Collective Bargaining: The Quest for Power in the Chicago Public Schools

Stewart Weinstein  
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss

Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2567

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.  
Copyright © 1988 Stewart Weinstein
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
THE QUEST FOR POWER IN THE
CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS

by
Stewart Weinstein

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
APRIL
1988
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As with most items in our lives we usually need the assistance of others to help achieve our major goals. This project is no different than any other. The writer appreciates the assistance of many people who have helped with this dissertation. Thanks is extended to Mrs. Norma Wilkins, Principal of the Lewis School who has the knowledge and appreciation of education in order to extend me many courtesies and to give general support. My appreciation is given to Dr. Joan Smith, Director of the dissertation committee for her wise counsel and for being there when I needed her. Gratitude is given also to Dr. Max Bailey, and Dr. Philip Carlin for their encouragement and understanding. Appreciation is given to Archie Motley and the staff at the Chicago Historical Society for having the time and patience to help in this project. The writer is also thankful to Susan Friedman for reading and editing this dissertation and finding the mistakes I kept going over.

I would like to extend appreciation to my classmates who have helped me through this project with their encouragement and camaraderie. To my wife, Barbara, the writer is forever indebted for her patience, sacrifice and encouragement throughout the entire program.
VITA

The investigator, Stewart Weinstein, was born the second son to Morris and Dorothy Weinstein on 2 November 1946, in Chicago, Illinois. He received the Baccalaureate Degree in Liberal Arts and Science in 1970, the Master of Arts Degree in Political Science in 1973. He completed a Thesis on the "Economic Development of South-East Asia," in 1973.

Starting in 1970 he became a teacher in the Chicago Public Schools where he taught Language Arts in various Upper Grade Centers until in 1984 he came to the Lewis School. At the Lewis School he was instrumental in the development of a discipline referral system. This led to his appointment as coordinator of discipline referrals.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE QUEST BEGINS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A Brief Look Back</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Formation of the CTF</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Tax Suits</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Land Leases</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Edwin Cooley and His Secret Marking System</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Affiliation with Labor</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Board Runs Out of Money</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Volunteer Emergency Committee</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishing a Single Union</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chapter One Notes</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE RISE OF FEWKES</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The North Central Controversy</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishing a New System</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishing Relations</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Salary Issue</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Fewkes-Hunt Styles</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chapter Two Notes</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEWKES AND WILLIS</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Negotiations For 1957 and 1958</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Election &amp; 1959 Salary Negotiations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The 1960 Salary Negotiations</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Pressure is Applied in 1961</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chapter Three Notes</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEWKES RESPONDS</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1963 Negotiations</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1964 Negotiations</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exclusive Bargaining Agent</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chapter Four Notes</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE WARRIORS CHANGE BUT THE WAR CONTINUES</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance and Delay</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Court Case Battle</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Decision</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leadership</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leaders, New Complications and a New Contract</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations of 1968</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five Notes</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE STRIKE YEARS</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations Begin</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Year</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Battle in Springfield</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six Notes</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN RETROSPECT</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Legacy</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven Notes</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE QUEST BEGINS

A BRIEF LOOK BACK

In examining the development of collective bargaining for Chicago teachers it became evident that one issue has been constantly reoccurring in the Chicago schools from its inception to the present. That one issue has been lack of proper funding.

It was apparent that from the beginning of the Chicago public schools, in a storeroom of a Presbyterian church in 1833, to the nineteen day strike of 1987 the Chicago school system has complained of inadequate funding. In 1837 when the Chicago schools had enrollment of 325 students the schools shut down because there were no tax revenues to support them. The people of the city did not think of public education as a priority and were not willing to pay for it.¹

By 1840 the first organized board of inspectors was established which would in 1857 become known as the board of education. The system was composed of four temporary buildings. In 1845 the enrollment was tripled and by 1850 it increased ten times. This amounted to 1,919 students and twenty-one teachers. The first permanent school
was built by the city in 1845 at State and Madison and the first superintendent was John Dore. He came from Boston in 1854 at a salary of $1,500 per year. In his first report he complained about the lack of trained teachers:

It has long been conceded that to become proficient in any art or profession, an apprenticeship is necessary, but by some unaccountable oversight, the art of teaching has been considered an exception or rather has received no consideration at all.²

At this time women teachers were beginning at two-hundred dollars and increasing to a maximum of four-hundred dollars. While their male counterparts were making four-hundred to eight-hundred dollars salary.

The financial situation of Chicago schools was said to be in bad shape. In 1855 the total expenditure on schools had been $16,546 while in 1860 it was $69,630. The President of the Chicago Board of Education in 1861 complained about the state allocation not being distributed fairly to Chicago.³

The financial problem led the schools to try to keep expenses down. This meant keeping teacher’s salaries down. One way to do this was to increase the numbers of female teachers because they received lower salaries than there male counterparts. In 1854 the female to male teacher ratio was five to one. By 1871 it was sixteen to one. In the state of Illinois in 1860 there were 8,010 male teachers which was and increase of 319 teachers from the previous year. In the same year of 1860 there were 6,485 female
teachers which was an increase of 485 from the previous year. In 1865 in Illinois, there were 10,843 female teachers and 6,172 male teachers. The female teachers had taken over in number but not in salary.

The ratio of female and male teachers was attributed to the Civil War, the opening of the frontier, and bad economic times. When the soldiers returned from the war there was a period of great unemployment. The one factor that must not be forgotten was that in times of little money it was cheaper to have a female teaching force.

In 1860 the salary for female teachers was increased by a hundred dollars at the maximum end, making it five-hundred dollars. A male teacher's salary went from five-hundred to one-thousand dollars a year. The low end of the scale for male teachers was the high end of the scale for female teachers. It was possible to give men teachers higher raises because there were less of them; therefore the real expense was not that much.

The next raise for teachers came in 1863. Female teachers remained at three-hundred dollars for a year and a half and then moved to four-hundred dollars. Teachers received no new raises till 1873 when elementary teachers received $450-700. For the high schools female teachers went from $1,000-1800 while male teachers received from $1,800-2,200. This was to be cut back 25 percent in 1876. Even though salaries were low, the teacher supply was increasing
especially for women, because there were few professions open to them. Just as the schools were starting to recover from lack of attention due to the war, a tragedy struck. In October 1871, the city was destroyed by fire. Fifteen school buildings were destroyed. The remaining schools were taken over by the city government. The high school became the court building and city schools were not reopened till 1874 -- a lapse of three years.

The fire had destroyed all the records. Without these the city and the state could not collect the taxes that the schools needed. The leasees of school lands already paid low rents but after the fire the city agreed to cut rents on school land by 40 percent. In the rebuilding process of the city the schools were not high on the priority list. New water system, sewers and a new city hall came first. The rebuilding would be even more costly because the city wanted everything to be as fireproof as possible.

It wasn't until 1880 teachers received another salary increase. Elementary female teachers were paid from $400 to $775 while their male counterparts started at $500 going up to $1,000. High school female teachers started with $850 went up to $1,245, while male high school teachers started at $2,000. It took three years for the next salary increase. In 1883 high school teachers would start with $1,000 with a maximum of $1,800. In 1892 Dr. Joseph Mayer Rice personally observed a sample of the school systems of
this country. In the style of the newspapers of the day he exposed them in a series of articles which found Chicago to be the "least progressive." Then in 1893 Chicago Mayor Harrison appointed an eleven man commission to study the problems of the Chicago school system. Two of the members of the commission were also members of the Board of Education. The chairman of the commission was William Rainey Harper, President of the University of Chicago. Five years later the commission produced a 248 page report on the condition of the schools with recommendations for improvements. The recommendations included a reorganization of administration and more central control and authority for the superintendent.

The commission was not impressed by the city's teaching force. They noted that they lacked any incentive to good performance, and that the existing system of salaries and promotion mitigated against improved teaching. Therefore, the commission recommended a system of degree requirements, examinations and increased supervision as a way of helping the superintendent improve hiring and promotion practices. The report also promoted one large corporate model that was beginning to dominate American business life. This pattern adopted a small board of directors who made policy and an administrative structure that implemented policy. This was what the commission wanted to be passed on to the city schools. The report also
suggested a need for more "scientific management," i.e., one that would employ the correct business practices in order to bring efficiency to the schools.

THE FORMATION OF THE CTF

Margaret Haley, A Chicago Teachers Federation (CTF) leader, in speaking of the Harper Report's use of the business model, said:

Two ideals are struggling for supremacy in American life today. . . . One is that of commercialism, which subordinates the worker to the product and to the machine; the other, the ideal of democracy -- the ideal of education, which places humanity above all machines, and demands that all activity shall be the expression of life. If this ideal of education is not carried over into the industrial field, then the ideal of commercialism will be carried over into the schools. Those two ideals can no more continue to exist in American life together than our nation could have continued half slave and half free.9

The CTF had several reasons to oppose the reform commission and its proposals. First of all, the University of Chicago President, William Rainey Harper, was considered no friend of organized teachers. In 1898, as a member of the Chicago school board, he had taken a leading role in denying teachers a promised salary increase. Also, However, The Harper Report did support the notion of teacher organizations such as the NEA when it stated that: "Development and recognition of organized associations of teachers will focus the experience and the thought of the five thousand Chicago teachers to the great advantage of the Chicago School System and will prove a wholesome stimulus to
themselves." On the other hand, the Commission would never have endorsed a union type teachers' group such as the CTF.

The CTF was an outgrowth of elementary teaching conditions -- especially financial. In 1895 the state legislature enacted a pension law for teachers with benefits financed from a 1 percent assessment on each teacher's salary. The pension quickly became controversial due to the objections from high school teachers whose payments on a percentage basis were higher than those of elementary teachers. Because their salaries were higher, they obtained proportionally no more in benefits. Thus they saw their larger contributions disappearing rapidly with nothing left for themselves. The problem with this first pension law was that it did not provide enough money to pay the pensions promised the contributors who could join for a month or so and still expect to receive the pension upon retirement. Another problem was that the sole source of income was the collection of a 1 percent salary contribution from everyone in the system, including non-teaching employees.10

Pensions had great appeal for older teachers, but a large organization which the CTF intended to be, needed an image which would appeal to all elementary-school teachers. Therefore salaries were an issue, too. Margaret Haley identified that objective when she remarked that the CTF grew out of the needs of teachers, the "first and greatest thing being that of enough salary to live on. Most teachers
In 1897 the board did act to extend the seven-year salary schedule to ten-years with an increment of seventy five dollars for the eighth year and fifty dollars each for the ninth and tenth or eleventh until a maximum of one thousand dollars was reached. However, this was never accomplished, because no teacher ever got beyond the eighth year on the schedule.

Teachers in Chicago were deeply worried about practical problems. Most immediate, was the danger of collapse of the new teachers' pension system which had finally been passed in 1895. Pension laws were then a new experiment, and there was not much experience on which to base them. Besides, there was still considerable opposition to teachers having any pension although Chicago police and fireman enjoyed one since 1890.

On 16 March 1897, a small group of teachers concerned with the disaster facing the pension fund met to discuss the problem at the Central Music Hall. That night they agreed to form an organization to "do something" about the pension. By June 1897, they had three hundred members signed up. By December they had 2,567 paid up members—more than half of all the teachers -- and had obtained 3,567 signatures to a petition to the Board to "do something" about salaries. The statement of purpose adopted at the first meeting in 1897 was as follows:
The object of this organization shall be to raise the standard of the teaching profession by securing for teachers conditions essential to the best professional service, and to this end, to obtain for them all the rights and benefits to which they are entitled. 

The Chicago Times Herald on 14 November 1898 stated, "The new organization made a tactical blunder of asking for more pay, as showing a spirit not credible to the high standard of professional ethics." 

A number of the elementary teachers saw in the Chicago Teachers' Federation a way to better their working conditions. Among those who felt this way were Catharine Goggin and Margaret Haley, two teachers who were to play a major role in the federation. The election of officers was scheduled for Spring of 1899. Catharine Goggin was elected president and Margaret Haley vice-president.

In 1900, another crucial step in organizational development was taken: Haley and Goggin began to devote a great deal of their time to the pursuit of teacher welfare. In order to enable them to devote all of their time to federation activities, Haley and Goggin were released from teaching and paid salaries with CTF funds equal to those they earned as teachers. The financial costs of increased power and status for the CTF leaders were born by the members and they were not inconsiderable. Shortly after the creation of staff offices for Haley and Goggin, membership dues increased 100 percent.
THE TAX SUITS

The CTF's first major battle was launched during the Christmas vacation of 1899-1900. The 1898 salary petition originally approved had been rescinded. The board of education said that they could not comply with the projected 1900 increases and would not be able to afford all of the 1899 advances. In response to this salary cut, Margaret Haley and Catherine Goggin undertook an investigation of tax abuses. Since 90 percent of the schools' income was from property taxes levied by the city council, it made sense to find out if anyone was not paying their share. They checked and found many large corporations were paying no taxes at all. The Illinois State Board of Equalization, whose function was to authorize tax payments, had never done so for certain large corporations.

Haley realized that if the delinquent corporations could be legally forced to pay their share of taxes -- some had not paid any for twenty-five years -- the city treasury would have adequate funds to pay the increases which the board would allocate. With the help of Catharine Goggin, she set about obtaining legal counsel. Ex-governor John P. Altgeld told her that she was definitely right in what she wanted to do. As she said, "I did not see why we should not win if we were right."

All this was presented to the county tax assessor in 1900, and he did nothing. The CTF then went up the line
to the State Board of Equalization, which also did nothing. The federation had to sue in court if they wanted the corporations property assessed. So on 2 January 1900, Goggin decided she was going to "institute mandamus proceedings against the State Board of Equalization." Haley went to meet with Board President Harris to get his opinion on the matter. After consultation Harris told Haley to proceed with the suit.\(^{20}\)

The federation sued in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County to get a mandamus to compel the State Board of Equalization to assess the major corporations according to the law. The federation got the mandamus compelling the Board of Equalization to assess the corporations, but the corporations went into Federal Court and obtained an injunction to restrain the State Board from "assessing them." The injunction however, was dissolved almost immediately. The Circuit Court in Springfield gave the state board three days to comply with the mandamus or be in contempt. The state board then met and adopted a new rule assessing the corporation, but only at a nominal rate.

The federation went back to court complaining about the assessment being to low and on 1 October 1901 the State Supreme Court ruled that the low assessments were fraudulent and ordered the corporations be assessed according to the law. The new assessment was $2,300,000 but the corporations went to federal court stating that the
rates set for them violated the uniformity clause of the state constitution. The court accepted the argument, reduced the amount to $600,000, and issued a permanent injunction to stop payment on the rest.21

The Times Herald of 27 January 1900 stated that the teachers had been "thoughtless in characterizing the corporations as tax dodgers" and added on 20 February: "Teachers were assuming a responsibility beyond their legitimate sphere of action." The Tribune on 16 March 1900 scolded the federation for trying to set the whole world straight for treating the city like a small child. By October the position of the press was changing. The Daily News of 10 October 1900 was supporting the federation's tax suits and by their 18 March 1901 they urged the federation to continue their fight. On 17 November 1900 the Chicago Chronicle "agreed that the tax cause was worthy."22

The Board of Education's share of the $600,000 was $249,544. The CTF had gotten the board the money it needed to provide them with salary increases the board said it needed. The final insult occurred in July when the board, decided to use this money to pay bills and for maintenance.23 The federation had paid for the lawyers and court fees and the teachers received no increase at all.

The CTF went back to court to obtain an injunction against using $193,000 of the $249,544 for anything but salaries appropriated legally by the board for the year
1898-99. The case was given to Judge Edward F. Dunne in the Circuit Court who ruled in favor of the federation. The board took the case to the appellate court. Haley now realized it took more than having right on one's side. At this point the federation became involved in politics.

In 1904 the federation was at a low point. The board had tied up the teachers' salary increase. This was done by appealing the case. Also, to get back at the teachers the corporations had introduced a bill in Springfield to remove the compulsory aspect of the teachers' pension, making it voluntary to join; it became law, and the new mayor (Carter Henry Harrison) went back on his promise by ignoring a referendum on public ownership of utilities. It was under all these problems that Haley and Goggin decided to enter politics. Unsuccessful in persuading the board to oppose the merit plan, the CTF worked to replace the board by having its members elected, not appointed by the mayor. This effort also failed, but the CTF then turned its attention to electing a mayor favorable to their principles who would appoint school board members favoring the CTF's position. This effort was successful when Edward F Dunne was elected in April 1905.

By June of 1906 over half the board were Dunne appointees. After more then six years of fighting this board gave the teachers what they were promised in 1898 and what the court affirmed in 1904. They voted to use the delinquent
tax money for teachers back salaries. This victory did not last long because Judge Dunne lost his reelection bid in 1907 to Fred Busse, who was much less interested in educational reform. 26

Haley and Goggin had worked long hours preparing a good pension bill and lobbying for its passage in Springfield. The bill that became law in July 1907 finally contained a compulsory contribution with some public funds added and a trustee composition of: (1) two school board members appointed by the board; (2) six teachers elected by teachers; and (3) the secretary of the board of education to act as an ex-officio member. 27

In 1913, a battle was fought to retain teachers' control of the pension fund and, one year later, the CTF restated its main priorities as protecting the pension and funding the existing salary scale. When a revenue shortage threatened salaries in 1915, the CTF fought board proposals to cut all salaries or eliminate the top two steps on the salary scale. In response to this latter proposal the federation stated that the last time those steps were eliminated it took ten years to get them back. Nevertheless, history repeated itself; this time it would be three years before they were restored. In 1920, as teachers were struggling with rampant postwar inflation, the CTF sought a salary increase to help members deal with their economic woes. 28
LAND LEASES

The CTF searched for money in other areas also. For example, they took a look at the use of school lands given by the federal government to the schools by the Ordinance of 1785. The federation found that the land was leased in 1903 at half of its true value. Since the land belonged to the board it paid no property tax. However, even though, the board was tax exempt, the lessees were not: therefore, they should have paid the same rates on their leases as private owners.

The biggest offender was the Chicago Tribune who held a ninety-nine year lease (running from 1886 to 1985) on their Madison and Dearborn lot. It is interesting to note that in 1895 the board president was at the same time the attorney for the Tribune. In 1905 there was a chance to change these leases. Besides, leasees who had not had the revaluation clause removed, were suing in the courts to have it struck from their leases as well. In 1905 Judge Edward Dunne was mayor, and he appointed Jane Addams and other independents as board members. At their instigation the board took a suit to court asking that the 1895 Tribune lease be declared illegal.

The Circuit Court held the lease proper and binding. For these actions the Dunne Board members were accused by the Tribune of being "tools of the Federation." The CTF lost the battle for revaluation and the leases stood
till 1985; but from then on, the Tribune seldom lost an opportunity for attacking the federation on any ground. 31

EDWIN COOLEY AND HIS SECRET MARKING SYSTEM

The board gave Superintendent Andrews's successor, Edwin Cooley, a five-year instead of a one-year term of office, and it quickly adopted the new superintendent's plan for raises in experienced teacher's salaries. Under Cooley's proposal teachers would receive raises not according to their experience, but according to their "merit" as measured by examinations and supervisors' ratings.

Applicants for the eighth step, on a ten step system would have to take promotional examinations, the first of which would be given in 1902. (If teachers showed enough credits from a degree granting institution or from normal school they might be excused from the promotional examination). A grade of 80 percent was required for passing the examination. In addition, the applicant must receive at least an 80 percent efficiency mark by the principal. To avoid the problem of political influence, he made his ratings secret and thereby raised a storm of protest from all kinds of teachers.

