the ego, is appresented to the ego as the body "Here" for the other. When both sides of an object are presented in the same stream of consciousness, they can be identified as belonging to the same object. The same holds true of any other object. Another's experience of it can be appresented to the transcendental ego is the same way.

In this manner, a social reality and all its cultural objects are given to different subjects existing in the same world. The ultimate cultural products of these appresentations are the personalities of the two subjects related to each other. The world of other people integrates the physical world and the world of culture. Husserl calls it the world of life (Lebenswelt).

The fifth of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations proves that the reductions are indispensible for an understanding of the foundation of interpersonal relationships. To put the matter a little differently, it would be a mistake to think of Husserl's later Lebenswelt philosophy as a repudiation of his earlier work. It would also be wrong to look at them as discontinuous projects. Transcendental egology and the philosophy of Lebenswelt ultimately are integral parts of a single plan. Husserl's
own words speak eloquently of his singleness of purpose:

For the present it must suffice that we have indicated these problems of a higher level as problems of constitution and thereby made it understandable that, with the systematic progress of transcendental-phenomenological explication of the apodictic ego, the transcendental sense of the world must also become disclosed to us ultimately in the full concreteness with which it is incessantly the life-world of all of us.124

(iv) Husserl's Method

Husserl's approach to the problem of the foundation of knowledge of other people has led him beyond the "solutions" offered by John Stuart Mill and Edith Stein. For Mill, the problem of knowing the existence of other people is the problem of knowing other minds. He thinks that we know the existence of other minds, not intuitively, but by inferring it from the similar behavior of the bodies of others and our own. Husserl, on the other hand, does not reduce the problem of knowing other people to the problem of knowing other minds. He recognizes that knowledge of the other person's body and bodily behavior are an essential part of our knowledge of others. According to Husserl, we have intuitive knowledge of the existence of other minds. The body of the other appresents itself as a subject having the same experiences we would have if we stood over there where he is.

Edith Stein, like Husserl, claims that we have intuitive knowledge of other people. Like Husserl she claims that we know another person as an object and as a subject. But like Mill, she seems to identify knowledge of other people with knowledge of their minds. Empathy is the name she gives to the intuitive awareness of other people's experiences. She says that we can know the experiences of others as objects, or in a subjective way. The pain
of a friend, for example, can be given as an object of consciousness when
we turn towards the cause of his sadness, we can appropriate subjectively.
Husserl would likely agree with Edith Stein's analysis, but he refuses to
reduce the problem of other people to the problem of other minds. He is
committed to the epistemological primacy of the body and bodily behavior of
the other. They give us knowledge of other people first. Then it becomes
comprehensible that we could have empathic knowledge of their present state
of mind. 125

Husserl treats the problem of other people much as his theory of method
leads us to believe that he would. His description of our knowledge of other
people corresponds almost exactly to his theory of the descriptive project.
However, he does not reduce the objects of his description in the manner
prescribed by his theory of reductions. Nor does the relationship between
the projects of reduction and description hold exactly as it should in a
descriptive science. Let us examine each of these three methodological problems
individually.

Husserl's description of his knowledge of other people can be outlined
in five steps. He begins by considering himself as an individual person
straightforwardly aware of other people as objects in the world and at the
same time as subjects who experience the same world he does. Secondly he
concentrates on himself as a transcendental ego, that is, on the essential
structure of his existence as a person. However, instead of clarifying the
essence of his personal existence through free imaginative variation, he does
so by reducing his existence to that of a transcendental ego whose essence he
can apprehend. The eidetic reduction, instead of supplementing the third
step of descriptive method, seems to have displaced the one that comes before
Nevertheless, he apprehends the transcendental ego as a body-subject who is kinaesthetically aware of himself as a moving object. He finds that he is essentially connected to another as two members of the class of living moving organisms. The other's class membership is confirmed by his varying but harmonious behavior. By imaginatively varying his position to that of the other, the other becomes appresented to him as a body-subject having the same experiences he would have if he were over there. Finally Husserl has described his awareness of himself as an individual, the clarification of his essential existence as a transcendental ego, his essential identity, and his essential connection with another. All of these steps can be anticipated by his theory of phenomenological description.

Husserl's theory of reduction does not fare so well. Theoretically, the philosophical reduction should be followed by the eidetic and then by the phenomenological ones. But Husserl's search for the foundation of interpersonal relationships exhibits no sign of the philosophical epokehe. This kind of reduction is supposed to make the intuition of objects possible by eliminating speculative theories about them. Since Husserl does begin with his intuitions of himself as an individual person relating to others, we might argue ipso facto that the appropriate reduction has been performed. But this interpretation of his method, besides being very generous to Husserl, does violence to the self-reflectiveness of phenomenological procedure. The philosophical reduction, if it has been performed at all, does not seem to be a step of thought "which is immediately understood."126

Husserl's reduction of his existence as an individual person to that of a transcendental ego seems to be an eidetic one. After the reduction he is no longer an individual person who can be contrasted with others.
The transcendental ego is not a unique historical personage, but the essential structure of any personality.

