Detente: The Great Foreign Policy Debate

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DETENTE: THE GREAT FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE

by

George Allen Sufana, Jr.

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VITA

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. KISSINGER: A VIEW OF POWER IN A NUCLEAR WORLD</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. KISSINGER, WHAT IS DETENTE?</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE CRITICS RESPOND: THE &quot;REALIST&quot; SCHOOL OF DETENTE</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. DETENTE ATTRAITS SUPPORTERS: THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL OF DETENTE</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. DETENTE AND HUMAN RIGHTS</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPILOGUE</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv
CHAPTER I

THE CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE

On March 1, 1976, President Gerald Ford announced that he would no longer use the word "detente" to describe the state of United States foreign policy, and specifically, the conduct of American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Rather, he stated in an interview with Murray Marder of the Washington Post, he would substitute the term "peace through strength." What had occurred to cause an American President, who had closely collaborated with the chief architect of detente, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to terminate not only the usage of the word, but perhaps question the policy as well? After all, President Ford had wholeheartedly endorsed Kissinger's efforts, penned his signature to the Vladivostok Accords in 1974, and signed the Helsinki Agreements in 1975 at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

A great debate had been building in the foreign policy establishment since the time of the Viet Nam War. This questioning of the conduct of American foreign policy challenged the continuation of the conventional post-war strategy of politically and militarily combating the spread of Communism,

and because of its massive strength second only to the United States, containing the power of the Soviet Union. With the advent of Richard Nixon to Presidential power, and his reliance on Dr. Henry Kissinger as his chief foreign policy adviser, new policy initiatives were begun to correct what was perceived by them to be a faulty and outdated analysis of the global competition between the two superpowers. On the one hand was the ideological threat of Marxism that emanated principally from the Soviet Union, but was by no means limited only to Moscow. On the other hand were the basic political questions of how to most effectively utilize the strength of the United States in areas where the two nuclear giants were rivals for power.

The main concern of this debate was the question of the national survival of the United States. A policy that failed to exhibit an American willingness to use its power to its best advantage could provide the Soviets with the opportunity to drastically increase their own power. As such, any new policy would have to delicately analyze Soviet goals and intentions, and what the projection of Soviet strength would mean to the existing power balance. The debate that would ensue encompassed not only speculation about Soviet purposes, but also the manner by which the United States approached the methods of modifying its prior strategic policy.

What were the origins of this controversy on détente
that would provoke such a statement from President Ford? Something must surely have occurred for so explicit a statement that seemed to repudiate a policy that had characterized American foreign affairs since Richard Nixon assumed office. To President Ford, the policy of detente could not only be responsible for the loss of millions of votes in an election year, but could possibly imply that the national security had been endangered by a misinterpretation of the Soviet Union's willingness to reach an accommodation with its American rival. Secretary of State Kissinger had requested a national debate, and in this regard the comments from political observers were willingly offered. Before one can delve into the sources of the controversy, a brief generalized account of why detente was attractive to the United States and the Soviet Union is in order.

Foreign policy observers have expressed a number of opinions delineating the factors that influenced an alternation of policy that was labeled "detente." This thesis will concern itself with a number of these factors. One factor that seemed to predominate over other concerns was the commitment by American and Soviet officials to avoid nuclear war. Since the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union have been locked in an ideological and political-military struggle on a global scale. The Soviets have stated the intention to perpetuate their Marxist dogma, and to amass all the means in their power to spread its
appeal world-wide. The United States had made an equally
determined commitment to check the furtherance of this dog-
ma, whose purpose its practitioners quite emphatically
state, is to eliminate America's political and economic
system. The capability to destroy civilized existence with
nuclear weapons is another factor that has made the politi-
cal and military struggle particularly dangerous.

With the advent of the atomic bomb and the means at the
disposal of both sides to deliver the instrument of destruc-
tion, Moscow and Washington had to weigh every political
move in the light of this awesome alternative. Detente was
the conclusion drawn from thirty years of unceasing enmity
by both sides, that a Third World War should be avoided.

Secretary Kissinger has written:

Each of us (the United States and the Soviet Union) has
thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable
of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this
very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create
a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdepend-
ence for survival between the two of us. Although we
compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by
victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to co-
exist. We have an inescapable obligation to build joint-
ly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality
is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective for-
eign policy today.²

Both the United States and the Soviet Union expressed
themselves in favor of avoiding this terrible catastrophe.

². Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy. New York:
Some type of arrangement had to be made by which the nuclear arms race would be brought under control. The fear that nuclear weapons had created was not just in its massive destructiveness, but that political conflicts could possibly emerge in which one of the superpowers would utilize its nuclear capability. Out of this environment, the Nixon and Ford administrations, and their counterpart Secretary Brezhnev, sought a detente between their respective nations to reduce the threat of nuclear war and its consequent arms buildup.

Detente struck at the very heart of this most complex dilemma: How could the United States and the Soviet Union co-exist without resorting to war, and yet realize that they will continue to remain rivals for global power? Each side would be favorably inclined toward detente, but with certain conditions. The two superpowers adhered to certain views and policies that seemed unlikely to change. For example, the Soviet Union was willing to partake in negotiations on strategic arms, and accept inducements such as economic and technological assistance, but not at the expense of ending its ideological mission, nor its concerns about a nuclear China, and the withdrawal of its political and military muscle in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Likewise, the United States was inclined toward a reduction in tension - detente - but not at the prospect of abandoning its political and military allies. Detente would be accepted, but on
certain conditions understood by each side.

To summarize, the United States would accept a detente with the Soviet Union because of the gigantic costs that the political and military rivalry between these two superpowers had created, and because of the diminishing American willingness and ability to contain Communism, except in specific areas where direct challenges to American security had to be repulsed. The post-war American commitment to resist Communism through the policy of containment was believed to have been an effective strategy. With American assistance, Western Europe had recovered from the devastation of the Second World War, and was protected by the American nuclear umbrella, along with the conventional forces of NATO. The Communists had been defeated in a civil war in Greece, Turkey was a secure partner in the Atlantic Alliance, West Berlin resisted Soviet pressure to starve the city into submission, and American forces acting under a mandate from the United Nations had successfully resisted a Soviet-sponsored North Korean invasion against South Korea. In numerous other regions of the globe, the United States policy of containment was rating high marks. But then came Viet Nam, and with it a great policy dislocation. Through almost a decade of fighting in the jungles of Viet Nam, America paid a terrible price in attempting to extricate itself from the Asian involvement, without appearing to have foresaken our political and military commitment to that country and our allies.
Viet Nam was the most challenging event of American foreign policy since World War II, not solely because of the protracted military commitment, but because of the extended political ramifications our involvement there will have for years to come. The French historian and political observer, Andre Fontaine, penned a fitting commentary on America's involvement.

The United States lost in Viet Nam their finest title to fame, that of the champion of the right of peoples and individuals to self-determination. But it is not only abroad that its image has deteriorated. How many of the hundreds of thousands of well-fed and overequipped young men who have been fighting in the rice paddies for a year against men, women and sometimes children whose emaciation and reproachful gaze perpetually faced them with the question why they were there, have returned cynical, disgusted, drug-addicts, or at the very least disillusioned with the American dream on which they were raised? Nothing has been so instrumental in the profound crisis that has afflicted the United States for some years as Viet Nam.  

For a decade, the debate over our involvement in Viet Nam would call into question a number of tenets basic to American philosophy. Politically, the involvement meant America's concentrating primarily on Viet Nam to the detriment of our ability to act with political and military decisiveness in the Middle East and Europe. An America stifled and bogged down in Viet Nam would provide the Soviets the opportunity to exploit this situation.

There were other inducements, which will be mentioned later in this paper, such as the possibility of a decreased military budget, an improved economy, and an opportune moment to concentrate more on national affairs. All these exerted a combined effect over a period of a decade to induce a detente.

What of the Soviet Union? What factors made detente acceptable to it? A brief mention of these inducements were: the Soviet Union's great desire for Western technology; the need to purchase food to feed a population which is unable to adequately feed itself; the political and militarily significant question of how to respond to a nuclear China, unwilling to acknowledge Soviet hegemony in Asia, or Soviet ideology in the Communist movement; and finally, the need for security and the acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was to make it explicitly clear that they would be favorably disposed to negotiating with the United States on a broad range of subjects vital to each nation. To this end, the Soviets also made it known that their acceptance of detente did not include the abandonment of their Marxist faith. Simply stated: the Soviets would assent to a detente with their capitalist rival because of the nature of the political and military questions involved; but for the United States to assume that the Soviets would no longer follow their Marxist-Leninist principles was an analysis that could possibly lead to a false sense of
security with dangerous implications.

This brief introduction to detente leads one to the roots of the controversy itself. Any political question in a pluralistic society is bound to provoke lively debate, and the topic of detente is a vivid example. Professor Stephen P. Gibert in *Soviet Images of America* lists three types of detentists: "the 'orthodox detente' supporters, who have controlled American foreign policy since 1969, the 'revisionist detente' school and the 'realists.'"\(^4\) These are three labels which this paper will use to a great extent in describing the positions of various individuals and groups involved in the detente controversy. Because of the Soviet-American competition in the international arena since the termination of World War II, opinions in the United States concerning Soviet actions, and the American response to them, have made the question of detente the foremost concern in the field of American foreign policy.

When a controversial political decision is made the responsibility for that action is in many cases attributed to an individual. It is axiomatic that whenever detente is mentioned in any fashion, the name of Dr. Henry Kissinger is inevitably linked to that political persuasion. Even though President Richard Nixon possessed his own world views, he would not have allowed the "influence of the gray eminence,

the obscure, German-born ex-professor, ...unless both the president and his adviser viewed the world through the same spectacles."\(^5\)

It would be commented on by many observers that Henry Kissinger was the architect and initiator, and Richard Nixon the willing actor whose views were not too dissimilar. Each complemented the other. Indeed, it is unlikely that Kissinger would ever have tasted of power had it not been for Richard Nixon, who noticed that Kissinger's views on international politics and the utilization of power on a vast scale were similar to his own. It is at this point that a chapter devoted to Dr. Kissinger is in order. One cannot examine the policy without studying the architect, and thus an exploration of Kissinger's thesis.

CHAPTER II

KISSINGER: A VIEW OF POWER IN A NUCLEAR WORLD

To analyze Henry Kissinger's theory of political power, one can begin by taking a step back in time to the difficulties that faced the European world in the wake of Bonaparte's defeat. This is essential in attempting to gain a clearer understanding of Kissinger's opinions, particularly in view of Kissinger's fascination with one of the greatest statesmen of Nineteenth Century Europe, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Prince Clement Metternich. What was there about Metternich and the post-Bonaparte world of European politics that attracted Kissinger's attention?

The Congress of Vienna was a landmark event in political history. That assemblage of diplomats attempted not only to redefine the borders of states, replacing Napoleon's actions of political power predicated upon military conquest, but also to negotiate issues that were directed toward creating a stable European order. One of the conditions for a guaranteed peace was the legitimacy of all European governments, and a shared balance of interests. With Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia the primary contributors, the Congress was convened to redistribute the balance of power in Europe on some permanent basis to avoid further con-
Metternich's prime political mission was to negotiate the re-establishment of the Continental Order in what he was to describe as the community of European interests. It was from the political and military influences by the strongest European powers that Metternich sought a limitation of state power, and with that prospect, a true "Concert of Europe." The problem that confronted Metternich was how to temper the constant strivings for increased power and territory that inevitably led to European war, with a more lasting order, and with it the "sacred principle of legitimacy." Metternich strove for what was politically advantageous for Austria, specifically, and for the future of European politics in a broad sense. A balance of power within the community of European interests would be possible to Metternich only if each state respected the sovereignty of the others, thereby limiting its foreign desires. In a passage that can describe his political philosophy as it regards the interests of the European state system, Metternich wrote:

Politics is the science of the vital interests of states in its widest meaning. Since, however, an isolated state no longer exists and is found only in the annals of the heathen world...we must always view the Society of States as the essential condition of the modern world. The great axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge of the true political interests of all states; it is upon these general interests that rest that guarantee of respect for acquired rights...constitutes in our time the essence of politics, of which diplomacy is merely the daily application. Between the two there is in my
opinion the same difference as between science and art.\(^1\)

As a graduate student at Harvard, Kissinger's doctoral dissertation was concerned with the political actions of Metternich, and the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, at the Congress of Vienna. His doctoral dissertation was published in 1957 under the title *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822.*

As a scholar preoccupied with the dimensions of international politics in our nuclear age, his inquiry into the maneuvers and ramifications of the Congress of Vienna offered him a focus of study conducive to deciphering any similarities that might appear with those in the present age. The parallels, of course, were quite obvious. Europe after Hitler's defeat resembled to a marked extent the Europe after Napoleon's demise. Without cataloguing the parallels, one similarity that concerned Kissinger was how the statesmen of the Nineteenth Century approached the reconstruction of a stable European system. The political question that eventually faced the statesmen of the victorious nations was how to devise a stable European order out of the fragile alliances they had entered into for military considerations.

