Plato's Notion of Justice in the Republic: Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness

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PLATO'S NOTION OF JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC:
Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness

BY

Robert Tarsitano, Jr.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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Like every piece of writing, this one is a product of many minds and sources of inspiration. My intellectual debt is to those faculty members of Loyola University of Chicago in whose classes I had the privilege of attending. In this regard, I would like to thank especially my major advisor, Professor Corey B. Venning, for her diligent reading of the text and for constructive suggestions on form and content. A special thanks also goes to other members of my committee, Professors Richard S. Hartigan and Thomas J. Bennett for their accessibility and encouragement in meeting this academic need. None of them of course are responsible for any errors of interpretation which may occur.

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VITA

The author, Robert Tarsitano, Jr., is the son of Robert Tarsitano (deceased) and Anna (Maioni) Tarsitano. He was born July 6, 1935 in Chicago, Illinois.

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He was an eligible recipient of a Regency Tuition Fellowship, a National Science Foundation Grant, and is presently a holder of a United States Patent. He is a member of the American Political Science Association and the Midwest Political Science Association.
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INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the question of whether Plato's justice, as described in the Republic, tends to make men happy. This reading stresses his authoritarian political views. In a close examination of the Republic, one is exposed to arguments that establish a society into hierarchically arranged classes. Plato contends that naturally some men are superior to other men. This superiority rests upon knowledge of the Form of justice which only a few men, i.e., the superior, can perceive. Hence, they alone are fit to rule the bulk of humanity. Presuming that the knowledge of the great mass of men is limited to less pervasive fields of interest, and that they are thus incapable of self-rule, they should, according to Plato, follow the rulers.

But are Plato's citizens given the necessary opportunities to accomplish what they desire to accomplish? Does he compel them, by force or otherwise, to be placed into set molds or classes? Is the design of the Republic geared to limit free expression for all men? With these concerns in mind, the Republic has been studied and analyzed. It is concluded that Plato, to a large degree, limits one's self-expression more than he enhances it. In this regard, the Republic is considered a largely authoritarian political document and, as such, negatively answers the question of justice and happiness in society.

With respect to the arrangement of the content in the thesis, the discussion is chronologically organized. For purposes of clarity, rather than shuffling back and forth in the document, the thesis analyzes the topics as Plato presented them. This method of analysis
discourages the criticism of quoting out of context. As Plato presents his case, as it were, occasional interpolations of the discussion will be presented in terms of evaluating his presuppositions, logical consistencies or inconsistencies, begging the questions, and so on.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ART, POWER AND VIRTUE

Influence of Education on Art and Virtue

What does Plato mean by art? Art (techne) is an ability or power designed to provide an advantage over the material of an art. Art, by definition, is without blemish, deprivation or defect. It is as perfect as possible.

It is not enough for a body to be a body. ...It needs something else. And, the art of medicine has now been discovered because a body is defective. ...and it won't do. The art was devised for the purpose of providing advantages to the body. ...It is correct so long as it is precisely and wholly what it is. (342bc).

That is to say, art becomes real when it, in fact, does provide advantages, as when the art of medicine cures ill or deprived bodies, or the sailor's art provides safety in sea travel. Similarly, the art of the ruler must provide an advantage to weak, unruly men. It provides justice so that men can be happy. Providing advantages then is what designates an art as a working real art. It indeed gives advantages to defective or weaker bodies or things. So the practicing artist, in a

---

1 Plato, The Complete Works of Plato, ed. by Henri Estienne (Stephanus) and translated by Jean de Serres, Geneva, 1578.

2 Plato's 'material' over which art provides advantages are seen more as animate things, which seem to possess "powers" to make that particular art successful. Herein lies a basic distinction between, say, the medical art and the art of painting. Medicine seems to help directly an ill animate body to become well as the body somehow aids this healing. Painting, on the other hand, deals with inanimate things which cannot reciprocate "aid" in the same way animate things do. Indirectly, though, the painting may induce one aesthetically to feel better.
sense, is a master or ruler over the weak, not for the benefit of the artist or the art, but for the recipient of the art, i.e., the weak.

Nor does horsemanship consider the advantage of horsemanship, but of horses. Nor does any art consider its own advantage, for it doesn't have any further need to. ... but the advantage of what is weaker and ruled by it. There isn't anyone who rules that considers or commands own advantage rather than that of what is ruled, for its advantage that he says everything he says and does everything he does (342de).

Art can only be an advantage, if it is possessed by men who are disposed, by nature, with a specific excellence (virtue, arete) that helps one to perform a specific art best. 3

Each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in his nature; different men are apt for the accomplishment of different arts (353b).

Men are properly born to be doctors, carpenters, and so on. Anything, in fact, is apt to do its own peculiar art. For example, an eye's techne is to see; ear's, to hear, and so on (353bc). It is the virtue of a thing that disposes a thing to do its art and to do its best. But, if the virtue of an eye, the power to see, is diminished or gone, the eye's art of seeing will also wane. To Plato, lack of power or diminishment of virtue are forms of a thing's deprivations. A deprivation is a vice. It is an absence or a decrease of the essential intensity of a virtue that naturally exists in something. Briefly, then, an art provides advantages to something weaker. Each man is disposed in a certain way to a specific excellence which can make an art work

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3 I. A. Richards takes a special exception to Plato's "one man, one art" concept. In his Plato's Republic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 11, he suggests it is a defective policy if pushed to great lengths. It loses sight of a "widely recognized fact that any expert in any art usually needs newer experiences from creative experts in similar arts or others." So, some sort of creative change is an eventuality for any artist.
advantageously. But the excellence alone is insufficient to provide the advantage. What is it that it lacks?

Certainly, Plato implies in the above that men are born good. That is to say, men possess a specific excellence (a virtue) which is good in itself. But specific excellences (virtues) must be developed or educated. A lack of a proper education, Plato asserts, can result in the virtue turning into a bad thing. For example, if a soul has the virtue of wisdom, it can possess the specific art to manage, to rule and to deliberate on public things. Living, as it were, is the soul's art. But, if the virtue is deprived (poorly educated), its art of ruling cannot be accomplished well. It is executed badly. In the end, the soul necessarily rules badly, whereas a good soul, one properly educated, can rule well. So things are done well with proper education and badly without it. "And everything else is included in the same argument" (353ce). So, in the end, a thing is good or bad in its consequences. And, the power to give good or bad advantages to the weak depends upon the sort of education a thing receives. So, from the outset, education plays a major role for Plato. He claims that each man has a specific excellence, which when properly educated will let him use his art to benefit the subject matter (the object) of the art, be they ill bodies, horses or weak, unruly men.

Hierarchy of Virtue Leads to Hierarchy of Arts

Virtues are arranged hierarchically. At the apex is wisdom. Its supplements are courage, moderation and justice. An individual born with the virtue of wisdom possesses the excellence to counsel well. He is a wise ruler. But the ruler needs the cooperation, not the
competition, of the other men. Men whose excellence is courage must
defend the opinion or counsel of the ruler. Men who are neither wise
nor courageous will possess moderation, if they balance their pleasures
(appetites) and pains for the good of the whole city. In the end,
Plato maintains that when these virtues operate in this fashion, the
virtue of justice emerges. It is a derivative of this hierarchical
arrangement. A well ruled city then is said to be just. It is the
last piece, as it were, to be fitted into a jigsaw puzzle, entitled the
"just city."

Furthermore, Plato maintains that each art has its own sphere of
control and it is this diversity of control that accounts for the dif-
ference between the arts. The medical art's area of control (respon-
sibility) is the curing of ill bodies, while the sailor's is safety on
the sea. He indicates that a general art is required to be responsible
for all occasions and over specific arts, as well as the overall way
one conducts one's life. This general art then must encompass all the
other arts. It has no specific control like the others, but a field
that includes the others. It focuses on how men should live rightly
in all ways. Plato imputes that the general art is the responsibility
of the ruling art.4 One of his main aims in writing the dialogue is

4 Some commentators accuse Plato of having an ambiguous poetry or
art. J. Tate, in his "Plato and 'Imitation,'" Classical Quarterly,
XXII (1928), pp. 161-64, however, advises that in as much as art rests
upon his metaphysics before making relevant conclusions on the art of
ruling, one should critically analyze the metaphysics. Tate contends
that any ambiguity arising from Plato's discussion of art may be clar-
ified by a keen look at his notion of 'imitation.' Good poetry or art,
he suggests, imitates the ideal world of knowledge once removed from
that world, while bad poetry or art is twice removed. It uses opinion
and sense experience. So, depending on Plato's use of the term, the
ruling art, a commentator will come away with a better understanding of
it.
essentially to make this point obvious. Moreover, as the art of medic­
cine is found in one having the ability to practice medicine well, so too does the art of ruling need a place in one who has the ability to practice the ruling art well. Plato calls the ability or virtue to practice the ruling art well the power of knowledge. It is basically an innate ability of knowing what is good for the city. It is not meant to be synonymous with the power to mobilize large groups. Plato sees this ability as more of a personal intellectual attribute of a ruler than one designed to incite the fears and emotions of the masses.

The art of ruling then, he continues, is not restricted to any specific occasion or personal acquaintance. Its duty is to all men to maintain the regime's political stability. Since ruling is an all encompassing art, its purpose must be designed for the advantage of all. It cannot be designed to help only friends and not enemies. If justice, being a derivative of the art of ruling, were to operate this way, it would simply be a morality of demonstration. Such a moral display would falter, since its machinations rest essentially on individual behaviors, not on principles. A house built of sand soon crumbles. Specifying occasions for the art of ruling to work, like paying debts, honoring contracts, etc., can lead to dilemmas, Plato states, especially when associated with a ruler's fallibility. It would be just to steal from friends, if thought to be enemies, and give to enemies, if thought to be friends. The number of laws are kept to an extreme minimum. So, it seems absurd to Plato to think that the art of ruling only informs one's behavior on special occasions or with special friendships. The art of ruling then is not a specialized art, but a general­ized one designed to control (mastering) all men's living patterns.
In effect, then, Plato's ruling principle is to maintain political stability. The regime operates as one entity where individual grievances are less important than political cohesion. Rulers, it seems, are largely incapable to judge whether private iniquities are adjudicable, unless the altercations adversely affect the regime's stability. With the absence of such overwhelming adversity, it is conceivable that Person A could quite easily steal from Person B without impunity. As a result, it is not too difficult to envision a regime ruled by an elite wielding large doses of discretionary political power.

On another matter, Plato states that no one is willing to practice one's art without a reward in return. Willingness to perform is derived from some form of wage, either money, honor, or a penalty. Since this wage is an advantage or benefit for the artist, according to Plato's definition of art, some art form must exist for that which it is an art. The wage-earning art then is created, which induces the artist to practice it willingly. Otherwise, no one would be willing to perform any art.

For it isn't because of sailing that one is called a pilot, but because of his art and his rule over sailors...There is something advantageous for each of them...And the art is naturally directed toward seeking and providing for the advantage of each (341d).

But the sort of wages one receives establishes a fundamental difference in the character of artists. A difference exists between those artists who work for money and honor and those who work as a penalty. The first is a reproach, while the other is out of need. The decent artist (ruler) masters an art out of fear. His greatest penalty is to be controlled by some worse artist, a less competent one; one deprived, one with a vice. Decency, which implies knowledge, compels one to
rule. Money or honor is not an inducement. Neither desire is present as part of the decent's natural disposition. The decent artist's sole and primary love (desire) is to know the truth. The wage (price) of this inherent desire is a sort of penalty, since it compels the decent to seek some higher truth, although they are not certain of attaining it. Other artists' desires are more readily satisfied with more tangible things (money, honor). The decent ruler, on the other hand, seeks to secure happiness for the ruled by arranging their lives for the good of the city.

Also, the art of ruling is not simply a power permitting the stronger, as some claim, to maintain an advantage over the weaker for the stronger's benefit. Plato argues that human fallibility works against this proposition, since strict obedience to all rules of the stronger can foil any advantage that a ruler may have. The power of the art then is seen to dissipate. But Plato's adversaries object to this position on the ground that the conduct of the art is fallible, i.e., the way one performs the art of ruling. They say that the power that all arts have is in itself infallible. In this sense then it can serve the interests of the stronger over the weaker.

Plato's position is that power may well be infallible, but arts are not. They must be as perfect as possible. And as arts they do help the weaker. He states that art by definition helps that for which it is an art, for the recipient's advantage. But it is dependent upon the thing over which it is an art. This inferior or weaker thing becomes the major art's supplementary virtue. For example, if the deprivation is bodily illness, the art of medicine plus the body (a supplementary power) is needed to make the whole person well. If the
end is health, the higher art is medicine, and the lower one is the body, since the former supposedly possesses some sort of knowledge that the body does not have.

So, the distinction between the higher and lower art forms is that the higher art is the one directly related to fulfill its purpose. Medical art's purpose is to cure ill bodies. It is not the body that is curing, although it helps; it is a needed supplement.

To illustrate hierarchy of the arts, Plato maintains that sunlight is a higher art form than the power to see or the power to be seen, if the purpose in mind is to make things appear. Light gives illumination to things. Supplementary to this advantage are two other powers 1) the power to see, residing in the eye and 2) the power to be seen, residing in things. Light is the primary virtue. To make things illuminant is its specific virtue, while the others, to see and be seen, help illumination to exist. All three must work together. Without either, the primary act, light, would be ineffective. So no art tends to be perfect unless it receives this kind of assistance from other relevant virtues and powers. So the art of light does not benefit the maker of light or the art, *per se*, but rather the one who is deprived of light, i.e., the weaker (eyes and things). Similarly, the art of ruling cares for the ruled, weaker, unruly men, those deprived of knowledge of what is good for the whole city.

Moreover, to live in a just city is to live in an excellent and wise one. But, according to Plato, excellence means something by which men's performance can be rated. It is not the ideal. A good ruler or doctor knows or understands the problems of one's art, as best as possible. One's knowledge and ability can lead to utopia.
Remember, Plato states that his approach is not complete. It is possible, but not a probable one. The steps and the theory behind his aim consists in large measure in Book VI concerning the 'form of the good.'

The art of ruling can promote justice. To show that this art can promote the virtue of justice and that the lack of it can promote the vice of injustice, Plato gives us the following polemic. By concession, the just do not want any advantage over the just, but only over the unjust ("likes" take advantage over "unlikes," not "likes"). Also, the unjust want advantage over unjust and the just ("unlikes" take advantage over "likes" and "unlikes"). Further, the unjust desire to seem good and prudent, while the just do not pretend.

Also, by nature the prudent musical person wants advantage not over the musical, but the unmusical, while the unmusical, who are thoughtless, want advantage over both groups. Likewise, one with knowledge does not want advantage over the knowledgeable, but only over the ignorant, who are bad and unlearned. The ignorant want advantage over both. It is conceded that the knowledgeable are good and wise, that the knower and musical are like the just, since neither desire to take advantage over their likes (kind). However, the ignorant and unmusical are like the unjust, since all want to take advantage over both.

It is conceded that anything good and wise is virtuous, and anything bad and unlearned is a vice. Therefore, as a result of the above logic, justice is a virtue and injustice is a vice.

Also, injustice cannot be mightier than justice. One without learning is not as mighty as one who is wise and good. An unjust city is an ignorant one. By nature, the unjust city is divided between the
best (wise and good) from the worst (bad and unlearned). It produces hates and factions between and among men and between the gods. One becomes an enemy to oneself and with others. Justice, however, which is wise and good, shows how to make the city (men and gods), friends alike, all working together as one. So, it alone can accomplish mighty things.