Finally, Husserl's reduction of transcendental experience to the "sphere of ownness" seems to be the ultimate refinement of the phenomenological reduction. At the beginning of the fifth meditation, Husserl explains that the transcendental or phenomenological reduction restricts observation and description to the stream of pure consciousness and the unities constituted within it.\textsuperscript{127} Even earlier, in Ideas I, he has spoken of the phenomenological reduction as a "graded reduction."\textsuperscript{128} For the first time we can see its application in different grades, the ultimate gradation being the reduction of the objects in the ego's stream of consciousness to the ego's kinesthetic awareness of himself as an object.

Theoretically, there is supposed to be a certain relationship between the reductive and descriptive projects. The philosophical reduction makes possible the intuition of objects, and therefore, should precede the intuition of individuals as instantiations of an essence. The eidetic intuition makes possible, and therefore, should immediately precede the apprehension of an essence (or class) itself. Finally, the phenomenological reduction restricts the phenomenologist to the description of the essences and essential connections exactly as they appear to him.

Husserl's method of dealing with the problem of other people does not show many signs of this relationship. There are no indications that the philosophical reduction has been employed before the intuition of individual objects. The eidetic reduction appears before the apprehension of the transcendental ego, but instead of supplementing, it appears to have displaced the clarification of essences through free imaginative variation of
individuals. Only the phenomenological reduction, that is, the reduction of the essential being of the ego to the sphere of ownness seems to occupy its proper place and perform its correct function.

We may conclude from this investigation that Husserl's procedure is much less rigorous than his theory of method would lead us to believe. The time has come to correlate the results of all our investigations.
Chapter IV: The Adequacy of Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology

It might, of course, be objected that Husserl has maneuvered himself into an untenable position by his insistence that philosophy by nothing less than a strict science, but that is a criticism that applies to the ideal, not to the consistency with which Husserl has tried to realize the ideal. Like every other philosopher, Husserl was a child of his times, and his times would be satisfied with nothing less than scientific verifiability for every proposition that is to be recognized as meaningful.

* * * * *

Husserl himself would be the last to say that he had evolved during his career a complete philosophy, or even to say that his method has been satisfactorily formulated. More than once he expressed dissatisfaction with the formulation of that method. Of two things, however, he never ceased to be convinced: first of all, that philosophy as he conceived it could develop only in accord with the scientific ideal he had conceived from the beginning; and secondly, that no development which in any way contradicted the essential laws of intentional constitution... could possibly be admitted as genuinely philosophical.

* * * *

For the actual fruitfulness of this method we cannot look to Husserl's own works; we must look to those who have, to a greater or less extent, drawn much of their inspiration from Husserl.

--Quentin Lauer,
Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect, pp. 159-161.
In Ideas I Husserl speaks of phenomenology as a first philosophy, not only in the sense of a science upon which mathematics, logic and other formal disciplines must be built, but also as the proper foundation for the factual sciences. The verification of factual knowledge depends ultimately on the meaningfulness of the claims that we perceive things, that we live in a world, and that we relate to other people. In order to verify scientifically the meanings of these propositions, Husserl's phenomenology must satisfy a number of requirements. It must have a "scientific" foundation, a "scientific" method, and there must be "a certain harmony" between them.

In Ideas I, Husserl expresses the idea of phenomenology as a descriptive science of essential being operative strictly within the limits of immediate intuition. His definition establishes the intuition of essences as the foundation of his new science. As the foundation of a science, the intuition of essence generates the demands not to speculate about the unseen, but only to describe objects exactly as they appear. From these two fundamental demands stem Husserl's reductive and descriptive projects. The reductive project consists of three reductions which should be applied in order. Similarly, the descriptive project is composed of five methodical steps, each of which builds on the insightfulness of the one which precedes it. The foundation of phenomenology gives priority to the reductive project. Each reduction is a section of the handrail that helps us up the stairs of insight one step at a time.

The aforementioned harmony between the foundation and methods of phenomenology is what makes them scientific. Quentin Lauer suggests that Husserl, being a child of his times, could be satisfied with nothing less than
scientific verifiability for every meaningful statement. He also suggests that this ideal is untenable. Our investigations of Husserl's attempt to determine exactly the meaning of factual knowledge indicates that he has not maintained his standards of scientific endeavour. However, we are not yet in a position to say whether Husserl's is an untenable ideal.

Lauer confrontes us with the task of determining whether the distance between Husserl's methodology and his method can be bridged. He suggests that it can, but not in the context of Husserl's philosophy. Lauer says that for the fruitfulness of Husserl's method, we cannot look to his own work. We must look to other philosophers who have drawn much of their inspiration from him. Husserl's idea of phenomenology may serve to characterize, not his own philosophy, but that of other philosophers who are supposed to be following in the direction towards which he led. Let us therefore also consider briefly the work of a man who has drawn much of his inspiration from Husserl, namely Jean-Paul Sartre.

