Vilfredo Pareto: The Sociologist and the Man

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VILFREDO PARETO: THE SOCIOLOGIST AND THE MAN

by

Gastone Pozzobon

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June

1973
LIFE

Gastone Pozzobon, born February 25, 1942, was the seventh child in a family of eight. He grew up in Camposampiero, Province of Padova, Italy.

As a graduate of the Franciscan Private Lyceum in Brescia, Italy, June 1963, he continued his studies in Philosophy and Theology at the Franciscan University Seraphicum in Rome. In June 1969, he graduated with the degree of Licentiate (STL). He also has his degree in French from the Institute Catholique, Paris, France.

In 1970, he came to America to attend St. Louis University, receiving an advanced Certificate in English. Meanwhile, he took undergraduate courses in Sociology.

In the Fall of 1971 he transferred to Chicago in order to enroll in Loyola University. Upon completing coursework and the present thesis, he was awarded his M.A. in sociology, June 1973, specializing in social organization. His private research in that field was made in several countries, including Italy, France, Egypt, Mexico, and the United States.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The inspiration for this study came while this writer was still a student in Philosophy and Theology at Seraphicum University in Rome. At that time I was acquainted with Francesco Bertolo, a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology, taking a seminar on Pareto from the well-known Italian Sociologist, Franco Ferrarotti. Bertolo was writing a Ph.D. dissertation on Pareto's thought in the Les Systemes Socialistes. Long discussions on the topic with him encouraged me to turn from Philosophy and Theology to Sociology.

The present M.A. thesis is a review of many conclusions from Pareto's whole sociological scheme since my first contact in Rome.

I also owe much to many. I am particularly grateful to the first reader of my thesis, Dr. Paul Mundy, Professor of Sociology at Loyola University for his criticism and encouragement. He followed the progress of my thesis, week by week, helping me to structure its various developments.

I am also grateful to the second reader, Dr. Thomas Gannon, S.J., Chairman of the Sociology Department at Loyola University, who painstakingly corrected and polished some aspects of the present work.
I am deeply indebted to Mr. Angelo Ciambrone, a Juris Doctor at the Universities of Notre Dame and De Paul, for helping me to better express the thesis in English.

Naturally, any attempt to deal with the huge number of concepts in Pareto's writings requires a great deal of cooperation and tolerance from many other helpers. While I cannot mention them here, to them also I owe my deep appreciation.
The best known collection of Vilfredo Pareto's works is by Giovanni Busino, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lausanne. It is currently being published in French. The many commentaries on Pareto's sociology are published and still continue to be published in Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, a Swiss periodical under Busino's direction.

However, Pareto's Treatise is the only one of his major works fully translated into English. Undoubtedly, this is related to the lack of interest and awareness concerning Pareto among American sociologists.

My aim in the thesis is to state the gist of his entire sociological contribution by presenting his complete sociology through a general analysis of his seven major books and his numerous journal articles.

A fairly detailed presentation of his life and work is given in the first three chapters of the thesis. An effort has been made to give the flavor of his developing sociological views through original translation of several passages of his writings.
Chapter IV contains the essentials of Pareto’s sociological theory and its general reaction among sociologists in Europe and in the United States.

Chapter V deals with an analytical comparison of Pareto’s and Marx’s theories by showing their points of agreement and disagreement. Also of interest to us in the chapter is the diatribe between Pareto and Mosca. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Pareto’s influence on C.W. Mills.

In the final chapter Pareto’s views on Fascism are presented. Arguments for and against labeling Pareto a Fascist are then reviewed.

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Loyola University
June 9, 1973
CHAPTER I - EARLY INFLUENCES ON VILFREDO PARETO:
FATHER AND HOMELAND

Not much is known about Pareto's life, but of this we can be certain that it was devoid of extraordinary events. Nothing has been published about his wife; we do not know whether he had children and much more important, we know nothing about his relations with his own family, in his youth. But from his work it may not be too difficult to reconstruct the essential fact which determined his whole outlook on life. This fact, though not stated in any document, was clearly the conflict with the ideas of his father. (Borkenau 1936:9)

Vilfredo Federico Damaso Pareto's family originated in a place called "della Fontana Buona" (Good Fountain), near Chiavari (Genoa) in Northwest Italy. He came of a Ligurian family which John Lawrence Pareto had ennobled on January 22, 1729. The armorial bearings of the family were a black eagle on a green background. (Bousquet 1960) John Lawrence Pareto had, among other children, two sons: John Benedict (1768-1831), grandfather of Vilfredo, and John Augustin. John Augustin (1800-1865) was a well known man in his day, becoming famous, first, as a noted geologist and later
as a politician. (L. Pareto 1847) Vilfredo's father, Raphael, was born in Genoa on July 28, 1812, the youngest of the John Benedict Pareto's family. Raphael, an opponent of Savoy's family, rejoined Charles-Albert, for whom he was, for a period, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

When Vilfredo was born in Paris on July 15, 1848, Raphael was with Charles-Albert in the expedition to Custoza (July 24, 1848). At that time Vilfredo's parents lived at 10 Guy-la-Brosse Street, not far from the Faculty Sciences building.

Pareto always claimed to have many ties with France: his father was from Genoa, a French possession at that time; his own birth occurred in France; his mother was French -- the former Marie Metenier. (Finer 1966:9)

Vilfredo Pareto's Father Political Ideals: First Sprincks of the Nationalism

Nationalism, as it was to be known in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe, developed as a movement of resistance against the forcible spread of the Napoleonic empire. It arose in protest against the Napoleonic idea -- of an European continent united by uniform law and administra-
tion, with a continental economic system of its own, a single foreign policy, and armies combined in a Grand Army under one command. Since the proposed international system was essentially French, the nationalist movements were anti-French; and because Napoleon was an autocrat, they were anti-autocratic. The nationalism of the period was a mixture of the conservative and the liberal. Both conservatism and liberalism rose up against Napoleon, outlasted him, destroyed him, and shaped the history of the following generations.

Nationalism was a very complex phenomenon developing in different ways in different countries. In England the profound solidarity of the country exhibited itself; all classes rallied and stood shoulder to shoulder against Napoleon; and ideas of reforming Parliament or tampering with historic English liberties were resolutely put aside. It is possible that the Napoleonic wars helped England through a very difficult social crises; the industrial revolution had resulted in dislocation, misery, unemployment, even revolutionary agitation among a small minority --all of which were eclipsed by the patriotic need of resistance to Bonapart.

In Spain, nationalism took the form of implacable resistance to the French armies that desolated the land. Some Spanish nationalists were liberals; a bourgeois group at Cadiz, rebelling against the French regime, proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812.
In Italy the Napoleonic regime was better liked, and national feeling was less anti-French than in Spain. Bourgeoisie of the Italian cities generally prized the efficiency and enlightenment of French methods and often shared in the anti-clericalism of the French Revolution. The French regime, which lasted in Italy from 1796 to 1814, broke the habit of loyalty to the various duchies, oligarchic republics, papal states, and foreign dynasties by which Italy had long been ruled. Although Napoleon never unified Italy, he assembled it into only three parts and thus French influence brought the notion of a politically united Italy within the bounds of reasonable aspirations.

After 1815, nationalism became a deliberate and conscious program. Led by intellectuals, it began at the cultural level, holding that each people has a language, history, world-view, and culture of its own, which must be preserved and perfected.

In its second place, nationalism usually moved to the political level, asserting that each nation should create for itself a sovereign state in order to preserve this national culture and to assure liberty and justice to its individual members. Outspoken nationalists, of course, were discountenanced or persecuted by the authorities; consequently, they formed secret societies in large numbers. The Carbonari, organized in Italy in the time of Napoleon, became the best known of the secret groups.
Most influential of the nationalist philosophers in western Europe was the Italian Joseph Mazzini (1805-1872), who spent most of his adult life in exile in France and England. In his youth Mazzini joined the Carbonari. In 1831, however, he founded a society of his own, called "La Giovane Italia" (Young Italy); he also edited and smuggled into Italy copies of a journal of the same name from the land of his exile. In 1834, from the base he established in Switzerland, Mazzini organized a group of insurrectionists to move against the Kingdom of Sardinia, hoping that all Italy would rise and join him. Undeterred by the total failure of first effort, he continued to organize, to conspire, and write.

For Mazzini, nationality and revolution were a holy cause in which the most generous and humane qualities were to find expression. He was a moral philosopher, as may be judged from the title of his most widely read book, The Duties of Man; the basic thesis of his book was that duty to the nation was a pure obligation which ranked between duty to family and duty to God. Mazzini sympathized with the national aspirations of all people, but his deepest feelings went out to his own Italian homeland, which he believed had a special mission to lead humanity against oppression. (Palmer 1965:436) Even though we know nothing about the personal opinions of Vilfredo Pareto's father while he belonged to the Mazzinist movement, there is no reason to assume that he had differed in essential respects from the
views of the party for whose sake he had accepted exile.

Like their leader, Mazzinists were fervent republicans, democrats, and humanitarians; they believed in progress, the harmony of all interests, the natural goodness and perfectibility of human nature, in nationalism but also in international collaboration. (Borkenau 1936:10)

**Raphael Pareto's Influence on his Son Vilfredo**

Little information about Raphael Pareto's influence on his son is available. Raphael, belonging to the party of Mazzini, was forced to leave Italy for France where stayed for a long time in Paris as a refugee. There he met Maria Metenier, his future wife.

Borkenau observes that Vilfredo Pareto participated fully in the rise and decline of the Mazzinist movement, which widely separated the generation which became adult after the accomplishment of Italian national unity (1861) from their fathers who had fought for this unification. (Borkenau 1936:10) One difference between Vilfredo and the majority of his generation, however, is that he was not simply driven away from the ideals of his father; he retained a hatred for them until his last days. In his work on general sociology, this boiling hatred, contempt, and disgust for
the Mazziniist ideals can be felt on almost every page. This antagonism dominated Vilfredo's problems, his research and his solutions. Borkenau notes that it would be very helpful to know whether a personal conflict existed between Pareto and his father corresponding to their ideological antagonism. (Borkenau 1936:11) We do not have any evidence of such personal conflict from Vilfredo own work; however, ideological and political differences of father and son are clearly evident.

While in Paris, Raphael Pareto published a very important work, The Irrigation and the Sanitation of the Soil (1851). This work appears to be quite similar to the Cours d'économie politique which Vilfredo was to publish in Lausanne some years later. (Bousquet 1960:19) Another of Raphael's work, written for Science Academy of Modena (1869) and dated November 1, 1868, concerned the misuse of physics and social sciences. From Vilfredo's father's writings we can perceive the link of scientific interest between father and son. After his return to Genoa from Paris in 1852 or 1853 (when Vilfredo was four or five years old), Raphael Pareto was in charge of the administration of Public Works in Turin, Florence and Rome, where he became a member of the "Accademia dei Lincei" (The Lincei Academy).

1The Accademia dei Lincei (Rome 1603), dedicated mainly to the study of science, was the ancestor of two present day academies. After many vicissitudes, it was remodeled
In 1872 he published a long, detailed report of his researches on the Roman soil. (R. Pareto 1872) A few years later he wrote a masterpiece on architecture, The Monuments of Italy. (R. Pareto 1879) Raphael Pareto died on April 28, 1882, at which time he was head of the Public Works Administration.

Italy in the Years of Vilfredo Pareto's Childhood

The age in which Vilfredo grew up was dominated by belief in social and material progress, in human perfectibility, and in scientific positivism. (Finer 1966:3) Nevertheless, it is not easy to summarize the immediately prior history of Europe between 1815 and 1848. No balance had yet been achieved among all the forces set free by the French and Industrial Revolution --liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, republicanism, democracy, socialism. No international system had been created. Europe had rather fallen into two camps --the West in which liberal conceptions lurched forward, and the East in which three autocratic monarchies held sway.

In 1826 by Pope Leo XII and again in 1847 by Pope Pius IX, only to be taken over by the Italian State in 1870, when it became the Accademia Nazionale dei Linaci.
Western Europe favored the principles of nationality; governments in central and eastern Europe still opposed them. The West was growing collectively richer, more liberal, more bourgeois. Middle class people in Germany, Central Europe, and Italy did not enjoy the dignities enjoyed by their counterparts in Great Britain or France. But the West had not solved its social problems; its whole material civilization rested upon a restless and sorely tried working class. Everywhere there was repression. The result was the general revolution of 1848.

At that time in Italy there had long been about a half dozen sizable states, in addition to a few very small ones, of which several had dissolved in the Italian movements that accompanied the wars of the French Revolution. All these states had been reorganized, first by Napoleon Buonaparte and then by the Congress of Vienna. In the Northwest lay Sardinia, also called Savoy or Piedmont; its royal house was the only native Italian dynasty in Italy. East of Sardinia lay Lombardy, and even further East the state of Venetia.

There was a widespread disgust in Italy with the existing authorities and a growing desire for a liberal national state in which all Italy might be embodied and which might resuscitate the Italian grandeur of ancient times and the Renaissance. This sentiment, this dream of an
Italian Risorgimento, had become very heated at the time of the French Revolution.

The State of Sardinia, where Vilfredo Pareto spent his childhood and youth, had been ruled since 1848 as a constitutional monarchy under King Victor Emmanuel. His prime minister after 1852 was Camillo di Cavour, one of the shrewdest political tacticians of that or any age. Cavour was a liberal in the Western mold. He tried to make Sardinia a model of progress, efficiency, and fair government which other Italians would admire. He favored the building of railroads and docks, the improvement of agriculture and emancipation of trade. A liberal and constitutional monarchist, a loyal servant of the house of Savoy, a wealthy landowner in his own right, Cavour had no sympathy for the revolutionary and republican nationalism of Mazzini.

The echoes of Cavour's teachings were still fresh in Turin when Vilfredo arrived there, and he absorbed the new ideals of freedom and independence. In fact, Vilfredo himself was later to comment in a letter to A. Antonucci from Céligny, on December 7, 1907: "My feelings, obviously, lead me toward that individual independence that once was called freedom...feelings which are opposed to those of the persons among whom I lived." (A. Antonucci 1938: 18)

Vilfredo lived in Turin until the completion of Italian unity. In 1861 the Kingdom of Italy was formally
proclaimed. Victor Emmanuel II was the first King. The last state to join the kingdom was Rome that was annexed in 1870. The dream of ages was realized.

CHAPTER II - VILFREDO PARETO IN ITALY

Pareto in Turin (1852-1869)

After completing the secondary school Vilfredo attended the University and the Polytechnic School of Turin, where he was Galileo Ferrari's classmate and friend. In 1869 he defended a thesis on the "Fundamental Principles of Equilibrium in Solid Bodies." This was not his first publication. Bousquet found at the National library of Florence an earlier essay, "Applications of the Axonometric Design," which appeared in 1866.

At Turin, the noted Niels Henrik Abel was one of Vilfredo's teachers. The Analytico of Mechanics was the fundamental textbook for the training of young Turin engineers, and mechanics was the foundation of all sciences. Among the staunch defenders of mechanism was Angelo Genocchi,
a specialist in analytic and differential calculus who taught in Turin. Genocchi, together with Ferdinando Rossellini, was among the scientists who most influenced Vilfredo. (G. Busino 1966:16)

At that time, Turin was also the most active center of the Darwinism in Italy. Thus, the first important components shaping young Vilfredo's perspective were mechanics and Darwinism. It is interesting that the only testimony of Vilfredo's Turin experiences is contained in his letters to Antonucci. He wrote:

I was 16 years old when I had occasion to read two authors of different opinions: Bossuet and Bastiat. The first was objectionable; the second was satisfactory to my beliefs, which were contrary to the beliefs of the people with whom I was living.

In 1869 I was 20 years old and I was able to formalize my beliefs. I felt, like other men, that my convictions were the fruits of my reasoning. I read Buckle and I became enraptured. Buckle's work appeared to be the non plus ultra of reasoning in social science; and I found there the methodology used in the physical sciences that I was studying at the University. I was amazed to find many people so ignorant and headstrong as not to understand those doctrines.

At that time I believed in this. Political economics as categorized by the classical economists was a perfect or near perfect science, requiring only to be put into its principles, to be put into practice.
Therefore, it was necessary to apply the law of Godden, which was the most useful and perfect since the beginning of humanity. In politics, the sovereignty of the people was an axiom, liberty was an universal panacea. History demonstrated to us that on one hand the masses, intelligent and honest, were oppressed by the superior classes. Militarism and religion were the major scourges of the human race. Caesar among the ancients, Napoleon I and Napoleon III among the moderns, were for me examples of evildoers. I denied or at least justified the mistakes of democracy. Terror was a slight stain on the illustrious picture of the French Revolution. (Antonucci 1938:18-20)

Pareto in Florence (1870-1893)

After earning his degree in engineering, Vilfredo moved to Florence in January 1870 in order to assume the responsibility of director in the local section of the Rome Railway Company. (Fiorot 1969:10)

Besides his own professional work, the young engineer studied advanced mathematical economics, working especially with the well known Francesco Ferrara (1810-1900). (T. Faccaloni-Monaco 1965:30)

In 1873 Vilfredo moved to S. Giovanni Valdarno (Florence)
to become managing director of the Societa' Ferrariere d'Italia, a firm which extracted and processed iron and allied products. Here he often met workers coming from all of the different Italian provinces; and had frequent business and social contacts. According to Silvestrini, it was in Florence --a city more inclined to discussion and the passion of the public life, a milieu less frowning, a freer and easier way without the complexes of the subalpine traditions--that Pareto decided to enter politics. (Silvestrini 1965)

As early as 1872, in a letter addressed to count Trivulzio Pallavicino and published in the Gazzetta del Popolo of Turin (November 12), Pareto made clear his conviction about universal suffrage and the principle of equal representation in government.

It seems to me, wrote Pareto, the error --not only of those who desire immediate and absolute application of universal suffrage, but also of those who want to append to one's status the qualification of voter--flows from having considered the electoral vote more as a right to be exercised as a necessary function for the common good of the society; and so, and the former say, every citizen upon reaching his legal age ought to enjoy this right; since he is now responsible for the defence of his country and, through taxes, he shares the burden of his country. The latter adds further, in defence of their position, that only those who sustain public expenditures ought to enjoy the right of taking part
in government.

For me, I believe with Stuart Mill, that the exercise of the electoral vote is one of the prerogatives of the State; therefore it seems to me that whoever is called must possess, as a first and indispensable quality, the culture and understanding which are necessary for intelligently exercising this right, regardless of his professional status.

Therefore not only the illiterate do I exclude from voting, but I would like, if it were possible, that this right would belong only to those who have successfully completed their grammar school education. But in order to safeguard these rights which every citizen enjoys, it is necessary that everyone receive an elementary education, and then universal suffrage will be more than an empty word...

I want to emphasize the principle of equal representation. It seems to me that this is a just principle because it holds that every party has in government a number of representatives proportional to the number of citizens in its state. (T. Giacalone, Monaco 1965: 233)

One of the crucial years in the history of Italy was 1874. The elections brought differences among the liberals; the contradictions could also be found in academic circles. The proponents of uncompromising liberalism strongly opposed the supporters of controlled participation by the State in economic affairs.

The protectionist economists of Padua and Pavia were influenced by the principles of the German Historical School. Among those to be remembered are Bedele Lampertico, Luigi Cossa, and especially Luigi Luzzati, who is mentioned
most often by Pareto in his lecture given at the Accademy of Georgofili in June 1877. (Busino 1966:127) In contrast, the uncompromising liberals reverted to reading the English classics through which they became aware that new developments in English liberalism had more recently taken place. They read Stuart Mill, Lubbock, Buckle, Bagehot and Bain. Above all, the works of H.T. Buckle (History of Civilisation in England) and of W. Bagehot (Physics and Politics) confirmed Pareto in the belief that only scientific knowledge of the natural laws would give man the means and the security to act.

Pareto, in the lecture cited above, came to examine the famous liberalist doctrine of laissez-faire and Laissez passer; he maintained that, far from being absolutely true, it had considerable limitations in application. (Busino 1966:139) He refers to Spencer's doctrine, according to which the organic structure of a society is able to function up to a certain point; to continue beyond that point it is necessary to restructure that society. (Spencer 1862)

In accord with this principle, Pareto took the occasion to criticize the proposal of Luzzatti to create an autonomous administration of state railroads and for the intervention of the government in the control of water. (Busino 1966:144)

Besides his professional and academic activity, Pareto was a political activist. In 1877 he was elected a member of the city council of S. Giovanni Valdarno (near
Florence). In 1880 he suffered a political defeat; he lost
the election as a trustee in the ward of Montefarco
(near Florence). As a result, he began to take fuller account
of the burden of the political intrigues of the opponents
who administered the ward of Montefarco as one would admi-
nister a personal fund. He said, "I do not believe that
the good of the country can result from the election of
persons who couple hatred and rancor with political ambitions."
(Busino 1966:144)

In 1882 Pareto became a candidate for the Council of
Pistoia-Prato-San Marcelllo Pistoiese. Again, he met defeat.
The effects, these political experiences are clearly docu-
mented in Pareto's letters to Peruzzi. (T.Giacalone-Monaco
1965:152) As a result of these defeats, Pareto definitely
renounced his office-seeking political activity and became
completely involved in promulgating the doctrine of libera-

In 1889 he began to collaborate with the Journal des
Economistes, submitting an article on "Italian Customs
and Tariffs." In May of the same year he spoke to the
Congress for Peace in Rome on "The Union of Customs to improve
Political Relations for the Cause of Peace."