In describing Metternich and his balance of power advocacy, one may inquire in what way did this influence Henry Kissinger? There are parallels that can be observed compar-

ing the political world of post-Bonaparte Europe with the
global - or more specifically European - situation of the
post-World War II era. Whatever the similarities may be be­
tween those days and the present, one overriding factor ex­
ists today that was absent in the time of Metternich: a
nation, the Soviet Union, with a world view which it propa­
gates aggressively so as to change the present political or­
der.

Metternich was well aware of the political and military
ambitions of a Russia under the rule of the unstable Alexan­
der, and how a Russia yearning for more power in Central and
Eastern Europe could threaten European order. For decades
Russia has been stifled at various times in its quest for
greater political influence by the weight of the powers of
approximate military strength - Prussia, Poland, Austria.
Each at intervals was militarily prepared enough and suffi­
ciently motivated on a cultural, national and religious basis
to adequately resist and neutralize - and in some cases de­
feat - a Russia with covetous ambitions that was seeking ter­
ritorial security. The balance of power to which Metternich
so adhered was achieved only because of the nature of the
powers involved. Prussia, Austria, Russia, France and Great
Britain were of comparable military strength. Each nation
was capable of defending itself, and realized that the deser­
tion of one side to another side could disturb a precious
balance. As a result of World Wars I and II, the balance of
power, which had secured European order for one hundred years as inaugurated at the Congress of Vienna, was obliterated, thereby creating a political situation altogether different from anything that came before, and proving the prophecy of de Tocqueville: Russia and America would emerge as the world's two great powers.

Kissinger's fascination with Metternich and his curiosity regarding the deliberations and strategems contrived at the Congress would provide a beginning point at which to explore in further detail the mechanisms through which states construct foreign policy. Beyond this critique of scholarship there existed Kissinger's inquisitive appetite for discerning how men function in the political world of their peers, particularly those statesmen and diplomats on the international plane. This is indeed the actual workings of politics, the reality which transcends all other factors. History ultimately evaluates and reevaluates the success or failure of any diplomatic enterprise through the passing of time. Metternich's conduct and those of his peers at Vienna are no exception.

Kissinger's thesis, in one respect resembling that of Metternich, places a great emphasis on equilibrium and stability if international order is to be achieved. As Metternich evaluated the political and military questions that confronted a number of powers after the abdication of Napoleon, Kissinger viewed the present order since World War II as a
world chaotically structured, with fewer powerful actors able to shape their own destiny because of a Soviet-American bipolar balance of power. No longer do the nations of Europe exercise their prime political and military power as was their privilege prior to World War II. What Dr. Kissinger has noticed - and he is by no means the only observer of this political phase - is that the balance of power may not be the sole determinant of a stable system. Indeed, it may very well be an unstable condition. To this end, when one nation ends its partnership with other nations for whatever reason, the balance of power is disturbed, creating an unstable condition that can lead to possible military and political crisis. The concept of the balance of power relies on a number of powers, each somewhat approximate in strength, each having the capacity to counter-balance the outcome of the scheme of things. Thus, Kissinger believes, it is difficult to achieve equilibrium and stability in a world that is militarily bipolar, functioning within a world community that is politically multipolar.

In his *American Foreign Policy*, Kissinger wrote of the international distribution of power in the militarily bipolar, yet politically multipolar age, as having put an end to the political dominance of the two superpowers. Although the superpowers continue to possess the greatest of military strength, this condition remarkably enough "has actually encouraged political multipolarity. Weaker allies have good
reason to believe that their defense is in the overwhelming interest of their senior partner."² Because the two superpowers require political and military allies, these weaker states recognize that their political importance has grown disproportionate to their military strength. The superpowers desire their support, and therefore tolerate an amount of independence that traditionally would not have been acceptable. Kissinger views political multipolarity as contributing to a state of instability that interferes with the necessity of international order. Such a situation poses difficulties in the search to find some way toward reaching equilibrium, particularly "among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience."³

The Twentieth Century has seen a drastic deviation from the political world prior to our time. Europe was ruled by a number of states, each attempting to gain increased power and influence. Whatever the sources of conflict that pitted Russia against Prussia, or Austria, or Britain versus France or the Ottomans, these aberrations of policy affected only to a minute degree - if at all - the situation in China, or Japan, indeed, hardly even touching America. Foreign policy was basically the application of political and military strengths of nations in areas within

³. Ibid., Pp.56-57.
close proximity to one another. Kissinger believes that it has been the revolutionary nature of the Twentieth Century that politics is now performed on a global stage; that military might can be disposed anywhere by a number of powers; and that the emerging nations from the colonial past have created new power centers of their own.

The emergence of the nuclear age and the outgrowth of atomic weaponry; the rising importance of products such as raw materials and petroleum; and the addition of new nations that sprang from the loss of European colonial possessions, are factors that have forced technologically powerful nations to exercise policies that not too long ago would have produced military intervention without hesitation. Consequently, Dr. Kissinger has written that every nation is now an active participant in global affairs. Because of the revolutionary advance in communications and technology, even previously insignificant nations can affect the global balance of power. In this regard, Dr. Kissinger sums up the "revolutionary character of our age" as having increased the number of international actors, their "technical ability to affect each other," and the greatly enlarged "scope of their purposes. Whenever the participants in the international system change, a period of profound dislocation is inevitable."  

Because of the nature of a changed political world

4. Ibid., p.53.
since World War II, the traditional powers, while still capable of exercising great economic might, have found themselves in a position of profound military and national impotence. The end of their colonial empires now a fait accompli; the reluctance to utilize their still conventionally adequate - even potent - military and economic power as weapons of political authority; and the disruption of the balance of power by a Russia equipped with nuclear weapons, has produced a great cleavage in the traditional power balance since World War II.

The United States and the Soviet Union still possess the instruments of monopolistic strategic weaponry, but in a world where the exercise of that power must take into account other power centers. Henry Kissinger may well have asked: What is required to bring order to an unstable world, and in this regard what contribution should America make? An important particular of Kissinger's thesis states that the "greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order." When such an "agreed concept of order" is lacking, power is used without any degree of shared purposes. Such a condition can fall prey to the forces of ideology and nationalism, which weaken the chances for stability. The shared concerns of Nineteenth Century Europe which allowed for adjustments in the political sphere, Kissinger states, "are gone forever. A new concept of interna-

5. Ibid., Pp.57-58
tional order is essential; without it stability will prove elusive."\textsuperscript{6}

The American contribution to this task cannot be imposed by America because of political multipolarity. International order can only be based on the realities of the present political makeup of a multipolar world, where America must fashion new policies to convince others that stability is in their best interests.

In Kissinger's world view of the inter-relationship of global powers, what path does he suggest American foreign policy must follow? Dr. Kissinger observes that American policy must lead to the development of purposeful and orderly uses of American power that can alleviate the traditional types of crisis that in the nuclear age have become increasingly critical. Dr. Kissinger states that a mature conception of our interest in the world would obviously have to take into account the widespread interest in stability and peaceful change. It would deal with two fundamental questions: What is it in our interest to prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?\textsuperscript{7}

To Henry Kissinger, the answer to the first question is quite readily apparent: the avoidance of nuclear war and aggression. The second question is difficult to answer because of the continuing debate over political and strategic goals. The United States should no longer attempt to shoulder the supreme responsibility for the defense of the free

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., Pp.57-58.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p.92.
world and our allies alone. America's strength and leadership can be utilized effectively only with the assistance of our fellow allies acting in concert, and of other states interested in preserving regional order. Kissinger thought that other states, particularly in Western Europe and Asia, should begin to shoulder an increased burden for their own protection, while the United States would be "concerned more with the overall framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise."8

Shared regional responsibilities; a changed conception of power; the bipolar military dimension in a politically multipolar world; these conditions in the fact of a nuclear world called for a strategy that would devise new tactics toward the goal of "building a stable and creative world order."9

Kissinger's erudition on the notion of power on a vast scale in the atmosphere of Cold War conflict is of primary importance, for it provides a clue to a most vexing problem: the question of Soviet-American relations, and in that context, detente. How power is distributed, how much each has, and how it continues to be exercised, are questions that presented to Henry Kissinger the means by which to analyze questions of war and peace.

Another astute observer, Raymond Aron, also considered

8. Ibid., p.97.
9. Ibid., p.97.
the difficulties of devising an effective strategy to meet the conditions of a multipolar world. The specific problem when approaching the realities of a radically changed global condition where many new power centers have emerged is "to find a precise meaning for multipolarity." 10 Particularly difficult to devise is a strategy that accepts the political realities of multipolarity when "two rivalries, one continental, the other global, overlap in a subsystem." 11 The Sino-Soviet rivalry on a continental basis, and the Soviet-American competition globally, are two rivalries that Aron referred to when noting the complexity of such an international system that also had to account for smaller rivalries and other power centers. Even though the United States and the Soviet Union would remain militarily supreme, multipolarity would continue to create problems for stability and international order. These were matters that concerned Henry Kissinger.

Raymond Aron would comment that Kissinger's global politics, his partnership with Richard Nixon, and his parting of the ways with Metternich was "contributing to the creation of a post-war world wholly unlike that of Metternich or Bismarck." 12 Nixon, through Kissinger, was accepting the realities of the interstate system which was less a result of ideological conflict than it is a contest for power

11. Ibid., p.138.
12. Ibid., Pp.146-147.
normal among states. A military balance would exist between the two superpowers, and there would be a recognition that each has vital interests to protect in their inter-relationship with regional powers. American policy should not view "every revolutionary movement of any sort as a menace," while "a revolutionary state" - read Soviets and Chinese - would renounce "spreading their creed by violence..." While Metternich and Bismarck attempted to combat the emerging power of revolutionary forces, Nixon and Kissinger's policy would air for a rapprochement with states that espoused a revolutionary ideology, and convince them that stability was in their best interests.

Before one begins with an examination of detente as defined by Dr. Kissinger, a final analysis of Kissinger's political observations and opinions on modern global power is necessary. Here, if anywhere, the problem faced Kissinger: What is the role of power in a scientific, technologically advanced world, that has restructured the pre-World War I conception of the balance-of-power? The nuclear age has produced a reconsideration of political and military thinking of the technologically developed powers, cautioning particularly the United States and the Soviet Union from relying solely on the traditional modes of behavior. Among the nuclear powers, military action as a ready alternative in meeting political challenges can no longer be implemented without taking into

13. Ibid., Pp.146-147.
account for greater potential dangers. Implied in this rethinking of past political practice is that no political option can discount the likelihood that nuclear weapons can be utilized. Dr. Kissinger has written of the effect nuclear weapons has had on traditional modes of political practice, and what this can mean for the balance of power. Prior to the advent of nuclear weaponry, the balance of power was dependent upon territorial considerations. States were able to expand their influence only through conquest and the threat of direct military forces. The "showing of the flag" placed not only military strength at a premium, but more importantly political power as well. But in the nuclear world of post-war politics, and with the accelerating technological advances in weapons systems of a strategic and conventional type, "this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power are possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state." 14 A state that is capable of developing nuclear weapons can disrupt the balance of power without dispatching military forces outside its border.

Kissinger furnishes another example of the revolutionary increments of modern global power by speculating upon the notion that if the Soviet Union had conquered Western Europe, but remained deficient in nuclear weaponry, it would have remained, to a considerable extent, less militarily able to

dictate and protect its security needs than would a Soviet Union in its present status. The political options that are available to policy implementors because of nuclear weapons have radically restructured diplomatic procedures. Kissinger elaborates:

In other words, the really fundamental changes in the balance of power have all occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an urgent need to analyze just what is understood by power—as well as by balance of power—in the nuclear age.\(^{15}\)

Commenting on the evolution of modern technology, and what ramifications this has had for decision-makers, Kissinger has noted the political difficulty of devising strategic policy when weapons technology continues to increase at a rapid pace. No sooner is a policy agreed upon than a technological advancement in nuclear weaponry makes a reconsideration of political and military policy mandatory. "The gap between experts and decision-makers is widening."\(^{16}\)

Finally, the force of the enormity of modern power on the traditional modes of settling political and military disputes has destroyed its cumulative impact to a considerable extent. Throughout history the use of force set a precedent; it demonstrated a capacity to use power for national ends. In the twentieth century, any use of force sets up inhibitions against resorting to it again.\(^{17}\)

Kissinger would argue that in view of the changed nature of power in the nuclear age, traditional attempts to

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15. Ibid., p.61.  
16. Ibid., p.61.  
17. Ibid., p.62.
gather more power and influence through "geopolitical and military power" is no longer relevant. The attempt to gain marginal advantages over an opponent and thus tip the scales of the balance of power, as in the past, does not mean that the practice for greater political power can be used to advantage over one's competitor in the nuclear age. The Soviet Union and the United States have recognized, Kissinger states, that as their military power grows, the attempt to transfer that power for political ends "does not necessarily represent an increment of useable political strength." 18

Each advance in weapons technology by one side creates a necessity for the other side to keep pace. Consequently, marginal advantages cannot be decisive except in the short term. Such a situation is extremely dangerous and destabilizing since it puts a "premium...on striking first and on creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory capability." 19 Kissinger would make a most controversial point that his détente opponents would focus on when he stated that "marginal additions of power cannot be decisive." 20

To Henry Kissinger, "marginal advantages" by each power must be hindered if a truly creative world order can become a goal that will result in arms control and coexistence in a world of divergent beliefs and aims.