The just, furthermore, live better and happier lives than the unjust. Virtue permits a thing to do its work best. Eyes that cannot see, i.e., lack the power of sight (virtue) cannot work well. Things without its virtue are defective (a vice) and, consequently, work badly. Likewise, the soul, to work well (manage, deliberate, rule) must also have its virtue educated. The better soul is the virtuous one. Without a defect, it is happy, well and blessed. While the defective soul is wretched. Profit accrues more to the happy soul than to the wretched one.

Plato's Fundamental Challenge: Is Justice a Good in Itself?

In the previous analysis, Plato has argued that justice is a good in itself, i.e., justice is a virtue. This stand is in opposition to others who hold that justice is not a good in itself, but is good only for its consequences. They maintain that it is a natural good to escape injustice and a natural evil to suffer injustice. So one must pursue one's own good consequences. The best way to do so is to publicly praise justice, while privately believing it to be foolish and mad to be just. The unjust are satisfied by the consequences of others being just. Vigorous deception insures their endurance of less suffering. Perfect deception gives the appearance that one is perfectly just and
extremely happy. It is better to seem just than to be truly just. Counterfeit justice fares better than legitimate justice in the derived consequences.

Plato is confronted with a fundamental challenge on whether justice is a good in itself. It is generally believed that justice has good consequences. So his task is largely to show that good and justice are 'things' in themselves and that they are good.5

In a brief fashion here, but more comprehensively later, Plato maintains and argues that a person is a microcosm of a city. The soul, as it were, is divided into similar parts as a city. It is better to see the larger things, and then apply this knowledge to the smaller (soul).

A city is established to satisfy human needs and wants. Since they are numerous, many arts are required. The principle of the division of labor compels one to practice one art rather than many. This specialization conforms to one's particular excellence. Besides, by practicing one art, one can produce better things, faster and more easily. Further, arts form a hierarchy of importance in the city. The ruling art resides at the pinnacle. The true ruler teaches how to behave properly. The guardian's art must protect this teaching as true opinion for others to follow. Finally, the practical artists perform their functions under the guidance of the ruler's art.

5 One of David Sach's main concerns is whether Plato has really shown that justice is a good in itself, and thereby, the just man is happier than an unjust man. In his "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic," Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963), pp. 144-45, he argued that Plato's conclusion is irrelevant. While Plato tried to show justice's own good, he really explained how justice can be good for its consequences, not for its own sake.
A significant part of the art of ruling is the art of education. It is designed to give advantages over that which it is an art, namely, soldiers and artisans. Its purpose is to develop another's virtue so one can benefit the city as well as oneself (wage). One of the first duties of education is to remove false doctrines, namely, the odious myths espoused by prominent poets particularly on the nature of gods, content and style of speech, and so on. Having done this task, Plato believes that the soul will be properly (good) disposed to see virtues and vices in things and in themselves. The forms of virtue/vice first must be seen in things and then as they are in themselves, later. One cannot recognize the form, tree, in water as a tree, unless one first sees a tree.
Emergence of the City

Plato's previous theoretical view of justice was clearly unconvincing to Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glacon and Adeimantus. While he argued the just man is stronger, mightier and happier than the unjust, they still remained unpersuaded that justice, in itself, makes one good, and injustice, one bad.

Of what profit in justice itself to man who possesses it, and what harm does injustice do (367d2-3)?

Admittedly, Plato remarks that understanding justice is no ordinary task. It requires sharpness. It is best to see it in the large sense, i.e., in the city. Then, one can more readily see how it works or resides in each man. "Being unclever men, it will be like a godsend to read its bigger letters first" (368d). Since a city is larger, it will be easier to observe it closely, and, then place the "likeness of the bigger (city) into the idea of the littler (man)" (369a). One will then be more able to see what the just man is.

Plato discusses the reasons why a city is founded. It begins by the insufficiency of one man to satisfy one's needs well (369b). Men come together as partners, one helping the other. Moreover, since one's needs are many (food, shelter, clothing and complements), many arts and artists are also required. Further, since men are naturally different, each man should practice one art. "Different men are apt (disposed) for the accomplishment of different jobs" (370b). And the
advantages associated with this natural division of labor, e.g., ease, speed and quality of production, follow from man's innate differences. Especially during crucial times, for one to do several arts, the vital needs of the partnership may not be fulfilled, consequently, ruining circumstances for all (370c). So, in this sense, a true, healthy city, in part, is sort of an economic arrangement between men, where they exchange their production and labor for the good of the whole city (371e3-5).

But, what are the mechanics of the exchange? "It was for just this reason that we made an arrangement and founded a city" (371b3). To know how exchanges can take place well, Plato suggests one can see how justice comes to be. But he seems to have been diverted from not discussing justice's emergence in a healthy city. Rather, he is moved to discuss how a luxurious, feverish city begins. "But, if you (Glaucon) want to, let's look at a feverish city, too" (372e4). It is one that is unsatisfactory, i.e., containing unnecessary things. The desire for luxuries requires more people, which means more land, which means unlimited appropriation, and ultimately war (373e7).

**Character of the Guardian's Disposition**

War is a natural consequence of a luxurious (bad, unhealthy) city. And, the struggle for victory is an art like other arts, except it is a higher one. It protects the other arts' preservation (374e). Moreover, to win wars requires effective guardians. To be a good guardian, besides sole possessor of weapons, Plato maintains that one must be endowed with certain natural qualities. The guardian must be a) spirited (thymos), b) gentle and c) philosophic.
Spiritedness at that time was defined as the "principle or seat of anger or rage." Plato states that it disposes the soul to be "fearless and invincible to everything" (375b2). A guardian must be gentle to one's own people (friends) and savage (spirited) to one's enemies (375c). Plato acknowledges that each notion is directly opposed to the other one. Yet, he believes it is possible for them to reside and to operate in one nature. He gives the illustration of the noble dog who is "gentle" with familiars and "savage" with those whom it does not know (375e2-3). A philosophic guardian possesses a power to distinguish between a friend from a foe. This feat is accomplished by a disposition which inclines him to recognize a friend and disinclines him from others. The absence of this disposition brings with it ignorance. Presumably, to be ignorant of anything means that something is alien to one's natural disposition. In effect, a good guardian is generally disposed (is turned) to friends and undisposed or ignorant (turned away) from enemies (376b3). In effect, any disposition not mirroring what one thinks a friend is is an enemy. Plato, unfortunately, makes no comment on neutrals.

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6 See Alan Bloom's transliteration of the word, "thymos," in the author's [The Republic of Plato](fn. 33, p. 449.)

7 Karl R. Popper raises an interesting question on this point. In his [The Open Society and Its Enemies](fn. 33, p. 449.), he is puzzled over how Plato's fierce and gentle guardians will not be prone to attack each other. In the end, it must be a matter of self-control, since the artisan cannot restrain them. Popper is unconvinced that this sort of guardian self-restraint is really possible. To Popper, Plato's explanation is questionable.
To explain what is meant by a "disposition to or from something," Plato again uses the "noble dog" example. "Without knowledge or a bad experience," the dog will get angry (spirited) at someone or even with one's hostile looks. It turns against that person. On the other hand, "with some knowledge and no good experience," the dog is gentle with others. It turns towards them. In the first instance, the dog is ignorant of that kind of "look," because, presumably, its disposition does not "mirror" it. The look is alien to the dog's good disposition, and, somehow, it thinks the image an enemy. But, in the second case, the dog, using some sort of knowledge (intuitive, perhaps) looks at an external object and thinks it mirrors what is its good disposition (376b2). Both seem akin to one another, and, hence, the dog believes the object to be a friend. Good or bad experiences are not crucial to its behavior. What is crucial is whether a dog—or a human being—can judge what is its own according to its good disposition. If one can, one will love to learn whatever it mirrors as its own. Plato concludes:

So shall we be bold and assert that a human being too, if he is going to be gentle to his own and those known to him, must by nature be a philosopher and a lover of learning (376bc)?

Glauccon agrees, and Plato concludes further:

Then the man who's going to be a fine and good guardian of the city for us will be in his nature philosophic, spirited and gentle (376bc).

In effect, Plato has stated that a guardian must be spirited with enemies and gentle with friends. Although both qualities are directly opposed to one another, it is possible for them to be parts of the same nature or soul. Moreover, the ability to distinguish between friend
and foes resides in another part, the philosophic. Then the whole na­
ture is characterized as having a "good disposition." If an object
sensed, mirrors one's good disposition, the thing is a friend. If it
does not, the object is an enemy. Experience plays little or no part
in reaching this judgment. But, essentially Plato fails to adequately
explain the specific difference between knowledge and experience. Why
does he dismiss environmental experiences out of hand as inconsequential
"conditioners" in developing character traits? Feeding a noble, but
hungry dog, whether one 'mirrors' or does not 'mirror' its good disposi­
tion may well be more of a gratification for the dog than trying to
"decide" whether the feeder is friend or foe. So it still remains to
be determined by Plato what the nature of the good disposition is. At
this point, we know it is sort of an "intuitive tool," in a sense, by
which one, either, cooperates or competes with another, depending on
whether 'the other' is perceived as friend or foe. This is all we know
so far.

Plato's "Educational" Content: Censorship, Deception and Propaganda

While a good disposition may be innate, to a large extent, it is
to be developed by Plato's notion of education. He asserts that a gen­
eral review of the art of education will not deter him from making his
immediate point, namely, to show how justice and injustice come to be.
"The present consideration (art of education) will contribute to that
end" (376d3).

The essential nature of Plato's educational system consists main­
ly of two parts: 1) music, which includes melodic, verbal (speech) and
rational content for the soul and 2) gymnastic, i.e., tension exercises
for the body. And, by convention, music precedes gymnastics for the very young (377a7-8).

Plato observes that the nature of the young soul is very malleable. Because the soul easily assimilates what it receives sensually, no child should hear any tale or opinion (377b2). Only approved ones are permitted for "these tender things ears" (377c). The implication is given to us that the potential guardian, although disposed philosophically, can quite easily modify or have altered this inherent disposition. Their malleability tends to induce Plato to shelter the young from unapproved opinion. To this extent then one should be concerned with the strength or depth of a "philosophical" disposition.

The young must not believe Achilles was confused over two opposite diseases 1) love of money and 2) arrogant disdain for gods and men. ... Otherwise... (391c4-5)

Plato maintains such an opinion would encourage in the young a "strong proclivity to badness" (392a). From this point of view, it seems that a philosophical or a good disposition is a rather fragile, tenuous human characteristic, which must warrant Plato's censorship program, if he is to achieve just ends.

For example, Plato believes some of the opinions of Hesiod and Homer on warring gods are not for the ears of the young guardian. Gods to them are largely represented as murderers, revengers, and so on. While conceding some accusations may be true, their telling, if made at all, should be professed to a select few, presumably, the older and more philosophically educated. They will know how to justify divine anger, rage or warfare among the gods. But, for the young, these are "unspeakable secrets" and bad lies that can cause harm to the city's harmony or cooperation (378a4). Men, especially young men, tend to
emulate their heroes. Quarreling heavenly gods then will induce conflicts within the cities. They can encourage the youth to become easily upset, angry and uncomfortable with oneself and with another, vicious and most shameful conduct. Such behavior is extremely difficult to alter or remove, especially when one gets older (378c2). But some lies, on the other hand, are good, if they bind the city together, e.g., Phoneclian lies, mating game tricks (414c3).

So, the primary duty of a founder of an "ideal city" is to find ways to bind its members together, i.e., to establish a good pattern. His theory of the nature of the gods can work to this end. Since gods are things to be emulated, they, again, must be presented largely as cooperative beings. Plato asserts anything that cooperates with one another establishes a good pattern, and gods do. They are good in themselves, and nothing good is harmful or can cause evil. They can only benefit the city and are not the cause of the many bad things. Certainly, Plato can be charged with being doctrinaire, for he offers no evidence at this point to justify the gods' intrinsic goodness and their consequent "good" effects. Despite this weak argument, which borders more on faith than reason, he receives a universal and uncontested acclamation, "of course what you say is true" from Adeimantus and the others (379b3). Again, it appears to be in Plato's advantage to state that gods are good and cooperate with one another, since it is their conduct that will be eventually emulated by his citizens. Plato's regime, like most others, requires this sort of harmony.

But, Plato makes an exception to the rule prohibiting the young from hearing heavenly quarrels. The "Sorrows of the Pelopidae" and the "Trojan Sorrows," for example, are justifiable causes of gods'
angers that all should know. He maintains that the punishment associated with that anger profited men. Men were wretched. By paying the penalty, they were profited and benefited (380b4-6). This instance, however, is the extent of Plato's elaboration on this exception. He avoids giving us the middle term as to what sort of popular wretchedness was deemed evil and punishable and which was not. Either his listeners were convinced that gods can cause justifiable harm or they were becoming docile. Adeimantus and the others give "their vote" to the exception as correct (380c4).

In addition, Plato characterizes the nature of the gods. They do not deceive or change their "own form to many shapes" (380d3). His claim is that gods are in the best condition, naturally. Because of this condition, they possess virtue and beauty. Anything in best condition, by nature or art, will then possess these god-like qualities. A well-built house is a work of art. It is in the best condition and most difficult to transform. Art produces a house's virtue. But a soul is courageous and prudent, more so by nature than by art, say for example, education, if it is disposed this way. Plato's creeping doctrinaireism seems to have overwhelmed his listeners (381a4). Again no supportable evidence was shed to justify his major premise that "all gods are in the best condition." As a result of having no opposition, Plato is free to conclude that nothing in best condition will transform or deceive willingly. Any alteration must be, of necessity, a worse kind, i.e., lacking by degrees in virtue and beauty. Gods, then, are simple, not of mixed shapes, and seldom departs from its own idea (380cd6).
Concerning deception, Plato maintains gods and humans hate "true lies." They are concerned with the "most sovereign things," namely a) things that are and b) things to be unlearned. True lies make the soul ignorant. Ignorance is a phantom or imitation of a soul's real affection. The soul is deceived on what it truly desires and is disposed to or for which it has an affection (382b9).

These are truly a lie...the ignorance of the soul of the man who has been lied to. For the lie in speeches is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it that comes into being after it (382b8-9).

In effect, ignorance is having something which one should not possess. It is not the lack of something, e.g., a void or nothing. It is having the wrong thing for which the soul has no affection or disposition. And, since true lies cause this form of deception "of the most sovereign things," they are hated by men and gods.

However, some lies are not hated by men, if they are useful or bind the city together. Usefulness emerges, if it deters anyone from harming the city, usually done by "private men." These lies can act as a drug against a madman or a remedy for a ruler (389b). It can liken itself to the truth on "ancient things" (things sovereign) on which no one has any real knowledge.

And, in the telling of tales we're just now speaking about... those told because we don't know where the truth about ancient things lies...likening the lie to the truth as best we can... (382d3)

The lie encourages men to follow one set of ideas (lies) over another, say for example, Plato's over Homer's. It is useful, if one is persuaded by it. Plato's must be more convincing than Homer's. All of this reasoning assumes that the true teacher is closer to the truth than another teacher, since all men lack full knowledge. Gods, how-
ever, have no such problem. They hate all lies, because it is of no use for them to lie. They fear no madmen and know all things. So, "it would be ridiculous for them to lie" (382de). To conclude, Plato tells us that no man knows the truth, men can lead us to it, and men who have an insight into it (as Plato feels he has) should overpower others by the education he is apparently employing. In the end, then, lying is derived out of fear of an enemy and/or a lack of knowledge on what the truth is and aimed at binding a city together.