2See "CVP," I, 1963,pp.99-105. This theory is apparent today
with the establishment of the European Common Market.
The following year (1890) was important intellectually for Pareto. It was then that he made first his contact with Pantaleoni, who was to become not only a trusted and intimate friend but a colleague in scientific collaboration. After 1890, in order to dedicate all of his time to study, Pareto resigned his position with the Italian Railways, even although he remained as a technical consultant. Relieved of these responsibilities, he began to frequent the Florentine Circles of philology, where he became a friend of Domenico Comparetti, Augusto Franchetti, and Arturo Linaker. During this period he began to publish many articles and papers, all of which show the strong influence of the theories of Gustave de Molinari, a leading exponent of the French School of liberalism. Pareto became a strong advocate of this theory in Italy.

Busino has observed that the political environment in which Pareto became acclimated helped to create his image as a unique and individual speaker -- at times satirical, at times ironical, at times a verbose and chronic proverbialist; this was a Pareto unsupported by his contemporaries. (Busino 1966:21) All of these factors contributed to Pareto's decision to dedicate himself to the discovery of "pure economics."

Maffeo Pantaleoni advised Pareto to restudy the works of Leon Walras. In the meantime, Italy's political current
was moving toward socialism. The independent Pareto felt this climate would be beneficial to his ideals. However, upon his examination of socialism and its relation to his strongly held convictions about free trade, Pareto became convinced that socialism was not the answer which would resolve the many problems of his day. He wrote:

The practice of socialism, which was effected by a certain segment of the bourgeoisie, actually prepares the death of it. Then, the true problem, which must be solved by the people, in order to have a good government, could be either how to give the power to the cultured, the educated, to those who are called "the best" or to the masses ignorant and rude? The answer seems obvious. Yet it is certain that whenever that aristocratic minority has had the possibility to have power, it was concerned only with its own problems and not with the problems of others. Therefore, it seems that the lesser evil is to give power to those who know less, and are not concerned only with their own kind. (Pantaleoni 1966:86)

Pareto's skepticism issued in a conclusion. Since human events follow this course of increased selfishness propagated through the aristocratic minority, it is absolutely necessary to change the distribution of power. A reading of 'Das Kapital' by Marx convinced him that even the most obvious truths cannot be shared and accepted.
He wrote:

What does it matter, even if we let the economic science go on, when only we are few to know the truth of it? Is it not our duty to let it know to other?... Well, that can be achieved only by the diffusion of the science to all, because, knowing the truth, everyone will advance the common good. (Pantaleoni 1966:103)

Under the inducement of his friend Pantaleoni, Pareto thus became aware that he could not satisfy himself, nor his ideals in Italy. He asked Pantaleoni to write Leon Walras requesting that, in the event the chair of Political Economics at the University of Lausanne became vacant, to recommend him for that post. This event occurred on April 25, 1893, when Vilfredo received a formal offer from the University to accept the chair which was being vacated by Walras.

CHAPTER III - PARETO IN SWITZERLAND

Pareto in Lausanne (1893-1923)

The call from Lausanne was an important event in the life of Pareto and the beginning of a new period in his intellectual growth. (Busino 1966:23)
On May 25, 1893 the new Professor of Political Economics gave his inaugural lecture. "Political Economics," affirmed Pareto, is a part, but a minute part, of the Social Sciences. In its dominion, where she is a queen, it must not usurp the dominion of other sciences. (Fiorot 1969:23)

The social sciences were then developing in Lausanne in a particular climate. Evolutionism and Positivism strengthened empirical research. Aware of these exigencies, Leon Walras concentrated his researches on economico-political theory. For him, political economics was the science of order and social processes. Since it embraced all the phenomena of life in society, Walras saw no need to distinguish economics, sociology, and political science. He was perfectly consistent, then, in affirming that the only science of society is economics. It is understandable that this viewpoint explicitly orientated the development of the social sciences at the University of Lausanne, and that it provoked the extraordinary advancement of political economics. (Blaudet 1965:42)

When Vilfredo arrived in Lausanne, the situation was simple: political economics was the reigning science, although the other social sciences also had an important place. In fact, the writings of William James were studied and taught by the Genoese Theodore Flournoy. (Blaudet 1965:43)
Methodological techniques of scientific researches were also being developed. Research on capitalism and the ways of life in a capitalistic society by Augusto Forel were well known. (Biaudet 1965:43) Pareto then found himself at home in the cultural milieu of Lausanne. One year after his arrival, he was appointed a full professor (April 13, 1894).

Cours d'Economie Politique (1896)

During the period of 1893-1896 in Lausanne, Pareto worked zealously on preparing his Cours d'Economie Politique. The Cours undoubtedly reflects a deepening of Pareto's intellectual development. It embraces and concludes all of one series of researches treating the technical aspects of economics, problems on methodology, political thought, sociological exigencies, and cultural interests. The methodological elements and the sociological implications of the Cours induced authors like Macchioro to assert that Pareto's economic and sociological principles remain substantially unchanged from the Cours to the Treatise. (Macchioro 1955: 149)

Eisermann, like Macchioro, has observed that an understanding of Paretian economic methodology is necessary for under-
standing his sociological methodology; many prerequisites of the Treatise were presented in the Cours. (Eisermann 1964)

The Cours d'Economie Politique emanated from the desire to study a significant sector of human action, above all, economic action. In this work two chapters were dedicated to social evolution and social physiology. It should be noted that Pareto went beyond solely economic action. In fact, in the years in which he was completing the Cours, he placed emphasis on the proper way to collect facts, to classify them, to infer empirical and rational laws. These concerns explain why Pareto partially abandoned a strictly deductive method of analysis. This first work also provides a preview of another theme of Pareto's future theory: social phenomena acting and reacting upon each other. Here Pareto extracted the notion of mutual dependence of social phenomena from Herbert Spencer's The Principles of Sociology with which he had been well acquainted since 1881.

The idea of mutual dependence confirmed Pareto's earlier idea that equilibrium establishes a series of mutual adjustments among various related phenomena. Like Leon Walras, Pareto understood "equilibrium" in the sense of "equivalency" and "conformity," but he added the notion of "adaptation" among active and passive elements, as well as the concept of "proportionality" in the composition of diverse elements.
Thus, in Pareto's view, all the forces acting within an equilibrium, in opposing themselves, compensate and neutralize one another in an active manner; therefore an automatic return to stability is inevitable. Although Pareto also introduces a distinction between a stable and an unstable equilibrium (Cours, #40), he continues to assert that eventually diverse forces must mutually neutralize each other.

Therefore, the conditions which foster and support social order change very slowly. The resistances to internal and external forces which tend to modify the society are sufficiently strong that the movements toward change are notably weakened; as a result, the society finds itself in a position of equilibrium—a dynamic equilibrium, of course. "All the known facts," wrote Pareto, "help to emphasize the mutual dependence of the economic, intellectual, and moral condition of the society, without, in most cases, it being possible to specify in what such dependence consists" (Cours, #602). In a situation of dynamic equilibrium, then, the movement slowly modifies the society; such imperceptible movement Pareto calls "evolution." The theory of social evolution, he says, was one of the greatest discoveries of his era (Cours, #625). He added that "...among the conditions which determine evolution is the intellectual level of men. In its turn, such a level depends on their knowledge, and
such knowledge is strictly connected with the degree of progress achieved by the different sciences" (Cours, #606).

The Cours also presented the first outline for a study of human actions. Pareto clustered these actions in three groups: (1) actions which cause men a pleasant feeling (ophelimity); (2) actions which provide men some conditions of health of body and intellectual development (individual utility); (3) actions which make it possible for all groups to achieve these conditions and to assure their reproduction.

A year after the publication of the Cours, in October 1897, Pareto offered the first course in sociology at the University of Lausanne. By this time the study of social reality had come to be one of the themes which ever more intruded on his scientific activity. In the inaugural lecture in sociology, "Il Compito della sociologia fra le scienze sociali" published in Rivista Italiana della Sociologia (July 1897), he held that sociology's first task was to study the composition of society, races and their differences. (Busino 1966) Then should follow an examination of elementary actions and their combination, i.e., social institutions; through the arrangement of these elements Pareto sketched the complex organism of the society. He approached his definition of the new subject in these words:

Society is a fact and it can be therefore an object of various scientific researches. These are
already divided into several branches, and they will be divided into a great number of branches in the future, according to a process already verified in the development of human knowledge. The specialized disciplines which study the various categories of social phenomena are united by a discipline which considers these same phenomena in their totality and the extent to which those belonging to one category have an influence on those of another. It is to this discipline that we may give the name of sociology. (Busino 1966:183)

In March 1899, Pareto published "Problemi della Sociologia" (Busino 1966) after stressing the importance of the history of social science, he went on to emphasize the necessity of analyzing actual and implicit changes in society; actual changes indicate how such phenomena move in reality, whereas implicit changes indicate how these phenomena would move in particular circumstances. In the description of actual change Pareto detailed how changes from one position of social equilibrium to another took place, and how this description illustrated the theory of evolution. In this article Pareto elaborated the theory of evolution which he had merely sketched in the Cours. While his theory of equilibrium remained unaltered, this article emphasized the historical trends in the evolution of equilibrium states. Sociology, Pareto observed, must first of all study the composition of a society, know its component races (i.e., national groups), and point out the cultural difficulties which are
found in them; after this one can examine elementary actions in a society, proceeding from the simple to the complex, i.e., toward social institutions and institutional patterns of social living. Only after putting together all these elements of the system can we have an idea of that system, that is, the complex organism called society.

In July 1900, Pareto published a lengthy and very abstract article, "Un'applicazione delle teorie sociologiche" (Busino 1966) in which he asserted that every social phenomenon can be considered in two different ways: the objective--which focuses on relations among real objects (persons or social actors) -- and subjective--which focuses on relationships among psychic states. To know the total reality of a given happening, it is necessary to go beyond social action itself; in other words, every sociological inquiry must begin and continue in the human psyche. Thus, social inquiry is primarily psycho-historical.

In the same article Pareto contended that "people, except for short periods of time, have always been ruled by an aristocracy," that is, by the strongest, the most energetic and capable, either for good or evil" (Busino 1966:31) However, because of the general law of physiology, aristocracies do not last; history is, in substance, a rotation of aristocracies--a phenomenon which manifests itself in many ways. In general, the ascendant aristocracy begins by wanting
to share power with the entrenched elite which it wants to dethrone, but for a time, it masks its real intention to rule alone. It strives to lead the oppressed and claims to fight for them --that is, for the people, the common good. However, once victory is obtained promises are forgotten, and the new aristocracy tends to revel in its power. Contemporary history, said Pareto, is a struggle between a corrupted and weakened bourgeoisie (the new group in power) and an emergent, courageous working class.

Les Systèmes Socialistes (1902)

Between April 1898 and November 1901, Pareto researched and prepared Les Systèmes Socialistes. This is a book in which he studies numerous elements of economic and political reality. Here Pareto reveals his passion for researching data from the most diverse sources --from ancient Greeks to modern authors. Above all one finds a clear embodiment of his logico-experimental method of analysis. The development and justification of this method constitute the central nucleus

of the work. The theory of logical action is presented, i.e., actions dominated lay instincts, passions, and sentiments (which Pareto terms residues) versus actions labeled derivations and derivatives. Derivations are ex post facto reasonings by which persons justify their conduct; derivatives are the propositions at which those reasonings arrived. (Busino 1966:32) More clearly, it can be said that in the realm of the logico-experimental action there are three definite steps to every method of reasoning: (1) the accumulation of facts; (2) the use of logic; (3) the resultant theory. Outside the realm of logico-experimental action there are three corresponding steps: (1) the promptings of the residues; (2) the use of derivations; (3) the resultant derivatives. For example, a person may embrace humanitarianism and then try to justify that doctrine. His reasoning is prompted by (1) the residues (self-interest, ascetism...); (2) it proceeds by means of derivations (e.g. humanitarianism promotes social progress; it is to the interest of the masses; it ensures the proper working of democracy); (3) it arrives at a derivative (humanitarianism is the best of all social doctrines). (Buongiorno 1930:363) In presenting this method of social action, Pareto does not argue metaphysically; he seeks neither the essence nor the highest principles of human action; rather, he simply studies the relationships of reasoning the social facts, treating them as physical facts.
With this foundation Pareto undertakes to analyze the theoretical system and the practical effects of socialism, considering the great variety of forms (or common traits) which it is found and how it is joined with certain sentiments. These traits and sentiments explain the origin, successes and failure of the several socialist doctrines which have existed in different forms and in different places and times—especially the socialism of his day. Les Systèmes Socialistes thus contains a partial analysis of certain aspects of social life and provides the starting point for criticizing theories of sociology. The study of particular cases soon brings Pareto to believe that the instincts, i.e., the irrational behavior, play an important role in human actions; but instincts become veiled by the fact that men, while acting under the influence of instinct elaborate theories by which they claim to justify their actions. (Pareto 1902:11)

As a result, in analyzing the various doctrines among men, elements of great importance are perceived to determine forces of the human communities; these are the motives of various social forces. Motives are influential not because of their believed scientific value but because the motives and these forces remain at the level of instincts, passions, and interests.

What does Pareto really intend to say in his Les Systèmes Socialistes? The key to answering this question is presented
in the "Introduction." In the first place the author denies any desire to construct any kind of practical doctrine; rather, his work strives to have a rigorously scientific character. The angry reactions it will stimulate in his critics will have nothing to do with truth or falsity of Pareto's theory. (Pareto 1902:33) To declare that a system is applicable or not applicable, to study the origin of the system, to observe its several forms --this is the only research that Pareto proposes, making very clear at the same time the relativity of his proposed opinions. One point in the "Introduction" merits particular stress: the distinction between objective and subjective phenomena. (Pareto 1902:6) The emphasis on these two phenomena will have a fundamental methodological importance in the development not only of Les Systèmes Sociauxistes, but also in his later works. It constitutes one of the most fruitful of Pareto's distinctions. An **objective phenomenon** represents what actually exists in reality; a **subjective phenomenon** refers to the theoretical and doctrinal method by which that reality is expressed. Within this context, the obligation of a scientific man is to make a critical analysis of the subjective systems in their relation to reality, seeking objectively the psychological, social or other causes, that have given origin to the subjective systems.

If we examine for a moment a specific point in Pareto's analysis --namely, his commentary on Marxism-- the interest in the Paretian distinction will become clearer.
"In the development of the dispute of Marxism," Pareto comments, "the two opposing tendencies are easily discerned. On one side are the supporters of Marxism, who, convinced a priori of the social importance of this doctrine, try to demonstrate that it rests on a theory scientifically valid; on the other hand, the adversaries, having questioned the validity of Marxism from a scientifically great point of view, proceed to deny the social importance of it. (Pareto 1898) In reading Les Systèmes Socialistes one is impressed by the Pareto's constant efforts to discover the primordial forces that are hidden behind the variable appearances. Theories, like theologies, are simple derivations; their purpose is to give logical form to the irrational base of human behavior. In confirmation of this, it should be noted that Pareto wrote, "We must be persuaded that the optimistic doctrine which hopes for progress and deems it possible to change social order radically is a fable. Wicked beast is man and wicked beast he will remain for many centuries to come, even though he saw reason to believe that after many centuries he ought to improve instead of worsening." (Letter to Turati 1898)

Pareto cites varied and abundant events, past and present, to demonstrate that we do not differ much from our ancestors and that our age is very similar to that of the past. (Pareto 1902:88) Notwithstanding these general ideas, there is no orderly plan, not wholly formulated conclusion in Les Systèmes
As Bousquet reveals. (Bousquet 1926:17)

With rare exceptions, the work demonstrates that the effort to explain socialist systems tells us almost nothing directly about social facts. A common characteristic of all the socialist systems can be summarized simply: "Before any other thing Les Systèmes Socialistes tries to restrict the right of personal property and to extend the rights of the State to the detriment of individual liberty." (Pareto 1902:26)

Moreover, in Pareto's era, social systems presuppose considerable development of humanitarian sentiments in the higher strata of society which create in the lower classes a parallel growing feeling of their own dignity. (Pareto 1902:74)

Manuale di Economia Politica (1906)

Between late 1903 and 1905, the Manuale di Economia Politica (Manual of Political Economy) was being readied for publication.³ It finally appeared in 1906. This work, which signifies new step in Pareto's intellectual evolution, includes two very important chapters reflecting his developing sociological perspective: the first of these chapters is entitled

"General Principles;" the second and more important chapter is called an "Introduction to Social Sciences."

Pareto treats of the differences between the Cours and the Manuale in the "preface" of the Manuale. In the Cours, the economic phenomenon is founded on an hedonistic hypothesis, the concept of capital, and the steady element of price. In the Manuale the economic phenomenon is founded on the contrast between "tastes" and "obstacles" (which is the foundation for economic equilibrium), the transformation of economic goods, and the unsteadiness of price. In the Cours, peace and politico-economical freedom are said to be the best ways to obtain "the good of the peoples." But Pareto does not demonstrate such a statement; for him the objective reality originates in the sentiments. Therefore, such a statement had to be omitted from a work which set out only to study facts scientifically. Indeed, nowhere in the Manuale does the author even hint his earlier statement about peace and freedom.

Another difference between the Cours and the Manuale is that Pareto uses a different principle in studying concrete phenomena in order to avoid some of the mistakes in his earlier work (Cours) -- i.e., applying an incomplete synthesis of analytical elements to a concrete doctrine, as was the case in his analysis of free exchange and protection.
Scientifically, it is demonstrable that protection leads to a decrease of wealth, for this reason protection cannot positively be condemned. Actually, before expressing a judgment, other social consequences of the protectionist system should be considered. From a study of these consequences Pareto saw yet another of the idols of the liberalist faith of his youth shattered. Not only the conventional view about free competition and protectionism, but also other fundamental laws of economics need to be reshuffled. The law of supply and demand in the Courc is put in classical terms, according to which demand always diminishes when the price increases, whereas supply first increases with prices and then later declines. In the Manuale Pareto is more specific: "In general supply and demand depend upon all the circumstances of the economic equilibrium." (Pareto 1906: 145)

One more sociological shortcoming of the Courc is that its propositions are stated in an exclusively objective way without taking into account the subjective phenomena. This topic is developed to a greater extent in the Manuale's chapter entitled "Introduction to a Social Science." The novelty of the Manuale is its assertion that psychology constitutes the basis of every social science. For this reason Pareto found it necessary to create a typology of action. However, as Busino observes, such a typology is in part reduced to a distinction already made in Pareto's previous
writings -- the distinction between logical and non-logical action. (Busino 1966:35) Nevertheless, it is precisely his theory of action that connects Pareto to the field of sociology.

In the *Manuale* Pareto's trend toward sociology is already clear. As a matter of fact, the results of his teaching and research presented in his following works is primarily directed to studying the themes of sociology. Pareto outlines his view about the tasks facing sociology in his "*Programme et Sommaire du Cours de Sociologie*" (Program and Summary of the Course of Sociology). (Busino 1966) The program is divided in five parts: (1) **General Principles**: these include several general considerations of sociology as a science and some metaphysical canons. (2) **Society** is defined as a heterogeneous and hierarchical aggregate; the problem of elites and their circulation is implied. (3) **Objective** and subjective phenomena. An outline of the theory of logical and non-logical action. (4) **Evolution**. A criticism of the theory that identifies sociology with the evolution of society is made. Pareto recommends the study of evolution of law, religion, morals, and politics. (5) **Mutual dependence of social phenomena**: Pareto advises the reader to consider religious sentiments as notable elements of social dynamism. As a matter of fact he states that "religious sentiments are the cement of society." (Busino 1966:369)
In March, 1906 Pareto gave lectures on sociology at the University of Bologna. On March 13 he delivered the inaugural address, "The Method of Sociology." (Busino 1966) In that lecture he gave two definitions of sociology: in a broad sense, sociology is the science "which would include the study of what belongs to the ordering to life and the development of human society; with this definition it is evident that sociology would excessively extend its control and include in its scope political economics, law, the science of religion, and other branches of our knowledge, which already have an independent and flourishing life. (Busino 1966) In a narrow sense, sociology includes: "(1) the synthetic study of human societies; to accomplish this, sociology is helped by the results at which particular sciences have arrived; (2) the study of not yet autonomous branches, or the study — with particular aims — of branches which already have an independent life. (Busino 1966:335) He continues: "it is difficult, even impossible for people to devote themselves to sociology and to entirely neglect certain questions which belong precisely to philosophy, that is, to the general theory of human knowledge... Every sociology presupposes a philosophy... and quite often a faith." (Busino 1966:335) Pareto concludes by hinting that the first task of sociology is that "one must find the relationship between theory and facts, by refuting what goes beyond experience." (Busino 1966:346)
In May 1907, responding to an international inquiry on the question of religion, Pareto responded that the religious phenomenon is the most relevant manifestation of human behavior from the sociological viewpoint. Given that religious belief as a social fact is made alive and powerful by sentiments, Pareto asserts that the presence of these sentiments may be an element more or less constant in history; even though the forms assumed by various belief vary considerably over time. The actual religious tendency in Europe develops toward humanitarian, pacifist, and socialist forms; its effectiveness does not depend on its theologies and ideologies, but on the strength of the sentiments from which these forms rise. From the viewpoint of social utility, "religions serve as elements of cohesion and the various forms will be more useful if they will better consent to the possibility of an orderly progress." (Busino 1966:377)

In that same year Pareto published another article entitled, "L'économie et la sociologie au point de vue scientifique" (Economics and Sociology from a Scientific point of View). (Busino 1966) Once more Pareto underlines the difference between the purportedly logical action of political economics and the concrete action of men in the reality. Social science cannot be discovered at the level of "what ought to be," but only at the level of actual human behavior, as it has occurred concretely in the evolution of history.
The methodological propositions and the explicit references to authors to whom Pareto often refers are instructive. He insists that there is no difference between the laws of economics and sociology and the laws of other sciences. In this connection he refers to Poincare and his models of mechanical theories, to Volterra and his analogy between the abstraction "homo economicus" and the "material point" of the mechanists, to mathematical applications in the works by Laplace, Gauss, Poincare, and Walras. For Sociology Pareto observes that the problem is still to formulate an idea which specifies an instance of the mutual dependence of social phenomena. To obtain scientific reasoning based exclusively upon facts requires a substitute for reasoning based upon association of ideas or sentiments. Only a few authors, according to Pareto, have done important works in this respect, e.g., Levy-Bruhl in *La morale et la science des mœurs* or Reinach in *Cultus, mythes et religions*. In each of these works we can see uniformities which emphasize the mutual dependence of social phenomena. (Busino 1966) But, wrote Pareto, a great deal of effort has yet to be expended to acquire knowledge of such uniformities. This is one of the goals that Pareto will try to achieve in his *Treatise*.