The CTF opposed the plan, arguing that its conception of merit by examination and supervisory rating was abstract, unrealistic and unrelated to the actual work of teachers. The examination provisions applied to teachers
with more than seven years' experience -- a direct attack at the older CTF members. The secrecy of the rating was the biggest point of controversy however. In 1903 the Chicago Federation of Labor urged superintendent Cooley to give all teachers copies of their ratings.32

At their July 1902 meeting the board approved for fall the merit plan with its secret marking system. This was the same meeting at which the board decided to use the new tax money won by the CTF for building and maintenance.33 After Dunne's election as mayor in 1905, the new members of the Dunne board gave the teachers the right to know their scores and arranged that teachers might go one afternoon a week for ten weeks to normal extension classes every other year.34 By the spring of 1906 seven more Dunne appointees were added to the board. The new board inquired into the secret marking and merit system. An investigation committee discovered that by holding experience and grade level constant, there were no differences between the average efficiency marks of the group of people who advanced to the eighth step and those who did not. Because of these findings the board abolished the Cooley system, adopted a new promotion plan, and discarded the secret marking system along with percentage scores. Principals were to share their evaluations with teachers, who were to be rated as either "efficient" or "inefficient." Efficient teachers would automatically advance toward the maximum salary level.35
When Fred Busse became mayor, in 1907, he lost no time in trying to remove the Dunne appointees from the board. The Dunne group had to go to court to retain their position. This court action took time and from May 1907 to January 1908 the deposed board members waited for action in court. By 15 January they were legally reinstated, but it was too late in certain respects. They had been ousted long enough for Cooley to be reelected and the modified Cooley plan to be readopted. The salary advances for the 2,600 teachers were also rescinded at this July 1907 board meeting. By 1909 Cooley tendered his resignation, effective March 1909. He stated poor health as his reason, but he did accept the presidency of the D.C. Heath Company at an annual salary of $25,000. 36

AFFILIATION WITH LABOR

These actions taken by the board during the tax fight helped the federation in making their decision to affiliate with the Chicago Federation of Labor. At a meeting of the CTF called in 1902 to discuss the merits of affiliation, Jane Addams spoke in favor of unionization and tipped the balance of members' opinion in favor of it. Haley seized the opportunity and immediately pushed for affiliation. The reasons were given by Margaret Haley herself:

The only people you can depend on to act permanently with you are those whose interest are identical with
yours. We expect by affiliation with labor to arouse
the workers and the whole people . . . to the
dangers of confronting the public schools from the
same interests and tendencies that are undermining
the foundations of our republic.37

The CTF membership did not share Haley's enthusiasm for the
workers. In a dispute on the matter the elected president
resigned believing that teachers should not align themselves
with any one class of the population, but most of the
membership supported Haley's position and joined the Chicago
Federation of Labor in 1902.

The newspapers at the time did not support the
federation's affiliation with labor. On 24 January 1902 the
Tribune stated, "It is not enough for a teacher to teach,
she must also be a trade unionist, referendum enthusiast, a
municipal ownership worker and a politician generally. . . .
Discipline and efficiency in the schools will give way."
The Daily News of 12 November 1902 stated, "Labor affiliation
for teachers was clearly untenable." The opposition of the
press continued so that on 27 January 1905 the Chronicle
asserted, "A teacher must be neutral . . . that character
and citizenship could not be taught by a teacher in a labor
organization which taught hatred of other classes." The
board of education itself held a meeting on 21 June 1905:
"The board then voted 13-6 to condemn teacher affiliation
with the Chicago Federation of Labor as absolutely
unjustifiable and intolerable in a school system of a
democracy."
By 1915 the anti-labor faction had developed considerable influence within the Chicago Board of Education. Jacob Loeb, the leader of the anti-labor board members, took it upon himself to rid the Chicago schools of the labor menace in the teaching ranks. The CTF and the Loeb members of the school board clashed over a reported deficit of $600,000 in the school budget: Loeb used this shortage as an issue to investigate economy and efficiency in the schools. The investigation led to the idea of cutting teacher salaries. The CTF responded by developing, with Superintendent Ella Flagg Young, an alternative to salary cuts and was successful in obtaining a tax increase from the state legislature. The board still wanted to proceed with the idea of salary cuts but backed away when faced with a wave of political opposition stirred up by the CTF.38

In August 1915 the board got ready for another attack on the teachers. One of the committees chaired by Loeb recommended that no teacher be employed who belonged to an organization which affiliated with labor or which employed full-time paid staff who were not teaching in the schools. The target of the committee was Haley and the CTF, but others fell into the web including any who were affiliated with the state teachers' association. The CTF and other labor-affiliated teachers' groups on 23 September 1915 asked for and obtained an injunction against the enforcement of this rule. The court held that the rule was arbitrary and
would make it impossible for any Chicago teacher to belong to even the National Education Association. The board on 29 September 1915 narrowed its rule specifically to the federation claiming that the organization was "hostile to discipline, prejudicial to the efficiency of the teaching force and detrimental to the welfare of the Schools." This was academic for a time because no teacher could be dismissed until June, by the terms of the 1895 pension law, without an individual trial. Thus, the federation and the board waited till the end of the term.

In June of 1916 as the time neared for the annual rehiring of every teacher, the board obtained a judicial reversal of the tenure provision of the pension law of 1895. Acting on this, they voted not to rehire sixty-eight teachers for the 1916-17 school year, thirty-eight of whom were CTF officers and members. Clearly, the board intended to destroy the influence of the CTF.

The CTF went to court to fight the board's campaign to break the CTF with a "Yellow Dog" contract. After lengthy litigation the Illinois Supreme Court ruled, in 1917, that the board had the power to decide arbitrarily against union membership for its teachers. "The school board had the absolute right to decline to employ or reemploy an applicant for any reason whatever or for no reason at all." The Board was not obligated to offer reasons for its policy: "It is free to contract with whomsoever it chooses."
Reaching the end of its legal course of action, the CTF was forced to disaffiliate from labor. Haley and the CTF leadership prepared to withdraw from the labor movement in order to gain reinstatement of the fired teachers and preservation of the federation as an unaffiliated organization. On 21 May 1917, the CTF announced it was leaving the Chicago Federation of Labor, the Illinois State Federation of Labor, the AFT and the Women's Trade Union League. On 13 June, the board rehired the dismissed teachers, indicating that its war with the CTF was over. The CTF's affiliation with labor ended for the same reasons it began; i.e., to enhance their teaching positions.\(^41\)

**THE BOARD RUNS OUT OF MONEY**

The financial picture had been dark even before the crash of 1929. Plagued by an inefficient bureaucracy and a notoriously corrupt tie with politics, the school system was in deep financial trouble. The failure of the tax assessor's office to assess property properly meant glaring inequalities in the tax structure. With the beginning of the slump and the resulting delinquency in tax payments came greater crises. Although the stock market did not crash until October 1929, the effects were felt in Chicago as early as January 1930 when teachers' pay checks were held for two months. From then on, the salary situation grew worse until the summer of 1934 when the federal RFC loaned
the board of education money. During this entire period of four and one-half years, nine salary checks were received on time, and the remaining payments were delayed for periods ranging from one week to ten months. The teachers were alternately paid with cash, tax warrants, and a worthless scrip at which merchants sneered. The scrip theoretically could be redeemed for cash as, and if, the city's largest corporations paid their municipal taxes, but fewer and fewer were paying until finally in April of 1932, the school board went over completely to scrip; there simply was no more cash. 42

The business community, organized a committee called Chicago Citizens Committee under the leadership of Frederick Sargent. Sargent was President of the Chicago Northwestern Railroad. This committee justified the business community's action of non-payment of taxes by charging that the city had done too little to lower its expenditures. Among other drastic measures, the committee also demanded massive layoff of teachers and a doubling of class size in order to cut spending.

VOLUNTEER EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

The men and women's high-school groups had cooperated since 1916 and had by 1929 organized four more union locals -- one for elementary teachers, one for playground teachers, one for truant officers and one for
school clerks. These six groups had a joint board organization, a constitution, a common office, and several clerical workers and competent attorneys. Teachers never before active in any organization, began to work together with those who had been active under the Volunteer Emergency Committee.

The committee announced that it did not want to become a permanent organization; it was to operate only until pay was forthcoming. It was composed of four high-school teachers, one of whom, was John Fewkes. He had gained attention due to his defiant oratory. "Let them fire all of us," he once told a rally of unpaid teachers, his raised fist clenched, and "I hope they heard us loud and clear."43

In March 1933, the volunteer Emergency Committee called for a large parade of all Chicago teachers, neighborhood mass meetings of parents, and pupils, the elimination of organizational jealousy and conflict, and the unification of everybody in the Chicago schools being an immediate action program.44

Fewkes warned of disruptions, but no one listened. Just to show the city he and the committee were serious fifteen thousand students were unleashed in the loop on 5 April 1933. The students who respected Fewkes, made a lot of noise, broke a few windows and demanded full pay for their teachers.45 Ten days later, a committee-sponsored mass parade took place. A march led by Fewkes of twenty-thousand
parents and children paraded around the mayor's office. Mayor Kelly informed Fewkes that there wasn't enough money to pay the teachers, because the larger corporations simply were not paying their taxes and the largest banks were holding on to any other income the city was due. Fewkes's attention then turned to the bankers.

On 24 April 1933 (part of the Easter recess,) Fewkes and his assistants in the committee assembled five thousand teachers in the loop. The teachers were not aware of what they were to do since their orders were sealed in envelopes and not to be opened until the parade began. Around eight thousand teachers marched down Michigan Avenue from Congress Street to the City National Bank demanding to see Charles G. Dawes, Chairman of the Board of the City National Bank. When Dawes appeared before the crowd a teacher shouted "Hey, Charley give us our money," and the group shouted "pay us! pay us!" When Dawes had a chance to speak to the crowd he said, "I have only one thing to say to people like you", 'to hell with troublemakers'." The crowd responded by tearing up the bank and creating havoc. Later, Fewkes led a small delegation to the mayor who once more said there was no money.46

Two days later, the teachers returned to the loop, with a smaller group -- this time all men who brought their school books with them. This group marched to the Chicago Title and Trust Company. The mounted police tried to stop
them but the teachers threw their books at the horses who bucked allowing the teachers to get into the Title and Trust Building. There were smashed windows and mirrors and the building was ransacked. Fewkes returned again to Mayor Kelly's office where Governor Henry Horner was investigating the first violent actions ten days earlier. When school resumed the following week, the Chicago teachers were paid, part of their back pay, in cash. In July the teachers staged a mass meeting to avow their militancy. The grave situation continued, however, until the Reconstruction Finance Corporation gave a $3 million loan to the city, thereby persuading the banks to loan money to the board who in turn used their school lands as collateral. 47

ESTABLISHING A SINGLE UNION

During the crisis of the 1930s everyone saw the advantage of establishing a united front when dealing with the board or politicians. In May 1936 the Men Teachers Union elected as president John Fewkes on a platform calling for amalgamation of the teachers unions. Letters of invitation to discuss possible unity went out to all teacher organizations. The only two to refuse were the federation (CTF) and the High-School Association, a local branch of the NEA. The latter said that they "did not believe in labor affiliation."
The union joint board held a series of open meetings beginning in January 1937 on amalgamation. By April the four groups representing teachers had elected a council, with one representative for each hundred members, who chose as temporary officers John Fewkes, Helen Taggart, President of the Federation of Women High School Teachers and Kathleen Crain, a member of the Elementary Teachers Union.

By the end of May, all four union groups all voted to return their charters and ask for one charter. In a ceremony in 1937 the four groups gave up their charters to the Secretary-Treasurer of the American Federation of Teachers. John Fewkes as president received a charter for the new organization. It was Local One, the old number of the CTF, not used since 1917. In December of 1937 an official election was held to elect permanent officers and an executive board, representing all parts of the organization from elementary teachers to principals. Fewkes won again for president. By the beginning of 1938, this new union was doing very well with 8,200 teachers as members. This was two-thirds of the entire teaching force.48

Fewkes continued as president until 1941. Then Ira Turley and Arthur Walz became presidents from 1941 to 1947. The political school situation was not calm and Turley and Walz were seen as weak inefficient presidents. Probably teachers remembered the forcefulness of Fewkes during the post depression period. At any rate, Fewkes was relected as
president in the 1947 CTU election. He found that he had inherited problems that had been pushed aside during those "payless paydays." Most of the problems stemmed from attempts of the teaching force to gain more control over their professional lives. However, the board continued to ignore or resist their efforts in the same manner that they always had in the past. What follows is an account of this interaction and an analysis of the CTU leadership across the years that led to Chicago's first teacher strike. This account is presented in hopes of better understanding the complexity of the situation that led to this outcome.
CHAPTER ONE NOTES


2. City of Chicago, *Report of the Superintendent of Schools* (Chicago: Board of Inspectors, 1855); 12.


5. This scale was only for elementary teachers because Chicago did not have a high school until 1856 when Central high school was established at Halsted and Monroe street.


13. Ibid.


15. "Teachers gain Point," *Chicago Record Herald*, 2 February 1902. The Federation had started, in 1898, a salary petition which was unsuccessful this was why the Federation started to speak out against the Board.
16. "Minutes of CTF," 20 January 1900, 16 May 1903, 22 February 1902, 22 March 1902, 24 February 1900, 13 February 1903, Box 1, Chicago Teachers Federation Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


22. Times Herald, 27 January; Chicago Tribune, 16 March 1900; Chicago Daily News, 10 October 1900; Chicago Chronicle, 17 November 1900.


26. Smith, Ella Flag Young, 137.


28. "To the Federation Correspondent," 15 November 1904, Box 38, "To the Teachers of Chicago," 1 December 1908, Box 39, "What has the Chicago Teachers Federation Done for me?" 28 September 1912, Box 41. "The Chicago Teachers' Federation will Hold Three Meetings," October 1914, Box 42 Folder "May - December, 1915, Chicago Teachers Federations Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago."

30. The president of the board was also the chair of the committee on school fund property. It was his recommendation that a non-revaluation change be added to the lease of some properties.


37. "CTF Minutes," 4 October, 18 October, 8 November, 22 November, 6 December 1902, Box 1; "Fitzpatrick to the Chicago Teachers Federation," 16 October 1902, Box 39; "To the Teachers of Chicago," 1 December 1908, Box 39, Chicago Teachers Federation Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


40. The People v. City of Chicago, 278 ILL. 318, (1917).


44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 46.


CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF FEWKES

Once the salaries were restored and the CTU was born many board policies and practices that had been ignored were examined by the teachers. The controversy in Chicago schools was analyzed by George Counts in his book *School and Society in Chicago*.¹ In this he studied the Chicago school system in the 1920s when William Hale Thompson was mayor. Thompson's influence was not lasting on the school system but board of education president James B. McCahey did leave a lasting impression. From 1933 to 1945 when McCahey was president the administration was strongly tied to controversy. During this administration, there were many charges that the school leaders were nothing more than servants of partisan politics. The specific charge was personnel practices based upon political or personal favoritism. This was shown by the grading of the principal's examination of 1936-37 and the abuse of public office by board members and the superintendent for private gain. It was in 1936 that William H. Johnson became superintendent of schools, moving up from assistant superintendent under
Superintendent Bogan. During his administration civic and professional groups assumed leadership roles in confronting the school administration and trying to adjust unethical practices. One of the most vocal groups was the Citizen's Schools Committee. This organization was founded in 1933 for the purpose of protesting a drastic cutback in public school programs and it became known as "the School Wrecking Program." McCahey had insisted upon it as a depression measure. The allegations protesting board policies and practices continued to go unheeded for many years until 1946, when the board entered into conflict with the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools (NCA).

THE NORTH CENTRAL CONTROVERSY

The NCA was the authority that approved high schools and programs. Thus in 1946, the NCA issued a warning to Chicago. The terms of the warning were:

The future status of membership and accreditation of the Chicago public high schools by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools will be dependent upon the taking of appropriate action by the electorate of the City of Chicago through their elected representatives; namely, their Mayor, their City Council, and their representatives in the Legislature of the State of Illinois to meet the following recommendations the administrative responsibility be centered in the office of the Superintendent of Schools [and] a politically independent board of education be provided.

The warning involved the 1936-37 principal's examination, intimidation of faculty members, salaries and tenure, and the use of transfers for punitive purposes. The
essence of the report was that the administration was using the schools for political patronage. It also covered areas such as overcrowded classes, and McCahey's drive to control all administrative policies; the possibility of financial problems; and superintendent Johnson's publishing contracts with textbook companies.3

The warning of the NCA was not to be taken lightly; it could be an embarrassment to the board of education and the city administration, and in certain hands it could be a political weapon. In an attempt to avoid loss of accreditation, Mayor Kelly formed an advisory committee which was composed of university presidents to make recommendations to the mayor on the improvement of schools. The committee was chaired by Dr. Henry Heald of the Illinois Institute of Technology. On 17 June 1946 the Heald committee released its report to the press.

The recommendations of the committee served as an impetus for reform of the system and were two-fold. First, the mayor should create a non-partisan advisory board made up of educators and community leaders who would nominate eligible citizens for school board appointments. Second, the present administrative system of the board should be revamped so that power would be concentrated in one chief executive officer, the superintendent, instead of having a business manager, attorney and superintendent. The change would remove conflict from different parts of the
administration and leave the board and its president free from resolving problems of overlapping authority. The second recommendation was conditional upon the mayor's request for the resignation of Superintendent Johnson. The NCA report stated, "the committee believes that Dr. Johnson does not possess all the qualifications necessary for the highest performance in the office of superintendent of schools to the city of Chicago." 4

When the Heald committee report was made public, William H. Johnson, superintendent since 1936, resigned. The mayor in accordance with the Heald committee established a advisory commission on school board nominations. Within a short time a number of board members resigned or their terms expired giving the new commission a chance to nominate six of the eleven board members. Although McCahey stayed on as board president, most of his power was gone.

With Mayor Kelly's announcement in 1947 not to seek a fourth term the Democratic machine knew that to keep any form of power, they must select a reform candidate. There choice was Martin H. Kennelly a respected Chicago businessman who had little contact with the local political organization. Kennelly won the election with his winning slogan "We cannot have a great city without a great school system." One of the new mayor's first acts was to select six new candidates from the nominating panel's list and have them immediately sworn into office. While this was occurring
in April 1947, James B. McCahey left the presidency of the board and was replaced by Charles J. Whipple who was also a businessman with no local political connections. In 1947 the reform movement in Chicago public schools had made great strides: six new board members had been appointed; Superintendent Johnson had resigned being replaced by his deputy, acting superintendent George F. Cassell; and McCahey was gone. Unfortunately all of this had left a mark on the school system so that many new prospective candidates for the superintendency were frightened away.5

ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM

The new school board had inherited the problems of the old administration, and the conflict with the North Central Association still had to be handled. The association had wanted to center all administrative responsibilities in the office of the superintendent of schools. Under the chairmanship of President Charles J. Whipple, a committee of the board was trying to comply with the NCA recommendations.

The Citizen's Schools Committee, which had been one of the vocal attackers of the old administration, was one of many groups who wanted to have its voice heard on the selection and choice of the new superintendent. It warned the board that no candidate with Johnson-McCahey ties would be acceptable. They feared that anyone with connections to the old regime would not be serious in trying to bring about
school reform. In the meantime a second committee of the board was working on a model that would allow for this centralization of power. At a meeting on 14 February 1947 the board agreed to sponsor a bill amending the 1917 Otis Law so that one administrative head of the Chicago public schools would be established. On 4 June 1947 the law was officially changed. The school attorney and the business manager also came under the direction of the General Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools. Below is a partial text of the new law.

The board shall by a vote of a majority of its full membership appoint a superintendent of schools. He shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the Board and shall have charge and control, of all departments and of the employees therein of the public schools. He shall hold his office for a term of four years with the approval of the board he shall appoint a business manager in charge of the business department, an attorney in charge of the law department and assistants in charge of such of such other departments as may be established. . . . The Superintendent of Schools shall have charge and control, subject to the approval of the board, of all purchases, the making of contracts and leases. . . .

On the day following the new legislation the board announced the selection of a new general superintendent of schools. Since the two NCA conditions were met, the threat of loss of accreditation was dropped. According to the Chicago Daily News of 5 June 1947, "The school's future is brighter. Legislation has given the new superintendent ample authority to make education, instead of jobs or politics, the paramount interest of the system." The next thing the board had to do was to select a new superintendent. One of
the candidates considered for the job was Herold C. Hunt, the current superintendent in Kansas City. Hunt had been approached earlier and had refused to accept unless the superintendent was given expanded jurisdiction over the entire school system rather than just the instructional branch. When the Otis law was finally changed Hunt formally accepted. On 23 May 1947 (within a month of Hunt's appointment) John Fewkes was again elected president of the Chicago Teachers' Union.

ESTABLISHING RELATIONS

Fewkes lost no time in establishing relations with the new superintendent. In a press release the union expressed "professional greetings and cordial good wishes to Dr. Herold C. Hunt upon his appointment to the superintendency of the Chicago public schools." In the first issue of the Chicago Union Teacher for the 1947-48 school year, the front page had a picture of Hunt with a note of greeting "offering full cooperation," and a letter from Hunt in which he remarked that he anticipated "the continuance of the pleasant and constructive professional association already begun." In the letter to Dr. Hunt, Fewkes stated:

The teachers of Chicago were heartened by the report in the newspapers of your announcement that you intend to work for a special session of the legislature to obtain funds to put the salary schedule into effect, and that if that failed to produce the necessary funds, that you felt the tax rate should be raised.
This was not the John Fewkes of earlier years who had led demonstrations against the board. He now believed in "quiet diplomacy" and "personnel negotiations," which at times he was to confuse with collective bargaining.