While Plato concedes that the full truth cannot be known, some "right" men must be induced to become courageous defenders of what seems at least truthful. He maintains courage is developed if the terror associated with Hades be abandoned. As it is, one would rather choose defeat or slavery than fearless fighting or death for the just regime (386ac). Hades is a place to be praised, not feared. It is where men ought to be rewarded for their courage, not punished for their lack of it. But, no objective insight is given to show why the traditional notion of Hades be abandoned. It seems that abandonment is to suit the purpose of the regime, namely, fearless protection of it. It is somewhat like saying fight with utter savageness, for you will be saved—one is fighting for the just city! Yet Plato offers no evidence at this point to support "the prophecy" or "the abandonment." One must almost obliviously go against Greek tradition and culture and

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8 Ibid., p. 166. Here Popper comments on Plato's "clean slate" notion. The eradication of existing institutions and traditions, the great purge, is certainly an uncompromising attitude of Plato's, an act of radicalism, Popper contends. He suggests that a society to be likened to a work of art can lead to the most violent measures.
and follow the dictates of the present sage. Is this a sound educational appeal?

Further, to reinforce this aspect, Plato urges that no famous, decent man, e.g., Achilles, should lament over the death or misfortunes of another decent comrade (388a4). "Being dead is not a terrible thing" (388a4). One is decent (epieikes), if one is self-sufficient, lives well and has least need of others" (387e). Most misfortunes should be borne gently, then. Only the bad, unserious cry over such losses. However, in terms of the "partnership" alluded to earlier where each helps another, Plato seems to be implying the decent are justifiably less partners. Should only the bad or unserious, i.e., the deviants of the regime, be compelled to form close ties with the city? It seems that the duty to cooperate as partners rests moreso with the less decent. Their self-sufficiency is not that assured. They are unable to be independent, whereas the decent are. This inequality suggests that the burden of cooperativeness largely is the duty of the less decent, which, in turn, infers they also have less political freedom than the decent possess.

Educational Style

Turning away from content for awhile, Plato holds, as another part of his educational art, speeches must be presented in proper verbal style. Simple narrative styles are permitted, since the poet, for example, takes no part in a character's disposition. Each character, as it were, speaks for oneself. A listener, say, a young guardian, is less confused over whether the poet or the character is "serious or not."

On the other hand, Plato claims when a poet speaks as though he
were someone else, i.e., as the character, the poet's style is likened to the character portrayed. Two persons, in a sense, become one, which can easily lead to a confused education for a potential guardian.

To liken oneself in voice and looks is the same as imitating the one he likens himself to (393c).

For example, Homer speaks as though he were Chryses in the *Iliad*. He, via Chryses, begs Agamemnon to ransom his daughter. So, Homer, a famous man, is represented as one who believes it right to beg and to ransom.

To a young educatee, Plato believes, one would find it difficult to separate Homer from Chryses' image. Further, even a guardian could not separate Homer (the famous man) from Chryses' calling on the gods to curse himself for a specific fault (393a). To Plato, then, these character representations are undesirable examples for the guardian's educational development. One suspects, however, a high degree of intellectual shallowness of the guardian, especially, if he is unable to distinguish between the personal beliefs of the narrator and the character in the narration. This sort of shallowness speaks poorly of the intellectual credentials of Plato's rulers, who do, in fact, emerge from the guardian class. Will they know what is good for the city?

Moreover, he maintains that the act of imitating several persons or arts is not fitting for anyone to do. It goes against the principle. ...

... that each could do a fine job only in one *techne*, not many, otherwise, one would fail in all. ... (394e) Human nature is minted in small coins (395b2).

So, since the guardian's *techne* is to protect, one should not be encumbered by other imitations or arts. Even if the art is closely akin to another, one is prohibited from practicing both. A tragic poet must not be a comedic poet (395b). One's job is to imitate or practice what is
one's proper and own disposition. For the guardian, it is a life of virtue, e.g., moderation, courage, holiness, and so on (395c3). But, for the rest of the regime, i.e., the multitude, their dispositions are mixed and many, an unfortunate, but common characteristic. The "more common one is (more variously one is disposed) the more one will imitate most anything from horses to thunder, thinking nothing unworthy of oneself" (397a2). A common person is not disposed in any strict pattern. At this point, although it is unexplained how the guardian/ruler differs from the artisan... a mere assertion begs the real question. Plato believes that while many modes or rhythms will please more people, it tends to disunite the regime. More than two basic modes in the regime or in the person will fracture both. The regime must contain a mode for voluntary, peaceful conduct and a violent mode for courage against its enemies (399c). Blending of both will tend to make all moderately disposed, a characteristic to be developed especially by the multitude.

Most imitations please them. This pleasure, however, is derived not from any special influence of anything innate, Plato maintains. By nature, one dominant disposition exists per man. Each man is apt (disposed) to perform one task. One is legitimately pleased, Plato contends, if that dominant leaning is developed to its potential by an art, especially. Art focuses the energy, if you will, of a particular ability to move in a single direction, not in any skewed pattern. But, he feels, the multitude lack art in general, and specifically, the art of education. Consequently, their endowment goes virtually undeveloped, and in the meantime, their other propensities or desires overcome or
submerge the real one. In such a case, no single disposition (endowment, propensity) is the first among many. At one time, A may be; another time, B; then C, and so on. Consequently, more 'unreal' pleasures appear concerning more things on more occasions. "One thinks it not unworthy to imitate dogs or wind." Moreover, since the multitude's dispositions are so skewed and pitched with ups and downs, they promote extremes in the just regime, and no extreme is tolerated. All of it is unlawful. While anything encouraging moderation is lawful. Plato's music does just this, he contends: "So far all these reasons there is rearing in music" (402a5). But, Plato continues to fail to show the basic distinction between the "many" and the "few" especially when reflecting upon his comments on the few's weak, malleable and tenuous 'philosophic' character.

The purpose of his music, he continues, is to "impress an image of the good disposition" (401b2). Impressing bad dispositions is like being reared on bad grass. However, to become receptive for the image requires a personal endowment which knows what is fine, graceful and beneficial (401c5). This gift again is that good disposition. And music is sovereign because it 'takes hold' of the soul's innermost parts and permits the good disposition (endowment) to see the "image" being impressed. Lastly, all of this process precedes anyone grasping "reasonable speech," i.e., the dialectic. Language development, to Plato, comes somewhat later, although both are akin to one another (402a5).

In effect, the soul of the guardian, moreso than anyone else's, is by nature receptive (disposed, endowed) to the image music educa-
tion impresses upon it. If it is properly disposed, it will receive the image. If not, it will turn away from Plato's music. Although Plato inundates us with the mechanics of the process, at this point, he, however, has managed to beg the real question, namely, what makes the "image" impressed the best one for the young guardian or, for that matter, anyone?

The Nature of the Competent Man's Reasoning

He partially answers the above question when describing a competent musical person. Competence exists if one is able to "read a few letters (large or small) anywhere (402b). To explain the letter A, for example, is to say the letter A is in whatever form or medium it displaces, e.g., sand, shadows of A, and so on. At first, however, it must be known as a letter A, before it can be recognized as the letter A anywhere. It must be named an A. It must have certain characteristics that only A's have, i.e., its own description. This same analysis holds for any sequence of letters that represent things. "They, the letters, didn't escape us in any combinations they turn up" (402b).

Further, Plato claims the image of writing represents a thing (402b4). For example, the writing, TREE, is an image of an actual tree. To know both the writing or the image in any medium or form (paper, shadow), one must first recognize the actual thing, i.e., a tree. Like the A, the thing is named a Tree, and is described like all things in common.

We wouldn't recognize them (images) before knowing things themselves...And both the thing and image is a part of the same art and discipline (402b5-6).

In effect, this skill implies an ability to recognize a tree in
different places. If one knows this thing, treeness, is in places X, Y and Z, one is said to have identified something common in all trees in all locations at any time, whatever the form or medium a particular tree displaces. So, if the form of Tree A is an actual tree, Tree B is an image of A and Tree C is the writing TREE of Tree B, all three trees represent the idea of treeness. This idea of treeness is peculiar to trees alone.

Plato carries this example one step further to intangible concepts. A musical man is competent also if one can identify the forms of the virtues and vices everywhere, i.e., in whatever form (in themselves, in things, in images) and likewise believe that all are part of the same art and discipline (402c). To recognize courage (like treeness), it must be known, ideally, in itself first. But since, it is an intangible, the second choice is to know it in things, then images, Plato suggests. But in whatever medium or form courage displaces, one who is still competent in music, is able to recognize it. But is Mr. Artisan a courageous man, if he behaves or reflects courage in his way or Plato's? Presumably it is Plato's courage that sets a guardian apart from the artisan. But this distinction is yet unclear.

Plato's Gymnastic Theory of Education

Turning to Plato's second part of his educational system, namely, exercise for the body, he endorses the Asclepuisian notion. Besides having simple diets, easily prepared and boiled food, the Asclepusians say the greatest cause of illness is idleness. He believed that the Asclepiod era was a healthy time and a healthy city and presumably just. Men were compelled to work at certain tasks (406cl-4). No
craftsman was permitted nor desired to be sick for a long time. If one is incurable, one returns to work until death comes. It is of no pro-
fit to oneself or to the city, if one remains sickly idle (407a). More-
over, excessive body care inhibits learning and the proper practice of one's art. If conventional prescribed drugs prove ineffective, living with a sick body profits no one (408b4).

Following this advice, Plato is intolerant of those who are ill most of the time. If a disease is not cured, one should resume one's work. Again, Plato's principle is that the regime is harmed by idle or ill men, ostensibly because it burdens others by decreasing the quantity and quality of goods and labor. A sick farmer, judge, ruler decreases their arts' advantages to the regime as a whole. Besides the weakness for not allowing for research or experimentation to perfect the art of medicine, further, Plato's intolerance of the grave legiti-
mately ill is another aspect of an intimidating domestic policy. He seems to escape this charge for he states that a good craftsman

will voluntarily say goodbye to a doctor, return to own home cures, and continue to work until he dies. ... He then is rid of his troubles (406e).

But such a comment is derived from the presumption that the Asclepusians were healthy and just. He gives us virtually no evidence to support this claim.9

9 In A. D. Lindsay's The Republic of Plato (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957), p. xxiv, the author suggests that, while Plato was influenced by the Asclepian school of medicine, neither Plato nor the Athenian assem-
blies recognized particular authorities concerning questions on remedy-
ing problems of human behavior. Previous speculative sciences indeed brought no certain conclusions or added value to life, although Plato implies that the Asclepian medical technique could be applied to the Greeks' social affairs.
In addition, the city's doctors and lawyers must be well trained at an early age. It is not a detriment for a doctor (like it is for a judge) to be of ill health and still practice one's art well. A doctor treats ill bodies with his knowledge of illness. In fact, it is best for one to experience all diseases to practice one's art well. This example is the extent of Plato's endorsement of objective research. One's body is the source of one's knowledge for the perfection of the art of medicine. This assumption leads to an apparent inconsistency concerning Plato's earlier statement, where he indicated "prolonged illnesses tend to inhibit learning and the proper practice of one's art" (407ab). For one to experience all diseases (or even the bulk of them) and to properly learn from this encounter seems, somewhat superhuman; in the meantime, one is still required to cure the diseases of others in the regime! Even assuming the possibility of such "great" doctoral feats in medicine, one wonders why Plato discredits the potential contributions of other artisans (shoemakers, farmers, etc.) who belong to the same class as doctors. In any event, his essential point is that a doctor with an ill body makes for an advantage for the medical art, assuming one's soul is well. A good soul, in the final analysis, rules over ill bodies.

On the other hand, in the case of the judge's art, a different situation exists. Here, the judge's soul rules another's soul. A good one (a virtuous one) treats an ill soul (one with vice). So, no taint of injustice must accompany the education of the young judge's soul. "A good judge has no pattern of bad affections" (409b). One must be late in knowing what injustice is. One uses one's knowledge of injustice later in life, not like the doctor using one's personal experiences
of illness as an aid to treat disease (a vice).

In effect, Plato is saying both, doctor and judge, must have good souls, each disposed to his particular techne. Both rule with them: one over ill bodies; the other over ill souls. Besides the obvious difference in their objects, the potential judge's soul differs also in being more prone, it seems, to be tainted by vice, if exposed to it early. The young doctor has no such problem when one's soul is so exposed. Plato makes no contrary assertion. This paradox raises an interesting question, in that, why should a judge's soul be more affected by its vice than a doctor's by its? Plato takes great pain to prevent the judge from being influenced by the object of the thing one is to rule or change, namely, injustice. Whereas, with the doctor, one is in the "heat of battle," so to speak. Perhaps a partial answer to this dilemma is that it seems that men's souls are disposed less to intangible realities, e.g., the virtues and vices. They are more vulnerable or unsure of their art's particular advantages than men disposed to medicine, carpentry, and the like. The latter see disease being cured, houses being built. The former, however, continue to see more bad than good men, and so on. So, to be less shaken in their faith associated with learning to rule well, one must avoid the unjust world until one's pattern of Plato's justice is molded in one's soul first. They are innocent and easily deceived by unjust men, because they have no affection similar to those of bad men (409b2). But is not cloisterism a notion closely associated with the behavior of innumerable teachers who seclude aspiring disciples for propagandastic purposes?

In addition, both music and gymnastics are designed for the whole soul. Exercise alone produces savageness. Music alone, teachers
Savageness is derived from the spirited part of one's nature. But, if it is trained with music, the spirited becomes courageous. It will defend what is good or advantageous for the city. Likewise, as tameness comes from the philosophic part, with exercise, it becomes orderly besides. The balance between savagery (tension) and tameness (relaxation) produces courageous, moderate man (411a). All of this analysis suggests, in effect, the good guardian must love the city. Love for anything exists when one believes one thing is an advantage to the thing and oneself. This love (conviction, opinion, belief) must be a steady one. But, again, it all hinges on more than what Plato has said, namely, why will his city make men just and happy?

Finally, Plato finds a dubious way (like the Phoenicians) to explain natural dispositions or differences in men. It is the noble lie which, if believed, tells how one is fashioned or educated in one's own peculiar way (414b7). No person is really responsible for one's education. All education took place before birth and the way one is now is how one basically should be.10 If one is a ruler, one should rule. If a farmer, one should farm.

While, in truth, at that time they were under the earth within, being fashioned and reared themselves, and their arms and other tools being crafted. Everyone are siblings too (414e1-3).

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10 In B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell's *Plato's Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 158, it somewhat endorses the Myth of the Metals. They suggest that Plato means to intimate that almost any new fable may be rendered credible over time. The "Metal Myth" (noble lie) is not more improbable than the old one was at first or the old one more true than the new. In effect, any ruler of a new regime especially must be taken into one's confidence. It is essentially an act of faith that the ruled must manifest for the ruler's opinions.
Plato's concern here is that men who rule should perhaps rule, but they are practicing the ruling art improperly, i.e., unjustly. But Plato opens two questions that are unanswered as of yet 1) is the lie a credible tool for ruling well and 2) what is the 'just' way to rule?

Nature and the Effect of Common Ownership of Property

Since Plato previously advocated common ownership of property, he must show why private ownership will interfere with one's happiness. Normally, men are considered happy if they are permitted to possess gold, houses, and the like. His guardians, for example, are prevented from owning anything, privately. They can only share the essential things in common, e.g., food, men or women, shelter.\textsuperscript{11}

But for them alone of those in the city, it is not lawful to handle gold and silver. And whenever they'll possess private land, houses, and currency, they'll be housebuilders, farmers and (traders) instead of guardians, and they'll become masters and enemies of other citizens, not allies, all of which will rush to the city's destruction (417ab).

To answer the question, he further declares:

It is not suitable for guardians to possess gold or property. When a new city is begun it is like painting a new picture. The fairest colors go on the fairest parts. Each part possess an attribute that suits it best. Each has its own art and assigned its share of happiness (421bc).