The essay "The Non-Logical Actions" published in the May-August 1910 issue of *Rivista italiana di Sociologia* (Italian Review of Sociology) includes a long list of histori-
cal facts which demonstrate the consistency of that type of action, i.e., "the movement and the dependence that there is among various social phenomena of history. (Pareto 1910) It should also be recalled that the ground upon which Pareto feels comfortable is history.

Although Pareto's theory of the non-logical action had been already formulated, a full development of the theory of action awaited his complementary theory of logical actions which he later developed in the Treatise. That theory of action is drawn more emphatically in the following passage:

Every nation is governed by an elite and, to be correct, it is indeed the psychic state of this elite that we have observed... An elite may change either by the change of men that make it up or by their offspring or also by the infiltration of non-related elements that can rise either from the same nation or another one. (Busino 1966:463)

After presenting several examples in his essay, Pareto concludes:

We have to beware of hasty conclusions...
We have found the characteristics of certain elites, but we have not worked out the problem of their composition. (Busino 1966:464)

It is precisely the problem of the composition of certain elites that Pareto emphasizes in his May 1911 article, "Rentiers and Speculateurs." (Busino 1966) In this article the distinction
between the categories of rentiers and speculativeurs is formulated: the first is conservative and nationalist; the second, progressive and internationalist. A certain proportion of the total population in these two categories helps to assure economically and politically prosperous nations; a disproportion raises serious risks for social equilibrium. The speculativeurs are the causes not only of the changes but also of the economic and social progress; meanwhile, the rentiers help to assure stability. This article clearly formulated and outlined Pareto's theory of social dynamism which rests on the two categories of rentiers and speculativeurs.

Le Mythe Vertuiste et la Litterature Immorale (1910)

In the Summer 1910 Pareto wrote Le mythe vertuiste et la litterature immorale (The Vertuiste Myth and Immoral Literature). It is a lengthy collection of facts and illustrations of the theory of "derivations." Pareto apparently thought that the inclusion of all the collected material in the voluminous Treatise would have made his masterwork everly

dull reading, so he published this material separately.

At that time, the newspapers were full of articles on indecent behavior; the government itself reacted against such publications by ordering the press to cease what it considered to be the propagation of pornography. "Vertuiste leagues" of outraged citizens were also organized to protest the appearance of these indecent articles. Since Pareto had earlier collected considerable information pertinent to this subject, he thought that they might both interest the public and, at the same time, demonstrate his own moral outrage.

The book amply demonstrates Pareto's extensive reading from Latin and Greek classics to Christian texts collected by Migne, the writers of the *Encyclopædia* and the complete works by Voltaire and Machiavelli. Ancient, medieval, and modern history is flung in confusion into the face of yesterday's and today's *vertuistes*. The book is sociological but such a characteristic is almost overlooked because the continuous pressure of collected facts either fascinates or disgusts the reader. Pareto ascribes to it the importance of an objective sociological inquiry. Fixed in our idea of seeing a continuity in the Paretian thought, we have to say that it is neither simply a long digression or an exercise in dilettantism, but through historical facts and documents the theory of "residues" and "derivations" is formulated. Although both *Le mythe vertuiste et la littérature immorale* and the *Treatise* are
two works published in different periods, to Pareto they constituted a whole. The following passage, drawn from *Le mythe* convinces in Pareto’s mind that the idea of the theory of "residues" and "derivations" is already well outlined; even more, the basic idea will be expressed in the *Treatise* in almost the same words:

There does not exist in history any great, strong, prosperous people, in which profound and active sentiments are found, which are not manifested by an ideal, a religion, a myth, a faith. Every people, where these sentiments weaken, is declining. Many small nations became great, because they had faith in themselves; a nation that loses this faith is near ruin.

In a certain way one might therefore enunciate this paradox: nothing is as real and practical as the ideal. The reality of the ideal is not found in the ideal itself, but in the sentiments which it reveals. The existence of the goddess Athena does not have any objective reality; but this reality exists in the sentiments of Athenians, sentiments which are manifested in the belief that Athena might dwell in the Acropolis of Athens and protect the city.
The Crusaders worked brave wonders when the cross was carried before them. The reality does not find itself in the myth of that cross; it exists in the sentiments of these warriors.

In those two cases, the forms of the myths are essentially different; the sentiments of which they are a manifestation are quite similar. Read, on the one hand, the Christian historians of the crusades, on the other hand, the Arab ones. Their religions are very different; the sentiments they inspire are alike. Therefore, those sentiments are to be studied in order to discover the laws of the development of society,
whereas the forms of myths, forms which till now have been given a great emphasis, are secondary. The logical content of the ideal is of lesser importance. What is important is the psychological state that it reveals. Do not waste time making the contradictions, the incongruities, the absurdities of mythology and of Roman divination. Put aside all this miscellany and underneath you will find as "residue" several sentiments. After that, retake history, follow it step by step, and you will see those sentiments which made the greatness of Rome. Repeat analogous operations for Athens, Sparta, for Mohammed's Arab followers, continue and come up to modern times.

Study in this way the epoch of the English revolution, that of the French revolution of 1789, that of Napoleon I, that of German people which drove the armies of Napoleon I out. Don't be tired. Observe how Bismarck knew how to use the myth that showed the sentiments of his people. Leave history if you like direct observation better and look at the relevant role still played by the myth of the great Germany among the German populations; the myth of forefathers, of dynasty, of native land among the victorious Japanese.

Everywhere you will find similar phenomena; everywhere underneath the derivations without logical value and sometime absurd, you will find those sentiments which are the great forces from which spring the form and the development of societies.

(Pareto 1911:638)

Almost two years later the publication of Le Mythe Vertuiste et la Litterature Immorale the first draft of the Treatise was finished; but four more years passed before
the work could be published. The delay was caused, on the one hand, by the outbreak of the war that made correspondence between Italy and Switzerland more difficult and, on the other hand, by Pareto's insatiable habit in reading and re-reading proofs in order to revise the text.

Another factor in the delay was that Louis Ambroso, to whom the task of compiling the indexes was committed, took about a year to finishing them.

By March 1915, Pareto thought that the Treatise would appear in print in only a few months. In fact, one more year was necessary. Writing to Sensini in August 1916, Pareto noted that the editor had intended to publish the two lengthy volumes in October.

Anyway, wrote Pareto, "pleasing to God, to censure, to mail" on December 25, 1916, the editor Barbera finally will publish the Treatise. 5

The Trattato di Sociologia Generale (The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology) was first published on December 25, 1916, after twenty years of gestation. The Treatise, like Les Systèmes Socialistes, is predominantly a critical analysis of the ideologies of various schools of thought in religion, philosophy, politics, and social justice. Pareto maintained that his observation of social behavior showed it to be traceable to non-logical, rather than to logical actions. It was this conviction that moved Pareto to study sociology. Within the sphere of non-logical actions Pareto focused on the passions, providing an original nomenclature as well as experimental methodology.

The theory of non-logical actions was influenced by Peter Bayle whom Pareto considered "far from being inferior to Rousseau. His work is as superior to Rousseau's work as the astronomy of Kepler is superior to the astronomy of Cosmas Indecopleustes. He may be blamed only for stopping too soon on a road which he has so splendidly opened." (#365) Elsewhere Pareto asserts that many statesmen and historians recognize non-logical action without giving it that name and without going to the trouble of finding a theory to explain it. Just a few examples from the works of Bayle
containing several theories of non-logical conduct show it is indeed surprising that a writer who lived two centuries and more ago acknowledged certain truths that are still unappreciated even today. Bayle declares and repeats that "opinions are not the rule of conduct" and that

man does not regulate his conduct by his opinion... The Turks hold certain tenets of that doctrine of the Stoics (fatalism), and they carry the business of predestination to extreme lengths. Nevertheless they may be seen to flee danger as other men do, and they are far from charging in battle with the courage of the French, who do not believe in predestination." (#358)

The existence and importance of non-logical conduct could not be recognized in plainer terms.

Pareto emphasized the role of the non-logical experimental theories in the fourth and fifth chapters of the Treatise. He wanted to show that the forces which move our society are "facts." He remarks:

Currently in any given group of people are a number of propositions, descriptive, preceptive, or otherwise. For example: "Youth lacks discretion. "Covet not thy neighbour's goods, nor thy neighbour's wife." "Love thy neighbour as thyself." "Learn to save if you would not one day be in need." Such propositions, combined by logical or pseudo-logical nexuses and amplified with the factual narrations of
various sorts, constitute theories, theologies, cosmogonies, systems of metaphysics, and so on. Viewed from the outside without regard to any intrinsic merit with which they may be credited by faith, all such propositions and theories are experimental facts, and as experimental facts we are here obliged to consider and examine them. (#7)

That examination is very useful to sociology; for the image of social activity is stamped on the majority of such propositions and theories, and often it is through them alone that we manage to gain some knowledge of the forces which are at work in society—that is, of the tendencies and inclinations of human beings. For that reason we shall study them at great length in the course of these volumes. Propositions and theories have to be classified at the very outset, for classification is a first step that is almost indispensable if one would have an adequate grasp of any great number of different objects. (#8)

The non-logical experimental theories, therefore, are the substance of Paretoian inquiry. Both induction and deduction were methods of inquiring into facts. Prior to the fifth chapter of the Treatise Pareto made use of induction to arrive at the theories which he dealt with in the later chapters. For Pareto the non-logical experimental theories have great importance in analyzing social historical phenomena:

We saw that from the logico-experimental standpoint they were devoid of all exacteness and of any strict
accord with the facts; though from another standpoint, we could not deny the great importance that they had had in history and in determining the social equilibrium. That discovery lent force to a suspicion: that the experimental truth of certain theories is one thing and their social utility quite another." (#843)

Notwithstanding the fragmentation of Pareto's major work, its scheme is simple and clear, as Bousquet has observed. After a preliminary chapter on methodology, the research develops six distinct, logically connected points.

(1) The distinction between logical and non-logical actions (Chapter 2). This distinction is the one exclusive aspect under which actions in Pareto's system are studied. More than two-thirds of his sociology is devoted to the expounding this distinction and its consequences. It should be noted, however, that only "non-logical actions" are studied by Pareto; although "logical actions" are not expressly excluded from his discussion.

(2) As Borkenau writes, the three further chapters (Chapters 3 - 5), deal with "non-logical actions in the history of doctrines," "theories transgressing the limits of experience," and "pseudo-scientific theories" and contrast the concept of non-logical actions with other sociological and philosophical theories. All three chapters clearly show Pareto's fight against the rationalism, that so dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth century with its beleif
in "reason" as the basic force of human life and the only essential characteristic of man.

(3) The analysis of the non-logical-experimental theories emphasized the two elements which comprise them: a less variable part (residues), which is a manifestation of elementary sentiments, and a more variable part (derivations), which includes more or less logical reasoning that attempts a rational justification of impulses, instincts, interests, inclinations. Pareto's terminology in this very subtle area is, as his critics have observed, wavering and inexact. The residues are divided into six categories (chapters 6, 7, and 8); the derivations are divided into four categories (chapters 9 and 10). These five chapters are the heart of Pareto's work, describing the systematic analysis of forces which act in human society, a society of being both instinctive and symbol-using.

(4) The residues' and the derivations' respective importance, mutual influence, and consequences derive from different combinations that arise from the composition and development of a social system. The longest and most confusing chapter (chapter 11) connects the analysis of single elements of every social system and their recomposition in the theory of social equilibrium. Its main scope seems to show that:

a) through various distributions and complex interactions of single elements, every system is heterogeneous (theory of
social heterogeneity); b) the most remarkable and permanent aspect of that heterogeneity is the distinction and continuous exchange between rulers and ruled (theory of elites and their circulation).

(5) The preceding study of various forces which act in a social system allows the construction of a theory of social equilibrium, in which the elements already considered act variously; added to these elements is the category of interest, primarily belonging to the economic action. The basic four elements include: (a) residues; (b) derivations; (c) interests; (d) heterogeneity and social circulation. (#2205)

A long and complex treatment (chapter 12) is devoted to the theory of the general composition of society. It deals with several rather unconnected topics; the chapter is famous not for its scientific value but because it reveals Pareto's political moods about the nature of government; it is both Pareto's diagnosis and judgment of contemporary society.

(6) After the construction of his theoretical model, Pareto offers an empirical verification of it by presenting a sequence of historical events (chapter 13). As Pareto observes: "In this chapter we will proceed toward new experimental verifications of our theories, and we will fulfill that by collecting facts and relations of facts." (#2412)

At the time of his Treatise Pareto's sociological mind
reached its fullest elaboration. He did think of adding a third volume to the *Treatise* as an "Appendix" which would have presented a study of World War I in the light of the theory already set forth in the *Treatise*. Death came to Pareto on August 20, 1923, making such a hope impossible. But between April 4, 1918 and November 4, 1919, Pareto wrote a diary (unpublished until 1958, with the original title, *Mon Journal*) in which he amused himself by commenting ironically on the most famous "derivations" produced by the propaganda of war. 6

*Mon Journal* (1918)

One may more profoundly understand the motive that inspired Pareto to write *Mon Journal* if several considerations are noted about the general world situation following World War I. Peace was questionable. Despite his conscientious desire to contribute to peace through his writings, Pareto did not want in any way to agitate the minds of politicians. He wrote his impressions for his own satisfaction; as he remarked in his preamble:

I write *Mon Journal* for the preser-

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vocation of my ideas and my amusement and—but I am not sure—also to speak to several of my friends. It is my idea to find the relation of facts, and to forget about my sentiments. (Pareto 1967:25)

Immediately after World War I, Russia—a former allied power—was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, who took no part in international relations. The once-proud German and Austro-Hungarian empires were already dead, and more or less revolutionary regimes struggled to establish themselves in their places. New republics already existed along the Baltic coast, in Poland, and in the Danube basin, but they had neither effective nor acknowledged frontiers. Europe east of France and Italy was in a state approaching chaos. In these circumstances, the victors—the United States, England, France, and Italy—assembled in Paris, in the bleak winter of 1919, to reconstruct the world left in disarray by four years of war. During 1919 they signed five treaties, all named after Paris suburbs—St. Germain with Austria, Trianon with Hungary, Neuilly with Bulgaria, Sevres with Turkey (1920), and most importantly the treaty of Versailles with Germany.

The world looked with hope to Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. President from 1913 to 1921. Wilson’s views were well known. He had stated them in January 1918 in his Fourteen Points—principles upon which, after victory, peace was to
established. The principles concerned the end of secret treaties and secret diplomacy, the freedom of the sea in both peace and war, the removal of barriers and inequalities in international trade, the reduction of armaments by all powers, the need for colonial readjustments, the evacuation of occupied territory, the self-determination of nationalities, the redrawing of European boundaries along national lines, and the creation of an international political organization to prevent war.

But Wilson had had difficulty in persuading the Allied govern-ments to accept his *Forteen Points*, although, a few reservations, the Allies did express their willingness to follow Wilson's lead. Twenty-seven nations assembled at Paris, but political matters were decided by conferences among the Big Four--Wilson himself, Lloyd George for England, Clemenceau for France, Orlando for Italy.

Wilson first fought a hard battle for establishment of a League of Nations, a permanent international body in which all nations, without sacrificing their sovereignty, should meet together to discuss international affairs. The League of Nations was inaugurated at Versailles, at the same time the Treaty with Germany was signed, later at Geneva.

Clemenceau demanded security against Germany at the peace conference. To trim Germany down more nearly to French size, Clemenceau proposed that the part of Germany west of the
Rhine be formed as an independent state under Allied auspices. Wilson and Lloyd objected, observing that the resulting German resentment would only lead to another war. Clemenceau sought security in another way, namely, by eliciting a promise from both Britain and the United States to join France immediately if it were again attacked by the Germans. Lorraine and Alsace were then returned to France. Germany lost all its colonies. Clemenceau and Lloyd divided between themselves the best of the African colonies. Orlando received Trieste and some of the Dalmatian islands.

Understandably, Pareto followed these political events with deep interest. *Mon Journal*, written from April 4, 1918 to November 4, 1919, is the most evident example. The initial portion of it—covering only April 4, 1918 to May 18, 1918—was published in 1958. The part of the Journal treating the period from May 19, 1918 to November 4, 1919 still has to be published. G. De Maria identified *Mon Journal* "as possibly the most foreseeing and knowledgeable soliloquy that was ever written by an economist on the rapport among politics, sociology, and economics." (De Maria 1958:v)

In *Mon Journal* Pareto was most interested to gather together the prevailing derivations which offered suggestions congenial to his spirit and his fascination with jest. To make his soliloquy more vivacious, Pareto wrote in form of a colloquy, addressed to his Angora cats, Myrrha and
Timothy. The main theme is expressed by the astonishment of Myrrhine at the observation that men are a race of curious beasts because, although they have the possibility of understanding things, they are pushed to distort them with sentiment. The diary develops in the form of a fairy tale: lions and foxes representing rulers and *speculators*; sheep, goats, rabbits, skylarks and fish representing subjects and rentiers. Many examples, taken from Non Journal, are refreshing in their Paretian satire. Pareto further suggested a sharp and curious comparison to the Treaty of the League of Nations, signed in Geneva in 1919:

Like the Romans who did not want any power to emerge in Greece stronger than theirs, capable of giving independence to other nations, without their consent, the United States, in proclaiming the Treaty of the League of Nations, wanted to curtail the power of Germany.

The Entente—England, France, and Italy—and their American allies will be victorious in the World War (1914–1918). In this case, it is in the future consensus of England and of the United States that one can find the Hope of political freedom and of independence from other nations. It does not matter that their dependence may be realized with the *Comédie de la Société des Nations* or in any other way.

The central powers have declared themselves ready to accept the League of Nations. It is necessary to have forgotten the fable of the lion who established
an association with a heifer, a goat, and a sheep; it is necessary to have forgotten the history of the history of the League of Nations constituted by Athens with the islands; by Sparta, with its allies; by Alexander, with his conquest of Persia; by Rome, first with Latium, after, little by little with all Italy, and with all of the Mediterranean basin, and so forth, in order to forget where the League of Nations will lead. (Pareto 1958:79-80)

Pareto, who was above all a man of politically independent ideas, not only looked with irony on the facts of international politics, but also scornfully ridiculed the political persecutions favored by those who changed the meaning of certain words to suit their own purpose.

By the use of the term défaitiste ("defeatist") Pareto demonstrated the injustices of the leading political classes. At the beginning the défaitiste seemed to have designated an individual wishing the defeat of his own country to assure the triumph of his political party. Such would have been the Socialist who would have invoked the defeat of the army to destroy the capitalist regime. The etymology was quite wrong. But it was very soon forgotten. At the present time, défaitiste denotes an individual who purposely seeks to destroy the political spirit. These terms are already vague and the law inclines every day to make them vaguer, and, it is strange to say, silence can also be defeatist. In short, défaitiste seems to
denote an individual who keeps "cool" and is not in accord with the strong who talk about war. (Pareto 1958:48-49)

Pareto, of course, corroborated his observations by quoting facts reported in the Italian newspaper, e.g. the seller Andrew Solaro from Castiglione (Asti) who was sentenced to five days in jail for having hung a loaf of bread to a telegraph pole. Such an act of scorn Solaro attributed to the poor quality of bread and a poor set of teeth; the Court of Asti however, saw the act as something which could depress the public morale.

A second example of Pareto's defeatism is the following:

The Socialists from Biella (Italy) are not quite happy with the deputy Humbert Savio, and their mood, their appreciation, their criticism may seem the expression of the judgment and of the criticism of the Socialist headquarters and of the Parliamentary group. Savio does not participate almost at all in parliamentary works; he rarely speaks. It is observed that he is not present in any important ballot and his name is not found in any motion. Several people assert that this poor participation of the deputy may result from the little sympathy he has toward war. His position is, however, not easy and one can understand that he may be obliged to make an equilibrium in order not to be disliked by the masses of his rural district whose mentality he knows very well, or the headquarters of his party; and at the same time, he must
keep faith with his own personal ideas. It seems, therefore, that he may be guilty of defeatism. (Pareto 1958: 50)

Pareto's *Mon Journal* contains several instances which demonstrate the continuous struggle between the people in power and those ruled. Pareto himself, meanwhile, reevaluated what he had written in *Mon Journal* for his own enjoyment and discussed it in another series of articles, *Fatti e Teorie* (Busino 1966 by beginning with an article entitled "After four years of War" (Busino 1966). In this article, Pareto specifically analyzes the "derivations" which he had discussed in *Mon Journal*.