The CTU had in its possession an evaluation of Dr. Hunt conducted by the local AFT in Kansas City, where Hunt had been prior to his appointment in Chicago. It reported that Hunt was "inconsistent and partial in dealing with teachers, intolerant of those who did not agree with him, undemocratic in his procedures, and unwilling to work actively for adequate salaries for teachers." The local concluded that in theory "Dr. Hunt is a liberal but he cannot tolerate opposition. Under Dr. Hunt's administration many committees of teachers have been set up, but they are not permitted freedom of work, action or choice . . . . The tendency has been to increase administrative personnel and to increase their salaries out of proportion to the teaching staff.14 Hunt, who was considered authoritarian by the Kansas City local, planned to take a different approach in Chicago because of the opposition to the authoritarianism of Johnson and McCahey.15 Biographer Kay Kamin believes that the democratic style was Hunt's natural style and the circumstances in Chicago favored Hunt's own personality and administrative theory and practice. Kamin puts it this way:

He intended to try and work toward democratic leadership because he did not want to commit himself to any course of action until he actually stepped into
office and consulted those who were concerned about the school situation.\textsuperscript{16}

Hunt accepted the union's invitation to attend their tenth anniversary celebration on 3 October 1947. This was the first time a superintendent had come to any CTU function. At the meeting Hunt promised that politics would no longer be involved in assignments and promotion. Afterwards in a thank you letter to Dr. Hunt John Fewkes said:

The Chicago Teachers Union is greatly appreciative of your presence and the fine speech that you made at our Tenth Anniversary Celebration . . . it is one of complete satisfaction. It seemed to me that the entire occasion was one of friendliness and great hope for the future.\textsuperscript{17}

In comparison to Johnson Hunt was considered more democratic. However in actual practice there still was little involvement of teachers in the development of school policies.

THE SALARY ISSUE

The salary schedule in January 1946 was not too different from the one in 1922: in 1922 a beginning high school teacher was paid $2,200 and in 1946 a first year high school teacher was paid $2,350. The difference was $150 but the cost of living increased more than that which in effect decreased the buying power of the teacher. In 1944 elementary teachers were given a $125 raise, but the requirements for the job had risen from the two years at a normal school to a four year college degree. In 1946 the
CTU asked for a $400 raise for high school teachers. Elementary teachers would receive five-sixths of this amount because elementary teachers worked a five-hour day as opposed to a six hour-day in high school. They also wanted a single salary schedule for the following reason:

A single salary schedule provides that the salaries of all classroom teachers shall depend entirely upon training and experience and not on the grade taught. Under a single salary schedule elementary teachers are paid at the same rate as high school teachers of like experience. It is based on the principle of equal pay for equal work. . . . It provides the same rates per hour for both elementary and high school teachers.¹⁸

However, the board of education responded with a $225 raise for elementary teachers and a $150 raise for high school teachers.¹⁹ The union was not happy with the salary schedule the board approved, so in response they prepared a 1947 salary schedule linking salary to the purchasing power of 1940. This required increases from $350 at the beginning level to $740 at maximum level. The request was made for a single salary schedule using the five-sixths method again. The union also asked for a reduction in the number of steps from nine to eight.²⁰ The board knew that it did not have enough money to fund a raise. Therefore, the CTU appealed to Governor Green for an emergency session of the legislature to increase funding for public schools. The governor, being a Republican, did not feel the need to satisfy the democratic administration of Chicago and no special session was ever called. Consequently the CTU approached the board directly with a salary proposal. Two days later the board
voted an increase which was exactly what the union wanted, but with the following condition: "To meet these salary increases, the board must seek either an increase in the tax rate or an increase in the amount received from the State Distributive Fund."\textsuperscript{21}

In August 1947 Fewkes sent a supplementary schedule to the board. It stated that it would cost the board $17,550,000 in increases to adjust the salary to the cost of living since January. He also asked the superintendent to help gain additional funds for the school system:

We hope as stated in our previous letter that aid from the State and saving through elimination of waste may make the burden on the property tax less than indicated. The cost of $17,550,000 if raised entirely by property tax would necessitate adding .26 to the tax rate. HOWEVER, IF OTHER MEANS CANNOT BE OBTAINED, WE BELIEVE THE CITIZENS OF CHICAGO SHOULD SHARE WITH THE TEACHERS THE HEAVY BURDEN WE HAVE CARRIED FOR OUR FELLOW TAX PAYERS DURING THE PAST 16 YEARS.\textsuperscript{22}

The CTU was still working to persuade Governor Green to call a special session of the legislature for increased state aid. The union stated that Chicago provided 50 percent of the state sales tax and received 23 percent of the State Distributive Fund. The governor's response was that the state had increased its aid by 155 percent since 1941.\textsuperscript{23} In the budget hearing on 9 January 1948 John Fewkes made a public statement on the matter of salary:

The increases contemplated in the budget for the salaries of employees do not fully meet the rise in the cost of living. They are based on conditions prevailing a year ago and do not take into
consideration the fact that living costs have increased over 15% during the year 1947. The members of the Chicago Teachers Union are willing to accept for the year 1948 the schedule adopted on 8 January 1948 except for the minor changes which the union has previously suggested to the board of education.  

To increase the tax rate the board of education needed the approval of the city council. This was due to a quirk in the law requiring that the board (not being an elected body) have an elected branch of government (the city council) approve the tax rate. The council was dragging its feet due to opposition from politicians and ward bosses who did not want a tax increase. The union responded by having their major elected body, the house of representatives, meet on 24 January 1948. It gave the executive board of the union the power to call a strike if the council refused to approve the board's budget and the tax rate increase. The date of the strike was to be 27 January 1948 giving the council only three days. Fewkes said that the union's executive board would call a strike if there be further unreasonable delay in the release of teachers' pay checks based on the 1948 salary schedule as provided in the Board of Education budget as passed on January 20, 1948, and/or further delay in the passage of the budget of the Board of Education by the City Council. . . . However, if the City Council continues to refuse to pass the Board of Education budget, the responsibility for a strike will rest squarely upon the aldermen.
The opposition in the council collapsed and the board's budget was approved in time to avoid a strike. The increased tax levy approved by the city council had been needed. One result of the battle was the renewed interest by the union in securing collective bargaining. In February 1947 the union's education committee prepared a document for the house of representatives entitled "Policies to be decided in the Development of Collective Bargaining Procedures." A year later it was presented to the house of representatives. There were eighteen major points in the document. The first one stated that there should be, "The establishment, when desirable, of a special action Committee of from 3 to 5 members, to perform functions of handling grievances and problems, which delegates will handle in other schools." Since public employees were not part of the National Labor Relations Act, which made private employers recognize one organization to which the majority of employees belonged, there was no legal way to force recognition of the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the teachers. The union had always wanted to be the bargaining agent and had expressed this desire to Dr. Hunt at their first meeting.  

THE FEWKES -- HUNT STYLES

During the Hunt administration cooperation between the board members, the administration, and the union reached
a high point. In 1948 when the city council refused to approve the school tax rate increase by non action, Charles J. Whipple, Herold C. Hunt and John Fewkes stood side by side before the city council to point out that they had no legal control over the tax levy voted by the board except, as an elected agency to declare it valid.27

Unfortunately the success achieved by the union in the 1948 salary negotiations was not repeated the following year due, once again, to lack of money. The union, nevertheless, still prepared its salary demands and listed them in a proposal dated 27 September 1948. This proposal stated that in order to show the serious financial situation which the teachers face, we propose to compare salaries today with salaries granted by the Board of Education in the budget adopted January 1940. For basis of comparison we shall use the maximum salary of a high school teacher. In January 1940 it was $3,515. If the salary of the high school teacher at the maximum today were to have the same purchasing power as $3,515 had in January 1940, it would have to be $6,300. Instead the maximum high school salary is about three-fourths of that amount, or $4,800. The comparison of take-home pay would show that the situation is even more serious than the above figure indicates .... We also recommend to the Board of Education and the General Superintendent the principle of recognizing additional training above the Bachelor's Degree and that the increment for a Master's Degree or for two years of college work beyond the Bachelor's Degree be $300.28

On 13 December 1948 the union made some changes and sent a supplementary schedule to the board urging them to be "fair and equitable and to be thoroughly justified by increases in the cost of living and shrinkage in the value of the dollar."29 When it came time for the formal hearing on 20
December 1948 John Fewkes presented the union's proposal. He reiterated their four major requests:

1. We request that the Board of Education adopt an equitable salary schedule for 1949 even though funds are not available to put it entirely into effect in January.
2. The Union urges the Board of Education to use all available savings accomplished by its economy program in 1948.
3. We suggest that the Board of Education take the lead in attempts to secure additional emergency funds from the state of Illinois as early as possible in 1949.
4. We urge that the entire new salary schedule be put into effect immediately upon funds becoming available.30

The board did not have the necessary funds to give the teachers a raise in 1949, so they did not pass any salary increases for that year. During 1949 the situation grew so bad that Hunt said in March "obligations are accumulating to such an extent that progress has stopped and actually ground is being lost."31 In a letter to president Traynor on 17 January 1950, Fewkes requested a meeting with the board's finance committee to discuss ways of finding the funds for a salary increase. The following October the union was back with a new proposal for the 1951 budget. On 8 November 1950 the union sent Hunt their salary proposal. This time the union asked for a 10 percent raise over the previous year and also for a salary increase for advanced educational achievement beyond the bachelor's degree. It was asking for a three hundred dollar increase for a master's degree or two years beyond a bachelor's degree. On 18 December 1950 the union formally presented its demands to
the board. In January of 1951 the board granted a salary schedule (elementary $2,700-4,540 and high school $3,200-5,445) based on a percentage basis opposed by the union.

The negotiations for the 1952 salary schedule were started when Dr. Hunt took the lead, and on 17 November 1951 he proposed a single salary schedule which completely equalized the pay of elementary and high school teachers. This was done by eliminating the difference in the number of hours taught. Dr. Hunt also proposed a schedule of fourteen steps and a three hundred dollar differential for education beyond the bachelor's degree:

The day in the elementary schools will be extended to make it more nearly equal to the high school day. The additional time in the elementary schools will be used for additional teaching time for conferences. . . . In 1952 teachers in the elementary schools with less than a Bachelor's Degree will be placed on the single salary schedule in the same manner as though they had a Bachelor's Degree. In 1952 teachers in the high schools with less than a Master's degree will be placed on the single salary schedule in the same manner as though they had a Master's degree.32

Fewkes responded that the salary schedule was developed by an autocratic not democratic process of discussion. Therefore, Fewkes was asking that their salary schedule be adopted:

Thus the schedule presented by the Chicago Teachers Union not only has the approval by each functional group of the salary request for its own category, but also has the approval of all functional groups of the salaries requested for the other functional groups. 33

In October 1951 the union proposed the same salary schedule it had submitted the previous year. In a letter to
Traynor on 2 October 1951 the CTU's House of Representatives rejected Hunt's unified salary schedule unanimously. The reasons Fewkes stated in his report was that the proposal provided meager increases and in some cases actually resulted in decreases in salary. The board did not accept Hunt's plan and voted an 8 percent increase on the old five-sixths scale as the union had requested. This made the maximums $4,910 for elementary teachers and $5,890 for high school teachers. The union had also wanted a two hundred dollar "across-the-board" increase in each step. This the board did not do.

By September 1952 the union was looking to the 1953 salary schedule and decided to ask for a significant salary increase of 35 percent. Dr. Hunt responded with a single salary schedule similar to the one he asked for in 1951 for the 1952 calendar year. In support of the union's salary request for a significant increase Fewkes said:

Union salary requests for 1953 approximate an increase of 35-36% over present salary levels. It would require 35% of about $94,000,000 or $32,000,000. In order to raise this amount by present modes of taxation, the Educational Fund levy would have to be hiked about 40 cents or from $0.993 per $100.00 valuation to about $1.39 or a 31% increase. Since 1948 the total tax rate has risen about 13%, while the rate for the Board of Education increased about 7% or less than for other tax collecting bodies in Cook County and Chicago.

The formal presentation to the board was 19 November 1952. In response to this request on 1 December 1952 Hunt wrote the board that he could not see how such an
increase could be accepted. Thus on 4 January 1953 the CTU submitted an alternate salary schedule. This proved to be a little too late because the board had already passed their budget for 1953 with no salary increases for teachers. When the union asked for an eight thousand dollar maximum in 1953 and received nothing on 6 February 1953, a letter was sent to Dr. Hunt asking for a meeting and thanking him for his efforts. Dr. Hunt responded that he would schedule a meeting, but not just with the CTU. Instead, it would include all Chicago teacher organizations. For this meeting Fewkes authorized the union's professional problems committee to develop a plan under the chairmanship of Charles Monroe. They drafted a plan for a single salary schedule. The professional problems committee's plan stated that:

Insistent demands of the Board of Education and various civic groups that some "single salary plan" be adopted before any possible increases are granted makes it necessary for the union to assume prompt and positive leadership in the establishment of any such salary schedule. Furthermore, General Superintendent Hunt has asked representatives of teachers' organizations to attend a meeting on the single salary question on February 28, 1953. Re-consideration of such a salary proposal is being insisted upon by the Board of Education at this time in anticipation of increased state funds and, in turn, a possible budget revision in July to make a new salary schedule effective in September.

The meeting was postponed by Dr. Hunt until 6 March 1953 and the CTU's House of Representatives approved the plan of the professional problems committee on 27 February 1953. However, they never met because Dr. Herold Hunt resigned to
accept a position at Harvard University. Hunt's announcement of resignation shocked everyone. On 1 March 1953 Fewkes wrote the presidents of the PTA chapters asking them to work to retain Dr. Hunt, but Hunt would not reconsider. 38

The board of education was free to pick a successor. Some on the board favored an insider this time because Dr. Hunt was from outside the system; others wanted an outsider. The decision to look inside or outside the system placed some board members against others.


6. If the Citizens School Committee got their wish no one connected with the old regime would be considered for the superintendent's position. Then, George F. Cassell, the acting superintendent, would not be considered for the post or anyone currently working for the board.


9. Hunt was approved as the first General Superintendent of Chicago public schools by a unanimous vote of the board of education on 2 July 1947. Chicago Board of Education Proceedings, 2 July 1947, 1291. The first time the board talked of the matter there was a split, on whom to pick, some board members wanted a local candidate who was presently serving with the Chicago schools, but when the local candidate (George F. Cassell, acting superintendent) refused the position it was given to Hunt unanimously.


15. The reformers were in control, but there was still politics to be found. Mayor Kennelly who was a reform mayor found it necessary due to political pressure to re-appoint Bernard Majewski to the board in 1951 even though he was still a machine loyalist. It must be remembered that it was the machine that slated Kennelly and worked to elect him.


20. "Proposed New Salary Schedule for 1947," 11 October 1946, All salary schedules from 1926-56 are in Box 26, Folders 5-7, From 1956-68 are in Box 27, Folders 1-6, and the schedule for 1968-69 are in Box 28, Folders 1-2, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago. Also see letter "John Fewkes to Herold Hunt," 7 August 1947, Most of Hunt's correspondence with the union from 1946-55 are in Box 24, Folder 4, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


25. "John Fewkes to CTU School Delegates," 24 January 1948, Box 26, Folders 5-7 contains internal union memos, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago; *Chicago Union Teacher*, January 1948, Box 80, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

26. *Chicago Union Teacher Magazine*, June and February 1943, Box 78, Folder 6, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

27. *Chicago Union Teacher*, January and February 1948, Box 80, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


32. "A suggested single salary schedule presented to teachers for discussion by Dr. Herold C. Hunt," 17 November 1951, Box 26, Folder 7, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

33. "John Fewkes to members of the CTU House of Representatives," 20 November 1951, Box 27, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

34. Ibid.


36. Fewkes was hurt by this action. He believed that, as president, he had established a good working relationship with Dr. Hunt. The CTU represented over half of the Chicago teachers' and this action put the CTU on the same status as organizations that represented only a few teachers.

37. "An alternative salary proposal presented by the union committee on professional problems for consideration of the membership of the Chicago Teachers Union," Charles Monroe, Chairman of the Professional Problems Committee, 17 February 1953, Box 26, Folder 7, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

CHAPTER III

FEWKES AND WILLIS

William Traynor, President of the Chicago Board of Education in 1953 insisted on a nation wide search for a new superintendent. There were a few board members, with ties to the political organization, who wanted Bernard Majewski, an insider. The other board members however had the votes to conduct a nationwide search. By the end of May it was apparent that Benjamin C. Wills, superintendent of schools in Buffalo, was the preferred candidate by the majority of the board. In closed session the board voted six to zero for Willis, with five abstentions. By the time the formal vote came it was unanimous. Willis was on his way to Chicago. ¹

On 3 June 1953, in a Sun Times editorial, Willis's work in Buffalo was discussed. The article stated that his achievements were accomplished through reorganization of the educational system to eliminate waste and make the schools more efficient. In an article written by Willis himself for the Chicago American, he stated as his major concern: "The most effective and economical use of the facilities must be made, consistent with a good educational program. Efficiency
in organization is essential if maximum educational opportunities are to be provided."²

Fewkes was not standing still at this time. At a house of representatives meeting of the union on 16 September 1953, a committee on school finance and taxation submitted a report to the union body. Fewkes had asked the committee to draw up two plans, one for a flat rate increase and another for a single salary schedule. By 21 October 1953, the union forwarded its proposals to the board and Willis. The union asked for a single salary schedule with a minimum salary of $4,400 for beginning teachers and a maximum of $8,000 on the tenth step of the salary schedule. They asked for a $300 increase for education beyond the bachelor's level and $600 for the Ph.D. and for all future raises to be tied to the cost of living. Also there was to be no increase in the number of steps to reach maximum. They waited for a response.³

On 24 October, Benjamin Willis responded to the union by proposing a salary plan of his own which would "recognize preparation and years of service."⁴ The plan called for an elementary teacher on the first step to receive a salary of $3,400. It seemed like a raise, but from the union's position it was a pay cut, due to the fact that the elementary teacher's day was to be extended to a six hour day and presently they were working a five hour day. The union said that amounted to a two-hundred dollar pay
cut. In response the union published its own criteria for a salary schedule. According to this an acceptable salary schedule:

(1) recognizes that effective elementary teaching is as important to children and to the nation as teaching at the high school or college level; . . . (2) provides a complete schedule acceptable to all levels of teaching service; . . . (3) does not require more than ten year's service to each maximum; . . . (4) does not discriminate among levels of teaching services; . . . [and] (5) offers to all teachers at all grade levels adequate professional remuneration commensurate with the importance of the service rendered, the increase in the cost of living, and the devaluation of the dollar.5

The CTU Executive Board voted on 20 November to reject Willis's salary proposal and to resubmit the union's. Fewkes, in his statement to the board on 18 November 1953, said:

The teachers of Chicago are not in the mood to brook further neglect of their needs. The general public must finance the public schools adequately. Had the members of the board of education been present at the meeting of the House of Representatives of the Chicago Teachers Union last Friday, they would have become keenly aware of the bitterness felt by the teachers, young and old, high school and elementary, over the fact that no increases were given last year. The temper of the teachers is at a white heat concerning their salaries.6

On 9 December 1953, Fewkes wrote to the delegates stating that the CTU was faced with an important and difficult decision. He said:

The board of education does not have sufficient money to put an adequate single salary schedule into effect in 1954 without injustices to many teachers. Even the new suggestion Dr. Willis made today would require more money than has been indicated would be available this year. It is evident that the general superintendent and the board of education will have to
make considerable adjustment in this new proposal both because of limitation in its resources and because of inequities. 7

On 14 December 1953, the CTU put forth a new salary schedule based on the five-sixth concept on a single salary schedule and asked for a flat rate increase of two-hundred dollars. Fewkes recommended to the house of representatives that they take a strike poll in the schools between December 13 and 18. At the house meeting an earlier report on the no-strike issue was addressed. The report drew the conclusion that the CTU was not bound by the AFT prohibition on strikes since this prohibition was not in the AFT constitution. By 4 January 1954, the CTU Executive Board instructed Fewkes that $350 was the bottom figure that they could accept. On 5 January 1954, the union officers met with Dr. Willis to discuss salary issues. This meeting did not accomplish anything. The following day the board voted approval of a slightly modified Willis plan. The union protested but to no end.

The modified Willis plan called for three lanes and twelve steps in the schedule. Individuals with a bachelor's degree would receive from $3,400 to $5,650. The second lane would be $3,650 to $6,150 and would require a master's degree and the third lane would be $3,900 to $6,650 for thirty-six hours beyond a master's degree. There was a ten dollar increase for each step in each lane, which was to
become effective in September. The only thing the union could do was to look to 1955.

The CTU started discussions early for the 1955 salary schedule. In June 1954 the committee of finance and taxation came back with the 1953 proposal which asked for a starting salary of $4,400 and a maximum of $8,000 for the first lane with increases of $300 for a master's degree, $600 for thirty hours beyond the master's degree and $900 for a Ph.D. This would create a four lane salary schedule.