Detente as a political term has been used to describe a period in which some form of conflict or tension has been replaced by an atmosphere where political or military difficulties have diminished. Theodore Draper, writing in *Commentary*, stated that detente is another one of those perfectly good words that misapplied, gets a bad name. It appears to be a relatively recent importation from the French. The first citation in the Oxford English Dictionary is dated 1908. The word is usually defined as a 'relaxation of tension' which may mean much or little depending on what kind of tension is being relaxed by how much.¹

Keith Eubank, Professor of History, Queens College, has remarked that the word detente was commonly used in European diplomatic circles prior to World Wars I & II to designate a period of reduced tension. Curiously enough, Eubank states, it was used "interchangeably" with "appeasement."² Neither term prior to World War II meant giving in to a more aggressive power, or of connoting a policy of surrender. And John Herz, Professor of Political Science, City


College of New York, has stated that detente "seems to undergo a transformation in meaning similar to that which appeasement underwent in the earlier period, namely, from a genuine effort to arrive at mutual understanding to a policy of unilateral concessions." ³

To most people detente is synonymous with Dr. Kissinger. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Kissinger's explanation of detente. As appeasement has fallen into disrepute because of the actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, so detente has, particularly since 1974, come under a similar attack by critics who believe that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger conceded too much to the Soviets, the United States receiving little in return. Since Kissinger is considered the architect of detente policy, it is appropriate to analyze his views on detente.

It should not be assumed that Kissinger was the sole moving force behind detente; others contributed in a substantial and important degree to this policy. ⁴ What can be established with a reasonable amount of certainty is that


4. To dismiss individuals such as Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev would be a gross error. Both often stated their support for detente. As the controversy on detente unfolded, their conceptions on what detente should be became increasingly ambiguous and conflicting. Also, Willy Brandt sought a detente with East Germany and the Soviet Union through his policy of Ostpolitik.
Kissinger was the architect who found in Richard Nixon an individual who shared a number of his personal and political idiosyncracies and views. There can be little doubt that William P. Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State in his first administration, was by occupation and temperament ill-equipped to challenge someone of Kissinger's discipline, and especially someone who had daily access to the President. As Chairman of the National Security Council, unencumbered by ceremonial and bureaucratic necessities, Kissinger was provided with the opportunity to offer Richard Nixon suggestions for reforming an American foreign policy in need of rethinking, and to accept certain realities that could no longer be denied: that Communism was far from being a united political bloc; that the United States no longer enjoyed nuclear supremacy; and that the Soviet Union had reached nuclear parity with the United States, and would have to be dealt with as an equal power in world affairs.

If any one factor would distinguish the conduct of the Nixon-Kissinger years from the previous administrations in the area of foreign policy, the radical turnabout of strategic weapons philosophy is surely the prime example. Since the advent of nuclear weaponry and all its modern vehicles of delivery, each successive administration had employed the doctrine of strategic superiority. With the ever-increasing spiral of the nuclear arms race, including
decisions on both sides of building massive ABM systems, president Nixon stated the groundwork of his administration during his first press conference on January 27, 1969. While Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird spoke of "superiority in nuclear weaponry," Nixon stated that "sufficiency is a better term actually than either superiority or parity." What this particular type of logic actually revealed was a recognition that the Soviet Union had indeed approached parity in nuclear weapons, and that only two options existed for both sides: continue the arms race in massive proportions, or attempt some form of rapprochement by which sufficiency - or in actuality parity - could be established as a framework to prevent the former prospect.

The SALT negotiations would lay the groundwork for the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union had a common area of agreement. "SALT is the central exhibit in Kissinger's museum of detente," wrote former Ambassador George W. Ball. The factors that compelled both sides to seek some sort of accommodation in the field of nuclear weaponry, Ball would state, was the nuclear weapons competition and its ever-increasing costs, the "escalation of what, in economic terms, was pure waste." Both superpowers wished to establish some type of

stability to reduce the dangers of nuclear competition, but this stability would be "possible only if something approaching parity were achieved... For one thing, the recognition of parity would advance their [Soviets] ambition to be regarded as the equal of the United States, capable of dealing with America on a self-respecting basis." ⁸

With the advent of the Nixon administration, U.S. foreign policy was subjected to a careful reappraisal by Kissinger and his staff, primarily to determine what policies should be scrapped, and what future proposals would be acceptable. Either way, a modification of past policy was definitely predictable. Elliott L. Richardson, Under-Secretary of State, in a speech to the American Political Science Association on September 5, 1969, entitled The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration: Its Aims and Strategy previewed the new tone. In his address, Richardson stated that Richard Nixon had noticed that the United States was responding to events and crisis, rather than forming new policies to avoid crisis; that Nixon noticed that "we fail to have the perspective and the long-range view that is essential for a policy that will be viable." ⁹ Richardson also mentioned that Nixon had "reinvigorated the National Security Council to assure our policies will not lack these attributes." ¹⁰

⁸. Ibid., p.116.
¹⁰. Ibid., p.257.
At this period in history the United States continued to be terribly hampered by Viet Nam, and by the previous administration's foreign policy in that area. The Nixon administration would establish the beginnings by which the totality of foreign policy would not be jeopardized because of Viet Nam. While Viet Nam would be dealt with, the aims of stifling the nuclear arms race through SALT, the search for a Middle East settlement, and the negotiations on Berlin and European security would proceed ahead despite the Viet Nam impasse.

The Johnson-Rusk administration, and the policy of Ostpolitik pursued by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who took office in October, 1969, provided an example of possible policy initiatives which Nixon-Kissinger could observe. Former Ambassador George Kennan wrote that the Johnson administration had noticed certain changes in Soviet policy that could possibly lead to a relaxation of tension, and that "certain gains were made, in the 1966-68 period which, if one had been able to build further on them, might well have developed into the sort of thing that later, in the early 1970's came to be known as detente."^11^ Kennan notes that two events interfered with the possible improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the American involvement in Viet Nam. "It was not

until the first could be forgotten, and the second brought into process of liquidation in the early 1970's, that prospects again opened up for further progress along the lines pioneered by Messrs. Johnson and Rusk some four to six years earlier."12

In August and September of 1974, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held one of its most extensive hearings on American foreign policy in its history. Entitled, On United States Relations with Communist Countries, foreign policy experts and analysts testified on a broad range of subjects that dealt primarily with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that the star witness was to be Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who would deliver his dissertation on the fundamental reasoning that compelled detente. Chairman Fulbright welcomed Kissinger as "the one individual who may, without exaggeration, be described as the architect of detente."13

Dr. Kissinger's opening statement came right to the point in describing his suggestion for international order based on cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a broad definition of detente.

12. Ibid., p.686.
There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

Thus, we must be clear at the outset on what the term 'detente' entails. It is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a continuing process, not a final condition. And it has been pursued by successive American leaders though the means have varied as have world conditions.14

Kissinger's fifty-page testimony on detente was not only an extensive exercise in the art of persuasion, but also an equally clear explanation - at least in theory - of what detente was meant to be, and what it was not. Although he had stated on other occasions the crux of his thesis, his testimony before the Committee was to be a thorough presentation outlining his political views on the state of Soviet-American relations, and the possibilities of expanding a relationship that had as its objective the avoidance of general war.

It was important for Kissinger to develop in his theory of detente a policy that could show continuity and progress. Two years prior on May 29, 1972, in Moscow, the United States and the Soviet Union signed what was entitled as the Basic Principles of Relations Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. At a news conference held that day, Dr. Kissinger explained at length upon what the formal relations of the United

14. Ibid., p.239.
states and the Soviet Union were based. While recognizing the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that has been the foremost concern of almost every nation's foreign policy since World War II, Kissinger stated that this new phase of relations would take into account many issues. These issues, Kissinger stated, "would create on both sides so many vested interests in a continuation of a more formal relationship," that a new and different outlook in the foreign policy of both powers would be possible. The existence of a Soviet ideology that would continue to compete with the West and the United States should not be an obstacle to peaceful coexistence, if the principles that were signed at Moscow were followed. The primary concern of the principles, Kissinger stated, was to avoid direct military involvements, and not to take unilateral advantage of political situations, but rather recognize "that the attempt of traditional diplomacy to accumulate marginal advantages is bound to lead to disastrous consequences in the nuclear age. This document is supposed to characterize relationships for the future."  

Detente was more than just a reconsideration of past political strategies and goals. It became, to Kissinger, the attempt to form an understanding with the Soviet Union.

16. Ibid., p.884.
that certain principles were immutable: nuclear war must be avoided, and the pursuit of "marginal advantages" made less desirable through the benefits of cooperation and mutual gain. There can be little doubt that what sparked these concerns was Soviet parity in nuclear arms, which meant that a definite military balance in strategic weaponry existed between the two superpowers. This would surely have its affect politically. On February 1, 1973, in an interview with Marvin Kalb of CBS News, Kissinger spoke of a "completely different world than the one that existed in the 19th Century. You can't have these shifting alliances; you can't have these endless little wars." 17 The balance of power, as fragile as it may be in this nuclear age, certainly does force upon states the recognition that their security cannot be entrusted "to the good will of another state, if it has a choice about it, especially of a state that announces a hostile ideology." 18 Kissinger explained that what the administration was attempting to accomplish was not so much to embark upon a policy of 19th Century balance of power politics, but rather to deal with the obvious fact of a nuclear world: no side can survive an atomic war. To eliminate the hostilities that are a result of this conflict, and with it the temptation to seek marginal advantages, would be the new policy rather than a continuation of confrontation politics.

and limited wars that would only end in nuclear disaster. Kissinger had few illusions about the intricacies of diplomacy with a hostile adversary. Ideological competition was bound to continue, along with the pursuit of power on a global scale. No situation remains static. A realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union's international status, its need for ideological legitimacy, and its resurgent conventional and nuclear power, made the pursuit of detente necessary, Kissinger believed. One of the guiding principles of Kissinger's detente policy was that the United States could not blindly trust the Soviet Union to ease international tensions for the sake of good will. Proper political interests would have to be devised to create the type of understanding that would make the easing of tension beneficial to both sides.

An understanding of the differences that divide the two superpowers, Kissinger believed, was the first step toward some type of reconciliation. But beyond the ideological, political, and military divisions lay the spectre of possible nuclear war, which "defines the necessity of the task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union point up its difficulty."19 The rivalry between the two powers, Kissinger stated, is a result of how each nation views its own national interest, and the differences that spring from opposing ideolo-

logical systems.

These two nuclear giants that are separated by diverging philosophies, governmental systems, and a plethora of other conditions and factors, must devise and agree to new policies to prevent nuclear war. Neither side, as Kissinger would state many times, would alter the conduct of its foreign policy because of moral considerations. A lessening of competition, and the development of acceptable criteria to enhance the probabilities for cooperation, are dictated by the realities of the political and military balance. A necessary condition is one in which both sides benefit. Politically, any negotiation between two formidable opponents with long-standing conflicts would only succeed when both sides believed that something could be gained. Kissinger thought that in view of the factors that split the superpowers, a new political approach would have to be attempted in which a number of issues would be negotiated over an unspecified time period. A realistic view of the status of Soviet-American relations would have to accept the fact that both sides would continue to compete, but recognize that certain interests forced them to co-exist. Kissinger believed that detente would reconcile the conflicts that produced this divisive condition by providing both sides with the opportunity to regulate and restrain their differences and ultimate-
ly move from competition to cooperation."²⁰

In this world of political divisions, power politics and two nuclear powers so contradictory to each other, came Kissinger and detente. Other circumstances and prior actions made this plausible. What led up to a change in global politics, which Kissinger viewed as having begun by the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, was the political friction in the Communist world which no longer accepted Moscow's supposedly supreme authority in matters of ideology and power politics, and efforts by the United States, undoubtedly because of the Viet Nam experience, to improve relations with Moscow. Kissinger credited the Soviets with restraint, particularly in refraining from exercising a more aggressive role in the Communist camp; a policy that was taking an increasingly greater look at the consumer and material needs of its people; and by seeking to "calm its public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions."²¹

The United States sought to take advantage of this relaxation of tension by offering incentives to the Soviets to continue on this course.