Between May and July 1920, Pareto published his last book entitled *Trasformazione della Democrazia* (Transformation of Democracy). 7

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To Pareto the term "democracy" has several different meanings. Understood as a form of government, it means to him a political system in which the power to make laws belongs to an assembly chosen by the majority of citizens. However, beneath this formal structure all democratic regimes contain a small "ruling class" and a large "ruled class." The former maintains its power partly by force and partly by the consensus of the ruled. To Pareto—and, as he saw it, to everyone who is not deceived by appearances—democracy is not at all a government of the majority. But what paths has the transformation of democracy taken? That is the question which Pareto addresses in his Trasformazione della Democrazia.

Having set forth his several sociological assumptions ("Generalities") in the first chapter and having relegated empirical data to the Appendix, Pareto analyzes a series of phenomena in the book's central chapters: the weakening of centralized power and the strengthening of anarchic factors; the rapid advance of plutocratic demagogy; the transformation of the sentiments of the bourgeoisie and the still ruling class.

Pareto does not suggest in what direction democracy
In the chaotic and restless period after World War I, he apparently did not feel capable of forecasting a precise political trend. In his assertion of the transformation of democracy into demagogic plutocracy, one can infer that he considered the weakening of central power to be an inevitable consequence of the ruling class' quest for power for its own good, not by force (as in a military plutocracy), but rather by soliciting "consensus" by trickery and fraud.

Pareto points out that, in the economic and social development of the past century and a half, elite "speculators" and the workers or proletariat have assumed an ever-growing importance, while the class elite "rentiers" have declined. "Speculators" include those persons whose sources of income are fundamentally changeable, depending on their shrewdness; "rentiers" include persons whose income is relatively fixed, with little dependence on personal chance or coincidences. To Pareto, a remarkable phenomenon since the turn of the century in Europe has been the fusion of speculators and workers vis-à-vis the State and other social classes, not to gain authority for the common good, but to exploit it for particular and private interests. "The phenomenon," wrote Pareto, "described by the people as plutocracy, springs principally from the exploitation that speculators make of the sentiments of masses." (Pareto 1921:94)

In studying the sentiments of conflicting classes,
Pareto points out that workers' sentiments were strengthened against the well-to-do, whereas in the upper classes all manifestations of sentiments hostile to the lower classes disappeared. Among the wealthy, sentiments of personal defence and property decreased, while the proletarians made assaults on them through more tricks and force.

To Pareto, it is evident that the sentiments of the proletariat were far superior to those of the well-to-do; the proletariat was more firmly united, more courageous in defending its ideals, and more constant in preaching its goals. Pareto thinks it probable that in the future the lower classes will improve; the transformation of the present-day democracy should finally be an illustration of the circulation of elites. As a consequence, the proletarians must make up the new elite instead of those in decline, the bourgeoisie. Pareto had hinted at such a theory in his Les Systèmes Socialistes. Nevertheless, his treatment of the decay of the wealthy class, as discussed in Les Systèmes Socialistes and 18 years later in Trasformazione della Democrazia, shows a remarkable difference of tone. No longer does Pareto display a kind of appreciation of the development of Socialism, so evident in Les Systèmes Socialistes, with its implicit recognition of new proletarian forces and its bold appearance on the scene to chase an already demoralized bourgeoisie.

Objectively, Pareto reports the decay of the bourgeoisie
and the growing force of the working classes, but his subjective sentiment is one of anger toward both protagonists of the social event: toward the bourgeoisie, because they have given up their social standing almost without fighting; toward the workers who have encroached with no difficulty at all.

Pareto certainly manifests a strongly conservative spirit. He realizes that society is transforming itself as the proletariat prevails, but his sentiments react violently against the very phenomenon which his theory explains. Given this contradiction, Pareto shows sarcasm toward all revolutionary ideas. Behind his sarcasm, he appeals to the "metaphysical entities" of justice, humanity, progress; he then attacks the errors, the illusions, the tricks without which men do not know how to act, the fanaticism, the fideistic interpretations, the idle talk of those who present to masses the deceptive mirage of absolute happiness. It is not difficult to sense his deeply desolate pessimism.

From late 1920, just two years before his death, Pareto turned his interest and attention even more intensively to the social and political situation of Europe -- and especially Italy. A commentary on Pareto's final political activity must be placed within the context of his relationship with Fascism.
In respect to methodology, Pareto has very clearly stressed the need for an empirical study of social action. In the first chapter of the Treatise ("The Scientific Approach") and in a specific article (Pareto 1897), Pareto sees sociology as a synthetic science of different special disciplines:

Human society is the subject of many researches. Some of them constitute specialized disciplines: law, political economy, the history of religions, and the like. Others have not yet been distinguished by special names. To the synthesis of them all, which aims at studying human society in general, we may give the name of sociology (#1).

The human mind is forced to study different aspects of the same phenomenon separately and, as a consequence, to isolate somewhat arbitrarily its various parts. Sociology should be a science able to overcome analytical limitations in a single view. Sociology is such a science, he held, capable of re-uniting in synthesis the fixed aspects of one concrete reality enlightened by other disciplines.
Nevertheless, to achieve such a synthesis, it is necessary to use the analytical method whose function the social sciences do not sufficiently understand. With his intolerance for abstract definitions, Pareto recognizes imperfection in all formulas which tend to fix the position of a social science in comparison with others. He simply describes sociology as "an experimental science which studies the relations among social facts" (#2)."

The experimental character of sociology becomes emphasized in analogy with other physical and mathematical sciences, especially with the exclusion of every reference to absolute principles and of all dogmatic a-priori assertions. Sorokin observes that, in Pareto's mind, no "a-priori element or principle is to enter in, or to be admitted to, sociology (Sorokin 1928:40." Reference to mathematical, physical, and chemical sciences, has been made many times, whereas science generally is defined "a miscellany of experimental data and logical inferences from such data (#20)."

The principles which belong to any science must be diligently selected. They are abstract propositions in which "the traits common to many different facts (#55) become synthesized; they are "hypotheses designed to formulate syntheses of facts, linking facts under theories and epitomizing them. Theories, their principles, their implications, are alto-
gether subordinate to facts and possess no other criterion of truth than their capacity for picturing them (#63).

Pareto is particularly preoccupied in keeping the distinction in the social sciences between the experimental criterion and the non-experimental which is based on philosophy, metaphysics, and pseudo-science. Without this distinction, sociology would suffer a particular lack of a clear delimitation of itself in terms of an empirical science: considerations of value must above all be eliminated (#62).

The "nominalist" and "instrumental" character of method is emphasized as a necessary need for all sciences, before proceeding in its deductions of facts, before defining the exact meaning attributed to words, to symbols and to relations expressed in hypothesis, independently from all considerations about the reality (#64, #65, #69).

Concerning his position as a man of science, Pareto repudiates every principle transgressing the limits of science. To him the method of all sciences, and consequently of sociology, is best characterized by the term logico-experimental, which is based exclusively on observation and experimentation with facts. No reasoning, no observation, no speculation, no moralizing, nothing which goes beyond facts, or does not describe their uniformities or qualities, can comprise an element or a theory of logico-experimental sociology.
The dialectics of logic and experience requires the two aspects of the scientific method: induction and deduction. Induction allows inference of several elements of a theory from a complex mass of facts; deduction, on the other hand, coordinates those elements into coherent theories, by subjecting them to the verification of the facts, for "there is not and there cannot be any other criterion to verify a theory better than to verify it with a concrete phenomenon (Manuale I-20)."

Having said this, the principles of Paretian--strictly empirical--methodology can be summarized in the following propositions.

(1) He carefully excludes inquiring into absolute truths concerning politics, morality and religion:

We intend in no way to deal with the intrinsic "truth" of any religion of faith, or of any belief, whether ethical, metaphysical, or otherwise; and we adopt that resolve not in any scorn for such belief, but just because they lie, beyond the limits within which we have chosen to confine ourselves. Religions, belief, and the like we consider strictly from the outside as social facts, and altogether apart from their intrinsic merits (#69).

(2) His methodology involves, first, the interrelationship of experience and observation to facts in analogy with the physical and natural sciences. Sociological theories, as far as science is concerned, should imply either propositions of a descriptive type or propositions that declare experi-
mental uniformities. Such theories must exclude propositions that add something to experimental uniformities of propositions which do not rely at all these uniformities. Consequently, every scientific propositions is relative and ought to be understood "within the limits of time and space known to us (#91, #65-5, #87, #529)."

Pareto remarks:

We start with facts to work out theories, and we try at all times to stray from the facts as little as possible. We do not know what the "essence" of things are (#19, #91, #530) and we ignore them, since that investigation oversteps our field (#91).

We are looking for the uniformities we may even call laws (#99); but the facts are not subject to the laws: the laws are subject to the facts. Laws imply no necessity (#29, #97). They are hypotheses serving to epitomize a more or less extensive number of facts and so serving only until superseded by better ones (#69-5).

Second, methodology also involves an absolute distinction between experience and the principles which are beyond it.

Here Pareto observes:

We seek strictly in experience and observation for a proof of our propositions, along with the logical inferences they admit of, barring all proofs by accord of sentiments, "inner persuasions," "dictate of conscience (#69-7).

Sociological generalizations ("laws") discovered
through induction express "probabilities" that are valid until and unless further observations or experiences modify them. The scientist proceeds "in successive approximations," that is to say, "to consider things as wholes, deliberately ignoring details. Of the latter we shall then take account in successive approximations (#69-9)."

(3) A continuous effort must be made to assure objectivity of the facts. Pareto states that it is his intention to choose from the multitude such facts as will exert least influence upon sentiments. So when I have facts of equal experimental value before me from the past and from the present, I choose facts from the past. That accounts for my many quotations from Greek and Latin writers (#85).

Pareto's methodology represents a particular contribution to the development of empirical sociology. The endeavor to establish with exactitude the particularly cognitive level of sociology was surely needed. Pareto formulates principles for an objective analysis of facts through criteria springing from his personal experience as technician and economist, rather than by a mature conviction based on participation in discussion of the issues involved in empirical knowledge. Pareto does not even mention Durkheim, who twenty years earlier had undertaken an in-depth analysis of the concept of social facts (Durkheim 1895).

Pareto studies the problem of the relation between
"facts and value" only in terms of the necessity to free empirical observation from all inferences not related to objective uniformities. Pareto, it seems, does not completely grasp the complex and important problem associated with treating an isolated social fact without analyzing its meaning and its value. With Max Weber, for instance, this latter issue was central to his methodology (Weber 1958). As with Durkheim, there is no mention of Weber in the Treatise.

The Paretian methodology, estranged from an explicit philosophical substratum, has substantially appeared acritical. Pareto has been judged very naïve in his endeavor to free himself from what he calls "temptations," i.e., "Sentiments or scientific theories." Nevertheless, he recognizes the limits of science and experimental method, acknowledging that a concrete phenomenon cannot ever be completely known; that experimental knowledge is expressed only in continuous approximations; that theory "cannot ever represent all the details of phenomena," and that science has only a relative and instrumental value.

He points out, for example, that

We can have only approximate concepts of concrete phenomena. A theory therefore can never account for all particulars. Divergences are inevitable, and the best we can do is reduce them to a minimum. And in this connection too we are once more carried back to our successive approximations. Science is a continuous development
and that is to say, every theory is supplanted by another which corresponds more closely to the real facts (#106).

Another important problem he only touches is that of the relations between the observer and observed social facts.

The man entirely unaffected by sentiments and free from all bias, all faith, does not exist; and to regard that freedom as an essential prerequisite to profitable study of the social science would amount to saying that such study is impossible. But experience shows that a person can, as it were, divide himself in two and, to an extent at least, lay aside his sentiments, preconceptions, and beliefs when engaged in a scientific pursuit, re-assuming them afterwards (#142, #143).

Such self-detachment, Pareto goes on, is more readily achieved in the natural sciences than in the social sciences. It is an easy matter to look at an ant with the skeptical disinterestedness of experimental science. It is much more difficult to look at human beings that way. But even if complete success in such an effort is impossible, we can at least try to succeed in part, and reduce the power and influence of sentiments, preconceptions, beliefs, to a minimum. Only that price can progress in the social sciences be achieved (#142, #143).

Against this background of Pareto's methodological considerations on method, it is appropriate to note briefly how, in fact, he pursued his methodological scheme.
The Paradigm of Logical-Non-Logical Actions

In the article, "Programme et Sommaire du Cours de Sociologie," Pareto affirms that "Sociology comprises, in a broad sense, the study of all that is referred to order, to life, and to the development of human society (Pareto 1905). Therefore, it is necessarily an all-encompassing study of human action, the predominant internal force in social phenomena, and the sole motivation of the social system. His systematic formulation of human action was first drafted in an article, "The non-logical actions," (Pareto 1910) and remained substantively unchanged in the Treatise. Human action--although Pareto did not give a precise definition of it--is considered to be a synthesis originated by "mixtures, in varying degrees, of the elements we are to classify (#148)." Therefore, even beginning action seems to as a function of diverse elements; however, Pareto makes no reference to the single original structure of human action.

The concept of action as a synthesis of elements is divided into two fundamental aspects, assumed as criteria of classification: an "objective" aspect, which should indicate in reality what a social phenomenon is, and a "subjective" aspect, which views to the same phenomenon as perceived by the "SPIRITO UMANO" (human psyche, human spirit). Such a distinction allows Pareto to lay the foundation for
his logical and non-logical paradigm as a method of studying social action.

"Subjective" refers to the point of view of the actor who intends to fulfill the action adequately as means to end; "objective" refers to the point of view of those (scientific observers) who have more knowledge with which to judge the adequacy of the action. The scientific observer is such insofar as he assumes, as a logical criterion, the intrinsic and demonstrable adequacy of the means. The end of action must be put on the level of observation and experience in order to be evaluated. When the end is outside experience, it still remains objective, but it eludes objective evaluation (2150). Therefore, the differential criterion for logical and non-logical actions is based upon the result of Pareto's logico-experimental method.

In sum, action is logical when the operations are logically related to their end, either subjectively understood as anticipations of what the actor intends to realize, or objectively understood as an adequate to the logically anticipated result. In this sense, the two aspects of logical action—subjective perception and objective end—coincide.

Pareto re-assumes his examination of logical action only in the synthetic final part of the Treatise, while diligently analyzing non-logical action. Pareto's emphasis in this final section is explainable because logical action,
is rare; non-logical elements are present in great number in concrete action. Nevertheless, logical action as a constitutive category of scientific research dominates the whole treatise and today is still considered to be a valid call to the empirical study of the social sciences.

The typology of non-logical actions is characterized by the fact that the objective end differs from subjective perception. Such a distinction gives origin to the four genera of non-logical actions and to other sub-species.

**Genus 1** includes actions which have neither an objective nor a subjective end, as in the case of the instinctive actions or acts of courtesy set by habit.

**Genus 2** is represented by actions which have only a subjective end, but no correspondence in the objective order; actions suggested by courtesy and custom. These occur when logical motives are alleged to justify actions subjectively), as well as magic (#160). As Raymond Aron remarks, "Pareto studies ritual acts just as Durkheim did in *Les Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse*, but he begins by placing them in the class of non-logical actions (Aron 1970:124)."

**Genus 3** indicates "pure type of non-logical actions" (#158) which, although having objective finality, lack subjective perception of this finality; actions of animals whose study may help us analogously understand mechanical actions
of men. Two subspecies are included in genus 3: (a) the situation in which the objective end, if known by the subject, would be accepted; (b) the case in which such an objective end would be rejected.

Genus 4 involves non-logical actions in which there is both an objectively and subjectively perceived end, but in which these aspects do not coincide. This category also includes the two subspecies to which Pareto alludes in Genus 3. Under this heading belong all actions governed by scientific error: the means employed actually do produce a result on the level of reality. Moreover, these means have been placed in relation to ends in the mind of the actor; but what actually happens does not conform to what the actor perceived should have happened. Error is responsible for the non-coincidence between the objective and the subjective sequence. Aron observes that "this fourth category also includes all actions dictated by illusions, particularly the illusions of political men or intellectuals. When idealists dream of creating a society without class or exploitation, the results of their action are altogether different from their ideologies; there is a non-coincidence between the hopes nourished by these men and the consequences of their acts; but on the level of reality, as well as on that of consciousness, the means are related to the ends (Aron 1970: 124)."
After what has been said it may be helpful to present Pareto's synoptic picture of the classification of social actions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genera and Species</th>
<th>Have the Actions Logical Ends and Purposes...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objectively?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Class I: Logical Action**
(Objective end and subjective purpose are identical)

- ✔ YES ✔ YES

**Class II: Non-Logical Actions**
(Objective end differs from subjective purpose)

- Genus 1: NO NO
- Genus 2: NO YES
- Genus 3: YES NO
- Genus 4: YES YES

**Species 3a, 4a**
Objective end would be accepted by the actor if he knew it.

**Species 3b, 4b**
Objective end would be rejected by the actor if he knew it.

**Critique.** One of several criticisms regarding the Paretoian analysis of social action deals with logical action resulting from valid empirical reasoning, and non-logical actions
determined chiefly by psychic states, sentiments, subconscious factors, etc. "It belongs to psychology to deal with this psychic state (#161)."

The weakness of Paretian analysis of social facts and, in particular, of analogical actions, rests in having this hypothesis cavalierly attributed to psychology. Pareto considers psychic states to be "a hypothetical entity" from which derive *manifest acts* implying *space-temporal elements* and *linguistic expressions* in the form of propositions or theories. Non-logical action is thus conceived and presented as human action estranged from logical elements, i.e., separated—either from the viewpoint of acts as *space-temporal* operations not adequate to the ends, or from the point of view of *linguistic expressions* as propositions and theories inadequately verified and hence non-scientific.

Psychic states, acts, and linguistic expressions are mutually interdependent. The psychic state, however, is a *non-observable datum* (#162); therefore, it can only be "summoned for study through the examination of acts, of *propositions* or of *theories* (#180, #217).

Pareto thus tends to divert his attention from a consideration of non-logical action as an operative force in the social system to the more subtle problem of psychic interpretation expressed at cultural level. Pareto was driven by a polemic interest to investigate non-logical social theories.
As a result, he discovered that non-rational plays a role in social life. Consequently, the problem of social action becomes also a problem of the expressive fact which interprets and describes that action. In fact, the whole study of empirical action is concentrated on the analysis of the relationship between residues and derivations.

The Residues and the Derivations

The depth, realism, and originality of Pareto's contributions to sociology are manifested above all in his theory of Residues and Derivations. His ideas about residues and derivations are scattered sometimes in a disorderly manner throughout all of his books. In the Treatise, this distinction occupies a dominant place, clearly revealed in almost every chapter. Unfortunately, Pareto did not seem able to expound his ideas clearly. Those who have read and studied the Treatise are not always aware of the refinement of his distinction between residues and derivations and of the distinction between "logical actions" and "non-logical actions." Moreover, Pareto begins by presenting the latter distinction, which is, rather, a consequence of the former. Such lack of clarity hindered the diffusion of his theory of residues and derivations and prevented other sociologists
from perceiving its importance.

The aim of the second half of this chapter will be to demonstrate the potential of the Paretian theory and to review the most common critique of this approach.

The Theory of the Residues

After having started to study deductively the consequences of principles that he either found or thought he had found inductively, Pareto planned to compare those deductions with facts. He affirmed that he would keep as valid theory only that which was in agreement with facts (#848, #849).

Pareto’s purpose was to discover through the variety of facts a profoundly interpretative key which would reveal the sense of concrete phenomena. In this he showed he was not far from that metaphysics which he himself had vigorously repudiated. Indeed, Pareto’s attitude revealed, in spite of his continuous statements about logico-experimental method, a pretension of arriving at ultimate causes in an almost psycho-analytic inquiry, of seeking beyond appearances the profound vis which gives life and direction in human action. Nevertheless, the rejection of every form of knowledge beyond observation and description—i.e. beyond a strictly grounded empiricism—prevented Pareto from conceiving an adequate model of social action, because human or social action presupposes a corre-
lution between empirical and psychological behavior (#249-2).

In treating logical and non-logical action, we have seen how Pareto may have refused to look deeply at the psychic state to which he referred on several occasion. To have accepted such a narrow conception of empirical method leads Pareto to consider as real only sense knowledge, whereas everything else is thought to be simple abstraction, arbitrarily inferred from experience. The limitation of such an attitude is particularly obvious in the classification of the residues, whose "intrinsic weak point is precisely that of being assumptions of uniformity, arbitrarily chosen without any exactitude either of reasoning or of empirical verifications (Sorokin 1928:59).

A residue, says Pareto, "corresponds, we may guess, to certain instincts of man, or more exactly of men, because (a) does not have objective existence and it differs in different individuals. It is probably because of its correspondence to instincts that it is almost constant in social phenomena (#850).