When Fewkes presented the schedule to the board for consideration he stated:

the teachers are far from content with the single salary schedule adopted by the board of education last year. High school teachers are particularly incensed over the fact they received very meager increases last year and that only those qualifying for the third lane will receive any increases in 1955.8

In January 1955 the board followed a Willis recommendation and voted a three-lane, twelve step salary schedule which provided a $3,400-$5,650 range for a bachelors degree, a $3,650-$6,150 range for a master's degree and a $3,900-$6,650 range for thirty-six hours beyond the master's degree. There was also a ten dollar increase for each step in each lane, to take effect in September. In writing to the delegates about the new salary schedule Fewkes stated:

While the establishment of the one-hundred dollars in the salary schedule plus the increment of $250 for 30 years of service is only for the last four months of 1955, it does implement the union's salary program to the degree possible under the restrictions of the
budget the board of education saw fit to establish for 1955. 9

On 13 July 1955 Willis recommended a salary increase of $500 for 1956. This would mean that the ranges would become $4,000 to $6,250 for the bachelors lane, $4,250-$6750 for a master's degree and $4500-$7,500 for thirty-six hours beyond the master's degree. This was to be in the January budget. The union response was to thank the superintendent and submit its own proposal which was made public on 3 November 1955; it asked for an additional $200 thereby making the bachelor's degree $4200-6700; the master's degree $4450-$7200; thirty-six hours beyond the master's degree $4700-7700. In November, the union proposed an additional twenty dollars per month to the promised twenty-five dollars that was to go into effect in January. This January increase was accomplished with additional state monies received by the board.

It was during 1956 that the stage was being set for the conflicts to follow. To begin, in January 1956 the board established a new policy which required that a teacher could not progress on the salary schedule while being marked unsatisfactory. To increase the frustration of the union, the Willis administration did not even discuss the 1956-57 school calendar with them. Fewkes wrote Willis a letter in which he said:

On a matter that so directly affects the wages hours and working conditions of teachers, we feel that the Chicago Teachers Union should have been given an
opportunity to discuss the proposed changes with the school administration before they were submitted to the board and certainly before they were adopted by the Board of Education.

The only answer Fewkes obtained from his letter was a phone call from Willis stating that he had recommended to the board not to consider any changes.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR 1957 AND 1958

The union submitted a proposed salary schedule for 1957 asking for raises amounting to three-hundred dollars. This would make the range for elementary and high school teachers from $5,300-$9,500. The board stated that they did not have the funds for an increase, and none was given for 1957.

Without a salary increase and without any communication from the Willis administration to the union on matters so important to them, Fewkes became aware of a needed change in tactics. Quiet diplomacy which, Fewkes thought, worked so well with Hunt, could not work with Willis. During these years the union started to pressure the board for collective bargaining. As the board stuck fast to its position, Fewkes changed his. In an article in the Chicago Union Teacher in the November 1957 issue Fewkes said, "The Union must modernize its techniques of negotiation with the school administration and board of education in order that it may more effectively and speedily resolve the
welfare problems of the teachers, at all levels of the school system. 12

On 15 August 1957 Fewkes in a letter to Willis stated that the last salary increase for Chicago teachers was January 1956. He asked for a $250 raise in September 1957 and a $500 raise in January 1958. The board, on Willis's recommendation passed a salary increase for 1958 which provided a $250 increase for all the teachers. In his letter to the delegates, Fewkes stated his disappointment that the board did not pass a more substantial salary increase for 1958. He said, "The Board of Education decided that other expenditures were more vital and necessary than increasing teachers' salaries beyond $250 for the year. . . . The budget for 1959 will be an extremely tight one and we will have to fight vigorously to obtain any increases in 1959." 13

THE ELECTION & 1959 SALARY NEGOTIATIONS

Another matter that Fewkes had to attend to in 1958 was the union election for president. He began his run for re-election with an article he wrote in the union paper. He stated:

Techniques of negotiation with school administration constantly have been improved. The Board of Education has declared its intention of giving the officers of the employee unions an opportunity to discuss salaries with the Board before the budget is adopted for 1959. This is real progress in collective bargaining. 14
Fewke's opponent in his reelection campaign was Meyer Weinberg. Weinberg wrote an article for the union newspaper, in which he stated his belief that collective bargaining would mean a contract with grievance procedures. He criticized Fewkes for not really having collective bargaining: "Collective bargaining means a real give and take between union and administration, instead of one-sided dictation." 15 Fewkes's response to this criticism was also in the same issue of the union paper.

In no large city does collective bargaining exist in the sense that it exists in industry. But Chicago is perhaps the first city where collective bargaining for teachers has existed in fact, if not in name, for so long that no one can remember when it started. The Chicago Teachers Union has, from the beginning of its existence negotiated; and before that, other organizations carried on negotiations. 16

In that same April issue of the union paper in which both candidates stated their positions an article by Charles Monroe, the union's vice-president, appeared. It was entitled "Collective Bargaining Versus Political Action." Monroe responded to the criticism about the union's position:

This same charge has been made frequently in past years when such statements were made that the Union's leadership was too "soft," insufficiently militant, and too timid to use the weapons of collective bargaining. These same spokesmen charge also that the Union wastes too much time and money in 'politicizing,' lobbying, . . . when instead the Union should be busy pressing its demands on the Board of Education and then, if these demands are not met, proceed to use direct action to secure what is wanted. 17
When the election was held in May, the result was that Fewkes received 4,202 votes and Weinberg received 1,061. Fewkes was reelected for another term but he knew that the issue of collective bargaining would come back if he let it rest.

With the election out of the way, Fewkes could concentrate on salary and benefits for the membership. The negotiations on salary with the board were becoming harder. Fewkes believed that the union was not getting its due and was being looked upon as just one of many employee groups and not the one that represented a majority of the teachers. In 1957, the board had told Fewkes that it would invite input from employee groups. In 1958, when the time came for this, Fewkes and representatives from other employee groups were given five minutes to make oral presentations. In his presentation to the board, he said:

The Chicago Teachers Union is convinced that the board of Education will be well advised if it places at the top of its priority list steps to improve teacher morale. Teachers want to have a part in deciding problems effecting their wages, hours and working conditions; they resent the fact that the elected representatives of 10,000 of them is allowed only five minutes to discuss their requests with the Board of Education.18

In a letter to the delegates, a few days later, Fewkes addressed the same issue, when he said:

On Wednesday, October 29, 1958, as your President, I presented to the Board of Education, at its Employee Hearing, the salary requests of the Chicago Teachers Union for 1959, and a statement indicting the Board of Education for its failure to give sufficient attention to the problems of the classroom teachers. . . . The
Union intends to see that the teachers receive the greatest possible increases in salaries that the Board can afford to give in the 1959 budget. We also intend to demand immediate action on many of the welfare problems on which the school administration has delayed too long.19

The salary request that Fewkes presented asked for an increase of $500 in January 1959 and an additional increase of $250 in September 1959. The board voted an increase of $150. The executive board of the union, on finding this out, voted to poll the membership to determine:

whether the teachers desire that the Union hold a mass meeting to protest the failure of the Board of Education to: (1) provide adequate salary increase in the 1959 budget, (2) correct working conditions that have been brought to the Board's attention repeatedly, and (3) negotiate with the officers of the Chicago Teachers Union on salary increases and working conditions.20

The house of representatives asked each delegate to bring two people to the 23 December 1959 board meeting. Its purpose was to make the board members and general superintendent aware that the teachers were not happy with the $150 increase the board allocated in the 1959 budget. A protest walk was approved at a meeting of the house of representatives on 9 January 1959. It was to take place on 13 January 1959 in the afternoon. To make matters worse, on the day of the protest walk, the board of education voted to give increases to other unionized employees but refused to consider any change in teacher salaries. The budget was adopted on 15 January 1959.
Fewkes responded to this in the January issue of the *Chicago Union Teacher*, when he said, "The union is in no mood to take quietly the failure of the Board of Education to provide adequate increases in 1959, to grant requested improvements in working conditions, and above all, to properly negotiate with the Union."21

The last protest walk against the board had taken place approximately twenty-five years earlier and had been led by the same man, John Fewkes. As the earlier protest was a sign of major changes to come, this protest walk was a sign that Fewkes and the union were changing their position in relation to the board. It was also becoming increasingly important to Fewkes that the Chicago Teachers Union become the bargaining agent for Chicago teachers.

In June of 1959 the CTU tried to open salary negotiations. The house of representatives voted on 12 June 1959 to ask for a three-hundred dollar increase effective in September. Fewkes wrote to the delegates, "if the Board of Education has not provided for adequate salary increases, starting in September, the teachers may be called upon to support the Union in some very drastic action. BE PREPARED." The board and the administration ignored the unions request.22

On 12 August, the executive board of the union felt that the board had the finances to be able to give each teacher a $750 increase rather then the original request of
$300. The union also asked for a $250 increment for the twentieth, twenty-fifth, thirtieth, and thirty-fifth years of service. The union asked its members to put pressure on the board by writing and sending telegrams to board members and other officials to adopt a supplemental budget. The CTU's efforts were rewarded when, on 14 October 1959, the board of education voted a $500 increase for teachers and a $250 increment for the twenty-fifth and thirty-fifth years of service.

The leaders of the CTU learned what collective action could do. The protest walk of January and the pressure of letters and telegrams had accomplished the desired affect. On 28 September 1959, the board of education indicated at its next meeting on 14 October 1959 that all teachers would receive a $50 per month increase. While teachers with twenty, twenty-five and thirty-five years of service would receive raises of $75, $100 and $125. This was not far from what the house of representatives had asked for on 11 September 1959. They wanted a $75 per month raise and a $25 per month increase for all teachers with twenty or more years of service.23

Fewkes wrote to the new board president, R. Sargent Shriver, stating that this new salary would attract teachers to Chicago.

The Union feels that granting the $75 a month increase, the 20 year increment to all teachers ($250 to all teachers who have taught 20 years or more) and improved sick leave would put Chicago in a favorable
position in the market for the recruitment of new teachers and assist in the retention of experienced teachers. 24

THE 1960 SALARY NEGOTIATIONS

Seven days after Fewkes wrote his letter of thanks to Shriver, the union's finance and taxation committee was moving on the 1960 salary schedule. The negotiations were to take place in January 1960, and the committee agreed to ask for a $250 additional raise for everyone under twenty-five years of service.

On 4 November 1959, Fewkes spoke at the budget hearing to explain the reasons for a $250 increase the union had asked for in the 1960 school year. When the board finally passed a budget on 14 October 1959, there was a $250 increase for teachers with twenty-five and thirty-five years of service. What bothered the union was that the board also passed an administrative organizational change without consulting the union. Fewkes felt that the change was introduced in the last minutes of the budgetary meeting so that Willis could sneak it through the board very quickly without union pressure to vote against the measure. A number of the items pushed through were items that the union had been discussing with Willis for some months. In a letter to the board members, Fewkes said:

The Chicago Teachers Union feels that it is ill-advised to propose and adopt changes in the
organization, administration and operation of the school system during the last few minutes of budgetary deliberations without due consideration on the part of the board and without consultation with those affected.25

At the end of January, Willis again acted without consulting the union. He cut home mechanics courses from seventy-eight schools, which required the displacement of many teachers. Fewkes wrote to the board members again:

To be shifted about from position to position without consultation or consideration, smacks of cattle being herded from pen to pen. Teachers are professional people and they rightfully revolt against such treatment. We must warn the administration of the Board of Education against the continuance of such arbitrary practices.26

Willis seemed to ignore the CTU and this made Fewkes angry. In October he wrote a letter to the board members and the general superintendent, complaining of Willis's uncooperative attitude. Fewkes said, "Some way must be found to resolve the professional problems of teachers more expeditiously and more humanely. . . . If the General Superintendent would take more time to discuss the problems of teachers with the elected representatives of the majority of Chicago teachers."27

Events outside of Chicago were putting pressure on the union leadership. In November of 1960, the New York AFT local called a strike. As a result, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) was given a collective bargaining election, increases in salary and no reprisals. The news spread
rapidly among the membership of the CTU that a local had used a strike to gain collective bargaining.

The CTU leadership decided that its members must be educated as to what collective bargaining really required. So in the November 1960 issue of the *Chicago Union Teacher*, an article was written by John Ligtenberg, the union attorney, stressing the right of a teacher's union to act for its members. In the December issue there were articles describing other cities where public employees had collective bargaining.28

THE PRESSURE IS APPLIED IN 1961

On 28 September 1960 Fewkes purposed his 1961 salary request. This was a $500 increase for all teachers. Willis reduced it to $150, and the board approved it. One board member, Raymond Pasnick, voted against the 1961 budget because he did not like the way Willis was treating the board. They had no time to discuss the matters and had few facts before voting. He said, "What greater insult to our intelligence could have been offered to us than the fact that the so called 'new directions' of the budget were given us as late as January 3rd."29

Pressure was also building in the CTU's House of Representatives. At the 13 January 1961 meeting, a resolution was introduced from the floor, putting pressure on the union for collective bargaining. The Fewkes forces
had enough votes to table the motion but the resolution was convincing evidence that the membership wanted something done in the area of collective bargaining. Fewkes, feeling the pressure, wrote the delegates:

The Chicago Teachers Union has been pressing the issue of more democratic negotiation procedures with the school administration and the Board of Education since its inception in 1937. To date, formal procedures have not been set up, but the effectiveness of the Union, in securing improvement in wages, hours and working conditions is steadily improving. 30

By February 1961, Willis's actions were proving that meetings with him and his staff were not doing any good. The superintendent's staff prepared a plan for a change-over to a trimester system at the Chicago Teachers College, where teachers were represented by the CTU. The plan was submitted to Willis, who approved it on 6 February 1961. The union found out about it when the plan was released to the press. The board was asked to approve it at its next meeting. Fewkes was angry because Willis did not see fit to inform the union, even though it affected many teachers, who were union members. It convinced the union leadership that it was impossible to deal with Willis because he did not feel it was necessary to discuss anything with the union.

On 20 February 1961, Willis released to the press a new procedure for transfer of teachers which he wanted the board to approve at its next meeting. Once again an issue
vital to many teachers was presented to the board without any consultation from the CTU. Fewkes wrote to the board:

In the matter of personnel policies, may we again call your attention to the fact that this vitally important Board Report was made available to the public on February 20 and it is to be acted on February 23. The first inkling that any changes in teacher transfer policies was contemplated was through the daily newspaper.31

The union was having problems working with Willis on a voluntary format; many members felt that through collective bargaining Willis would be forced to work with the union. Unfortunately for Fewkes, this created more pressure to achieve collective bargaining.

The Chicago Union Teacher of February 1961 was devoted to collective bargaining. It carried a question and answer page on collective bargaining and an article by Peter Senn, a college professor, who explained the give and take of collective bargaining. The April 1961 issue of the publication carried an article by Monsignor George Higgins about President Kennedy's executive order directing governmental agencies to bargain with employee groups.32

In August 1961 the CTU decided, once again, to try to have its voice heard by the board. The union submitted its salary proposal early enough for discussion. The union asked for a one-hundred dollar per month increase, starting in January 1962. An additional fifteen dollars per month was to be given to those teachers with less than fifteen years of service, who received only a ten dollar raise in
1961 when other teachers received a twenty-five dollar raise. Fewkes also decided to take a stand early in the school year. In his column in the Chicago Union Teacher, Fewkes stated:

Your Union starts the year with some unresolved personnel problems: some individual, pending grievances; and continuing unilateral rules and regulations made by the administration, hurriedly carried out by the Administration and, often changed abruptly by the Administration. The Union will continue trying to obtain favorable and more carefully reasoned action on these matters.

In the board hearings of October 1961, Fewkes's public statement requested again that the board of education set up procedures to establish collective bargaining. He mentioned that President Kennedy had recently established a cabinet level committee to investigate the matter of collective bargaining for employees of the federal government. He noted also, that since the early part of 1961, negotiations were in process between various union organizations which dealt with city government and the city of Chicago.

On 29 September 1961, the Chicago-Cook County Council of Public Employees was formally established, and John Fewkes was elected president of the coalition. The purpose of this group was to work for collective bargaining. With this new position, Fewkes was becoming more and more involved with the union's goal of achieving collective bargaining. He had been faced with pressure from all sides for bargaining. There were outside events such as President
Kennedy's granting of collective bargaining rights to federal employees and the New York UFT's election victory as the bargaining agent among the teachers, that pressed on him. Yet, he could not get any cooperation from the Willis administration. Therefore, Fewkes decided that it was time to take a more aggressive approach.
CHAPTER THREE NOTES

1. The unanimous vote for Willis was similar to the same vote for Hunt. Both votes were unanimous in order that the public would believe that the board was unanimous in its support for Willis even though there was disagreement. See School Politics, 57-78 for discussion of the vote.


3. "Report of the School Finance and Taxation Committee," 16 September 1953, Box 26, Folder 6, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago. When this was approved by the house of representatives it was called "Salary Proposal for 1954", 21 October 1953.


8. "Presentation of CTU Salary Proposals to the Chicago Board of Education by John Fewkes," 3 November 1954, Box 39, Folder 6, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago. This reply was to the Willis salary schedule approved by the board in January 1954.

9. "John Fewkes to School Delegates," 7 January 1955, Box 26, Folder 7, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago. Fewkes was claiming credit for something he had little influence in bringing about.

11. "The Chicago Teachers Union is Presently Discussing the Following Matters with the School Administration," June 1956, Box 39, Folder 8, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


13. "John Fewkes to Delegates," 23 January 1958, Box 21, Folder 4, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago. Later on an additional ten dollars a month was added to become effective in September 1958.

14. Chicago Union Teacher, April 1958, Vol.23, Issue 8, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago. Fewkes had a discussion on the topic of collective bargaining. He was not engaged in collective bargaining. What was really going on was Fewkes would ask questions and Willis or his assistants would try to provide answers. In no way was this collective bargaining. What Fewkes's motives were, in calling this collective bargaining, can only be guessed upon.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


24. "John Fewkes to R. Sargent Shriver Jr.," 4 September 1959, Box 40, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


26. "John Fewkes to Members of the Chicago Board of Education," 8 February 1960, Box 40, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

27. "John Fewkes to Members of the Chicago Board of Education," 5 October 1960, Box 40, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

28. Chicago Union Teacher, November and December 1960.

29. Quoted in Chicago Union Teacher, Box 86, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


CHAPTER IV

FEWKES RESPONDS

In 1962, John Fewkes went on the offensive. In the 4 January 1962 issue of the Chicago Union Teacher, Fewkes attacked Willis when he said:

Teacher's salaries . . . were given last minute, undetailed consideration and the manner in which they were presented to the press before being considered or even presented to the members of the Board of Education should be resented by any self respecting member of the Board of Education. . . . It is definitely resented by the Chicago Teachers Union and other employee groups who were given no opportunity to evaluate the proposal and discuss it with the General Superintendent and the members of the Board of Education.¹

On 8 January 1962, the executive board of the union directed Fewkes to write to the board President, William Caples and ask that the board start the process of collective bargaining by establishing a committee of the board to work with the union. Fewkes wrote the letter on 9 January 1962. He requested that the board establish collective bargaining, giving President Kennedy's executive order as a reason. Another reason Fewkes stated, was the union's inability to work with the current administration.²

At the same 8 January meeting, the union established a collective bargaining planning committee
On 19 January Fewkes appointed Charles Skibbens as chairman of the CBPC. Skibbens was a relative newcomer to the union. Why he was appointed to chair a committee of this nature is uncertain. Skibbens had written his thesis for a master's degree at Loyola University. The topic was the CTU and this impressed the vice-president of the union, Charles Monroe. In a memo written on 28 February 1957, Monroe stated, "I suggest that Mr. Skibbens be kept in mind for some specific service in the CTU, as soon as he is available."

When Caples received Fewkes's letter he did not respond, but he did distribute it to his fellow board members. When Fewkes did not receive an answer, he brought the issue back to the executive board. The board recommended that he write another follow-up letter. Fewkes wrote Caples again on 9 February 1962. On that same day, he also chaired a meeting of the Chicago-Cook County Council of Public Employees (CCCPE). The council decided that each of its subgroups would write separately to the board members requesting collective bargaining.

