1973

Attitudinal Similarity, Severity of Consequences, and the Attribution of Responsibility for an Accident to the Pedestrian and to the Driver

Julieta Rosales. Flores
Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2697

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1973 Julieta Rosales. Flores
ATTITUINAL SIMILARITY, SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCES, AND
THE ATtribution OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN
ACCIDENT TO THE PEDESTRIAN AND
TO THE DRIVER

by

Julieta Rosales Flores

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

February, 1973
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express her gratitude to Dr. Emil J. Posavac, Dr. Marilynn B. Brewer, Stanley J. Pasko, and Dr. Homer H. Johnson for their interest, suggestions, and continued words of encouragement. Also, sincere thanks are given to the International Institute of Education for providing the opportunities leading to this thesis. Thanks are also due to Ms. Kathy McCaffrey for typing this manuscript.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. METHOD</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulus materials</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. RESULTS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary manipulation checks</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary manipulation checks</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent measures</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DISCUSSION</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian (Sex by Pedestrian Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian (Sex by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mean Perceived Similarity to the Driver (Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mean Perception of Being in Circumstances Similar to those of the Pedestrian (Sex by Accident Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Pedestrian (Accident by Driver Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Pedestrian (Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Driver (Sex by Driver Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mean Perceived Foreseeability of Accident (Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Correlations of Dependent Measures for Females and Males for Accident Conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Conceptions of personal responsibility determine both the existence of human laws and the impositions of sanctions for transgressions. Such attributions of responsibility would seem to require impartiality on the part of the judges. Given a group of individuals asked to determine the responsibility of a person for a certain action, one would like to determine both the presence and the degree of any subjective biases entering into such a judgment.

Attribution theory concerns the process by which an individual interprets events "as being caused by particular parts of the relatively stable environment" (Heider, 1958, p. 297). Attribution refers to the process of inferring or perceiving the dispositional properties of entities in the environment. Kelley's (1967) interpretation says that attribution of behavior to one or another causal source (one's self or the environment, personal idiosyncracies or the objective requirements of the situation, and the like) will often require social comparisons. To be able to tell whether one's judgments, beliefs, or opinions are objectively right, it may be necessary to compare one's beliefs with the beliefs of others. We usually describe people by the acts they do. "The perceiver seeks to find sufficient reason why the person acted and why the act took on a particular form" (Jones & Davis, 1965, p. 220). Heider points out that the attribution of personal responsibility involves a decision as to which of the several conditions of action--the intentions of a person, personal power, or
environmental factors--is to be given primary weight for the actual outcome. In general, the more environmental factors are thought to influence the action, the less the person is held responsible for an action with which he is connected.

In the case where the person is concerned with the dispositional properties of his surrounding environment, the choice is between external (environment) attribution and internal (self) attribution. Kelley (1967) holds that attribution to the external stimulus instead of the self requires that the individual respond differentially to the stimulus, that the same individual responds consistently, over time and modality, and that the individual responds in agreement with an opinion of another person's responses to it. The analysis of the attribution process proposed by Kelley is related to the theory of correspondent inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965) in that both derive from Heider's work. However, Jones and Davis were concerned with the circumstances under which an actor is seen as the cause of given effects, whereas Kelley was concerned with attribution to the environment. It can be said, however, that both theories complement each other.

Attribution of responsibility for an accident

Attribution of responsibility for an accident is an issue that has stimulated much recent research. Walster (1966) hypothesized that there is a tendency to try to assign responsibility to someone when we hear about an accident and that people attribute more responsibility when the consequences of the accident become more serious. Her data supported this hypothesis and were interpreted in terms of defensive attribution.
According to Walster, the realization that life could be profoundly affected by chance happenings over which one has no control is very threatening to most individuals. Therefore, a perceiver attributes more responsibility to a victim or perpetrator in a serious relative to a less serious accident to protect himself from acknowledging the fact that he could ever be involved in such an unfortunate event. Walster (1966) presented subjects with a taped description of a stimulus person and the accident in which his vehicle was involved. In the first two conditions, the person's car received either inconsequential or considerable damage when it rolled downhill after being parked on a street. In the third condition, other people fortuitously escaped harm and in the fourth condition these people were seriously injured by the rolling automobile. Both male and female subjects assigned more responsibility to the owner when the consequences of the accident in terms of damage to the automobile were serious rather than minor. Males attributed more responsibility to the stimulus person when other people were actually injured than when they were only exposed to danger; females attributed the same degree of responsibility to the driver of the automobile in both personal injury conditions. Greater seriousness of outcome did not, however, result in the subject's attributing greater carelessness to behavior prior to the accident. Subjects did advocate more rigorous safety measures when the consequences were more serious.

In a second paper, Walster (1967) reported two experiments in which a stimulus person, in a taped interview, described the decision alternatives and risks involved in a real estate purchase, the aim of which was financial gain. The final course of action taken by this individual and
the actual outcome were also revealed in printed material prior to the presentation of the taped interview. Subjects in these experiments expressed more confidence that they themselves would have foreseen the actual outcome as the consequences, both negative and positive, became more serious. However, contrary to the original experiment, greater personal responsibility was not attributed to the stimulus person as the outcomes became more serious. In fact, in one of the experiments attributed responsibility decreased with seriousness of outcome, while in the other, there was no consistent relationship.

Several other attempts were made to replicate Walster's (1966) original findings. Shaver (1970a, 1970b), Shaver and Carroll (1970), Shaw and Skolnick (1971), and Crinklaw and Vidmar (1971) have all failed to reproduce the original findings.