In this first definition, an acute problem is represented by the instinctive and subjective nature of (a) in the hypothetical expression, "we may guess." Furthermore, true

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Pareto in analyzing facts distinguished as two principal elements (or parts); a substantial element (part), which we shall designate as (a), and a contingent element (part), on the whole fairly variable, which we shall designate as (b) (#798).
and real residues, as manifestations of sentiments, are distin-
guished by Pareto as "the appetites, inclinations, tastes
and in the social relationships that very important class cal-
led 'interest' (#851)." Thus he makes his notion of residue
more unclear.

As has already been pointed out in describing Pareto's
classification of the four types of non-logical actions,
Genus 3 was described as "yes-no": objective relation of
means to ends, but no subjective purpose-objective end rela-
tion. This category was conceived to provide a classification
for actions of the instinctive type which did not give rise
to rationalizations, theories, and justifications.

Aron seems to see "appetites, tastes, and inclinations," de-
scribed by Pareto as something beyond the residues; neverthe-
less, Aron continues, "Pareto has not facilitated our work,
by explicitly establishing a relationship between the third
category of non-logical actions and the terms "appetites,
tastes, and inclinations;" "in my opinion," Aron asserts,
"we are really dealing in the last analysis, with the same
phenomenon" (Aron 1970:142).

Moreover, Pareto contends that the residues must not be
confused with the sentiments or instincts to which they
correspond (#875). Here, for the first time, Pareto hints
that sentiments exist in contrast to residues. Pareto's
statement needs a specification, but he never provided clari-
fication. Reading Pareto, as he expressed himself on this particular question, it appears that the instincts-sentiments might belong to that category called residues. Instincts-sentiments are manifestations of the residues, but they belong to the same "whole," just as the "rising of the mercury in a thermometer is manifestation of the rise in temperature (#875)." Such manifestations, although in a subjective form, have their own objective reality through which they influence the social equilibrium.

Aron makes a slightly different interpretation of the problem of the relation between residues and sentiments:

Pareto sometimes speaks as if residues and sentiments were one and the same. There is no doubt, however, that there is a distinction in his mind. The distinction seems twofold: (1) residues are closer to acts or expressions than sentiments are, since they are found by analyzing acts or expressions; (2) residues are not concrete realities, they are analytic concepts created by the observer to explain phenomena; one cannot see or grasp residues as one sees a student or a table (Aron 1970:144).

Sorokin, the most outstanding critic of Pareto among American sociologists, makes a biting comment on the problem.

His (pareto's) concept of the residue remains somewhat unclearly defined, and, in its essence, it is "subjective" in the sense that it is taken as a kind of an inner "drive" (sentiment) which could not be objectively studied and measured....
Such inner drives are almost impossible to study objectively and quantitatively. In spite of Pareto's inclination to such a quantitative study, he did not factually give a real quantitative investigation of his residues. This explains also why Pareto's classification of residues appears to be considerably arbitrary and questionable, naturally influencing many of his deductions and conclusions in the same way (Sorokin 1928:61).

Morris Ginsberg's view is similar to Aron's.

The residues are the patterns or principles in accordance with which the sentiments work, and they can only be discovered by an analytic and comparative study of complex acts, in which the influence of the sentiments may not at first sight be at all obvious. In studying them Pareto is thus trying to discover the different ways in which the sentiments unconsciously affect belief and action (Ginsberg 1965:95).

Given these clarifications, it is time to present Pareto's classification or division of residues. Pareto gives six major classes of residues (with numerous subdivisions): combinations, persistent aggregates, sociability, activity, integrity of the individual, and sex.

I. Instinct for Combinations: the whole synthetic activity of the mind and all forms of associations, behind which is apparently a single drive to combine elements with aggregates.  

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2 This category also includes the following subdivisions:  
Ia. Generic combinations; Ib. Combinations of similar or oppo-
II. Persistence of Aggregates is the opposite of the category I, and involves a stability of combinations once formed, steadfastness and directness, willingness to accept open conflict, a tendency to override obstacles and hence to use force, traditionalism rather than innovation, and an absence of cleverness and resourcefulness. 3

3 This category also includes: IIa. Persistence of relations between a person and other persons and places; relationships of family and kindred groups, relations with places, relationships of social classes; IIb. Persistence of relations between the living and the dead (ghosts, apparitions of the dead which have at all times taken seriously); IIc. Persistence of the relations between a dead person and the things that belonged to him in life (the different practices of burying or of burning the corpses); IID. Persistence of abstractions (such residues underlie theologies and metaphysics, beliefs in the supernatural); IIIe. Persistence of uniformities (the persistence of abstractions creates a general rule); IIIf. Personifications (discussion on anthropomorphism); IIIj. Sentiments transformed into objective realities (such residues are numerous-- they lack scientific exactitude); IIIh. Need of new abstractions (discussion on mythologies which are superseded; among the educated, new abstractions are needed and consequently new developments of the same abstractions are needed) (#888).
III. Need of Expressing Sentiments by External Acts: Activity, self-expression, religious exaltation and political agitation, all of which are usually treated by psychologists.

IV. Residues Connected with Sociability Pareto defines as follows:

This class is made up of residues connected with life in society. Disciplinary residues might also be grouped here, if one agrees that the sentiments corresponding to them are strengthened by living in society. In that direction, it has been observed that all domestic animals except the cat lived in society when they were wild. Moreover, society is impossible without discipline, and consequently the establishment of sociability and of discipline necessarily have some points of contact (#1113).

4 This category includes: IIIa. Need of doing something expressing itself in combinations. Pareto says that as regards combinations we come across residues of class I. It is a question really of a variety of compound residues. What is new here it is the demand for action; IIIb. Religious extaerias: this sentiment of demand for action may rise in intensity to the point of exhilaration, exaltation, and delirium (#888).

5 This category includes: IVa. Particular societies: men tend to create associations, especially voluntary associations...; IVb. Need of uniformity: no society exists unless it imposes on its members certain ways of thinking, believing, and acting; IVc. Phenomena of pity or cruelty. (Pareto is not advocating brutality or cruelty; he is trying to show that either of two extreme attitude--humanitarianism and cruelty--is dangerous to social equilibrium). IVd. Tendency to take suffering upon oneself for the good of someone else. We are dealing here with devotions that drive individuals to sacrifice themselves for others; IVe. Sentiments of social ranking: hierarchy. The deference of the inferior toward the superior and vice versa; IVf. Phenomenon of assetism. The
VI. The Sex Residue. With this category we are at the frontier of pure instinct; as such, does not enter into sociology's field of study. We are interested in it, says Pareto, only insofar as it influences theories, modes of thinking (#888).

Critique. The classification of Paretian residues prompts discussion of their political implications. This discussion will be treated in the fifth chapter of this study as part of our consideration of concept of the elite. At the moment, the sociological value of the residues is of concern. For Pareto, the residues constitute the basic reality upon which some social institutions rest. Although the classification of residues may have descriptive value, Burzio and Parsons, among others, are not satisfied with the Paretian classification. Burzio (1945:133-134) distinguishes two elements in the Paretian concept of residues: (a) residues based on experience and (b) residues based on metaphysical concepts. These two types of residues are separable only with difficulty for they strengthen each other. The residues are distinguished treatment of ascetism as a residue of sociability is striking. Pareto interprets ascetic behavior as, in the main, due a hypertrophy or perversion of the social instincts, or as an exaggeration of the need to control and to master the self-assertive impulses (#888).

5 This category includes: Va. All reactions tending to maintain equilibrium or to restore a violated equilibrium, and Vb. The
from the logical experimental principles because of their lack of preciseness and verificability. But they are still strong because of their reality; they are tied to reality in order to survive the experimentally contradictory verifications. Up to this point it must be observed that it is not possible to talk in Paretian terminology about concrete residues; for Pareto the residues have no existence of their own; therefore, they cannot have any concreteness. Only their manifestations can be considered from an objective point of view, and this is understood, in the Paretian sense as the point of view of the scientific observer (the sociologist). The sociologist considers the residues as analytically more persistent motives within the derivations.

Nevertheless, to appreciate the sociological bearing of Pareto's discussion on residue, one must examine Parsons' detailed study of Pareto in his work, *The Structure of Social Action*. As his point of departure, Parsons begins with Pareto's distinction between residue and instinct and between residue and sentiment (a distinction which is not at all clear in Pareto's *Treatise*).

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sentiments of equality in inferiors, that is, a defence of integrity on the part of an individual belonging to a lower class and a means of lifting him to a higher one. Vo. A need for restoration of integrity by acts pertaining to the individual whose integrity has been impaired; Vd. A need for re-
Parsons bases his thesis on Pareto's distinction of the non-logical theories: (1) theories which contradict experience and (2) theories which go beyond experience.

According to Pareto, these are the two ways by which a non-logical theory cannot satisfy the logico-experimental criterion of analysis. The residues which nourish such theories are born from metaphysical postulates regarding the criteria of scientific rationality.

In the case of theories that contradict experience, they identify themselves with the instincts governed by external factors of heredity and of milieu; in the case of theories which go beyond experience, they are closer to the sentiments and are tied to the conscience of personal or collective value which orientate both individual and social action (Parsons 1937:215). To Parsons these are norms.

Parsons suggests that the two categories of residues are not independent of each other, but are part of the same system in a state of mutual independence (Parsons 1937:215; Pareto: #875).

storiation by acts pertaining to the offender: real offender or imaginary or abstract offender (#888).
Parsons' notion of an internally divisible residue has two precise and distinct meanings: one psycho-physiological (hereditary and environmental), the other psycho-sociological and normative (value attitude).*

The sociological value of the residue lies in the second meaning. Certainly, Pareto is not as dogmatic as Parsons seems to be in attaching the two meanings to the concept of residue; but we do have to credit Parsons with an ingenious intuition (Guy Perrin 1966:143).

In sum, the notion of residue not only covers instinctive forces or biological tendencies of human behavior, but also the presence of normative value or sentiments capable of orientating human action. These normative values or sentiments be may both personal and collective; they can be stimulated either by a personal or group-approach to social action. The question still persists: "How much of the foregoing explication of the notion of residue belongs either to Pareto or to Parsons?" needs answer.

*Parsons uses the term "normative" as applicable to an aspect, part or element of a system of action if, and only in so far as, it may be held to manifest or otherwise involve a sentiment attributable to one or more actors that something is an end in itself, regardless of its status as a means to any other end (1) for the members of a collectivity, (2) for some portion of the members of a collectivity or (3) for the collectivity as a unit (Parsons 1937:75).
First, Parsons' inference about residue is based on his own distinction between residue and instinct. This distinction--often not clearly defined in Pareto's theory--is critical to Parsons' psycho-sociological interpretation of residue.

Secondly, Parsons posits a dissociation within the residue; this distinction is not explicit in Pareto's conception. Parsons is aware of what he is doing when he says that the classification of residue as normative and non-normative is a distinction which evidently departs from Pareto's own classification (Parsons 1937:206).

Thirdly, the psycho-sociological direction of the Parsonian distinction of the residue is twofold: (1) residue conceived as instinct-indicator of the social action and (2) residue conceived as normative or non-normative value in producing the social action.

Parsons finds justification for his imputation of normativeness in Pareto's theory of social utility (##2105-2155). This theory attempts to transpose into sociology the economic theory of utility, called "ophelimity," according to which, in certain determined conditions the inquiry of maximal interest of every economic agent considered in itself leads to maximal satisfaction of all the individuals of the same collectivity. In economics, this level of satisfaction is reached when it is not possible to increase the "ophelimity" of all the individuals of the collectivity.
Pareto proceeds to explain that the concept of "ophelimity" can be considered in both economics and sociology; it must be applied differently:

In pure economics it is not possible to consider a collectivity as a single person; in sociology we may consider a collectivity as not as a person at least as a unity. The ophelimity of a collectivity does not exist, but we may in rigorous fashion conceive the utility of a collectivity. That is why in pure economics there is no danger of confusing the maximum of ophelimity for a collectivity with that of the collectivity, since the latter does not exist; while in sociology it is necessary to take great care not to confuse the maximum of utility for a collectivity because both of them do exist (#2133).

Therefore, Pareto distinguishes between "utility for" (implying the sociologically meaning of "ophelimity") and "utility of" a collectivity. The "utility for" does not sufficiently exhaust the notion of social utility; the notion of "utility of" a collectivity is needed, if not as a person at least as a unity (#2133).

The sociological difference between "utility for" and "utility of" lies in the fact that the former includes the satisfaction of the interests of all the members of a collectivity; the latter, on the contrary, looks at the interests of a collectivity as a unity.

The problem is how personal interests which Pareto calls "heterogeneous" will be useful to a collectivity?
On one hand, Pareto solves this problem by referring to the presence of residues within human beings that will lead personal actions toward a social goal (#1145, #1146, #1147, #1148). Parsons, on the other hand, answers that human action is moved not only by external data, but also involves the existence of values common to a collectivity (Parsons 1937:246n3). Therefore, the presence of common values within a collectivity helps individuals to act with social interest for the collectivity.

The Theory of the Derivations

The analysis of residues, as it was developed in the previous part of this chapter, might lead to the impression that residues are an independent and isolated reality. According to Parebian logic, however, the reality of residues manifests itself only in union with derivations. Our aim now will be to clearly show the relationship between residue and derivations.

*This unity on the level capable of analysis in terms of non-subjective categories may well include a socially emergent element, ascribable to the association of individual human organisms in collectivities. The present argument is concerned only with that aspect of the "unity" of a collectivity which may be held, analytically, to be ascribable to value elements. In so far as this is the case, it is legitimate to speak of the values as being held "in common."
In chapters III, IV, and V of the *Treatise* Pareto discusses how men may try to impute logic to their non-logical behavior (#90-216; #219-248; #319-356). Throughout his long treatment, the importance of the logico-experimental method stand out, even though in the past many scientists did not apply it completely (#256-299). Pareto writes, "If we keep strictly to forms, all these disquisitions on natural law given by those men look like a mass of nonsense," (#445) but he continues by observing that "if we disregard forms and consider what it is they the disquisitions hide, we discover inclinations and sentiments that exert a powerful influence in determining the constitution of society" (#445). In fact, through his critique of those discussions, he distinguishes two types of theories: (1) theories based on observation and objective experience; (2) theories based on subjective experiences.

The objective-subjective dichotomy already used in the paradigm of logical and non-logical actions, appears again in Pareto's critique of such theories under the label of "experimental entities" and "non-experimental entities" which underlie his threefold theory typology:

(1) experimental entities may be combined with experimental entities (those are the only scientific theories for Pareto); (2) experimental entities may be combined with non-experimental entities; (3) non-experimental entities may be combined with non-experimental entities (#472).
Most current social theories, observes Pareto, tend to approximate types I and II theories that are made up of non-experimental entities, but usurp the form and appearance of experimental theory (476).

In conclusion, in analyzing unscientific theories Pareto asserts that the "widespread prevalence of non-logical conduct" constitutes the substance of many theories, "which if judged superficially might seem to be products of logic (797).

Through this approach Pareto formulates his concept of derivations. Derivations are manifestations of need for reasoning (1401). The derivations seem to be composed of a certain number of residues, as primarily, the first type of residue--the instinct for combination--which shows the need for logical development (972-975).

As soon as man "needs" to explain behavior, derivations arise. An animal, not having a reason, acts instinctively; it does not have derivations. Man, on the other hand, must "explain" his own actions by reasoning; he has to use "derivations" (1400). The derivations also include "logical reasonings, sophisms, manifestations of sentiments"; they are, in a word, the expression of man's need for reasoning (1401).

The derivations, then, are the variable elements in human behavior--its verbal accompaniment (Aron 1970:159). In order to grasp the "whole reality" of human actions, therefore, the sociologist has to look at the variable elements,
the "derivations," as well as the constant elements or "residues." The derivations are important in analyzing human action insofar as they are "indices" of residues-- the true impulses of human actions (#1402, #1403, #1404).

However, Pareto claims it is a mistake to consider the derivations and the residues as two separate realities. They form "one reality" whose harmony provides the perfect social equilibrium (#1746).

Pareto's classification of Derivations

Pareto distinguishes four types of derivations:

**Type 1 - Affirmation** (##1420-1433)

1a. Experimental or imaginary facts (###1421-1427)
1b. Sentiments (###1428-1432)
1c. Mixtures of facts and sentiments (###1433).

The first type includes pure and simple affirmations which can be provided by facts, sentiments, or by both facts and sentiments. The first and simplest type, Aron observes (1970: 160), includes the communication of the mother who tells her child: "Obey because you must," "This is the way it is because this is the way it is," and "You must because you must."

Interpersonal relations of a definite type must exist
for a derivation of simple affirmation to achieve its object. Facts and sentiments about this first type of derivation are separable only abstractly, because they are found together in concrete action. From these simple derivations we pass to the more complex ones of the second type.

**Type 2 - Authority (##1434-1463)**

2a. Authority of one or many men (##1435-1446)

2b. Authority of traditions and customs (##1447-1457)

2c. Authority of divinities or personifications (##1458-1463)

Derivations of this type appeal to the authority of a man or of a number of men ("I am a revolutionist because, as Rousseau says, man was born free and is everywhere in chains"); or to the authority of tradition, usage, and custom ("My action is in accord with the tradition of my country, or city, or party"); or to the authority of a divine being or an abstraction ("God wills it, said the Crusaders") (Buongiorno 1930: 363). In Type 2, the residues "explained" are those of the second category, the "Persistence of aggregates."

The most important type of derivations is the third:

**Type 3 - Accord with Sentiments or Principles (##1464-1542)**

3a. Sentiments (##1465-1476)

3b. Individual Interest (##1477-1497)

3c. Collective Interest (##1498-1500)
These derivations "explain" a man's acting in a certain way or believing a certain statement because such action or such belief conforms either to his own sentiments or to those of others. The residues "explained" are most frequently those of sociability or of the persistence of aggregates (Homans and Curtis 1934:195). The various sub-types give this category more profound and detailed analysis.

The first sub-type, (3a) Sentiments, recalls the residues of the instinct of combinations (Type I).

The second sub-type, (3b) Individual Interest, involves two types of derivations: (1) "If you do that, it will be to your interest," and (2) "If you do not do that, it will be to your interest."

The third sub-type, (3c) Collective Interest, helps men to secure direct or indirect benefit in terms of the community. To this type belong the derivations of politicians in which their personal interests are masked by the "collective interest."

The fourth sub-type, (4d) Legal Entities, covers men living in society relating to each other through a "social contract" and "natural law."

The fifth sub-type, (5e) Metaphysical Entities, refers
to men acting in certain ways "because" these are in accord with principles and ideals, such as Duty, Reason, Humanity, Progress, Kant's Categorical Imperative, Democracy, and Solidarity.

The sixth sub-type, (6f) Supernatural Entities, views attributing their acting to the Holy Texts, the Bible. Clearly, the classification Type 3 derivations is quite coherent. To be logical, in Type 3 Pareto could have included Types 1 and 2.

**Type 4 - Verbal Proof (#1543-1686)**

4a. Indeterminate terms (#1544-1551)

4b. Terms exciting accessory sentiments (#1552-1555)

4c. Ambiguous terms (#1556-1613)

4d. Terms corresponding to nothing concrete (#1686)

This type includes all derivations not formulated by the logico-experimental method. The "verbal derivations" use indefinite, dubious, and equivocal terms that have no correspondence to reality (#1545). This type also includes all "explanations" especially those which are apt to stir emotions or those that have an obscure meaning (reason, truth), as well as derivations from metaphors, allegories and analogies which use dubious, indefinite, non-concrete terms.

**Critique.** Several commentators have had strikingly different responses to Pareto's classification of derivations.
Max S. Handman, a professor at the University of Minnesota observed:

When one wishes to understand the forces which move a collectivity, and bring it through various oscillations to a state of equilibrium, one needs to keep his attention on the residues, not on the derivations. Similarly, when one wishes to modify the actions of individuals in a collectivity one should work on the former, not on the latter. The derivations may change and they do change from time to time, but the residues behind them remain the same (Handman 1931:144).

On a strongly negative note, sociologist Ellsworth Faris pointed out:

In the third volume derivations are likewise presented in a similar classification [as that of residues], but here the results are even more meager. Classes and subclasses are set down to the number of eighteen, but they are really all about the same (Faris 1935:666).

Morris Ginsberg criticized Pareto's derivations in a different way:

His [Pareto's] analysis of residues and derivations would have been greatly improved had he paid attention to the work of modern psychology and especially the psychology of the unconscious (Ginsberg 1936:98).

Sorokin (1928), Parsons (1937), and Aron (1967) have noted that Pareto's derivations are very similar to Marx's notion of ideology. For Marx, ideologies (derivations) are but a manifestation of the residues. "The residues are the
fathers of ideologies." The "derivations are a kind of weathercock which turns according to the direction of the wind of the residues." Their influence is not nonexistent but it is much less than many think (Sorokin 1928:50).

Timasheff (1967:165) observed that "Pareto's analysis of derivations is less detailed than his treatment of residues. Derivations "... are conceived as surface manifestations -- explanations-- of underlying forces in social life... there is no close connection between the classes of residues (outlined above) and of derivations; each crosscuts the other."

In sum, the following conclusions on residues and derivations seem appropriate:

(1) Derivations are much more variable than residues in the activity of human beings.
(2) If properly interpreted derivations are indicators of the direct manifestations of residues.
(3) Derivations have much less influence than residues on the phenomenon of social equilibrium.