(1) Its Adequacy with Regard to His Own Work.

The problem of the foundation of factual knowledge can be sub-divided into smaller problems, the problem of the object of perception, the world of objects, and other people in the world. We have investigated each of them in detail. Let us now correlate the results of our investigations, take a final measure of the distance between Husserl's theory and his practice, and determine whether the gap between them can be bridged. Husserl's idea of phenomenology calls for descriptive and reductive projects; its foundation gives to reductive endeavours.

Husserl's idea of scientific description corresponds almost exactly with his descriptive practices. His description of the object of perception
involves five steps, each of which follows in the order prescribed by his theory of description. 3 Husserl's description of the world of objects also corresponds exactly to his theory. 4 The lone exception occurs in his description of other people. There, instead of bringing his essential existence as a person to complete clarity by free imaginative variation, he brackets his individuality and considers himself as an essentially epistemological subject, a transcendental ego. Despite the omission of the second step required by Husserl's theory of description, he completes his project in the way his theory demands. 5 Except for this one omission, his procedure is a precise application of his methodology.

All evidence indicates that Husserl's theory of description, far from being untenable, is almost within reach. The only departure from his theory points to a gap in Husserl's philosophy which can and must be closed. The clarification and analysis of the exact relationship between one's real existence as a unique historical personage and one's essential existence as a transcendental ego deserves much more attention than Husserl has given it. The clarification of their relationship would probably open the door to a reconciliation between Husserl's transcendental egology and other projects like Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body as a subject. Such a reconciliation would require a great deal of work, but no new methodological principles.

Husserl's theory of reductions does not correspond nearly as closely with his reductive practices. In fact his theory and practice are so far apart that it is doubtful whether we can speak of a correspondence between them at all. Husserl's theory of reductions demands that the philosophical reduction should be applied first, followed by the eidetic, and then the phenomenological
reductions. While examining the object of perception, Husserl reverses this order, applying the phenomenological, the eidetic, and then the philosophical reductions, after which he applies the phenomenological reduction again. Only the application of eidetic brackets agrees with Husserl's theory. During his investigations of the world of objects, Husserl suspends only the natural viewpoint. Its suspension exhibits characteristics of all three reductions, which leads us to believe that he has applied them all at the same time. This procedure is incompatible with Husserl's theory of reductions.

Finally, Husserl's consideration of our knowledge of other people comes closest to the reductive procedure demanded by his methodology. Although there is no evidence to indicate that he has deliberately applied the philosophical reduction; the eidetic and phenomenological reductions follow in the proper order. Only the absence of the philosophical reduction is lacking to make his procedure correspond with his theory of method. So there is still a chance that a re-examined and amended reductive method will correspond with his theory of reductions.

However, there is enough evidence to demand, not only a re-examination of Husserl's reductive practices, but also of his theory of reduction. Lauer says that Husserl was never completely satisfied with any formulation of his theory of method. Herbert Spiegelberg points out the reductive project as the object of his dissatisfaction:

Even in his last decade Husserl was in the habit of stating that no adequate account of the phenomenological reduction had appeared as yet; in fact, in his correspondence he referred to it as the most difficult thing ever attempted in philosophy, much as he insisted on its indispensableness for a genuine phenomenology.

We can only conclude from these observations that Husserl does not apply his
brackets scientifically. A doubt is also cast upon the usefulness of the theory of reductions we attributed to Husserl in chapter two. A more adequately developed theory of reductions or a more disciplined application of his theory, or both, are required if Husserl's phenomenology is ever to become a scientific discipline.

Finally, the foundation of phenomenology on the intuition of essence demands that the reductive project should have priority over the descriptive one: the philosophical reduction is supposed to precede the intuition of individuals, the eidetic reduction should precede the intuition of their essences, and the phenomenological reduction ensures that everything is described only as it appears. In his investigation of perceived objects, the phenomenological reduction led to the observation of individual conscious events, the eidetic reduction to their clarification and analysis, and the philosophical reduction to the intuition of their essential connections. When Husserl investigated the world of objects, he applied all three brackets at once. Their application was followed by the intuition of essential connections amongst objects. In his examination of interpersonal relationships the eidetic reduction preceded the consideration of his essential existence as a transcendental ego, and the phenomenological reduction led to his description of the ego in relation to another. Only in the case of his investigation of other people does the actual relationship between projects bear any resemblance to the one prescribed by Husserl's methodology.

All the available evidence indicates that the actual relationship between Husserl's reductive and descriptive projects is not the one demanded by his theory of method. The phenomenological methods used by Husserl are not
scientific inasmuch as they are out of harmony with their foundation. A great deal, if not all of the required harmony, could be restored if it were possible for Husserl to re-formulate his reductive project.

