The Trials of Gestapu: Political Change in Indonesia, 1965-1967

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THE TRIALS OF GESTAPU: POLITICAL CHANGE
IN INDONESIA, 1965 - 1967

by

William N. Bentivegna

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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LIFE

The author, William Nicholas Bentivegna, is the son of Sam Bentivegna and Alice (Luke) Bentivegna. He was born March 5, 1949 in Waukegan, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained in the public schools of Waukegan, Illinois, and secondary education at Waukegan Township High School, Waukegan, Illinois, where he was graduated in 1967.

In September, 1967, he entered Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois, and in June, 1971, received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in history, graduating with honors. He was elected a member of Phi Alpha Theta, the honorary history fraternity in 1971.

He is presently employed by Township High School District 211, Palatine, Illinois, as an instructor of United States' History and Russian History.
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

The World Since World War II

The world since the end of World War II has seen the struggle for independence by many of the former colonial states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. At the time of this writing, over sixty previously dependent states have achieved sovereignty since 1945. Today, one must look closely to find the last vestiges of the great colonial empires. Yet, with independence the leaders of these new states are confronted with many pressing problems that heretofore had been handled by the bureaucratic institutions of the colonial power. These problems range from simply being able to provide basic services to larger considerations such as the development of a national foreign policy. Fundamental to these problems is a larger, more central issue, that of establishing a peaceful, orderly method of transferring political authority and its accompanying aura of legitimacy from one group in society to another. It is an issue of

crucial importance that the leadership must face if the new state is to survive its first pangs of political development.

**Indonesia: A Typical Developing Society**

For the purposes of this paper, a developing society may be viewed as a transitional stage in the evolution of a modern developed industrialized state. Whereas a traditional society is based on a sacred value system, manifested by an emphasis on custom and tradition, a subsistence peasant economy, and a restrictive political process and a modern society is one based on a predominately secular value orientation with its accompanying emphasis on modern (i.e., western) economic and political institutions, a transitional society is an environment in which the clash between sacred and secular has not yet been resolved. It is a society in which the pull of the past as well as that of the future is still strong. Thus, a developing society is an environment of inherent conflict. If the lure of modernity is strong enough, the developing society will eventually evolve into a modern one. This drift toward modernity is by no means assured, however. It is entirely possible that the ties to the past (traditional society) will be strong enough to prevent any modernizing movement to develop. The challenge for the leadership in such societies is to find a way to create the best possible environment for their citizens while at the same time reconciling the conflict between the two competing value systems.
In many regards, Indonesia is a typical developing society. A state of 120 million inhabitants spread over 700,000 square miles, Indonesia was first brought into contact with the West by the Portugese in 1511. The area came under Dutch hegemony in the early 1600's when they supplanted the Portugese as the leading European power in sea-girt Southeast Asia. The Dutch ruled Indonesia for more than three centuries. Her rule was abruptly terminated in 1942 when Japan seized control of the islands, driving the Dutch from the area. Japanese control of the islands was short-lived, ending with her defeat in World War II. Of major significance, however, was the fact that during the latter stages of the Japanese occupation the military governor summarily granted independence to Indonesia through a native nationalist movement headed by the future president of Indonesia, Sukarno. This action was to take on added significance later when the Dutch attempted to re-assert their influence in the area following World War II. To the Dutch, the grant of independence made by the Japanese was invalid because the Japanese had seized the area in violation of international law. The stage was therefore set for a crisis in political change that was not resolved until December 1949 when the Dutch, realizing the futility of their efforts, formally ceded sovereignty to the Indonesians. In August 1950, the unitary Republic of Indonesia, with a western-style parliamentary system was proclaimed.
The history of Indonesia in the 1950's and early 1960's is the story of the failure of western democratic traditions and the growing concentration of political power in the hands of one man, President Sukarno. This pattern of growing authoritarianism was only checked by the events of September 30 – October 1, 1965. These events and the resulting crisis in political change form the bases of this research.

As Lucien Pye has pointed out, in non-western societies the political sphere is oft-times not sharply differentiated from the social and cultural environment. That is to say, many of the actions and values of the political leadership in developing societies are shaped by the socio-cultural environment out of which the political culture evolved. Issues in the political sector may well be influenced by social configurations permeating all aspects of life. Thus, the concept of political change may be greatly affected by factors not manifestly related to the political process, but profoundly controlling it just the same.

Such is the case in Indonesia. Indonesian society is centered around the mystical values and rituals derived from the ancient Javanese culture. Certain cultural traits stand out in this respect — the fear of shame (loss of public esteem), conformity orientation, and hierarchical deference to individuals in positions of

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authority. Underlying all of Javanese society is the penchant for misdirection or the desire to confront any problem obliquely rather than in a direct manner. It is the contention of this research that this typically Javanese reaction of misdirection (manifested artistically in the classical Javanese art form, the wayang kulit or shadow play) was employed by both contending parties in attempts to resolve the crisis in political change that occurred as a result of the events of GESTAPU.  

**Purposes**

Several ends are sought in this thesis. First, it is intended to serve as an introduction to Indonesia, a state that has the potential to become a major Southeast Asian and world power. By exploring the roots of contemporary Indonesia, it is hoped that the reader will gain an insight into a diverse, complex society that is sure to take on added significance in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Going beyond a cursory examination of Indonesian society, however, this paper will also focus on a crucial relationship that exists in any of the new states in the world today; namely, the institutional role of the military in the political decision-making process. In developed (i.e., western) states there has been a long tradition of non-participation by the military in matters political. Historically,

3An acronym usually used to denote the attempted coup of September 30–October 1, 1965.
this function has been reserved for the political institutions (political parties, politicians, bureaucracies) in that society. In developing societies, however, this generally has not been the case. Created as a defensive institution by the colonial power, the military in a developing society has generally received favored treatment in terms of educational opportunities and budgetary considerations. Thus, under the colonial administration the military institutions were often stronger and more modern than any other institutions in society, particularly the political ones. A basic source of conflict is thereby established.

When the time for independence comes, the political leaders, by the very nature of their activities, feel that the legitimacy to govern should automatically devolve to them. The military leaders, on the other hand, long accustomed to playing a dominant role in society, feel otherwise; namely, that they, as the protectors of society, should wield the predominant influence. This feeling on the part of the military may be reinforced especially if the military was called upon by the political institutions to aid them in the struggles for independence. This was exactly the case in Indonesia in the late 1940's as Sukarno and his PNI associates negotiated Indonesia's independence at the conference table while General Nasution was winning it in the jungles of Central Java against the Dutch. The point to be made is this: in developing societies, the military has become enmeshed in
the political process. Because of the role it played in winning the
independence, military men have tended to believe that they should
have a predominant voice in the political decision-making process.
Politicians, on the other hand, feel that military men lack the finesse
and expertise necessary in politics. Yet the desires of the military
must somehow be accommodated. If their desire is blunted, a crisis
in political leadership may occur. By tracing the role of the military
in pre-1965 Indonesian society, this research will isolate the factors
that led the military to intervene in the political decision-making
process in March, 1967. It will serve as a model of military-civilian
relationships and identify the variables that may disturb the precarious
balance between the two. It is hoped that this thesis will generate valid
generalizations that can be utilized in a broader comparative study of
the role of the military in developing societies.

There is another, larger question to which this thesis will
ultimately address itself. It is intended to be an examination of the
concept of political change in a developing society. Institutionalized
political change is a key characteristic of a mature political system.
This was not the case in Indonesia during the period 1965-1967.
Indeed, upwards of one million people lost their lives in the blood-
letting that followed the abortive 1965 coup attempt. It was at this
juncture that the military felt compelled to enter the political arena.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the manner in which this crisis in political change was resolved.

An integral component in the Indonesian experience was the trials of suspected communist politicians and military men that took place in the wake of the abortive coup attempt. Each defendant was selected because of his alleged proclivity for communist ideals and also because of his relationship to the head of state, President Sukarno. Operating in typically Javanese fashion, the military used these trials to displace the civilian authorities by undermining their bases of support in society. By focusing on the trials to illustrate their central role in the resolution of the crisis in political change that threatened to destroy Indonesia during 1965-1967, it is hoped that this thesis will aid in the understanding of the problems of developing societies, particularly in the area of political change. It is a subject that must be considered if the gap between the developed and developing societies is ever to be bridged.

Methodology

To this end, the following methodological construct is proposed: the roots of the coup attempt will be explored with an eye toward identifying the factors that prompted the confrontation; the events of the coup will be analyzed, providing a background necessary for a competent understanding of the trials; the trials of three
prominent Sukarno subordinates will be examined to show how the verdicts were virtually assured by the political climate of the times. Finally, the trials will be placed into the context of the military's strategy for the displacement of Sukarno. Comments on the significance of the trials as regards a model of political change in developing societies will conclude the paper.
CHAPTER II

THE ACTORS

By the mid-1960's, two factors were becoming increasingly apparent to students of the Indonesian political scene. The first was that President Sukarno was the dominant personality in Indonesia's somewhat chaotic political situation, dwarfing any potential rivals. Second, it was clear that Sukarno was able to maintain himself in power through the delicate manipulation of the only two institutions in society that could potentially challenge him; the military and the Communist Party of Indonesia. ⁴ This chapter will look briefly at the evolution of these factors with an eye toward ascertaining the motives that prompted the crisis in political leadership that occurred on the night of September 30 - October 1, 1965.

The Military

Historically, the military of Indonesia has played an important role in the development of the Indonesian nation-state. The People's Security Army, founded in October, 1945, was the

⁴Henceforth, the Communist Party of Indonesia will be referred to as the PKI.
fore-runner of the modern Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. It was the People's Security Army that waged the guerrilla campaign against the Dutch after World War II. Thus, from its very inception, the Indonesian military had played an integral part in the political decision-making process. Many military men felt that, because they had fought for the state, they were entitled to a predominant voice in state affairs.

The source of the officer corps in the Indonesian military is varied. Many of the officers received their training from the Japanese during the occupation period. Other future officers were trained overseas by the Dutch at the Dutch Military Academy at Breda, the Netherlands. Still other future officers served in the independent "lascar" units that operated against the Dutch or were recruited from the student army that developed in response to the occupation period. Generally speaking, the officers who began their careers in the years of struggle against the Dutch were still in control of the military structure in the mid-1960's. They had grown accustomed to the positions (and accompanying prestige) of political decision-making.

The history of military-civilian relations in Indonesia prior to the coup attempt of 1965 had been checkered at best. The

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development of the People's Security Army in 1945 had left the country with a military structure lacking any ideology upon which to base its actions. As Daniel Lev has pointed out, the problem for the military leadership prior to 1965 was to find a role for the military that would satisfy its political, economic, and social aspirations.  

The initial split between the military and civilian authorities came on May 7, 1949 as a result of the Roem-von Royen Agreement that ended guerrilla activities against the Dutch. Military men generally frowned on the decision while the politicians felt it to be the most expedient course available. This conflict in military-civilian relations was further exacerbated on October 17, 1952 over the question of proposed civilian sponsored cut-backs in the military budget. Throughout the early 1950's this pattern of military-civilian tension manifested itself again and again until the Sumatran revolts of 1957-59 finally clarified the relationship.

Although it is beyond the scope of this research to become involved in the history of the Indonesian civil wars, several implications warrant some examination. The first result of the Sumatran-Sulawesi rebellions was that the most radical officers such as Colonels Lubis, Simbolon, Husein, and Sumual were eliminated,

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thereby removing the extremist wing of the military. Second, and far more important, the military gained a stronger position vis-a-vis the other national groups. As a result of the civil wars, the military began to function as an administrative elite, running former Dutch estates, imposing censorship, breaking up strikes, and banning demonstrations. The culmination of this increased political activity on the part of the military came when General A. H. Nasution was elevated to cabinet level in July, 1959. In the period from the end of the rebellion to the institutionalization of military rule, the prestige and political authority of the military increased to the point that the military became a cornerstone of the Indonesian political scene along with Sukarno and the PKI.

When attempting to examine the relationship of the military and civilian minds, one must naturally look at the ideological position that underlies each position. This is particularly true of the military mentality. The ideological make-up of the Indonesian military is similar to that of most former colonial military structures. The typical Indonesian officer is:

1. More concerned with the warrior elan' than with technical training.
2. Strongly religious with a deep puritanical nature concerning individual behavior.
3. Deeply nationalistic with a great sense of xenophobia.
4. Introspective.

5. Violently anti-communist. (An exception must be noted here. While this generalization holds true for the army and navy, it does not apply to the Indonesian air force, long the bastion of radical tendencies.)

6. Firmly convinced that, because of the military's role in the struggles for independence, the military should have a predominant role in the decision-making process of the state.

7. Unfamiliar with, and in general opposition to, the civilian mentality.

It must be remembered that these seven indices interact to create a specific way of looking at the world. They cannot be isolated but must be taken in totality. The value system of the Indonesian officer corps must therefore be considered when viewing the military's reaction to the political crisis of GESTAPU.

The Communist Party of Indonesia

Also gaining in strength and prestige during the early 1960's was the Communist Party of Indonesia. The history of the PKI is the

story of a series of failures brought about by inept planning and poor organizational strategy. Founded on May 23, 1920 under the name of Perserikatan Kommunist di India, the PKI takes its spiritual heritage from the Indies Social Democratic Association, a group founded by the radical Dutch socialist, H. J. F. M. Sneevliet. The fledgling communist party later changed its name to the Partai Komunis Indonesia on June 7, 1924. The first chairman of the PKI was a Sumatran, Tan Malaka, a cautious man more concerned with developing a sound base for the party than with overthrowing the existing Dutch political institutions. Because of his conservative approach to politics, Tan Malaka was outvoted by his more militant colleagues in 1926 on the question of a proposed assault on the telephone/telegraph buildings in the capital city of Batavia (later renamed Djakarta after the termination of Dutch authority). The attempt failed, setting in

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8 Hendrik Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, born May 13, 1883, founded the Indies Social Democratic Association in 1914 to stir up nationalistic feelings in Indonesia. Previously a union organizer in the Netherlands, Sneevliet migrated to the Indies in 1912. After a split in the Social Democratic Association in 1917, Sneevliet emerged as the leader of the more revolutionary wing of the movement. Because of his renewed interest in union organizing, Sneevliet was deported from Indonesia in 1917. Upon his return to Europe, Sneevliet was associated for a time with the Communist International. In 1929 he helped found the Revolutionary Socialist Party in the Netherlands. He served as a parliamentary representative of that body from 1933 to 1937. Sneevliet was executed by the Germans on April 13, 1942.
motion a program of repression so severe that Ruth McVey has said, "this action put an effective end to communist activity in the Indies for the remaining period of Dutch rule."\(^9\) The crack-down following the ill-fated assault netted 13,000 arrests and prompted the party to go underground, not to re-emerge until 1935. During the interim, Tan Malaka, disenchanted with the party's lack of progress, split from the PKI to form the Marxist-Leninist Party that operated out of Bangkok.

The void in leadership during the period of enforced seclusion was filled by Musso, a hard-liner favored by the Stalinist regime in Moscow. Under his leadership, a second attempt to overthrow the government took place at Madiun, Central Java in September, 1948. Communist guerrilla units seized the city on September 18 and held the area until the 30th when government forces retook the city, executing Musso in the process. These 1948 rebellions were especially costly as 36,000 followers were arrested and executed, including 11 top PKI leaders, five members of the Politburo among them. Once again the party was forced underground to regroup.