The political and military competition that had punctuated so much of the post-war period was, to Kissinger, in a state of transformation by the mid-1960's. Superpower

²⁰. Ibid., p.248.
²¹. Ibid., p.249.
status did not mean that power could be exercised against other states with impunity, even against developing nations, solely by the threat of military intervention. The United States experienced this painful lesson in Viet Nam. The Soviets also experienced the limitation of their awesome power with Tito's Yugoslavia, in the conflict with China, and with the resentment and dissension that continues to plague them in Eastern Europe.

A new international structure, Dr. Kissinger would write, was predicated on more than just a reduction of tension from the threat of military action and political competition. After the Second World War, a new international system was emerging that presented America with an opportunity to confront challenges of a pluralistic world, and help shape a new international environment, "less dominated by military power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the globe."22 Such a desirable international system could only be likely if the major nuclear powers practiced a policy that inhibited them from utilizing the traditional elements of power and persuasion: political stratagems that sought increased power and influence for purely national ends, backed up by military muscle. Kissinger opined that the two major nuclear powers, because of political multipolarity, do

22. Ibid., p.250.
not have the dominating power as in the past, nor do they have the means to dictate a new international order solely on account of their bipolar military strength. Nevertheless, the strongest nuclear powers can blunt opportunities toward moderation, and make the goals of restraining influences difficult to accomplish.

In this new international structure of cooperation and restraint, the acquiescence of the United States and the Soviet Union is paramount for a new beginning. The circumstances that forced a reappraisal of policy, Kissinger thought, were problems that were challenging all nations, regardless of political ideologies. The difficulties of energy, population control, pollution, and the perplexing questions of the world economy were problems that could not be eradicated - in fact, only compounded and delayed, if the United States and the Soviet Union continued to confront each other with dangerous and anachronistic policies, legacies of the Cold War. How to resolve this confrontation between the two superpowers was the crux of Kissinger's détente.

One possible avenue that could lead to a reconciliation of views was the recognition by both superpowers that common problems could be solved if a definite commitment was exhibited by both sides. As negotiations began over a broad range of subjects, it was thought that progress in one area would lead to progress in more difficult fields. Negotiations and
agreements on vitally important political issues, Kissinger stated, would be an impetus to construct "a new standard of international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age." Benefits would be advantageous to both sides, particularly to the Soviet Union in the economic and technological spheres, when moderation and restraint became a normal instrument of conduct, instead of confrontation and the "search for marginal advantages." Kissinger would label the means toward achieving this new relationship as "linkage."

Linkage emerged as a concept of incentives and penalties that attempted to influence restraint. With Kissinger's policy of negotiating with the Soviets on a broad political front, the elements of progress enjoyed by both sides would lead to a relationship that could possibly reduce difficulties in other strategic areas. Progress in economic matters, in which the United States would assist the Soviet Union in overcoming its technological and agricultural deficiencies, and even grant Most-Favored-Nation status, could lead to a Soviet willingness to seriously bargain in good faith the question of strategic weapons. With that accomplished, the United States could assist the Soviets in parallel matters that would act as an incentive for restrained Soviet behav-

23. Ibid., p.250.
ior in particularly explosive areas, such as the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, senior staff member of the National Security Council from 1969-1974, and a protege of Henry Kissinger's, focused this definition of detente and the concept of linkage:

It is (our policy) an attempt to evolve a balance of incentives for positive behavior and penalties for belligerence; the objective being to instill in the minds of our potential adversaries an appreciation of the benefits of cooperation rather than conflict, and thus lessen the threat of war. Thus, detente in practice has been an active policy, conducted over the creation of mutual interests in the maintenance of peace.24

Critics of detente and linkage would comment that the Soviet Union could not be entrusted to abide by policies that the West would find desirable, such as objectives that would benefit the national interest by maintaining peace and stability. A state that proclaims a revolutionary ideology has obligations that transcend the need for security and stability. Indeed, the revolutionary ideology that the Soviet Union advocates on a global scale, the critics would state, labors in the opposite direction: It does not create stability, but rather instability and political crisis.

Kissinger could not ignore a Soviet policy which places its own interests first, even at the expense of the revol-

tionary ideology it professes. The Soviets have used the power of Marxist ideology to a great extent in pursuing their foreign policy goals. The ideological factors have been tempered in recent years, Nixon and Kissinger believed, due to the political and military questions that confronted the two superpowers. These questions were thought to have influenced a moderating effect on Soviet foreign policy, forcing the Soviets to approach these critical matters in a practical and realistic manner. This does not spell an end to the political and military rivalry, but rather channels the great power competition into areas that seem to hold the prospect for possible negotiation. To Nixon and Kissinger, the Soviet Union and Mainland China were no longer "revolutionary states" in the manner that Kissinger himself had at one time described them.

Stephen R. Graubard, historian, long-time friend, and observer of Henry Kissinger, wrote that the new President and his foreign policy adviser shared the opinion that the "times were propitious for new initiatives to be taken vis-a-vis both the Soviet Union and Communist China." These "new initiatives" were thought to be possible because of the nuclear balance between the two superpowers, the continued erosion of unity in the Communist Bloc, and the thought that the

Soviet Union and Communist China were no longer revolutionary states. A new international order was dependent upon the consensus of its members, particularly the most powerful. Because Moscow and Peking had significantly modified their revolutionary aspirations, this was thought to be an indication that an approach could be made to convince them that a new international order was possible.

Hans Morgenthau would write after Mr. Nixon's Moscow Summit in 1972 that both sides accepted the reality that they shared common interests, and that such an acceptance would necessitate joint pursuits. With this new outlook focused on resolving common problems, the ideological competition would recede. Morgenthau further stated that future conflicts involving the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China will be more in tune with political and military questions of power in which the powers will be primarily concerned with their own national interests, and not the ideological competition between different social systems. This decrease in ideological tension is a positive step, Morgenthau believes, since traditional power struggles can be solved by normal diplomatic procedures.26

The reduction of ideological conflict in the late 1960's and early 1970's was interpreted by the Nixon adminis-

tration as a change in policy on the part of certain Communist states, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Soviet Union, that the possibility of settling political disputes could be approached without resorting to past forms of ideological warfare. Much of this change of approach was due to the improvement in economic relations. To Kissinger, this hardly spelled a permanent truce in the competitive nature of the two superpowers. Kissinger realized, like all keen observers of political affairs, that nothing in politics is permanent, but that the fundamental, philosophical, and ideological structures of the two societies were too complex, ingrained, and opposed to abolish conflict. Neither nation would supinely tolerate a political or military provocation that could materialize into a strategic advantage for one side; defeat for the other. Kissinger underlined four principles which the United States would expound in its foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union:

First, if detente is to endure, both sides must benefit; second, building a new relationship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional alliance relations; third, the emergence of more normal relations with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense; and fourth, we must know what can and cannot be achieved in changing human conditions in the East.²⁷

The first principle stated what all negotiations explore: the possibility of gain. Neither side would cooper-

ate in a serious atmosphere unless an element of gain would make the venture profitable. The second and third principles specified the traditional American posture of relying on the combined strength of the Western powers to provide for a common defense strategy. Detente did not mean the abrogation of conflict, but rather the possibility that a modification of policy by the two superpowers, and the benefits that could result from it, would be conducive toward restrained behavior.

Kissinger believed that the Soviets would continue to exert their political and military power, and spread their Marxist ideology, but in a restrained and more cautious fashion. To deal with Soviet power the United States would have to continue to rely on a Western strength that took into account the power centers of Western Europe and Japan. Such shared interests and values that bound the Western nations together were "an indispensable element in the equilibrium needed to keep the world at peace."\(^{28}\) The political structures that the Western nations thought worth defending and preserving were vital if the West wished to survive. Western unity would not be cohesive and effective if it could only be invoked during times of crisis. To Kissinger, the Soviet Union would continue to be a formidable adversary, even with the progress exhibited in the beginning stages of detente.

The fourth principle, that of human rights, was recognized by Nixon and Kissinger as indeed controversial, and potentially explosive. The issue of human rights was inextricably woven into the very fabric of Western political life, and the values ascertained from its philosophy and historical evolution. In the American and British experience this affirmation was particularly more pronounced. The record of Soviet - and Communist - intransigence and refusal to grant their citizens political rights is well known. What can be mentioned with certainty is that Western governments have been perplexed in deciding what policy is appropriate in interacting with a government which negates some of the most fundamental values of political life, as the West views them, while pursuing with a determined effort the world-wide acceptance of its political and economic beliefs.

To those who would argue that a precondition for any improved relations with the Soviet Union would be a tempering and/or reappraisal of their domestic policy, Kissinger responded by stating that the primary question was how the Soviet Union approached international issues. This would be the measure by which to judge the relationship between the two superpowers. The political and military difficulties that needed to be resolved were the predominant concerns that overshadowed Soviet domestic policy. Though the United States would continue to use its power to persuade the So-
viets to alter their policies at home, Kissinger stated, results could only be expected in the long-run, since to demand immediate changes would be "futile and at the same time hazard all that has already been achieved." 29

And, finally, the future of detente will depend on a set of "ground rules" prescribing American and Soviet diplomatic behavior on a continuum that perceives of detente as - in Kissinger's words - "a continuing process, not a final condition." The primary sources of tension that have exacerbated the Soviet-American rivalry, and its political, military, and ideological competition, stated Kissinger,

must be guided by the principles of restraint... Crisis there will be, but the United States and the Soviet Union have a special obligation deriving from the unimaginable military power that they wield and represent. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is not acceptable. 30

Negotiations on a continuing basis to dispel past suspicions and hinder possible future conflicts were to Kissinger the methods for a redress of the tensions marking the Cold War. Kissinger's associate, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, has written that while the power of the Soviet Union continues to grow, it

must be a major purpose of our diplomacy and of our security policies as a whole to insure that in these circumstances our own interests and values are safeguarded, that power is used with restraint, and influence wielded responsibly. Essentially, that is what détente is all about. 31

29. Ibid., p.258.
30. Ibid., p.259.
Throughout this third chapter, an effort has been made to explain Kissinger's theory of detente. Opinions and attitudes on policy are one matter; the course of action to directly implement policy is quite another. Chapter Four will explain the structure on which this new policy was built upon. The subject of this thesis is not solely what has been defined as detente, or how it evolved, but also the debate this policy produced. To study these debates by the supporters and opponents of detente, one must explain how the events of the Nixon-Ford administrations prompted these deliberations.
CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY

When Richard Nixon assumed the Presidency in January, 1969, "newness" became the watchword of the new administration. Nixon had promised during the Presidential campaign to revise American foreign policy, a policy that not only seemed to be suffering from a lack of direction, but also one experiencing an intense assault from domestic critics because of the involvement in Viet Nam. The inability of the Johnson administration to win decisively in Southeast Asia cast doubt on its effectiveness in other regions. It will be to Nixon's credit that he at least was able to modify and revise foreign policy without being totally absorbed with the war in Southeast Asia. No doubt, the war was still a burden, but nevertheless not an obstacle hindering new initiatives. Politics would be concentrated in other areas that might in some way alleviate the still controversial issue of Viet Nam. Thus, political points could be made by taking advantage of the fractures in the Communist world, such as the Sino-Soviet split. It was not by chance that Nixon journeyed to Romania in August, 1969, an indication that the administration was showcasing a new policy that would lead to a rapprochement with various Communist states.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were concerned over the inertia that American foreign policy was experiencing. Kissinger, in particular, had criticized American policy by noting in his writings that America was not channelling its great power in new policy directions and not facing up to the realities of a changed post-war world. To continue on the same course would only add other failures as observed in Viet Nam, and in the increasing Soviet and Chinese political and military penetration in the Middle East, Africa, and Third World nations. The dynamics of politics required a recognition of Soviet national interests on a world-wide scale, demanding a modified foreign policy and a strategic doctrine that allowed flexibility of purpose within the guidelines of American national security. This attempt to fashion a foreign policy to avoid the difficulties that deluged the Johnson administration was an initiative that Nixon and Kissinger believed imperative. The political and military confrontation of forces on a global scale presented difficulties that were inherited from past administrations. The changed political and military conditions of the 1960's, particularly the rapid growth of Soviet nuclear power, demanded a revamped policy to deal with the questions of proliferating nuclear arms, security in Europe, and a general reduction in tensions.

To criticize policy and offer remedies, particularly
from a distance, is one matter. To actually formulate policy and manage it on a day to day basis is quite another. The Nixon policy would have an opportunity to evolve into practice what had been suggested in theory.

The new administration acted expeditiously in its desire to proceed along the avenues of the Johnson administration’s SALT initiatives. Having taken a brief respite to acquaint himself with past policy and procedures of a technical and bureaucratic kind, Nixon began publicly by June of 1969 to increasingly mention the SALT Talks, and the continuation of policy that would hopefully stabilize the arms race and open new possibilities for further improvement in East-West relations. Nixon announced at a June 19, 1969, press conference that the SALT Talks would begin in July or August at either Vienna or Geneva. He also stated his desire not to abandon MIRV testing, and to go ahead with the Safeguard AMB System, not only because of Soviet progress in that direction, but also because of Soviet testing in MIRV weaponry.