Husserl's idea of phenomenology does bear some resemblance to his actual philosophy. He describes things almost exactly the way his idea demands that he should. Only his reductive practices, and perhaps also his theory of reductions, should be reformed. Husserl's interpreters agree that he was never able to carry out such a reformation, never able to make phenomenology a science himself. Nevertheless, his idea remained as the goal towards which he worked all his life, a promised land which he was able to envision at least in part.

(2) Its Adequacy with Regard to the Work of Sartre.

Although Husserl has failed to put his idea of phenomenology to practice, it would be premature to condemn it as untenable without seeing how successful his followers have been. As Lauer says, we may have to look to the men who have been inspired by Husserl to judge the fruitfulness of his method. His influence on Jean-Paul Sartre can hardly be doubted. Sartre spent a considerable amount of time studying and absorbing Husserl's philosophy. The question is which of Sartre's works we should measure against Husserl's idea.

Nearly all of Sartre's works could be called phenomenological. Sartre's reasons for giving them this name suggest which of his works it would be most appropriate to examine. In a Playboy interview published soon after he refused the Nobel Prize for literature, he said that:

... I discovered "phenomenology", that is, I learned that one could talk in a philosophical way, ranging further, and more scientifically even, than the
language of philosophic textbooks. I had the idea of uniting literature and philosophy in a technique of concrete expression—with philosophy providing the method and the discipline, and literature supplying the words. What interested me was unraveling the curious and concrete relations between things and men, and later between men and themselves...

In my first novel, *Nausea*, I looked at trees and tried to define just what they are by means of words so as to get down to essences; in other words I embarked on a perpetual questioning of things, trying to ascertain what they are.14

Phenomenology, he says, has a mode of expression that could be more scientific than the language of academic philosophy. He seems to think that the language of art is more suitable for the description of the curious, the concrete and the human. For Sartre, science and art are not mutually exclusive. The artist can produce scientific descriptions of human relationships. Sartre has opened new vistas of possibility for the phenomenological movement. Just as phenomenology may be the secret longing of modern academic philosophy, 15 so Sartre hints that works of art may secretly be phenomenological. 16 Phenomenology may be modern philosophy striving to become literature.

Husserl, with his special interest in the philosophy of mathematic, logic and science, could hardly have anticipated this development. The only way to determine its correspondence with Husserl's idea of phenomenology is to examine one of Sartre's popular literary works in hopes of sorting out his descriptive and reductive endeavours, and their common foundation.

In Sartre's short story, "The Wall", we find a descriptive project involving the five steps demanded by Husserl's theory of method. Pablo Ibbieta and Tom Steinbock are introduced at the beginning of the story as two individuals with nothing in common except that they are both prisoners by the
fascists during the Spanish civil war.\textsuperscript{17}

Subsequently events in the story make it clear to them that they are waiting to be executed.

Sartre then presents them as instantiations of an essence seen through the eyes of Pablo Ibbieta:

I looked at him (Tom) sideways for the first time he seemed strange to me: he wore death on his face... For the past 24 hours I had lived next to Tom, I had listened to him and I realized we had nothing in common. And now we looked as much alike as twin brothers, simply because we were going to die together.\textsuperscript{18}

Tom's and Pablo's real existence, their individuality, is suspended, as it were, by consciousness of their impending death. They are paired as members of the same class, we find an overlaying of each with the sense of the other. Pablo sees Tom as a manifestation of death.

Sartre traces the connections amongst death and other essences through the eyes of Pablo Ibbieta. Pablo tries in various ways to imagine what death is. None of these variations reveals anything more about it. But when he gives up and begins to think of his past, he discovers that awareness of life and death are inseparable connected. Death is something that he cannot turn away from. His whole life appears before him in a crowd of memories. He sees it has been a lie. Because he never thought of death, he had spent his life counterfeiting eternity.\textsuperscript{19} Until this very moment he had understood nothing, neither death nor life. After realizing the essential connection between them, Pablo turns away from the past. It no longer has any value for him.

The reason for their essential connection soon becomes evident. Because of his heightened awareness he is able to see his situation in a new light. He sees that:
... objects had a funny look: they were more obliterated, less dense than usual. It was enough for me to look at the bench, the lamp, the pile of coal dust to know that I was going to die. Naturally I couldn't think clearly about my death but I saw it everywhere, on things, in the way things fell back and kept their distance discretely, as people who speak quietly at the bedside of a dying man. It was his death Tom had just touched on the bench.  

Knowledge of life and death are inseparable for Pablo because the death he anticipates is his own. Life and death are properties of the individual. They are essentially connected because of their subsumption under this higher genus. We might say that, in Sartre's philosophy, the anticipation of one's death is one of the things that makes one an individual. It is a principle of individuation.