The significance of the ill-fated Madiun campaign goes farther than a simple tactical error, however. Granted, there was

a large loss of life at a time when the PKI was desperately trying to assert itself in Indonesian political life. Even more important, however, than this loss of vital personnel was the image of the PKI that was created as a result of the abortive coup attempt. In the eyes of many Indonesians, the actions of the PKI, coming at a time when the Republic was fighting for its political life, were very treasonous. This argument was given further credence when the PKI issued a bitter denunciation of Sukarno after the defeat at Madiun. Such an action simply served to alienate even more persons who admired Sukarno as the Father of the Indonesian Revolution. Thus, in the eyes of many Indonesians, the PKI became the symbol of disunity in Indonesian politics. This was an image that would remain for many years and may even have been an underlying rationale for the bloody defeat of the PKI in the mid-1960's. In a country where consensus is paramount, the PKI had earned the reputation as the exception to the normal established order of things political.

In 1950, the leadership of the party was assumed by Dipa Nusantara Aidit. Widely acclaimed as a skillful organizer who was more oriented toward Peking than Moscow in his ideological persuasions, the youthful Aidit (31 in 1950) presided over the resurgence of the PKI in the 1950's. In 1955, the party won 16.4 percent (6,176,000 votes) of the votes for the Indonesian Parliament. This
total placed them fourth with 39 out of the 257 contested seats. This must be considered a remarkable showing in light of the demise of the party following the debacle of 1948 just seven years prior. The party was eagerly looking forward to the 1959 elections in hopes of gaining even more support. But these elections were never held due to the insistence of the military and the capriciousness of President Sukarno.

By the mid-1960's, Aidit had built the PKI's membership to three million. In addition, about 14 million members were loosely associated through the PKI sponsored front organizations, such as, the women's group, Gerwani, and youth group, Permuda Rakjat. To do this, Aidit had to compromise his ideological purity. He called for non-interference with other parties' activities, pledged to cooperate in various national fronts, and proclaimed a belief in the Panta Sila, Sukarno's amalgamation of religion, nationalism, humanism, democracy, and social justice. He stated that membership in the PKI was open to all. "The only thing we require," said Aidit, "is that they must be patriots." \(^{10}\)

By the mid-1960's, the PKI had worked hard to gain legitimacy as Sukarno's most faithful disciples. They were so successful that by mid-1965 it appeared as if Aidit would be named

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\(^{10}\) John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay Company, 1967), p. 84.
Sukarno's political heir. Speaking at the 45th anniversary celebration of the PKI on May 23, 1965, Sukarno said, "Aidit is the bulwark of Indonesia."\(^{11}\) It had been a difficult road from Batavia in 1926 through Madiun in 1948 to that day. Since 1950 the PKI had come to represent as well a disciplined organization as there was in Indonesia. Thus, on the eve of GESTAPU, the PKI was a threat to the only other highly centralized organization in Indonesian society, the military. The resulting conflict in political leadership was to re-affirm the superiority of the military yet one more time.

Sukarno

Sitting atop the Indonesian political environment and thoroughly dominating it through his own unique brand of personal politics was President Sukarno, Great Father of the Revolution. The preface to Sukarno's autobiography aptly sums up the measure of the man: "The simplest way to describe Sukarno is to say he is a great lover. He loves his country, he loves his people, he loves women, he loves art, and, best of all, he loves himself."\(^{12}\) Sukarno has been called many things -- meglo-maniac, charmer, faddist. As

\(^{11}\) Scalapino, *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, p. 279.

Donald Kirk has remarked, "Sukarno was the best speaker I ever heard. He could have been a movie star. He had that kind of talent." Yet there is one thing that all experts agree on; that in his every action, Sukarno was the manifestation of the classical Indonesian mentality. A brief sketch of the man will reveal his classical Javanese personality. To do so, the reader must seek the roots of the Indonesian nationalist ideal which Sukarno came to exemplify.

The Indonesian nationalism that surfaced after World War II had its philosophical beginnings in the first quarter of the 20th century. More specifically, Indonesian nationalism can be dated from 1908 when a small group of Javanese medical students formed a society named Boedi Oetomo (High Endeavor) to promote cultural ideas and educational reforms in response to the Ethical Policy of the Dutch instituted around the turn of the century. At the same time, another group, the Sarekat Dagang Islam, was established to protect Muslim cultural and business expression against the growing overseas Chinese population in Indonesia. Some members of the Sarekat Islam also belonged to the Social Democratic Association, the fore-runner of the PKI. Thus, when the PKI was crushed after its futile coup attempt of November, 1926, the Sarekat Islam movement was also doomed to extinction. To

\[13\] Ibid., p. 9.
fill the intellectual void left by the destruction of the PKI and the Sarekat Islam, a number of student study groups were formed. One of these groups, based in Bandung, was headed by a young East Javanese civil engineer, Sukarno.14

Sukarno was born in 1901, the son of a Javanese school teacher and a Balinese dancer. As a boy of fourteen, he was sent to live as a foster son in the home of O. S. Tjokroaminoto, a former prominent leader of the Sarekat Islam movement. During his stay in Tjokroaminoto's home, Sukarno acquired many of his radical views on nationalism. There can be no doubt that this period had a profound effect on the young impressionable Sukarno.

In 1927, when he was twenty-six years old, Sukarno helped found the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI). The PNI was to become Sukarno's mouthpiece in his rise to prominence during the struggles for independence in the late 1940's. While there were several other nationalist groups operating in Indonesia at the time (notably the Nahdatul Ulama, a Muslim group), it was the PNI that ultimately was to become the leading spokesman for the Indonesian cause. This was

14Sukarno's father, a teacher, long desired his son to be a "servant of the fatherland." Because of his fluency in Dutch, Sukarno was admitted to the European Elementary School in Modjokerto. In 1916 he advanced to the "high school" in Surabaya. Sukarno's education continued upon his admission into the Institute of Technology in Bandung in 1920. He graduated in 1926 with an advanced degree in engineering.
probably due to Sukarno's great personal magnetism, which even at this early stage in his career, was his major asset.

In 1929, Sukarno was arrested by the Dutch because of his nationalist activities. He served two years of a possible three-year sentence. This pattern of arrest and imprisonment by the Dutch was to continue throughout the 1930's. In 1933, Sukarno was arrested again and exiled to Sumatra. It was during this confinement that Sukarno established personal relationships with many men who were destined to become his associates in government. Among his cell-mates was Mohammed Hatta, who was to serve as Vice-President from 1949 to 1956 when he resigned over a petty dispute with Sukarno.

If the anti-Dutch agitations of the 1920's and 1930's had planted the seeds of discontent, it was the Japanese occupation that allowed the Indonesian nationalist movement to blossom. At the time of the initial take-over, Japanese officials rounded up and incarcerated all potential Indonesian political dissidents. Sukarno was among those arrested and detained. By using flattery, gile, and calculated risks, Sukarno was able to gain acceptance to the inner circle of Japanese authority to the extent that when the Japanese declared Indonesia a free republic on August 17, 1945, he was in a position to be named president of the new state. This was an office he was destined to hold until post GESTAPU events forced him from office on March 12, 1967.
While Sukarno’s formal educational experiences had taught him the sharp dichotomy between eastern and western value systems, he was no ordinary intellectual rebel.\(^{15}\) From his earliest days, Sukarno was constantly driven by his desire for Indonesians to reach social parity with the white (western) world. Indeed, much of Sukarno’s personal appeal with the Indonesian masses can be gleaned from his anti-colonial attitudes. Sukarno regarded himself not only as the founder of the Indonesian state, but as the very personification of anti-westernism as well. Not long after the announcement of "Guided Democracy," Sukarno declared,

> I belong to that group of people who are bound in spiritual longing by the romanticism of the revolution. I am inspired by it. I am fascinated by it. I am completely absorbed by it. I am crazed, I am obsessed by the romanticism of revolution. That is why I, who have given the topmost leadership in the struggles of the Indonesian nation, never tire of appealing and exhorting: Solve our national problems in a revolutionary way, make the revolutionary spirit surge on, see to it that the fire of our revolution does not die or grow dim, not even for a single moment. Come, then, keep fanning the flames of the leaping fire of revolution. Brothers and sisters, let us become logs to feed the flames of revolution!\(^{16}\)

In the days before GESTAPU, such fiery rhetoric was not lost on the Indonesian people.

\(^{15}\)Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karno," p. 8.

In many ways, Sukarno's style paralleled that of the 1960's civil rights leaders who taught their followers to reject white society and glorify their own history. Indeed, some writers feel that Sukarno's greatest contribution to Indonesia was his resentment of the Dutch in particular and the Western ideal in general. Touching on this subject in his autobiography, Sukarno commented, "The Dutch children never played with native children. They were the good, the pure, the snow-white Westerners and they looked down on me because I was a native or 'inlander.'"\(^\text{17}\) It was such a frame of mind that Sukarno brought to the political leadership of Indonesia in the years before 1965.

It is only at this point that the tragic flaw in the man's personality appears. It is indeed ironic that even while Sukarno openly worked against the ways of the West, he really yearned to be like Westerners. He drove western cars. He dressed in the latest western fashions. He entertained in western style. When questioned about his life-style, Sukarno rationalized, "I reacted to the poverty and tragedy in which I was brought up in. I like my pleasures, I have earned them."\(^\text{18}\) It was this inner contradiction that was to destroy Sukarno in the wake of GESTAPU.

\(^\text{17}\)Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karno," p. 7.

\(^\text{18}\)Ibid., p. 9.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a sense of creeping authoritarianism could be noticed in Sukarno's actions. By this time, Sukarno felt that what was needed was not a chaotic parliamentary system which had no basis in either Indonesian thought or tradition, but a strong bapak (father figure) to draw the country together. By 1957, Sukarno was ready to put his plans into action. In February of that year, Sukarno announced his desire to return to the old 1945 executive oriented constitution. At the same time, he introduced his "Guided Democracy" which would assure the chief executive (Sukarno as President) strong central power and offer an alternative to the western democratic, i.e., imperialist tradition. In 1959, Sukarno further consolidated his position by dissolving the elected parliament and instituting a gotong royong (mutual cooperation) assembly of his own choosing. This trend toward concentration of power reached its zenith in 1963 when Sukarno was named President For Life. By this date it was apparent that democracy, in the western sense of the word, had become a dead issue in Indonesia.

If Sukarno can be said to have given Indonesia a sense of unity in the years before 1965, it can also be said that he was the indirect cause of the crisis in political leadership that occurred in that year. Because of his penchant for high living, by the mid-1960's Sukarno was in serious ill-health. It was widely felt that his demise would touch off a violent struggle for power among the only two forces
in society capable of assuming control, the military and the PKI.

There was no legal line of succession because the Vice-Presidency, vacant since Hatta's resignation in 1956, had never been filled. Furthermore, Sukarno had given little indication of his preference of an heir apparent. Thus, the classic struggle for political power between the military and civilian mentalities was joined. Both contending parties knew the consequences should the other gain the upper hand.

The question of a legal successor to Sukarno became a moot point, however, because on the night of September 30—October 1, 1965, Lt. Col. Untung, battalion commander of Sukarno's bodyguards, attempted a coup d'etat that was destined to change forever the course of Indonesian politics.
CHART SUMMARIZING THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN THE INDONESIA REPUBLIC

August 1945  The Japanese surrender. Dr. Sukarno proclaims the independent Republic of Indonesia before the return of the Dutch colonial power.

September 1948  An uprising of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is quelled.

December 1949  After two "police actions" against the nationalists, the Dutch finally concede sovereignty to Indonesia, but leave open the question of the future ownership of Dutch West New Guinea.

1950  Indonesia adopts a Western-style parliamentary constitution.

1951-1953  An uprising of the fanatical "Darul Islam" movement gains momentum in protest against President Sukarno's failure to make Indonesia an Islamic state.

September 1955  General elections. Nationalist, Muslim, and Communist parties dominate the parliament.

February 1957  Sukarno proposes to introduce "Guided Democracy" to give the executive strong central power and as an alternative to Western democratic practice.

December 1957  In his campaign to wrest Dutch West New Guinea ("West Irian") from The Hague, Sukarno breaks off diplomatic relations with Holland, expels all Dutch subjects, and begins appropriating all Dutch interests.

February 1958  Regional military commanders rebel in Sumatra, where a "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" is declared.

1959-1960  Sukarno announces his "Political Manifesto," which is the basic document of "Guided Democracy," and becomes head of government as well as head of state.

Sukarno dissolves the elected parliament and replaces it with a gotong royong (mutual cooperation) assembly of his own choosing and subordinated to his authority. The new policy of NASAKOM (cooperation between Nationalists, religious parties, and Communists) is confirmed.

February 1960  Khrushchev visits Indonesia.

1961  The Sumatra rebellion peters out. Indonesian troops begin infiltrating "West Irian" to harass the Dutch.
1962 The New York agreement gives Indonesia provisional control of West Irian under the aegis of the United Nations but stipulates that the population must be granted their own "Act of Free Choice" in 1969.

The Darul Islam revolt is finally suppressed.

September 1963 Sukarno launches serious military "Confrontation" against the new expanded Federation of Malaysia.

January 1965 Sukarno takes Indonesia out of the UN in protest against the admission of Malaysia.

September–October 1965 An abortive Communist coup in Indonesia is followed by a widespread massacre of Communists by the military and the Muslims.

1966 Muslim youth movements organize massive demonstrations against Sukarno, the Communists, and the Chinese. General Suharto assumes effective power.

June–September 1966 Confrontation is ended by signed agreement. Indonesia rejoins the UN.

February–March 1967 Suharto officially becomes acting president.
CHAPTER III

THE COUP THAT FAILED

The Rumours

In the days before GESTAPU, Indonesia was besieged by rumours of plots and counterplots having varying ideological persuasions. One rumour, widely circulated by communist party press organs, told of a purported "Council of Generals" that would stage a right-wing coup on Armed Forces Day (October 5). The avowed purpose for the take-over, according to the communists, was to destroy the PKI and solidify the position of the military in the Indonesian political picture. At the same time, it was alleged that Aidit had pressed Sukarno to create a "fifth force" of armed peasants and workers to act as a countervailing to the growing power of the military.19 In a speech on January 17, 1965, Aidit revealed, "I have submitted a proposal to President Sukarno to arm immediately the workers and peasants, the pillars of the revolution. No less than

19 When Sukarno challenged Army Chief of Staff Yani on the existence of a "Council of Generals," he was told that it was merely a group of senior officers who met from time to time to discuss "political matters" and some internal Army affairs mainly having to do with promotion and retirement of senior officers.
five million organized workers and ten million organized peasants are ready to take up arms." Such a statement was clearly a challenge to the military's position of dominance in society. General Sutopo Juwono, director of the Army's intelligence division, stated the military's position when he said,

Our feeling at the time was that if the fifth force was set up, the Army -- the armed forces -- would be separated from the people and we would end up with a dual command. We considered the proposal an outside effort, especially by Peking and the PKI, to divide the Army from the people.\textsuperscript{21}

Even at this early point the lines of confrontation were becoming apparent. In addition, Sukarno's continued physical demise and the arrival of a team of communist Chinese doctors lent plausibility to the suspicion of an externally inspired communist plot. It was rumoured that these Chinese acupuncture specialists reported Sukarno's condition directly to Aaidit.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, on the eve of the coup attempt Sukarno's health had become a political football. Sukarno scoffed at any suggestion of an attempt to displace him.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20}The proposed "fifth force" would be an alternative to the four regular branches of the Indonesian military -- army, navy, air force, and marines.