This expressed desire to proceed with the SALT Talks would send a message to American policy observers, and most importantly to the Soviet Union, that the administration would actively negotiate issues of limiting nuclear arms. Progress in the area of stabilizing nuclear arms competition could lead to the advancement of procedures to alleviate other areas that bred political and military struggle on a glo-
bal scale. SALT thus became the symbol of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente, and more importantly, its main focus.

If one examines the United States State Department Bulletin one finds no reference to "detente" until mentioned by Romanian President Ceausescu at a state dinner given for President Nixon in Bucharest on August 21, 1969. President Ceausescu spoke of the need for detente, a detente that should not be hindered by the present international situation and diverging political systems, but rather a detente that would advance "a search for new ways of improving the world political atmosphere."¹ President Nixon sounded a theme that was to be repeated in the years to come: "We seek the substance of detente, not its mere atmosphere."²

An important part of the "substance of detente" was the commitment by the Nixon administration to proceed with the SALT Talks. This commitment was predicated upon the realization that the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a semblance of nuclear stalemate, in which the continued advancement of technological weaponry to achieve a temporary superiority and successful first strike capability was indeed costly, not to mention extremely dangerous. What had indeed become the reality was that both nuclear superpowers had progressed to a point of relative parity, in which the word "sufficiency" in the American lexicon reduced

2. Ibid., p.172.
the possibility that the United States would seek an accelerated program to achieve what many thought would be a dubious superiority. This attitude was conditional upon the Soviet Union's acceptance of the nuclear status quo, an indication being their willingness to partake in serious negotiations to limit nuclear arms. On October 25, 1969, the White House announced that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union would meet at Helsinki, Finland, on November 17 for preliminary discussions on SALT. In President Nixon's message to Gerard C. Smith, Chairman of the U.S. delegation, the explicit reference to sufficiency set the tone of the present and future direction of the negotiations. "I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies." ³

This "sufficiency" in nuclear weaponry was based upon the assumption that there exists what former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger called "the military balance of power," and "an equilibrium of force." ⁴ The SALT Talks and détente were inextricably bound together by this nuclear balance. Schlesinger would elaborate on this matter at a 1976 seminar on United States foreign policy sponsored by the

³. Ibid., p.543.
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Schlesinger stated that United States allies are dependent on America to ensure that balance. Without the military balance of power and equilibrium the global political situation would be altered. Schlesinger explained that if detente is to be achieved, then the military balance must be maintained. If not, to allow one side to gain advantage in strategic weaponry, particularly the Soviet Union, would result in "drastic changes in the political frontiers around the world."  

When Henry Kissinger took command of the National Security Council, an exacting study was conducted on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union that attempted to define the capabilities and present nuclear doctrines of both sides, along with their future capabilities. Lawrence Whetten, a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, wrote that when the study was complete in the summer of 1969, the "essential outcome...was to settle for strategic parity." The report described the Soviet strategic program as having indeed caught up with the United States in the field of strategic weaponry, having "reached such a size and such a momentum that there was no feasible way to maintain superiority at an acceptable price." Perhaps because of the consternation

5. Ibid., p.45.
7. Ibid., p.20.
this report would provoke, President Nixon referred to 
American strategy as one of "sufficiency."

With the Soviet Union rapidly approaching the point 
where they could progress beyond parity to superiority, Nix-
on and Kissinger were faced with two difficult options: 
proceed with a massive and highly expensive program to push 
ahead of the Soviets; or negotiate limitations on strate-
gic arms, accepting the fact that a nuclear stalemate - or 
balance - was now the case. The latter course was selected. 
This decision would set the course for all the subsequent 
SALT Talks that were to come, the ramifications of which 
would hold great importance for the future conduct of Ameri-
can policy, and subsequently detente with the most powerful 
adversary. To Kissinger, the SALT Talks were the beginning 
of a new political strategy "of an interlocking web of agree-
ments that would give the Soviet Union a stake in maintaining 
stability."\textsuperscript{8}

This desire on the part of the United States to active-
ly partake in the SALT Talks ultimately hinged upon the ac-
quiescence of the Soviets to negotiate in a like manner. A 
number of considerations influenced both powers. Dr. James 
E. Dougherty, former Professor of Political Science at the 
National War College, and a research associate at the For-
eign Policy Research Institute, wrote that both parties were 

\textsuperscript{8}. \textit{Ibid.}, Pp.22-23.
expected to negotiate arms limitations in accordance with the Non-proliferation Treaty. Beyond this agreement in principle lay the price tag of greater expenditures of revenue, which often resulted in one sides' new weapons system cancelling out the other sides. Neither power could gain any appreciable advantage except in the short term. Dougherty states that both sides were cognizant of what would transpire if the SALT Talks faltered: more weapons would be designed and implemented without permitting "either side to achieve military superiority in a meaningful sense." 9

The Soviets and the United States were bothered by problems of a political nature central to the security of each nation. The question that emerged to American initiators was whether the Soviets would accept parity. Professor Dougherty wrote that opponents of detente were doubtful of Soviet indications to accept parity, since "no such concept [of parity] can be found in Soviet strategic literature." 10 Dougherty goes on to state that the prime consideration in American participation in SALT was to discover if the Soviet political leadership was willing to accept parity and to force it upon their military establishment.

On October 25, 1969, the White House announced that

10. Ibid., p.176.
representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union would meet at Helsinki, Finland on November 17, 1969, for preliminary discussions on SALT. On that same day, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated at a press conference that the upcoming SALT Talks were an important feature of detente. He also stated: "What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms limitation agreement which will keep us in the same relative position that we are now - and which can be verified."11

After the first session of the SALT Talks recessed in December, 1969, and was scheduled to commence again in April, 1970 in Vienna, Gerard C. Smith, Chief of the U.S. Delegation and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, held a press conference on December 29, 1969, and stated that the Soviets did show a serious attitude at Helsinki. To display an American willingness to construct ABM systems to counter Soviet MIRV testing, President Nixon announced on January 30, 1970 the go-ahead with stage one and two of ABM systems to defend Minutemen sites from major nuclear powers, and area defense for cities against minor nuclear powers. Also of importance was March 5, 1970, when the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, which prohibited the nuclear weapons countries from transferring atomic weapons to states not already pos-

sessing them.

On August 14, 1970, phase two of SALT ended at Vienna, with the third phase scheduled to begin in Helsinki on November 2, 1970. This occasion prompted both Ambassador Smith and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.S. Semenov to comment that the Talks continued to exhibit a businesslike demeanor, and that both parties were looking forward to phase three on November 2, 1970. Apparently, a complication had occurred after the beginning of phase three. On March 9, 1971, Secretary of State Rogers stated on a PBS broadcast that

the Soviet Union realizes that we're not going to be cajoled into thinking that there's a spirit of detente if nothing has happened. On the other hand, I think they realize that we're prepared to work out agreements with them that are sensible and practical. And I think that's reflected in the SALT Talks we're having.12

Consequently, the deadlock was broken, allowing President Nixon to announce on May 20, 1971, a significant breakthrough: the United States and the Soviet Union would concentrate on working out an agreement for the limitation of ABM systems, and also to limit offensive nuclear weapons. On September 24, 1971, President Nixon approved two agreements that had been negotiated by the SALT delegations, one entitled, "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between U.S. and U.S.S.R.," and "Agreement Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on Measures to Improve the

U.S. - U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link." On this date, phase five of SALT concluded.

The inclination to partake in serious negotiations on arms limitations, and the steady advancement of those talks by both sides, resulted in a transformation of terms, concepts and language. Sufficiency was increasingly being replaced by parity. That fundamental change - gradual to be sure, but nevertheless quite noticeable - was a signal that previous expressions of strategic doctrine were to be fundamentally altered. Opposition would in some cases be vehemently voiced to the newly initiated policy, particularly by those in the military. But at this point the acceptance of parity was rapidly replacing strategic superiority. President Nixon spoke of this new policy when he briefed the Western Media Executives in Portland, Oregon on September 25, 1971, by admitting that a strategic balance now existed in regard to nuclear missiles, and that "neither power at this time is going to be able to gain a clear enough superiority that either would launch a preemptive attack upon the other." 13

Nixon went on to say that this strategic balance was the reason why the SALT Talks were showing signs of success.

An interesting perspective on the SALT I agreements that portrays the difficulties of negotiating with Soviet

strategic perceptions is provided by Paul A. Nitze, a participant in the Talks from their inception in 1969 to 1974. Nitze describes the American attempt to convince the Soviets to accept the "desirability of limitations which would assure 'crisis stability' and 'essential equivalence'" - and adds that "the Soviet side stoutly resisted these efforts." 14 Nitze describes the most important political-military positions that guided the Soviet stance on security as being their refusal to accept the American concept of "essential equivalence." The American SALT delegation attempted to convince the Soviets, states Nitze, that "both sides did not have to be exactly equal to that of the other and at a level, one could hope, lower than that programmed by the United States." 15 The Soviets would have none of this. Rather, they lobbied for their own concept of "equal security," which took geographic factors into account besides the requirements of political and military considerations. What this amounted to, says Nitze, was the Soviet desire for strategic superiority over the United States, American allies, and China. Nevertheless, both sides were successful in finalizing an Interim Agreement limiting ABM systems and halting new offensive missile systems.

15. Ibid., p.217.
The SALT Talks that had been in progress since 1969 were leading up to the historic agreements signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in May, 1972. On this occasion, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to limit the scope of their nuclear endeavors, and to refrain from what were the very likely prospects of an unlimited nuclear arms race. Edward Luttwak, Associate Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at Johns Hopkins noted the disparity in the number of long-range nuclear weapons that were agreed to by the SALT delegations:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>USSR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
<td>656</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Bombers</strong></td>
<td>382</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>2540</td>
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Luttwak commented that even though the numbers on the side of the Soviets are important, those in favor of this arrangement would argue "that this advantage is entirely meaningless, since the quality of the American missiles means that they can launch many more separate nuclear strikes."  

The disparity in nuclear weaponry agreed to by both sides sparked a controversy by many American observers, the

17. Ibid., p.52.
primary cause being the Soviet "advantage" that the American side conceded. This controversy centered around the opinion that America was unilaterally foresaking nuclear superiority to the Soviets without any concrete concessions, except possibly the limitation of ABM systems. This outcry provoked Kissinger's famous impassioned plea while in Moscow: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?"

Negotiations were proceeding not only in the limitation of strategic weapons, but also in commercial agreements, in the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Proposals for negotiating issues on a broad range of subjects and interests were moving forward. Two agreements on strategic and political issues that resulted from successful negotiations were the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and England. The September 24, 1971 Agreements on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and the Agreement Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on Measures to improve the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link as negotiated by the SALT delegations, and approved by President Nixon, were signed by Secretary Rogers on September 30, 1971.
These specific agreements began to produce a certain mushrooming effect. One successful endeavor was leading to another, and opening the possibility of progress at a steady pace, primarily because of the momentum these discussions generated, and the desire by Nixon and his administration to display this series of agreements as fuel for the upcoming 1972 Presidential campaign. Soviet willingness was shown by their desire to negotiate concrete issues, and by the first objective expressed by Secretary Brezhnev as he addressed the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in March, 1971, "a final recognition of the territorial changes which took place in Europe as a result of World War II." \(^{18}\) Consequently, on October 12, 1971, in a joint communique by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev, the two stated their intent to meet in Moscow in the latter part of May, 1972, because of the progress in negotiations involving both parties. The communique specifically mentioned that both leaders would review all major issues "with a view toward further improving their bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace." \(^{19}\)

It is important to note the effect these pronouncements had on a Viet Nam weary American populace, and especially those active in foreign policy matters. The administration continued to stress that America had to awaken from past po-

\(^{19}\) Ibid., Oct.-Dec., 1971, p.473.
policies that led to involvements such as Viet Nam, and recognize a world changed from the perceptions of the 1950's and 1960's. In a report to the Congress on February 9, 1972, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's - The Emerging Structure for Peace, President Nixon stated that the world had indeed changed because of the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan; the increased self-reliance of the post-colonial states; the breakdown of unity in the Communist Bloc; the end of unquestioned American strategic superiority; and the desire by the American people that other nations should bear an increased burden for their national defense, with the consequent restrained American role.

The administration began announcing a number of agreements that had been negotiated with the Soviet Union. Nixon would continue his commitment to detente, to a "new" policy, in a "new" world, in a "new" era, that demanded American compliance in its realities. There can be no doubt that this veritable barrage of rhetoric carried with it an expectation of domestic rewards - votes in the upcoming election year - and Nixon was making himself into the candidate of peace in Viet Nam, and the world at large. This should not be examined in a cynical manner. The agreements were tangible enough, and the administration certainly did embark on a course that could take credit for foreign policy achievements with a determined adversary. Nixon considered 1971 "the watershed year. The foundation laid and the cumulative effect of the
actions taken earlier enabled us to achieve, during the past year, changes in our foreign policy of historic scope and significance.  