Sartre's short story exhibits, not only a descriptive project, but also a kind of reduction. Under the sentence of death, Pablo's life as an individual is suspended. Even though he escapes execution by a surprising turn of events, he is condemned to live the rest of his life as it were, between the brackets of birth and death. He, the soldiers guarding him, and everyone else, are condemned to die and must wait for their sentence. The only difference he observes is that some were going to die a little later than him. Pablo Ibbieta's being-towards-death, as imagined by Sartre, is remarkably similar to Husserl's remarks about the existential import of his reductive project. Spiegelberg quotes Husserl as saying that:

the total phenomenological attitude and the corresponding epokehe is called upon to bring about a complete personal transformation which might be compared to a religious conversion, but which even beyond it has the significance of the greatest existential conversion that is to be expected of mankind.
The reductive project demands a complete personal transformation, a religious, or an existential conversion. A complete personal transformation is precisely what Pablo Ibbieita has experienced.

The foundation of Sartre's phenomenological efforts in "The Wall" seems to be the intuition of essences. But since he fails to distinguish varieties of reduction, we cannot say that the phenomenology he builds upon it is scientific by Husserl's standards. We can say, however, that he has been no less successful than Husserl in approaching them. Husserl's idea of phenomenology applies to Sartre's literary works as well as it does to his own academic philosophy.

(3) Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology Compared to Samuel Johnson's Idea of Good Literature

Some art may be phenomenological, even by Husserl's standards. This fact raises a question. Some artists, like Sartre, may be self-conscious phenomenologists. But may it not be the case that something in the nature of art itself makes it inherently phenomenological? Because Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) is to modern literary criticism what Husserl is to phenomenology, it seems appropriate to settle the question by comparing Johnson's standard of excellence in literature with Husserl's idea of scientific phenomenology.

In his "Preface to Shakespeare", Johnson contrasts the absolute and immediately recognizable excellence of demonstrative sciences with that of all other works which is recognized only gradually and by comparing them to others.

He says that in literary works which, by their very nature, appeal only to observation and experience:
Nothing can please many and please long but just representations of general nature...

Shakespeare above all writers, at least above all modern writers, is the poet of nature...
His characters act and speak by the influence of those general passions and principles by which all minds are agitated... In the writings of other poets a character is too often an individual; in those of Shakespeare it is commonly a species. 24

Johnson's claim that works of art appeal only to observation and experience for standards of excellence establishes the intuition of objects as their foundation. 25 The objects he appeals to are those of a general nature, general passions and principles, and kinds of people. In Husserl's terminology, he is appealing to the intuition of essences. Great works of art, he says, are nothing more than "just representations of a general nature." Only great works of art, then, can be phenomenological.

The only difference between Johnson's idea of good art and Husserl's idea of phenomenology has to do with science. As far as Johnson could see, science and art were mutually exclusive because he thought that art was based on observation, while science was demonstrative. Our ideas of art and science have changed considerably since Johnson's time. The task Husserl sets himself is precisely that of making observation and description a scientific project. Because Husserl failed to accomplish his task, we might say that his actual philosophy corresponds more closely to Johnson's idea of good literature than it does to his own idea of phenomenology. We might also say, as Johnson would have said, that only the passage of time and the judgment of future generations can determine how great a philosopher Husserl actually was. We can, however, say a few things about his ideal.
(4) Ten Conclusions about Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology.

1. The popular slogan "Back to the things themselves!" is not an adequate expression of Husserl's idea. The expression brings to mind Hume's positivistic doctrine that all our ideas are derived from simple impressions which they faintly copy. But phenomenology is not like British empiricism. We should not think that the things themselves of Husserl's philosophy are only empirical objects to which we can return only through perception.

2. Husserl thought of phenomenology as a descriptive science of essential being operative within the limits of immediate intuition. The objects of phenomenology are the essences or class memberships of individuals and their formal relationships. Classes and formal relations are objects of which it is possible to be immediately aware. Scientific description of our awareness of these objects demands a foundation in our immediate awareness of them, a dedication to the demands stemming from the problematic nature of our awareness, and a method dictated by the demanding nature of its problems.

3. The popular slogan "Back to the things themselves!" is an expression of half of Husserl's first principle of method. The foundation of Husserl's phenomenology is the immediate intuition of essences. As a methodological foundation it generates the demands not to speculate about the unseen, but only to describe things exactly as they appear. The expression "Back to the things themselves!" is equivalent to the methodological commandment to describe things exactly as they appear.

4. Husserl considered his first principle of method to be the foundation of phenomenology as a rigorously descriptive science. His first principle is the commandment not to speculate about the unseen, but only to describe
things as they appear. Its two demands are really different. Husserl gives
the first priority over the second. His two demands generate reductive and
descriptive science built upon Husserl's foundation, the reductive project
has priority over the descriptive one.