\textsuperscript{21}Scalapino, \textit{The Communist Revolution in Asia}, p. 291.

\textsuperscript{22}Shaplen, \textit{Time Out of Hand}, pp. 94-95.

\textsuperscript{23}When told of the rumours, Sukarno dismissed them as "PKI phobia" or "psychological warfare" aimed at sidetracking the "revolutionary spirit."
The Strategy of the Plotters

Despite the President's denials, the coup attempt of September 30 - October 1, 1965 followed a highly intricate plan. The plotters, left-wing members of the military supported by communist front organizations, notably the women's and youth organizations, chose Halim airfield outside Djakarta as their base of operations. The commandant of the base, Major Sujono, as well as the Air Force Chief of Staff Dhani were among the plotters.

H-Hour for the coup attempt was to be 4:00 a.m., October 1, 1965. It was hoped that the coup forces would be able to achieve their objectives before morning thus negating any reaction from opposing forces. This coup force was divided into three groups, each with a specific objective to be achieved. The names of the attack forces were derived from mystical characters in the classical Javanese shadow play, the wayang kulit. The Pasupati, composed of Untung's Tjakrabirwa palace guards and Permuda Rakjat (youth group) trainees, was given the task of seizing the top command of the military. A list of eight generals was supplied. The murder squads were to

24 The eight officers included: General Nasution, Minister of Defense, General Yani, Army Chief of Staff, Major General Parman, Intelligence Division, and staff officers, Major General Suprapto, Major General Harjono, Brigadier General Pandjaitan, Brigadier General Siswomihardjo, and Brigadier General Sukendro. The plotters failed to realize that Sukendro was out of the country at the time of the coup.
either capture or kill these selected members of the military high command. Those on the list were either killed at their residences, on the way to Halim, or at the base itself. Their bodies were buried in a remote section of the airfield. The Bimasakti, composed of visiting Central and East Javanese battalions in Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day celebration, had the objective of capturing and holding the Presidential Palace, radio station, and telecommunications center on Merdeka Square. A reserve force, the Gatot Katja (air force and youth groups) remained on ready alert at the airfield. At the appointed hour, unmarked troop convoys rolled into the streets of Djakarta.

Reaction and Defeat

When news of the coup attempt reached President Sukarno on the morning of October 1, four options were considered as viable alternatives to insure his safety against the plotters. First, he

25Photographs of the bodies of the murdered generals discovered after the defeat of the coup, helped inflame military sentiment against the PKI.

26On the night of the coup, Sukarno drove first to Senayan, a suburb of Djakarta to address one of the "functional groups" that sat in the Parliament. After the speech he returned to the Presidential Palace only long enough to change clothes before driving to the Hotel Indonesia to pick up his Japanese wife, Dewi, who had been attending a wedding reception. They then drove together to her residence in Slipi where Sukarno spent the night.
could go to a "well situated house" in the Djakarta suburb of Kebajoram. This was the residence of one of his wives. Second, he could put out to sea on a vessel of the still loyal Indonesian navy. This alternative would totally remove him from physical danger and also make any escape more feasible. Opting to remain in the country, Sukarno could choose to travel to the Presidential Palace at Bogor approximately forty miles from Djakarta via an armoured car. The last option was for Sukarno to go to the rebel stronghold at Halim and openly "confront" the plotters. In a fateful decision that would ultimately cause his political downfall, President Sukarno chose this last alternative. O. G. Roeder sees this decision as the tragic flaw in Sukarno's actions at this time. "If Sukarno had gone to the palace he would have been in a position to side either with Untung or Suharto or to play one against the other." However, for reasons known only by Sukarno, he opted for the trip to Halim.

The plotters, now calling themselves the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia issued their first radio communique at 7:15 a.m.

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27 Over the course of his lifetime, Sukarno was rumoured to have been married 18 times. At the time of the coup he had five wives (one more than the legal Muslim limit). Since each of his wives had her own establishment, he always had a wide choice of accommodations.

on the morning of the first.\textsuperscript{29} In this initial message, the plotters stated that the purpose of the coup had been to smash the reactionary "Council of Generals" who themselves had planned a coup for October 5, Armed Forces Day. After pledging to work for the good of the Indonesian people, the communique concluded with a list of some fifty prominent military and civilian leaders who allegedly supported the actions of the September 30th Movement, the group claiming responsibility for the coup.\textsuperscript{30}

It was only at this point that President Sukarno broke his silence on the unfolding drama. When viewing his actions in retrospect, his behavior was curious indeed. On the evening of the first, Sukarno issued a Presidential Order of the Day.\textsuperscript{31} Along with the expected call for calm and increased vigilance on the part of the citizenry, Sukarno chose this moment to appoint Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro as acting commander-in-chief of the Army.

The urgent question is this -- unless Sukarno knew that Yani had been on the list of officers to be executed by the Pasupati, why did he need

\textsuperscript{29}The communique is included in its entirety in the appendix to this paper.

\textsuperscript{30}It is interesting to note that many of the people included on the list later said they were never consulted or gave permission to use their names in the statement.

\textsuperscript{31}The text of the Presidential Order is included in the appendix to this paper.
to appoint a new commandant at this crucial juncture? The timing of this announcement would be crucial later as the military attempted to prove Sukarno's prior knowledge and involvement in the abortive coup.

As will be recalled, one group of the coup force (the Bimasakti) was to gain control of essential communications centers located in the heart of Djakarta along Merdeka Square. During the day following the take-over (October 1) loyal government forces of the Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) under General Suharto negotiated with the plotters holding the square. By using threats and appeals to nationalism as a basis, by the end of the day Suharto was able to persuade these troops to capitulate and release their hold on the vital communications facilities. Having now driven a wedge in the organization of the coup forces, Suharto now began to evolve a counter-coup strategy that aimed at defeating the conspirators.

With the coup in a state of precarious balance, the PKI created a massive blunder that ultimately provided the documentary justification for the party's own obliteration at the hands of the military. The PKI sponsored daily newspaper, the Harian Rakjat endorsed the coup attempt in an editorial in its October 2, 1965 edition. Accompanied by a cartoon of two generals with dollar signs for epaulettes, shoulder badges of the "Council of Generals" and caps with the letters,
"C.I.A." propped up by an evil-looking Uncle Sam, the Harian Rakjat editorial read as follows:

It has happened that on the 30th of September measures were taken to safeguard President Sukarno and the Republic of Indonesia from a coup by a so-called Council of Generals. According to what has been announced by the September 30th Movement, which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung of a Tjakrabirwa battalion, action taken to preserve President Sukarno and the Republic of Indonesia from the Council of Generals is patriotic and revolutionary.

Whatever the justification that may have been used by the Council of Generals in its attempt, the staging of a coup is a condemnable and counter-revolutionary act.

We the people fully comprehend what Lieutenant Colonel Untung has asserted in carrying out his patriotic movement.

But whatever the case may be, this is an internal army affair. On the other hand, we the people, who are conscious of the policies and duties of the revolution, are convinced of the correctness of the action taken by the September 30th Movement to preserve the revolution and the people.

The sympathy and support of the people is surely on the side of the September 30th Movement. We call on the people to intensify their vigilance and be prepared to confront all eventualities. 32

Thus, in an incredibly ill-advised move, the PKI sealed its own fate by tying itself forever to the actions of the September 30th Movement.

Meanwhile, after regaining control at Merdeka Square, Suharto planned his counter-attack against the plotters headquartered at Halim field. In the early hours of October 2, Suharto's Kostrad troops moved against the now disorganized plotters at the airfield. The coup attempt was defeated by 6:10 a.m. on the morning of the

32 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 78.
second as Suharto's forces retook the area with no casualties.

Commenting later on the action, Suharto said,

I gave top priority to avoiding bloodshed. I could have seized the radio station early in the morning. But this would have resulted in shooting and at that time I still did not know the real background of the September 30th Movement. Once the announcement of the Revolutionary Council and its composition had been made, their real activities were unmasked, convincing us that we no longer need hesitate to take action against the September 30th Movement.33

The remnants of the September 30th Movement, now more aptly called a retreat, were pursued into the rural areas beyond Djakarta. Within a few days loyal government troops had either regained control or neutralized the rebel elements. The real blood-letting was yet to come.

The defeat of the coup attempt exposed the flaws in the plotters' strategy. The failure of the Bimasakti to hold the communications center allowed word of the coup attempt to be conveyed to loyal government troops throughout Indonesia. The failure to kill General Nasution provided a symbolic rallying point for the counter-coup forces. The plotters made a fundamental error when they failed to regard Suharto as a potential threat. By ignoring him, the plotters allowed him to operate with a relatively free hand until he, not they became the master of the situation. Most importantly, the plotters failed to gauge accurately the public mood of the citizenry of Indonesia. The

33Ibid., p. 72.
plotters felt that the coup would be the signal for a spontaneous reaction among the masses. This did not happen. As the Sultan of Jogjakarta, now a prominent figure in the government of Suharto, explained, "There was no popular uprising of the people." The communists, he said, misjudged the temper of the people. The PKI had become a mass party that lacked any support of the masses. Indeed, the defeat of the coup was to signal something quite the opposite than what the plotters had intended.

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34 Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia*, p. 140.
CHAPTER IV

THE BLOODY AFTERMATH OF GESTAPU

The defeat of the coup attempt signaled the beginning of a massive reign of terror in Indonesia. The military, now wearing the hero’s laurels due to Suharto's defeat of the purported communist coup, was enraged over Sukarno's failure to denounce the PKI and its role in the aborted take-over. Photographs of the slain generals' mutilated bodies buried at Halim further served to accentuate the growing rift between the military and civilian mentalities. Further fuel was added to the budding controversy when Sukarno failed to appear at a memorial service honoring the murdered officers. The sight of General Nasution on crutches at the ceremonies, evoked a strong emotional response that was not lost on the military men attending the rites. In retrospect, Sukarno's failure to attend the function must be viewed as a fundamental error on his part if he

\[35\text{In the days immediately following the coup attempt, Sukarno never made any reference to the role of the PKI in the take-over attempt.}\]

\[36\text{General Nasution injured his foot while fleeing the squads on the night of the coup attempt.}\]
wished to remain in control of the political system. It was at this time that the military announced creation of a "Combined Action Body for Crushing the September 30th Movement." This organization was a concerted attempt to unite all anti-communist sentiment explicitly against the PKI. The fact that many overseas Chinese residing in Indonesia were also victims of the purge implied the military's belief of complicity on the part of the Chinese communists. Indeed, one of the first actions of the mob (notably anti-communist Muslim student groups) was to attack the embassy of the People's Republic of China.

The motives for the blood-letting were varied. To the military, the need was to eliminate the PKI as a contending political force. To this end, military units stood idly by as mobs attacked and destroyed the PKI headquarters in Djakarta. The homes of Aidit and other leading PKI figures were looted and burned. Slogans such as "Crush Aidit" or "Crush the PKI" began to appear with regularity on the walls and billboards of the city. More importantly, there were few, if any, arrests of vandals during this period. When criticized for their inaction during the disturbances, the military rationalized, "It was the communists or us. If we hadn't killed them, they would have killed us." 37

37 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 189.
To the Muslim religious groups, the killings took on a mystical religious connotation. This was particularly true in the outer islands. East Java provides a classic example. In this area, most of the executions were by beheading. The bodies were buried in one grave, the head in another. This action satisfied the local belief that decapitation and separate burial prevented the spirits of the dead victim from returning to haunt the slayers. In other areas as well, the patterns of killing reflected deep divisions of race, religion, and culture.

To the student groups, notably the radical university student group, the KAMI, the purges were an expression of a nationalistic fervor to drive out the overseas Chinese. For many years, the resident Chinese aliens had assumed a predominant position in the Indonesian economic structure. Although numbering only three million in 1965, the overseas Chinese controlled over 70 percent of the "native" industries. The student groups felt that the purges offered an opportunity to redress this situation. Indeed, the militant student groups were later to become the most vocal critics of the military when the military sought to wind down the purge.

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To the average man in the street, however, the motive was much simpler; the killings were rationalized on the basis of self-defense. It was a simple matter of kill or be killed. As one of Indonesia's best known artists, Antonio Blanco has remarked, "Every night we could see one village after another go up in flames. We were in deathly fear of our own lives."\(^{39}\) Another Balinese resident, a Dutch woman, said, "Everyone got the blood lust. At night, sleeping with guns under our pillows, we found ourselves saying, 'Why don't they kill that man instead of this one?'"\(^{40}\)

Internationally, world reaction to the events in Indonesia varied. The United Nations made no official statement. Neither did many of the non-aligned countries. The communist world (Moscow and Peking) viewed the passing of the largest communist party in Southeast Asia with a cautious sorrow. Pravada conceded the "possibility" that a PKI "adventurist" clique "may" have been involved. The Chinese were more outspoken. Calling the crimes "heinous and deliberate ... unprecedented in history," the Chinese condemned the Indonesian military for its handling of the situation.\(^{41}\) (In retrospect, this may be viewed more of an attack along ethnic lines than ideological


\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 129.

\(^{41}\) Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia*, p. 117.
ones. Recall that the overseas Chinese were prime targets of the purge.) The West treated the situation lighter than it would the genocide in Biafra in 1968. While several publications\textsuperscript{42} ran feature articles on the events in Indonesia, the United States government never officially commented on the situation.

Statistics on the number of persons killed during the purge varied according to the source consulted. The \textit{Economist} set the figure around one million. The \textit{Washington Post} reduced this figure to 500,000. \textit{Life} magazine calculated 400,000 casualties while the \textit{New York Times} estimated from 150,000 to 400,000 victims. In a speech before his death in 1970, Sukarno set the figure at 87,000.

The real figure will never be known.

At this point, an assessment of the impact of GESTAPU and its bloody aftermath must be made. The economy of Indonesia, already weak before 1965, was pushed past the breaking point. The cost to Indonesia, both directly in terms of actual expenditures and indirectly in terms of lost foreign aid (once in a fit of pique over the United States' refusal to send Indonesia any further foreign aid because of his anti-Malaysia policy, Sukarno told the United States to "go to hell with your aid") was tremendous. The political process was a

\textsuperscript{42}Major publications with articles on Indonesia included the \textit{Times of London}, \textit{Guardian}, and \textit{Saturday Review}. 
shambles. Any sense of constitutional legitimacy had been destroyed by Sukarno's constant usurpation of power during the late 1950's. Political organizations of varying persuasions had been systematically outlawed and their leaders jailed to the extent that the concept of democratic choice was a mere illusion in Indonesia. Political authority was now based on the monopoly of the instruments of violence.

Socially, Indonesia was a nation caught up in a massive witch hunt aimed at eradicating a philosophy alien to the Indonesian mentality. It was a situation that pitted neighbor against neighbor in a struggle that threatened to destroy the very concept of the Indonesian nation. Even more important, however, was the fact the GESTAPU had created a cerebral gap in the Indonesian mind. Any sense of ideological continuity had been shattered. Nationalism seemed to have no meaning any longer. Marxism had apparently been violently repudiated. Even the personalism of President Sukarno, long a source of security for the average Indonesian, was now in serious doubt. Students of the Indonesian experience have never found any document left by the PKI describing the nature of the character a Marxist Indonesia would have taken had the coup been successful. One can only speculate on its essence. In light of this situation, the mantle of political legitimacy was there for the taking by the first group that could claim to speak for the masses of Indonesia. It would not remain unclaimed for long.
CHAPTER V

THE TRIALS AND SUKARNO - I

It was in this atmosphere of emotional reaction to GESTAPU that the military announced the trials of suspected conspirators in the coup attempt. The defendants selected for prosecution were either members of the now discredited PKI or left-wing officers in the military. The defendants were to stand trial before a mahmillub (military tribunal) composed solely of highly ranking military officers. The attorneys for the state were also members of the army's legal division. Foreign newsmen were barred from the proceedings, making Antara, the official government news agency, the only source of information about the trials. Thus, the military was to be in complete control of this attempt to resolve the crisis in political leadership that was threatening to tear Indonesia apart.