Shaver (1970a) believes that the more relevant a negative outcome, the more a perceiver is forced to find ways of denying that he could ever be blamed for his involvement in a similar accident. He proposed an alternative conceptualization of defensive attribution. According to this formulation, the real discomfort experienced by the perceiver when he confronts a serious accident is the realization that he could at some time be blamed by others for his involvement in a similar accident. To protect himself from acknowledging this possibility, a perceiver attributes less personal responsibility to the individual involved in an accident as the outcomes of a mishap become more serious. But unfortunately his data did not fully support this hypothesis either.

According to Lerner (1972) attribution of responsibility depends upon
the perception of justice or injustice in a situation and it is closely tied to the process of ascribing causality or blame for the fates of the people involved. He believes that an individual's concern with justice and injustice may influence the way he explains to himself the causalities of important outcomes in his environment. Because human beings wish to feel secure, most people prefer to believe that others earn their misfortunes, instead of attributing the causes to mysterious factors beyond their control. Because many times people need to feel secure in their own world they may assign blame to someone else. Lerner asserts that in effect people say, "It can happen to others, but not to me." In a more general manner it could be said that people will arrange their cognitions so as to maintain the belief that people get what they deserve, or, deserve what they get. This point has been made by other psychologists. For example, Heider (1950) has noted the tendency to perceive misfortune as punishment: the harm that befalls a person is deserved and therefore ought to happen to him. Lerner and Simmons (1966) found support for their major hypothesis that "rejection is the product of the observer's attempt to maintain his belief in a just world."

The role of similarity

Shaver (1970a) makes an analysis of the concept of "relevance" and reveals at least two major classes of contributing factors: those associated with situational similarity and those associated with personal similarity. The first one refers to perceived similarities between the circumstances of the stimulus person and the subject. In contrast, the second one which is personal similarity refers to the perceived congruence
of beliefs, values, and personal characteristics between the stimulus person and the subject. Situational similarity would appear to be necessary for arousal of the self-protective tendency. It can be illustrated by pointing out that a crash of a military jet aircraft would be of almost no importance to an average female college student, but it would be quite threatening to another military pilot. He would feel less secure since an accident did happen to someone similar to him. The accident was, therefore, relevant and the pilot must make some cognitive effort to protect himself. Once the self-protective tendency was aroused by situational similarity, differences in judgment might be produced by different degrees of personal similarity. If this assumption is a valid one, this may be the reason why Walster (1967) was unable to replicate her earlier work. The subjects in the latter experiment expressed more confidence that they, themselves, would have foreseen the actual outcome as the consequences, both negative and positive, became more extreme (serious). Thus, contrary to the original experiment greater responsibility was not attributed to the stimulus person as the outcomes became more extreme.

Shaver (1970a, 1970b) conducted five experiments using the last two conditions of Walster's (1966) original study, possible versus actual injury to other people. Subjects were instructed to make individual jury decisions on the basis of pieces of evidence or testimony, presumably to be used as baseline data for a jury study. None of these studies found significant differences in attribution of responsibility between minor and serious accident conditions, although less responsibility was attributed when the stimulus person carried insurance which compensated the injured
victim (Shaver, 1970b). In these experiments Shaver made an attempt to replicate Walster's (1966) findings, but his procedure was slightly different. Subjects were attributing responsibility as part of a jury study and no attempt was made to prevent involvement with the victim. Walster's results again were not replicated. Shaver (1970a) hypothesized that these failures at replication might be due to differences in perceived similarity to the victim by the subjects.

As a matter of fact, Shaver (1970a) found that the more the perceived similarity between the subject and the stimulus person, the less the responsibility assigned for the mishap. In these experiments subjects perceived the victim to be more similar in the severe consequences rather than in the mild consequences condition, therefore, attributing less responsibility. No measure of personal similarity had been taken in previous research. Shaver was led to theorize that the attribution process was more complex than Walster had indicated. When the circumstances surrounding an accident or the victim of an accident are sufficiently similar to the subject, defensive attribution will take place. When the victim is seen as different by the subject, he can easily be blamed for the accident. However, when the victim is seen as similar by the subject, the subject can no longer be assured that his own behavior would not have similar consequences in that particular situation. The accident is seen as being externally caused thus making the attribution of responsibility to the victim less correspondent. The subject is not seeking to avoid the consequences of the accident as Walster had theorized but rather is seeking to avoid blame for those consequences. Since the subject cannot differentiate himself from the victim, the victim
must not be responsible for the accident. Subjects in Experiment II (Shaver, 1970a) imagined either that they were very similar to the victim or that they were very dissimilar from him. Following the line of thinking of the defensive attribution hypothesis, imaged-similar victims were rated as significantly less responsible for an accident than imaged-different victims.

In the same line of research and following the suggestion made by Shaver (1970a) that similarity between the perceiver and the victim of an accident will lessen the attribution of responsibility to the victim for the accident, McKillip (1972) controlled behavioral similarity and found that subjects who smoked marijuana attributed lower responsibility for a serious accident to a victim who himself smoked marijuana than to a victim whose behavior was not similar. McKillip's results were interpreted as supporting the defensive attribution analysis by Shaver (1970a). When attributing responsibility to a person who has a serious accident, the subject is threatened by a high degree of similarity to this victim. If the victim were different, the subject could attribute high responsibility believing that he, himself, would be more careful and thus would avoid the accident. Since this self-defensiveness is not possible when the subject and the victim are in fact similar, the subject tends to attribute the cause of the accident to chance, thus lessening the attributed responsibility. In a later study by McKillip and Posavac (1972), a similarity by severity of consequences interaction was found; attribution of responsibility was greater for the similar victim than for the different victim in the mild accident condition. They interpreted the outcome saying that it may be that in some circumstances, a similar victim of a mild, but potentially harmful,
accident is viewed as lucky.