Nixon then gave a step-by-step notation of what had been accomplished.

In February - we agreed on a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floor. In May - we broke the deadlock in the talks on limiting strategic arms, and agreed on a framework which made it possible to rescue progress. In September - we and our British and French allies reached an agreement with the Soviet Union in Berlin to end the use of the citizens of West Berlin as Cold War hostages. In September - we agreed on a draft treaty prohibiting the production or possession of biological and toxic weapons. In November - the visits of the Secretary of Commerce to Moscow looking toward a general normalization of economic relations.

Similar to the pieces of a complicated puzzle that begin to take form, a provocative series of negotiations was leading to the Basic Principles of Relations, the political dimensions of détente. Henry Kissinger, at a news conference in Moscow on May 29, 1972, the date of the signing of the landmark agreements, sounded the tone of the administration in which his personal hand had had such an indomitable influence:

For two years we have been engaged in negotiations on a broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on the verge not just of success in this or that negotiation, but of what could be a new relationship of benefit to all of mankind - a new relationship in which, on both sides, whenever there is a danger of crisis, there will

21. Ibid., p.315.
be enough people who have a commitment to constructive programs so that they could exercise restraining influences.\textsuperscript{22}

In an address before a joint session of Congress on June 1, 1972, President Nixon spoke glowingly of his triumph in Moscow, and beckoned the Congress to concur with the deliberations and agreements that were negotiated over a three year period.

The foundation has been laid for a new relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world...The final achievement of the Moscow Conference was the signing of a landmark declaration entitled Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. As these twelve basic principles are put into practice, they can provide a solid framework for the future development of better American-Soviet relations.\textsuperscript{23}

What were these twelve principles that were designed to bridge the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, establishing the political framework for the policy of detente? Throughout the debate on detente, the Basic Principles would be prominently mentioned as examples that either the Cold War had ended, and a new era in Soviet-American relations had begun, or that the United States had fallen victim to a ruse delicately devised by Moscow. The twelve Basic Principles as signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev can be summarized as follows:

1) There is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age. Even though such state adheres to certain world views, these views should not hinder "normal rela-

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., May, 1972, p.752.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., June 26, 1972, p.855.
tions based on principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage."

2) Both sides would strive to eliminate situations that could lead to political and military crisis. Negotiations will continue to redress difficulties that have contributed to conflict. Neither side will conduct its policy with the view toward seeking "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly..." Security for both sides will be based on an equality of strength.

3) Both sides will attempt to create conditions for a peaceful world order, and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.

4) Both sides will take notice that all agreements must be faithfully implemented.

5) Both sides agree to continue the process of negotiating and discussing issues.

6) Both sides "regard as the ultimate objective" complete disarmament.

7) Improvement in commercial and economic fields.

8) Increased contacts in science and technology.

9) Improved cultural ties.

10) Both sides will continue contacts "on a firm and long-term basis."

11) Both sides will recognize the sovereign equality of all states. Soviet-American relations will not be conducted to the detriment of other nations.

12) The Basic Principles will not terminate any agreements that both sides have toward other nations.24

In the text of the Joint Communique, both sides agreed to continue efforts toward a reduction in tension. Great importance was attached to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-

ment limiting strategic offensive arms, and to other agreements which were meant to facilitate efforts for cooperation in economic relations, maritime matters, cultural exchange, health, science and technology. The signing of the Basic principles was the culmination of a lengthy series of negotiations involving issues of political, military, and economic concern to both superpowers. An agreement was reached by which both sides sought to formalize their new relationship. Time tested this new relationship. Each power would judge how the other approached the vitally important political-military questions that were still unresolved. On many an occasion Henry Kissinger reminded his listeners that détente was "a continuing process" and not a "final condition."

After the Presidential election of 1972, the process of détente came increasingly under fire because of the SALT I Agreements, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Soviet support for Marxist groups in Angola and Portugal, the downfall of Richard Nixon, and the consequent embarrassment to Henry Kissinger. Nevertheless, two related agreements in the military-political spheres were signed during President Ford's tenure in 1974 and 1975. These two agreements, the Vladivostok Accord of November 1974, and the Helsinki Agreements which were the product of the CSCE in July 1975, would continue to elicit both support and criticism from a wide array of domestic observers. A brief explanation of Vladivostok and Helsinki is in order.
The SALT I Agreements were a first step in the limitation of strategic offensive arms. Because of the nuclear security requirements of the two superpowers, and the steady advancement of weapons technology, Washington and Moscow thought the SALT I Agreements would result in a "continuing process" to further reduce the volume of nuclear arms. The most vexing problem in negotiating a SALT II Agreement was what - by definition - is a strategic system? According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Soviet approach before the Valdivostok Accord was to define a strategic system as one that accounted for the total nuclear arsenals of both sides that were capable of striking targets in the respective states. The Agency report goes on to state that this definition was "carefully tailored to include the U.S. - but not Soviet - tactical nuclear weapons in SALT negotiations." 25 Expanding further in their desires, the Soviets attempted to include the nuclear arsenals of U.S. allies in the SALT deliberations without accounting for "medium-based ballistic missiles and bombers in the Soviet Union which can strike the same allies." 26

The American response to the Soviet position, the Agency reported, was not to exclude these Soviet ideas in further discussions if U.S. allies were invited to partake as active

participants. The American position was to "strenuously oppose attempts to use theoretical definitions as a way of imposing one-sided limitations," particularly on the military forces of U.S. allies, but not on the Soviet systems. The Agency report concluded by stressing the importance of the Vladivostok Accord because of the establishment of balanced strategic systems such as ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers, and the Soviet concessions in dropping demands to "include what they call U.S. 'forward-based systems.'"

After the May, 1972 ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement was signed in Moscow, Paul Nitze stated that both sides agreed to continue the arms negotiations toward "a more complete and balanced long-term agreement on offensive strategic arms." The American posture, Nitze stated, advocated a policy that dealt with the "principles of equality in capabilities, greater stability in the nuclear relationship between the two sides, and a mutual desire to reduce the resources committed to strategic arms." The Soviets thought otherwise, however, but did make concessions at Vladivostok.

The equality of force levels as agreed to at Vladivostok, and signed by President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev, was of major political importance, particularly as regards Soviet concessions. What it did accomplish was to set near-parity

27. Ibid., p.31.
30. Ibid., p.218.
in offensive strategic systems. Edward Luttwak commented that American negotiators saw "the equality in force levels agreed at Vladivostok as a major negotiating achievement." 31 Prior to Vladivostok the American negotiators thought the numerical differences in strategic weapons of SALT I were unimportant. Luttwak gives Soviet diplomacy high marks for its skill in getting "higher force-level ceilings in 1972 as a free concession," then numerical parity at Vladivostok. 32

Another product of the detente process was the negotiations that led up to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE had been an important goal of Soviet foreign policy. If any time had been advantageous for the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to finally persuade the West to partake in these discussions that would encompass political and military questions, it was in the atmosphere created by the momentum and success of detente. The Soviets, and especially Secretary Brezhnev, were particularly enthused as the assemblage of Foreign Ministers, Presidents, and their respective diplomats from East-West nations gathered in Helsinki to sign the agreement that had for so long been a prime Soviet objective.

32. Ibid., p.15.
Basket I of the CSCE provided for the recognition of the European boundaries as a result of World War II. Basket II dealt with technological and economic cooperation that the Soviets felt they could extract from the West in return for restrained Soviet conduct in Europe. Basket III provided for the "free flow of people, information and ideas" across the European frontiers. This last Basket was primarily a Western European proposal. The provisions of Basket III in the Helsinki Final Act did - like all the agreements before it - spark a further debate on detente.

The third and final dimension of detente was the hope for a broadened economic relationship with the Soviet Union that would not only bring profits for American industry, but hopefully add another element to Kissinger's web of interlocking agreements: linkage. If the military and political aspects of detente were goals of American and Soviet foreign policy, and with those objectives the politics of gains and concessions, the economic aspects seemed to be one-sided. The Soviets could continue to construct and enlarge at a rapid pace their conventional, tactical, and strategic weapons system in the hope of catching and even by-passing American military might. They could, likewise, continue to base their foreign policy on their increased military power, and aid national liberation movements around the globe, while at the same time maneuvering in a determined and provocative fashion in Europe. What the Soviets did require were the
high quality and advanced Western — particularly American — technology, economic assistance in the forms of loans and credits, and economic investment. It was in this area that the West held the trump cards: no detente, as it was beginning to take shape, no investment, loans, credits and technology.

Economic negotiations were part and parcel of the detente process. Benefits would accrue to both sides. In the 1972 Basic Principles agreement, a section was composed and agreed to that was entitled "Commercial and Economic Relations." It read, in part:

The two sides agree that realistic conditions exist for increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice.33

A U.S. - Soviet Joint Commercial Commission was formed to explore the possibilities of what was expected to be an increase in trade, and to formulate principles and information to facilitate the exchange of economic products. The initial overtures and commercial developments far exceeded any previous forecast.

The economic by-products of detente were beginning to show results to American industry. Soviet interest in a large truck plant, fertilizer plants, petroleum exploration

in Siberia, heavy-scale industrial machinery, and the purchase of the latest in computer technology were economic possibilities that the Soviet Union was considering in its commercial dealings with the United States. A Board of Directors of the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council was formed, which consisted of high Soviet diplomats, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the chairmen of twenty-six major corporations.

At the October, 1972 meetings in which President Nixon agreed that the Soviet Union should be granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and credits from the Export-Import Bank, a new controversy arose to plague détente: the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. This economic-political debate was expressed in an amendment offered by Representatives Vanik and Mills to the Trade Reform Bill, and cosponsored in the Senate by Henry Jackson. The amendment before the bill stated that the Congress would deny MFN unless the Soviets eased restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews and other Soviet citizens that wished to emigrate. On December 11, 1973, the amendment passed the House by a vote of 319 to 80.

Secretary of State Kissinger was understandably concerned over the extremely menacing effect that an issue such as emigration could inflict on progress in economic and political matters. From the end of 1973 all through 1974,
Kissinger attempted to save the vestiges of progress that had seemed so likely only a year and a half before. The question of the relation of the stalled MFN and Export-Import Bank credits to the emigration of Soviet Jews was unduly interfering with the political aspects of détente. In a speech before the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions on October 8, 1973, Secretary Kissinger strongly defended the administration's efforts in extending MFN status to the Soviet Union without tying it to a policy of increasing the emigration of Jews and others. While admitting "a genuine moral dilemma" in this matter, Kissinger stated that there were limits as to how far the American government could press the Soviets in their internal affairs "without returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tension."⁴³⁴

In Secretary Kissinger's testimony on détente, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he expressed his fears of the emigration issue and the potent debate it was generating on the economic area of détente.

The period of confrontation should have left little doubt however that economic boycott would not transform the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign policy... The question then became how trade and economic contact - in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested - could serve the purposes of peace. On the other hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the political context.⁴³⁵

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35. Detente Hearings, p.252.
In discussing the specific progress made since the detente negotiations began, Kissinger acclaimed their significance and the prospects for future improvement in economic-political matters by stating that a number of beneficial and far-reaching economic agreements had been negotiated. Kissinger stated that no remonstration was voiced in regard to Soviet internal matters, and the possibility of tying that to the furthering of trade while the negotiations were in process. Only after the agreements had been signed in 1972, Kissinger stated, were issues about Soviet internal affairs raised that could jeopardize "progress so painstakingly achieved." 36

And, finally, in discussing the linkage between the economic outgrowth of policy and the knot being tied by the concern for Soviet domestic policy, Kissinger stated that this type of linkage raised questions for the Soviet Union concerning American dependability at the negotiating table. Kissinger believed that possibly over time the Soviet domestic order would be modified because of trade and the realization that the Soviet economy was strongly associated with, and dependent upon, the world economy. Such an awareness, Kissinger stated, would act as a stabilizing influence in Soviet-American relations.

36. Ibid., p.252
One month after his testimony before the committee, Kissinger sent Senator Henry Jackson a letter stating the intention of the Soviet Union to ease restrictions on Soviet Jews and other applicants. Senator Jackson responded by stating that Congress would "apply a 'benchmark' of 60,000 visas a year for would-be emigrants, irrespective of their 'race, religion or national origin.'" 37

Congress finally passed the Trade Reform Act on January 3, 1975, but as a result of the amendments offered it was considerably less than what both the administration and the Soviet Union expected. The Soviet response was predictable. On January 10, 1975, the Soviets informed the administration that it could not comply with the provisions as imposed on the 1972 trade agreement, and refused to repay a $700 million World War II Lend-Lease debt. Such was a display of the limits of detente.