The verdicts were foregone conclusions. The significance of the trials, therefore, was not the verdicts rendered but the way in

43 Of the nine jurists on the tribunal, none were civilians.

44 The loudest critics were the student groups who viewed the trials merely as attempts to cover up the real role of Sukarno.
which the military used the proceedings to discredit President Sukarno by linking him to the plotters in a superior-subordinate relationship. The military was forced to employ such tactics in the days immediately following the coup attempt because Sukarno was still enormously popular with the majority of Indonesian citizens. As one young professor at the University of Indonesia said, "We need Sukarno. They (the people) idolize him. What are they going to do if they hear we've thrown him out? They might even start fighting for him."45 Statements such as these were indicative of the mood of the people. A direct confrontation at this delicate juncture might have ended in defeat for the military. Operating in typical Javanese fashion, the military evolved its plan of indirect attack against the government of Bung Karno.

The Early Trials

In the early trials, the military moved cautiously, selecting minor personalities. It was hoped that these early trials would set the stage for Sukarno's repudiation without having to confront him directly. Njono, a PKI labor front leader and the coordinator of the youth groups at Halim during the coup attempt was tried and sentenced to death in February, 1966. He was to be the first individual to be legally punished for the events of September 30 - October 1, 1965. During his

trial, Njono repeatedly said the PKI had staged the revolt in order to keep a "group of army generals" from seizing power. Just as the Harian Rakjat editorial had implicated the PKI, the testimony given at the Njono trial tended to re-enforce the military's contention that the PKI was behind the take-over attempt. With Sukarno's close relationship to the PKI a known fact, these were potentially damaging revelations.

Lt. Col. Untung, the commander of the palace guards and alleged mastermind of the coup attempt, had fled Djakarta in the last hours of the coup. After an extensive search, he was captured in Central Java on October 11, 1965. He went on trial on February 23, 1966. Throughout the proceedings, the prosecution tried to create an image of Untung as an ambitious, gullible man who was willing to become a dupe of the PKI in exchange for personal aggrandizement. Untung's only line of defense was that he had acted to thwart a "Council of Generals." He was found guilty and sentenced to death on March 7, 1966. The sentence was carried out in a military prison in West Java on September 28, 1967.

47 Ibid., p. 113.
During mid-1966 more guilty verdicts were handed down. Lt. Ngadimo, a communist army officer was sentenced to death in April, 1966. The commandant of Halim Field, headquarters for the plotters, Major Sujono, was next, being sentenced to death in June, 1966. Aseli, a PKI organizer, learned his fate in August, 1966. With each new guilty verdict, the military felt that Sukarno's credibility was being diminished. At the same time, General Suharto moved to increase the military's prestige by freeing 15 prominent politicians who had been incarcerated by Sukarno. Most of these individuals were well-known figures who had been associated with political organizations that had been outlawed by Sukarno. The charges brought against the men had been "a dislike of Guided Democracy." The military hoped that this action would put themselves into the position of being considered humanitarians while at the same time portraying Sukarno as an unfeeling dictator.

During these early trials, the prosecution repeatedly tried to get the defendants to implicate Sukarno or at least his top subordinates in the planning, execution, and cover-up of GESTAPU. In this maneuver, however, they were not successful. All the defendants steadfastly maintained they had only been working for the good of the Indonesian "state." All the defendants stated they were merely

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operating to "serve" the Great Leader of the Revolution (Sukarno).

Major Sujono was typical: "Without Bung Karno, the revolution cannot be completed and President Sukarno cannot be replaced by another."49 Couched in these terms, their testimony only indirectly suggested Sukarno's responsibility in his role as head of state. The military prosecutors felt it was impossible to connect Sukarno to the plotters on the basis of such weak, inconclusive evidence.

While the early trials were in session, Sukarno made numerous public appearances in which he refuted any suggestion that he was in league with the plotters. As early as two weeks after the coup attempt, Sukarno promised to find the "true roots" of GESTAPU.50 These appearances were planned to keep Sukarno's charismatic personality in the public eye while at the same time mitigating the growing influence of the military. This pattern of speaking out against any new disclosure was to continue right up until the termination of Sukarno's power in March, 1967. Indeed, in a speech less than three months before his removal from office, Sukarno said, "Some people have asked me to keep quiet and not make any speeches. But I cannot be quiet. When I feel I should support,


I will support. I am the Great Leader of the Revolution and I will lead the revolution according to my own conviction." In the early days of the post-GESTAPU era, such rhetoric was accepted. Later it would not be.

Because these minor figures had failed to produce the necessary evidence to implicate Sukarno, the prosecution felt it was time to move against his major subordinates. Those selected for special attention by the military included Finance Minister Josef Mustafa Dalam, the Deputy Premier of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio, and Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dhani. It was felt that by attacking the major associates of President Sukarno that the military could sway public opinion to the extent that Sukarno would be forced to resign. It was in this spirit that the military announced the trial of Dalam in late August, 1966.

Major Personalities - Dalam

Josef Mustafa Dalam had been the chief financial officer under President Sukarno. As such, he was in a crucial position to observe the monetary manipulations of the Sukarno regime. It was this area of malfeasance that the military sought to bring to public attention. It was felt that if Dalam's fiscal juggling, as well as some

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personal indiscretions could be associated with Sukarno, public
credibility in the regime would suffer accordingly. The indictments
against Dalam bore out this decision.

Article I of the indictments charged that between 1964 and
1966, Dalam had attempted to disrupt the governmental fiscal struc-
ture as well as the Indonesian economy in general. It was alleged
that he did this in several ways. First, it was suggested that Dalam
issued import licenses totalling $270 million on special deferred
payment plans. It was contended that such actions led to a deficit in
Indonesia's international balance of trade. Second, it was suggested
that Dalam granted special credits to friends that led to a deficit in
the state budget. Finally, Dalam was charged with exacerbating the
staggering inflation rate by printing more bank notes, thus increasing
the amount of currency in circulation.

Article II charged that Dalam had imported, without proper
license, firearms from Czechoslovakia. It was suggested by the
military that these weapons (400 submachineguns, 1,000 pistols and
ammunition) were destined to be used to arm the "fifth force" move-
ment of the PKI suggested by Aidit. (See p. 29.) Such a connection
would have indeed been injurious to Sukarno because his relationship
with the PKI was such public knowledge. If such allegations could be
proven, it would appear that Sukarno had been involved in an intrigue
to create an alternative to the military.
Article III also dealt with Dalam's purported monetary mismanagement. It was charged that he embezzled 10 million rupiahs in government funds which were transferred with Sukarno's approval to a special "Fund of the Revolution." It was further charged that this money was later "loaned" to six private business concerns that paid an exorbitant interest rate to Dalam for the privilege of the "loan."

Article IV charged Dalam with having six wives as opposed to the four considered legal by Islamic cannon. Indeed, it was soon apparent that the prosecution was as keenly interested in Article IV as it was in the rest of the indictments.

As the trial unfolded, it was obvious that the military sought to present spectacular revelations in order to stun the Indonesian people with the crassness of the present regime. The highlight of the Dalam trial came with the testimony of Dalam's girlfriends and their tales of his lavish gifts to them. Titiek Puspa, a 29 year old actress, told of Dalam's gift of a new American-made automobile. A 22 year old actress, Tina Wowanrutu, topped this earlier testimony by relating how Dalam had given her two cars in return for her favors. The most sensational testimony, however, was reserved for Ida Auboedah, an 18 year old school-girl, who claimed to have married Dalam by proxy in 1965. As a wedding gift, she reportedly received

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a new house just six months prior to GESTAPU in March, 1965. Using these new disclosures, the military prosecutors repeatedly sought to portray Dalam as a lecherous public servant who thought only of his own well-being. It was hoped that some association could be constructed with Sukarno's rather glamorous, opulent life-style. The implication was that Dalam was nothing more than a cheap imitation of Sukarno.

The defense was no match for the well constructed government case. In a weak, feeble rebuttal, Dalam admitted to his polygamy (Article IV) but said that he was only acting on "orders from higher ups" on the other charges. Throughout the trial he steadfastly refused to name these higher authorities. As regards the embezzlement charge, Dalam said that Sukarno was in charge of the operation of the "Fund of the Revolution." According to Dalam, only Sukarno had the power to disburse funds. On the charge of issuing improper licenses and other government documents, Dalam contended that he only acted on requests signed by Sukarno, or the Deputy Premier Subandrio. He stated that he seldom even looked at the requests personally, usually leaving them to his underlings instead. (Such a remark might have had the reverse effect on the tribunal, however, because while it absolved Dalam of the embezzlement charge, it could leave him open to a charge of irresponsibility in public office.)
Dalam was found guilty on September 9, 1966 of the four counts listed in the indictments. In declaring a penalty of death, the Chief Justice of the Tribunal stated that the verdict was "clearly supported by the prosecution's case." In passing sentence the Chief Justice commented that Dalam deserved no leniency because throughout the trial he had shown no regret for his actions and that he was guilty of contempt of court because of his unwillingness to supply answers to the prosecution's questions as to the purported "higher ups." In retrospect, the verdict is certainly open to debate because most of the state's case was based on unsubstantiated, circumstantial evidence such as the testimony of Dalam's girlfriends.

Public reaction to the Dalam verdict varied. The military felt it had been able to connect Sukarno to the extravagance and corruption of Dalam by implying that Sukarno had approved in advance Dalam's illegal activities. Other groups, notably the student organizations, viewed the outcome differently. These groups were unhappy that the trial had centered on Dalam's sexual exploits rather than getting to the real issue of economics. Viewing the trial as a "staged comedy" with little real significance, Kami Djaya, a student publication said, "The people's hope that their sense of justice would be

54 Ibid., p. 1.
satisfied has been shattered."\textsuperscript{55} The Action Command of Indonesian Students demanded to know "why there were attempts to distract court proceedings in another direction whenever the name of President Sukarno was mentioned."\textsuperscript{56} All of these statements tended to reflect a lack of faith in Suharto and his new regime. As Ismid Hadad, a student leader said, "There is no new order as a force yet. It is still just a climate. The old order is a weakening force. Once the central figure is out, then it will be easy."\textsuperscript{57} Throughout the trial, the central figure remained silent, not willing to comment or pass judgment on his friend. The military, however, was not so reticent in its actions.

\textbf{Major Personalities - Subandrio}

Relatively pleased with the outcome of the Dalam trial, on October 1, 1966 the military opened the trial of Dr. Subandrio, the Deputy Premier of Indonesia and Sukarno's chief protege for more than nine years. It was more than mere coincidence that the military chose the first anniversary of the coup attempt to try the most powerful of Sukarno's subordinates. At this point the military felt the


\textsuperscript{56}\textit{ibid.}, p. 9.

initiative was with them. It was hoped that a conviction of Subandrio, coming close on the heels of the Dalam verdict, would push Sukarno's popularity with the masses even lower, thereby assuring a military victory in the struggle for the mantle of political leadership in Indonesia. Again, the verdict was a foregone conclusion. Even before opening statements had been heard, the military sought to characterize Subandrio as a durno; a character of the wayang kulit who gives bad information to his ruler and thus is an evil, untrustworthy servant.

As early as March, 1966, the military had implied that Subandrio was the mastermind of GESTAPU in its official publications. The tribunal was so convinced of Subandrio's guilt that two weeks before the trial even began, the presiding Chief Justice said, "It should take us about 12 days to convict him." All that was needed was for Subandrio to provide the crucial testimony that would link Sukarno to GESTAPU.

The indictments against Subandrio, as had been the charges against Dalam, were deliberately worded in a vague manner. This had a two-fold purpose. First, and most obviously, the military sought to make things as difficult as possible for the defense by never specifically


enumerating the charges against the defendant. Second, the military hoped that Subandrio would try to save himself by directly naming Sukarno in the events of September 30 - October 1, 1965. When made public, the reaction of many responsible groups in Indonesian society was one of general rejection and displeasure. This was particularly true of the student groups who characterized Subandrio as a greedy, self-centered public servant with little regard for the common man.\(^{60}\)

The indictments against Subandrio purported that he:

1. Was a mainstay in the planning and execution of the events of GESTAPU.
2. Had embezzled more than $500,000 in government funds and then diverted this state revenue for personal use.
3. Subverted efforts to restore order in the wake of the defeat of the coup attempt.

Subandrio pleaded innocent to the charges brought against him.

The state's case basically sought to link Subandrio (and through him, Sukarno) with selling out to the Chinese communists. Particularly damaging to Subandrio's defense was the testimony of two of his closest subordinates. His personal secretary Hartono, stated that Subandrio took $500,000 meant to cover expenditures at

\(^{60}\)Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p. 270.
the upcoming Afro-Asian Conference and banked the money for his own uses. Hartono further testified that Subandrio had sent him on a secret mission in February, 1965 to transfer the money to an unnumbered account in Geneva, Switzerland. Statements such as these tended to confirm the state's allegations of fiscal mismanagement on Subandrio's part. (Later, during the defense stage of the proceedings, Subandrio claimed he had diverted the money to save it for a planetarium for "all the people." Such an explanation only brought more sarcastic rebuttals from the prosecution.)

Equally injurious to Subandrio's case was the testimony of Suwito Kusumowidagdo, the First Deputy Foreign Minister. In testimony before the tribunal on October 10, 1966, Suwito stated that Subandrio had conspired with Air Marshall Dhani (later a key defendant) to secretly transport Chinese-made weapons for the proposed "fifth force" of the PKI into Indonesia without the knowledge of the Minister of Defense, General Nasution. The inference to be drawn from such a statement is obvious. While Suwito was merely interpreting his own thoughts, the military tribunal was undoubtedly swayed by his statement. The implication is as follows: Subandrio was a close associate of Sukarno. Sukarno was favorable to the PKI

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61 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 247.

and reportedly sympathetic to the creation of a party-sponsored para-military capability for the FKI. Hence, since Subandrio was in charge of procuring weapons for this unit, Sukarno undoubtedly was aware of the activities of his subordinate. If he did, he was guilty of complicity. If not, he should be discharged from his office on grounds of negligence. While such a conclusion is highly circum-spect, in the emotion reaction to GESTAPU, it was entirely possible that this was how the military interpreted Suwito's testimony. This feeling was given added credence when the state was able to produce yet another witness, Kartono Kadri, a former section chief of the Central Intelligence Board who claimed to have seen Subandrio destroy a letter to Sukarno from Aidit which outlined how Sukarno could create the "fifth force" with weapons secretly purchased from the People's Republic of China. Kartono said the letter was burned "because it concerned something in the past and because it involved President Sukarno." This letter was to become the first concrete evidence of Sukarno's involvement in the coup attempt.

Another segment of the indictment dealt with Subandrio's alleged subversion of attempts to restore order following the coup.