Most studies of attribution of responsibility have used only one actor who was both victim and perpetrator (Crinklaw & Vidmar, 1971; Walster, 1966). In those which employed two actors, only perceived similarity to the perpetrator was measured (McKillip, 1972; Shaver, 1970a). In the present experiment, subjects were asked to judge the responsibility of a driver and of a pedestrian involved in an accident when the two were known to be attitudinally similar or dissimilar to the judges. In addition, the severity of the accident was varied.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were suggested:

1. Less responsibility will be attributed to the similar pedestrian than to the dissimilar pedestrian, especially in the severe accident condition.

2. Less responsibility will be attributed to the similar driver than to the dissimilar driver, especially in the severe accident condition.

3. If the above hypotheses are supported, compensation given to the pedestrian should be greater when the driver is dissimilar and the pedestrian similar than when the driver is similar and pedestrian dissimilar. Compensation should be higher in the severe accident compared to the mild accident condition.

The effects of sex of the subjects on judgments of responsibility have not been explored, although sex differences have been reported (e.g.,
While no hypotheses concerning sex differences were suggested, the design of the present study permitted an examination of some differences between the judgments of females and males.
CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 96 volunteers, 48 females and 48 males, who were enrolled in summer school psychology classes at Loyola University of Chicago. Data were collected for 127 subjects in all; eight females and nine males did not meet the qualifications mentioned below, and 14 protocols, nine females and five males, were randomly dropped to equalize the number of subjects in the treatments. This was done, of course, before the dependent measures were coded or analyzed.

Stimulus materials

Each subject was presented with a booklet divided into three sections. The first contained a brief introduction to the experiment, a description of the accident, a selection of six attitudes attributed to the driver of the accident, and six attitudes attributed to the pedestrian of the accident. The second section consisted of nine questions regarding the accident in which the subject was asked to indicate his or her judgment regarding the degree to which the driver or victim was responsible for the accident. The last section of the booklet was a questionnaire containing 60 attitude items which included the 12 selected for the similarity manipulations.

The cover sheet of the booklet informed the subjects that they were participating in a study of jury functioning, and that they would be given part of an actual case report. The subjects were asked to read the information very carefully and report their judgments on the scales which
would follow.

**Manipulation of accident severity.** The second page of the booklet contained the manipulation of the severity of the accident. In the severe condition the following information was given to female subjects:

Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. She was not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Suddenly Ann C., also a local college student, stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Mary's car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and she hit Ann. Ann was taken to the hospital in an ambulance where X-rays revealed that her right leg was broken. She was also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the hospital for ten days.

For the mild accident condition, the second page of the booklet given to females was the following:

Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. She was not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Suddenly Ann C., also a local college student, stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Mary's car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and she hit Ann. Ann was taken to the hospital in a police car where X-rays revealed no bone damage. After Ann was treated for bruises on her right leg, she went home under her own power.

The mild and severe accident reports administered to males were exactly the same, except that the names of Mary and Ann were changed to Jack and Paul, respectively.

**Manipulation of similarity.** The third page of the test booklet presented a rationale for giving the subjects information about the attitudes of the driver and attitudes of the pedestrian in the following manner:
In order to help you make a fair judgment of this case, it is necessary for you to know something of the character of the persons involved. It has been shown that a synopsis of attitudes on a number of important topics helps subjects to formulate more accurate impressions. On the following two sheets of paper, then, are two sets of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian. The items have been selected to be representative of the attitudes of each person, even though they are only a small sample of each one's total opinions. Guided by this knowledge, please answer the questions about the driver and those about the pedestrian.

The fourth and fifth pages contained two sets of attitudes; each set had six pairs of attitude items of which one in each pair was indicated as an attitude held either by the driver or by the pedestrian. Presentation of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian was counterbalanced. The mode of presenting two sets of attitudes was taken from recent research by McKillip and Posavac (1972); each set contained responses which were frequently endorsed (high popularity) and responses which were less frequently endorsed (low popularity attitudes). The mean endorsement frequencies for the subject population taken from the study by McKillip and Posavac were .82 and .18, respectively. By manipulating the endorsement frequency of the attitudes, it was assured that most subjects would be attitudinally similar to an actor attributed to hold high popular attitude responses and different from an actor attributed to hold low popular responses.

Since any individual subject may hold unusual attitudes, it was necessary to check on the adequacy of this way of manipulating similarity. An attitude questionnaire containing 60 items (including the twelve items used in the study) was given to the subjects in order to assess their own attitudes. The twelve items utilized to manipulate similarity are given in
Appendix C (where it is indicated which responses are popular and which are unpopular). Seventeen subjects (8 females and 9 males) did not meet the criterion of endorsing these items as expected and they were dropped from the study.

The attitudes were presented in such a way that each set served equally often as similar and dissimilar attitude items in all combinations. The order of presentation was completely counterbalanced. (See Appendix C for a summary of the counterbalancing design.)