CHAPTER V - PARETO'S THEORY OF ELITE, AND CONTRASTING VIEWS: MARX, MOSCA, AND C.W.MILLS

Pareto and Marx

Pareto's theory of the elite is without doubt an important political and sociological theory (Pareto 1896; Pareto
1902; Pareto 1916), especially for the attention it gives to the circulation of elites. Marx's theory of social classes (Capital 1867) and their succession has elements which are similar to Pareto's theory, although he does specifically use the concept of elite.

It is the writer's belief that Marx's theory is more concrete than Pareto's, and it more clearly illustrates social and historical realities. However, certain elements of Pareto's theory of the elite complement Marx's. It is pertinent to compare both theories, to point out similarities and differences.

Pareto

The essential ideas of Pareto's theory of the elite can be briefly noted. Elites and their circulation have existed throughout history. For Pareto, society is composed of two different strata: (1) the inferior stratum, which constitutes the non-elite; (2) the superior stratum to which belong the governing and the non-governing elite (#2034). *

* All paragraphs in this chapter are taken from Pareto's Treatise.
Pareto's model of society may be illustrated in the following diagram:

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Superior: Governing-elite
Stratum: Non-Governing elite
Inferior: NON - ELITE
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In Pareto's usage, the term elite has no inherent moral or honorific connotations; it simply denotes "a group of people who have the highest indices in their branches of activity (#2031)." Pareto continues, "it will help if we further divide that in two groups: a governing elite, comprising individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in government, and a non-governing elite, comprising the rest (#2032)."

The members of the elite are more naturally gifted than others in society. They constitute an "aristocracy" (#2051). Pareto does not totally deny the influence of the social factor in the categorization of individuals in elites, but he emphasizes the individual factor --natural capacity and talent-- with such endowed persons coalescing into a group. It is much like a coalescence of charisma, as in Max Weber's concept of charismatic leadership.
Related to elite there is the connected concept of its circulation. The essential "law" that Pareto emphasized is the inevitable degeneracy of ruling elite, making the theory of the elite a circulatory or cyclical one.

Every governing elite necessarily degenerates, whereby its members become incapable of governing after a certain period of time. It is to be noted that Pareto is not wholly clear on his issue: the causes of the inevitable degeneration of the elite are not very well elaborated.

In effect, Pareto associates the degeneration with the changes of residues among the members of the governing elite (#2048). It is necessary that the residues of the two types be rather equally distributed among the ruling members. A governing elite becomes incapable of continued governance when, within its members the residues of the first two types (instinct of combination and instinct of aggregates), are not equally distributed. That elite becomes either innovating to the point of instability because of the preponderance of the instinct of combinations or, on the contrary, it becomes very conservative; therefore, it is lost and must be renewed either partially by evolution or totally in a revolutionary way (#2056, #2057).

Pareto is too sophisticated to think that the residues are the sole cause of the inevitable circulation of elites. He says expressly that the residues are in a relation of
mutual dependence with other factors, so that they are not the only operative cause (#1014). Nevertheless, the fact remains that Pareto considers the **equitable distribution** of residues so important that it seems to be decisive in certain of his formulations. For example, often Pareto emphasizes that the French Revolution would not have happened if the governing elite had really known how to use force, that is, if it had had more of the *residue* of the second type.

Whence this importance of imbalanced residues for the social displacement of the ruling elite. It comes from Pareto's assigned causality to residues; in this case, changes in proportion of the residues in the governing elite causes the circulation of elites, and this circulation produces circular change of society. Nevertheless, society always goes back to an equilibrium (#2056). Although the residues are distributed in the elite and in the people non-elite, they are not equally scattered (#1724). If the proper distribution of residues is kept, society is stable, but this distribution-stability is rarely maintained. Different causes strengthen one type of residues, little by little. For instance, if economic prosperity increases, that causes greatest success and use of people possessing residues of the first type. Such people dominate the governing elite. If the elite is open-minded, it absorbses new members rising from the governed to join the ruling elite because they have
qualitative difference of the residues, while members of the elite having a lack of those residues decay in leadership (#2179). If the elite is close-minded, there is no increase of new ruling members.

As time passes, such an elite becomes incapable of governing because it does not use force to maintain power. Then, either the elite starts to absorb new members having residues of the second type and equilibrium is renewed or a counter-elite, created and rising within the governed class, takes power by force. If the new elite in which the residues of the second type prevail does not grow with members having residues of the first type, then it becomes, in turn, incapable of governing if and when the circumstances of its rule demand other residues.

In this way, Pareto asserts a cyclical movement as the rule in social evolution. A linear conception of social change is strange to Pareto. He claims to demonstrate the fallacies of all historical tendencies, historical laws of evolution, and of linear theories of the stages of progress. What is factually given in history, he contends, is only the fluctuations and oscillations over time, and of their various velocities. He would hold, with Sorokin, that the existence of any perpetual linear evolution of a society or social institution has not been proved (Sorokin 1956:59).

Summing up, one can say that in Pareto’s theory of the
circulation of the elite a twofold process takes place: 
(1) a process in which the most gifted individuals belonging 
to the non-governing and the non-elite circulate from their 
social stratum to the governing elite stratum and vice versa, 
influencing both; (2) a process in which one elite is replaced 
by another. (Pareto does not say where the losing elite goes). 
This is the case when both from the lower stratum and from 
the non-governing elite a counter-elite is formed; either 
by cunning or by force, it tries to take power. 
In the first case there is an upward and downward process of 
mobility.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Superior} \\
\text{Stratum} \\
\text{Non-governing elite} \\
\text{Governing elite} \\
\text{Non-elite} \\
\text{Inferior} \\
\text{Stratum}
\end{array}
\]

In the second case there is an upward process of mobili-
ty: the run to power. The downward process is not explained 
by Pareto.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Superior} \\
\text{Stratum} \\
\text{Non-governing elite} \\
\text{Governing elite} \\
\text{Non-elite} \\
\text{Inferior} \\
\text{Stratum}
\end{array}
\]
Pareto does not discuss the new position of the individuals belonging to the governing elite after they lose their governing role. But what is essential in his theory is that he thinks of the two processes as an ongoing phenomenon due and animated by residues of types I and II; in other words, there is a cyclical phenomenon happening within the three strata of society. This phenomenon is favored by the degeneracy of one elite in power. The degeneracy may be caused either by admission of, or by the maintenance within, the governing elite of incapable members who should in reality belong to the non-elite.

Marx

Marx, it should be remembered, does not employ the concept of the elite in any specific way nor does he build a theory of the circulation of elites. His manner of explaining social evolution is completely different from Pareto. In his view, there is a true social evolution, not only a cyclical movement similar to that of Pareto. By and large, this evolution is explained by the historical development of private ownership of the means of production and the division of labor is divided from ownership of the productive means. That development produces a division of society into two hostile social classes, which, in turn, produce a merciless
fight in order to gain (or to hold) and wield economic and political power. The level of development of production reflects a governing class in economic and in political terms. Historical trends in the means of production also reflect a continuing and regular change in the form or personnel but not substance of the governing class.

Marx soon turns from the analytical to the prophetic. A governing class cannot always retain power. The evolution of society eventually reaches the level of the classless (one class of workers) society, preceded by a dictatorship of the working people, the proletariat. The state "withers away," and with it, the need for governing or for classes. Only the workers endure in an idyllic "ever after" of the anarchistic script.

For Marx, therefore, the power of minority rule is valid only for one level of the exploitative development of society. The establishment of the governing class is not determined by the psychic qualities of its members, but by their objective social position in relationship to the means of production. If such personal qualities play a specific role, it is not a decisive one.

As is well understood, Marx does not consider the entire governing (bourgeois) class as exercising political power; nor does he equate it with Pareto's governing elite. The governing class is occupied, first of all, with the exercise
of its economic power; it is an economic class (Marx 1964:78). Political power is seen as merely instrumental to economic denomination. The state is but a bourgeois prejudice, needed to maintain the thefts of capitalism. Within this class, an independent group exercises political, cultural, and other influence which is necessary to the governing class. Within this larger category and for this this larger purpose a group which rules politically is constituted. It is this political group which corresponds to what Pareto calls the governing elite; and, says Pareto, the members of the governed class may also be drawn to it.

On the other hand, for Marx the governed class itself constitutes an enormous group needing to organize and escalate its political struggle against the governing class to the level of all-out war (Marx 1964:80). This group—as the political vanguard of the workers—is similar to Pareto's notion of the counter-elite. The successors of Marx and above all Lenin, have developed their theory of a political elite of the working class—the Communist Party. They do not identify it, of course, by the term "elite," but by the term "vanguard." It is this vanguard which knows best, is to lead the proletariat to victory, and is then to establish socialism (Lenin 1935:100).

The Party is the collective reason of class; at the beginning it is composed of people who constitute an elite
in Pareto's sense, i.e., those who are more capable of political action. It is at this level that Leninist theory approaches Pareto's theory of the elite. But for Lenin, and especially for Marx, the explication of the political elite is not psychological, as it is for Pareto; rather the explication is economic and situational. Both the division of labor and specialization for the political activity are what accounts for the formation of that elite (Marx 1972:65).

Stalin conceived the political elite as a group of people whose ability is a gift of nature, rather than the result of specialization. Stalinism has very much emphasized the importance of the political elite and the Communist Party. In the socialist state, that elite represents a mysterious force, free from error -- a view very far from Marx's mind. It is very important, therefore, to avoid attributing to Marx what in reality is the idea of several of his disciples (Stalin 1965:372).

Differences between Pareto and Marx

After this brief analysis of Pareto and Marx, it is not difficult to establish that the two theories differ in their assumptions, content, and conclusions. Marx's theory is more consonant with the perspective of sociology. Pareto, who wanted to create a strictly scientific
sociology—the science logico-experimental—has not quite succeeded; rather he notably departs from a sociological frame of reference. In short, these are the most important points of divergence between Pareto and Marx. First of all, Pareto presents a sociological theory which can be viewed primarily psychological. Pareto is a careful scholar; he affirms that residues are not the only cause of social change; the residues exert influence along with other factors. But Pareto does not clearly define the dependence of the psychic factor on other factors; residues remain the most important cause of social conditions. This is especially noticeable when Pareto explains different phenomena of social life independently from his abstract formulation of social laws. Residues consistently play a very important role in Pareto’s analysis.

Marx, however, gives a consistently sociological explanation. He examines economic factors and other social institutional factors which influence social life. The influence of psychic factors cannot be ignored, but as Marx observed, this influence cannot be decisive.

Sociology as a separate science cannot be based on psychology; social psychology properly blends both disciplines sociology and psychology. The balance leans to Marx: the psychic factors mentioned by Pareto do not explain the phenomena he wants to explain. If we examine the social component Pareto sees as most important in social control and social change,
we find that this factor is the governing or political elite. The elite shapes social consequences by its political power. Pareto does not neglect social classes and other social units; he just does not take them into account in his explication of social phenomena.

One could say that Pareto first studies political phenomena and so it is not necessary to take other factors into account. This assertion finds no support in Pareto's theory for two specific reasons: (1) Pareto does not exclusively talk about political phenomena, he discusses social equilibrium and the general social cyclical movement; (2) in order to explain political phenomena, it is necessary to look to other social entities, not only to the political elite.

Marx provides a vast image of the social structure—its economic base, its superstructure, its social classes, its political organizations, etc. In that conception, there is also place for the governing elite, but the elite does not play the decisive role it does for Pareto. Marx's image of social reality is dynamic; Pareto's image is schematic. Marx seeks to encompass the life of humanity in a systematic manner; Pareto sketches separate fragments, with several simple illustrations of his essential idea of the circulation of elites.

Since Pareto's attention is focused on the governing elite, it is surprising that he proceeds without explaining
why political power is necessary to society or why it exists. Pareto observes its existence without any concern to interpret it sociologically. Nor does he clearly explain how the governing elite obtains power. He hints at an individual and collective circulation of elites, but he does not present actual causes of that circulation. From Pareto's analysis, we do not come to understand why a certain group of people constitutes a governing elite. Pareto seems to affirm a perpetual charisma: it is the ability, the attitude of governing which allows "these men" but not "those men" to comprise the governing elite. But such view does not provide an explanation. Social history documents the fact that governing elites differ one from the other, e.g., feudal elites, bourgeois elites, etc. Does the social background of elites have a certain influence in determining the ascent of the governing of few? Pareto considers only two types of residues from his lengthy list, and it is their distribution which determines the composition and political survival of the elite.

Marx, in contrast, provides a more detailed analysis of the political phenomenon in its totality, as well as of the formation and change of the governing elite through his theory of class war. Instead of making the elite the sole and decisive factor, he emphasizes the crucial ingredient of social class. The class in power is the base of the governing elite; the ascent of a class to economic and social power
produces a new governing elite. Although Marx does not use the terms "governing elite" and "circulation of elite," he distinguishes within the governing class a designated group which rules in behalf of the class; such a group corresponds with the Paretian notion of governing elite.

Another point in which Marx's theory differs from Pareto is in its dynamism. Pareto's conception is essentially static, despite the emphasis on the circulation of elites. Elites circulate cyclically; society considerably departs from an equilibrium position and moves to another equilibrium with one of two elite groups in control. In contrast, Marx sets forth a highly dynamic theory of dialectical change; the unfolding stages of change are qualitatively different one from another. The basic difference between the views of Marx and that of Pareto thus lies in the fact that Pareto's explanation is essentially subjective and psychological; Marx's notion is essentially objective, economic, and materialist.

The circulation of elites, Pareto explains, is due to the presence of *residues*—the stable, psychic, human qualities which do not change. The distribution of residues among individuals, groups, villages, nations is also stable. The two essential types of *residues*—instinct of combination and the instinct of the persistence of aggregates—produce only two types of men—*foxes* and *lions*: those who use tricks, "the speculators," those who use force, "the rentiers."
These two types follow one another to power because they cannot relate to each other in any sustained and satisfactory way. Pareto's explication is, in fact, very simple. It is difficult to believe that only those two types of residues and men exist and play a role in the political power and that all changes are due to their circulation. The psychic qualities of men are without doubt more numerous and varied than the explanation of Pareto provides. Thus his view of the ascent to and maintenance of power by the governing elite is less than satisfactory. He gives only historical illustrations, but they are insufficient to support his general arguments (Bottomore 1969:52). He seems to affirm that the success and failure of elites are traceable exclusively to the relationship determined by the balance or imbalance of the two types of residues. If this needed proportion holds, the elite should maintain itself in power forever, without worrying about economic or other external social changes. Following his own logic, Pareto does not weigh the influence of economic factors on social change. Marx, in his turn, considers economics the essential factor in the dynamism of society. Economic power, Marx contends, is the true base of the political power. Pareto is largely unconcerned with the issue or the answer, and that is a major shortcoming and evidence of a lack of curiosity about institutional structures of Pareto's theory in relation to that of Marx.
In conclusion, Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites does not specify whether the degeneracy of the governing elite is due only to its present possession of power; if the exercise of power "consumes" the elite, making it lose the ability to govern; or if this degeneracy consists only in the fact of change of proportion of the residues' types among the governing elite. Pareto seems to express himself as if a natural "consumption" of the elite and a degeneracy in the quality of residues occurs. Because of this imprecision, Pareto's theory is pluralistic in focus: psychological, sociological, and even biological.

Similarities between Pareto and Marx

In spite of their differences, the theories of Pareto and Marx converge on several points complement each other. First, Pareto and Marx both affirm the existence of a governing elite, although their conceptions of that elite differ. For Pareto, "a governing minority" constitutes the "governing elite" to the exclusion of the "non-governing elite"; Marx thinks of "political group" as a designated part of the whole class in power-- the bourgeoisie, the "governing elite."

Pareto and Marx also agree that a minority is usually more capable of actually governing than a majority. It is for this reason that Pareto uses the term "elite."
consequently, the existence of a governing minority, more capable of governing than the majority, is an indisputable fact both for Marx and for Pareto. Evidently, Pareto regards that minority positively—as continuously existing, though changing. Marx, on the contrary, thinks of the minority in negative terms, convinced that it will disappear in the future stateless socialist and communist society.

Undoubtedly, Pareto's merit is to insist on considering important internal factors, such as the psychic qualities of men. Marx and some of his successors did not pay much attention to these factors, insisting rather on the importance of external factors.

Another of Pareto's merits is his concept of elites and their circulation. But as we have seen, Pareto confuses two fundamentally different processes in his theory of the circulation of elites: (1) the circulation of individuals between the governing elite and the non-governing elite; (2) the replacement of one elite by another.

Marx considered the second case in discussing "ruling elite" and "Party vanguard"; he ignored defections, conversions, and cooptations in both directions for the first. Similarly, Marx and his followers tended to ignore both the circulation of individuals between elite and non-elite and the circulation of elites within the same class in power. This helps to explain many microsociological events which cannot be approached through the macrosociological perspective of class war and
class succession to social and political power.

For his part, Pareto neglected the phenomenon of the circulation of individuals of different strata within the governing elite, even though he approved such research conducted by one of his students, Maria Kolabinska.

Bottomore remarks:

She (Maria) distinguishes three types of circulation. There is, first, the circulation which takes place between different categories of the governing elite itself. Secondly, there is the circulation between the elite and the rest of the population, which may take either two forms: (1) individuals from the lower strata may succeed in entering the existing elite, or (2) individuals in the lower strata may form new elite groups which then engage in a struggle for power with the existing elite. The major part of Kolabinska's work is devoted to a study of these two last processes in French society in the period between the eleventh and the eighteenth centuries (Bottomore 1970:49).

Clearly one cannot overlook the fact that Pareto uses the concepts of the elite and its circulation to explain social equilibrium. From this viewpoint, Pareto is a forerunner of modern-day functionalism. Pareto's functionalism is an integral part of his view of society as a system tending toward equilibrium (Lopreto 1969:5).

It is understandable that Marx, a revolutionary, did not focus sufficiently on equilibrium, even though, at root he shared Pareto's functionalist perspective.
Conclusion. In sum, Pareto's theory is really quite different from, and in many ways almost opposite to, Marx; the one is psychological, the other is sociological; the one is individualistic, the other is collectivist; the one is partial, the other is global; the one is relatively static, the other is relatively dynamic; the one is pessimistic, the other is optimistic; the one is conservative, the other is revolutionary.

The Ruling Class: Pareto and Mosca

The confrontation between Pareto and Mosca began while both were still living. Mosca raised the question of priority of discovery with Pareto. The issue centered on the principle of minority rule and its utilization for interpreting historical facts. That polemic offers an opportunity to analyze the similarities and differences between the two theoreticians on minority rule.

The theory of "the political class--the ruling class" was first elaborated by Mosca in 1884 in his work Sulla teorica dei governi e sul governo parlamentare (On the System of the Government and the Parliamentary Government). Mosca

1Gaetano Mosca, Sulla teorica dei Governi e sul Governo parlamentare (Torino: 1884).
maintained that despite various forms of government, power had been historically exercised by a closed group of individuals, whom he called "the ruling class." Political science, therefore, must first of all study the composition of that class, how the governing class intends to justify its rights to rule, and the use of governing power over the governed (Mosca 1884). This idea was in 1896 by Mosca in his Elementi di scienza politica, translated as The Ruling Class. With greater scientific rigor, Mosca explored the themes of social circulation and degeneracy of the dominant class. Pareto also published his first work, Cours d'economie politique, in the same year.

In November 1897, Mosca published in Giornale degli Economisti (The Economist Journal) "Il Programma dei liberali in materia politica ed ecclesiastica" ("Program of Liberals on the Political and Ecclesiastic Matter") which criticized the principle of cause and effect applied by Marxists to social phenomena. Mosca maintained that it was more correct to apply the principle of interdependence. By this time Pareto was certainly reading Mosca's works. In fact, in a letter dated July 23, 1900, he wrote to Pantaleoni: "Mosca has his own reasons to criticize mathematics, probably because he does not know it. If he writes about politics, he is like a bag of wind (Pareto 1900:324).

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2 Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di scienza politica (Roma 1896).
Perhaps this passage contains a key to Pareto's antipathy towards Mosca. One can also add their different methodological approaches to analysis of the same problem, and even more, their claim for recognition as originators of the elitist argument.

In his 1900 article, "Un'applicazione di teorie sociologiche" ("An Application of Sociological Theories"); Pareto made frequent references to the theory of the elites, without mentioning Mosca. Only in his Les Systèmes Socialistes (1902) does Pareto mention Mosca's The Ruling Class for the first time in his discussion of the constitution and social function of the armed forces.

In his inaugural address for the academic year 1902-1903 at the University of Turin, Mosca treated the theme "Il principio aristocratico ed il democratico nel passato e nell'avvenire" ("The Aristocratic and Democratic Principle of the Past and the Future" (Mosca 1902). He lamented the fact that Pareto "with strange forgetfulness" did not mention that he (Mosca) first formulated the theory of political classes. In a footnote he also mentioned that the idea of interdependence of social phenomena expressed in Pareto's Systèmes had been previously set forth in his own "Programma" of 1897.

Pareto's reaction to this first attack appeared in a letter addressed to Carlo Placci on January 4, 1904, rebuking his friend Placci for citing Mosca in an article;
He (Mosca) shouts that I plagiarized him, but I leave him to his shouting because I have other things to think about instead of these trivia. Truly, that he before me stated that the minorities always govern, but in actuality many authors before him stated the same thing. I have never had the foolish pretension to claim that this concept, nor that of the decadence of aristocracies and of their perpetuation by renewing themselves, were mine; Dante, indeed, very well expounded the concept that aristocracies perpetuate themselves.