5. Husserl's phenomenology approaches, but does not correspond with his
idea of a rigorous science. He was well aware of the discrepancy between his
ideal of phenomenological philosophy and phenomenology as he practiced it.
A truly scientific phenomenology was, for him, a promised land upon which he
would never set foot.

6. He does not realize his ideal of a rigorous science because part of
it—the reductive project—is not sufficiently articulated. Husserl's theory
of reductions is so unlike his reductive practices that we can hardly speak of
a correspondence between them at all. The great distance between them calls,
not only for a re-examination of Husserl's reductive practices, but also of
his theory of reductions.

7. Husserl's idea of phenomenology is at odds with phenomenology as
practiced by others. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, presents a description
of death based on the intuition of objects. He describes various objects in
the manner prescribed by Husserl's idea of phenomenology. But since he fails
to distinguish varieties of reduction, we cannot say that his description is
scientific by Husserl's standards.

8. The artistic expression of intuited essences is as close to his own
ideal as his own "phenomenological" practices. Samuel Johnson's claim that
works of art appeal only to observation and experience for standards of
excellence establishes the intuition of essences as their foundation. The
objects he appeals to are those of a general nature, general passions and
principles, and kinds of people. In Husserl's terminology, he is appealing to intuition of essences. The task Husserl sets himself is precisely that of making observation and description a scientific project. Because he failed to accomplish his task, we might say that by his own standards, his actual philosophy is an artistic description of essences, not a scientific one.

9. The artistic impulse can be intrinsically phenomenological. Samuel Johnson says that works of art often portray only individuals; but in great art works, the individual is portrayed as the just representation of a general nature. The goal of Husserl's phenomenology is "faithful conceptual expression" in judgments general in form. Johnson's standard of excellence in art, and the goal of Husserl's phenomenology appear to be the same.

10. Some works of art furnish phenomenological insights for philosophy. Sartre's short story, "The Wall", for example, offers valuable insights into the nature of death. Samuel Johnson claims, in effect, that the works of Shakespeare offer important phenomenological insights. Phenomenology, as a attempt to deal scientifically with qualitative material has a great deal to learn from the language of art. Phenomenology requires an expended notion of "completely true and steady conceptual expression." A phenomenology of art as language must therefore be undertaken.
Footnotes

Chapter One.


3 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 13.


8 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 174. cf., p. 72, 175, 191.

Translator's note: Wesen here translated as 'essence' means in ordinary language 'being', and is often so translated; in some contexts it also means 'creature'. Strictly speaking, however, Wesen is essential being as opposed to existential (Dasein or Existenz), these representing complementary modes of Being in general (Sein). In this section what is important is to stress the phenomenological aspect of being, the essential nature of things as given, in contrast to its ontological aspect, and for this purpose, the word 'essence' has acquired in English translations of Husserl and other phenomenologists, a technical meaning which makes the only possible choice as an equivalent for Wesen in German. Some of the ambiguities of Wesen in German,
however, are not reflected in corresponding ambiguities of 'essence' in English. cf., Ideas 1 p. 42.
The expression Idea and Ideal are not quite in such evil odour as regards confusing ambiguities, though they suffer on the whole pretty badly in this respect as the frequent misinterpretations of my Logical Studies have made me feel painfully enough. As a further incentive to a change of terminology, I may mention the need to keep the highly important Kantian concept of the Idea free from all contact with the general concepts of (the formal or material) essence. I therefore make use as a foreign expression, of the terminologically unspent Eidos, and as a German expression of a term whose equivocation are harmless, though at times vexatious, the word Wesen (Essence or Essential Being).

11 Spiegelberg, Movement, p. 58.
12 It is often said of Husserl's Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations that in it he repudiates his Philosophy of Arithmetic because of Frege's devastating criticism of his earlier work. But Farber (Foundations, p. 58) notes that "Frege's criticism was only partial; not everything in the book was attacked or questioned by any means. In fact, even if every point made by Frege were admitted to be valid, most of the materials of the book, critical and original might still remain." (cf., Movement, p. 103.) Most importantly, Husserl retained his mode of analyzing both the things we are aware of, and our awareness of them. See Foundations, p. 218. This noetic, noematic style of analysis is a theme that runs from Husserl's Arithmetic to the Lebenswelt philosophy of The Crisis.
13 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 13.
14 Ibid., pp. 45- 71.
15 Ibid., pp. 45- 46.
16 Ibid., p. 47.
17 Ibid., p. 46.
19 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 47.
20 Ibid., p. 66.
22 The essence of a tone, say the tonal structure of one of Beethoven's symphonies, should not be confused with one's idea of it. The way I would think of his ninth yesterday is not the way I would think of it today. Yet both are ideas of the same thing. My ideation is not its essence. The belief that essence and idea are the same is a form of psychologism much like the one that identifies a physical object with one's perception of it. (See, for example, Hume, Treatise, pp. 67-68.) His belief commits the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival variations. See chapter three, the object of perception.