The dependent measures. Pages six and seven of the experimental booklet contained the dependent measures and the manipulation checks. The general format was to ask a question and have the subjects report their responses on a twenty-one point bipolar scale labelled at both poles. The first judgment concerned attribution of responsibility to the pedestrian. The judgment extended from "she (or he) was not at all responsible" to "she (or he) was totally responsible." The second question assessed attribution of the driver's responsibility for the accident. The judgment ranged from "she (or he) was not at all responsible" to "she (or he) was totally responsible." In question number three the size of compensation for the victim was determined as an alternate way of assessing the judgment of responsibility. Question number four asked how foreseeable the accident had been. The low pole was labelled "obviously foreseeable" and the high pole "impossible to foresee." The remaining five judgments were manipulation checks. Question number five asked how similar the subject felt she (or he) was to the pedestrian, and in question six it was asked how similar the subject was to the driver. The labels in both questions
were "she (or he) is totally different," to "she (or he) is the same." In question seven it was asked how possible it was that the subject might be in circumstances similar to the pedestrian in the accident reported.

Question number eight asked how possible it was that the subject might be in circumstances similar to the driver in the accident reported. The rating was from "never" to "easily." The ninth question asked for ratings of how severe they considered this incident to be. The rating was from "very severe" to "inconsequential."

**Attitude questionnaire.** The measure of subject's own attitudes was presented in the booklet after the dependent variables were measured. Subjects were classified as similar to the high popular actor if they agreed with the high popular answers on four or more of the stimulus items.

Subjects were classified as dissimilar to the low popular actor if they disagreed with his responses on four of the six infrequent stimulus item answers. In other words, the criterion for acceptability as an experimental subject was four or more responses on the survey of attitudes which were the same as or different from the given attitudes of the appropriate stimulus person. The 60 items used in this survey of subject attitudes are given in Appendix E. In addition, the subjects were asked to identify themselves in terms of sex and age.

**Procedure**

Subjects were tested in groups, mostly of size twelve. After they were seated in the classroom used for the experiment, they were given one of the experimental booklets, which had been randomly ordered (except for sex of driver and pedestrian) and were asked to complete the booklet.
carefully and honestly, after reading the general instructions. The subjects were asked to read through the booklet at a comfortable pace. After all subjects had finished, the experiment was fully explained to them.

**Design**

The basic design was a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ factorial with degree of severity of accident (mild or serious), similarity to the driver, and similarity to the pedestrian as factors. Order of assignment to conditions was blocked randomized in groups of eight. Since there were six males and six females in each treatment, sex was used as an additional factor in the analysis. The nine dependent measures were subjected to $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ analysis of variance.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Primary manipulation checks

An analysis of variance of the manipulation check of perceived similarity to the pedestrian (question five) revealed, as desired, that the similar pedestrian was seen as more similar to the subject ($\bar{X} = 14.10$) than the dissimilar pedestrian ($\bar{X} = 4.35$; $F = 146.52$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .001$).

There was also an interaction of sex by pedestrian for perceived similarity to the pedestrian ($F = 9.00$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .01$). Table 1 contains the means relevant to this interaction. It can be seen that male subjects are more extreme in their perceptions of similarity than female subjects. The analysis of variance also yielded a significant interaction of sex by pedestrian by driver ($F = 4.72$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). Table 2 contains the appropriate means. This interaction shows that the tendency for males to report extreme perceived similarity to the pedestrian, as indicated in Table 1, occurred primarily when the driver was dissimilar.

The second manipulation check, question number six, dealt with perceived similarity to the driver by the subjects. The relevant means are shown in Table 3. The analysis of variance of this scale showed a significant effect for the driver's actual similarity ($F = 59.02$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .001$). Similar drivers were seen as more similar to the subject ($\bar{X} = 13.44$) than dissimilar drivers ($\bar{X} = 5.90$). Thus, this experimental manipulation was also effective. The significant interaction of pedestrian by driver ($F = 5.25$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$) indicates that subjects were more
TABLE 1
Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian
(Sex by Pedestrian Interaction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of subject</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
TABLE 2

Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian
(Sex by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

Actual relationship between subject and pedestrian attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>8.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>14.58</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>16.83</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 12 subjects per cell.
TABLE 3
Mean Perceived Similarity to the Driver
(Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual relationship between subject and pedestrian attitudes</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>15.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>5.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
extreme in perceptions of similarity to the driver when the pedestrian was presented as dissimilar rather than similar to the subjects, especially when the driver was presented as similar.

The third manipulation check concerned the perceived severity of the accident. The analysis of variance for this manipulation check yielded a significant main effect for severity of accident ($F = 5.56, \text{df} = 1/80, p < .05$). The severe accident ($\bar{x} = 11.81$) was seen as more serious than the mild accident ($\bar{x} = 9.50$).

Secondary manipulation checks

Question number seven dealt with the possibility of the subject finding himself (or herself) in similar circumstances to those of the pedestrian. The analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction of sex by accident severity ($F = 4.69, \text{df} = 1/80, p < .05$). Table 1 shows that females were more likely to see themselves in the mild accident than were males. It had been expected that the judgment of being in similar circumstances as the pedestrian would have been influenced by the manipulation of the pedestrian's similarity; however, this effect did not achieve significance.

Question number eight dealt with the possibility of the subject finding himself (or herself) in circumstances similar to those of the driver. The analysis of variance showed that subjects similar to the driver saw themselves as more likely to be in such circumstances ($\bar{x} = 16.67$) than subjects dissimilar to the driver ($\bar{x} = 13.75$; $F = 6.81, \text{df} = 1/80, p < .05$).