The CBPC was also developing a plan of action in regard to collective bargaining. The house and the executive board had expressed confidence in the committee. The executive board, on 5 March, approved the work the committee had done. While the committee was planning and getting praise for its actions, a move was being made by Skibbens and the CBPC. One of the resolutions that he wanted passed,
on behalf of the CBPC, would place this committee on equal footing with the CTU's Executive Board. The resolution called for both groups to meet in joint session. A majority vote by this combined committee would be the same as a vote by the executive board alone. This resolution, if passed, would greatly increase Skibben's power. Fewkes already had control over the executive board and adding more members could only dilute his authority. So Fewkes never put the resolution on the board's agenda. Therefore, it never came to a vote.6

In mid April, the union released to the press a paper entitled, "Chicago Teachers Are For Collective Bargaining." The paper stated:

The present methods of dealing with the Board of Education have often resulted in long and costly delays . . . . That is why in this modern age, Chicago Teachers Union is demanding the right of becoming exclusive spokesman in all deliberations affecting all Chicago teachers. We can no longer be content to appear and wait, hat in hand before the Board of Education.7

Also in April Caples, resigned from the board and Clair M. Roddewig took his place. Fewkes now had to acquaint him with the situation. He wrote Roddewig at the end of May. In the letter he placed the previous correspondence he had with Caples. Fewkes believed that Roddewig would listen to reason, but by 15 June the only thing Fewkes could report to the delegates was:

The CTU and the Chicago-Cook County Council of Public Employees are awaiting an answer from President Roddewig, of the Board of Education in regard to our
request that a conference be set up between the Board of Education and the Unions representing employees of the Board of Education, to discuss the orderly establishment of Collective Bargaining. We hope to hear from President Roddewig in the immediate future.8

During the summer when the union leadership met with Willis on 16 and 26 of August 1962 no progress was made. When Fewkes raised the question of collective bargaining, Willis replied that it was a matter to be discussed with the board. Fewkes wrote, in the September issue of the Chicago Union Teacher, that all news on collective bargaining be changed to reflect the actual state of our bargaining campaign.9

On 18 September Fewkes again wrote Roddewig asking that the board consider establishing collective bargaining:

On May 29, 1962, the union wrote to you as the new President of the Board of Education. The Union suggests that the Board of Education recognize the Chicago Teachers Union as the collective bargaining agent of the teachers because it presently has approximately three times as many paid-up members as the next largest teacher organization and represents a majority of the teachers.10

Roddewig wrote to Fewkes saying that he had placed the issue of collective bargaining on the agenda for the 10 October 1962 meeting and asked Fewkes to come and speak to the board on the issue.

Fewkes was finally to address the board on collective bargaining, but he was faced with problems within the union. In March, when the CBPC wanted to unite with the executive board and failed, a number of people on the committee were disappointed. One member, Gerald Adler,
resigned on 7 October 1962. In his letter of resignation, he described to Fewkes how many members of the committee felt:

> You suggest you are making progress with Mr. Roddewig. I see no evidence of it; you have offered none at our meetings, of which you have attended less than six. I am not concerned about Mr. Roddewig's sensitivity about our militancy; it is his worry, not ours. Let's build some rapport within the union, as well as with Mr. Roddewig. As far as I am concerned, I have lost both rapport and communication with you and the executive committee.\textsuperscript{11}

The 10 October meeting of the board did not deal with collective bargaining. It had to be postponed due to racial tension in the city. Instead, the meeting was used to discuss school segregation issues that had arisen in recent months.

In the meantime Fewkes went to work. In October, the house passed a petition drive among the teachers, asking for collective bargaining. Two weeks later, Fewkes asked the executive board for approval to hire an administrative assistant to work full time on collective bargaining issues. Fewkes recommended Chairman Charles Skibbens of the CBPC, and the executive board approved. He did not perceive Skibbens as a threat. Mindful of the complaints from the CBPC, he believed that Skibbens's appointment would defuse the situation. Furthermore, since the assistant would work full time on collective bargaining, who would be a better choice then the chairman of the bargaining committee?

Other teacher groups responded favorably to the CTU's plan to have a full time administrative assistant
working on collective bargaining. However, the Chicago Teachers Federation president wrote to Roddewig on 13 November 1962 stating:

In the first place; we believe that such an agreement would not be legal in Illinois, Secondly; we are informed that in states in which agreements are legal the mere fact of the agreement does not eliminate personnel problems, but often has made them more complex because of greater and new kinds of pressures on individual members of boards of education.\textsuperscript{12}

In his column in the \textit{Chicago Union Teacher}, Fewkes criticized the board for its failure:

However, the failure of the School Administration to make decisions and come to grips with some problems presented by the Union, for actually years on end, forces us to the conclusion that there must be a written procedure to be followed entailing time limits and provision for arbitration when negotiations break down or no agreement is reached.\textsuperscript{13}

The anger of the CBPC increased as they could see no real progress. Their hope that Skibbens's appointment could be effective in moving things along was shattered. Thus, on 5 December 1962, the committee passed a resolution:

The committee requests the President and/or Vice-President make every effort to be present at the meeting of the Collective Bargaining Planning Committee. The membership of this committee has during the past year come up with a long list of suggestions for the implementation of collective bargaining, many of which have never been put into action. The committee members feel a sense of frustration which has been building up over a period of months.\textsuperscript{14}

The Chicago-Cook County Council of Public Employees started to put pressure on the board for collective bargaining. When reporting to the members of the council, Fewkes stated:
The way it is now, any individual or organization could come in and talk to the Board. This does not satisfy the unions representing the employees working for the Board of Education at all. Roddewig said he would like us to wait until after the budget has been established in January, and then he will be glad to take up the matter of collective bargaining.15

On 20 December, the council met again. At this meeting, there was discussion of the matter of drafting a bill for the legislature. The salary goals of each group for the 1963 budget were also discussed. Fewkes reported that, in a meeting with Willis, he was told that there was very little money available for salary increases. Fewkes stated that something had to be done for the employees and suggested the idea of hospitalization. Eight days later, the council decided that John Ligtenberg and Lester Ascher would be the best persons to consult, in order to get a collective bargaining bill introduced. It would require the support of the democratic machine, which meant that Mayor Daley's help would be needed.16 Willis's warning to the union that there would be no salary increase proved true. The board of education went along with the general superintendent and did not include any pay raises in the 1963 budget.

1963 NEGOTIATIONS

On 9 January 1963, Fewkes presented 13,493 teacher's signatures on a petition asking for collective bargaining. This was done at the January board meeting, at which he presented the union's demand for collective
bargaining. The postponement of this issue in the October board meeting had given Fewkes enough time to complete the petition drive. In his address to the board of education Fewkes said:

Collective bargaining will be a concrete indication to the teachers and to the public that the Board of Education is truly interested in the welfare of its teachers and recognizes the importance of their work with the children of Chicago . . . . It is our desire and earnest wish that the Board of Education will enter into good faith negotiations without such unnecessary strife as occurred in New York City.17

Reference made to the New York teacher's strike came up again, leaving the impression of a veiled threat to the board.

Fewkes informed the February meeting of the house that, in the General Assembly, House Bill 298 was introduced. This bill would allow public bodies, such as the board of education, to engage in collective bargaining with their employees. Fewkes believed that this time it might pass because the mayor promised to support the bill.

Roddewig had asked Fewkes to return to the board and address it again on collective bargaining. Fewkes spoke at the 13 March 1963 board meeting. He argued that collective bargaining was legal and discussed the possibility of a strike.

A collective bargaining agreement usually contains within it the effective elimination of the possibility of a strike; moreover, the teachers of Chicago have refused to strike in the past under the most adverse conditions and they are resourceful enough to find other ways in which to fight injustice, dictatorial, unsympathetic administration and any lack of
responsibility and good judgement on the part of the Board of Education.18

The Illinois Education Association (IEA) advocated that teacher organizations be given a more active role in determining board rules and regulations. The CTF stated, "Collective bargaining would be dangerous because all of the functions of the board are interrelated and there could possibly be areas into which negotiations might not penetrate to influence decisions on the conduct of business . . . ."19

At later board meetings, other unions and different teacher organizations presented their views. The general superintendent gave his views on handling professional problems and collective bargaining.

This proposal was made up of four elements; (1) That the proposals as submitted by employee groups for altering the present procedures of communication between employee groups, the administration, and the Board of Education be rejected; (2) That encouragement be given to facilitating . . . the creative thought and intellectual independence of the profession of teaching; (3) That a commitment to improve communication among all groups be implemented as resources permit; and (4) that steps be taken to expedite procedures for resolving individual personnel problems requiring special attention.20

Nevertheless, on 10 July 1963, after passing the lower house of the general assembly, H.B. 298 was defeated in the Republican dominated senate. This meant that the law would be silent on the issue of collective bargaining for public employees in Illinois. The board's attorney, in answer to a request from the board on the legal status of
collective bargaining, rendered the opinion that, since there was no specific existing law, the board was not authorized to enter into collective bargaining with employee groups. Once again, Fewkes had to rethink tactics. The union would have to convince the board of the merit of collective bargaining or use a show of force.

Toward the end of the school year, Fewkes gave an interview to the Chicago Tribune. In the interview Fewkes stated that in the past, the union had always avoided strikes: "There is nothing to prevent teachers from striking if conditions become intolerable." Roddewig asked Fewkes to appear again before the board on 14 August to discuss collective bargaining. At the 14 August 1963 meeting, Fewkes used the forum to present legal opinions and arguments against previously expressed opposition. He submitted a legal opinion by John Ligtenberg, the union's attorney, stating that collective bargaining was legal. He stated:

The General Superintendent indicated to the Board that he would deny to teachers the right to determine which professional organization should represent them. In effect, he suggests that the age old practice of "divide and conquer" be continued by recommending that the present multiplicity of organizations be perpetuated.

In September, Fewkes wrote to each union member, stating how extremely patient the union had been. He recalled the events that had happened until then: the board's failure to act on desegregation, Caples's resignation and the failure of legislative action. He
believed that the time for patience had passed and that the union should press for collective bargaining.

After his presentation to the board in August, Fewkes had asked that the board take action by October. The board set 23 October as the date but had to postpone making a decision on that day because they had to deal with the shocking announcement of Willis's resignation. The board wanted a more liberal student transfer than Willis was allowing, so in protest, Willis resigned. The board refused to accept his resignation and appointed a committee to investigate. The committee cut a deal with Willis, and he withdrew his resignation. The result was a formal statement setting forth the role of the superintendent and the board. This settled the matter.23

When interviewed by WGN TV on the matter of the resignation of Willis and the withdrawal, Fewkes said:

Now that the General Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools has conducted a successful eleven-day strike, the teachers in the future should feel no hesitancy about resorting to a strike if it is necessary to do so, for instance, to attain collective bargaining before the Board of Education in order to resolve the professional problems more speedily and readily than we have been able to do in the past.24

Willis used the attention he obtained by resigning as a platform to put forth his ideas on collective bargaining. He proposed the establishment of a council of elected presidents or chairs of professional organizations to represent employees. To the union this was nothing more than the establishment of teacher councils which they
opposed in the past. In a press release on 22 October, Fewkes said:

Such councils are an autocratic dictatorial approach to employee-employer relations which cannot substitute for the established democratic American procedure that assures employees of the right to participate in the determination of matters affecting their rights and their welfare.

On 15 November, in a letter to the general superintendent, Fewkes said:

The Chicago Teachers Union rejects the proposal of the General Superintendent for the establishment of an employee council and will not send representatives to the meeting called by the General Superintendent on Monday, November 18, 1963, and of which we received notification on Friday, November 15, 1963.25

The collective bargaining meeting originally scheduled for 23 October was placed on the 30 October agenda, and Fewkes finally addressed the board on the issue. He also presented the union's salary demands for 1964. He told them that teachers had received no increases for the past two years, during which time the cost of living had been increasing. He asked for a fifteen dollar per month increase, a reduction in the number of steps to reach maximum salary and individual hospitalization insurance. 26

After Fewkes's presentation, the board voted on collective bargaining. By a vote of four to three with two abstentions the board refused to enter into collective bargaining with its employees. The union reaction was to call a special meeting of the house. The house directed the president to write to the board declaring the determination
of the Chicago Teachers Union to obtain collective bargaining and requesting that the board of education reconsider its decision. The CBPC presented a report to the house for action. Skibbens read the report and asked for house approval, which he got. It stated that the CTU would:

(1) work for reconsideration by the Board of Education of the vote previously taken against collective bargaining and for the securing of a favorable vote;

. . . . (2) conduct area meetings as speedily as possible to inform its membership concerning the issues involved; . . . (3) conduct a massive publicity program among its members; the Board of Education; the press, TV, radio, newspapers, concerning its case for collective bargaining; . . . (4) stage a mass meeting to which it will invite top leaders of the labor movement to attend and speak for collective bargaining; and (5) conduct a referendum in the schools on the strike issue after November 13, 1963, in the event the Board of Education had not reversed its position.27

1964 NEGOTIATIONS

On the 26 and 27 of December, the board met to discuss the budget for 1964. They approved the Willis recommendation which gave teachers with eleven to fifteen years of service, a ten dollar a month raise. Also, teachers with sixteen or more years of service received a twenty dollar a month increase, while the rest of the teachers, the majority received nothing. The final budget was approved on 8 January 1964, with one dissenting vote, that being Ray Pasnick's.28

The vast majority of teachers received no raise at all. Fewkes decided that he would have to try again to get
most of his members a salary increase. If he could not achieve the end result of a raise, at least he had to show that he was trying.

The union had asked the board for reconsideration of the October vote rejecting collective bargaining. So Thomas Murray the board vice-president introduced a resolution at the 8 January meeting:

Now be it resolved, that the Chicago Board of Education do recognize the Chicago Teachers Union as a collective bargaining agency for teachers and educational personnel who indicate their desire to have the Chicago Teachers Union represent them and that the General Superintendent is directed to meet with the representatives of the union and set up an agreement for the orderly and speedy processing of grievances and resolving of professional problems which may arise from time to time. Roddewig asked the board to defer the resolution until the February meeting so that new board members could become acquainted with the issues involved.29

After failing again Fewkes called a meeting of the house for 10 January 1964. The house voted on the following:

(1) to hold a mass meeting on Friday, February 7, 1964 at Orchestra Hall; (2) to have the Union seek a conference with Mayor Daley headed by William A. Lee, President of the Chicago Federation of labor; (3) to plan to send out a strike vote ballot to the schools on Wednesday, February 26, 1964, if the Board of Education does not vote affirmatively that the vote be conducted on Monday, March 2, 1964; that a strike be called for Thursday March 12, 1964; and (4) to continue to hold conferences with the members of the Board of Education on the matter of collective bargaining, especially with the two new members.30

The media strongly criticized the union for taking a strike position. Standpoint, a TV editorial for Chicago's CBS affiliate, criticized the union for using a strike as a
means to put pressure on the board. The Chicago Tribune criticized the union for making a strike threat and said:

The Board of Education should not budge a millimeter from its position that in Chicago public schools strikes are out, and that a union threatening strikes cannot and will not be recognized as bargaining agent for Chicago teachers. 31

Fewkes responded to the media in his column in the Chicago Union Teacher of January 1964: "If, on February 26, the Board of Education turns down collective bargaining with the Chicago Teachers Union, I urge every member of the Union to vote to strike when the referendum is taken." In a press release entitled, "Collective Bargaining Prevents Strikes," he said that the "Chicago Teacher's Union is not making a demand for power but for the right of the majority to be heard." 32

The mass meeting turned out to be a great success. People had to be turned away due to limited seating. Senator Paul Douglas and Walter Reuther addressed the audience. Fewkes stressed that collective bargaining could prevent strikes. He stated, "We do not want to close the schools! We want to keep them open and keep them more effectively operating." 33

At the house meeting on 14 February, Fewkes outlined the contemplated action:

After considerable discussion, it was finally moved, seconded, and carried, that the House of Representatives of the Chicago Teachers Union go on record as strongly desiring that the Board of Education proceed immediately to an election for the purpose of determining the exclusive collective
At the board meeting on 26 February, Thomas Murray offered a substitute motion for his 8 January resolution:

Therefore, be it resolved that the Chicago Board of Education do recognize the Chicago Teachers Union as the collective bargaining agent for such teachers and educational personnel as are members of the Union or who indicate their desire to have the Chicago Teachers Union represent them; and that the General Superintendent is directed to meet with the representatives of the Union and set up a written memorandum of understanding for orderly and speedy processing of grievances and the resolving of professional problems of those persons the Chicago Teachers Union represent.

In the place of an agreement, the revised motion specified a memorandum of understanding. The resolution passed by a vote of seven to one. The victory won was short lived.

After the vote was taken, Bernard Friedman introduced a resolution, almost the same as the one just passed, but substituted "the Chicago Division, IEA" for "the CTU." If passed this would mean that the CTU would not be the sole bargaining agent.

EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT

The CTU was opposed to giving the IEA the same bargaining status as itself. The problem that the board members had with that stand, was that Murray had assured them that the CTU did not intend to ask for a collective bargaining election to determine the exclusive bargaining agent, if the board passed the Murray resolution. If this
were true, it was curious that the CTU was opposed to having the IEA and CTF gain bargaining status?36

Dissident groups within the CTU claimed that acceptance by the union of the Murray resolution, giving bargaining status to the CTU, was a sell out and condemned the leadership for settling for the promise of a "memorandum of Understanding" instead of a commitment to real collective bargaining.

The media came out strongly against the board for granting any recognition to the CTU. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune of 28 February 1964, entitled "Board of Education Gives in" stated:

President John M. Fewkes clearly regards the board resolution as a go ahead for bargaining in which the union will bring up broad questions relating to policy such as teachers’ working conditions and classroom load, as well as salary scales. There is little doubt that the union will use this authorization as the opening wedge toward a union contract.

On 2 March 1964, the Chicago Tribune attacked the board in an editorial entitled, "Towards More School Chaos." The editorial stated, "Exclusive bargaining rights and a contract would open the door to endless strikes like those in New York, where the teachers union has kept the school system in chaos, in spite of a state law forbidding strikes."
At the house meeting on 5 March, the strike referendum was postponed until after the board meeting of 11 March 1964 at which time the resolution to give the IEA bargaining status would be discussed. At the March board meeting, the board passed the resolution giving the IEA the right to bargain for its members and Fewkes wrote to the delegates:

This action of the Board of Education and their avowed intent to grant other teacher's organizations the same right to collective bargaining will create a chaotic situation which will eventually have to be resolved by the holding of a collective bargaining election to determine the organization that will represent teachers and educational personnel as the only official collective bargaining agent.37

On 13 March the union's house of representatives voted to request a collective bargaining election so that one teacher group could be chosen to negotiate for all teachers. In a letter to Roddewig, dated 16 March, Fewkes states, "The Chicago Teachers Union does, therefore, formally request that the Board of Education proceed immediately to hold such an election." The union even offered to pay the expenses of such an election.38

Fewkes argued that recognition of multiple bargaining agents would lead to confusion and conflicting rules and procedures. He said:

Recognition of two or more teachers organizations as collective bargaining agents in the same jurisdiction can result only in a confused, chaotic, and most probably an illegal situation . . . . It most assuredly would be illegal to adopt varying procedures for different groups of the same classifications of employees.
In a press release dated 23 March, Fewkes announced:

The action of the Board of Education, in recognizing a second teachers' organization as a collective bargaining agent and indicating its intention to recognize others in the same jurisdiction has made such an election a necessity to resolve what will otherwise be a chaotic situation.\(^{39}\)

At the board meeting on 25 March, Pasnick moved that an election be held. He also asked the state attorney-general for a legal opinion. Whiston and Green concurred in a motion to defer consideration of the motion.

On a 26 March meeting with Willis the union found it necessary to issue a press release which stated that the meeting had to be adjourned, "because the general superintendent found it necessary to leave." What apparently happened is revealed in a letter Fewkes wrote to M. Liberthal:

Using a pretext of looking for his notes Dr. Willis left the meeting minutes after it convened and did not return. After seeing him walk down the hall with three or four other persons, we called a halt and asked that another meeting be scheduled when Dr. Willis could be present. \(^{40}\)

Though the union was having problems with Willis, the work of formulating a written memorandum had to proceed. The union was having a meeting with the administration even though Willis was not present.

At the board meeting on 8 April, Pasnick's resolution calling for a collective bargaining election was deferred. At the 23 April meeting it was deferred again. On 5 May Fewkes wrote the board president to inform him that
the Detroit Public School System had just held an exclusive bargaining election.

While these events were taking place an election for union president was scheduled. The two major candidates were John Fewkes and Thomas Connery. As in previous elections each candidate was given space in the union newspaper to express his views. Connery used the forum to express his criticism of Fewkes:

1. I promise a genuine, exclusive collective bargaining contract and I unreservedly disown the obnoxious "company-store" deal submitted to us by our president.
2. Supreme authority in our Union will be returned to the House of Representatives as directed by our Constitution. In this way future fiascos such as we now have will be avoided.

Fewkes and his slate of candidates were elected on 22 May 1964. Fewkes received 5,116 votes to Connery’s 2,639. Although he won, this was the closest election Fewkes had experienced. Connery even obtained more votes in the high schools which showed dissatisfaction with the direction the union was going.