\textsuperscript{11} We know that Plato abolished the family system and endorses the regulation of reproductive practices especially for the guardian class. His purpose is mainly to breed better citizens mainly for political stability. H. D. P. Lee states, however, in his Plato, The Republic (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1958), p. 42, that these sorts of prohibitions are self-defeating. While Plato sees family loyalty as a distraction to proper uniformity in a community, Lee claims that only by strengthening family ties will a community become strong. He argues that greater community loyalty draws its strength from smaller ones (families) which it contains.
Obviously, these declarations beg the question: Why no private property? Being somewhat ambiguous, he argues that private possession is the main cause of extreme wealth and poverty which, in turn, is the leading influence for corruption and producing bad men.

Take the craftsmen and consider whether wealth and poverty corrupt and make men bad (442d). The rich potter becomes less diligent, it is believed. Wealth is the cause of idleness, carelessness and, in the end, one becomes a bad potter. On the other hand, a poor potter, lacking adequate tools, will produce shoddy pots.

Then from both poverty and wealth, the product of one's art and men themselves become worse (421e2-3).

He concludes then that the guardian who may own things will also tend to corrupt himself. But is the analogy between the potter's corruption and the guardian's a proper one? It seems Plato is comparing apples to oranges. The guardian, supposedly, is a 'cut above' the ordinary money-maker. In view of being of better stock, the same things (private property) may not have such a corrupting influence as it has on the 'poorer stock.' In addition, Plato's assessment that "men become bad in themselves" leaves something to be wanting, despite the agreement by "the others," who docilely assent, repeatedly: "By far... That too, by far...It looks like it..." (421de). Perhaps, largely by experience, they have encountered rich, idle, careless men, and poor, illiberal men. But, some rich are not idle, and some poor, not illiberal. Plato unfortunately neglects to discuss these rather important exceptions. Instead, he, in a way, prefers to play upon "their" conventional psychology, to wit: Poverty and wealth corrupt. Both
may corrupt men. But, Plato in charging poverty and wealth as universal culprits, indeed, omits an obligation to explain, at least, why in some or perhaps in most cases, they do not.

In view of advocating neither wealth or poverty for his city, he implies a regime consists of a broad economic class. It is a moderate regime. Moderate regimes, Plato contends further, can successfully defend and even make war against wealthy ones. His guardians are so trained to be "champions in the art of war." He argues, if a fat boxer can easily fight against two, fat, non-boxers, a champion guardian could easily resist a wealthy enemy (422bc). His assumption is that a wealthy regime's soldiers will be careless, fat and lazy, forever doomed by wealth's corrupting influence. One wonders if his foreign policy is not a frivolous one.

But, to offset such an objection, he claims further that an extremely wealthy city is essentially many cities that can pose no real threat to a moderate one. A wealthy city is really many cities, rich ones and poor ones. Having this sort of aggregate, Plato calls for the military tactic of "subdividing and conquering" (423a4). That is to say, offer money and power of the rich to the poor, if the poor would ally with Plato's regime. Gaining adherents for Plato's cause can emerge easily, if they know his domestic policy of economics, namely, "All property is shared in common, and war is justified, if one citizen keeps the property of others" (422d1-2). By this persuasion, Plato believes it would fragment the wealthy regime and, in the end, enlarge his city with newer devotees.

He warns us, however, that a proper proportion must prevail be-
tween land availability and population size. If one or the other is disproportionate, one or the other must be let go (423b5). A city, for example, can have too much land, confiscated or otherwise. A moderate city is one which is one and sufficient.

Each person must be brought to that which naturally fits him, one man, one art. One artist must not produce many arts. Likewise the whole city will naturally grow as one, not many (423d1-4).

He further declares a city is sufficient if the guardians protect the "one, great sufficient thing," namely, their education and rearing (423e3). It will produce sensible men who believe in the old proverb, "friends have all things in common (424a). It will permit a regime to grow circularly; sound education produces good natures, which, in turn, produce better education, and so on. So, in the final analysis, it allows for innovation, especially in music and gymnastics, nor any new praises or many laws. The "great sufficient thing" makes gentle men, and makes what is good self-evident. The guardian and Apollo must protect and preserve what has been founded (427c6).

Conceivably, Plato's delicate land-population balance could quite easily lead to a fierce foreign policy. His premise is that the land to people ratio must be such as to work for the advantage of the whole city. And any disproportion most likely would make a city weak. For example, a sudden or even slow land surplus/insufficiency or population explosion/decrease, can make the city vulnerable to poverty or wealth. A surplus of land tends to lead to more appropriation and speculation by the immoderate, money-maker (artisan) class. Similarly, an increase in population alone leads to high unemployment, and, hence, poverty.

Given these implications from his premise, Plato seems to suggest ostra-
cism or confiscation to remedy either the surplus or unemployment problems. Earlier, one learns that conquest and confiscation is more desirable than ostracism (37337).

Concerning the question of dampening the desires of the (artisan) money-maker, Plato seems to apply the idea of "sufficiency" as a remedial measure. While generally the craftsmen seek self-satisfaction, Plato believes his educational policy over time will produce the better natures, which will, in turn, make for a better policy. Education is seen largely as an ongoing, progressive art, limited to the extent it becomes innovative. This restriction, however, is the crucial concern. When does education become innovative? No apparent insight is given to explain this dilemma, except, he states, when it disrupts his music or gymnastics. But much of this argumentation rests upon earlier subtle or tenuous presuppositions.

Is the City Virtuous?

At this point in the discussion, Plato asserts his city has essentially been founded. "So, now, son of Ariston, your city would now be founded" (427c6). He admits, however, a large task has yet to be completed, namely, is it just, unjust, is there a difference between the two, and which promotes happiness?

He begins with a theoretical blueprint, as it were, on what a correctly founded city is and then compares the "blueprint" with the one he established. First, he asserts a correct city must be perfectly good, that is, it must be wise, courageous, moderate and just. Of course, these are the virtues he previously discussed. In a sense, he seemed to have predetermined what a city is at the outset of the
Republic, argued about these notions, and believes that the discussion was valid. Secondly, to learn whether they are present in his city, he plays, as it were, a 'marbles game,' pretending the four virtues are like marbles. The purpose of the game is to find the "justice marble." If it were found first, the game ends. But, if the other three marbles were recognized at first, the remaining marble would have to be recognized as the "justice one." So, by this technique of elimination, he intends to recognize justice in the city.

Apparently the justice marble cannot be recognized at the outset, so he is forced to look for another. He looks into the city and strangely enough, "it is of good counsel." It is wise, because it contains a special kind of knowledge, by which men counsel well. Although it has many sorts of knowledge, e.g., farming, carpentry, this special knowledge is geared to "how a city as a whole best deals with itself and other cities" (428dl-2). Moreover, it belongs to a few citizens (true guardians), mainly because their knowledge is special, i.e., it deals with the whole city and all its parts (4283l-2). So, the smallest class (wisdom) has the ability to rule and supervise the other classes. One questions, however, why the guardians' knowledge is so special. It seems that all the knowledge in the city is special. The primary difference between it and the others is that the former's area of control is larger, and perhaps, more significant for

Francis MacDonald Cornford suggests that Plato's sole pursuit of wisdom, the enthronement of reason, as it were, cannot be the cure-all for society's ills. He calls for some sort of compromise between "existing conditions" and the enduring unquestionable principles without which any legitimate reform is jeopardized. See his The Republic of Plato (New York: Oxford Press, 1965), pp. xxvii-xxviii, for further elaboration.
the whole's well being. But this fact is not shown yet. One ques-
tions, too, why Plato attributes this ruling knowledge to just a few
citizens. Nothing at this point would lead one to this conclusion,
excepting one precarious implication. If the money-maker class (the
artisan) is the largest, the other classes (auxiliaries and guardians)
must be smaller in size. And, since the money-makers' area of compe-
tence is particularized in the city, they, in a sense, preclude them-
selves from 'ruling and supervising' the whole. But number or lack of
size should not be standard for determining the lack of virtue or exis-
tence of it. In fact, after spotting wisdom, Plato admits of the pre-
cariousness of the argument when he states: "So we've found wisdom...
I don't know how...this one of the four..." (429a4-5).

Is their city courageous? Courage, to Plato, is that element
which defends the city. It is part of the city and has the power to
preserve opinion on what is terrible, what is the city's education, per-
severes in spite of extreme pains, pleasures, fears and desires (429d).
It is like colorfast dye, impervious to lyes, sodas, and so forth. In
the end, it is a kind of power that preserves what is right and lawful,
which requires education also. Slaves or beasts are not courageous.
They lack education on what is right and lawful. Theirs is not lawful
(430b7). Lawful courage, on the other hand, can be either political
and/or general. The former induces one to "die at the law's command"
(fn. 16, Book IV), and the latter is the willingness to question any
opinion. In the end, likewise, all docilely agree that courage is a
part of their city.

The third virtue, moderation, is found and explained this way.
It is not like wisdom or courage. Each resides in a particular part of the city or in man. Courage resides in the auxiliary, and wisdom resides with the ruler. Moreover, both reside in a particular part of the soul of man. But to explain moderation, Plato takes a cue from the conventional psychology. The phrase, "stronger than himself," is commonplace, and it is applied to moderation in the following manner. Plato claims that "in the soul there is something better and something worse" (431a4-5). When one is considered "stronger than himself," one's better self masters the weaker self, and one is praised for this behavior. But, when one, by bad education or association, is weaker than oneself, the worse larger part masters the smaller better part of the soul, and one is blamed and considered licentious (431b). Given these psychological presuppositions, Plato's listeners agree, without debate or discussion, that their newly founded city will be a moderate one (431b5). Since many diverse bad pleasures and pains exist in the common many, they must be harmonized. They must be controlled by the better part of the city, that is, by permitting the simple desire and prudence (wisdom) of the decent few to master them. Then, the city will be stronger than itself. All men will have the same opinion on who shall rule. The "whole city from top to bottom will use the same chart" (431d).

To summarize, Plato seems to have made the following points about moderation. All men, including the budding guardian, have better and worse selves. The primary difference between the ruling and the money-making class is that the former is educated in the art of ruling, and the latter is not. The money-maker class contains more particular-
ized art forms, while the art of ruling brings with it an unusual ability to master all unruly desires. One becomes more simple and decent. The guardians, in effect, are better than those multitudes who are unable to master their unruly desires. One questions still the ability of his guardians to master their selfish desires. If each class has its job, the money-makers must succumb to the ruler, since it is the ruler alone who knows what is beneficial for the whole city. They must moderate their "love of money" to conform to the ruler's blueprint of what is advantageous for the city. Again, how does the ruler know what is advantageous for the city?

Finally, Plato discusses the "justice marble." The notion comes into view largely as a procedural affair.

That one practice one function naturally suited to oneself (433a6-7). ... One minds one's own business and does not meddle in another's affairs, especially between the three classes (434c7-8). ... This the practice of minding one's own business ... when it comes into being in a certain way, is probably justice (433b3-4).

So, it seems justice provides the power by which moderation, courage and wisdom come to be accompanied with the power to preserve themselves.\(^\text{13}\)

In effect, justice is a power derived from his own deliberations. The preceding discussion was the instrument by which "the virtues came to be." This notion is the result of his persuasion of the "others" to believe that virtues exist the way they do. He continues:

... and, yet we were saying that justice is what is left over (a residual) to preserve what was found (i.e., three virtues) (433c).

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\(^{13}\) J. D. Mabbott somewhat reinforces this interpretation in his "Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?" Mind, 46, (1937), pp. 470-74. He maintains justice is a certain kind of "conditional presence." It has the power to render the soul harmonious. The harmony itself, though, is justice. Harmony is not a consequence of justice. ... Just acts are.
In addition to being a product of "debate," justice consists of something more than "what has come to be." A cyclical effect appears. It acts, somewhat, like a catalyst for discussion as well as producing things, i.e., the virtues.

He adds, however, virtues by themselves, cannot be ranked easily with one another in terms of which can do the city the most good. Somewhat of a rivalry exists between justice especially and the others. Each virtue is possessed by one of the classes. Given that justice is a power compelling one to practice one art, each class, in effect, practices its own form of justice. A money-maker's justice is to be moderate, a guardian's is courage and a ruler's is wisdom. The minding of their particular businesses stems from the pervading power, justice (433d5-7). Rivalry diminishes and ranking becomes obvious, Plato implies, when the ruler, in fact, exercises his justice. The ruler alone has the skill or art to judge the merits of lawsuits. It is his duty exclusively to decide what belongs or does not belong to another. In this sense, his justice, by his "special" knowledge, is the final 'say.' The other two classes do not have such knowledge or power, although each can do or have what is its own within each's limits (433c8-9). But Plato still must show the peculiarity of the ruler's competence to rule. Up to this point he has not convincingly demonstrated it. Shall we take what he says on faith? It seems that he would be the first to answer in the negative.
CHAPTER IV

INTERNAL JUSTICE

The Divisions of a Single Man: The Argument

We have seen Plato's treatment of justice viewed in the larger sense, i.e., in the city. But, for justice's forms (moderation, courage, wisdom) to be useful, they must apply to single men (434e4). A city is just when the three classes mind their own business, i.e., each practicing their peculiar virtues. He contends that individuals, too, are just if they possess these forms in similar ways. It is apparently self-evident to Plato and "the others" that if a city can have these forms and dispositions, their possessing them must have been derived from men. "Surely they didn't get there from any other place" (434e2-3). So, it is a foregone conclusion that they exist in each man. Men, Plato claims, have been influenced by three geographical regions, namely, 1) the spirited disposition (courage) is from the upper Thracian region, 2) the love of learning (wisdom) comes from the middle Greek region and 3) the desire or love of money comes from the lower Phoenician-Egyptian region. Plato offers no evidence, however, to support such influences. They are accepted as being true (435e1-7).

But, how are these parts of dispositions (forms) related to one another in one's soul? Are they separate or are they linked together in some fashion? Plato describes their relationships by using the principle of contradiction. One whole thing, at the same time, cannot move and be at rest (436c4-5). A part of a whole, however, can either

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move or be at rest while another part does the opposite. Some of Plato's contemporaries (not his listeners) disagree. They contend that a spinning top, for example, as a whole moves and remains motionless simultaneously, if its spike is fixed. It spins circularly, without moving laterally. Plato sees the example differently. He claims that the surface of the top, i.e., a part of the whole, is moving in relation to the top's exact center, another part of the top. A series of centers forms an imaginary line called a straight or a vertical.

So, to Plato, the top consists of two parts, the circumference and the vertical. The circumference moves, while the vertical remains straight and motionless. It does not lean or turn. Consequently, the whole top is not moving and moving simultaneously. A part of the top moves, while another part does not. Based upon this observation, he concludes that parts of things can move while other parts remain at rest. No whole thing, per se, can do its opposite, simultaneously. He admits though that this sort of logic is somewhat frustrating, as he remarks:

Let's answer this is so, go ahead, if it appears otherwise, all our conclusions based upon it will be undone (437a5-6).

Plato's frustration is indeed shared also. One becomes rather disheartened, at times, with his logic. To adequately understand the principle of contradiction or of opposites, it seems crucial that one knows what Plato means by "whole things." He states that "whole things" can not do its opposite (move and not move) simultaneously. Using Plato's examples of man, as a whole, and an arm, as a part of man, it is implied that an arm (like, eyes, hair, etc.) is not a substantial part of being a man. If it were, Plato would be suspect of self-contradic-
tion. So, taking the arm as an unsubstantial part of man, Plato, at least, should have explained the nature of the "whole man" or the "substantial man" to complete his argument. As it is, he does not. How does one know, then, when a "whole anything" is not doing its opposite, unless the "whole" is adequately defined?