In general the manipulations seemed quite effective. However, the significant interactions among the independent variables found in the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of subject</th>
<th>Mild</th>
<th>Severe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>12.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>12.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
analyses of the manipulation checks are difficult to explain in terms of the actual hypothesis tested. Nevertheless, two general factors seem prominent. First, females seemed to give less differentiated judgments than males regarding perceived similarity to the pedestrian, suggesting caution in generalizing across sexes as urged by Thomas and Seeman (1972). However, the findings here seem to be contradictory, both to their findings that males are universalistic and females are particularistic in judgments, and to the results of Shaw, Floyd, and Gwin (1971) who found that females appear to make greater differentiation among conditions than do men. Second, the contrast effect, in which subjects similar to one stimulus person increased their judgments of similarity to this person as dissimilarity to the other stimulus person increased, ought to be kept in mind in similarity manipulations involving two stimulus persons.

Dependent measures

The analysis of variance of attribution of responsibility to the pedestrian showed a significant main effect for accident severity ($F = 5.05$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). Subjects judged the pedestrian as more responsible for the mild accident ($\bar{X} = 17.10$) than for the severe accident ($\bar{X} = 15.17$). The analysis of variance also yielded a significant accident by driver interaction of ($F = 5.27$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). Table 5 indicates that the pedestrian was judged least responsible in the severe accident-dissimilar driver condition and most responsible in the mild accident-dissimilar driver condition.

The driver by pedestrian interaction was also significant ($F = 6.69$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). Table 6 contains these means. In the mild accident,
TABLE 5

Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Pedestrian

(Accident by Driver Interaction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between subject and driver attitudes</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>17.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>16.54</td>
<td>13.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
TABLE 6
Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Pedestrian
(Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between subject and pedestrian attitudes by accident severity</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mild</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>17.42</td>
<td>15.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>18.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Severe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>17.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>11.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 12 subjects per cell.
dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver condition, subjects attributed the most responsibility to the pedestrian. However, they attributed least responsibility when the subjects found themselves dissimilar to the pedestrian and to the driver and were judging the severe accident.

Analysis of the attribution of responsibility to the driver revealed a significant interaction of sex by accident severity ($F = 5.54$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). Table 7 contains the means showing this interaction. This interaction showed that female subjects attributed more responsibility to the driver in the mild accident than in the severe accident, while male subjects attributed less responsibility to the driver for the mild accident than for the severe accident. Comparing Tables 6 and 7, it can be seen that overall subjects attributed far more responsibility to the pedestrian ($\bar{X} = 16.14$) than to the driver ($\bar{X} = 5.78$). This relationship will be important in the discussion of improvements on the present design.

The third dependent variable, compensation which the pedestrian should be given by the driver's insurance company, yielded a significant main effect for accident severity ($F = 4.50$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). The subjects were willing to award more compensation in the severe accident ($\bar{X} = 8.92$) than in the mild accident ($\bar{X} = 6.79$).

With respect to the foreseeability of the accident, females indicated the accident to be more foreseeable ($\bar{X} = 16.75$) than male subjects ($\bar{X} = 14.62$; $F = 4.61$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). There was also a significant interaction of accident severity by pedestrian by driver ($F = 5.36$, $df = 1/80$, $p < .05$). The means related to this three-way interaction are in Table 8. It is hard to speculate on reasons for this particular pattern since on reflection it
TABLE 7
Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Driver
(Sex by Driver Interaction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of subject</th>
<th>Severity of the accident</th>
<th>Mild</th>
<th>Severe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 24 subjects per cell.
TABLE 8  
Mean Perceived Foreseeability of Accident  
(Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction)

Relationship between subject and pedestrian attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between subject and driver attitudes by accident severity</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>18.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>12.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>15.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>16.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. -- 12 subjects per cell.
is not clear whether subjects were estimating foreseeability for pedestrians or for drivers.

To analyze the role of sex differences in regard to the dependent measures, scores for the dependent measures were intercorrelated, across levels of accident severity and of similarity, separately for female and male subjects. The correlations are presented in Table 9. In general, it may be stated that the directionality of the correlations was consistently identical for the sexes though attained levels of significance were not always comparable. Specifically, attribution of responsibility to the pedestrian and to the driver correlated significantly for both females \((r = -0.54, df = 46, p < 0.001)\) and for males \((r = -0.54, df = 46, p < 0.001)\), as did the correlation between attribution of responsibility to the pedestrian and size of compensation, females \((r = -0.32, df = 46, p < 0.01)\) and males \((r = -0.53, df = 46, p < 0.001)\). The positive correlation between attribution of responsibility to the driver and foreseeability of the accident was significant only for females \((r = 0.30, df = 46, p < 0.001)\). The positive correlation between attribution of responsibility to the driver was significant for both females \((r = 0.53, df = 46, p < 0.001)\) and males \((r = 0.51, df = 46, p < 0.001)\). The negative correlation between attribution of responsibility and foreseeability of the accident was significant only for males \((r = -0.42, df = 46, p < 0.001)\). When separate correlations were performed for both conditions of the accident, the directionality of the correlations was the same as that for overall accident comparisons. In general, these correlation results do not suggest that differences between rating of males and females in the various conditions were due to differences
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>II&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>III&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>IV&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-.54***</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>-.54***</td>
<td>-.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>.53***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I<sup>a</sup> Represents attribution of responsibility to the Pedestrian.
II<sup>a</sup> Represents attribution of responsibility to the Driver.
III<sup>a</sup> Represents size of compensation to the Pedestrian.
IV<sup>a</sup> Represents foreseeability of the Accident.

*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
in interpretation of scales.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

The first hypothesis suggested for the present study was that less responsibility would be attributed to the similar pedestrian than to the dissimilar pedestrian, especially in the severe accident condition. The significant driver by accident interaction indicates that the pedestrian was judged least responsible in the severe accident-dissimilar driver condition. The significant accident by pedestrian by driver interaction seemed to be caused primarily by the low responsibility attributed to the pedestrian when the dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver were involved in the mild accident coupled with the high responsibility attributed to the pedestrian when the dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver were involved in the severe accident. There is no clear-cut pattern to these results which allows meaningful generalizations. Hypothesis I was not supported.