The union and board workers finally finished the final copy of the memorandum. The executive board approved it on 14 September and sent it on to the house which approved it by a vote of eighty-eight to sixteen. Fewkes was happy to announce this in the September 1964 issue of The Chicago Union Teacher: Thus starts a new era of practical, democratic, professional relationships between the School
Administration, Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Union.

At the same meeting which approved the memorandum for the union, a professional problems committee was established; its duties were:

(1) To develop a list of collective bargaining proposals for each school year; (2) To recommend strategy and procedure for the accomplishment ... collective bargaining goals; and collective bargaining proposals shall include wages, hours, working conditions and all professional aspects of the employment of teachers and other educational personnel.\textsuperscript{42}

The board, on its part, finally approved the memorandum on 14 October. At that meeting, the board voted unanimously to accept the agreement, directing the superintendent to work out the language and some slight modifications. When this was done, Fewkes announced that the union would seek a pay increase. He pointed out, when Willis complained about limited money, that this was nothing new:

This is a broken record that has been played every year. But we are fearful that there is more justification for this than usual. It is time the school administration and school board members recognize that we are not gaining any ground in recruiting teachers.\textsuperscript{43}

The union was asking that a monthly increment between steps be made uniform they ranged between ten and twenty-five dollars per month; that group hospitalization such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield and major medical insurance be paid by the board for all of its employees.\textsuperscript{44}
The budgetary requests of the union were submitted to the board on 20 November 1964. The board did not negotiate or bargain for the 1965 budget. On 28 December, Willis presented his plan for the budget. It included raising salaries by increasing the increments between steps and lanes to approximately $50 monthly, reducing the time to reach maximum salary level and eliminating the fourth lane. The board chose neither approach. No salary increases were approved, but what was frustrating was that the school administration did not consult with the union, so that the union could approach the board with a unified position. The board did approve Willis's recommendation that teachers be assured that, as additional monies became available, salary raises would be approved.

At the same time Fewkes was fighting the administration and the board, dissident members of his own union were after him. On 26 February these dissidents announced that they had secured enough signatures of union members to force a referendum vote on the question of the union requesting collective bargaining. Fewkes viewed such a vote as a threat to his leadership. He stated in the February 1965 issue of The Chicago Union Teacher "The union should not have been put to the expense and work of a referendum." In a letter to the delegates in early March, Fewkes charged that the dissidents were causing harm. He believed this was not good timing because a bill on
collective bargaining was before the state legislature, and such a referendum "could jeopardize the passage of this bill."\textsuperscript{45}

On 22 April 1965, the house voted fifty-eight to seven to notify the superintendent and board that the union wished to "amend the memorandum of understanding to include provision for determining an exclusive bargaining agent." This action was precipitated by the union's inability to work with Willis under the terms of the memorandum. The very day that the house voted the above action, Fewkes had to write Willis a letter complaining of his noncompliance with the memorandum:

The intent of the Memorandum of Understanding will be violated unless the Union has an opportunity to discuss with you and agree upon matters affecting the wages and working conditions of teachers before they are presented to the Board of Education for adoption.\textsuperscript{46}

Another example of the inability to work with Willis was illustrated by his proposed change in the regulations governing the assignment and transfer of teachers. He formulated a new policy without consulting the Union leadership as was provided for in the memorandum of understanding, and forwarded it to the board for adoption.

Fewkes complained to Willis in a letter dated 29 April 1965, and stated that, "The Chicago Teachers Union will notify the General Superintendent and the Chicago Board of Education it wishes to amend the Memorandum of
Understanding to include provision for determining an exclusive bargaining agent.\textsuperscript{47}

The union leadership met with Willis to discuss his proposed transfer plan and told him that it violated the memorandum of understanding because it made changes without consultation with the union. Fewkes believed that this transfer plan would interfere with seniority rights. When Willis did not respond, Fewkes decided to appeal directly to the board of education. The union backed up its appeal to the board with a strike threat. It was at this time that Frank Whiston became the new president of the board.

On 20 May 1965 the house of representatives gave the executive the power to call a strike if the union did not achieve results in its negotiations with the board on the transfer issue. The union's position was that transfer was a right that they were not willing to give up and that there was no consultation over the matter as required by the memorandum of understanding. The two sides were facing each other with a strike threat in the middle. Again the threat of a strike accomplished the union goal. Fewkes and Vice-President Desmond met with board president Whiston and the board's vice-president to try to work out the problem. As a result, Whiston agreed to withdraw the transfer plan and agreed that consultation would be held in the future. \textsuperscript{48}

On 11 May 1965, H.B. 992, collective bargaining for public employees, went down to defeat. Governor Kerner,
who had first stated he would support the bill, reversed himself and helped to cause the bill's defeat. The issue of a referendum on collective bargaining was still an active issue for some members of the union. With the defeat of the collective bargaining bill in the legislature, this issue became very active again. Fewkes wanted the dissidents to withdraw the petition, because the house of representatives had already voted in April to notify the board that the union wanted to modify the memorandum of understanding to include a provision for a collective bargaining election. Fewkes did not want to have the board know how many teachers wanted collective bargaining. He believed it would weaken his hand in dealing with the board, so the union leadership did not schedule any referendum. The dissidents were of another opinion. John Kotsakis, now a union official, complained to Fewkes that this action was a denial of the member's rights:

We must now ask that you come to some decision. According to the constitution of the union, you are required to act on these petitions and set up the referendum. If you plan to abrogate the procedures as set down in the constitution, then we will feel that our rights as union members have been distinctly denied and will seek legal recourse to effect this referendum.

The union wanted a substantial salary increase for teachers in September, 1965, and used the threat of a strike. In August Willis had recommended to the board salary increases ranging from $15 to $160; Willis and the union had mutually agreed to their terms during the summer.
conferences.52 Willis also proposed a salary increase at the 8 September meeting of the board. He did this again, after telling Fewkes that his recommendation was not ready. The latter proposal consisted of the following: "That all staff be placed on the new schedule as of September with the maximum increase to be $500 per year for the next four months." 53

The union responded that this was really an increase of fifteen to fifty dollars and not what they had agreed to during the summer. The board approved Willis's recommendations on 22 September 1965. This made Fewkes angry. He wrote to Whiston and sent copies to all board members requesting a conference of the union and board. Fewkes advised Whiston that the salary increase proposed by Willis had not been discussed with the union and that the union did not even have a copy of it. Fewkes pointed out that this was a violation of the terms of the memorandum.

Whiston agreed to have a special board meeting on 16 September to discuss the issues. The board was firm that since additional funds were not available, the 8 September proposal of Dr. Willis could not be changed. Since funds for greater increases were not available, the board would only fund those agreed to by the superintendent in his 8 September proposal.54

The executive board called for an emergency meeting of the house of representatives. The house stated
that," if the raise was not 75 percent of the salary schedule voted in principle the previous month by the board, they would not accept it." Fewkes wrote to Whiston telling him that Willis, had again presented his plan for pay raises to the board without consulting the union which was a violation of the memorandum of understanding.55

The house of representatives at a September meeting voted to:

Accept nothing less than a salary with a base of $5,500 and yearly increments of $375 . . . and authorize an election no later than October 29, 1965 to determine the sole collective bargaining agent for Chicago teachers. . . . If all the demands are not agreed to by the Board of Education the House of Representatives directs the president to declare and implement a work stoppage beginning September 27, 1965. 56

The union was willing to strike on two main issues. One was that the board implement the salary schedule they had passed in principle. The other was that an election to determine the exclusive bargaining agent for Chicago Teachers be held. On 22 September the board met and voted nine to one (Friedman voting no) to approve the 100 percent implementation demanded by the union. The next day the board met and by a vote of six to two (Friedman and Green voting no) the board authorized a collective bargaining election. The union called off its strike on the same day the board passed the bargaining election. 57

The union had achieved what they had desired for a long time. There would be one representative for the
teachers after the election. The board and the general superintendent would have to work and consult with the representative of the teachers. There would be an election for a sole exclusive bargaining agent.
CHAPTER FOUR NOTES


10. "John Fewkes to Clair Roddewig," 18 September 1962, Box 49, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


107


15. "Minutes of Meeting Chicago-Cook County Council of Public Employees," 4 December 1962, Box 49, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


20. "Benjamin Willis, Statement to the Board of Education," 23 April 1963, Box 40, Folder 4, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


24. "TV Interview by Mr. Fewkes on WGN TV by Mr. Sheridan," 16 October 1963, Box 40, Folder 4, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


34. "Minutes House of Representatives and Delegates," 14 February 1964, Box 24, Folder 2, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


40. "John Fewkes to M. Liberthal," 20 April 1964, Box 21, Folder 2, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


43. Ibid.

44. "Budgetary Requests for 1965," 20 November 1964, Box 40, Folder 5, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


46. "John Fewkes to Benjamin Willis," 22 April 1965, Box 51, Folder 4, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

47. "John Fewkes to Benjamin Willis," 29 April 1965, Box 51, Folder 4, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

48. "Statement of President Whiston to the Board of Education," 26 May 1965, Box 41, Folder 1, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


53. Chicago Union Teacher, September 1965.

54. Ibid.

55. "John Fewkes to Frank Whiston," 9 September 1965, Box 51, Folder 5, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.

56. Ibid.

57. Chicago Union Teacher, September 1965. At both board meetings that approved the salary increase and the collective bargaining election board members Adams, Pasnick and Scheffler were absent.
CHAPTER V

THE WARRIORS CHANGE BUT THE WAR CONTINUES

In September 1965, the board of education voted to hold an election to determine the exclusive bargaining agent for Chicago teachers. The threat of a strike was only one factor that persuaded the board to proceed with the election. The decision to hold a strike threat over the board was really not Fewkes's decision as the Daily News reported:

The proposal to call a Chicago teachers strike was pushed through by a group led by Charles Skibbens a candidate for president of the 13,000 member Chicago Teachers Union in next May's election. Apparently angered by Skibbens' activist role at Friday evening's stormy 2 1/2 hour meeting CTU president John M. Fewkes refused to pose with Skibbens afterward.1

This rival group led by Skibbens put together a narrow victory of ninety to eighty in the house of representatives to proceed with a strike unless their demands were met. This narrow victory and the fact that some representatives were absent or abstaining caused many members to favor a referendum of the whole membership. In a letter to Fewkes, the faculty of Burns School stated:

The vote of 90 to 80 in favor of a strike does not indicate that even the majority of the house of representatives favored this action, as there were
undoubtedly a number of delegates absent whose votes, had they been present, might have been cast against the motion to strike. Furthermore, that a ten vote majority out of 170 votes cast should presume to dictate to 13,000 teachers a course of action on an issue of such gravity, appears to us to be an arbitrary and improper assumption of power.²

fewkes was caught in the middle on this issue. He did not want this confrontation on the strike issue into which he was forced by the vote of the house of representatives. He could not support a referendum, because if the strike lost in a vote with the membership, the board would know that the leadership of the union did not have the support of the membership. Thus, the board would not respond to any pressure. Besides being caught in the middle on this issue, Fewkes was receiving letters expressing various opinions on a strike One group of teachers wrote "You are doing a good job of killing something you worked to build at one time."

Another group praised Fewkes as a, "moderating voice."³

Fewkes was placed in an awkward position because as he stated it, he was outmaneuvered. Skibbens offered the strike motion and Fewkes refused to take a stand on the issue. This left the representatives confused, some thought that Fewkes even supported a strike because of his silence. The Skibben's group used this indecisiveness to tie the collective bargaining issue to the salary issue.

The switch from the salary issue to the collective bargaining is seen by the observers as an attempt by the action committee to prove to the 13,000 union members that the militant group has the power to bring to a head an issue on which there previously has been no progress.⁴
Fewkes, in an interview to the Chicago Tribune on 21 September 1965, attacked Skibbens for forcing a confrontation and labeled his actions "irresponsible." The Daily News on 22 September 1965, reported that Fewkes was not prepared for a strike "voted by Skibbens and his adherents in a chaotic meeting." The Chicago American on 21 September stated, "Meanwhile a feud between Skibbens on one side and Fewkes and Desmond on the other became hotter after the union's executive board meeting last night." According to Fewkes, the dissidents had packed the delegates' meeting and proceeded to intimidate a number of delegates who otherwise would have supported the leadership position.

Before the union's house of representatives took a strike vote, the leadership of the union had renewed its commitment never to have a strike. The leadership was directed by the house of delegates not only to achieve a salary increase but also to gain collective bargaining or to strike. Fewkes was in shock: he was caught in the middle again and matters were to get worse. Five days after the September vote to gain collective bargaining or strike, other forces entered the field of battle. William Lee and organized labor decided to stand behind the teachers union because labor saw the teachers as a new source of power for themselves.5

Thus, the Executive Council of the Chicago Federation of Labor voted to support the teachers' demand
for collective bargaining. The president of the CFL, William Lee, a long term friend of the mayor, interceded with Mayor Daley on behalf of the teachers. With this kind of powerful, teacher-mayor alliance, Fewkes began to lose control of his union.

ACCEPTANCE AND DELAY

Shortly after the labor federation's decision the school board voted to accept a collective bargaining election and a salary increase. According to Warren Bacon, a board member:

All the good board members who normally vote as a bloc with the establishment were adamant against granting the union the right of collective bargaining . . . . Bill Lee (president of the Chicago Federation of Labor) and one or two other top leaders very closely identified with the so-called 'power structure' of this city were sent over to the Board meetings, and those Board members who were adamant against granting the union this right changed just like that.

Whether it was the strike threat or the political situation at the time, the board did vote to hold an election to determine the exclusive bargaining agent. Fewkes changed his direction and claimed credit for a favorable board vote. He did not mention Skibbens or his role in the near strike. Instead Fewkes claimed a great deal of the credit. In his president's column in the *Chicago Union Teacher* he thanked Mayor Daley and Bill Lee. He then went on to discuss how to win the election to become the exclusive bargaining agent for the teachers. The same issue included an editorial that justified a strike threat. It stated:
When a memorandum of understanding which is in existence is grossly ignored, teachers are justified in losing their patience, reasonableness and understanding. Had there been long term planning, good faith negotiation in accordance with the memorandum of understanding and action instead of promises, the issues which caused a strike vote to be taken could have been avoided.\textsuperscript{8}

Another reason that collective bargaining was approved by the board was proposed by Paul Peterson, a university professor and local authority on school politics:

The Mayor and his allies had a substantive political interest in arranging an alliance with the CTU. In the midst of the great struggles surrounding Benjamin Willis and the civil rights movement in the school system, Daley could ill afford to have the CTU, still another political force within the educational arena, opposed to his policies. If strikes were added to demonstrations, sit-ins and boycotts, the turmoil in school politics could possibly once again disturb the stability of Chicago political regime.\textsuperscript{9}

A COURT CASE BATTLE

Before the union could celebrate the issue would end up in court. On 5 October the Chicago Education Association (CEA), formerly known as the Chicago Division of IEA, filed for an injunction to block the exclusive bargaining agent election. The CEA suit had two complaints. First, the board had a contract with the CEA, i.e., the memorandum of understanding, and the board had breached the contract when they approved an election for an exclusive bargaining agent. Second, since the board had already approved the election, they would favor that side in the matter.
Judge Cornelius J. Harrington refused to grant the injunction against the election until the CEA had made their grievances known to the board, as stated in the memorandum. On 4 November the board of education rejected the grievance of the CEA to reconsider its bargaining agent election vote of 23 September 1965. However the board did amend its vote, making it clear that they did not intend to discriminate in any way among the organizations.

THE DECISION

On 23 February Judge Harrington gave his decision concerning the CEA's injunction suit against the collective bargaining election. He dismissed the suit of the CEA. In his decision, he indicated that the board should serve notice of intent to terminate existing memoranda of understanding before authorizing an exclusive bargaining agent election. Thus, the court upheld that the collective bargaining agreement between the board and a teacher organization was legal. He also insisted that a "no strike" provision be put into the contract. 10

The day after the court decision Fewkes wrote to Whiston requesting that the board notify any teacher's organizations with memoranda, that such memoranda between the organization and the board be terminated on 12 November 1966. The collective bargaining committee of the board set a meeting date with all the teacher organizations prior to 31
March 1966 to set the rules for an election to determine a collective bargaining agent for all Chicago teachers. 11

The agenda for the 23 March 1966 board meeting included the collective bargaining issue. On the day of the meeting Fewkes wrote Whiston that the board should act immediately "to implement the holding of an election to determine the sole collective bargaining agent for Chicago Teachers." At the meeting, by a vote of six to two (Green and Friedman voting no) the board approved a resolution to inform the teacher organizations that the existing memoranda would be terminated on their expiration dates in November. The board at their 13 April meeting would set a date for the election. 12 This meeting the board voted to authorize the negotiations committee to work out a procedure for an election to determine the bargaining agent for Chicago teachers. The board eventually fixed the date of the election for 27 May 1966.

The CEA asked that the date be set aside and no election be held until they finished their appeal on the legal case. The negotiations committee of the board refused. Then the CEA threatened to boycott the election. The Chicago Principals Club asked that it not be included in the election, but the board disagreed and included a separate ballot for principals. Fewkes wrote Judge Edward Scheffler, chair of the negotiations committee, requesting that the CTU be placed on the separate ballot for principals. 13
The campaign to determine the bargaining agent was a short one. The CTU stressed the same union theme. The campaign literature stated "A vote for Chicago Teachers Union will insure a long term contract to make teachers full partners of the school administration and the Board of Education." Other literature for the CTU stated they "would increase teacher benefits, conditions and participation."

The election was held on 27 May 1966, and the CTU won, receiving 10,936 votes out of 12,208. (The CTF received only 16 votes.) The election results were officially approved as resolution 74069 at the 13 July 1966 meeting of the board.

The union prepared for the new negotiations to take place with the board. At the house of representatives meeting on 10 June 1966, it established the collective bargaining resource committee. Appointed by the president its purpose was: "to compile the demands presented by the Steering Committees of the functional group, [and] also to do the necessary research and documentation for the negotiating team in drawing up a long form Contract."
committee, chaired by Jerome O'Mara had its first meeting a few days after being formed, and then continued to meet weekly. 15

NEW LEADERSHIP

In the middle of all the action on collective bargaining, the CTU had an election for president. Fewkes had chosen not to run again, so the candidates were Charles Skibbens, Fewkes's former administrative assistant, and John Desmond, the current vice-president of the union. Fewkes supported Desmond; he never forgave Skibbens for leading a dissident faction against him, even though this action eventually led the board to have an election for a sole bargaining agent.

Skibbens claimed in his election literature that he was the one responsible for bringing collective bargaining to the Chicago teachers. A time interval of four years had passed between Skibbens first involvement with collective bargaining and its final acceptance by the board. Fewkes involvement was many more years than that. 16

Fewkes replied to Skibbens's attacks in his campaign literature:

Mr. Skibbens has never been an elected officer of the Chicago Teachers Union. He was an unsuccessful candidate for an Elementary Vice-President on a slate that ran in opposition to the slate on which I was a candidate for President. Nevertheless, as President, I appointed him a chairman of a committee, thereby placing him on the Executive Board. Subsequently, he was hired as my assistant in the mistaken hope that he might develop into material for an elective office.
When Mr. Skibbens decided that he would be a candidate for the Presidency and so informed me, I asked that he resign as my assistant because I did not wish the false impression to be conveyed that he was my choice for the Presidency. HE IS NOT -- I RECOMMEND THE ELECTION OF JOHN E. DESMOND AS THE BEST QUALIFIED PERSON FOR PRESIDENT. 17

Whether this helped Desmond win is not clear. At any rate Desmond defeated Skibbens by a margin of 132 votes (4,553 to 4,421). This was the closest election in union history. What was clear was that the new leadership did not have a mandate from the membership.

At the same time the union presidency was being fought over and the collective bargaining issue was being settled, Willis announced to the board of education that he was resigning as general superintendent. His resignation was to take effect in August. This was not a major surprise to the board members because a year earlier, in May 1965, Willis negotiated an agreement with the board that, he would be reappointed for a fourth term but would retire in December 1966 on his sixty-fifth birthday. As the year ended, he decided to move the date up a few months to August. There were many reasons for Willis's early retirement. The major one was his failure to work effectively to resolve the problem of racial composition in the schools. A search committee already was seeking a new superintendent. They knew that Willis would be leaving in December 1966, so by the time he retired in August, they had already made preparations for hiring a new superintendent.
The board offered the job to James Redmond. Redmond was superintendent in New Orleans, so he had experience in desegregation issues in a large city. He also had experience with Chicago when he was brought to the city in 1947, as assistant to superintendent Herold Hunt.