Having set up a theory of opposites, he gets further agreement that human dispositions and actions can also be treated as opposites. For example, to accept is opposite to refuse, to embrace is opposite to thrust away, and so on. Applying this activity to a soul, a desiring part of the soul longs for what it desires to be its own. To the extent that part wills something, it says "yes" to itself, and then reaches to it. The opposite is also true. Another part will reject what is not its own. The soul then has, at least, two distinct parts, the desiring (the artisan in the city) and the forbidding (the ruler in the city).

The difference between them, Plato suggests, is based upon what each depends, i.e., on their objects (438d8-9). The desiring part is dependent on particular things primarily for its own benefit. One seeks spicy food, because it satisfies a particular desire; one wants to learn a particular art, say, medicine, because one wants to make money for oneself, and so on. On the other hand, the forbidding part is dependent on general objects supposedly aimed at benefiting the whole thing. It may forbid the use of spicy food, if it will injure the whole body; it may forbid the practice of medicine, if the whole body or even medical science, as a whole, is threatened. Likewise, it will forbid the desiring part of soul to act unruly, if the whole per-
son's well-being is jeopardized. The forbidding part has the ability to calculate or to reason, and as such, its sole function is to master the "bidding of the desiring part of the soul" (439c5-6). Without such an oversight function, Plato believes that the desiring part (the artisan class) would expire from its own lust. It is by calculation or reason that the soul opposes such vice. While Plato enlarged the argument with the inclusion of the theory of contradiction, he essentially has not shown that the forbidding part (granting its existence) possesses general oversight knowledge or that it too may not also be self serving.

The last and third part of the triune soul, the spirited, is discussed. It is as distinct as the others are or does it link with one of them as an appendage? By convention, he argues, that one is angered (spirited) or makes war with one's desires when one succeeds in doing what the calculating or forbidding part deplores, e.g., "looking at the dead corpses" (440a4-5). Plato implies that the soul treats the spirited part as one thing. It is considered the "anger" that the forbidding part manifests against the "desiring part." One blames oneself when one goes against one's reason. For example, if one thinks oneself unjust, a noble person is less prone to be angry at one's personal suffering inflicted by one who seems just. Or put another way, if one

14 William Chase Greene's "Paradoxes in the Republic," Harvard Studies in Classical Philosophy, 63, (1958), pp. 210-11, believes it a real psychological danger to say that one part of man is "better" than another, meaning the other part is "worse." One can be torn with inner conflict. So, he suggests why term the natural desires "worse" and reason, "better." Rather than setting up this sort of dichotomy, Greene urges that Plato should have reckoned with the "whole man" and begin to realize that pleasure has its proper place.
is thought to be done an injustice, one's spirit allies with what seems just, until it is soothed by one's calculating part (440e4). As a result, Plato contends that the spirited part is considered as a third part, but an auxiliary or appendage more or less of the calculating part.

At this point in the discussion Plato feels that he has shown the resemblance of the man to the city. Despite the expressed disenchantment with his argument, he is confident to conclude that a man can be wise, courageous, moderate and just as the city can be. The city's justice is similar to a single man's justice. If the ruler is wise and rules the city, the calculating part is wise and rules the soul. If the auxiliary-guardian obeys and defends the opinion of the ruler, the spirited allies with the calculating part. Both must control the largest part, the multitude in the city or the desiring part of the soul. Otherwise, enslavement or inappropriate classes will ruin the city or man (442b1-2). So, the entire city or whole is just, if that which we are so often saying is operating and in the same way (442d4)... Each part minds own business... so are you still looking for justice to be different from this power which produces such men and cities?... Answer, No, I'm not (443b3-4)... So, we probably hit upon the origin and model for justice (443c).

Plato briefly compares, in summary fashion, justice to injustice. Justice in the city is external justice. It is a power that produces wise, courageous and moderate men to take part of the public affairs of the city. Justice in men is internal justice. It is a power that permits each man set, as it were, his own house in order and be a friend to oneself. That is to say, each part has its duty, and each must not
meddle with another's. In this way, one will act rightly. And, one will act only when such actions will produce or preserve the condition in which one finds oneself. One shall be in the condition to be just, according to Plato.

Injustice, on the other hand, is the opposite to justice. The parts of the soul or city are in rebellion with one another. Meddling is rampant. The desiring part which ought to be a slave to the calculating part rules it. He characterizes this condition as vice entire. Vice in the soul or in regimes takes on at least four significant forms, while virtue has only one, justice.

This one we've described, but it could be named in two ways. If one exceptional man arose among the rulers, it would be called a kingship, if more, an aristocracy (445d2-5).

In Rudolph H. Weingartner's "Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXV, (1964-65), pp. 250-51, he states that psychologically all men have three parts (reason, spirit, appetitive) and, if each performs their own task, all men will be internally just. Reason will rule, spirit will support reason, and the appetitive will acquiesce. The conflict arises, however, he says, when one's internal justice competes with the "ways" of the city, external justice. So, it seems imperative to Weingartner that Plato make it rather obvious how both kinds of justice can work in unison, instead of trying to show laboriously their existence.

R. W. Hall also takes notice of the relationship between internal and external justice. In "Justice and the Individual in the Republic," Phronesis, IV, (1959), pp. 155-56, he raises an interesting dilemma, but unfortunately does not reach a satisfactory conclusion. He says that if most men are capable of internal (personal) justice, they indeed could govern themselves by an intelligible drive within themselves. Each man potentially has the "knowledge how" from this educative precept. Subordination to the state is not that necessary. But, he adds, a required degree of inter-dependence is essential to live peacefully. Each entity (state and individual) need each other, is unclear on how this relationship will work.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL POWER FROM THE GRAND LEAP TOWARD "KNOWLEDGE"

The Philosopher's Edge Over the Many

In the previous discussion, Plato has spoken of a pattern of justice. He admits though that the pattern is inherently precarious. The founding of a just city is like a painter's picture of the most beautiful human being. Each may resemble an ideal. Speech is, as it were, the tool that permits one to create the likeness of the ideal city. It is analogous to the painter's instruments with which one draws the ideal man. In the verbal sense, then, the just city is a possibility. He forewarns us, however, not to be too optimistic. One cannot prove that the founding of an actual city will be similar to the one created in speech (472e2-3). A natural paradox exists between what is said and what actually can be done. The nature of acting attains the less truth than in speaking (473a1-3).

Furthermore, things that come to be, by speech, are not the full truth either. Speech is, as it were, a giant step away from the ideal. The likeness symbolized by speech and the ideal itself remain far

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17 R. S. Bluck comments on Plato's ideal state. In his "Plato's Ideal State," Classical Quarterly, IX, (1959), pp. 166-67, he maintains that even Plato's rulers must restrain their appetites and redirect their energies in one direction, otherwise their ruling ability is weakened ----"a stream with many channels loses its force."
apart from one another. Naturally men lack the precise language to describe the ideal accurately. One can only construct and describe the conditions by which a city or a man can function in relative happiness. The more the "conditions" are emulated, the happier man becomes (472d).

To approximate the conditions (forms) of justice, he strongly advocates the blending of philosophy and political power in a man. The existing ruler must learn to philosophize, or philosophers must rule (473dl).

Plato defines for us what a philosopher is. A philosopher loves all kinds of learning. Generally, a philosopher is like other lovers, e.g., sights, sounds, bodies. Each lover desires all parts of the thing loved (474c8-10). Wine lovers make excuses to love all forms of wine, although one kind is preferred over another. The lover of honor will even make excuses to love those honored men who refuse to reciprocate honors. But, the philosopher is unlike the others in a significant way. The "others" delight in fair sounds, fair bodies, and the like. Their notion of "fairness" is applied to each sort of experience, and, as a result, it appears as many things. Fairness is not considered by them as one thing, i.e., the fair, itself. The philosopher, on the other hand, Plato asserts, can seize and delight in the

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18 On the other hand, R. Demos argues that Plato's state as it is written in words is not a factual one. In "Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrines of the Ideal State," Classical Quarterly, VII, (1957), pp. 165-67, he contends that Plato's state is purely an ideal one. "The city described can be found nowhere on Earth" (529a-b). Demos concluded that Plato's state is indeed the City of Zeus. While a city may not have been founded on Earth, it certainly does not follow that one better than an existing city could not be established.
fair itself. But, his assertion is a mere supposition. The existence of the fair and the other ideals come to be largely as a result of Plato's cajoling Glaucon into granting their existence. No evidence was presented to substantiate their existentiality.

"It wouldn't be at all easy to tell someone else. But, you (Glaucon), I suppose, will grant me this. Since fair is opposite to ugly, they are two. So, each is one. This same argument supplies to justice, injustice, good and bad" (476al-6).

Besides receiving an outright major concession (free of debate) from his brother Glaucon that ideals exist, Plato's next "burden" is to explain how a few, rare men (philosophers) can perceive these ideals. He does not explain "the how," but continues to dogmatize. Philosophers see "fairness" in things as a likeness or a reflection of the fair, itself. Those who "believe" the fair exists itself are awake. Being awake is to know, and to know is to possess knowledge. On the other side, most others cannot perceive the ideal, even if led to it. They think 'fairness' is an actual embodiment of the fair in a thing. That is to say, the fair does not exist in and of itself. It is in a thing, inseparable from the visible world. So, these men dream.

"Doesn't dreaming, whether one is asleep or awake, consist in believing a likeness of something to be not a likeness, but rather the thing itself to which it is like" (476c4-7)?

Plato's polemic begs two important questions, namely, 1) what is...

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In Steven Tigner's, "Plato's Philosophical Uses of the Dream Metaphor," *American Journal of Philology, XCI*, (1970), pp. 208-9, he suggests that the Platonic 'dream' embodies some sort of intellectual richness that is more overlooked than it should. The dreaming geometer of 533bc grasps the real, but does not account for his assumptions. They are unarticulated. The acquisition, Tigner believes, is on the way to episteme. Secondly, a dreamer to Tigner can be aware of dreaming, while moving to the real, which is richer than a delusion where awareness is unplausible.
the nature of the ideal, invisible world and 2) by what special knowledge do a few men perceive that world? The mere statement alone that a few men possess knowledge because they think thus and so, while others do not think this way (they have opinion) is certainly dogmatic. The "special" insight of the philosopher borders on pure speculation at this juncture.

A Short Epistemological Framework

Perhaps, in anticipation of such a reaction, Plato develops an epistemology to clarify his suppositions. He divides "things" into two extremes, i.e., things that totally are, and nothingness. Knowing means one knows a thing entirely. One, then, possesses knowledge which naturally depends on things that are, entirely. So, knowledge cannot exist in anyone, unless a thing is known completely. Concerning "nothingness," he states it is a complete absence of anything. Nothing is the opposite of something entire. It is an is not. Since it is an opposite to something entire, nothing is entirely unknowable. Anything dependent on it is assigned ignorance.

But, full knowledge of anything is an impossibility for anyone, even for the few, rare men. The philosopher simply tends to find it easier and more delightful to perceive more of the truth than other men do. They love all learning. The love to learn does not mean one knows all things entirely. Consequently, if no one can be fully knowledgeable, Plato must still explain the basic difference between the perceptions of the few vis a vis the many.

By introducing what the notion of "opinion" means, Plato hopes to give us a clue as to how and what the many perceive. (The nature of the
philosopher's perceptions will come later.) Glaucon supplies a partial answer, favorable, in part, to Plato: "...one who can make errors" (477e6-7). If someone errs, one lacks full knowledge of a thing. The mistake indicates one's view is an opinion. One possessing knowledge is free of mistakes. On a theoretical level, Plato explains the difference between opinion and knowledge in the following way. It is asserted that both are powers. Powers are a class of beings capable to do what they can do. Each power has a specific capability, and each cannot be sensed. Their difference lies upon what each depends and on what they can do. Knowledge depends on what IS alone, and it accomplishes faultlessness. Opinion, on the other hand, cannot depend on what IS and on what IS NOT. Each entity is either the domain of knowledge or ignorance. By the process of elimination, it seems, opinion is relegated to another domain. To Plato, it looks darker than knowledge and lighter than ignorance. As a result, opinion must fit somewhere in between them. Analogously, since opinion is neither light (like knowledge) or dark (like ignorance), it is both of them, simultaneously. It is dimly lit.

Origin and Content of the Opinion of the Many

Let us proceed to the original question. What do most men possess, opinion or knowledge? For Plato, obviously, it will be opinion. But, how will he show it? He is somewhat clever in the ways this conclusion is reached.

It is agreed that the best of "the many" see many fair things. Playing upon a human foible, he asks whether there ever will be a time when many fair things will look somewhat ugly too, and the just look
somewhat unjust, etc. Obviously, their answer was affirmative. No one, perhaps except Plato's chosen few, would say otherwise. Man will look at another man and say one is just, but at another time, will say one is not so just, especially if the initial qualification is compared to one more just. The same sort of argument holds for special relationships. A big thing may look small, if it is compared to a bigger thing at another time.20

As a consequence of their admissions, Plato has accomplished what he had set out to do. His intention was to demonstrate that the many fair things have something ugly too. Some just things have some unjust things too, and so on. These things are neither fair themselves or nothing. They are something of both. So, their appropriate place must fall between things and not being. They "roll around" between these extremes. Since these objects have come to light this way, they must be opinionable. Opinion is the power that is dependent upon things both IS and IS NOT. In the final analysis, then, most men possess an opinion of the many things. The philosopher, however, is not so psycho-

20 On this point, R. E. Allen argues that Plato's "opposites" are merely contraries. In "The Argument from Opposites V," Review of Metaphysics, XV, (1961), pp. 326-29, Allen takes the position against the Idealists who essentially maintain that what exists may appear self contradictory. Self contradiction is the degree of reality in something, while things (substantive or evaluative) are not. They are what they are which the mind beholds by degrees of understanding. Allen, however, states that nothing can be incompatibly qualified. Anything can be qualified by comparative or evaluative opposites. That is, there is something taller or wiser than other things. So, to Allen, Plato's theory of opposites remains unconvincing.
logically disposed nor fooled.

Some philosopher-types generally considered useless and vicious men. Plato admits the prevailing attitude is present, but it is generally a false one. He maintains that the most competent in any art lack a good reputation by the "many." For example, a true pilot is denied the art of piloting a ship. Most seamen who are a part of the "many" believe the art of piloting is an unteachable one. No one really can know how to navigate a ship with the aid of stars. So they conclude that any art attached to stargazing is useless. As a result, the only way to be a pilot is to bribe, plot, kill, i.e. do evil deeds. The same reasoning applies to the art of ruling. The "many" say that it is an unteachable art. No one really learns anything from the true philosophers. They are queer, vicious men who also want to rule by doing evil deeds.

Plato explains that this sort of obnoxious attitude is a result of a badly educated philosophic nature. Each nature has its appropriate education. Since the philosophic is a vigorous one, it must be given a vigorous education. If it is deprived of its essential quality, the nature becomes bad. As a result of the deprivation, it will become

In a similar fashion, H. W. B. Joseph draws the same conclusion that Allen draws. In Essays On Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 35, he suggests that Plato draws too rigid a distinction between knowledge and opinion. For Plato, only the "real" is the object of knowledge, and the things between knowledge and ignorance are objects of opinion. Using Plato's own examples of double-half, light-heavy, etc., Joseph contends that these illustrations are merely relative terms, and, as such, still can resemble real things. "A" may be greater than "b", but smaller than "C", but yet "A" still can be real. So, it can partake in some sort of knowledge.
worse than an ordinary or weak nature that is deprived of its appropriate education. Greater injustices stem from exceptional natures that are deprived. This supposition rests purely on a psychological convention, to wit, "nothing good or bad can come from the weak or ordinary" (491e3-5).