If Mr. Mosca pretends that those concepts are his, he must argue with Sumner Maine, Taine and many others; and as far as I am concerned, he has to thank me because only after I published Les Systèmes Socialistes did I see his works cited which previously were clandestine (T. Giacalone-Monaco 1957).

Only with the publication of the *Manuale di economia politica* (1906) did Pareto explicitly mention the issue in a footnote in which he observes that Professor Mosca complains and is strongly disturbed that "I [Pareto] do not mention him when I recall the fact that in society there is always a small number who govern, and he [Mosca] seems to believe that he discovered that" (T. Giacalone-Monaco 1957).

After cited Mosca’s works, Pareto noted again that the minority principle had become common place and that it is found in many scientific works, as well as in many other writings.

In a 1907 article titled "Piccola polemica" (Little Polemics"), Mosca renewed the discussion of original source, recognizing that the idea belongs to Taine and also to Gumplovicz who, independently of one another, had adopted
the minority principle in the interpreting the social facts.

Mosca pointed out that his rereading Pareto's works convinced him that Pareto's theory of elite stems from his own theory of the political class. He concluded that Pareto's arrogance was too much to tolerate (Mosca 1907).

In the 1909 French edition of the Manuale (Manual d'économie politique), Pareto ignored the polemic; but he also removed the footnote pertaining to Mosca. Mosca's name never appears again in this or in Pareto's later works. In correspondence, however, the dispute continued.

In a letter of March 16, 1908, addressed to A, Antonucci, Pareto again underscored his point:

In the theory of the circulation of elites, there are more parts. (1) The fact is that it is always a minority which governs. Truly Mosca said that, but it is also true that others said it before him. I have never pretended to have the right of priority on such a theory, as I have never said that I have discovered America. (2) The fact is that human society is not homogeneous, that there are elites; this, too, is an old theory and I have never claimed to have made any discovery in that field. (3) The fact is that elites, aristocracies do not last, but they degenerate: this also is very known; Bants, indeed, speaks about it. I have collected all these facts; I have found a connection and, as a result, a theory emerged that I have checked with the historical facts. I did not mention Mosca because, as far as I am concerned, he did not do that. I only claim the comprehensive theory and not the facts which constitute it (Pareto 1908).
This is the point to which one must pay attention in order to judge this polemic impartially. Undoubtedly, the minority principle had been previously pointed out by Mosca. The important question is whether the Paretian theory, as a whole, is merely a repetition of Mosca's.

By and large, the two theories are quite different. Mosca's theory is essentially based upon legal-constitutional and historical-political considerations; Pareto theory derives from a sociological foundation. If Mosca had followed the complex sociological construction which is at the base of Pareto's theory of elites, he would have developed new ideas and avoided imitative thinking.

The last mention of Pareto's polemic with Mosca occurs in a letter of September 2, 1920, in which Pareto, refers to several passages copied almost exactly from the Treatise by an Italian Professor named Rensi. He points out:

If I were like that good man Gaetano Mosca, who was angry with me and shouted as a wounded eagle because I did not mention him with regard to the circulation of elites, I would also make claims against Professor Rensi, who does not cite me at all, although he says things like mine. But I do not care (Pareto 1920).

Before turning to a substantive comparison of Pareto and Mosca, it should be noted, as Mongardini has observed, that the common interests of Mosca and Pareto in the theory minority rule can be jointly traced to Taine's Origines de la
France contemporaine. The debt of recognition that Mosca attributes to Taine was repeatedly declared in the various editions of his works. Pareto knew Taine's work; he frequently cited it in his works, but always with many reservations. Only after 1912 did Pareto judge Taine more favorably. In fact, the Treatise completely re-evaluates Taine's work. That change of view is also documented in a letter to Pansini dated October 20, 1917, in which Pareto, talking about his personal appraisal on historical matters, wrote:

I was induced for my purpose to read all the textes of Roman history, to compare ancient and modern facts, and only after that was I able to publish my personal evaluations. Comparing them with those that I had formulated twenty years ago I have to say that I was less prudent toward Taine. I am sorry (Pareto 1917).

After this brief review of the polemic between Mosca and Pareto, the first problem is to explore the ways in which they differed from one another.

As far as terminology is concerned, both lack clarity in their use of words, e.g., Pareto's elite and Mosca's ruling class. Elite is more extensive and, in fact, inclusive than is ruling class. Both author's terminological problem is evident when they try to adopt synonyms for these concepts. Mosca's search for equivalents leads him to use such expressions as "leading classes or political classes," "directing

Taine H., Origines de la France contemporaine (1875-1894).
class or political class," "superior classes," "Class or ru-
lers," "organized minority," "ruling minority," as well as
reciprocal expressions such as "ruled class," "inferior
class ruled by rulers," "unorganized and ruled majority."

Pareto's terminology is also unsatisfactory. An elite
(in Italian, classe eletta) is constituted, as we have seen,
by groups of individuals skillfully exercising all kinds of
activities. A governing elite and a non-governing elite are
parts of a general elite. The governing elite includes all
groups which are directly or indirectly involved in govern-
ment activity. The non-governing elite is a residual cate-
gory, that is, the remnant groups not involved in government.
Pareto also uses other expressions with diverse nuances. The
term "superior stratum," for instance, at times indicates
the equivalent of the elite; at times, groups of various kinds
of elites. Aristocracy emerges from the "superior stratum,"
and is understood to be a poorly delimited aggregate of fami-
lies whose members have the required qualities to belong to
the elite.

Nor is the term "inferior stratum" very precise; sometimes
it is applied to the governed class, comprising as well the
non-governing elite; at other times, it refers merely to
non-outstanding people, the non-elite.

As far as the problem of expansion of the ruling class
is concerned, Mosca briefly examined the links between the
ruling class and the so-called middle-class, considered as
an auxiliary class in recruitment. Pareto not only saw in the
middle class—substantially identified with the bourgeoisie—
the natural substratum which nourished the dominant class; he
also emphasizes the existence of other political classes.
New elites (aristocracies of workers, syndicates, chiefs of
popular movements) either co-operate with or oppose the go-
verning elite. In the same bourgeois class, Pareto also di-
stinguishes antagonistic groups like "rentiers" and "specu-
lators," emphasizing the progressive development of the same
class for government in towns, small villages, and in the
capitals.

As far as the problems of renewal and replacement is
concerned, Mosca points out that the ruling class perpetuates
and renews itself by heredity and elections. Heredity stren-
gthenes the aristocratic tendency and elections the democra-
tic one. But heredity, Mosca notes, does not have exclusive
influence in the formation of the ruling class. Mosca remarks:

What we see is that as soon as there is
a shift in the balance of political
forces then the manner in which the
ruling class is constituted changes
also. If a new source of wealth deve-
lops in a society, if an old reli-
gion declines or a new one is born,
if a new current of ideas spreads,
then, simultaneously, far-reaching
dislocations occur in the ruling
class. One might say, indeed, that
the whole history of civilized man-
kind comes down to a conflict be-
tween the tendency of dominant elements to monopolize political power and transmit possession of it by inheritance, and the tendency toward a dislocation of old forces and insurgence of new forces: and this conflict produces upper classes and certain portions of the lower. Ruling classes decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, when they can no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their talents and the services they render lose importance in the social environment in which they live (Mosca 1939:65-66).

Pareto’s analysis on this subject, although he substantially agrees with Mosca’s, nevertheless is developed within a more thoroughly sociological context. The proportion of individuals with residues of the first and second type play a decisive role in determining degrees of “opening” of the governing elite, as well as in shaping relations with the governed class under the pressure of group interest. This emphasis is nowhere presented in Mosca’s theory.

Power Elite: Pareto and C.W. Mills

Two seemingly contrasting characteristics stand out in C.W. Mills’ biography: he was a professional sociologist but at the same time a resolute outsider with regard to
sociology and the profession, and even to the worlds of the academic culture and American political life (Dahrendorf 1967:172). During his active years as a writer, from World War I to 1962 (the year of his untimely death), Mills was the target of double ostracism from those representing the major movement of theorization (Parsons, Merton, etc.) and abstract empiricism (Lazarsfeld, Zetterberg, etc.), to use Mills' expressions for the two branches of academic sociology in the United States (Mills 1959).

Of his provocative ideas, only Mills' concept of power and of the elites which administer it will be briefly noted. Mills referred principally to the "classic tradition" of Europe: first of all to Mosca, then to Pareto, Michels, Weber, and finally, to the American economists Veblen and Schumpeter.

From Mosca and Pareto he borrowed the concept of elite which he developed through the range of his works. From them he also took the vision of a centralized power able to regulate the life of all citizens and to impose its decisions upon them (Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935: chapter XII). From German sociology (Weber, Michels, Mannheim) he adopted the key concept of bureaucracy, as well as a sensitivity for the implicit force bureaucratic structure represents in industrial societies (Weber 1920, Michels 1915, Mannheim 1936). From Veblen and Schumpeter he derived the general operational
understanding of contemporary American society that he imaginatively labelled the "overdeveloped society" (Mills 1963).

The Power Elite

The concept of "power elite," as applied to "both groups and individuals who collectively take decisions having consequences of national importance," (Mills 1954) is a recurrent term of reference in all Mills' work.

In the United States the concept of "elite" had a negative connotation and the term "elitism" is a virtual synonym of "anti-democracy" (Lasswell 1958:13). But after World War II, the term "elite" came to be used primarily in researches studies of local communities (Lynd 1937; R.A. Dahl 1961). This usage characterized the studies on "power elite" in the United States for two decades. These studies were entirely different from those that dominated European theoretical efforts. Mosca, Pareto, andMichels are the most outstanding examples of social scientists who tried to explain the fused (and confused) structure of political and philosophical trends.

Mills' work contributes in a systematic way to the construction of a new concept of elite—elite seen in
relation to the total social structure. The first distinction that Mills makes is between the term "power elite" and the profoundly different term of "ruling class" used mostly by Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. Mills summarizes the peculiar characteristics of the power elite as follows:

"Class" is an economic term; "rule" a political one. The phrase, "ruling class," thus contains the theory that an economics class rules politically.

We hold that such a simple view of "economic determinism" must be elaborated by "political determinism" and "military determinism;" that the higher agents of each of these three domains now often have a noticeable degree of autonomy; and that only in the often intricate ways of coalition do they make up and carry through the most important decisions. Those are the major reasons we prefer "power elite" to "ruling class" as a characterizing phrase for the higher circles when we consider them in terms of power (Mills 1956:277).

Two points are immediately evident: Mills does not want to adopt the economic term "class" simplistically; he is aware of the great influence the military forces have assumed in the world and in the United States since World War I. Mindful of the political force which has been traditional in American society, however, he seeks to integrate the three powers -- economic, political and military-- into an unified scheme of power. This does not mean that Mills denies the existence of "classes" in the American social structure; the contrary is shown in the frequent use he
makes of the term in his writings. But he does rejects the idea of "class" understood in Marxian terms. In substance, he does not deny that his concept of "power elite" may exclude the singular notion of class, since he admits that class based only on economics might hold and wield power. According to Mills, the American Elite, composed of members drawn three major institutions—economics, politics, and military—finds either its own unity or power in the coordination and reciprocal interpenetration and interdependence of the three institutional hierarchies.

The definition of "power elite" in terms of institutional components is consistent with Mills' theoretical formulation of power. For Mills, power is not an attribute of men but of institutions; there are dominant institutions which concentrate in themselves most of the power of society and the instruments to administer this power. Persons who occupy the top positions of the three institutional orders are the only ones able to make decisions of national importance; they constitute a directing minority, a power elite.

Mosca's formula, "the minority rules," seems to have influenced Mills's formulation. One can understand, therefore, why Mills dismisses the idea that a power elite may be composed of a group of persons that "own" a great measure of personal qualities. This was Pareto's criterion of the determination
of the elite (1916: ##529-530); according to Mills, it is abstracted from sociological reality. It does not give any idea of the institutional base of such qualities, nor of the way by which a power elite is formed. Leadership is thus viewed from a situational-- i.e., sociological-- aspect. Leaders (and at times, non-leaders) may indeed have striking personal qualities, although it would be hazardous to try to universalize these qualities. Leaders always lead from a strategic social location.

Unity of Elites: Structural Factors

A problematic point of Mills' analysis is his explanation of the common goal of the three institutions. In his chapter, "The theory of Balance," Mills gives several examples to show the interdependence of the three focal institutions. He seems to say that, at the base of everything, there is an alliance among military government, and big businesses; both have as common purpose the preservation of a permanent war economy which keeps away the danger of an otherwise inevitable depression (D.H.Wrong 1956:280).

Of the intimate link between military expenditures and some degree of economic prosperity of the United States, one cannot have much doubt. But it is far from clear that this link is sufficient to explain the relatively autonomous
role of the power of the military leadership. Mills attributes the ascent of the military forces to the result of the war economy, technological development, the rise of the United States to a world power, etc. All these elements are not in themselves convincing and sufficient to demonstrate the importance of military leadership in the Millsian power elite.

Parsons (1957:135) has pointed out the subordination of military forces to political heads, referring to the example of Truman's removal of General MacArthur from command of the wartime operations in Korea; Truman opposed an enlargement of the conflict to China, whereas MacArthur wished to extend operations to include the bombing of China. Morris Janowitz (1960) and Arnold M. Rose (1967) maintain that, although the military have increased their power, they do not constitute a closed group, but rather a pressure group, whose influence is increased when it is united with the other sectors of leadership.

Discussing the problem of unity of elites, Lynd (1956:410) observes that among the three institutions, one holds priority. Mills to some extent agrees with Lynd's interpretation, but does not specify which of the three institutions plays the key role of priority; maintaining only implicit subordination of one to others.

We have seen that Pareto conceives the circulation of
elites in a cyclical fashion. Mills also treats this aspect of the elite structure, but he takes a horizontal/vertical view of the process.

The three orders—economic, politic, and military—are centers of autonomous power; in each of them power is hierarchically structured. It is only at the highest level, Mills says, that the three orders have a point of unity. Thus, he continues to assert that "people of the higher circles may also be conceived as members of a top social stratum, as a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account" (Mills 1956:11).

Unity of Elites: Social-Psychological Factors

The model of solidarity conceived by Mills would be somewhat unlikely, if it were based only on structural factors. However, such factors as the psychological and social background characteristics of men of power are also help to explain the group's cohesion.

In analyzing psychological factors, Mills follows Pareto very closely. The following passage clearly illustrates that Mills intertwines the second and the fourth types (instinct of persistence of aggregates and residues connected with sociability) of Pareto's residues as contributing
to the formation of power elites when he says:

It is not only the similarities of social origin, religious affiliation, nativity and education that are important to the psychological and social affinities of the members of the power elite. Even if their recruitment and formal training were more heterogeneous than they are, these men would still be of quite homogeneous social type. For the most important set of facts about a circle of men is the criteria of admission, of praise, of honor, of promotion that prevails among them; if these are similar within a circle, then they will tend as personalities to become similar. The circles that compose the power elite so tend to have such codes and criteria in common...

There is a kind of reciprocal attraction among the fraternity of the successful -- not between each and every member of the circles of the high and might, but between enough of them to insure a certain unity. On the slight side, it is a sort of tacit, mutual admiration; in the strongest ties-ins, it proceeds by intermarriage. And there are all grades and types of connection between these extremes (Mills 1956:280-281).

Thus, Mills stresses that the unity of the power elite is partly a psychological phenomenon rooted both in the interchange of interests among the three institutions and in the homogeneity of the requisites of persons in
power. For Mills, such mutuality or interchange of interests among the institutions also resolves the problem of organization of the power elite; according to Mosca's classic formula (1935:53): "the dominant minority which is such because it is organized, and it is organized for the very reason that is a minority."

Regarding the homogeneity of the leadership group—which is the second cause of the unity of the elite—Mills is not fully satisfying in his explanations, for he fails to provide sufficient empirical evidence of his assertion. For Mills, what creates and sustains the unity of power elites in highly diverse situations is a balance of the social-psychological interests among the persons who comprise the power elite.

For Pareto, however, balance is created by a perfect relationship between residues of the first and the second types in the governing elite. Even though both authors conceive the "elite" differently, their theories converge in treating the cause and maintenance of elites.
CHAPTER VI - THE CHARGE OF PARETO'S LINKS WITH FASCISM

The Origins of Fascism

Italian Fascism, like other twentieth-century manifestations of dictatorship, vivified certain tendencies in political philosophy that are probably as old as political rule itself, as Aristotle's Politics would suggest. The distinguishing feature of recent Fascism has not been profundity of thought or novelty of elements, but rather the organizational efficiency which united ideology and these elements.

The two main principles of Fascism may be delineated as follows: (a) The first is the absolutist tradition: the leader is all-powerful; all authority and rights within the State stem from him. (b) The second is social organism: the theory that a nation is an organic unity like a human body with many separate organs existing for, and contributing to, the general welfare of the body itself.

Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), as leader of Fascism, ruled as dictator of Italy from 1922 until his death in 1945. The history of this movement, neither long nor consistent, can be briefly summarized. Italy had entered World
War II on the side of the Allies. In 1917 Italian troops were rooted in a decisive battle at Caporetto (which today belongs to Yugoslavia); Italy lost more than 600,000 lives in the war. By 1919 Italian glories were dim. The disasters of war prompted some people to hope for a "charismatic leader" who would be able to reconstruct the country. The new political movement of Fascism sought to meet the need of the people for peace and order. Until late in 1921 Fascism played an unimportant role in Italian politics. Suddenly, an explosion of new strength occurred in October 1922 when the "Blackshirts" (as Fascists were then called) marched on Rome. They converged from various directions on the capital; Mussolini, their leader, as "leaders sometimes do," remained at a safe distance to the rear— in Milan. The then liberal-democratic coalition cabinet resigned and Mussolini was named premier.

He received from parliament no more than a year's emergency power to restore order and to introduce reforms. But as soon as he received full power, Mussolini established himself as "dictator." In place of democracy he preached the need of vigorous action under a strong leader; he himself took the title of il Duce. He denounced liberalism, free trade, laisser-faire, and capitalism, along with Marxism, materialism, socialism, and class-consciousness. All these, he said, were the evil offspring of liberal and capitalist society. He saw himself as the "charismatic lea-
der," the man that Italy needed at that time.

Intellectuals regarded the "new event" with considerable dismay. Among them, even though living outside his country, was Pareto, who viewed it with the shrewdness of a man who tries to avoid any future compromise.

**Indirect Influence of Pareto's Ideology on Fascism**

As sociologist, Pareto did not treat the phenomenon of Fascism in any of his major works. However, he did use his conceptual scheme in three articles\(^1\) which present his analysis of it. The articles focus on two main characteristics of Fascism: (1) the use of extra-legal force; (2) a nationalistic myth.

The use of extra-legal force at times substitutes itself for, at times it opposes itself to, the hierarchy holding powers in various sectors of the politically bureaucratic structure (Pareto 1922:39). This is not just a characteristic of Fascism, he asserted; the desire to overcome others by force is found in all the histories of different societies.

\(^1\)Vilfredo Pareto, "Il Fascismo," _La Ronda_ (Gennaio 1922), pp. 39-52;
"Il Fenomeno del Fascismo," _La Nazione_ (Marzo 25, 1923);
"I Partiti Politici," _La Nazione_ (Giugno 1923).
C. Wright Mills, quoting Mosca, has a comment on that:

All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence...
Gaetano Mosca assumes that in any society, there is a sort of quota of men who, when appropriately provoked, will resort to violence.
If, says Mosca, we give such men genius and historical opportunity, we will get a Napoleon; if we give them a great ideal, we will get a Garibaldi; if we give them a chance, and nothing else, we will get a Mussolini (Mills 1956:172)."

To Mosca and Mills the phenomenon of Fascism is not a novelty; it is but a "particular case" in the long history of politics. Pareto, a few years earlier, had said much the same thing (Pareto 1922:39). Men are always the same. Fascists do not differ from Greeks and Romans; they, too, have the same base (residues and interests); what makes them look different are the derivations.

Within men there is a strong presence of type V residues. These residues call for justice, equality, legitimacy of power, property, and freedom. The Fascists, of course, emphasized in speech and printed word, these inner desires of people, provoking great enthusiasm throughout the country. Italians hailed Fascism as "the savior of the country."

Pareto seemingly looked at the new political event with cautious joy, for his prudence led him to avoid premature judgement. In his analysis of the phenomenon, he reser-
ved a short comment for the derivations of the freedom-residues. He pointed out that in a dictatorship type of government it is easy to get immediate results on various issues because of an abuse of freedom (Pareto 1923). To exist dictatorship needs continuous power. To have absolute power requires the common use of force (Pareto 1923).

The second characteristic of Fascism was the need for a nationalist myth as well as other sentiments (Pareto 1922:39). Mussolini might well have borrowed the statement from Pareto when he said:

Against individualism, the Fascist conception is for the State, and it is for the individual in so far as he coincides with the State, which is the conscience and universal will of man in his historical existence...
Fascism reaffirms the State as the true reality of individual (Mussolini 1932).

We do not know with certainty if Mussolini knew and used Pareto's writings. The same can be said of other theorists.