The second hypothesis postulated less responsibility attributed to the similar driver than to the dissimilar driver, especially in the severe accident condition. The data relevant to this hypothesis show that the male subjects attributed less responsibility to the driver in the mild accident than in the severe accident condition. However, female subjects attributed more responsibility to the driver in the mild accident than in the severe accident condition. However, these differences were unrelated to differences in similarity to the driver. The nonsignificance of these effects offers no support for the second hypothesis.
opposite tendency, attributing more responsibility to the driver in the severe than in the mild accident conditions. While the data were in the process of being analyzed, the results of Deaux's (1972) research were brought to the attention of the writer. Her results indicate that the permutations of sex of judge and sex of stimulus person do not lead to equivalent results. Inasmuch as males were judging males and females judging females in the present experiment, it is unclear whether the results in this experiment were due to the judge's sex or the sex of the stimulus persons. Nevertheless, Thomas and Seeman's (1972) finding that males were more universalistic and females more particularistic in judgments does not seem to be applicable to judgments regarding attribution of responsibility.

Over all levels of similarity to the pedestrian and driver, both sexes were highly comparable in their judgments.

Directions for improvements in design include: (a) rewriting the story, (b) including heterosexual stimulus person-subject pairs, (c) control for age of subjects, and (d) more clear dependent variable wording.

The story should be written in a different fashion, to give the opportunity to subjects to identify themselves according to their own perceptions of the external world (environment) as Kelley proposed. A better story would leave the question of responsibility more ambiguous.

Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. She was in a hurry, trying to get to class on time; she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, and it was raining. Unexpectedly, as Mary was just two blocks away from campus, she recalled seeing a person (who turned out to be Ann C.) in front of her car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to stop her car. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and hit Ann.
Another alternative for changing the reports that may be helpful is to present subjects two different stories of the accident, one story as told by the driver and the second as told by the pedestrian. This will permit the study of another possible source of bias in judging and attributing responsibility to the parties involved. It may also allow the subjects' perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions more strongly to influence the judgments.

On a more general methodological level, the present study suggests that results based on male-only and female-only samples are not equivalent. Therefore, in order to improve generalizability, (a) subject males should judge males, (b) subject males should judge females, (c) subject females should judge females, and (d) subject females should judge males, in order to clarify sex distinctions.

The age variable of the subjects should be consistent with the age of the stimulus person. In the present study, the female subjects' ages ranged from 18 to 47, and the male subjects' ages ranged from 18 to 45. The subjects who participated in the present study were all summer school students. Such age differences could easily have obscured the manipulations of attitude similarity.

Finally, the meaning of the foreseeability dependent variable was unclear, and should be rewritten into two questions. One would deal with the possibility of the driver foreseeing the accident and the other with the possibility of the pedestrian foreseeing it.
APPENDIX A

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Many people are called upon to make decisions concerning how responsible another person is for his behavior or for the results of his behavior. The processes people employ to make such decisions are not clearly understood because most outcomes are partially caused by the people involved and partially caused by the unforeseen situation. Some situations are easily foreseeable while others, of course, are very unlikely to be foreseen. Whether you are a committee chairman, a jury member, a roommate, a teacher, a supervisor, a parent, a judge, a consumer, etc., there are many situations which require you to make informal decisions concerning the degree of a person's responsibility for some behavior or outcome. However, the level of responsibility for various outcomes must be determined before further research into the process of making responsibility judgments can be conducted.

Please read the following case report carefully and report the judgments requested. Inasmuch as attribution of responsibility to other people for their behaviors and outcomes is an important type of judgment for many kinds of human interactions, your work is a necessary preliminary to further research. Thus, a careful consideration of the judgments you report would be sincerely appreciated.

Thank you for your cooperation.
APPENDIX B

STORY

i - Severe Accident, females
ii - Mild Accident, females
iii - Severe Accident, males
iv - Mild Accident, males
Severe Accident

Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. She was not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Suddenly Ann C., also a local college student, stepped between two parked cars and into the path of Mary's car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and she hit Ann.

Ann was taken to the hospital in an ambulance where X-rays revealed that her right leg was broken. She was also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the hospital for ten days.
Mild Accident

Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. She was not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Suddenly Ann C., also a local college student, stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Mary's car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and she hit Ann.

Ann was taken to the hospital in a police car where X-rays revealed no bone damage. After Ann was treated for bruises on her right leg, she went home under her own power.
Severe Accident

Jack B. was driving his car on his way to college. He was not in a hurry, he was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Suddenly Paul C., also a local college student, stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Jack's car. Immediately Jack stepped on his brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Paul. However, Jack did not stop fast enough and he hit Paul.

Paul was taken to the hospital in an ambulance where X-rays revealed that his right leg was broken. He was also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the hospital for ten days.
Mild Accident

Jack B. was driving his car on his way to college. He was not in a hurry, he was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Suddenly Paul C., also a local college student, stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Jack's car. Immediately Jack stepped on his brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Paul. However, Jack did not stop fast enough and he hit Paul.