NEW LEADERS, NEW COMPLICATIONS AND A NEW CONTRACT

By the fall of 1966, the school year was not promising to be a smooth one. First, the Chicago Teachers Union had a new President, John Desmond, who won by a narrow margin. Second, the board of education had two new members, Jack Carey and Harry Oliver and a reappointed Cyrus Adams. Carey was a union representative -- a staff worker of the United Steel workers of America; and Oliver was a businessman -- vice-president of March & McLennan. Finally, the General Superintendent was new to the job, if not to the city, and he had inherited all of Willis's problems: finance, segregation and collective bargaining. With all these factors it was not surprising that matters went from bad to worse for the school system.

During the summer of 1966, the union through its collective bargaining resource committee, had drafted its demands. In the minutes of the resource committee on 20 July 1966, Desmond said, "We should shoot for the moon and work down."\textsuperscript{18} It was obvious that not too many people at the union really knew what collective bargaining was. In the
minutes of the 28 July 1966 meeting of the bargaining committee, one of the members, Mr. Holland, stated:

That we consult legal counsel as to what avenue C.B. committee should take. Do we rewrite Board rules or do we put in a catch-all phrase at end of contract placing burden of changing Board rules to conform to our contract?19

The board and the union were still trying to find the handle on collective bargaining in October 1966. In the October 1966 issue of the Chicago Union Teacher, Desmond stated:

The Board, in its well-intentioned bumbling and indecision, could easily pass the point of no return in the time left for meaningful negotiations. We must be prepared to prevent such a tragedy. We will set a deadline for the completion of negotiations . . . . We, the CTU and every Chicago teacher, must be determined and immovable in our decision that no teacher will teach in 1967 unless a contract has been completed and implemented through budgetary provisions.20

The issue ended in Mayor Daley's office. The mayor was instrumental in hammering out an agreement between the board and the union. The board, which repeatedly stated that the money was not available, finally found some funds with the assistance of the mayor. This settlement cost the board in the area of $20 million while it insisted that it could only afford $5.4 million

The union did receive a five-hundred dollar salary increase and hospital, surgical and major medical insurance and two personal business days as part of the settlement. The needed funds were to come from a property tax increase
referendum in February 1967. The mayor was instrumental in its passage.

When the additional revenue came in from the property tax increase, the board found itself with a surplus of about $17 million. The board informed the union of this because Article 46-4 of the agreement between the board and the union stated, "negotiations shall be undertaken between the parties with respect to monies which become available over and above the total Educational Fund revenues appropriated in the annual school budget for 1967." Therefore, the acquisition of additional funds required reopening negotiations on the 1967 contract. It didn't take long for disagreement to occur. The union wanted the additional funds to go to the hiring of teacher aides to give teachers another preparation period, one week's Christmas vacation pay, and a seventy-five dollar per month salary increase for teachers. On 27 September agreement was reached on the supplementary budget. Included in the settlement were a paid Christmas vacation, pay for extracurricular activities, and employment of 1200 teacher aides.

NEGOTIATIONS OF 1968

In October 1967 the union submitted to the board its demands for 1968, and the negotiators began work on 13 November. These negotiations were different. The board did not just sit quietly; instead, it submitted to the union
sixty counter demands, including modifying or deleting articles the union had won in 1967. The CTU, on the other hand, started giving publicity to the negotiations by releasing a detailed summary of the its demands to the press.

Serious negotiations were postponed, as usual, until the end of December. By then the CTU had submitted to the board a list of "vital issues" that included:

A hundred-fifty dollar per month increase; a ten step salary schedule; a salary increase for full-time basis substitutes; a paid spring vacation; and three personal business days.24

The board's response to the union was a 2 percent across the board increase; letting FTB's (full-time basis substitutes) move up to the third step on the salary schedule. This was contingent upon the union accepting a weakening of the grievance procedure and elimination of transfer rights. The union's response was delivered by Desmond in the January 1968 Chicago Union Teacher:

This insulting offer of a 2 percent a year wage increase is a full 1.6 percent less than the rise in the cost of living since March, 1967. In effect, the Board offered the teachers a 1.6 percent pay cut in real wages. All teachers should consider such an offer contemptible and wholly unworthy of good faith negotiations. 25

The union submitted a counter proposal on 27 December, demanding a $125 per month increase to begin on 1 January 1968, but the board refused to change from 2 percent. On 3 January the CTU submitted another proposal asking for the following: one-hundred dollars per month
beginning on 1 January 1968; fifty dollars per month additional beginning on 1 September 1968; a paid spring vacation; one additional business day; and retention of transfer rights. The board submitted a counterproposal on 4 January 1968 calling for: a twenty dollar per month increase in January and an additional forty-five dollars per month in September. The board's new proposal would also increase civil service salaries by two percent in January and three percent in September. The board also withdrew its demand to change the grievance procedure.26

The same day the board made its new offer, the union's house of representatives rejected it and set 9 January 1968 as a strike date. The minutes of the house of representatives meeting stated that, "The president is hereby authorized and directed by this House of Representatives to announce the effective date of the strike (9 January 1968) to the membership assembled at the meeting to be held at the Opera House on Saturday, January 6th 1968."27

A fourth counterproposal was sent to the board on 5 January 1968 asking for a fifty dollar per month increase on 1 January 1968 and an additional fifty dollar per month increase on 1 September 1968. The union also asked for FTB's to go to step five on the salary schedule; two preparation periods for teachers; and a paid spring vacation.28
On 6 January 1968, with the strike date three days away, Mayor Daley called the negotiators into his office. The negotiations took six hours and ended with an agreement that included the following:

1. That FTB's advance to step 4 on the salary schedule.
2. That teachers receive a $40 per month increase in January and a additional increase of $60 per month in September.
3. That civil service personnel receive a 5 percent increase.
4. That 600 additional teacher aides be appointed.
5. That teachers receive 3 personal business days.29

To persuade the board to agree Daley promised that the state tax referendum would pass in June and increase the board's revenues. A majority of the board agreed. However, some members voted no, arguing that it was not good business to budget in consideration of future tax increase. In other words, it was bad business practice to make allocations on future funds.

The decision to implement part of the agreement in January 1968 and the remainder in September 1968 led to another budget deficit. In his previous budget Redmond said, "The school system would fall short by 40 million dollars by just standing still." Unless additional funds came in, the board would not be able to pay for the items to which they agreed.30

In a letter to the delegates Desmond told them:

Pressure from the Union on the Board of Education resulted in the appointment of a Special Committee composed of outstanding civic and professional leaders whose principal purpose is to obtain funds for our
schools, and a commitment by the Board of Education to work with the Union to pressure the Illinois General Assembly to live up to its responsibilities to provide a good common school education for the children of Illinois. 31

The election for presidency of the union was due in May 1968. Desmond's unsuccessful opponent Richard Holland called upon the teacher's to "not lock . . . into a Contract including a 'no strike' clause without first obtaining a clear cut agreement that previous promises made regarding salaries will be fulfilled." In other words with such board deficits he thought the CTU might have to use the strike tactic. 32

The final negotiation of the 1968 contract took seven months. It was not until June that the board and the union approved it. The union vote of the membership was taken on 7 June 1968, and the result was acceptance by a vote of 9,003 to 2,196 In August, Redmond announced that the board did not have sufficient monies for all its budgeted provisions. The board had a deficit of about 8.5 million dollars and this would require cuts. 33 As a result of the cuts the number of new teachers to be hired was reduced by four hundred. The class size of the elementary schools was increased by 1.5 students and the implementation of many provisions of the 1968 contract were drastically cut. In-service training, free periods for elementary teachers, and planning classes for the socially maladjusted were reduced by half. 34
The board was in trouble. They were not able to meet their 1968 programs and unless additional sources of revenue were made available they might have to break provisions of the union's contract. The legislature could not help until the spring session, and the warning of some of the board members about budgeting on future revenue seemed to be prophetic. Thus the mayor was in trouble. He could not find the resources to fund his last mediation effort. The passage of the June tax referendum, which Daley told the negotiators he would achieve, never was accomplished. According to one source:

Daley reportedly disregarded such skepticism (expressed by some Board members) and assured both sides that the money would materialize. But only $19,600,000 has been found -- thus, leaving a $12,000,000 deficit and considerable doubt over Daley's ability to squeeze funds from a Republican dominated legislature.35

Desmond and Redmond got together and worked out a series of cuts to be made. Desmond called the cuts a "supplemental budget." He stressed the gains made such as the salary increase and the Christmas vacation pay and stated:

The House action upheld the previous day's Executive Board motion which provided that programs for (1) after school workshops in inner city schools, (2) duty-free professional preparation periods for elementary teachers and (3) a pilot program for socially maladjusted children be partially implemented by October 15, 1968 and fully implemented January 1, 1969.36

In a letter written to Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, chair of the board's committee on labor relations, Desmond
repeated the union's position and again stated that the legislature was their best hope for money:

The Board must also alert the citizens of Chicago of the crisis in our schools. If the citizens of Chicago knew the true facts, they would vote wisely at the polls in November to send legislators to the General Assembly who would be responsive to the necessity of providing adequate funds for education.37

With this as the background, the union and the board began to bargain a contract for 1969. The union's position was, that before any new issues could be handled, the board must implement the provisions of the 1968 contract which were cut due to lack of funds.

The stage was set for conflict: on one side was the union who wanted its cuts returned and other demands met; on the other side was the board which, due to a lack of funds, could not let the teachers have anything new.
CHAPTER FIVE NOTES


2. "Burns School Faculty to John Fewkes," 24 September 1965, Box 51, Folder 3, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


21. Agreement between the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Teachers Union, 1 January 1967-31 December 1967, (Chicago: Board of Education, 1967). This article relates only to monies which were not appropriated in the annual budget.


CHAPTER VI

THE STRIKE YEARS

In 1966 when the board of education agreed to have a sole collective bargaining agent for Chicago teachers it opened a new era. Gone were the days when a superintendent could dictate if there would be a raise or not. The union had a steering committee which was responsible for putting together the demands for the negotiators in November 1968. The book of demands were delivered to the board on 8 October 1968. The salary level Desmond was looking for was $8,500 for starting teachers.1

In an interview in the Chicago Daily News on 12 September 1968 Desmond stated that "(1) the legislature would have to increase state aid to Chicago schools and (2) the future contract settlement will no longer be reached in the mayor's office."2 The last statement referred to the fact that the mayor had assumed the responsibility of the salary increases in the previous two negotiations of 1967 and 1968. In the last year he was only partially successful in acquiring the additional funds needed to finance the second settlement for 1968. Therefore, the school board was faced with its first deficit as contract talks began for the
1969 contract. The board informed the teachers that any salary increase would be impossible because of the deficit. This was the reason Desmond was looking to the legislature. In the October 1968 issue of *The Chicago Union Teacher* John Desmond in his column stated:

Present state support of the Chicago public schools is only 22.2% of the total revenue needed. Illinois, one of the richest states, ranks 47th in the amount of its personal income spent on local public schools. This is shocking when one realizes that Illinois ranks third in the nation in personal income and seventh in per capita income.³

On 8 November Redmond published his tentative budget for the coming year which did not include salary or educational improvements. This was ammunition for TAC (Teachers Action Committee), a dissident subgroup of the CTU who opposed Desmond and sponsored Skibbens in the 1966 union election. TAC's demands were reduction of class size, duty free preparation period and reestablishment of the 1968 contract agreements. John Kotsakis president of the organization threatened that "should the CTU officers fail to bargain for these demands or achieve them, TAC will call a rally in January to plan and direct action to achieve them."⁴

The sides were aligning: the board claiming deficit and no more funds available; and the leadership of the union
already feeling pressure from the TAC dissidents. All of this was building before either side had sat down for negotiations. When Redmond released the budget proposal it totaled $24 million dollars less than the 1968 budget. It also included $48 million worth of cuts in programs; this would mean staff cuts of at least six thousand in September. This budget was constructed using only revenues that the board knew they would have. They could afford to continue the same level of service from January to June. Therefore the cuts were set for September 1969. Anticipating the union's reaction to these cuts Redmond said, "It looks like we're heading for a real knock down, drag out session." He also said that to just implement the sixty dollar per month raise the teachers already had won would put the board in a twenty-five million dollar deficit.  

In 1968 when a contract was agreed upon in the mayor's office one of those who opposed it was Harry Oliver, a member of the school board. He was quoted in the 20 November 1968 edition of the Chicago Sun-Times on the pay raise issue. He said, "last year's pay raise came out of the hide of expanded programs." The Chicago newspapers not only quoted the superintendent but also the CTU president to the effect that "Numerous teachers are requesting improved working conditions, lower class size and special programs. These things will definitely be on the list of demands we will submit for the board for collective bargaining."
NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN

In November as the negotiations were to begin Desmond announced to the press that he expected the board to implement the provisions of the 1968 contract in January 1969, even though they had already stated that this would create a $25 million deficit. All the Chicago media took a strong position against a teacher strike as a means of settling the conflict. For the most part the Sun-Times put the blame on the legislature because of inadequate state aid and in an editorial the paper said, "School children should not be forced to bear the burden of legislative indifference." The real position of the union was expressed in a meeting of their leadership with other factions of the CTU including the dissidents: the vital issues they set were a five-period teaching day and an absolute minimum salary increase of $650 with two paid vacations. The Chicago American's editorial on the matter suggested as all the others that the solution would have to come from the legislature. The editorial also suggested that the problem was with the funding procedures, in as much as the superintendent had to make a budget in November but wouldn't know until June what state monies were available. This was not an important issue until school leaders were looking to Springfield for increased funds. In a Chicago Tribune article Desmond was quoted as saying, "The Board must re-allocate the money it does have to make educational
improvements we’re seeking; salary is secondary. "Desmond was also quoted in the Chicago Daily News as claiming that salary would be de-emphasized in this contract and issues such as class size were going to be the important areas of discussion. "We will demand an extra teacher for every elementary school class with more than twenty-five students." 11

The actual negotiations began 22 November 1968. On 27 November the board submitted its own proposals rejecting the majority of the union’s demands due to budget restrictions. This was the first time that the board responded with detailed proposals of their own and was seen as the beginning of true negotiations. On 29 November the board proposals were rejected by the union. At the 29 November meeting it became evident to the union that Manford Byrd, who was handling the negotiations as deputy superintendent, could not make major decisions. Therefore, Desmond wanted to know if they were just stalling. A response from the board was not forthcoming.

By December, with little progress being made at the negotiating table, the union decided to go public with its demands. The Chicago Tribune of 11 December 1968 reported the story on the front page. It stated, "The 1969 contract demands of the Chicago Teachers Union would cost at least 285 million dollars, a board of education official said yesterday." 12 The major issues were listed as a salary
increase, reduced class size and reduced teaching load. There was also discussion of improvement of inner city schools. The Chicago Tribune on 12 December 1968 stated that in light of such demands and due to the extent of the current fiscal crisis neither side seemed optimistic about the prospects of averting a strike.13

The only thing that Desmond and Redmond could agree upon was the necessity for getting the schools more aid. Desmond stated, "It is about time the general public and the legislature knew the conditions in the Schools." An editorial in the Chicago American, placed the blame "on the legislators who have consistently skimped on educational needs and may be inclined to do so again."14 Marge Wild, a member of the board, stated that Illinois ranked "46th in the nation in amount of state aid to schools while being the 3rd wealthiest state."15 A television editorial ended by saying, "We hope the teachers union, and the teachers themselves will ease up on their costly demands and not go into this week's negotiations waving the threat of a strike."16

In the month of December proposals were exchanged but neither side could agree. The board would always respond negatively by stating that they did not have the money to fund them. Being frustrated on the bargaining issue Desmond raised other issues. He told the negotiators that the union did not believe that serious negotiations were going on
since few, if any board members were present. Also since (Byrd who represented the general superintendent) did not have any authority to negotiate, Desmond said he wanted a board member present if negotiations were to continue.

The bickering went back and forth with little results. The union started to put pressure on the negotiations when they issued a deadline. In a press release dated 13 December 1968 Desmond stated to the house of representatives that "the organization faces a crisis in its collective bargaining negotiations with the Chicago Board of Education." Consequently the union's house of representatives determined that a contract offer would have to be ready for approval by 6 January 1969. By the end of December it was obvious that the negotiations were in serious trouble. After a month of negotiations the two parties could only agree upon three items which included: the placement of union materials in teacher's mailboxes; the coach of the swimming team holding a certificate that he passed a swimming test and the adjustment teacher having a phone.

On 27 December 1968 the union returned to the bargaining table and found superintendent Redmond there. This meant that the serious negotiations were starting. The union presented its "vital issues." The board in response again complained that the union did not understand the board's problems and was unrealistic in considering the
financial resources of the board. In turn the union considered the board to be unrealistic if they believed that they would accept the following purposed cuts and layoffs: a layoff of six-thousand teachers and civil service personnel in September 1969; a cutback in teacher-aides; a loss of personal business days; and a loss in salary. The negotiations had to recess to conference with the respective parties. When they resumed on 30 December 1968, the union responded to the board's proposals declaring that some of the items were board requested and should not be considered as new items in the 1969 package. Thus December ended with little done. With so little progress being made the threat of a strike became more of a reality. The strike issue was not received well by the dissidents within the union. The 26 December 1968 issue of the Chicago Tribune noted, "Factions within the union are pressing John E. Desmond their president, to hold out for substantial "educational improvements," including lower class size and heavier spending in inner city schools."21

THE NEW YEAR

On 2 January 1969 the board met with the union for negotiations. The deadline set by the house of representatives of 3 January was the next day. Wild opened the meeting by reading the board's latest offer. The board would: (1) implement the 1968 agreement; (2) restore the cuts; 3) defer salary items to July; and continue to
negotiate.22 The union's response was presented that evening. This was the third counterproposal to the board. It included: (1) implementation of the 1968 contract; (2) change in certification; and (3) salary increase and negotiations to be continued. With regard to the latter they would continue until an agreement was reached on all items with the understanding that present contract terms and conditions would be continued pending negotiations.23

On 3 January 1969 the board presented its newest proposal to the union:

This Board proposal is made with the understanding that the present contract will be extended for 12 months subject to the obligation to continue to negotiate in good faith on all outstanding proposals not covered by this settlement, looking toward modification of our present contract by mutual agreement as appropriate. The extended contract also contains a provision to provide for further discussion of salary and education program improvements to begin after July 1, 1969.24

In response Desmond accused them of wanting a strike. Wild denied Desmond's charges and said, "The board's proposal had all the available funds in it, and it stressed improvements in education."25

On 3 January 1969 at the house of representatives Desmond recommended that they reject the board's latest offer and call a strike. He said that the board was trying to increase class size, stop transfers and avoid considering any cost of living raise. Joseph Jacobs, the union's attorney, reported that their suggestion to work without a contract or add a reopener clause was rejected. "They
wouldn't agree to that. They insisted on a signed contract now, without even a re-opener clause for later negotiation. They wanted us to agree to talk about what they want, when they want."

Desmond introduced the executive board resolution which rejected the board's offer and called for a general membership meeting on 6 January 1969 to authorize a strike by secret ballot. The union president then obtained from the house of representatives a resolution which called for "substantial progress" on thirteen key issues. Among them were the following: (1) the full implementation of 1968 contract; (2) the programs for socially maladjusted children; (3) the maximum class size of twenty-five; (4) the revision of certification procedure; and (5) the placement of full-time basis substitutes (FTB) to the fifth step on the salary schedule.

The house approved the resolution and rejected the board's offer. This meant a strike unless there was a change from one side or another. Desmond was preparing for a strike with TAC's support because they now wanted what the union wanted. On 4 and 5 January the talks went on for twenty-six hours. After six and a half hours of talking Murray, vice-president of the board, was able to report that "we hope to avoid a strike." Wild stated that the two sides had discussed each of the thirteen points of the union. Desmond did not feel the same. He called the board's proposal "a
slap in the face."\(^{29}\) He was referring to two items in particular. The first was that they would not consider a raise; and the second was that the board insisted on a full-year contract. The union position was to wait and see what the legislature would give before signing on for a full year.

Union leaders believed that the legislature would provide funds for a pay increase for teachers. Murray was quoted by the *Sun-Times* on 6 January 1969 as saying that he felt the "Board could go part of the way at least, by offering a $40 a month increase."\(^{30}\) The labor relations committee decided to poll the other members of the board. The results of this poll indicated that the vote would be a five to five tie. Union sources said one member could not be reached "If that board member had been reached, the vote probably would have been six to five in favor of the pay hikes. The union probably would have approved the contract proposal."\(^{31}\)

When the board met the next day on 6 January instead of a pay raise they offered additional money to be spent on educational programs. The board thought that if the union was serious in their educational reform demands and not just looking for raises they would accept. If they did not accept it would be good ammunition for the media. Desmond finally agreed to support the amended offer. It is not clear why he
supported an offer he rejected earlier. Perhaps he knew the board would not give any more.