Policy pronouncements in a free society do not pass unquestioned. And so it was - and is - with the history of detente. Critical analysis attacked the military, political and economic dimensions of detente. In July, 1975, Secretary Kissinger launched an angry assault on his critics.

Therefore, critics of detente must answer: what is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international

37. Steibel, op. cit., p.43.
danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises, and high arms budgets of the Cold War? Does detente encourage repression - or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing?\textsuperscript{38}

The next chapter will show that the answer was not long in coming.

CHAPTER V

THE CRITICS RESPOND:

THE "REALIST" SCHOOL OF DETENTE

The year 1973 can be labeled the period in which a concerted effort began to develop challenging the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. This effort was by no means limited to a specific organization dedicated to thwarting a continuation of the administration's policy. Rather, a loose and informal arrangement of interest groups and individuals from a variety of political viewpoints launched a determined effort to call into question the present conduct of Soviet-American relations. What had prompted this rather sudden and highly visible expression of dissenting opinion was the Soviet conduct during the 1973 Middle East War. Prior to this political-military conflict that quickly involved both superpowers, the anti-detente forces had been quite submissive to the administration's policy endeavors. The lack of a strong critical response during detente's high point of 1972 can be explained by the administration's successful China venture, the fear that an attack on detente could possibly produce the opposite effect of benefiting the forces of George McGovern, who was perceived by the detente critics as highly incapable.
of perfecting a strong defense posture, and by the prestige that the White House was enjoying as a result of an active foreign policy. By the end of 1972, the challenge which Henry Kissinger had initiated by requesting the foreign policy debate was reaching a height of concern. By the end of the 1973 War, a full-fledged debate was apparent. One may assume that even Kissinger was shocked by the totality and extent of this critical response.

The critical responses that were directed at détente from the Presidency of Richard Nixon to the end of Gerald Ford's tenure, had its origins in a historical-ideological viewpoint that was suspicious of any type of positive Soviet response to a rapprochement; and in another source that was primarily concerned with the political and military consequences of the recent American acceptance of nuclear parity, the result of which - the critics stated - would be a shifting of the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. The ideological criticisms derived from a view of the world political conditions from the end of World War I to the present. Specifically, this observation focused on the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and the international and domestic behavior of the Soviet state. American observers were perplexed as to what course the Bolshevik Revolution would eventually take. From the Bolshevik Revolution to the Second World War, Russia was a mystery - and dangerous. From the end of World War II, Russia was not only dangerous, it was
implacable.

Much of this ideological view dealt with the concern about the Soviet espousal of their Marxist viewpoint. Marxist ideology views conflict between the capitalist and working classes as a natural state of affairs. This also includes conflict among nations that adhere to diverging economic systems, such as capitalism versus socialism or Communism. American policy-makers, particularly after World War II, evaluated Soviet foreign policy as an attempt to disrupt the international political community, pursuing Soviet political-military and ideological desires wherever possible.\(^1\) Because of this Soviet post-war proclivity toward provocation (the Korean War and the Berlin Crisis stand as examples), many American policy observers believed that the Soviets were incapable of modifying their policy from one of propagating a revolutionary ideology, to one of acting in a responsible and non-belligerent manner. Even during the height of detente in 1972, a deep suspicion was felt by some policy observers toward what the Nixon administration believed was a Soviet modification of policy in seeking a genuine rapprochement with the United States. As such - detente critics would

\(^1\) Such views on the part of American foreign policy-makers were not representative of one party or political viewpoint. Domestic liberals such as George Kennan and Dean Acheson were often in agreement with conservatives on how to counter Soviet power.
state\(^2\) - Soviet willingness to embark upon a new relationship with the United States was only a temporary phenomenon, with the Soviets inevitably returning to their old habits of seeking to dominate an opponent by striving for advantage, then ultimately gaining the upper hand. This view, critics state, was evidenced by a reading of Soviet foreign policy, and by its ideological dictates that require the active proliferation of Marxism globally.

Another critical response surfaced from the concerns of the recent political-military negotiations that had begun with the Nixon Presidency, specifically the Basic Principles and the SALT agreements. These concerns were particularly sensitive to those who felt that America had succumbed in military strength to a surging Soviet commitment to approach equivalent strategic levels. In the political sphere, the Soviets were viewed as indeed dangerous, but certainly not implacable. American policy had to be revitalized, and probe for areas of agreement with the Soviets that would be beneficial to both sides. The Nixon-Kissinger years of détente at least exhibited a willingness to embark on an active foreign policy. By President Ford's tenure, the public perception of

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2. Most détente critics did not accept the Nixon-Kissinger proposition that the Soviets would agree to a consistent and long-term policy of reduced international tension. Critics such as Ball, Tucker, Schlesinger, Meany and Zumwalt believed that the Soviets would not accede to a new policy in which limitations would be imposed on their political, military and ideological power.
detente had waned amidst the 1973 War and the consequent oil embargo, Soviet disregard for the human rights basket signed at Helsinki, and the Soviet involvement in Portugal and Africa.

The critics of the recent political-military overtures to the Soviet Union of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy believed that detente was providing the Soviets with an opportunity to increase their global influence at the expense of an American commitment to preserve the balance of power. Detente simply was not meeting with the expectations originally thought conducive to American interests. A re-evaluation of political strategy was required, accepting the fact that the Soviets would continue the "search for marginal advantages" whenever and wherever politically beneficial to their national interest.

These detente critics shall be identified in this chapter as the "realist" school of detente. This realist school should not be confused with the school of "realism" in political science. The school of "realism" in international relations in America reached a degree of prominence after the Second World War, when certain observers - Hans Morgenthau is a leading exponent - adhered to the premise that the use of power on the global scene should be the prime focus in any political consideration. This use of power, and the power relations among nations which make up the balance of power, is the objective reality by which nation-states pursue poli-
tical goals.³

Those individuals that accept the approach of the school of realism have maintained that American objectives should be based on the dynamics of power. Such advocates stress the need to deal with competitive states—specifically the Communist nations—on the basis of power and "reality," and not to pursue policy objectives primarily because of ideological or moral considerations. The label "realist" in the context of this debate does not describe any particular type of school of political analysis, but rather a descriptive term to differentiate the supporters ("orthodox" detentists) from the opponents ("realists").

What the realists were lobbying for was a rethinking of American foreign policy toward the main competitor. This was thought necessary because those presently in command of foreign policy had misinterpreted Soviet intentions, believing the Kremlin would be content with nuclear parity and bringing the international political conflict into some form of resolution. The realists held to two evaluations of Soviet policy quite different from the political interpretation of the Nixon-Kissinger efforts. One contention analyzed Soviet strategic policy as willing to accept nuclear parity with the United States only as a means to gain time, then to ultimate-

³ For a much broader acquaintance with the "realist" school of political thought, see Cecil V. Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
ly push ahead into a position of nuclear superiority. In no sense would the Soviets be content with anything but a military superiority that would guarantee them the power to dictate their political desires. The other contention judged the Soviets as unwilling to be satisfied with nuclear parity and political stability. While not completely accepting the notion that the Soviets were bent on a policy of near-total nuclear superiority, this view held that they would strive for advantages of a political and military kind that would always keep them one step ahead of American strength, and thus capable of defending - and projecting - their interests globally.

What should be kept in mind is that many of the critics were not wholeheartedly antagonistic to the entire policy of detente, particularly members of Congress. Some of the critics felt, particularly in the early stages of the Nixon-Brezhnev detente in 1972, that at least an attempt was being made to alleviate present - and prevent future - forms of conflict. The policy was at least being given the opportunity to succeed or fail on its own merits. Time, and the political and military situation, were to be the indicator of whether the policy was fundamentally sound. The Soviet Union's international and domestic behavior was being carefully scrutinized to see if they would comply with the spirit of the Basic Principles.

Professor Stephen Gibert of Georgetown University and
Senior Research Consultant at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute, provides a description of the realist school. Gibert notes that the realists tend to accord more attention to Soviet capabilities and less to Soviet intentions. This group believes that there is such a thing as politically usable military superiority ... Although acknowledging the frightfulness of nuclear war, realists believe that it is possible that such a war may be employed as a conscious instrument of national policy and that an outcome which clearly differentiates the winner from the loser will occur. Furthermore, they think that détente is making it more likely that Soviet Russia, not America, will win such a war.4

Gibert further explains the realist position by pointing to the proclivity of the realists to be suspicious of Soviet intentions. They do not accept the rationale of the détentists that Moscow is now inclined toward accepting the status quo, or that the age of ideology has been buried. Gibert states that "many of this school of thought think, in fact, that Moscow does indeed intend war with the United States in the future. At the minimum, the realists believe that the U.S.S.R. will use force to change the international system in cases where they can short of war with America."5

In short, the Soviets will actively continue to stifle the American and Western political and military positions and not abandon their search for "marginal advantages." Only one month after the Basic Principles were signed in May of 1972,

5. Ibid., p.19.
Secretary Brezhnev stated that although peaceful coexistence would continue to mark Soviet foreign policy, the ideological struggle between the capitalist and Communist systems would intensify. At the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976, Brezhnev stated that detente would not "abolish or alter, the laws of class struggle... We make no secret of the fact that we see in detente the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction."^6

Professor Robert Conquest, Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and author of The Great Terror, enlarges on these thoughts by explaining that the "Soviet leadership are frank in their public speeches in describing detente... as itself a form of struggle."^7 The ideology of class struggle is a serious belief that the Soviets adhere to, and not just a form of intellectual argument. Detente has thus become, Conquest believes, another political tactic that the Soviets will use to further their own national interest.

Walter Laqueur, Chairman of the Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. wrote that the "great expectations prevailing in 1971-1972 have on the whole given way to a more realistic assessment."^8 American policy-makers miscalculated Soviet inten-

^6 Ibid., p.135.
tions, particularly the Soviet notion of peaceful coexistence and the proclivity to pursue the ideological struggle. Laqueur states that the Soviets "never promised to 'freeze' the global balance of power, nor have they ever said that they would not make the most of Western weaknesses and indecision." The fault, therefore, lies not with the Soviets for attempting to pursue their political ambitions, but with American policy-makers who have made an insufficient effort to understand the political psychology of the Kremlin leadership.

The political criticism of detente reflected a skepticism of present American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, especially since detente's pre-eminent year of 1972. What, some critics would inquire, was the actual difference between detente as fashioned by Nixon-Kissinger, and the past policy of containment, besides a shift in mood? Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University has written that while Nixon-Kissinger strove to diminish the effects of containment aimed at the Soviet Union and China, and create a stable world order, this notion cannot be interpreted as a reduction in Soviet-American competition. Tucker believes that the dramatics that accumulated from the Nixon-Kissinger practice of detente left an impression that the great power competition had ended. Detente was still a form of containment, Tucker states,

9. Ibid., p.37.
but "without tears and without the term that had once been widely accepted but was now carefully avoided."\textsuperscript{10}

Tucker commented that the effects of the domestic debate emanating from the Viet Nam experience would eventually have its effect on the détente debate. As such, a change of expressions and language was thought to have produced a great policy alteration. To Tucker and other critics of the realist school, the superpower competition in the post-war world required American policy-makers to devise a strategy to contain the Soviet Union without resorting to nuclear warfare. Detente was substituted by Nixon and Kissinger in place of containment, and that, Tucker states, was a misguided act. Tucker accuses the proponents of détente as having fostered and encouraged the notion that détente has ended the Cold War and containment. This "magical connection between words and things"\textsuperscript{11} is not a realistic assessment of the U.S. - Soviet rivalry.

One of the more outspoken detractors of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy of détente is former Ambassador George W. Ball. Ball resembles many critics from the realist school in his denunciation of not only the word "détente" but also the political policy as shaped by Nixon and Kissinger. While in agreement with those who support détente that the Soviet-

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p.47.
American competition must be brought under some form of resolution, Ball believes the whole conduct of the detente policy smacked too much of a Broadway production. Ball calls the "inherent ambiguity" of detente, its slogans such as the "spirit of detente," and the impression that person-to-person diplomacy between leaders can substitute for the rigors of traditional diplomatic practice, "has become such an overused phrase that the skin has worn off to disclose precisely nothing. Its constant flogging by political writers has made it as cheap and commercial as the 'spirit of Christmas.'" 12

Ball not only criticizes the politics of detente, but attacks those who have too readily labeled critics of detente as "cold warriors," "a term of opprobrium, since there is a school of thought that regards cold warriors as a threat to the peace, because they encourage the wrong Russians," 13 meaning the more provocative military elite as opposed to the more "peaceful" Brezhnev civilian group. So, to George Ball, detente has become an oversold production that promised too much, leaving the impression and hope that Soviet-American conflict would easily enter a new era of cooperation, restraint and an abrogation of conflict. The weakness of this logic, to Ball, was that it misjudged to an appreciable extent the global interests of Soviet political and military

13. Ibid., p.86.
concerns.

The first lack of realism, according to Ball, involves the conduct of the United States as it views its purposes and goals on a global scale. No detente as such can stop the Soviets from acting in a unilateral manner, much in the same way that Nixon and Kissinger conducted so much of their foreign policy in like circumstances. Ball states that the Soviets relate their strategic policies in terms of power and ideology, and if Henry Kissinger wishes to act the unilateralist, "the Soviets seem as addicted to playing a lone role of maneuver as is the Secretary."14

Ball's criticism echoes much the same concerns that other critics have followed: if detente is to spell an end to Soviet-American conflict, and form a policy by which joint cooperation can resolve the sources of conflict before it inevitably leads to a nuclear showdown, then unilateralism must cease. If it does not, then what change has there been?