Paul was taken to the hospital in a police car where X-rays revealed no bone damage. After Paul was treated for bruises on his right leg, he went home under his own power.
APPENDIX C

i - Presentation Design

ii - Instructions

iii - Attitudes - Set "A"

iv - Attitudes - Set "B"
The attitudes were presented in such a way that the driver and the pedestrian were represented equally often by the two sets of attitudes. The order of presentation was completely counterbalanced. Thus, we had the following sets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Similar Driver</th>
<th>Similar Pedestrian</th>
<th>Dissimilar Pedestrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>A - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td>B - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td>A - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>A - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td>B - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td>A - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Dissimilar Driver</td>
<td>Similar Pedestrian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td>B - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td>A - High Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Dissimilar Driver</td>
<td>Dissimilar Pedestrian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td>B - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td>A - Low Popular endorsements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to help you make a fair judgment of this case, it is necessary for you to know something of the character of the persons involved. It has been shown that a synopsis of attitudes on a number of important topics helps subjects to formulate more accurate impressions.

On the following two sheets of paper, then, are two sets of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian. The items have been selected to be representative of the attitudes of each person, even though they are only a small sample of each one's total opinions.

Guided by this knowledge, please answer the questions about the driver and those about the pedestrian.
Attitudes - Set "A"

(High endorsement responses circled)

1. A. I am in favor of freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus.
   B. I am against freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus.

2. A. I feel that people should usually go along with group opinion even if they disagree with it.
   B. I feel that people should usually ignore group opinion if they disagree with it.

3. A. I am in favor of student social activism.
   B. I am against student social activism.

4. A. In general, I am against necking and petting among couples in college.
   B. In general, I am in favor of necking and petting among couples in college.

5. A. I believe that the father should discipline the children in the family.
   B. I believe that the mother should discipline the children in the family.

6. A. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are not important.
   B. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are important.
Attitudes - Set "B"

(High endorsement responses circled)

1. A. I enjoy sports.
   B. I dislike sports.

2. A. I believe that girls should be allowed to date before they are in high school.
   B. I believe that girls should not be allowed to date until they are in high school.

3. A. I believe that money is not one of the most important goals in life.
   B. I believe that money is one of the most important goals in life.

4. A. In general, I am against an emphasis on the social aspects of college life.
   B. In general, I am in favor of an emphasis on the social aspects of college life.

5. A. I enjoy doing creative work.
   B. I dislike doing creative work.

6. A. I am in favor of the draft.
   B. I am opposed to the draft.
APPENDIX D

SCALE

i - Manipulation Checks for females and males

ii - Dependent Measures for females and males
Please circle the number on the scale which best represents your judgment on the information you have just been given.

1. Do you feel that Ann C. (the pedestrian) was responsible for the accident in which she was hurt?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
She was not at all responsible

2. Do you feel that Mary B. (the driver) was responsible for the accident in which Ann C. was hurt?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
She was not at all responsible

3. Relatively speaking, what size of compensation should be given to the pedestrian, Ann, by Mary's insurance company?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Very small

4. How foreseeable was this incident?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
Obviously foreseeable

5. How similar do you think the pedestrian, Ann C., is to you?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21
She is totally different
6. How similar do you think the driver, Mary B., is to you?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

She is totally different

7. How possible do you think it is that you might be in circumstances similar to those of the pedestrian, Ann?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Never

8. How possible do you think it is that you might be in circumstances similar to those of the driver, Mary B.?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Never

9. How severe do you consider this incident to be?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Very severe

Inconsequential
Please circle the number on the scale which best represents your judgment on the information you have just been given.

1. Do you feel that Paul C. (the pedestrian) was responsible for the accident in which he was hurt?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

He was not at all responsible

He was totally responsible

2. Do you feel that Jack B. (the driver) was responsible for the accident in which Paul C. was hurt?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

He was not at all responsible

He was totally responsible

3. Relatively speaking, what size of compensation should be given to the pedestrian, Paul, by Jack's insurance company?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Very small

Very large

4. How foreseeable was this incident?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Obviously foreseeable

Impossible to foresee

5. How similar do you think the pedestrian, Paul C., is to you?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

He is totally different

He is the same
6. How similar do you think the driver, Jack B., is to you?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

He is totally different

7. How possible do you think it is that you might be in circumstances similar to those of the pedestrian, Paul?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Never

8. How possible do you think it is that you might be in circumstances similar to those of the driver, Jack B.?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Never

9. How severe do you consider this incident to be?

1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21

Very severe

Inconsequential
APPENDIX E

i - Instructions

ii - Survey of Attitudes
The next part of the experiment is an attempt to get at opinions which you yourself hold, which might have influenced your ratings in the first part of the experiment. Your answer sheet is anonymous and there is no way that your answers could be traced to you. However, because of the importance of this aspect of the study, your frank and careful answers to the questions are important.

After the completion of this part of the experiment, any question which you have will be answered.

Remember, the success of this research depends on the care with which you answer these questions.
SURVEY OF ATTITUDES

Age: _____ Sex: _____ Class: Fr. ____ Soph. ____ Jr. ____ Sr. ____

Please indicate your attitude toward each of the topics below. Mark on your answer sheet either "A" or "B" whichever is the more accurate description of your attitude on the subject.

1. A. I am against fraternities and sororities as they usually function.
   B. I am in favor of fraternities and sororities as they usually function.

2. A. I enjoy western movies and television programs.
   B. I dislike western movies and television programs.

3. A. In general, I am in favor of undergraduates getting married.
   B. In general, I am against undergraduates getting married.

4. A. I dislike situation comedies.
   B. I enjoy situation comedies.

5. A. I believe that there is a God.
   B. I believe that there is no God.

6. A. I feel that university professors are indifferent to student needs.
   B. I feel that university professors are concerned about student needs.

7. A. In general, I am against necking and petting among couples in college.
   B. In general, I am in favor of necking and petting among couples in college.