The state contended that Subandrio tried to divert attention from himself and Sukarno after October 1, 1965 by claiming a British-American plot to attack Indonesia in late 1965. To pursue this point further, the prosecution introduced into evidence a curious document known as the "Gilchrist letter." This letter was allegedly a paper written by Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the former British ambassador to Indonesia purporting to outline a joint British-American plot, "together with some local army friends" to overthrow the Sukarno regime. The letter reportedly found its way into Subandrio's possession in his capacity as the chief of intelligence in March, 1966 when he received a copy of the report along with a brief detailing how the document had been "found" in the Djakarta home of one William Palmer, an American businessman representing the Motion Picture Export Association in Indonesia. According to the Communist Youth League members who uncovered the plot, Palmer was an operative of the American Central Intelligence Agency who had fled Indonesia fearing his discovery. When asked what he did with the letter, Subandrio later testified that he kept it a secret, wanting "only to use the document in the international arena against the British."\(^\text{65}\) When queried as to whether he had shown the report to Sukarno, Subandrio testified that he had, but that Sukarno had wanted to keep it a secret until the second

\(^{65}\text{Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 98.}\)
Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for June, 1965. At that meeting, Sukarno hoped to embarrass the British and Americans by distributing copies of the letter to all the delegates assembled. (The conference, as it turned out, was never convened.) Both men, however, in speeches made prior to the coup attempt, hinted at "evidence of an imperialist plot to destroy Indonesia." Yet, neither Sukarno nor Subandrio ever specifically mentioned the Gilchrist correspondence in public, being content to merely hint at its existence.

It was the military's contention that the letter was a total fabrication, probably the product of the CIB that Subandrio headed. The prosecution expressed its belief that the letter was an attempt by Subandrio and Sukarno to provide themselves with an "out" if the coup attempt proved abortive. The military also strongly hinted that the letter had been prepared in collaboration with the PKI with whom Subandrio had allegedly formed at least a tacit alliance on the question of the "fifth force." This relationship was given further substance when the prosecution repeatedly brought up Subandrio's burning of the letter from Aidit to Sukarno.

With the proceedings in a critical state of balance, the prosecution produced yet another bombshell. This was a document purported to be Aidit's "confession" made just prior to his execution.

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66 Ibid., p. 99.
by government troops in November, 1965. Quoting the Japanese daily Asahil Shimbun, the "confession" read in part as follows:

I, Aidit, have the highest responsibility for the September 30 incident. The incident was supported by other leaders of the party and leaders of mass organizations associated with the party. Dissatisfaction with the present setup was the basic starting point for the coup d'etat. I thought that if a national unification government was established under the communist party leadership, the state would recover, the people's livelihood would improve .... I planned to effect closer relations with China economically too, if the coup d'etat proved successful. 67

Several implications can be gleaned from this statement. First, the confession apparently exonerated Sukarno and placed the onus for GESTAPU clearly on the shoulders of the PKI and its chairman, Aidit. Second, in giving his motives for the coup attempt, in his statement Aidit makes no mention of a reactionary "Council of Generals." By merely alluding to "dissatisfaction" with the present regime, he leaves the door open for a myriad of interpretations. This would lend credibility to the military's claims while at the same time further damaging the image of the PKI. Third, by hinting that closer relations with Red China would have followed had the coup been successful, the "confession" conveniently turns an internal matter into an international one, again deflecting the spotlight of public

scrutiny from Subandrio and Sukarno. In the state's thinking, the "confession" provided a neat conclusion to an extremely complex problem.

It was precisely this simplicity that the military prosecutors sought to attack. Government witnesses present at the execution admitted that Aidit talked freely before his death. The substance of his conversations is debatable, however, as only military men were present. It would have been very convenient for Aidit to assume all the responsibility for GESTAPU at the hour of his death. It would also be convenient for Subandrio and Sukarno as well. Too convenient in fact. Accordingly throughout the trial, the military sought to use the "confession," not as an indication of Subandrio's innocence but rather just the opposite; that the "confession" was the result of some pre-arranged Faustian deal between Aidit and Subandrio to save themselves in the event the coup failed. What incentive they might have offered is simply a matter of speculation. By repeatedly bringing to mind the relationship between Aidit and Sukarno the military further sought to implicate the President in the illicit deal. While the argument is tenuous at best, one must remember the environment in which this evidence was presented. Operating in a military courtroom, with a tribunal of ardent, anti-communist officers, in a country wracked by deep seated social prejudices, the contention that Aidit's "confession" was a fabrication was ideal to the military's strategy. While the
document may have indeed been valid, the very thought of its lack of authenticity cast aspersions on Subandrio and through him, Sukarno. This was brought home in the testimony of General Edhy's aide who remarked, "Communists may talk, but good communists never confess." In the end, it was enough to condemn Subandrio.

The state's case against Subandrio was admittedly weak. For the most part, the prosecution's evidence was purely circumstantial which at best proved Subandrio's negligence but certainly not his complicity with the PKI or his involvement in illegal activities. Indeed, on the basis of the evidence presented, the worst "crime" Subandrio might have committed was to have been lax in his duties as the head of state security by not checking out thoroughly the so-called "Gilchrist letter."

As has been said above, the evidence in the Subandrio trial was weak and inconclusive. The most convincing pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were excerpts from public speeches made by Subandrio during the months before and after the coup attempt. It was the prosecution's contention that these speeches contained off-hand

68General Sarwo Edhy was the officer given charge of the anti-communist campaign by General Suharto.

69Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 167.

70Donald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," New Leader 49 (November 7, 1966), pp. 3-5.
references that showed the depth of Subandrio's involvement in the
coup attempt. The following examples are indicative of the type of
statements asserted by the prosecution to be concrete proof of
Subandrio's complicity in GESTAPU.

Nine months prior to the coup attempt, Subandrio gave
an exclusive interview to the government news agency, Antara. In
this interview, Subandrio made the following statement, "Don't be
surprised if at a certain time we leave those behind who were our
comrades-in-arms because they don't understand the revolutionary aims
and have become counterrevolutionary."71 The prosecution pointed
to this statement as evidence that Subandrio was involved with persons
or groups unknown to overthrow the existing government. On the
basis of previously presented testimony, the state strongly hinted that
the mysterious party was the PKI. In his defense, Subandrio con-
tended that he was only trying to appeal to the nationalistic fervor
of the masses to confront the massive social and economic woes of
Indonesia. He stated that by "counterrevolutionary" he was not
referring to any specific group but was only trying to bring to public
awareness those individuals who wished to slow down the pace of
revolution in Indonesia.72

71 Ibid., p. 4.
72 Ibid., p. 5.
A second selection chosen by the prosecution to show Subandrio's guilt was taken from an interview he gave to a Djakarta-based Muslim newspaper. In this article, Subandrio was quoted as saying, "Don't be surprised if some of our former friends fall."\(^{73}\)

The state asserted that this reference, when coupled with the first stated above, definitely showed that Subandrio was plotting to effect drastic change in Indonesia's political leadership. In his defense, Subandrio retorted that he was simply "leaking" the news that a shake-up in the Cabinet was imminent. As it turned out, Subandrio's predictions were accurate as in March and April, 1965 several high echelon government officials were dismissed because of their opposition to Sukarno's excessive Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia.\(^{74}\)

A final example comes from a speech Subandrio delivered to a group of pro-communist students in August, 1965 a little more than a month before the coup attempt. In this address, Subandrio is quoted as saying, "You must fight terror with counter-terror."\(^{75}\)

The military claims that this statement shows that Subandrio knew of a coup plot and was forewarning his pro-communist colleagues of the necessity to be ruthless and vengeful when the appointed hour comes.

\(^{73}\)Ibid., p. 5.

\(^{74}\)Shaplen, *Time Out of Hand*, p. 86.

\(^{75}\)Ibid., p. 89.
Subandrio replied that he was only warning of the consequences of using terror to solve social problems, not advocating it. The state replied that the speech was aimed at "creating unrest and disunity" among the people for the purpose of personal political gain.  

When studying these quotes there is little to suggest the conclusions drawn by the military. Granted they do express a sense of dissension within the government but they hardly show that Subandrio was involved with the PKI. However, just as in the case of the Gilchrist letter and the Aidit "confession," the quotes were enough to convince the already biased tribunal of Subandrio's guilt.

Now it was the defense's turn. Staffed by a battery of civilian attorneys, the defense put together a strong case in Subandrio's behalf. In its opening statements, the defense attempted to have the case thrown out on a jurisdictional technicality. The defense argued that the military tribunal was "incompetent" to try the defendant as he still was a member of the Cabinet (Subandrio had never relinquished his official positions) and could thereby only be tried in the Indonesian Supreme Court according to Indonesian law.

Sitting in special emergency session, the Supreme Court rejected the motion, ruling that under the present circumstances the military

76 Ibid., p. 91.
court was the proper jurisdiction. In its brief on the matter, the Supreme Court ordered the trial to reconvene on October 3, 1965.

At the outset of the trial, Subandrio had vehemently denied the charges lodged against him. Now, with the hope of a quick verdict of acquittal gone, Subandrio began to recant many of his initial statements. Yes, he admitted, he had known of a deal with Red China to arm 100,000 workers and peasants with weapons brought into the country illegally. On the charge of covering up the coup attempt, Subandrio admitted that he was told on September 15, 1965 that there would be an attempted coup on the 19th. He also acknowledged that he had heard rumours of a "Council of Generals" but that he had dismissed them as "groundless." When queried as to whether he had ever approached Sukarno with these reports, Subandrio replied that he had been reluctant to do so because he "felt the President knew more than he did."

Suddenly taking the offensive again, Subandrio launched into a bitter denunciation of the prosecution at this point. The state had misinterpreted his actions, Subandrio explained. Describing himself

78"The Man on Trial: Subandrio," *Time*, October 14, 1966, p. 44.

as a "single fighter," Subandrio denied any association with the PKI.\textsuperscript{80} As he said, "The Communist Party was in decline. To attach myself to it would have been political suicide. If it had ever come to power, I do not know whether I would have ever seen the sun again."\textsuperscript{81} On the question of his role in GESTAPU, Subandrio again reiterated his innocence. Explaining the need for leadership in any great social movement, Subandrio commented, "I am too small a man. I would like to become a great man but I cannot."\textsuperscript{82} On this poignant note, Subandrio began his summation.

Perhaps Subandrio realized the futility of his efforts for the first time. Perhaps it was simply a sense of weariness. In a clear, resonant voice, Subandrio threw himself on the mercy of the court. He said,

I feel gratified to have been briefly before this tribunal, because I feel like a human being again after having been regarded as the scum of society for a year. Whatever the verdict, I will accept it. I believe the verdict will not be pronounced by individuals but whispered by God to the judges.\textsuperscript{83}

With these few simple words Subandrio completed his defense and was silent.

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\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., p. 8.
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\textsuperscript{82}Donald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," \textit{New Leader} 49 (November 7, 1966), pp. 3-5.
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Subandrio was found guilty and sentenced to death on October 25, 1966. The state argued that because Subandrio had "brought tragedy to Indonesia and misery to all layers of the community," there was little reason for a lenient sentence.\textsuperscript{84} Describing Subandrio as a hypocrite who likes to pretend, Chief Justice Lt. Col. Ali Said called Subandrio, "a defendant with a very strong memory when the facts were in his favor but forgetting when circumstances might damage his case."\textsuperscript{85} When informed of the sentence, Subandrio stated that while Indonesian law provided for an automatic appeal of a death sentence, for the good of Indonesia, he would not do so. Thus, loyal and true to the end, Subandrio refused to place Sukarno in the ponderous position of having to make a decision between political expediency and personal friendship. It would be interesting to speculate on what might have happened had Subandrio chosen to appeal his conviction.

At this point, some analysis of the proceedings would appear in order. There can be no doubt that the Subandrio trial had a profound impact on Indonesian history. For one thing, Subandrio's sentence dramatizes the end of the pro-communist, pro-Peking period

\textsuperscript{84}New York Times, October 26, 1966, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{85}Donald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," New Leader 49 (November 7, 1966), pp. 3-5.
in Indonesian history. What the purges started, the Subandrio trial ended. Yet what of the military’s efforts to discredit Sukarno through the trials of his subordinates? Viewed from this perspective, the Subandrio trial must be seen as a major disappointment to the military. Nowhere did the military obtain a direct statement about Sukarno’s involvement. At the outset, it was hoped that Sukarno would voluntarily testify at the trial. This did not occur, however, because to do so would have left Sukarno vulnerable to hostile cross-examination. Instead, Sukarno’s written testimony, answering questions provided by the prosecution was read into the official transcript. His testimony can be summarized as follows:

1. Sukarno stated that he had only ordered Njoto (a high ranking PKI official) to return from Central Java in order to assist him in writing his speech presented on Independence Day, August 17, 1965. The state had previously hinted that Sukarno had recalled Njoto in order to finalize plans for the attempted coup.

2. Sukarno replied that he had not received any information from Subandrio on increased PKI activity prior to September 30 - October 1, 1965. (This would appear to be in keeping with Subandrio’s statement that he thought Sukarno had already been informed of this matter.)
3. Sukarno responded that he had heard rumours of a
"Council of Generals" prior to the coup attempt, but
that when he discussed the matter with General Yani,
his questions had been adequately answered.

4. Sukarno contended that the coup had caught him
completely off guard. 86

Never did Subandrio ever directly implicate his superior,
Sukarno. Granted, his reference to "the need for a great man" might
have inferred Sukarno. Likewise, his summation statement that,
"all the Ministers without exception acted only as assistants to the
President," might be taken to imply Sukarno's complicity. 87 Yet
nowhere did Subandrio use the opportunity given him by the vagueness
of the indictments to save himself by naming Sukarno to anything even
remotely connected with GESTAPU.

Even the guilty verdict in the Subandrio case could not
quiet the rising crescendo of discontent now beginning to be heard
from various segments of Indonesian society. Particularly vocal were
the student groups who referred to the Subandrio trial as a "staged
comedy" and repeated their demands for an investigation into


Sukarno's role in GESTAPU. The students went so far as to invade the Presidential palace chanting "Court-martial Sukarno!" on three separate occasions. With the failure of the Subandrio trial to turn the spotlight on Sukarno, the military announced the indictments of another chief Sukarno assistant, Air Marshall Omar Dhani. The military anxiously hoped that the Dhani trial would provide the elusive link it needed to associate Sukarno with GESTAPU. It was in this frame of mind that the military opened the trial of Dhani on December 5, 1966.

Major Personalities - Dhani

The charge leveled against Dhani in the indictments was for his complicity in the events of September 30–October 1, 1965. In comparison to the vagueness of the charges in the Dalam and Subandrio trials, the indictment against Dhani was much more specific and to the point. Several interpretations of the military's motives are possible. Perhaps the military was becoming bored with the legal maneuverings and simply wished to get the trial over with as soon as possible. More probable, however, is the interpretation that the military was beginning to feel the pressures exerted by the students to bring Sukarno to justice. By using vague terms, the military had assured itself a guilty

verdict. Yet the convictions had not had the intended effect of
displacing Sukarno. Therefore, it was entirely possible that the
military opted for a more specific indictment that would bring about
the desired response. In addition, a full disclosure of Sukarno's
involvement could only add to the legitimacy of the military's quest
to resolve the existing crisis in political leadership. In any event,
Dhani was considered to know the most of any of the three major
defendants about Sukarno's role in the coup attempt. As such, the
Dhani trial was to differ significantly from the previous two trials in
that Dhani was not portrayed as a mastermind of GESTAPU but rather
as a prominent player in its drama.