On 6 January at a mass membership meeting of the union, Desmond presented the board's offer. It included freezing class size as of 1 September 1968; initiating a planning project for funding three inner city schools; hiring additional substitute teachers; agreeing to consider certification procedure changes; advancing FTB's from a $805 monthly maximum to $840; and implementing the 1968 contract clauses on teacher aides, inner-city teacher workshops and programs for the maladjusted. Desmond argued in favor of the offer. He believed that "this was the best agreement we could get from the Board of Education."32

The dissidents led by Kotsakis opposed this contract. He told the members at the mass membership meeting that the house of representatives earlier had recommended a strike until "substantial progress" on all thirteen major points had been achieved. Kotsakis stated that this offer was no progress on any of the thirteen points, especially the one on a salary increase.

The membership rejected the offer and authorized the house of representatives to set a strike date. The vote was 1,368 to 1,148 which represented a small turn out of the union's 19,000 members. "Union President John E. Desmond, who had recommended acceptance . . . blamed the defeat on apathetic teachers and the board's intransigence on the pay
question." The Chicago Tribune also noted that Desmond was heckled during his presentation. The Daily News stated, "Union President John Desmond had never lost on such a vote before. Desmond tried hard for acceptance of the package and the membership turned him down." Desmond told the Chicago Tribune on 8 January 1969, "I cannot go back to the membership again with that offer." He said that all thirteen points -- including a teacher salary increase -- would have to be renegotiated.

On 7 January Desmond attended a union meeting. He told the members of the results of the mass meeting. He stated he received many petitions to put the issue to a referendum of the teachers but had to rule that the vote of the mass meeting of 6 January was final unless further negotiations resulted in a change in the package.

The media liked the idea of a referendum. The Chicago American in its editorial titled "Let Teachers Speak" asked for a referendum of the teachers. The Sun-Times also asked for one in its editorial page. To obtain a referendum Desmond would need 5 percent of the union membership to sign a petition or 950 teachers. This never came about because Desmond changed his position on it. Desmond changed his mind Tuesday night after a meeting of the union's delegates, who expressed their disapproval of the board's proposal. He said there would have to be some changes in the board's offer. Why he changed may be due to
pressure from the dissident elements in the union. John Kotsakis called a press conference to accuse Desmond of "weakening a strong bargaining position by seeking to go against the will of his members."\(^{37}\)

When negotiations resumed on 9 January, little if any progress was made. The union insisted on a cost of living raise. The board negotiators responded with the results of the 8 January board vote of 9-2 not to give any raises in the 1969 budget. In other words they had no new proposal. Desmond was being backed into a corner. The dissidents wanted a strike date to be set. The board proposal had already been turned down by the membership at the mass meeting. Desmond could not ask for a new vote on the same proposal.

On 11 January the parties returned to the negotiations table. The session began by having read into the record a letter Whiston had written Desmond:

The Board of Education today reaffirms its commitment to the Chicago Teachers Union to incorporate in the 1969 Budget the agreement on program improvements reached with the Chicago Teachers Union leadership and announced on January 6, 1969. \(\ldots\) The Board reaffirms its position that the Board of Education cannot at this time add a $40 per month salary increase to the package offered.\(^{38}\)

The union then gave the board its seventh counterproposal and the board accepted nine provisions and responded with a proposal to arrange for a referendum to approve the extension of the present contract for six months. The union asked the board negotiators to ask the
full board not to pass the 1969 budget until the conflicts were resolved. Desmond told the board that if they accepted this proposal the union leadership would hold a referendum and recommend acceptance.

On 11 January 1969 the full board met and passed its 1969 budget by a 9-1 vote. The board then developed a new counterproposal which provided for: a six month extension of the 1968 contract; fifty new adjustment teachers as of September; in-service training for physical education teachers; compensatory time for extra curricular activities; and counseling service for suspended students. The board also agreed to reopen negotiations for salary and others items in June to be included in the August supplementary budget.39

Desmond presented this at the next executive board meeting and they recommended acceptance by the membership "not because it is adequate or is satisfactory but only because it contains as much as, we can get at this time without an immediate strike."40 The reason he could come back to the membership again without a salary increase and ask them to accept this proposal (after one similar to it was defeated by a general membership meeting) was that this contract contained four new provisions that the other one did not have.

Desmond then prepared to present it to the
membership. In a letter to the membership Desmond explained why he accepted the offer:

The Board has been clearly and plainly notified by the CTU that if the membership accepts the six months agreement, we are going to insist on substantial salary increases in September, 1969. CTU will be demanding much more than the cost of living adjustments discussed during the most recent negotiating sessions. The Board will have been given every opportunity in the next six months to fulfill its duty to raise adequate funds to pay the teachers what they deserve for the work they do. The Board understands that though the teachers may wait this time, they will not wait again in September. And in September the members will not be tied down with a no-strike clause as they were last year when the Board cut back on earlier commitments.

In recommending the proposal to wait six months Desmond was gambling that the board would be able to obtain additional revenues in June. He would also be negotiating with exact amounts not anticipated revenue.

The dissidents in the union wanted a strike before the end of the school year. They were not in favor of the executive board motion. Kotsakis said, "the recommendation is an attempt to disguise the previously inadequate settlement with a token $300,000." In responding to the dissidents and presenting the leadership position Desmond in a "Special Report to All Members" stated:

A similar proposal was rejected last week by a vote of 1,368 to 1,146 when 15% of the Union's 18,500 members voted at a mass membership meeting. . . . Last Saturday, however, the Board of Education offered a new proposal -- to extend, the 1968 contract for six months while the Union continues its negotiations. . . . It is the desire of the Union to get a clear-cut mandate from its members whether they accept the partial settlement and extend the 1968 contract for six month or reject the partial settlement, strike
The referendum was conducted on 20 January 1968. The dissidents worked for defeat of the proposal but lost. The membership approved the contract by a vote of 9,622 to 5,206. Some called this a victory for the union leadership. Others said it was Desmond correcting his original mistake of calling a mass membership meeting.

The contract did leave open the right to renegotiate the salary schedule for teachers. Whiston had mentioned this fact in a letter to Desmond on 10 January, mentioned earlier. He wanted Desmond to know that the board was willing to discuss salary in July. "It also indicates its willingness to discuss the salary issue following July 1, 1969."  

After the approval of the membership of the interim agreement the union started to prepare for the July negotiations. Desmond said he was looking for a one-hundred dollar monthly raise and a fifty dollar vacation pay increase as of September 1969. He stated flatly that "salary was the number one issue." This was the first time Desmond placed salary first and educational programs for the children second. The Chicago Union Teacher reemphasized the point, "CTU members have given a mandate to President John Desmond and the negotiating team to continue negotiations for educational improvements and a substantial salary increase for September."
THE BATTLE IN SPRINGFIELD

For funding these salary increases the union looked to Springfield and the legislature. The board looked to the legislature also but, not for increased salary for teachers. Instead they sought to balance their budget deficit from the agreement in January 1969.

On 3 April 1969 Desmond announced to the school board that the union had decided to bring the issue to Springfield. Desmond then asked the board to close the schools so that the teachers could lobby in the state capital. The board was afraid of closing the schools to help raise funds. They instead suggested that the teachers use one of their spring vacation days. Desmond wanted the public to become aware of the issues and what might happen if funds were not given to the Chicago board.

I have no alternative now, in view of the way things are going in Springfield, than to say that the schools will not open if the superintendent puts through his planned cutback because of lack of money. I am not threatening a strike as such but just reflecting how the teachers would feel if up to 7,000 of their colleagues were laid off and if class size increased by 5 to 10 students per room.46

The 11 April meeting of the house of representatives even surprised Desmond. By a vote of one-hundred and twenty-three to one-hundred and seventeen the house postponed the Springfield trip for a week and instead called for a massive
house postponed the Springfield trip for a week and instead called for a massive demonstration downtown after school on April 22. Their recourse was in the fact that they voted to strike on 22 May 1969. Desmond was afraid that setting a strike date might make the legislature angry but he supported the decision in the April issue of the Chicago Union Teacher stating:

The Union did not create the deplorable conditions which exist in so many of our schools today. The blame must be placed squarely on the shoulders of the Illinois General Assembly which is constitutionally charged with providing the children of Illinois with a good common school education and the Board of Education which sets the priorities where the money is spent.47

The union called the move to get increased funding from the legislature "Save Our Schools" (SOS). The first phase was the march in the loop. On 22 April and estimated three-thousand teachers marched on the board offices.

By the end of April the situation was in a state of flux. On 27 April Ogilvie threatened to veto any school funding legislation that recommended more than a five-hundred dollar school aid foundation level. On 28 April Desmond was quoted in response as stating, "The school system is going to Hell." The following day (29 April) the teachers staged their protest rally in Springfield "In which thousands of our members joined ... in presenting ... petitions to the Governor to urge his support for more aid to education."48
This included a $150 per month raise and many other items. The board rejected the demands. In a press release dated 8 May 1969 the board stated, "In January the Chicago Teachers Union agreed to these procedures, well aware of the financial problems we faced. It knows there is no source of revenue open to us other than state aid."\textsuperscript{49}

At the house of representatives meeting on 9 May Desmond gave out a six page statement entitled "Why a Strike Against The Chicago Board of Education." The document gave a brief history of the situation and listed the union’s minimal program. This included no cut backs, certification to FTB’s and a $150 per month raise for teachers. The document ended by stating that:

The House of Representatives approved a strike in the event that the program . . . is not accepted by the Board of Education, . . . a strike referendum to approve the strike will be conducted in the schools on Friday, May 16, 1969, said strike to commence on May 22, 1969.\textsuperscript{50}

The vote to strike was two-hundred and ninety-seven to three. The governor’s reaction was "If they walk out, they’re going to stay out because I’m not going to give them any help." Desmond said, "The teachers have gone to the post before, but this time the race will have to be run."\textsuperscript{51} The mayor again opened his office for mediation. He said, "There’s an open invitation [sic] I extend it through you to ask if they won’t sit down and see if we can’t avoid what I see as a serious matter."\textsuperscript{52}
one for a strike against the Chicago Board of Education on May 22." The vote was 10,944-5,438. The union was now committed to a strike on 22 May 1969. 53

The reaction to the decision started to coming in. The Sun-Times in an editorial on 19 May 1969 entitled "Ogilvie's School-Strike Move" stated "The desperation of Chicago Teachers is surely apparent in the decision of 10,944 of them to give Chicago its first major walkout of elementary and high school teachers." 54 Ogilvie on 17 May sent a telegram to Desmond asking for a meeting in Springfield. He said, "The crisis involving the Chicago schools is a matter of vital concern to all of us. Every effort must be made to prevent the unnecessary disruption of classroom activity." 55

Desmond could not make the governor's meeting because Whiston announced a special meeting of the board for 19 May, the same day as the governor's meeting. The union wanted to present its case to the whole board. After the union and board met Whiston told the press that the board team had a new offer. It included no discharge of teachers, no cutbacks in summer school, hiring of teacher aids, severance pay, and preparation periods. The board would not include a pay increase and no certification for FTB's. Besides all that they did offer was contingent upon the state establishing a $520 level of foundation aid. 56
The union rejected the board's offer of 19 May and stated it's minimal demands. The two key items that it included was a salary increase of $150 per month and certification of FTB's after two years of satisfactory service. Desmond believed that the only answer was outside mediation. The board members were weary of mediation. They remembered how the mayor had helped to mediate in the past two years. It helped to create the problem they now had. Even knowing this a meeting was called because no one had any better solution. Thus the mayor proceeded to arrange a meeting of the parties in his office on 21 May 1969.

It was to late to call off the strike. It would have required a referendum of the membership and there was not enough time for that to happen. Therefore the first teacher's strike for Chicago took place on 22 and 23 May 1969. On the first day of the strike less than 24 percent crossed the line. Over 18,000 teachers would not cross the picket lines. Negotiations in the mayor's office lasted until 23 May, the board then voted six to five to accept the union demands, including a one-hundred dollar pay increase and FTB certification after three years of successful service. Daley again told the board members that he would find the funds to finance the settlement. Everyone wondered how these funds would be found. Many in the media believed the breakthrough came when the governor promised extra aid. It was stated in the press that Daley and Ogilvie made a
deal. The governor would help with additional aid to the Chicago schools and the mayor would provide votes in the legislature for Ogilvie’s tax plan to pass.58

This time the board felt that the mayor would get the money from the governor, but Desmond made it clear that the board had signed the agreement and they were responsible for funding the contract. "It was up to the school board to produce the money."59

On 24 May the union’s house of representatives voted 265-30 to end the strike. The membership approved the settlement by a vote of seventeen to one ratio. There was still concern about the fall salary. The union wondered if the board could fulfill its promises. The answer most gave was to go back on strike in September.

On 28 May 1969 the Chicago Board of Education officially ratified the contract agreed upon in the mayor’s office. The vote was six to four. A roll call vote was asked for by Mrs. Wild and the roll was called:

Mr. Witkowsky: I am going to vote no, because I don’t have this confidence [in getting new funds]. I hope I am wrong.
Mrs. Green: Yes.
Mr. Murray: Aye.
Mr. Bacon: I would like very much to see the teachers and the other personnel of the Board of Education get needed salary adjustments, but based on the experience of last year in which we did not get all of the funds that was needed to cover that year’s contract, and as a result, we had to cut programs, and one of the places where that program was cut was in the schools where improved quality education was needed most. So, based on the experience of last year and the fact that we do not have assurances in writing that there
will be sufficient funds to cover this contract, I reluctantly but nevertheless vote no.

Mrs Wild: Aye.

Mrs. Preston: I vote no.

Mrs. Malis: I frankly feel that we should be proud that we are establishing a salary that will be consistent with the needs of teachers and consistent with the idea of encouraging them to come into our public schools and to go into the teaching profession . . . . and I vote yes.

Mr. Carey: Aye

Mr. Oliver: I am voting no for what I am sure is the obvious reason that I see nothing in this in the way of agreement or understanding with the union that should we not have sufficient money to meet their demands, that we will not meet them.

President Whiston: I vote Aye.

The Secretary: Six Ayes, four nays.

President Whiston: Motion is adopted.60

Some observers of the school scene said that this was to set the stage for all the conflicts to follow. That this was the establishment of deficit financing for Chicago schools which in the years to come would cost the board its own self governance. Its credit rating would drop eventually and the School Finance Authority would be established in 1980 to monitor school finances in Chicago. After the first strike all the elements were in place for a repetition of this conflict. All the parties seemed doomed to repeat the same scenario every few years.
CHAPTER SIX NOTES


13. Ibid.


Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


29. Ibid.


44. "Frank Whiston to John Desmond," 10 January 1969, Box 55, Folder 10, Chicago Teachers Union Files, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago.


55. Chicago Union Teacher, May 1969.


59. Ibid.

60. "Official Transcript of the Meeting of the Chicago Board of Education," 28 May 1969, Chicago Board of Education.
Collective bargaining was not an easy solution for anyone involved. It came about after every communication had been tried. It was not regarded as a viable option in the early part of the twentieth century when CTF leaders pressed for salary increases and a uniform salary schedule. Nor was it considered as a solution when teachers’ contracts were not renewed during the Loeb board presidency. Again, during the Great Depression when teachers were too often paid in scrip, none of the existing Chicago Union’s advocated collective bargaining as a means for gaining salary they had earned. The notion of striking was even more remote to them.

The first two CTU leaders with longevity responded differently to the issues of collective bargaining and striking. Their response had less to do with their leadership styles and more to do with professional and political conditions which surrounded them. For example, John Fewkes used the threat of a strike two different times. Once he used it to put pressure on the city council to approve the 1948 school board budget. Fewkes said, "If there be further unreasonable delay in the release of teachers’ pay checks . . . the responsibility will rest squarely upon the alderman." ¹ He had used the weapon of a strike threat
for the first time and to his surprise it succeeded. Fewkes had also succeeded in bringing all the forces of the educational community together to put pressure on the city council.

The second time Fewkes mentioned a strike was in 1964. However, this time it succeeded for different reasons. Fewkes as stated earlier was getting no cooperation from Willis. The superintendent was autocratic and would not even discuss matters with the CTU before presenting them to the board. There was some grumbling in the board but not enough to make a significant change. This was leading to frustration by both the union leadership and the membership. The anger surfaced at a meeting of the house of representatives with a strike proposal: "The proposal to call a Chicago teachers strike was pushed through by a group led by Charles Skibbens"² The vote was a narrow victory being that many representatives were absent.

The resolution put Fewkes in a bad position. He had already renewed a pledge to the board not to strike and now the house had directed him to get a salary increase and collective bargaining or strike. When asked how he got into this position Fewkes stated he was outmaneuvered by the Skibbens group. Some recommended a general referendum to overturn the house's resolution but Fewkes could not accept this because if the members voted the strike issue down the board might think that the leaders were weak.
What came to Fewkes's aid was that the board gave in to the union’s demands out of a strike threat. Once again the board gave the CTU what it wanted, because it was afraid of a strike. Fewkes claimed the credit for himself and did not even mention the rival group and Skibbens. Fewkes rode the crest of a wave made by others. The school board was afraid of a strike. Each time Fewkes thought that his leadership had been a deciding factor when it was really the professional and political conditions of the time.

John Desmond in his negotiations with the board in 1969 thought he made a fatal mistake but in fact the forces pushing for a strike were powerful enough to overshadow his perceived mistake. In his public stances he said that salary was a secondary issue and educational improvements were first. Desmond would say that the schools needed more money to pay for the kind of educational programs the system needed. He would then claim that more than 75 percent of the union’s demands would benefit the children as well as the teachers. However his private view was different. "Salaries are the first thing. I want to get highest salaries in the country. Then we can work on class size." What legislator wanted to be known as the one not to give children all they could use.

The board took on Desmond’s public statements about educational needs at face value during the 1969 negotiations. In January 1969 while the union said a pay
increase for teachers was necessary, the board instead offered additional money to be spent on educational programs. If Desmond was serious on helping the children how could he refuse? Naturally Desmond finally had to agree to accept the board's new offer. He had been trapped by his own rhetoric.

Desmond called a mass membership meeting to present the board's offer to the membership. He supported it stating, "this was the best agreement we could get from the Board of Education." The membership rejected the offer by a vote of 1,368 to 1,148 among a membership of 19,000. Desmond would eventually have to put a renegotiated contract to a referendum which he would win. He needed to get a big win to retain his leadership position. Eventually this would led to a strike in 1969 which would end by giving teachers a hundred dollar a month raise when the board said they could afford none. The board again would give in to the teacher's demands and the mayor's promises.

Once again both leaders were afraid to take the initial steps which would lead to collective bargaining or a strike but when pushed by the political situation they would fit into the climate.

THE LEGACY

After 1969 the legacy left to the Chicago schools was one of conflict resolution with a bandage approach to
the school remedies. No one was thinking of long term goals; rather the approach was concerned with what would work for the particular year. This early moderate approach to leadership by all the parties would have results for years to come.

The leaders of all the factions believed that they had the power to manipulate people and events. In essence, the early leadership of the CTU saw themselves as leaders in charge but in reality they were part of the flow of events and not the determiner of events. They could steer the boat to one side or another but they did not control the current. It is this constant and reoccurring flow that leads to conflict after conflict. The flow was made up of the expectation and needs of the membership of the union and the system. As long as teachers were held hostage to a system over which they had no governance they created a flow for the one gratification they controlled: wages, hours and working conditions. After years of fighting and losing, the strike became their last play. To change the flow it is necessary for all the parties to move in the same direction. The board, superintendent, parents and the union. Only with this combined force can the movement of conflict resolution be changed into cooperation.
CHAPTER SEVEN NOTES


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles


"Pay For Chicago's Teachers." School and Society 35 (9 April 1932): 505.


Newspapers


Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean. February 1909.


Chicago Record Hearld. October 1900, July 1902, February 1909.


Chicago Union Teacher. May 1947, January 1948, November 1962, January 1964 through May 1964, August 1965 through

Unpublished material


Government Publications


Official Transcript of the Meeting of the Chicago Board of Education. 28 May 1969, Chicago Board of Education.


Collections

Chicago Teacher's Federation (CTF) Files. Chicago Historical Society.

Chicago Teacher's Union (CTU) Files. Chicago Historical Society.
APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Stewart Weinstein has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Joan K. Smith, Director
Associate Professor,
Educational Leadership and Policy Studies
Loyola University of Chicago

Dr. Philip M. Carlin
Associate Professor,
Educational Leadership and Policy Studies
Loyola University of Chicago

Dr. Max Bailey
Associate Professor,
Educational Leadership and Policy Studies
Loyola University of Chicago

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

11 April 1988
Date

Joan K. Smith
Director's Signature