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2 Bousquet wrote about it: "On s'est demandé si Pareto avait été en rapport avec Mussolini à l'époque où, le jeune homme etant refugié à Lausanne, il fréquenta plus ou moins l'Université (1902). La réponse est: "non," tandis qu'au contraire, il a connu personnellement Boninsegni (Lettre a Placci, du 5 Janvier 1923). Le diplôme de docteur, remis à Mussolini, mentionne P.Buoninsegni comme "votre maître encore vivant," tandis que, pour Pareto, la formule est seulement "votre éminent compatriote"). Par contre, il se peut que Mussolini ait assisté à certains de ses cours...Pareto, jusqu'à l'automne de 1922 semble n'avoir le plus souvent, pas cru à l'avenir de ce mouvement, dont le fondateur n'a jamais
of Fascism—e.g., Alfredo Rocco, Giovanni Gentile, and Mario Palmieri. They, do not cite him as an authority. If there is some influence of Pareto's thought on Mussolini, it seems to be indirect and non-specific in point of origin.

Pareto's analysis of Fascism did not go any further. His theoretical explanation of the phenomenon and its principles does not involve any clear evidence of his own personal adherence—or non-adherence, for that matter. Only in one of his articles, "I Partiti Politici" ("Political Parties"), written two months before his death, did Pareto show any hope in the new leader, Mussolini, but he hesitated to give any endorsement even then.

Both his detached analysis of early Fascism and his own death in 1923, at the very beginning of Fascist rule, explain the difference of opinions among scholars as to the possible link of Pareto to Fascism.

**Fascism and anti-Fascism in Pareto's Sociology**

The foregoing presentation of Pareto's writings on Fascism makes it much easier to assess the asserted relationship between him and Fascism. It is the aim of this final
section of the chapter to explore to what degree, if any, the sociological doctrines of Pareto may be considered the source of ideological inspiration for the rise of Fascism or in what sense these doctrines might have been instrumental to that rise.

Trying to characterize the most noteworthy phases of historiography on the Pareto-Fascism issue, one can single out two different periods: a first, extending from 1923, the last year of Pareto's life, to 1935, characterized by the interpretation of Pareto's sociology as both supportive of, and antagonistic toward, Fascism; a second period, especially in the years of World War II (1939-1945), was marked by a heightened national and international interest in the linking of Pareto's works to Fascism. In both periods various scholars formulated contradictory answers on the issue.

First Period, 1923-1935

The first document that seems to link Pareto's thought to the emerging Fascist movement was an article by Vincenzo Pani, a well known contributor to the leading Fascist newspapers. In his article entitled "Il concetto sociologico dello Stato" ("The Sociological Concept of State"), he observes first of all the attitude of Fascism toward its own ideology. He notes that Fascism is not a party of intellectuals;
that it differs from other parties because it looks at empirical, more than theoretical, problems; that the only one able to present new theories and new explications of the Fascist doctrine is "il duce Mussolini," whom all the followers must obey.

Fani proceeds to emphasize that the sentiments of Fascists, characterized by blind faith and enthusiasm, are manifestations of the Residues of Type II, i.e., the persistence of aggregates, with its eight subdivisions. The external choreography, the ceremonies, the rituals, which play so important a role during Fascist gatherings, are also manifestations of the same type of Residues (Fani 1923:599).

It must be noted that Fani had a very limited notion of Pareto's sociology; he treats Pareto very superficially. He was, in that article, the first one to call Pareto, "The Marx of Fascism," a description blindly accepted by several American sociologists as we will see later.

A more sophisticated, even thought debatable, formulation of the Pareto-Fascism issue is given by Luigi Stirati, another well known contributor to Fascist newspapers. In a series of articles on "Il Fascismo osservato attraverso la sociologia di Vilfredo Pareto" ("Fascism observed through the Sociology of Vilfredo Pareto"), written in 1925, he held that Pareto should not be fully considered to be the theoretician of Fascism. But if Fascism does not stem from theories
of Pareto, these, however, offer an objective explanation of it. He saw an indirect link of Pareto to Fascism in the analysis of the very controversial theme of "force."

For Pareto "force" is the ultimate means when all others fail (#2251). Fascism, too, he asserted, was in sympathy with this statement. In fact, according to Stirati, Fascism, in comparison with what happened in other political revolutions, did not misuse "force"; it simply made use of a minor physical enforcement.

Stirati was apparently discerning enough to label, as abuses of force, the loss of civil and political rights, the abolition of individual freedoms, especially those of thought and speech. Fascism went far beyond Pareto's conception of "force." For Pareto "force" is needed to create "equilibrium" between the I and II types of residues (#2254), i.e., between the rentiers and the speculators. For Fascism "force" was a necessary, unlimited means in order to hold power throughout the country.

A third representative of this first period was Robert Michels. He was German by birth and European by education. He loved Italy, its people, its culture; he accepted the Fascist ideology, fascinated by the charismatic power of Mussolini. He was closer to Mussolini than was Pareto; therefore, his writings contributed much more in building the philosophy of the movement. In an article, "Socialismo
e Fascismo in Italia," ("Socialism and Fascism in Italy") (Monaco 1919) he wrote about the relationship between himself and Pareto in regard to Fascism. He pointed out that Mussolini's political actions did not follow the moderately liberal suggestions of the Professor of Lausanne (Michels 1919:253).

There were in this first period many other writers of secondary importance who commented on the Pareto-Fascism issue. They are omitted because they did not add anything of significance to that of the three above-mentioned authors.

Second Period, 1936-1947: International and National Interest in Pareto's Possible Link to Fascism

By and large, French historiography has showed little interest in Pareto's thought. Bousquet and Aron are the only two commentators to give credit to Pareto to any great extent. Their opinions will be examined later.

In Germany P. Weingärtner in a article on "Vilfredo Pareto als politischer Denker" (Hochland, October 1934-March 1935:60-67) and in Switzerland C. La Roche in an essay on "Ein Theoretiker des Faschismus" (Neue Schweizer Rundschau, April 1935:800-813) re-echo very much of what Michels had said.
In that same year (1935), the *Treatise* was translated into English as *The Mind and Society*. This provided an occasion for a serious study of Pareto. Its influence is documented in "An Symposium on Pareto's Significance for Social Theory" (*Journal of Social Philosophy*, I, 1935).

Pareto's sociology had all the ingredients to allure American sociologists: the logico-experimental method, the analysis of human action, the new theory of the elite, and social dynamism.

By 1935 Pareto was already considered by Americans to be a classical figure in social theory, even though they had presented critiques and reservations about his inadequate analysis of the nature of residues, the lack of unity in his system, his assumptions based exclusively on historical data rather than on personal research. Parsons, among several others, deserves particular mention for his efforts to interpret Pareto's sociology.

On the issue of the possible relationship between Pareto and Fascism, American sociologists are split in their opinion.

Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action* presents an oblique comment on Pareto and Fascism: "To Pareto's personal values, which are by no means a main concern of this study, we may remark upon very briefly (Parsons 1937:292)." Parsons observes that Pareto was a lover of freedom in thought and action; he was a lover of a new civilization free from the use of
force and fraud. Certainly, Parsons knew Italian Fascism of the early 1930's. However, the Parsonian approach to Pareto does not assert any specific linkage of ideology between Pareto and Fascism.

Besides Parsons, two other American sociologists expressed themselves on the topic in very explicit terms. Homans and Curtis have pointed out:

> After the march on Rome (1922) Pareto was proposed as the Italian delegate for disarmament to the League of Nations, but his health prevented his acceptance of the post; at least that was the reason given. In 1923 he was appointed a Senator of Italy, and in the same year he died.

> It is true that the Sociologie Générale has become for many Fascists a treatise on government, and for that reason a few people have seen Pareto as the Karl Marx of Fascism, as a Fascist propagandist. But in point of fact Pareto maintained in deed and word his independence as a scientist. It is possibly notable that he was careful in the Sociologie Générale to make no reference to the Great War or later events. He did not leave Switzerland; he did not take the positions offered him by Mussolini; and while approving some of the Fascist measures, he openly condemned others, especially any limitation of academic freedom...

> Pareto thus is held to have been a Fascist because the Fascists have used excerpts from his book to justify what they have done (Homans and Curtis 1934:9-10).

The last sentence of Homans and Curtis is well illus-
Pareto as the Karl Marx of the bourgeoisie or of the Fascism is nothing more than a derivation. It is true that among the Fascist and Nazis, Pareto's work is much esteemed, though perhaps not always understood. But his writings are no less applicable to France, England, The United States, and Russia than Italy and Germany, and Pareto himself preferred to all other governments those of some of smaller Swiss cantons (Henderson 1935:189).

Philosopher Sidney Hook was even stronger than the foregoing authors in his evaluation of the charge that Pareto had inspired Fascism:

Whatever the practical implications of Pareto's doctrines are, they as little to do with the theory and practice of Fascism as the psychology of Pavlov, for examples, has to do with the politics of the Russian government at whose hands its author has received honors and rewards.

Many of Pareto's doctrines cannot be defended in Italy or Germany without bringing their professor into concentration camps. No matter how many honors Mussolini may have heaped upon Pareto in absentia, any talk about Pareto being the ideologist or prophetic apologist of Fascism is sheer poppycock (Hook 1935:737).

In the same year, however, Ellsworth Faris gave a sharply negative evaluation of Pareto's sociology. Conse-
quently, his implicit judgment on the issue of Pareto's being linked Fascism is clearly affirmative, even though he was careful not to assert a casual relationship. He said:

Although teachers of sociology will not choose to remain wholly ignorant of a work that has had so much publicity, yet there seems no reason whatever why anyone else should be asked to spend time in reading these bulky volumes. What in them is sound is not only new, but it is much better stated by authors long familiar to American scholars...

There has been some discussion concerning the relation of Pareto's views to Italian Fascism. A reading of the fourth volume reveals an extraordinary correspondence, whether or not there is any causal influence (Faris 1935:657).

Another social scientist who refused to indict Pareto fifteen years after the charge first began to be discussed, was Joseph Schumpeter, economist, who emphasized:

Toward the end of the nineteenth and during the first two decades of the twentieth century, an increasing number of Frenchmen and Italians began to voice dissatisfaction that varied from mere disappointment to violent disgust at the manner in which democracy functioned and at the result it produced in France and in Italy...

Englishmen and Americans, oblivious of the particular and historically unique circumstances that have developed in their minds an
equally particular and unique attituded toward democracy, have wondered about the possible meaning of Pareto's attitude toward Fascism. But this attitude is not problematic at least. No theory is necessary to explain it.

Pareto refused to embrace this "ism" as he had refused to embrace any other. There is no point in judging his action or, indeed, any action or sentiment of his, from the standpoint of Anglo-American tradition (Schumpeter 1949:147-148).

Nevertheless, several other Americans, less known in the field of sociology, presented Pareto as a pioneer of Italian Fascism. They were, it appears, influenced by favorable remarks given to Pareto by some Italian commentators, as noted previously. Early in 1933, even before the Treatise was translated into English, R. Worthington said:

His [Pareto's] influence on the Continent where his theories have been used, for example, by Italian Fascism, and where he has been styled by socialists and anti-Fascists as the "Karl Marx of Fascism," has been great (Worthington 1933:311).

Worthington, it appears, was the first American sociologist to note that Pareto was called "The Marx of Fascism" by some European commentators. He is fair in showing its source; he himself retains a neutral stance.

More damaging was the subtle and harsh contempt
of Emory Bogardus, who wrote:

Pareto's popularity today is doubtless connected with the current trends away from liberal-democratic ideas and toward Machiavelli and Fascism (Bogardus 1935:167).

The most unqualified enthusiast in this public denunciation of Pareto for "producing" Fascism was Max Ascoli, best known as a serious journalist, who asserted categorically:

The philosophy of Italian Fascism has been discovered, its author is Vilfredo Pareto, its content is packed in the Trattato di Sociologia Generale. This means that Fascism is no longer a baffling fact, an unpredictable and almost inconceivable conglomeration of accidents.

It is a philosophy, one can now approach it and deal with it intellectually at least as easily as he can deal with communism intellectually through the writings of Marx and Lenin.

In fact Pareto has been heralded by many in America as the Karl Marx of Fascism (Ascoli 1936:78).

In a different vein among American sociologists, other less known authors stressed the multiple and often contradictory problem of misunderstanding Pareto's political comments. One is Max Handman, a sociologist at the University of Minnesota, who said:
In the realm of human folly the Traité is a certain, if at times a too voluble, guide. But the immense mass of material presented will be culled differently by persons who approach it with different conceptions.

A Fascist will consider it as his Bible; so also can a liberal free-trader, an anticlerical, or a free-thinker; but the Fascist will get the best of the bargain (Handman 1931:139-153).

In the same line there are two Sociology Professors at the University of North Carolina, Harry E. and Bernice Moore, who elaborated on what Handman had pointed out:

Pareto's wealth of illustrative material is embarassing on two counts; first, in that the reader loses the thread of theory in the skein of illustration; and second, that those not agreeing can find ample illustrations for the support of any number of other theories...

This is, perhaps, the basis for the report that he has deliberately favored Fascism (Moore 1935:293).

As we have noted, there is no truly outstanding American sociologist who has agreed with the label, "Pareto, pioneer of Italian Fascism." Thus they are in basic agreement with other leading sociologists; in France, Bousquet and Aron; in Italy, Ferrarotti.

Bousquet is usually considered to be one of the best
critics of Pareto's sociology. On the issue of Pareto and Fascism he has this to say:

I can sum up my ideas as follows:
(a) Until the advent of Fascism the maître Pareto adopted a rather prudent and almost hostile attitude toward it.
(b) Later [at the beginning of Fascist power] he looked at Fascism with some pleasure.
(c) This tacit approval was made with prudence, emphasizing the necessity that the new movement ought to safeguard a great number of freedoms (Bousquet 1960:189).

In answer to the question, "To what political or intellectual party did Pareto give his support"? Aron admitted that he had to change his earlier charges that Pareto provided ideological support for Fascism. He wrote:

At a certain period between the two world wars there was a tendency to interpret Pareto in terms of Fascism. In an article I wrote about him almost thirty years ago, I myself accused him to some extent of having provided a justification, an ideology for Fascism. It is easy to interpret Pareto as a Fascist. Exactly like Pareto, the Fascists-- I mean the Italian Fascists and not the German National Socialists-- defended

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and illustrated an oligarchical theory of government. They held that people are always governed by minorities, that these minorities can maintain their reign only if they are worthy of the functions they assume; but since these functions are not always agreeable to the tenderhearted, a tenderhearted man should relinquish this kind of function once and for all, for if he tries to perform it without possessing the necessary psychological capacities, far from mitigating the amount of violence, he will end by increasing it. Pareto, in all fairness, was by no means a cruel man. He would readily have acknowledged that the aim of politics is to reduce historical violence as much as possible; but he would have added that the illusory claim to abolish all violence usually tends to increase it inordinately. Pacifists help cause wars; humanitarians precipitate revolutions. This is the Paretoian argument, which the Fascists managed to adopt by distorting it; they simplified the theory and maintained that in order to be effective, governing elites had to be violent (Aron 1970:195).

The final repudiation of blaming Pareto for Fascism comes from the well known Italian sociologist Franco Ferrarotii. He corrected what some prominent Italian sociologists--Mosca and Michels--under the spell of Mussolini had said many years ago.

He wrote: The idea of Mosca, like those of Pareto and of Michels, for
that matter were able-- in the field of politics-- to lend themselves to a justification of Fascism (or at least to a justification of the principle of the "charismatic leader" which was reminiscent of Weber's principle and which at the time was personified by Mussolini) independently of the personal political position of these writers. Ironically, on the other hand, with the advent of Fascism to power the possibility of conducting free research in the social sciences ended, and in the universities the chairs of sociology and of political science became chairs of "Fascist doctrine" (Ferrarotti 1965:134).

To have presented a short list of scholar who expressed themselves either pro or con the issue of Pareto's alleged Fascism risks inducing the reader once more to love or hate Pareto. That matter aside, the objective reader can scarcely consider Pareto as the pioneer of a party to which he would not give a more explicit appraisal-- the theoreticians of a movement to which he gave such meager attention in the voluminous writings that marked his lifelong interest and commitment.
CONCLUSION - THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PARETO'S WORK

To some persons, Pareto's conceptual scheme of human behavior drawn from his *Treatise* produces a bewilderment much like that of Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Spengler's *The Decline of the West*, or Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action* and *The Social System*.

It is not surprising, then, that the *Treatise* has received highly diverse evaluations in Europe and in the United States. Two main currents of opinions convey this disagreement:

(1) To some scholars, the *Treatise* is a huge book, a masterful explanation of human interaction.

(2) To some others, it is a work of confused and confusing stupidity. To reconcile such divergent evaluations is, of necessity, impossible. One can only note that in most instances of such strong conflicting opinions of scholarly effort, the truth falls somewhere between the polar positions. Surely the ambiguities of expression and the repetitions of concepts of Pareto have prejudiced some critics against him. Those who have been most willing to hear Pareto out from start to finish have tended to be more complimentary to him. Thus, Henderson remarked at the end
of his analysis of Pareto's sociology:

Having now to the best of my ability defined the relevant terms and described the nature of the phenomena that are involved, I may, perhaps, without undue risk of misunderstanding, give myself the pleasure of making a derivation of the first class my last word to the reader: Pareto's Treatise is a work of genius (Henderson 1935:59).

For those whose estimate of Pareto is favorable, they must answer the inescapable question: why is Pareto's sociological theory significant? First, he conceived society as a system of forces in equilibrium. He asserted that various factors are involved in this system. Pareto was particularly interested in the study of internal factors, which are properties of the actions and the individuals who act. He labeled these internal factors "residues and derivations."

Unfortunately, as Timasheff observes, Pareto's treatment of residues and derivations which occupies a large part of his Treatise is the weakest aspect of his work (Timasheff 1967:168).

Coser also asserts that "writing from perspective of an age that has been deeply marked by Freud, contemporary analysts feel by and large that the doctrine of residues and derivations lacks psychological depth" (Coser 1971:401).
Part of this fault seems due to Pareto's seclusion from the evolving cultural world of his time. For example, Pareto's "residues" are virtually identical with what Schopenhaur and Nietzsche describe as "manifestations of the will" (Martindale 1960:103). Strongly, there is no mention of either in the Treatise.

However, Pareto's significance lies elsewhere to a greater degree.

Coser remarks:

We owe to him [Pareto] the first precise statement of the idea of a social system that can be analyzed in terms of the interrelations and mutual dependencies between constituent parts.

We owe to him a theory of the elite and of the circulation of elites, a theory that has continued to inspire concrete investigation into the functions of the upper strata of both governmental and nongovernmental units (Coser 1971:402).

Regardless of Pareto's scientific approach to the inner factors ("residues" and "derivations") of human beings, his originality lies in his stressing the mutual impact of those on social behavior. In fact, his theory of equilibrium and the related concept of change in a given social system is due to the balance and imbalance of residues of Types I and II. Parsons thus comments:
The cyclical theory Pareto actually developed was not meant to be an exhaustive theory of the total process of social change but was concerned predominantly with the process of change in the relations to each other and to the rest of the factors in the social equilibrium of two of the six classes of residues; Class I, the "instinct of combinations" and Class II, the "persistence of aggregates" (Parsons 1937:278).

The theory of elites and their circulation also relies on the differential distribution of residues among the members of elites. Depending on the respective dominance of residues of Type I and Type II, the governing elite holding power may be either progressive or conservative. Although Pareto is original in his theory of elites he could very well profited from a consideration of the work of other sociologists. For example, Weber would have been a great deal of help in suggesting a more precise categorization of different classes and a more precise definition of "power" held by the elite.

Another interesting point in Pareto's sociology is his conception of the theory of social utility. He analyzed social utility as it is seen both in economics and in sociology, asserting that maximum utility for and maximum utility of, a collectivity—on the level of economic and of sociological analysis, respectively—are not parallel; they are arranged in a hierarchical rela-
tion to each other (Parsons 1937:249). In addition to the discussion of the different implications of this theory in the body of the thesis, it should be noted that a new inference from the theory of utility is offered by R. Aron, who observes that such theory may have important political implications. He remarks:

One might also relate Fascist thought to Paretian thought by bringing in the antithesis between maximum utility for and maximum utility of a collectivity. Maximum utility for a collectivity—that is, the greatest satisfaction for the greatest possible number of individuals—is, as it were, the ideal of humanitarians and democratic socialists. To give everyone what he desires insofar as possible, to raise the standard of each and every one, is the bourgeois-egoist ideal of pluto-democratic elites. Pareto does not state explicitly that it is a mistake to set such a goal, but he suggests that there is another goal, maximum utility of a collectivity—that is, maximum power and glory of the collectivity considered as a person.

The impossibility of a scientific choice between these two terms, insisted upon Pareto, may be regarded as tantamount to choosing maximum utility of the collectivity. One can go even further and say that someone whom like Pareto, denies the possibility of a rational choice between one political regime and another serves the cause of the individuals who claim to demonstrate by violence their right to govern (Aron 1970:195).

As has been mentioned several times, Talcott Parsons devoted most of an important book, The Structure of Social
Action, to an analysis of the works of Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber, because the writings of these three men significantly contributed to the theory of social action which must serve as the foundation of sociology. To probe the liaison among the three is very well done by Parsons. Here, Pareto is analyzed independently of Durkheim and Weber because this was the existential fact of life of the "solitaire de Céliegny."
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Gastone Pozzobon has been read and approved by members of the faculty of the Department of Sociology.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

May 21, 1973
Date

Signature of Adviser