Throughout the proceedings the prosecution attempted to
portray Dhani as a naive man with a "mitty-like" dream of succeeding
Sukarno as President had the coup been successful. The state
strongly implied that Dhani was a weak, gullible man who was thor-
oughly manipulated by the PKI in their attempts to defeat the challenge
of the military. His only attraction to the PKI, the prosecution argued,
was that he controlled access to Halim field, the area selected to be
the headquarters for the plotters. In response to the charge of having
given opportunity and aid to the plotters, Dhani replied that, "I know

now I was wrong in the actions I committed. But I never had any intention of overthrowing the government." Then Dhani added a curious comment stating that his only purpose in life was to "implant Bung's teachings in the Air Force" and to make all of his men "little Sukarnos." Dhani stressed that he had always believed he was fighting for the President and his country. This statement, perhaps added as an afterthought, was precisely what the military had been so futilely searching for. It was the comment that would bring down Bung Karno.

As the trial progressed, it was obvious that Dhani was now a secondary figure destined to play out the shadowy drama conceived by the two protagonists, Suharto and Sukarno. The majority of the prosecution's questions did not even deal with Dhani. Instead, the state sought to pin down witnesses as to Sukarno's role in the events at Halim after he arrived there on the morning of October 1, 1965. Particularly damaging was the testimony of Heru Atmodjo, an enlisted man who described Sukarno as apparently congratulating Supardjo on

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the success of the coup by slapping him on the shoulder. According to the prosecution, this action could be interpreted as concrete proof of Sukarno's involvement.

Yet, it was Dhani who ironically gave the testimony that was to cause Sukarno's downfall. During his cross-examination Dhani attempted to clarify some points regarding Sukarno's presence at Halim. While he resolutely refused to implicate Sukarno directly, his testimony nevertheless was crucial. According to Dhani, Sukarno had given at least tacit approval to the murders of the military officers on the PKI death list. When informed of the killings, Dhani recalled that Sukarno responded, "Good. This is an event in the revolution." While Dhani stated that he did not know whether Sukarno had had any prior knowledge of the plans, he did say that Sukarno did not appear distraught at the news. When asked by a member of the tribunal if Sukarno had ever expressed any dissatisfaction with the plotters in Dhani's presence, the defendant resolutely answered, "No." Coupled with the revelations of the "slapping incident" one can see how the tide was slowly turning in favor of the military.

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94 Ibid., p. 8.
Since the beginning of the Subandrio trial, the prosecution had been agitating in the press for Sukarno to come forward and explain his role in GESTAPU. The subsequent initiation of charges against Dhani had renewed this cry for information. Just as in the Subandrio case, however, Sukarno distained a court appearance that would have exposed him to a strong cross-examination by the state. Now, with the damaging testimony of the Dhani trial made public, Sukarno sensed it was time to take the offensive in order to stem the mounting tide of public criticism. In a written deposition Sukarno stated the following:

1. That Dhani had spoken with him on the day prior to the coup (September 29, 1965) but that at no time had they discussed the rumour of a "Council of Generals."
   (In his earlier testimony, Dhani had stated that the subject had indeed been a topic of conversation at that meeting.)

2. That the coup had been a total surprise to him. In this, he reiterated his written testimony given at the time of the Subandrio trial.

3. That he had gone to Halim of his own free will, not to associate with the plotters but to "confront" them.
4. That he had heard a "rumour" that several military officers had been killed in the coup attempt. To the specific details of this "rumour," Sukarno apologized that his memory was "faulty."95

In retrospect, this attempt by Sukarno seems feeble indeed. Taken as a counter-weight against the testimony presented at the trial, Sukarno's deposition appears shallow and unconvincing.

The end was near for Dhani. In a final, desperate move, Dhani's lawyers tried to save their client by inferring that he had only acted on orders "from above." Ra'den Soenario, one of Dhani's lawyers summarized the image the defense wanted to portray when he said in his closing statements, "The accused is a very loyal and good disciple of President Sukarno. I can only say that he is in fact a victim."96 At that point, however, any attempt at confession would have fallen on deaf ears. The tribunal was after bigger game than a vain, arrogant military officer. The military was sure of its case against Sukarno now. This heightened confidence was given even greater significance when the tribunal found Dhani guilty on December 24, 1966 and sentenced him to death.

When viewed in retrospect, there can be no doubt that the Dhani trial was by far the most damaging for Sukarno. Until this time, he had been able to explain away or brush off any suggestion of his involvement, relying heavily on his magnetic personality and relationship with the masses. Now this relationship had been challenged. The testimony of the Dhani trial had raised questions such as the "slapping incident" that Sukarno had not anticipated. It was an action that could not be explained away. Sukarno was being forced to come up with specific informative answers to questions regarding his personal behavior.

Likewise, the Dhani trial had initiated new pressures from all segments of society for an investigation of Sukarno's role in GESTAPU. Initially, only the student groups and action fronts had pushed for Sukarno to reveal his role. As a result of the Dhani trial, important leaders in the civilian sector began to press for a full disclosure by Sukarno. Speaking just three days after the guilty verdict in the Dhani case, a Djakarta-based association of Muslim groups called for Sukarno's resignation, describing him as a "destructive opposition" to Suharto's development of a new cabinet.97 The chairman of the Indonesian Lawyer's Association, commenting on the evidence presented at the Dhani trial, concluded Sukarno had

encouraged the coup. According to him, since the others (Dalam, Subandrio, Dhani) had received the death sentence, "the same should apply to Sukarno."98

It was apparent that the Dhani trial had been influential in garnering support for the military while at the same time destroying one of Sukarno's main bastions of support, the confidence of the masses.

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98 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 277.
Sensing that the Dhani trial had succeeded in placing Sukarno on the defensive, the military now sought to continue its pressure through the prosecution of several lesser figures who could now directly tie Sukarno to the coup attempt. The military hoped that by gaining guilty verdicts against these lesser figures the public outrage would be so great that Sukarno would be forced either to make a damning public confession or resign outright. Regardless, the military would be the victor in the power struggle without appearing to have been the aggressor. Illustrative of the military's new strategy was the trial of General Mastafa Sjarif Supardjo which began in February, 1967.

The Supardjo Trial

General Supardjo was important to the military's overall strategy for several reasons. First, he was the leader of the progressive element in the military and as such, a key link between the discontented military factions and the communists. While one of the decorations Supardjo had received in his military career was for his role in defeating the communist coup attempt at Madiun in 1948, it was
widely suspected that he was extremely pro-PKI. (This was borne out in testimony at the trial which appeared to show that Supardjo had been in close communication with Sjam, the chief deputy of Aidit, for several months prior to October 1, 1965.)\(^9^9\) Second, Supardjo was an arrogant, ambitious man who sought promotion rapidly. When advancement did not come fast enough to suit him, the prosecution contended that Supardjo was more than willing to associate himself with any movement that would assure him the rewards he desired. The state therefore desired to portray Supardjo as a totally reprehensible individual. It was expected that the public would completely turn against him. Thus, it was essential that some link between Supardjo and Sukarno be forged. The military did not have to wait long.

Much of the testimony in the Supardjo trial was vague and confusing. In pursuing its indictment of conspiracy, the state sought to establish Supardjo's relationship with the other, already convicted conspirators. To this end, the state questioned Dhani and Lt. Col. Untung, the head of the palace guards who was generally recognized as the head of the coup movement in the military. Untung was of little help, denying that Supardjo was even part of the movement, implying

contemptuously that Supardjo was only a willing dupe to be manipulated. Dhani's testimony was more revealing.

Dhani stated that since he himself was innocent, he would not have known if Supardjo was involved or not. Yet, according to Dhani, "I was never sure whether Supardjo was in command of the September 30th Movement or whether he received commands from someone else." The inference is obvious. True to form, Dhani had failed to make any incriminating statement. Yet, by even implying that "someone else" might have been involved, he gave the military the answer they wanted so desperately to hear.

It was at this point that the state dropped a bombshell. The prosecution now revealed that Supardjo had been able to escape capture after the defeat of the coup attempt because he carried a letter of protection supposedly written by Sukarno. According to the prosecution, Supardjo received the letter authorizing his safe passage into the hinterlands while Sukarno and Supardjo were together at Halim on the morning of October 1. This letter, the prosecution charged, was the reason Supardjo had been able to resist arrest until he was spotted by government troops in January, 1967.

The state alleged that Supardjo had used the letter given him by Sukarno to secure lodgings in his flight to avoid capture. To prove

this point, the state produced several witnesses. The first of these was former navy major, Suwardi. According to his testimony, Supardjo had lived in Suwardi's home for a short period immediately after GESTAPU. Suwardi claimed that he did not know who Supardjo was, but that because he carried a letter from Bung Karno, he must have been an influential person. Accordingly, Suwardi accommodated his distinguished but anonymous guest. A second witness, a former PKI member, also referred to the letter ordering that "Supardjo be protected and given shelter." While the military was never able to concretely produce the letter or even provide conclusive evidence as to its existence (Samsi, the PKI member, had testified that he never actually "saw" the letter), the implication was too conclusive. Coming on the heels of the revelations from the previous trials, it was now at least conceivable that Sukarno had known of and approved the coup attempt. Even while Supardjo was pleading in vain that he had never known of such a document, the military was preparing to lay the basis of its New Order that would lead to the resolution of the problem of political change in Indonesia. When the guilty verdict was returned against Supardjo on March 13, 1967 much more than a dissident military officer had been found guilty.

102 Ibid., p. 4.
The displacement of Indonesian President Sukarno in 1967 represents a major turning point in the history of Southeast Asia. It stopped the ascendancy of the PKI within Indonesia. It halted, then reversed Indonesia's close ties with Communist China. It allowed contending political parties to once again bloom in Indonesia. It rehabilitated the Indonesian economy, long stagnant under Sukarno. Perhaps even more important than these considerations, however, is that the displacement of Sukarno provides an insight into how one country resolved a crisis in political leadership.

There are three well-defined stages of Sukarno's demise in the days following GESTAPU. During the period October 1, 1965 to March 11, 1966, Sukarno attempted to restore pre-coup tranquility in Indonesia. In the days immediately following the coup attempt Sukarno was pressured by the military to explain his role in the events of September 30 - October 1. It must be remembered that at no time during this period did Sukarno ever once denounce the actions of the plotters or attempt to disassociate himself from the PKI. Indeed, Sukarno's biggest error during this time was his attempt to hang on to his relationship with the PKI in the face of mounting pressure from the military. In statements reassuring the people immediately after October 1, 1965, Sukarno tried to soothe the fears of the masses by telling them that Indonesia was safe because
"Indonesia's is a Left Revolution." On February 14, 1966, Sukarno even went so far as to praise the PKI as "the only party which made considerable contributions and sacrifices for the independence of the country." Statements such as these could only have served to divide Sukarno from portions of the population in the highly emotional state that then existed. He was able, however, to meet the initial challenge to his authority by using his charismatic appeal with the majority of the Indonesian masses. Speaking in a nation-wide radio broadcast in mid-January, 1966, Sukarno said,

I am sick of the secret campaign being launched against me. I, Sukarno, as the Great Leader of the Revolution, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, say whoever is still willing to follow me should rally behind me, defend me, build your strength.

The tone in this speech is unmistakable. Sukarno was still the unquestioned favorite of the Indonesian masses.

Sukarno appeared at this point to be playing a dangerous game. Believing that the people were still with him, Sukarno made two bold moves to re-establish his power base. In late February, 1966, he reshuffled his Cabinet to include many pro-PKI, pro-Chinese


104 Ibid., p. 19.

members. One of the ministers deposed was General Nasution, the lone survivor of the death squads and symbol of the military's participation in politics. Indeed, the post of Minister for Aircraft Industry went to none other than Omar Dhani, who had been out of the country on a "special mission" for Sukarno and who had not yet been arrested. Sukarno, ever the idealist, described the changes as "just a normal reshuffle so my assistants can better help me carry on the revolution." The military did not take such a casual view, however. Suharto, who had retained his dual roles of Minister of the Army and Chief of Staff, was furious but held back his anger because he felt the time was not yet ripe to openly challenge Sukarno.

On February 24, 1966, Sukarno alienated another segment of society when he banned the major student organization, the KAMI. Prior to the order, this group had been vocally advocating the removal of Subandrio, the banning of the PKI, and the lowering of prices to combat the rampant rate of inflation that had soared to 600 percent in late 1965. The students responded to Sukarno's order by openly demonstrating against the government. To deal with the problem, Sukarno ordered the military to disperse the students, with blood-letting if necessary. While the military leadership was indignant over the Presidential order to "chase kids," the student demonstrations

106 Ibid., p. 138.
gave the military the necessary leverage to demand more power to maintain civil order on March 11, 1966. In light of the fact that he had ordered the military into action in the first place, Sukarno could hardly refuse.

March 12, 1966 to January 10, 1967 saw mounting criticism of Sukarno from all responsible segments of Indonesian society. On March 12, 1966 Sukarno finally agreed to formally ban the PKI as a political force in Indonesia. In retrospect, this attempt at conciliation came too late to be of any value. Sukarno had waited too long to renounce his former associates. Immediately after the signing of the order banning the PKI, the military moved against the pro-PKI Cabinet members. Claiming to be acting for "their own safety," the military placed under house arrest such prominent government personalities as Subandrio, Charul Saleh, the Third Deputy Premier, Major General Achmadi, the Information Minister, Minister of Elections Sumardjo and Lenin Prize winner Peijono, the Minister of Education. A new Cabinet, with General Suharto in charge of security and defense, was sworn in on March 27, 1966.

Sukarno's world was crumbling on the international front as well. On June 26, 1966 the People's Consultative Congress (MPRS) moved to end Sukarno's costly Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia. This was finally accomplished on August 11, 1966, largely due to the negotiations of the new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik. The
ending of the war with Malaysia must be considered a major blow to Sukarno's attempts to re-assert his power.

On July 25, 1966 still another Cabinet shake-up established the tripartite power structure that endures to the present time. Suharto was given the powers of head of state, the Sultan of Jogjakarta would be the First Deputy Prime Minister and Adam Malik, long an opponent of Sukarnoist ideology, would be the Foreign Minister.

For all intents and purposes, the victory was now complete. What remained was the future of Sukarno. At this crucial juncture, Sukarno now made a totally uncharacteristic and ultimately fatal move. To counteract mounting public pressure, Sukarno attempted to divert attention from himself to a CIA plot to overthrow him. (See discussion of the "Gilchrist letter," p. 60.) For the first time, Sukarno publically took the offensive against the military, claiming military involvement in the plot. To check-mate Sukarno's new aggressive posture, the military on December 21, 1966 came out publically as a defender of the Constitution and the status quo. This move was meant to reassure the public of the military's outwardly peaceful intentions toward Sukarno. By doing so, the military made Sukarno appear an aggressive challenger to the New Order of Suharto.

For Sukarno, time had now run out. He sealed his own fate in a January 10, 1967 statement in which he criticized the leadership
of the MPRS for failing to recognize the "cunning of neokolim subversion" that was clouding their investigation of GESTAPU.\(^{107}\)

Between January 11, 1967 and March 12, 1967, the MPRS sought to revoke Sukarno's presidential powers. On January 1, 1967, Sukarno had given his "answers" to questions regarding his involvement in GESTAPU. By this time, however, many of the groups in Indonesian society were extremely wary of his statements. The outlawed student group, KAMI, for example, continued to agitate for Sukarno's ouster. He might have been able to weather this crisis as well had it not been for his statements of January 10, 1967 that convinced the MPRS to act for the "good of the state." On January 20, 1967, the MPRS opened deliberations on the fate of Sukarno.