Plato believes that the typical sophist is an example of one whose philosophic nature is corrupt. The sophist teaches that the angers, fears and pleasures of the "many" are embodiments of many fair, just good things in the city, and they organize this teaching into an art form. Plato sees "the teaching" as a tool to appease the pleasures of the "wild beast" (the many). He sees himself, however, as a sort of messiah, i.e., one who can save the philosophic from this sort of corruptive influence. He adds, though, in sort of desperation, that only from necessity or divine intervention will a philosopher actually come to rule a city.

Origin and Content of Philosophy

If the philosopher's likelihood of ruling becomes apparent, Plato's messianic role of intermediary between gods, needs and the ruling art takes on special significance. The philosopher must know what is meant by the Good. It is Plato's task then to explain it, as the self-appointed sage of all that is right.

The Good is introduced as the greatest study, although Plato admits that it is difficult to understand. However, to avail oneself of it will permit the other virtues to become useful, beneficial, just and, in the end, make men happy (505a1-3). But the Good is not a simplistic pleasure that the "many" say it is. They speak of bad pleas-
also, Nor is it the simple prudence that the "refined" say it is (505b4-5). To Plato, the Good is a nebulous, somewhat mysterious concept which every soul pursues, knowing it is something, and yet unable to grasp it. His philosopher alone can see a glimpse of it.

The Good in itself is like the other virtues are like in themselves. The Good is like its own idea. Recalling his previous remarks, by speech, each thing is fair, is just, is, also, ugly and unjust. The mixture of these qualities makes up the whole thing which can be sensed. Moreover, each thing possesses the fair itself, the just itself, but these qualities cannot be sensed (507b3). The fair itself, for example, conveys an idea of itself which can only be intellected. It cannot be sensed. Likewise, the Good itself conveys its own idea or likeness of itself (506e2-4).

To illustrate the likeness of the Good, Plato seeks to establish a close comparison between the intellected likeness with the things that are seen (or sensed). The intelligible world is related to the visible world. Specifically, the Good is compared to the Sun. The Sun and the idea are the offsprings of the Good (508b11, 506e2-4 and 507b4-6, respectively). His intention is to show that the nature and operation of the Sun in the visible world will help us understand the

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22 Norman Gulley elaborates Plato's position on the role sensual experiences have in achieving the Good. In "Plato's Theory of Recollection," Phronesis, XVI, (1956), pp. 207-8, Gulley suggests that Plato's sensual images cannot be recognized as what they really are. A guardian's images may well have some sort of unity, but will still lack true meaning (401bc), since one's knowledge of their forms is wanting. It is only when one is properly trained from "above" (401de) that one can begin to gain a knowledge of the Good. In effect, Gulley reinforces Plato's theory of Forms.
character of the Good in the intelligible world. 23

He explains what happens in the visible world. Things are seen by sight. Sight is a power that perceives things to be seen. So, there are two distinct powers working with one another. The seeing power (sight) is located in the eye, while the power to be seen (color, shape) is in things. Moreover, without light, a third power, neither of the other two powers can be operational (507e3). Both of them are "yoked" by this most honorable power of light. It seems questionable, however, whether the power to see and the power to be seen are as distinct as Plato contends. Certainly, three distinct objects exist, sun, eye and object. But, to see seems to imply seeing something. One cannot see nothing. Nor can a thing be seen without the power to see. Blind men cannot see. Therefore, to see and to be seen seem to be one in the same process, i.e. seeing. In this sense, both powers are not a distinct class of beings, but simply a coincidental process.

Plato further contends that the Sun, the source of all light, is totally responsible for the three powers' operations. For example, the Sun is the sole cause of the power to see (sight). As such, the Sun

23 A. S. Ferguson takes the position that the Sun and the Good are both excellences, but remain in their own domains. In "Simile of Light Again," Classical Quarterly, XXVIII, (1934), pp. 132-4, Ferguson maintains that each entity does not overlap into the other's field. He contends that Plato's intent is to show the nature of the Good by describing, in an analogous way, what the Sun is and what it does. The Sun causes good in the visible world. It is this world's chief benefactor, and it symbolizes 'seen things'. It is cause of light, though it is not light itself, but something more. Likewise, the Good is the cause of Truth, though not Truth or being itself, and it symbolizes 'unseen things'. Again, Ferguson's point is that a cosmological progression from the physical to the intelligible objects is not Plato's forte.
can be seen by sight itself. In a sense, the creator (sun) of the visible world can be seen by its own creature (sight). The degree of sight depends on whether the eye is turned toward the sun or away from it (508d). It is not difficult to understand why Plato asserts that the power of sight is a separate class of beings. It fits nicely with his analogy concerning the intelligible world.

The nature of seeing (sight) in the eye is compared to the nature of knowing in the soul. To make the relationship vivid, the words associated with seeing are placed in parenthesis alongside of his descriptions in the intelligible region.

When a soul (eye) fixes itself on fair things (shapes/colors), illuminated by truth (light), it knows, intellects (sees) and it appears to possess knowledge (sight). The soul, then, is said to possess an idea of the Good itself. But, when it fixes itself on many things that are both 'is' and 'is not,' it opines; and it is said to possess only opinions. He concludes that the Good does precisely what the Sun does in the visible region. It provides truth (light) to things known (things seen) and the power to know (see) to the soul (eye). So, the Sun occupies in the visible world a position analogous to the idea of the Good in the intelligible world. Moreover, as the cause of truth and knowledge, the idea of goodness can be understood to be things known themselves, similar to the way the sun is seen by sight itself.

In effect, knowledge is a power distinct from a thing's power to be known. By separating the knower from the known, as though they are two, he has been consistent with his theory of light. But, why does
Plato maintain the separation of powers theory? Why not call the "interactions" simply a process of knowing? His entire theory of justice rests on the notion that internal beings do exist. They are the "reservoirs" from which powers emerge, an integral aspect of his view of man's nature.

Educating in Philosophy by Similes and Allegory

Having come to the conclusion, though with diminished optimism, that the philosopher-king could be realized, Plato embarks on the training appropriate for such a ruler. This point in the Republic marks a transition from a discussion of the virtues, guardians and the ideal state to a different level. Previously, the guardians were told to preserve the true belief about their duty to the state. Now, true belief is insufficient. At 497d1-2, there must be some knowledge that the original lawmakers had. The rulers must, in fact, be philosophers, not simply men with true beliefs. They must possess the endurance to pursue the highest kind of knowledge. But, he adds, this way is "the longer and more difficult approach" than the dialectical journey in the previous discussion. Earlier the method in studying the virtues, for example, was mainly psychological. It was a moral psychology of explaining the virtues in terms of three aspects of the soul and the city and the relations between each. At this point, Plato moves to philosophy. If virtues are truly to be understood, a rigorous philosophical training must be undergone by future rulers. Epistemological and metaphysical considerations supercede psychological ones.

What is the highest kind of knowledge? He explains it with three interconnected similes, namely, the Sun, divided Line and the Cave. At
505a3, the highest kind of knowledge is the form of the Good. From it, right acts and usefulness flow. Although admitting the subject is a disputed one, the philosopher, in any event, must be able to grasp, at least, a glimpse of it. He is unable, however, to discuss the Good itself. It is "not part of the thrust of this inquiry." Instead, he decides to talk on what the Good is like. It is like its offspring.

**Simile of the Sun**

Let us discuss the similes briefly, and explain their relationships in depth. The traditional principle relationships between the visible world and the intelligible world is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VISIBLE</th>
<th>INTELLIGIBLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>Idea of the Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>The Truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects</td>
<td>The Forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sight</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Simile of the Divided Line**

The Line simile is a diagrammatic one. A Line is divided into two unequal parts, the lower, smaller segment is the visible world ruled by the Sun, and the upper larger portion is the intelligible world ruled by the Good. Each of these worlds are divided into two unequal parts.

**FIGURE I**

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    Intelligible Region
       E

    ---------------
    C

    Visible Region
        D

    A
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The original Line AB is divided into AC and CB with AC divided into AD and DC; likewise CB into CE and EB. So by construction a certain ratio exists between the Line segments: AC is to CB as AD to DC, and CE is to EB as AC is to CB. Therefore, a specific arithmetic ratio is patented, namely, AD is to DC as CE is to EB. It follows that DC and CE are equal in length, i.e., the two middle portions. Also, Plato states that each higher segment conveys more clarity and reality perceived.

How does Plato fill each segment? AC is the visible world. AD represents images, shadows, reflections, while DC represents the originals of which the likenesses in AD are like. The originals are living things and artifacts, and their copies are the likenesses in AD. In addition, Plato asks us to agree that the visible world (AC) has been divided in respect to degrees of reality and truth (aletheia) in such a way that as the sphere of belief is to the sphere of knowledge (i.e., AC is to CB) so as the copy is the original (like AD is to DC). In this sense, the visible world is a copy of the intelligible world, the original. So, the visible world is represented as the world of belief (to doxaston) (510a7-10). This is an important passage for later consideration.

Concerning the upper segment, the intelligible world, he takes a somewhat different approach. Instead of assigning different objects to CE and EB, like he did for the segments below, he characterizes the areas by different methods of inquiry. In CE, the soul uses the objects of its immediate lower section, DC, as images. These objects in the visible world are originals. In the uppermost segment, EB, the
soul uses no images and inquiries simply by Forms. In CE, the soul begins from hypotheses or assumptions to conclusions, not to a first principle, whereas in EB the soul goes to the first principle or the beginning. It seems clear that Plato is contrasting the method of mathematics in CE with the philosophical method in EB. He then assigns four states of the soul to each segment of the Line. Intelligence (noesis) is put into EB, thinking (dianoia) with CE, belief or trust (pistis) with DC and illusion (eikasia) into AD.

Allegory of the Cave

His last simile or allegory is the Cave illustration. It is designed to express degrees of enlightenment. Dwelling in the lowest part, a prisoner, figuratively, is chained to see shadows on a wall, listen to "their" sounds and to assimilate "their" passions, desires, loves, and so on. Plato compares the cave prisoner to contemporary man. "They are like us" (515a4). So their reality and ours is a world of shadows. He continues by describing the release and the ascent to wisdom. One is freed, turns, sees the statues, and the fire itself. This movement is painful and dazzling. The prisoner still believes the statues are less real than the shadows. He, then, is dragged up to the Cave's entrance to the sunlight. This, again, is painful and dazzling. He still prefers to look at the shadows. Only until later, is he able to look at the objects themselves, the stars, and eventually the Sun itself (516b).

The rescued prisoner pities his former fellows and would be prepared to endure anything than return to his old beliefs and life. If forced to return, it would take time to accustom himself to the dark-
The remaining prisoners, noting the freed man's dilemma, would think the ascent had ruined his sight and would be ready also to kill anyone who tried to be free.

Are Plato's Similes Used For 'Parallel' or 'Illustrative' Purposes?

Having looked at the three similes, let us piece them together. The Line can symbolize four mental states of clarity associated to the four classes of objects ascending the truth. AD would represent the lowest mental clarity and the lowest degree of reality. EB would be the highest clarity and form of reality. So, the Line could be the way the mind would pass to reach the true reality. The Cave simile can apply the Line as a "parallelism." For purposes of illustration, let us place the lowest part of the Line at the Cave wall and run it through and up the Cave to the Sun, itself. One can assume, then, that the journey through the Cave corresponds to the Line's four stages of intelligence.

Another view is that the Line simile can be an extension of the Sun simile, not a parallel condition. At 509c1-2, Plato introduces the Line "to complete the comparison with the Sun". In the Sun simile, the Sun gives light to the visible world, like the form of the Good gives

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24 N. R. Murphy elaborates this point in, "Back to the Cave," Classical Quarterly, XXVIII, (1934). He suggests that "returning in their turn" indicates to us that Plato is thinking of a cave as a permanent feature of his city. His city or regime is not the ideal that some commentators say it is. Murphy interprets Plato as suggesting that life itself is a continuous struggle to learn how to pursue the truth. So, as discoveries are made, newer forms of the Good are also noticed.

truth to the intelligible world. In the Line simile, Plato extends the
comparison with the Sun to illustrate how two methods of inquiry, with
the help of the symbols of the visible world, can lead to the knowledge
of the Good. That is to say, the relationship between the Line's lower
segments is a clue to the relationships of the two upper segments. For
example, AD represents shadows of originals, and DC represents origi-
inals. This relationship of AD to DC is solely and simply the way CE
(math) and EB (philosophy) are compared. Mathematics is a copy and
likeness of its original, the forms of philosophy. Just as a tree is
clearer than its image in the visible world lit by the Sun, so can
philosophy be clearer than its image, mathematics, lit by the Good. As
a result, the lower one-half of the Line is a pure illustration to the
top one-half. It is an analogous "illustration" relationship.

It seems doubtful that "illustration" was in Plato's mind when
constructing the Line simile. First, it is a continuous Line, not two
parallel lines. If he desired to illustrate a comparison of one region
to another, it would seem proper to draw two lines. Further, at 510b,
510e and 511a, Plato stresses that the mathematician uses images that
in the preceding sub-section served as originals. The mathematics in
CE uses images of the originals in DC, which are reflections in AD.

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J. L. Stocks endorses the illustrative interpretation. In
"The Divided Line of Plato's Republic VI," Classical Quarterly, XXII,
(1921), pp. 77-8, he maintains that the Line is not a progression or
a continuous development, although he admits of degrees of clarity as
one moves up the Line. Stocks states that the lower Line stands for
a complete sensible reality and its upper part (DC) is a better rep-
resentation of 'reality' than its lower part (AD). The same reason-
ing holds true for the upper Line. So, he concludes that an analogy
exists between the upper parts of both Line segments. A break sep-
arates them. Progression is not intended, then, in terms of objects.
This suggests a certain degree of continuity between the four sections each of which lying on a common scale of clarity. If so, the purpose of the lower Line cannot simply be confined solely to illustrate the sections of the upper Line.

Moreover, at 511e, each of the four states of mind, assigned to each Line segment, are to be arranged in proportion to the degree of clearness their objects have of reality or truth. The implication here is that there seems to be a common scale of clearness applicable to the four states of mind. It would follow that a common scale of reality applicable to their objects would also exist. A continuous Line is an appropriate symbol for such an application.

In addition, at 510a7-10, Plato refers to the whole lower Line as a sphere of belief, e.g., "likeness stands to originals as belief is to knowledge." The world of belief would comprise the world of particulars, the world of the non-philosopher. The word, belief, at 533d4 and 534a6 is used for the entire lower Line when he describes "thinking" as a quality of the mathematician's state of mind. "Thinking" is something between belief and intelligence. So it seems that the lower Line represents the visible world of particulars and the non-philosopher's state of mind, namely, belief or opinion.

For the following reasons, it is held that a "parallel" view of Line and Cave fit more with Plato's intent in using the similes. At

N. R. Murphy substantially agrees with this position. In "Simile of Light in Plato's Republic," Classical Quarterly, XXVI, (1932), pp. 100-2, he states that the Line corresponds to one's mental state, and the Cave is a pictorial representation of the mind's mental development in each stage of the Line.
517a-c, he instructs us on what we are to do with the allegory of the Cave:

"This image as a whole must be connected with what was said before. Liken the domain revealed through sight to the prison home, and the light of the fire in it to the sun's power; and in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place...."

It is crucial to understand what Plato means by the word, "liken." Does he mean to contrast the sunlit world with the firelit one in the Cave? "Liken" translated literally means to make like or compare, not to contrast. If this translation holds, Plato essentially is saying that we must "compare" the region revealed by sight, symbolized by the whole lower Line with the Cave. So, it seems the lower Line is parallel to the Cave.