23 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 48.
24 Ibid., p. 46.
25 Ibid., p. 46.
26 Ibid., p. 57. cf., ibid., pp. 81-82.
27 Ibid., p. 47.
28 Spiegelberg, Movement, p. 117.

Spiegelberg recognizes difficulties in the English term "intuition." "For Husserl the ultimate test of all knowledge, and of phenomenological insight in particular, is Anschauung; its most important type is the much vaunted, often misused, and even more ridiculed Wesensschau.

It is not easy to translate these German terms, or even to find approximate equivalents for them. Anschauung (looking at) differs from Erfahrung (experience) inasmuch as experience always refers to cases which are at least supposedly real, whereas Anschauung may also occur in imagination or recollection. It differs from intuition, especially in its German sense, where Intuition has usually the sense of an inspirational idea or an instinctive anticipation. Unless one were bold enough to launch a new literal English parallel like "in-templation", or using the unclaimed noun form of the verb "to intuit" or "intuiting".

... there is such a thing as non-sensuous intuiting... a fact which makes it necessary to expand the customary range of the word Anschauung, as represented, for instance even in Kant's widened use of the term (Anschauung without concepts is blind, thoughts without Anschauung are empty).

... this intuiting of general essences (which was all that was implied in the dangerously mystifying word Wesensschau, certainly nothing like a mystic second sight) is not to be claimed lightly... Yet eventually it is always the intuiting of the phenomena, particular as well as universal, in which all genuine knowledge finds its terminal verification."
Induction always presupposes at least the essential intuition that makes predication possible. One must intuit that "this here is a crow before inferring that all crows are black. For a more critical view of Husserl's position see David Michael Levin, "Induction and Husserl's Theory of Eidentic Variation", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (September 1968).

Spiegelberg, Movement, p. 54.

Ibid., p. 64.

Ibid., p. 65.

Ibid., p. 66.


Ibid., p. 130.

Ibid., p. 132.

Ibid., p. 134.

Ibid., p. 135.

Ibid., p. 139. cf., Movement, pp. 117-118.

Ibid., p. 135.

Ibid., p. 136. Husserl in his own lifetime was the centre of the Gottingen and Munich Circles. See Movement, pp. 168-172. For an account of Spiegelberg's community of researchers, see Wolfe Hays, "Report on a Workshop of Phenomenology", Philosophical Quarterly, (July 1967).


Ibid., p. 146.

Ibid., p. 144.
Chapter Two

1 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 165.

2 Ibid., pp. 83-84.

3 Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought, pp. 15-29. He gives an account of phenomenological, semiotic, axiomatic and reductive methods, fails to distinguish the two projects, and stresses the reductive one.

Quentin Lauer, Phenomenology, Its Genesis and Prospect, (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 46-64. Lauer fails to distinguish the two, stresses the reductive project, and claims to find six kinds of reduction.

Even Spiegelberg seems to lapse at times into this point of view. See Movement, p. 137: "The terms 'intentional analysis' and 'transcendental reduction' seem to be practically equivalent."


5 Ibid., p. 206.


7 Spiegelberg, Movement, p. 136.

8 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 103.

9 Ibid., p. 72.

10 Ibid., p. 40.

11 Hume, Treatise, p. 4.

12 Spiegelberg, Movement, p. 658.

13 Hume, Treatise, pp. 15-16.

14 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 41, p. 137. cf., Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 89.

Chapter Three

1 Husserl, Ideas 1, pp. 101-130.


3 Ibid., p. 38.

4 Ibid., p. 40.

5 Ibid., p. 72.

6 Ibid., p. 74.


8 Ibid., p. 133.

9 Ibid., p. 139.

10 Ibid., p. 151.

11 Ibid., p. 153.

12 Ibid., pp. 155-156.


14 Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, p. 156.

15 Ibid., p. 157.

16 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 101.
Husserl's variation in modes of consciousness to produce the intuition of its essence is not well developed in this section. See Aron Gurwitsch, "Gelt Goldsein's Concept of Concrete and Categorial Attitude and the Phenomenology of Ideation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (December 1949), for a discussion of the role variation plays in Husserl's phenomenological method.

Husserl's use of the method of eidetic variation is not clearly explained here. For a more complete discussion see David Levin, "Induction and Husserl's Theory of Eidetic Variation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (September 1968).