8. A. In general, I am in favor of smoking.
   B. In general, I am against smoking.

9. A. Racial integration in public schools is a mistake, and I am against it.
   B. Racial integration in public schools is a good plan, and I am in favor of it.
10. A. I enjoy comedians who use satire.
    B. I dislike comedians who use satire.

11. A. I feel that it is better if people usually act on impulse.
    B. I feel that it is better if people usually engage in a careful consideration of alternatives.

12. A. In general, I am against an emphasis on the social aspects of college life.
    B. In general, I am in favor of an emphasis on the social aspects of college life.

13. A. I am in favor of most birth control techniques.
    B. I am opposed to most birth control techniques.

    B. I enjoy classical music.

15. A. In general, I am in favor of college students drinking alcoholic beverages.
    B. In general, I am opposed to college students drinking alcoholic beverages.

16. A. I believe that the American way of life is not the best.
    B. I believe that the American way of life is the best.

17. A. I enjoy sports.
    B. I dislike sports.

18. A. In general, I am opposed to premarital sex relations.
    B. In general, I am in favor of premarital sex relations.

19. A. I enjoy science fiction.
    B. I dislike science fiction.

20. A. I believe that money is not one of the most important goals in life.
    B. I believe that money is one of the most important goals in life.
21. A. I am in favor of the university grading system as it now exists.
   B. I am opposed to the university grading system as it now exists.
22. A. I prefer the Democratic party.
   B. I prefer the Republican party.
23. A. I feel that people should usually ignore group opinion if they disagree with it.
   B. I feel that people should usually go along with group opinion even if they disagree with it.
24. A. I believe that my church represents the one true religion.
   B. I believe that no church represents the one true religion.
25. A. I dislike musical comedies.
   B. I enjoy musical comedies.
26. A. I believe that preparedness for war will not tend to precipitate war.
   B. I believe that preparedness for war will tend to precipitate war.
27. A. I am opposed to increased welfare legislation.
   B. I am in favor of increased welfare legislation.
28. A. I enjoy doing creative work.
   B. I dislike doing creative work.
29. A. I believe that girls should be allowed to date before they are in high school.
   B. I believe that girls should not be allowed to date until they are in high school.
30. A. I believe that Red China should not be admitted to the U.N.
   B. I believe that Red China should be admitted to the U.N.
31. A. I dislike reading novels.
   B. I enjoy reading novels.
32. A. I am opposed to socialized medicine as it operates in Great Britain.

B. I am in favor of socialized medicine as it operates in Great Britain.

33. A. I feel that war is sometimes necessary to solve world problems.

B. I feel that war is never necessary to solve world problems.

34. A. I am opposed to a state income tax.

B. I am in favor of a state income tax.

35. A. I am opposed to the custom of tipping.

B. I am in favor of the custom of tipping.

36. A. I enjoy keeping pets.

B. I dislike keeping pets.

37. A. I enjoy foreign movies.

B. I dislike foreign movies.

38. A. I am against strict disciplining of children.

B. I am in favor of strict disciplining of children.

39. A. I believe that parents should provide financial help to young married couples.

B. I believe that parents should not provide financial help to young married couples.

40. A. I am in favor of freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus.

B. I am against freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus.

41. A. I am in favor of requiring students to learn a foreign language.

B. I am opposed to requiring students to learn a foreign language.

42. A. I believe it is very important for a person to have a college education in order to be successful.

B. I believe that it is not very important for a person to have a college education in order to be successful.
43. A. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are not important.
    B. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are important.

44. A. I believe that the father should discipline the children in the family.
    B. I believe that the mother should discipline the children in the family.

45. A. I am opposed to the federal government’s buildup of nuclear arms.
    B. I am in favor of the federal government’s buildup of nuclear arms.

46. A. I believe that the federal government should provide community bomb shelters.
    B. I believe that individuals should provide their own bomb shelters.

47. A. I am opposed to divorce.
    B. I am in favor of divorce.

48. A. I enjoy gardening.
    B. I dislike gardening.

49. A. I enjoy dancing.
    B. I dislike dancing.

50. A. I am in favor of the draft.
    B. I am opposed to the draft.

51. A. I believe that women are not taking too aggressive a role in society today.
    B. I believe that women are taking too aggressive a role in society today.

52. A. I believe that the man in the family should handle the finances.
    B. I believe that the woman in the family should handle the finances.

53. A. I dislike looking at exhibitions of modern art.
    B. I enjoy looking at exhibitions of modern art.
54. A. I am in favor of women pursuing careers.
   B. I am opposed to women pursuing careers.

55. A. I believe that men adjust to stress better than women.
   B. I believe that men do not adjust to stress better than women.

56. A. I feel that Loyola is not too preprofessionally oriented.
   B. I feel that Loyola is too preprofessionally oriented.

57. A. I believe that Chicago is not a progressive city.
   B. I believe that Chicago is a progressive city.

58. A. I believe that a Congressmen should follow his own convictions when they conflict with those of the majority of his constituents.
   B. I believe that a Congressman should not follow his own convictions when they conflict with those of the majority of his constituents.

59. A. I prefer that none of my required courses be on a pass-fail basis.
   B. I prefer that some of my required courses be on a pass-fail basis.

60. A. I am in favor of student social activism.
   B. I am against student social activism.
REFERENCES


Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: wiley, 1958.


APPROVAL SHEET

The Thesis submitted by Julieta Rosales Flores has been read and approved by members of the Department of Psychology.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the Thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the Thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The Thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jan 15, 1973
Date

Advisor