Moreover, at the end of 533d-e, after explaining the role of mathematical studies in rescuing the prisoners, Plato returns to the Line, recalling the names he gave to the four states of mind represented by the four segments of the Line. In making this comparison, he, in effect, is implying that the lower Line also applies to the Cave. Finally, in the Line, Plato makes extensive use of the shadow-original relationships. He, likewise, makes similar relationships in his description of the Cave. In view of these remarks, it seems that he has created a close correspondence, a parallel, as it were, between the two similes.

Philosophical Significance of the Lower Line and the Cave

Let us discuss the lowest segment of the Line. It is where most men are. So it would be important to discuss any philosophical significance imagination (eikasia) may play concerning its objects, espe-
cially in contemporary Athens. In the lowest segment, is one's state of mind, a "guess" on the shadows and their relations with one another or is it a guess on the shadows as they are related to originals? The latter seems doubtful in view of Plato's restriction placed upon the prisoner's head movement. One cannot turn one's head in any direction. So, it seems then that these guesses are about shadows themselves. One does not guess about originals, though the shadows would also agree with what was stated earlier concerning "parallelism."

By briefly sifting through the text, one also can establish a close similarity between imagination and the shadows. At 476c5-7, Plato describes the non-philosopher as leading a dreaming life. Dreaming is "thinking" that the likeness is the original. At 533c2, the mathematician, in his attitude to his hypotheses, is described as "dreaming about being." If we use what was said on dreaming, in general, the mathematician's state of mind will be one in which, in a sense, he takes a likeness for the original, not realizing it is a likeness.

Finally, the mechanical proportions of the Line itself indicates that CE (math) is related to AD (shadows). This suggests the mathematician takes likeness for the original, as the man in the state of eikasia 28 does. This may indicate that the state of mind is not one of guessing at originals through their likeness. Rather, it is one in which likeness is accepted as reality without realizing that the objects

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28 This viewpoint is somewhat supported by D. W. Hamlyn's, "Eikasia in Plato's Republic," Philosophical Quarterly, VIII, (1958), pp. 20-1. He states that eikasia is not merely the taking of images for originals, but the taking of what we call "images" as all that there is.
seen are mere shadows.

If eikasia is understood this way, what would be the philosophical significance in contemporary Athens? It was agreed earlier that the lower Line represented the world of belief, besides being visible. At 517d3-6, the plight of the philosopher is recognized who, when compelled to return to the Cave, must contend with the "shadows of justice, goodness, and the images." It is suggested then that the shadows of the lowest section symbolize, in part, the imitations of justice, and so on, created by contemporary politicians, sophists, etc. Correspondingly, the state of mind that accepted these things as "real" would be eikasia. In the second lower section where the released prisoner looks at the originals he would be looking at first-hand facts and reaching his own conclusions. This exercise still would be opinion, although somewhat more enlightened than the second-hand opinion below. One is less likely to accept the arguments or semblances of the politician who Plato regards as a substantial threat to the good life. In view of this danger, specifically, the imitations of the politicians of Athens, Plato felt it plausible to mark or separate them from the real things of which they are images. They are placed in the lowest section. Similarly, he regarded a corresponding state of mind with the likeness as philosophically significant for those being deceived.

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This point of view is elaborated upon in H. J. Paton's, "Plato's Theory of Eikasia," Mind, VIII, (1963), pp. 82-3. It is essentially Hume's position on eikasia. Eikasia is the only way of knowing. "The stream of impressions or ideas are the objects of the whole of reality." The world of appearances is everything. Everything is what it seems and seems what it is. "Everything is reality for me".
Philosophical Treatment of the Upper Line and Cave

Let us turn now to the upper regions of the Line and Cave. Our concern is on the relationship between: 1) mathematical thinking (CE of the Line) and the contemplation immediately after exiting from the Cave and, 2) the philosophy or dialectic of the uppermost part of the Line, EB, and the contemplation of the Sun, itself.

First let us explain how Plato differentiates mathematics from philosophy (dialectic). The mathematician uses sensible objects and is compelled to employ unproven assumptions. The sensible objects are diagrams or models, like a wooden triangle, square, etc. which are used but are only images of originals in the section below, DC, which in turn are copies in the lowest section, AD. Although a mathematician uses originals as aids, his thinking is not on them as such, but rather on their image or copy, namely, the square, triangle or diagonal (510d-e). S, the content of DC serves as images for the mathematician, and the content of CE are copies of the originals in DC. Incidentally, this continuing image-original relation may clarify what was stated a moment ago concerning the suggestion that the two lower sections of the Line are not solely "illustrative" of the two upper sections. In summary, then, the mathematician makes use of sensible models (wooden

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A. E. Taylor maintains that the 'figures' relied upon by the mathematician are unjustified tools. In "Note on Plato's Republic, VI," Mind, N. S., XLIII, (1934), pp. 82-3, he argues that Plato uses the definite article before 'figure.' He explains that the geometer will discuss and try to construct all kinds of figures (unknown ones), knowing that this exercise is a practical human impossibility. And, in as much as this endeavor is impossible, the geometer's assumptions ultimately rest on an unjustified assumption concerning what the genus, figure, really is.
triangles), but is concerned with the triangle itself.

From this brief introduction, let us discuss the specific objects that concern the mathematician. First the objects must be intelligible ones, that is, not apprehended by the senses. They could be Forms or some other class of intelligibles. But, could they be another class of intelligibles rather than Forms? To explain this possible distinction, let us draw two triangles. The actual drawn triangle, at the outset, is particular, sensible and impermanent, whereas, a proposition about a triangle would be general and permanent. It seems, then, that Plato's mathematician is not really concerned with drawings or models of a triangle, but rather with a proposition or the Form of a thing, i.e., what a thing is in and of itself. On the other hand, however, each Form is unique. There is one form for a triangle, rectangle, and so on. This proposition implies that a class of geometrical objects exists above sensible ones in an intelligible region. They are like the sensibles (e.g., the wooden triangle--the original) in that there are as many kinds of Forms as there are many kinds of objects (although a Form is a generalization of many particular objects of one kind). But, they are unlike sensible objects as they are unchanging and permanent. So, this is the way appropriate objects are provided for mathematical thinking. In addition to this persuasion, we could have argued by way of Plato's definition of powers. At 477c-e, he states that each power has its own object. So, if "thinking" is a distinct power or state of mind, one would expect it to have its own object, namely, a mathematical Form.

But, what is the distinction between the Forms of the "thinking"
mathematician and the "intelligent" philosopher? "Thinking" and "Intelligence" are different powers, so to preserve the principle, different powers, different objects, each person must have different Forms. Plato is silent on the specific objects studied by the philosopher, but he does contrast the mathematician's and philosopher's method of inquiry. It seems that the Forms in the third section are separate, and one's understanding of them is incomplete and fragmentary. While, in the fourth segment, they are seen connected to the Form of the Good, and the philosopher's knowledge of them is complete. So, the lower Forms are independently and fragmentarily known, while in the uppermost section, they are known as connected to one another and dependent on the Form of the Good.

Differences Between Philosopher and Mathematician

Mathematics seems to be a "bridge" to the study of philosophy or dialectic. The distinguishing mark between the mathematician and philosopher is that the former depends on sensible objects and its Forms, while the later never uses anything "sensible," but only Forms, moving throughout them and ending with them. For Plato, the mathematician is half-free from the changing, imperfect world of sensible particular objects. He must use diagrams while thinking of the non-sensible. It is for this reason Plato regards mathematics as the "bridge builder" leading one from the sensible world to the intelligible and why the various branches of mathematics can provide the initial training for the philosopher. But, it is a preliminary sort of training, since the philosopher put them aside and relies totally on the Forms themselves.
The question arises concerning how the philosopher makes this intellectual transformation. He does not diagram the Form of justice like the geometrician diagrams a triangle. It is an obscure study. It would seem that if the philosopher were to compare justice to goodness, he would consider how the words, just and good, are used in particular cases. But this is not Plato's style. This sort of comparison is unsatisfactory to Plato's definition of the dialectical method. The trained philosopher will somehow apprehend the Forms in question independently of their sensible impression. His world is the intelligible one, a universal world, where there is no embodiment of universal Forms in particular things. Mapping out the Forms is entirely done in the intelligible world. One is inclined to say that this approach is a difficult undertaking. Some actual cases, events, situations need study before Forms can be clarified. This clarification is bound up in the world of action and sense, the visible one in which living takes place.

The second way the mathematician differs from the philosopher is in the way each view hypotheses, i.e., assumptions. At 510c-511d, Plato explains the difference. The mathematician takes assumptions, as known to be true, and uses them as first principles to derive certain conclusions. The philosopher, on the other hand, recognizes them as hypotheses, simply unexamined assumptions, whose truth must be established. He seeks, then, to identify the initial assumptions. He moves up, as it were, looking for more general assumptions until he comes to something that is non-hypothetical, i.e., the first principle of everything (the Form of the Good). He, then, reverses his steps, going through each assumption and demonstrating how each is derived from the first principle. To summarize, the mathematician does not establish
the system nor his conclusions are shown to be true, in the strict
sense of "true." Plato states, "How can something be knowledge, if its
beginning...end are unproved" (533c2)? The philosopher, however, must
reach a genuine proved first principle.

Several comments seem to be in order here. Let us recall the ra­
tios of the parts of the Line to one another. CB is to AC as EB (in­
telligence) is to DC (belief), and also as CE (thinking) is to AD (il­
lusion). A parallelism exists between 'thinking' (mathematics) and il­
lusion (cavemen inside the Cave). Thinking makes use of sensible dia­
grams and has a certain attitude toward assumptions. But, which of the
two, diagram or assumption, does Plato want us to compare with illusion
(eikasia)? It should be recalled that one in eikasia takes what is in
fact a copy for an original without realizing it as a copy. His state
of mind is simply unquestioning acceptance. From this view, "thinking"
refers less to sensing diagrams than acceptance of hypotheses. It is
akin then to eikasia behavior. Illusions are accepted without ques­
tion, giving no account of underlying assumptions.

"The Deeper We Go, The Less We Know"

Let us investigate deeper into the mathematician's assumptions
and see how the philosopher treats them. At 510c2-6, Plato gives math­
ematical examples of hypotheses, "odd-even numbers,...three sides of
angles, etc...." Presumably, these are the typical assumptions of the
time. At 533c, Plato further contrasts mathematics with philosophy by
saying "the method of dialectic alone proceeds, destroying the hypo­
theses, to the beginning itself to secure confirmation." It seems that
"destroying the hypotheses" means refuting their hypothetical nature.
Dialectic seeks to derive hypotheses with which it begins from general hypotheses to a non-hypothetical first principle. As this method of inquiry proceeds, assumptions lose their hypothetical character, i.e., they are destroyed as being hypotheses. The mathematician assumes certain propositions and deduces from them, whereas, the philosopher is not content with this logic. His dialectical method attempts to establish the truth or falsity of the propositions assumed by the mathematician.

The philosopher follows a dialectical method of inquiry. The inquiry goes from hypotheses to the first principle of everything, and, then, proceeds down to specific conclusions. Essentially this is all Plato tells of a most important intellectual journey. We can speculate though on how a dialectician knows. He may examine the consequences of hypotheses or propositions to determine if any inconsistencies exist in each of them or between them. If inconsistencies appear, the hypotheses are abandoned or the inconsistent part, at least is discarded. This process is continued until the first principle is reached. Once attained, no hypotheses are necessary. The first principle is knowledge, absolute certainty. It is the goal of the Republic, and accordingly, the philosopher with this knowledge is alone entitled to rule. However, reaching the unchangeable hypothesis, the first principle, he must somehow step out of the hypothetical method. Presumably, then, it seems the hypothetical method is, somewhat, supplemented by intuition, a sort of an altruistic hunch. That is to say, after the method has reached its length, something "dawns" on the philosopher that this is true. This immediate awareness of the first principle is now the
truth, it seems. "Dawning" reminds one, however, of something Plato stated earlier. He asserts that "any method of study must be designed to protect one's own interests" (530e5-7), and at 533a3-6, "we must insist that in the upper regions, Forms are seen by themselves. There are no images. It is an end that ought to be." It "dawns" on Plato and the others that the entire discussion has been designed to guard what they believe as a right, namely, the laws which were established. His philosophical study, then, becomes a circular argument and a somewhat devious way to protect law which, heretofore, presumably, rests on philosophical wisdom. So, "dawning" does not seem objective or unbiased. One studies to justify, "the design of the Republic." One does not study to verify the presuppositions upon which "the design" rests. In this sense, then, Plato's leap to the non-hypothetical beginning lands on slippery, dubious ground.

So, to summarize the difference between the philosopher from the mathematician, they are unlike in the use of sensible objects (diagrams) and in their attitude towards hypotheses. Though there are weaknesses in the mathematical method, it is essential to be trained in mathematics, initially, to become a philosopher. Plato briefly outlines a mathematical model. Studies that draw the soul from the world of change to reality is the central recommendation Plato makes. It is the acid test, as it were, for higher education. It is a power that can lead a soul from the changing world of sense experience to the changeless objects grasped by intelligence. He lists several, but two of which may shed light on the philosophic method. The study of astronomy should not be done to simply examine the "embroidery in the heavens" or the movements of the stars. One must try to determine the
ultimate cause of the heavens. Natural phenomena is not Plato's real concern. This is where calculation and number come to play a part. By calculation, one may collect and name objects one thing and another thing. It is more important to recognize differences between things than to simply count or accumulate things. To note differences implies that there are, at least, two things present. Each is one. In the final analysis, Plato's mathematician becomes a philosopher, if he is able to take a comprehensive view of the mutual relations and affinities which bind all things together as one, and finally, to see how everything stems eventually from the first principle, the Form of the Good.

So far justice has not appeared in the discussion, and one wonders how Plato hopes to show by it that the just man has a happier life. At 586d-e, he mentions that a man pursuing the love of money, for example, and following the guidance of the prudential part of the soul (calculating part) will achieve the most real love of which he is capable. In effect, the whole soul must obey the love of the calculating part which is wisdom. The love of wisdom then is a higher desire than the love of money. This is a simplified recall of his description of "inner justice" alluded to much earlier. In any event, it is not clear here in his summation at 586d-e how the hierarchy of desires is established. For example, how will the love of money or for that matter the desire for anything, controlled by the reason (calculating part) make the desired pleasure any less real, if the calculating part did not rule?
Has Plato succeeded? Has he adequately shown that justice itself can make men happy in a city? In broad terms, Plato believes that justice will emerge in a city only when all political change is arrested. The city must be rigidly stable operating with clock-like efficiency. Each individual must do his own job and remain in his own class. No deviations from this norm are acceptable and, indeed, are deemed criminal. Everyone works for the welfare of the whole city regardless of individual interests. The city's interests in most, if not all ways, surpasses the individual's. Essentially, then, Plato's justice will produce an authoritarian political system.

An authoritarian regime can be characterized as being composed of most of the following elements. There is virtually no division of political power among a society's social groupings. Political competition is suppressed, concentration of political power essentially rests in the hands of a few, an elite group which tends to manipulate the majority of men by devious means to monopolize such power. It emphasizes a citizen's obligation to compulsory labor. It consists of a frivolous and coercive domestic and foreign policy, inspired, perhaps, by some form of ideological Messianism geared to discipline its own society and to conquer others.