In the midst of these discussions, a new element was added to the drama. Charging that, "Mr. Sukarno failed to act as indicated by the law in his position as head of state and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,"\(^{108}\) the Indonesian Supreme Court demanded that Sukarno be tried for treason on charges of embezzling state funds and complicity in the coup attempt. For Sukarno, the end had come. There was no rhetorical outburst to counter this final challenge.


On February 20, 1967 President Sukarno officially surrendered all governing powers to General Suharto in accordance with MPRS decree #15 of that date. Meeting on March 12, 1967 the MPRS legitimized the actions of February 20 and made moves to institute the New Order of President Suharto. The crisis in political leadership had finally been resolved. 109

The Trials: A Preliminary Assessment

The vital question is this: how was the military able to triumph over a seemingly invincible Sukarno? The answer to this question can be found in the typically Javanese manner employed by the military in their dealings with Sukarno. The military won out because it had not tried to form public opinion but only to follow the "apparent wishes" of the masses.

In formulating its strategy against Sukarno, the military recognized several basic facts. The military was aware the PKI and Sukarno were wedded through the policy of NASOKOM into an unholy alliance directed at the military. Any action taken against one party would therefore be viewed as an attack on the other as well. Second, Sukarno had implicitly given his blessing to the PKI as his political heirs. His statements on the role of Aidit in Indonesian politics

109 The texts of these two MPRS statements appear in the appendix to this paper.
(see p. 18) as well as his seemingly leftward drift toward the orbit of Red Chinese influence seemed to confirm this fact. Third, the military recognized that the PKI desired to eliminate the military as a political force in Indonesia and that if the PKI was allowed to continue operations, this situation might become reality. Paramount, however, was the military's recognition of Sukarno's immense popularity with the masses. It was felt that in a direct confrontation, Sukarno's mass appeal would be the deciding factor with the military the loser. Thus, the military was forced into a typically Javanese strategy of attacking Sukarno through indirect means. To this end, the trials of suspected participants in GESTAPU played an integral role in the military's strategy for the displacement of Sukarno.

The trials served several purposes. They exposed the corruption and inefficiency that existed in the Indonesian government. Finally, the glittering image generally associated with the Sukarno years had been stripped away to reveal a decayed, rotting infrastructure. No longer could the ultramodern Hotel Indonesia blot out the tumble-down shacks of Djakarta. Similarly, the trials discredited the PKI and the concept of the Marxist revolution in Indonesia, at least for the time being.\footnote{According to some experts, notably Arnold Brackman, if the Suharto government cannot make real inroads into the economic woes of Indonesia, there is a good chance that the PKI may yet succeed.} Within the military itself, the trials provided a
rationale for purging its ranks of left-wing military officers by tying them to the coup attempt. In doing so, the Indonesian military reverted, at least temporarily, to its traditional conservative origins. The trials also served to establish the military as the defender of the "popular will." By such gestures as the freeing of political prisoners (see p. 48) the military created the image of the sympathetic public servant while detracting from Sukarno's image of the "Great Father." Most importantly, however, the trials undermined and finally destroyed Sukarno's legitimacy to govern by raising indirect questions that Sukarno was increasingly unable to answer to the satisfaction of the majority of groups in Indonesian society. The key word here is indirect. In this respect, the trials were an extension of the classic Javanese mentality.
CHAPTER VII

GESTAPU AND POLITICAL CHANGE

As was stated in the initial chapter of this paper, the purpose of this research has been to provide a case-study of incidence of political change in a developing society. A fundamental consideration has been left unanswered, however. That is, what constitutes political change? What symbols, personalities, or institutions must be manipulated in order for a crisis in political change to be resolved peacefully (assuming that this is the desired goal). This final chapter will explore these questions and attempt to place into perspective the events in Indonesia from October 1, 1965 to March 12, 1967.

Political Change in Traditional Societies

In a traditional society, the instruments of governing are highly visible to the average citizen. The institutions of governing have evolved over a long period of time and have had their legitimacy inculcated into the value systems of the governed. It is a relatively simple, uncomplicated process. A king or some other princely personality fulfills the executive function. Presumably, this individual rules with the divine approval of a deity that oversees the operations
of mortal men on earth. Oft times, the ruler is the physical manifestation of this supernatural being placed on earth. His words are law and his every action is deemed legitimate because of his exalted, pre-eminent position in society. Likewise, the legislative and judicial functions may be centered in a "council of elders" that has the same aura of legitimacy as the ruler. Indeed, in some traditional societies, all three functions may be centered in one institution, the ruler, thus creating a primitive form of autocracy. In such societies, the institutions of power are well defined. Likewise, the question of political change is a relatively simple one. The ruler dies and is supplanted by another who inherits the mantle of legitimacy from his predecessor. Even when conflict among pretenders does occur, it is usually confined to a small group of individuals, each with a varying interpretation of how the problem should be resolved. No matter who wins in such a situation, the mantle of legitimacy is kept relatively intact. Tradition has dictated the answer to the problem.

Political Change in Developed Societies

In a developed political system, political legitimacy is equally well defined. Constitutions, the manifestation of the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions in government, spell out specifically the institutions that subsume political authority. Where the traditional system is diverse, the mature political system may be characterized
as specific. Developed political systems resolve conflict through socially acceptable channels. In democratic settings, candidates contest electoral positions, commissions and boards fill non-elective vacancies. In authoritarian systems, the selection process, while not as open as in a democratic society, is closely regulated by institutions of government to insure their smooth operations. In any developed political process there are standards of behavior required for any potential participant in the process. Any person exhibiting deviant behavior outside the accepted limits is considered an outcast to be excluded from participation. In such a manner the mature political system is able to insure its own perpetuity.

Political Change in Developing Societies

Transitional societies, such as those that achieved their independence after World War II do not fit into either of the afore-mentioned categories. Indeed, life in a society torn between the security of the past and the promise of the future may be the most complex of all. Men do not willingly part with the past. Yet the model of development stands as a dream to be realized in order to be recognized as a world power. One will note no underdeveloped societies (with the possible exception of the People's Republic of China) that would classify as a world leader. Western political scientists have deemed the Western, industrialized model to be the
yardstick by which all states are measured. Those that fall short wish to catch up as quickly as possible, no matter what the cost involved.

Just as social discontinuity in a transitional society can create a psychological dilemma for the average citizen, so also does a conflict in matters political. The transitional political process is uniquely unequipped to deal with society's massive problems. The lure of the past and the promise of the future create a political environment incapable of achieving anything but the most trivial goals. Ancient symbols and institutions do not appear to have legitimacy in the space age. Likewise, the average citizen is so tied to the past that to attempt a break with that past would create a psychological dichotomy so severe that one must question the worthiness of even trying. Thus, the society may well stagnate or even possibly regress, creating in the meantime even more seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

The key to the problems of a transitional society is how political conflict is resolved. Drawing on a colonial mentality (particularly the Anglo-American tradition), the leaders of developing societies have learned that "participation" is central to a mature political process. Yet the institutions of governing they employ are not capable of handling the complex action of "choosing." Traditional ideology had always looked to the deity to supply political leadership. It was a process that excluded mortal men from participation.
Developed societies, on the other hand, have the trappings of government (legislature, judicial systems, executives, constitutions) to solve a crisis in political leadership. One needs only to consult the proper statute to find the answer.

Transitional societies enjoy neither the mysticism of the past or the precision of the future. While power is present in various forms (charismatic leaders, political parties, interest groups, the military), legitimacy is often not congruent with the recognized institutions of government. Hence, transitional societies are caught up in a seemingly impossible situation of trying to resolve conflict in an environment that lacks the institutions to do so. This is precisely the contention of this research; that Indonesia, as a transitional society, was not able to resolve its crisis in political leadership because the institutions and symbols of power in Indonesia lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the average citizen. Political authority did not spring from the recognized organs of government. It came from elsewhere (the military, the PKI, and the personality of Sukarno). The remainder of this chapter will examine this contention as it applies to Indonesia and attempt to draw some conclusions about the significance of the Indonesian experience for other developing societies.
Indonesia: A Typical Developing Society

The roots of contemporary Indonesian society run deep into its Javanese past. Throughout Indonesia one can find proud references to ancient Javanese empires that exerted a major influence over much of sea-girt Southeast Asia. Principal among these empires was the Mataram dynasty of the early seventeenth century. Early in the history of the Mataram period, the Sultan Agung restored the political unity of Java in a series of devastating campaigns that established the imperial capital near present day Jogjakarta. The political structure in Mataram times began and ended with the absolute authority. Since Mataram was an Islamic state, the king, while no longer explicitly a god-king, was still a sacral figure. According to legend, the ruler could be recognized by the wahyu (divine light) that either descended upon him or shone from his eyes. When the wahyu left the king, it was considered that his legitimacy to govern had been revoked.

The early Javanese princes were obliged to fulfill certain functions in Mataram society. Basically, it was the ruler's solemn responsibility to maintain natural order in the kingdom, encompassing and reconciling any disturbances should they occur. That these functions were held in high esteem in early Javanese society is indicated by several of the titles given the Mataram princes: Hamengku Buwono ("He who holds the world on his lap") and Paku Buwono ("Axis of the
Thus, it was the ruler who became the physical manifestation of power and political authority in ancient Indonesia.

In many ways, Sukarno must be considered as the 20th century reincarnation of the Mataram princes. As Bernhard Dahm has pointed out, much of Bung Karno's personality was inherently Javanese.\(^{111}\) Dahm first considers Sukarno's underlying belief in a cyclical view of history in which Indonesia's rulers are simply temporary phenomenon. This unique view of history implies an "inevitable" ending in which Indonesia's ruler was to be a Just Savior (Ratu Adil) who would establish a flourishing kingdom, bestowing upon its inhabitants prosperity, freedom from taxation, and houses built of stone. Such a prophecy came from the Djajabja tales of the Mataram period of which all Javanese youth are acutely cognizant. It is Dahm's contention that Sukarno felt himself to be the Ratu Adil of the ancient tales.\(^{112}\) The fact that the prophecies told of a savior only lent credence to Sukarno's rationalization of his personal life-style as his just due.

Javanism was also at the base of Sukarno's ability to combine, synthesize, and submerge divergent, sometimes even


\(^{112}\)Ibid., p. vii.
opposite positions and groups into a curious unity of his own creation. Such a disavowal of conflict is deeply embedded in Javanese cultural traditions. Indeed, a basic core value of Indonesian society is conformity orientation. Indonesians as a whole have a high affiliation need, like to please each other and do not like to openly hurt other's feelings. In addition, Indonesian society is strongly deferential to the senior partner in any hierarchical relationship. Thus, it was in this manner that Sukarno was able to rationalize his unholy alliance of the PKI and the military in the days before GESTAPU. While outsiders might have viewed the alliance as potentially explosive, in Sukarno's own mind, it was simply the result of the natural course of events. In the long run, it was his farsightedness that would prove fatal.

To this deep-seated Javanism, Dahm adds a third factor: Sukarno's unbending devotion to his conception of what was right for Indonesia. It must be remembered that at no time did Sukarno ever openly seek self-aggrandizement. To his own way of thinking, every rupiah spent in Indonesia was money spent for the glorification of the state and its people. His speeches redound with praise for the masses and their struggles to achieve a better way of life. He honestly felt that the actions he took were beneficial to the masses of Indonesia.
Yet he was so far from reality in his actions. As Dahm comments,

There is a tragic greatness in a man so possessed of his own rightness and self-righteousness, so impervious to the harsh truths of Indonesian political life. From his earliest days as a political activist, Sukarno insisted that nationalism, Marxism, and Islam were one. And so, in a sense, they or rather what he assumed and proclaimed each of them to be, were by his own Javanese light. \[113\]

Just as the wahyu shone down on the ancient Mataram princes, so in his own convictions, did it reflect on Sukarno. And, just as the extinguishing of the light signaled the end of the princes reign, so also with Sukarno, Great Leader of the Revolution.

In the opening chapter of this essay it was stated that the research would not concern itself only with the events in Indonesia but also the larger question of political change in developing societies. It would appear that some assessment of the significance of the Indonesian experience would be in order. The questions are these: What are the lessons of GESTAPU and its aftermath? More specifically, what is the significance of the displacement of Sukarno for students of developing societies? Finally, can the Indonesian experience provide new insights into the problem of political change in developing societies? The conclusion to this essay will address itself to these important considerations.

\[113\] Ibid., p. viii.
The Indonesian experience once again reaffirmed the fact that political change does not occur within a vacuum with all the variables clearly identified and understood. Indeed, the events in Indonesia showed the definite need to explore and comprehend the socio-cultural environment from which the political system evolved. Indonesia's political system developed for specific reasons unique to its cultural heritage. If the researcher truly wants to get an accurate picture of any society, he must be aware that cultural patterns do play an important role in the politics of that society. For Indonesia, the primary consideration was the central role of Java in the contemporary environment. It was the awareness of this cultural heritage that influenced all the agents in the drama of political change that unfolded after September 30 - October 1, 1965. It is not surprising to learn that both of the major actors in the Indonesian scenario (Sukarno and Suharto) were extremely conscious of their Javanese backgrounds. Whatever the case, GESTAPU has proved the need to study all aspects of a social situation when attempting to comprehend bios politicos.

GESTAPU also proved that even in the most authoritarian settings, the masses do play a significant role in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of the political leadership. When the mood of the masses was favorable to him, Sukarno was widely praised and supported. However, as the revelations of political intrigue were
made public by the trials, the mood of the masses began to change until their support was withdrawn altogether in March, 1967. The ability to recognize the mood of "the people" and to act in accordance with their wishes is a difficult political task indeed.

Sukarno had become so involved in manipulating the symbols of power that he lost sight of their purpose: to insure the best possible environment for as many citizens as possible by shielding them from the excesses of government. He saw political legitimacy not as a rational tool to be used in aiding the masses but as an emotional instrument to feed his self-image. By losing sight of his authority, Sukarno failed to recognize the shifting mood of his subjects as they regarded their government. Worse yet, when he did finally recognize the people's true sentiments, he failed to readjust his strategies to accommodate the new situation. Instead of coming down to the level of his citizens, Sukarno sought to wrap himself in the aura of psuedo-legitimacy that his symbols of power had created for him. Instead of coming closer, Sukarno retreated. In contrast, Suharto was able to measure this sentiment of the people. This ability to properly analyze the situation was the decisive factor in alleviating Indonesia's crisis in political leadership.

Similarly, the events in Indonesia teach the need to be persistent but patient in attempting to resolve a crisis in political leadership. The military knew that an open challenge to Sukarno's
legitimacy in the early post-GESTAPU days would have ended in their defeat because of Sukarno's pre-eminent position in Indonesian society. Even while many of the politically elite groups in Indonesia had suffered under the repressive reign of Sukarno's rule, there was still a tendency to prefer him over a military, that at least in their minds, had seized the symbols of legitimacy without just cause and was now proceeding to create a new legitimacy by perverting the old institutions for their own ends. Even though Sukarno had suppressed them, the political elite still felt a sense of commonality with him; they were all politicians. Such a sense of "oneness" was missing when the military assumed effective control of the political system. To the political elite, the military was a curious interloper who sought to use their monopoly of weapons to create an unnatural state of affairs.