After the phenomenological epokhe, Husserl cannot examine and criticize the doctrine and arguments of Berkeley and Descartes. An analytically minded philosopher might argue that Descartes proves too much while Berkeley proves too little. Since the sensible dimensions of Descartes' wax have changed completely, it has no abiding mathematical properties which can be apprehended "by the mind alone." Berkeley has proven that mathematical properties cannot be attributed to an object which has no sensible qualifications, but he has not succeeded in proving that either of them are "nothing but ideas in the mind." It is a feature peculiar to Husserl's phenomenological method that it should overcome philosophical arguments without directly addressing them in this manner.
32 Ibid., p. 118.
33 Ibid., p. 119.
34 Ibid., p. 123.
35 Ibid., p. 72.
37 Ibid., p. 393.
38 Ibid., p. 393.
39 Ibid., p. 394.
40 Ibid., p. 394.
41 Ibid., p. 394.
42 Ibid., p. 396.
43 Ibid., p. 396.
45 Whitehead, Contemporary Philosophical Problems, p. 396.
46 Ibid., p. 396.
48 Whitehead, Contemporary Philosophical Problems, p. 399.
49 Ibid., p. 399.
50 Ibid., p. 400.
51 Ibid., p. 405.
52 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 135.
53 Ibid., p. 154.
54 Ibid., pp. 91–100.
55 Ibid., p. 91.
See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 396-402, where he argues that the alternative notions of a finite or an infinite world are equally absurd. He recognizes that we must reason about things we cannot experience. He claims that when we do, we must arrive at two equally reasonable conclusions which contradict each other. Contradictory conclusions produced by means of pure reason are called antinomies.

It might be said that this failure marks Husserl as a Platonist. See Aristotle on the difference between Plato and the Pythagoreans, From Thales to Plato, ed. by T. V. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 54: "he separates numbers from things that are seen, while they say that numbers are the things themselves, and do not interpose mathematical objects between them." This reveals the Neo-Pythagorean tendencies in modern science.
We should not understand this as a demand that scientific research should stop. Husserl is not suggesting that quantitative research is misplaced. He does, however, want to make the point that it lacks a metaphysical foundation. Research cannot rest on the ground of formal mathematical concepts alone. Every empirical science requires material concepts which are not mathematical. The region of nature with all its categories cannot be reduced to pure mathematical concepts, for then there would be no difference between pure and applied mathematics, or between math and physics. Every empirical science, as Husserl puts it, must be supported by regional as well as formal ontologies. See Husserl, Ideas 1, pp. 55-62, especially p. 57.

81 Lauer, Phenomenology, Its Genesis and Prospect, pp. 148-149. In chapter eight, Lauer briefly surveys Husserl's fifth cartesian meditation.


84 Waltraut Stein, translator's preface to ibid., p. vii.

85 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 46.


87 Ibid., pp. 255-256.

88 Ibid., p. 258.
The positivistic idea that there is only one kind of object—the spatial kind—originates in what Herbert Spiegelberg would call the sense organ fallacy.


This is what we usually mean by empathy.

She even goes so far as to suggest that God and man know each other in the same way (ibid., p. 11), but she offers no description of such knowledge.

Nor at this stage does it do justice to one's own personal existence. But that comes later. The constitution of the ego as transcendental subject precedes the constitution of the other as subject which precedes the constitution of the lived world (Lebenswelt) which precedes the constitution of the ego as object and complete person. See Ibid.
The necessity for this extra reduction seems to indicate that the ego is essentially related to an alter ego. The other must be bracketed before the essence of the ego can be described in isolation.

There are other appresentative acts besides memory and anticipation. Perception itself is appresentative in a number of ways. For instance, an object appresents its backside and prescribes a determination to it.

Conversely, another moving body which was not a living organism would disqualify itself if there was anything "discordant" in its behavior. Husserl, however, does not specify the meanings of harmony and discordance.

In this popularly misread passage, Husserl is saying that the subjectivity of the other is not appresented as the "far side" of his body. Nor is he saying that our appresentations of an ego are any less certain than those of an object because they cannot be perceptually verified.

cf., ibid., p. 119, where Husserl says appresentation of another subject never demands and is never open to fulfillment by presentation.
Chapter IV.


5 Ibid., cf., p. 25 and p. 62.

6 Ibid., cf., p. 24 and p. 48.

7 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

8 Ibid., pp. 81-82.

9 Spiegelberg, Movement, pp. 135-136.


11 Ibid., p. 63.
12 Ibid., p. 82.


15 Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 166.

16 For further exploration of the relationship between phenomenology and literature, see Juan Bacca, "E. Husserl and J. Joyce, or theory and practice of the Phenomenological Attitude," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (March 1949), and Donald Kuspitt, "Fiction and Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (March 1970).


18 Ibid., p. 22.

19 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

20 Ibid., p. 27.

21 Ibid., p. 33.

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Richard Allan Berg, the first child of Gustav and Lillie was born April 17, 1945, in Melville, Saskatchewan, Canada. In 1948 the Bergs moved east to St. Catharines, Ontario. There on May 27, 1949, the birth of Kenneth Gustav completed the Berg family.

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The thesis submitted by Mr. Richard Berg has been read and approved by members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

24 May 1971

Roger Funk
Signature of Advisor