Let us review Plato's political thought in light of this criteria and determine whether his form of justice will make men happy.
Plato's justice imposes some rather rigid political prohibitions on the artisan's class's ability for self defense. They cannot defend their individual or class interests while the guardian class can. Class differences rest on a rather vague principle of naturalism underpinned by Plato's theory of education. (cf. pp. 3-5) Each man is disposed to perform one art suitable to his nature. (cf. pp. 27-8) Men are then divided into three classes in which all are to mind their own business within their respective groups. While denying the guardians the right to private property on a puzzling argument that it is selfish and destructive to the city (cf. pp. 35-6), Plato, however, does grant them the exclusive right to bear arms to defend themselves and the city. It seems rather superficial though for Plato to deny material things, i.e. property, to the guardians, while at the same time granting them the exclusive right to control "those things" unilaterally with the force of arms if the occasion arises. Any potential adversary undoubtedly is the other class, the artisans. (cf. pp. 16-19).

Plato argues though that the right to bear arms is based upon the guardian's sole knowledge of what the true opinion of the ruler is, whereas the artisans lack such insight. (cf. pp. 24-6) This special insight supposedly rest on their natural superiority. They are the few men who can rule rightly and defend the ruler's opinion. (cf. pp. 42-4) Superiority consists in a philosophical, spirited and gentle disposition. But, how valid is Plato's natural superiority doctrine in terms of extending such a grave, solemn right to a select handful of men? Presumably, they must possess the most unimpeachable credentials and character traits. A substantial lack of these personal attributes would indicate that Plato's
chosen few could conceivably usurp or snatch away considerable portions of political rights, e.g. dialectics (free speech), property, self defense, from the artisans. Moreover, to claim an elite ruling competence without adequately justifying it or, in fact, disguising it, as he does, by devious logic surely is a blatant disregard to the remainder of society's interests, including other guardians. The real question then hinges on whether Plato's chosen few do, indeed, fit into his paradigm of ruling competence. If the rulers do, no quarrel is justifiable. If not, Plato's rulers certainly lack credibility.

Plato states that guardians alone have the good disposition to rule competently. Let us see if they do. From the text Plato had argued that if the noble dog can be gentle, savage, and philosophic, so could man. These three qualities can reside in one thing, man or beast. This sort of disposition, he states, is primarily a product of one's own nature emerging in one's "tender years" before the age of nine. One begins to know a good or a bad thing (friend or enemy) by some sort of natural intuitive knowledge. (cf. pp. 16-19) Outside environmental experiences in these early years, for the most part, are literally dismissed as inconsequential factors for developing character. Given this dismissal of environment over character as Plato has virtually done, a charge of logical inconsistency can be leveled against him. (cf. pp. 17-19) Plato tells us that true learning is the philosopher's first love. Certainly it is Plato's also. However, it falls upon his shoulders, at least, to explain in some cogent fashion why he minimizes the importance of environment and telling us little about the nature of intuition. Simply declaring that
th dog or man will "mirror its own good disposition" muddles the real question. (cf. pp. 18-19) The so called, "good disposition" conceivably could be a product of a subtle conditioning process by master, teacher or others before the age of nine. If so, a well disposed child-guardian may not be chosen for some special innate attribute, but rather for his docile willingness to believe (faith) via the conditioning process the teachings of Plato on the just regime. Surely it is Plato's burden to have shown why this analysis is not very likely to occur. In this sense then the "good disposition" theory rests on rather vague slippery reasonable grounds. In this regard, precluding artisans from bearing arms on the basis of the theory essentially amounts to an elaborate subterfuge to deny them any individual political rights or class interests. This denial certainly fits neatly into an authoritarian paradigm. Will the artisan, for example, be content or happy with this kind of political deficiency? We think not.

Given this rather obvious tenuous theory, Plato is, more or less, personally self-induced to find a way to reinforce the "good disposition" of the guardian as well as foster his basic trust or faith in the teaching. So, he adopts a rather harsh censorship policy. Being acutely aware of the fragility of human nature (rulers and guardians included), he advocates a conscious sheltering of the young in their tender years from being intellectually exposed to the many prevailing views on justice. (cf. pp. 20-22) But, is not this a form of Platonic conditioning? Moreover, by legal compulsion the young are forbidden to hear any tales that would disunite the regime. Included in the list are stories on warring gods, all
the pernicious lies by Homer and Hesiod on the most "sovereign things," the listening even to "complex narratives" from stage performances.

(cf. pp. 20-28) In addition to this sort of "educational" policy, he promises the guardian a reward in "after-life" presumably in return for his act of faith and a courageous defense of the teaching. (cf. pp. 24-26) In the end, then, Plato has built a monolith of propaganda for the development of his program, but neglecting to give us any reasonable evidence which clearly explains the wisdom of the teaching or the special insight the ruler/guardians have over the artisans.

The question of lying also raises an interesting dilemma in the Republic. Plato's philosopher, as we indicated above, is supposedly a lover of truth. But, the philosopher, himself, is not quite truthful. He is permitted to deceive the artisans when he alone thinks such deceptions can benefit the city. No one else can lie and, if one is caught lying, harsh penalties are administered. (cf. pp. 23-25) But the issuing of such penalties as death or exile on the pretext of knowing what is good for the city, while, at the same time, admitting a ruler's fallibility, surely, seems consistent with an authoritarian regime. It is the clock-like efficiency with which Plato is primarily concerned to preserve all political stability. So, it is politically expedient for the ruler alone to use the privilege of lying. Again, will the artisan be happy with this sort of political system? It seems rather dubious. But, of course, much of anyone's happiness ultimately rests on whether the ruler knows what is good for the city. But, if his knowledge is that special, any political dissatisfactions become mere peripheral
private problems to be worked out later. Surely, no one would quarrel with this formulation.

Another example of Plato's political utilitarianism is seen in his comparison of the ruling art and the medical art. The wise doctor, Aesculopius, is like the wise ruler. The medical art's primary aim is not to prolong life, but rather it is geared to serve the interests of the city, not those of individual men or the artisan class. No one has time to spend life ailing or, indeed, getting cured. (cf. pp. 19, 30-33) Besides, the infirm's offspring are considered burdensome to the city's clock-like efficiency. This sort of strong medicine is akin to administering "political lies." The philosopher-ruler must be able to order a great many lies to maintain this efficiency. Sick drones, as it were, are virtually exterminated. Being truthful, then, is not one of Plato's avowed political policies.

His regime condones the kinds of falsifications that are primarily designed to control the great mass of its population, i.e. the artisans. Free speech (dialectics) on the most sovereign things is prohibited especially in large assemblies. Men there tend to act like "wild beasts" agreeing or disagreeing on the basis of the persuasive abilities of the speakers. The myth of the metals should be believed as a "truth." It places the regime's population in appropriate classes. Over time the myth will be generally accepted as traditional by future generations who will view it as reliable. But, it too, as we had pointed out in the text, is merely a faith doctrine without credibility. (cf. pp. 30-34) The common ownership of property is another essential device to control the masses,
although it too fails to answer our exceptions. (cf. pp. 35-36) The merits of the broad economic class supposedly stabilizing the material needs of the regime ultimately seems prone to cause the regime to endorse a fierce foreign and domestic policy. Ostracism or death for deviant behavior are likely punishments. (cf. pp. 37-40) In the absence of adhering to these forms of doctrinaire falsifications, Plato must have known that the tripartite class system would quickly disappear. He even seeks to exclude the young, potential guardian from knowing or demanding to know the truth. Truth seems to be lost in the regime's history. In the end, this sort of city planning by a devious system of deception is merely geared to strengthen the regime's political stability and led by the untenable attributes of the "chosen few."

On the matter of discovering justice, Plato essentially pretends to argue to it. Indeed, it seems that he cleverly soothes his listeners' critical abilities. "Having seen Wisdom and Courage emerge, whose resurrection Plato even admits is a precarious one, two remain, Moderation and Justice." Moderation is simply a satisfaction with one's place in life. Justice appears after the other three begin to operate efficiently. Justice is essentially a procedural result, a residue. It is the last piece of the city's puzzle called, it seems, "togetherness."

It is just to remain in one's class while practicing what is one's own. But, one's own seems to be applied to a class as an inalienable possession of the class rather than as a personal one. One's own really turns out to be not one's own individually, but "our own" separate classes within which all men are judged similarly. By serving the class, one serves the
whole. Class egoism is unselfish, while individual interests are selfish. By proposing this polemic, Plato adroitly appeals to one's sense of humanism and unselfishness, while implying that others who cherish private gain are selfish. (cf. pp. 35-37) Although Plato attempted to diminish private gain, its effects struck at the heart of one's political rights. Men, especially the artisan, could not go their own way. They are locked into a class system where any mobility was shunted in a downward direction to more menial tasks within the class. No artisan could be a guardian. Plato's artisan then is compelled to turn from a "love your fellow man" ethic to the political demand of "love your city first" kind of morality. The public interest extremely outweighs any individual or class interests. In this regard, the justice fostering a class egoism is much more politically expedient than one geared to serve, say, several million separate individual citizens. Besides, due to his awareness of the fallible ruler, Plato found it more politically expedient that the ruler's chances of maintaining a wise and courageous profile is greatly enhanced when dealing with two distinct classes than with millions of separate individual interests. (cf. pp. 51-52, 57-59)

Admittedly, Plato states ruling will be bad (incompetent). He is not optimistic for true justice to emerge, but claims a special hope for the regime. A regime can improve if it emulates or copies the idea of justice. Given this inherent weakness in rulership, he attempts to alleviate the problem by adopting an organizational solution. How can proper governmental arrangements be devised to diminish incompetent ruling? We have seen his answer. It is in the selection and training of "natural"
leaders by an educational system of indoctrination, censorship and deception. Their minds are shaped to the extent of becoming virtually incapable of doing anything independently. Further, only those guardians beyond the prime of life would be admitted to the ruler's higher education, i.e. dialectical training. (cf. pp. 39-41) It is a devious delay, since it manifests Plato's fears of the young's searching political thoughts. Their natural curious insight tends to bring with it a tendency for more political unrest than Plato would like. As a consequence, it is only after they "prove up" through the molding effect, alluded to earlier, courage in military campaigns and so on, would they be then placed into leadership positions to carry-out the regime's policies.

From these rather negative considerations, one learns that the philosopher is not one who actively and truly seeks the truth, although Plato portrays him as one who does. Supposedly, the philosopher 1) has great insight into the truth, 2) is a learned man, 3) can recognize the ideal world's existence, 4) is proficient in dialectical power and 5) can pattern the city after the heavenly ideal model.

In addition to these distorted claims of Plato, his descriptions of the idea of the Good in the similes do not fully explain what specific deeds are good in themselves and which ones can produce good results. The descriptions are not associated directly to the idea of the Good. (cf. pp. 58-62) Good, to Plato, is simply that which preserves the things he wants to preserve, and evils are the things that do not arrest political change. Admitting his inability to explain the Good, one surmises that the good regime is simply permanently stable virtually lacking the clear evidence
to justify this sort of stability.

One question comes to mind concerning why the philosopher shall be the permanent ruler in view of the prohibition that subsequent rulers or anyone for that matter cannot introduce any substantial political innovations. Once the "educational" system is firmly established, why not have the guardian class rule the regime? Certainly, the need for a philosopher is not simply for administrative purposes. Administration will be virtually useless, since the educational institution can effectively maintain the proper philosophical standards without the philosopher, per se. The philosopher is seen largely as an "extra piece of baggage" after the institutions are operating.

Consequently, what theory underpins Plato's reliance on the philosopher-ruler, if it simply is not an educational motivation? It seems that his philosopher functions like a theocratic ruler. (cf. pp. 49-52) Plato drew a definite line between ruler and ruled. The philosopher alone is able to recognize the forms of the invisible world, an area where no other class, i.e. the artisan, could trespass. In addition, the permanency of the philosopher is desired to improve the natural excellences of the citizens. That is to say, as dogs are bred into "better stocks" so can men be bred to produce better offsprings, better dispositions which, in turn, will produce better educational systems. (cf. pp. 35-7) Presumably, the philosopher alone can see the real image of man in the invisible world. He alone has the desire, endurance, and ability to copy the heavenly original. In the end, then, the theocrat-ruler using this special, private, somewhat secret knowledge must continue to deceive the artisans, even to
the extent of quietly selecting their mating partners. It is clearly
obvious the ruler fears offending the artisan class's marital relations,
tantamount to inciting a real disruption in the regime's stability.

Finally, everything previously discussed and analyzed must now
focus on how the philosopher-ruler possesses this special insight. Why
is the art of ruling more significant in the city than, say, the art of
repairing shoes? What special knowledge does the philosopher have that
the shoemaker, for example, does not have? Plato's discussion on the
existence of the ideal world is somewhat plausible, although it contains
several basic presuppositions that lend itself to legitimate skepticism.
On the question of ideals existing separately, one learns that their
existence was granted largely by Plato's ability to cajole his listeners.
(cf. pp. 52-54) As a result, each "ideal" may not be catagorical oppos­
tes or as exclusively independent as Plato suspects. The suggestion is
that they are relative predicates.

Concerning the question of whether justice is intellected and
the object of knowledge, the following points were made. Although his
epistemology is consistent with theories of light, seeing, and being
seen, it is maintained that separating the power of knowing from the power
of being known and thereby claiming two separate operations, having their
own classes (powers) of existence are highly problematic inferences. It
is suggested that "knowing", likewise, "seeing" are coincidental functions
with being known and being seen. (cf. pp. 60-63)

In his use of similes, Plato attempted to show the reflection
process and use it in terms of how "copies" of the visible world are
related to "originals" in the intelligible world. To explain the relationship Plato used the Line and Cave similes, and it was suggested that both similes are "parallel" in their character. That is to say, a shadow of man in AD is a copy of the original man in DC. The wooden triangle in DC is a copy of the original form, i.e. the genus, triangle, in CE. Being aware of these relationships, say, the Form in CE vis a vis its counterpart in DC, one supposedly should explain how the entire lower segment of the visible world, AC, can pattern the entire invisible world in the upper segment, CB. (cf. pp. 65-69) But in an apparent act of desparation, Plato simply asserts that the pattern of the just city described in the visible region, (AC), ought to be and is the correct resemblance of the ideal invisible Form, Justice.

Plato's picture of the ideal world presents a puzzling set of conditions. The just pattern in the city despite its many psychological presuppositions, propaganda and deceptions could even be condoned, if the above descriptions were fully clarified. Namely, does the philosopher-ruler indeed tend to possess more of the knowledge of the ideal, Justice, than the other classes or other individuals? There is no doubt that Plato possesses an ingenious argumentative style, but even so one learns that the "final act" in the drama, the climax, is quietly discarded or covered-up. (cf. pp. 76-78) Instead of succinctly explaining how possession tends to occur, he instructs us, in the final analysis, to accept the existence of the possession presumably on the discussion's dialectical merits. This sort of argumentation, however, lends itself to circular logic. His leap to justice is essentially then an elaborate
process of intuiting the nature of the possession. The "pattern of justice" in the city does not essentially depend on the "knower" any longer, but on the "supposer." The "supposer" believes that his awareness of the pattern is the correct one. Although admitting man's fallibility in trying to symbolize the ideal in words, everything presented to us along Plato's dialectical journey supposedly rested on knowledge. (cf. pp. 78-79) It is learned however that Plato's teaching simply rests on supposition, although prodigiously arranged and argued. The gnawing question still remains. Can a hunch, as it were, on the art of ruling be the crucial factor in making the city just and men happy? Given the authoritarian character of the discussion, it seems certainly to frustrate happiness and too awesome a political power to hand-out to a few men who happen to have a "hunch" on the correct ruling pattern. In this regard, it is concluded that Plato's notion of justice is convincingly authoritarian tending to make life somewhat sad for the rest of society. In the final analysis, a good shoemaker may well practice his art as well as or perhaps better than a ruler who may guess much of the time.
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