Accordingly, the military conceded Sukarno's dominance in those first days and were willing to bide their time until such an opportunity to directly confront him was feasible. Yet the military did not sit idly by while Sukarno gained even greater legitimacy. In the days after GESTAPU the military tacitly approved the student attacks on Sukarno by failing to control the crowds, claiming a lack of authority to do so. This in turn forced Sukarno to give them the necessary power to cope with the situation. In addition, the military used indirect means (i.e., the trials) to undermine Sukarno's legitimacy to govern. As a result, when the time for confrontation arrived, the
military had garnered enough support to displace the President. There is little doubt that if the military had tried to force Sukarno from office immediately after GESTAPU that they would have failed in their attempt. Doing so would have simply established the image of Sukarno as the symbol of the constitutionally legal order being supplanted by a dissident military. By exercising restraint and discretion, the military allowed Sukarno to undermine his own position, thereby making the transfer of political authority a desirable and necessary action. Sukarno was made to appear the aggressor, not the military. The implication of the Indonesian experience is clear: do not try to challenge legitimacy with illegitimacy. Symbolic manifestations of authority make an indelible imprint on a man's mind. Use the symbols of authority when confronting authority. Do not challenge simply to challenge. Manipulate the established symbols to create an aura of legitimacy. Only in this manner will the displacement of a government be acceptable to its constituents.

The final lesson of the Indonesian experience is an obvious one: no leader is invincible to political change. No matter how charismatic or dogmatic a political figure may be, he is still ultimately accountable to his constituents in one way or another. Sukarno -- Bung Karno, Great Father of the Revolution, President for Life -- how secure and inscrutable he appeared to be. Yet, perhaps it was this state of mind that brought about his demise. Perhaps Sukarno had
grown too complacent in his relationship with his people. Perhaps he had allowed himself to become isolated from the true feelings of the society in whose name he governed. Indeed, perhaps Sukarno believed that he was the Ratu Adil of the ancient Javanese prophecies. One thing is certain, however. The winds of political change were blowing in Indonesia after October 1, 1965. One man (Suharto) was able to accurately gauge its intensity. Another man (Sukarno) was not. Whether "Pak Harto" and his New Order will succeed is still unclear at this point. Only time will tell the answer.
POSTSCRIPT

General Suharto has sought to create a broad basis of support throughout Indonesian society since assuming power in the wake of GESTAPU. A major blot on his record, however, has been the government's inability (or unwillingness) to rehabilitate the associates of the coup participants. As a result, this failure at reconstruction has caused some segments of Indonesian society to doubt the validity and sincerity of President Suharto's proposed Orba (New Order).

As late as June, 1970 many of the minor participants of the coup attempt were still being detained by the government. The majority of the prisoners were being held as members, supporters, or "associates" of the outlawed PKI. Amnesty International reported in 1970 that there were 116,000 political prisoners still being held in Indonesia.\(^{114}\) The Indonesian government responded to this charge

by saying that the figure was closer to 55,000. The exact figure will probably never be known. 115

The detainees are classified into three general categories:

**Group A** includes the hard-core prisoners, those reportedly incapable of rehabilitation.

**Group B** prisoners are those whose fates have not yet been decided by the military tribunals hearing their appeals.

**Group C** individuals are those whose involvement in GESTAPU has been proven but whom the government views as minimum security risks.

The overwhelming majority of those persons now incarcerated are classified in the Group C category.

The conditions in the camps are extremely poor. Prisoners constantly suffer from cruelty and harassment at the hands of the military guards. More importantly, the prisoners suffer from a chronic lack of food and medical facilities. Often, prisoners receive nothing more than a thin gruel of wheat and a few stalks of bajem (spinach) once a day. In spite of the bad conditions, however, most

115 In recent years, the issue of the prisoners has become a dead letter. Interviews with government officials provide no new insights into the future plans for rehabilitation or even the number of persons still being held.
prisoners maintain a high sense of self-respect. In the long run, this sense of personal worth may prove to be decisive in light of their extreme deprivation.

The prospects for the release of these prisoners is not bright at the present time. For one thing, there exists a great fear on the part of the government that if these prisoners were released into the general society, they might attempt to reorganize the PKI. As one government official has stated, "We have learned that it does not pay to be lenient. These communists are acting docile now, but they are sly and they are clever."\textsuperscript{116} As long as attitudes such as this prevail, it does not appear that release will be forthcoming.

There is also apprehension as to how the general populace would accept these former PKI intimates. Many Indonesians still harbor great animosity toward the PKI because of the post-GESTAPU purges. As one young man, whose brother was killed by the PKI has said, "I know who did it. I am waiting for them to come back. If the communists come back to our town, we will have to kill them."\textsuperscript{117} Comments like this are heard throughout Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{117}New York Times, November 16, 1969, p. 4.
In August, 1969 the Indonesian government outlined a plan to send 2,500 Group C prisoners and their families to the deserted island of Buru. By the end of 1971, however, less than 1,000 detainees had been relocated. It appears at this time that the problem of the political prisoners will remain a major blemish on the image of Suharto's "New Order" for many years to come.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX

DECREE NO. 1
ON THE FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF INDONESIA

I. For the sake of the safety of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, for the sake of safeguarding implementation of Pantjasila and the whole of the Pantja Azimat of the Revolution, for the sake of the safety of the Army and of the Armed Services in general, in the middle of the night of Thursday, 30th September 1965, a cleaning-up operation was carried out in the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia, Djarkarta, against members of the self-styled Council of Generals, which had planned a Coup just before Armed Forces Day on 5th October 1965. A number of Generals have been arrested, the means of communication and the other vital objects in the Capital have fallen fully into the power of the 30th September Movement. The 30th September Movement is a movement solely confined to the body of the Army to put an end to the arbitrary deeds of the Generals who are Members of the Council of Generals and of the other officers who are accomplices and sympathisers of the Council of Generals. This Movement is assisted by armed troops outside the Army.

II. In order to facilitate follow-up activities of the 30th September 1965 action, the Leadership of the 30th September Movement will form the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the members of which will be composed of civilians and military persons who support the 30th September Movement without reserve. For the time being, pending general elections for the Madjelis Permusjaratan Rakjat in conformity with the 1945 Constitution, the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia is the source of all authority in the state of the Republic of Indonesia. The Revolutionary Council is the instrument for the whole of the Indonesian nation to realize Pantja Sila and the whole of the Pantja Azimat of the Revolution. The Revolutionary Council of Indonesia will be represented in its day-to-day activities by the Presidium of the Council, which will be composed of the Commander and the Deputy Commanders of the 30th September Movement.
III. With the falling of all the authority of the State to the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the Dwikora Cabinet automatically has the status of being decommissioned. Until the formation of a new Cabinet by the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the former Ministers have the obligation to carry out routine tasks, to guard orderliness in their respective Departments, are forbidden to appoint new civil servants and are forbidden to take steps that can have wide-spread consequences. All former Ministers are obliged to account for their responsibilities to the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia and specifically to the new Ministers who will be appointed by the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia.

IV. As the regional instruments of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, Provincial Revolutionary Councils (maximum of 25 persons), Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils (maximum 15 persons), Ketjamatan Revolutionary Councils (maximum 10 persons) and Village Revolutionary Councils (maximum 7 persons) will be set up, composed of civilians and military persons who support the 30th September Movement without reserve. These Regional Revolutionary Councils are the highest authority for the region concerned, and the work of those in the Provinces and Kabupaten will be assisted by their respective Day-to-Day Administrative Bodies, whilst those in the Ketjamatan and the Villages will be assisted by the leaders of the local branch of the National Front who are persons supporting the 30th September Movement without reserve.

V. The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia consists of the Commander and the Deputy Commanders of the 30th September Movement. The Commander and Deputy Commanders of the 30th September Movement are the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia.

VI. Immediately after the formation of the Regional Revolutionary Councils, the Chairmen of the relevant Revolutionary Councils must report to the Revolutionary Council of the next higher level as to the complete composition of the membership of the Council. Provincial Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification from the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia. Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification from the Provincial Revolutionary Council, and the Ketjamatan and Village Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification from the Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils.

Djakarta, 1st October 1965
THE 30th SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT COMMAND

Commander: Lt-Colonel Untung.
Deputy Commander: Brig-General Supardjo.
Deputy Commander: Air Lt-Colonel Heru.
Deputy Commander: Sea Colonel Sunardi.
Deputy Commander: Adjunct Senior Commissioner of Police Anwas.
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ANNOUNCEMENT (OCTOBER 1, 1965)

We, the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution announce the following:

1. We, the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution herewith announce: That I am in good health and that I continue exercising the State-leadership, and leading the Revolution. That temporarily, the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia is directly in the hands of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

That in order to implement the daily tasks within the Army, Major General of the Army, Pranoto Reksosamudro, 3rd Assistant to the Minister/Army Chief, has been temporarily appointed.

2. To the entire Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, I order to again increase their vigilance and to remain at their respective posts and only move on orders.

3. I order to the entire People to remain calm, to increase their vigilance and to maintain their National oneness and unity as compact as possible.

Djakarta, October 1, 1965

PRESIDENT/SUPREME COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION/MANDATARY OF THE MPRS
sgd.

SUCHARNO
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 002/PENG/PUS/1965

It is hereby announced that:

1. An understanding, cooperation and determination has been resulted by the Army, Navy and the Police Force to overcome the counter-revolutionary deeds committed by a movement called "Gerakan 30 September" (September-30 Movement).

2. By establishing what they call "The Indonesian Revolutionary Council" and by declaring the DWIKORA Cabinet as demissionary, it became obvious that they are counter-revolutionaries committing a coup against the President/Great Leader of the Revolution and having kidnapped several high-ranking Army Officers.

3. The public is asked to be calm, alert and watchful.

Djakarta, October 1, 1965

TEMPORARY ARMY LEADERSHIP
sgd.
SOEHARTO
Major General of the Army
1. On October 1, 1965, things happened in Djakarta as the result of a counter-revolutionary action calling themselves "September 30 Movement";

2. They kidnapped the following high ranking officers of the Army:
   1. Lieutenant General A. Yani;
   2. Major General Suprapto;
   3. Major General S. Parman;
   4. Major General Harjono M.T.;
   5. Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan;

3. They had been able to force and use the R.R.I. (Radio Republik Indonesia) and the Head Office of Telecommunications;

4. President Sukarno and the Minister of Defense and Security, General A.H. Nasution, were safe and sound;

5. The Army's leadership is in the hands of Major General Soeharto for the time being.

6. The general situation had been controlled and security measures were still being taken. The public is asked to remain calm and do their daily tasks as usual.

Djakarta, October 1, 1965

TEMPORARY ARMY LEADERSHIP

sgd.

SOEHARTO
Major General of the Army
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ORDER (FEBRUARY 20, 1967)

I. Considering:

1. This present stage of the Revolution, and the national and international political situation as well;

2. The Order of the Day of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/President/Great Leader of the Revolution, on March 8, 1966;

II. In View of:

1. The necessity to create an atmosphere of calm and stability for the Government, and the course of the Revolution.

2. It is deemed necessary to guarantee the oneness between the Great Leader of the Revolution, the Armed Forces and the People, in order to maintain the authority and the leadership of the President/Supreme Commander/Great Leader of the Revolution and all his teachings.

III. Has resolved/ordered:

To order: Lieutenant General Soeharto, Minister/Commander in Chief of the Army, on behalf of the President/Supreme Commander/Great Leader of the Revolution:

To take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and the stability of the running of the Government and the course of the Revolution, while securing the personal safety of and the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution.
IV. To convey this announcement with fullest sense of responsibility, to the entire People of Indonesia and to the MPRS. May God Almighty protect the People of Indonesia in implementing their ideals in realizing a just and prosperous society, based on Pantja Sila.

Djakarta, February 20, 1967

PRESIDENT/SUPREME COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER
OF THE REVOLUTION/MANDATARY OF MPRS
sgd.

SUKARNO
PROVISIONAL CONSULTATIVE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
DECREE NO. XXXIII/MPRS/1967

Considering:

a. That the address entitled "Nawaksara" as a whole, that was delivered by the President/Mandatary of MPRS to the MPRS on 22nd June 1966 and the letter of the President/Mandatary of MPRS, No. 01/Pres/1967 of 10th January concerning the Supplement to the "Nawaksara" address, falls short of fulfilling the hopes of the people in general and especially the members of the MPRS, since it does not clearly contain and account for responsibility as to the policy of the President in regard to the counter-revolutionary rebellion of the "September 30 Movement"/PKI and its epilogue, the economic deterioration and decline of morals;

b. That the President/Mandatary of MPRS has transferred the power of Government to the Executor of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 as laid down in the announcement of the President/Mandatary of MPRS on 20th February 1967;

c. That, based on the written Report of the Commander of the Command for the Restoration of Order and Security/Executor of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 in his letter No.:R-032/1967 on 1st February 1967, supplemented with the report before the Special Session of the MPRS on 7th March 1967, the MPRS is of the opinion that there are indications that President Sukarno has conducted a policy which indirectly benefitted the "September 30 Movement"/PKI and has given protection to leaders of the "September 30 Movement"/PKI;

In View of:

1. The DPR-GR Resolution and Memorandum of 9th and 23rd February 1967;

2. The address of the Chairman of the MPRS at the opening session of the Special Session of the MPRS 1967;
3. The address of the Chairman of the DPR-GR at the opening session of the Special Session of the MPRS;

4. The Government Statement before the DPR-GR on the 4th of March 1967;


With due regard to:

1. The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, the 1945 Constitution and its Elucidation;

2. Decision of the Leadership of the MPRS No. 13/B/1967 concerning the rejection of the Supplement to the "Nawaksara" address.

Having heard:

The deliberation at the Special Session of MPRS from 7th March to 12th March 1967 inclusive.

Has resolved:

To decree:

The Decree concerning the Revocation of Government Power from President Sukarno.
CHAPTER I

Article 1

Declare that President Sukarno has not fulfilled his constitutional obligations as a good Mandatary ought to do towards the MPRS which has given him the mandate as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution.

Article 2

Declare that President Sukarno has not executed the policy of the State and the Decrees of the MPRS, as a good Mandatary is obliged to do towards the MPRS which has given him the mandate as provided for by the 1945 Constitution.

Article 3

To prohibit President Sukarno from conducting political activities till the general elections and, as from the coming into effect of this Decision, to revoke the MPRS mandate from President Sukarno and all powers of Government as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution.

Article 4

To sanction the coming into effect of MPRS Decree No. XV/MPRS/1966, and to appoint General Soeharto, Executor of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966, as Acting President based on Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, until the election of a new President by the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat as a result of general elections.

Article 5

The Acting President shall obey and is responsible to the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat (Sementara).
CHAPTER II

Article 6

Decide that the further judicial settlement which concerns Dr. Ir. Sukarno be implemented in accordance with the stipulations of Law in the context of upholding law and justice; entrust its implementation to the Acting President.

CHAPTER III

Article 7

This Decree comes into effect at the date of its sanctioning and shall have retroactive force as from 22nd February 1967.

Decreed at: Djakarta
On : March 12, 1967

PROVISIONAL MADJELIS PERMUSJAWARATAN RAKJAT
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Chairman
sgd.
Dr. A.H. NASUTION
General of the Army

Vice Chairman
sgd.
OSA MALIKI

Vice Chairman
sgd.
H.M. SUBCHAN Z.E.

Vice Chairman
sgd.
M. SIREGAR

Vice Chairman
sgd.
MASHUDI
Major General of the Army

Clarification

The power of Government as meant here is understood to mean as is stipulated in the 1945 Constitution and its Elucidation, so that in accordance with mentioned stipulations, President Sukarno has been substituted by General Soeharto, Executor of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 as Acting President.
The thesis submitted by William N. Bentivegna has been read and approved by members of the Department of Political Science.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

January 13, 1975

Signature of Advisor