A second lack of realism, Ball states, is not to have grabbed the opportunity to extract conditions from the Soviets for our economic and technological assistance. Thus, American policy could have demanded that the Soviets modify their international policies. If the Soviets continue to obstruct American policies that attempt to solve world-wide problems, then Ball questions the wisdom of assisting the So-

viets in correcting many of their pressing technological and agricultural deficiencies. As long as the Soviets find it in their interest to play the game of superpower politics, Ball states, and not to substantially reconcile their views and actions as befits a comprehensive détente, then the United States would be remiss not to oppose them.

Ball would label the references by Kissinger to détente as the "mindless chatter" of a professor who should know better. Underlying Nixon and Kissinger's policy of détente was the thesis of the Soviet Union's diminished reliance on revolutionary doctrine. The Soviet Union, in Nixon and Kissinger's view, was ready to accept the present balance of power with American incentives reinforcing that avenue. The legitimacy of the existing international system would be accepted.

George Ball questions the accuracy of such perceptions. Has the American acceptance of Soviet strategic parity prompted the Soviets to alter their actions and become a power interested in stability? Ball views such assertions as ridiculous, prompting him to remark that "that young skeptic, Professor Kissinger, would have thought the idea quite foolish." 15

In Ball's final critique of détente, he not only questions whether the policy will result in a more relaxed atmos-

15. Ibid., p.125.
phere between the Soviet Union and the United States, but is clearly pessimistic that detente can resolve third party conflicts, such as in Africa and the Middle East. To Ball, that is "the acid test of detente." 16

Professor Hans Morgenthau, a realist to be sure, levels his doubts of detente in much the same manner as George Ball. Writing in 1972, Morgenthau expressed his concern over the dramatics of detente and the public images it had created. To Morgenthau, a realistic assessment of detente is that it has not brought about peace, and will not do so in the foreseeable future. Rather, detente simply eased some tensions of the political-military rivalry. This is, Morgenthau states, progress that will be beneficial in three areas: "the global atmosphere, international power relations, and nuclear arms control. How extensive and lasting these accomplishments will ultimately prove to be, of course, only the future can show." 17

The ideological rivalry of the Cold War has eased, says Morgenthau, so it would be highly unlikely for both sides to return to it. However, political conflicts will continue, although lacking the ideological combativeness of past years. Disputes will be conditioned on a more traditional basis of

16. Ibid., p.126.
conflict, i.e., power conflicts in which both sides strive for advantage.

Morgenthau, writing in 1975, sees detente as having succeeded in some areas, while having failed in others. Progress in the areas of strategic arms negotiations, a subsiding of the ideological tensions of the past, lowering of East-West tensions in Europe, and even in the area of Middle East negotiations, a form of detente has occurred. But as George Ball has also written, there is no detente in third party struggles throughout the globe. Morgenthau states that the "same tensions exist as existed before because the same incompatible objectives exist on both sides of the dividing line. And here is the intellectual and political danger in the term 'detente.'" 18

Politically, Morgenthau asks, what does detente mean as a policy if it fails to act as an incentive for the superpowers to resolve and avoid involvements in conflicts between third parties? The danger exists, Morgenthau believes, that neither superpower will concede part of its strength or its participation in small, localized conflicts when political advantages can be acquired. Even though it seems apparent that detente has not succeeded in this area, Morgenthau states, the public expectations that quite naturally followed

the Nixon administration's pronouncements have now produced a disillusioning effect. Detente has become an illusion, Morgenthau believes, his primary concern being that it "creates public expectations which may not be fulfilled," and the difficulty of discerning "between means and ends in foreign policy."\textsuperscript{19}

Paul Seabury, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the editorial board of \textit{ORBIS}, is likewise concerned with the public expectations that have followed detente. The danger of these public expectations, as Seabury views it, is that the public will expect a much diminished role of America's obligations to self and allies. Seabury notes, like George Ball and Hans Morgenthau, that detente has created public expectations which cannot be attained. While the general public may be persuaded to believe that the Cold War has ended, the actual fact is that the Soviets do not adhere to this notion, and continue to pursue policies that have been "merely rechanneled into areas of opportunity and benefit."\textsuperscript{20}

Seabury notes that the detente policy of the Nixon administration received its greatest support from a population

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p.77.
weary of the Viet Nam involvement, and the continuing global competition in general. Detente held out the promise of not just an easing of Cold War tension, but possibly even the erasing of the political and ideological rivalries between the superpowers. This view, shared by a large segment of the population, was an over-optimistic and unrealistic appraisal of the international environment. Detente was built upon what Seabury notes as "pillars of strength," the political and military balance of power. It is the equality of strength that exists between the two superpowers that provided them the opportunity to negotiate a number of important issues. Yet, Seabury notes, the promises of detente can leave the dangerous impression that these "pillars of strength" are no longer necessary.

Seabury concluded by mentioning that the Soviets have purposefully refrained from imbuing their citizens with any false hopes that their ideological pursuits will be abandoned.

Some critics review past periods of Soviet detente, and see in those actions lessons that can possibly indicate future Soviet conduct. Professor Gerald Steibels, Director of Foreign Affairs Research for the Research Institute of America, labels six time periods in which Soviet policy moved for 21. Ibid., p.241.
a détente with adversaries. These periods can be summarized as follows:

1) 1920, The Lenin Detente - Lenin and Soviet Russia, because of the continuing civil war, massive crop failures, its economy in ruins, and their hopes for world revolution, particularly in Europe, standing little chance for success, sought help from the West to assist in economic recovery.

2) 1935, Stalin's Detente - This period produced Stalin's concern over the Nazi threat emanating from Germany's rearmament. He ordered the Communist Parties of Europe to join their political counterparts in "popular fronts" to resist Fascism.

3) 1941, The Devil's Detente - The need for Russia and the West to band together to defeat Nazi Germany.

4) 1954, Khrushchev's Detente - Phase One - Soviet-American decision to negotiate an ABM Treaty and limitation on offensive nuclear arms.

5) 1968, Brezhnev's Detente - Phase One - Soviet-American decision to negotiate an ABM Treaty and limitation on offensive nuclear arms.

6) 1972, Brezhnev's Detente - Phase Two - The ABM Treaty; limitation on ICBM and SLBM's; and the Basic Principles were the highlights.22

Steibel remarks that with each period of détente, optimism was followed by disappointment and conflict. While not overly critical of détente as other detractors, Steibel does place détente in these perspectives:

First, détente is an up and down affair, not a straight line evolution. Second, détente is an institutionalization of conflict, not a replacement for it... Détente is relaxation to permit conflict to continue on less dangerous levels. Entente is the abolition of conflict and the

movement toward full amity and alliance. The distinction must be kept in mind if détente is to be handled effectively. Third, détente has become a negotiating process.23

Steibel concludes by stating that past détentes have proven that the Nixon-Kissinger variety will stand little chance of success in the areas of crisis management and the elimination of "marginal advantages." Rather, détente will alternate between periods that will benefit both sides. In other words, détente will be selective and not all-encompassing as Kissinger hoped.

Theodore Draper, who has written extensively for Commentary, views détente as a form of appeasement. This was done not by design, but by a terrible miscalculation of the world political realities, especially as concerns the Soviet quest for hegemony. While touching upon the notion by some advocates of détente that there is no middle area between détente and Cold War, Draper answers by asking: "'Do you want to go back to appeasement?' In fact, an even more incredible question might be: 'Do you realize that appeasement was built into détente?'"24

Draper, not too unlike other critics, views Soviet advantages accruing from their ability to extract political and military concessions from an American-inspired policy that

23. Ibid., p.12.
has provided them this opportunity. Accordingly, they have utilized the American thrust for detente to conspire with the Arabs in the 1973 War, to assist the Cubans in Angola, and to repress Jews and dissidents. Economically and technologically, the Soviets have everything to gain and nothing to lose. In the Soviet view of international politics, Draper points out, is the Soviet proclivity toward analyzing an adversary's potential strengths through more than just its military make-up, but by what they perceive as the "correlation of forces," which takes into account factors such as political will, allies, economic health, ideology, and military acumen. Detente has been a miscalculation of policy from the very beginning, Draper states, because of the divergent world views held by each superpower, and how they analyze political events and the possibility of gain. To the Soviets, Draper states, "what always counts most is the relationship of forces, not the arrangement of words." 25

Draper mentions two factors which have contributed to what he views as appeasement: linkage and its policy of incentives, and a policy of non-interference in Soviet internal affairs. Appeasement was built into detente, Draper states, because of the willingness by the United States to placate the Soviets in the area of nuclear arms, economics, tech-

25. Ibid., p.31.
nology, and a lackadaisical attitude toward the question of human rights. American acceptance of Soviet desires provided the Soviets with advantages which they would not have been able to extract solely by themselves. To Draper, the Soviets are now in an unmistakably expansionist and imperialist phase, and no efforts toward detente can "appease the unappeaseable." 26

If the Soviets are indeed "unappeaseable" what are their reasons for detente? And how do they view its benefits? Critics and supporters of detente have taken two different positions in this analysis. In studying the debate between these two schools of thought, a clearer view can be established that assists one in the search for Soviet motivations. Supporters of detente see the Soviet need for technology and economic assistance, and a need to lessen the expensive and massive nuclear arms race, plus the Soviets' desire to avoid a military confrontation with the United States, and to be regarded as a great power on a par with American strength. Critics of detente view a different set of criteria for the Soviet acceptance of detente. Detente has provided the Soviets with a change in tactics to further isolate and outflank the Americans while gaining unique advantages that were denied them in the past. Lawrence Whetten commented that it is a widely asserted notion that detente has not pro-

26. Ibid., p.36.
duced the expected results that the West at one time thought possible. This recognition rests upon the misconception by the United States of Soviet military and political power.\textsuperscript{27}

The United States has incorrectly analyzed Soviet technological capabilities, states Whetten. Even more significant was the American attitude in misperceiving Soviet political intentions, particularly what advantages the Soviets would theoretically perceive within the context of strategic superiority. Whetten views the Soviets as following a course not too dissimilar from that which American foreign policy adhered to in the 1960's: exercise restraint against a weak rival while maintaining overwhelming superiority. Political "points" can be accumulated with such a policy, and Whetten feels that this analysis has been the primary motive for Soviet detente policy. Whetten views such Soviet attitudes as "one of the most significant accomplishments of the Brezhnev era."\textsuperscript{28}

Hans Morgenthau sees a much more specific need for the Soviet acceptance of détente. First, is the fear of China, a nuclear China, and what could be the terrible results of having to engage in a two front war. The second reason is that the Soviets recognize their inability to compete with


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p.14.
the West in terms of technological and economic strength. And, to Morgenthau, the third consideration is the Soviet political objective to end American influence in Western Europe, and destroy NATO through means short of war, isolate West Germany and then dominate it under Soviet power. 29

Professor George Schwab, a member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy, views Moscow's motives for detente as a tactical change. Schwab does not accept the premise of the detentists that the Soviets have appreciably diminished the use of their ideology in the quest for political goals, nor does he discredit the possibility that detente may lead to appeasement. The detentists have misinterpreted Moscow's political and strategic intentions, "and have, thereby, seen only what Moscow at this moment wishes to convey to the West." 30

Schwab, like Morgenthau, sees the Soviet motivation behind detente spurred on because of a fear of a nuclear China, and the consequent possibility of having to fight a two-front war. The military dimension, and the need to protect their Russian flanks in Europe and Asia, have forced the Soviets to re-align their political policy. To prevent such a possibility from occurring, the Soviets have embarked on a two-pronged course, Schwab noted, "which on the surface may

29. Friedlander and Schwab, op. cit., p.100.
30. Ibid., p.143.
appear contradictory, but in fact, form two sides of a coin." The Kremlin's long-range military target is to substantially weaken the military capabilities of Western Europe and the United States, while at the same time acquiring financial credits, Western technology, and trade. Schwab concludes by stating that the course the United States embarked on with its policy of détente is "partial appeasement," since the U.S. has reacted with insufficient strength and resolve in permitting the Soviets to gain political and military strength at American expense.

Frank R. Barnett, President of the National Strategy Information Center also views Soviet motives for détente in a questionable light. Critical of Secretary Kissinger's belief that if détente falters the Cold War will escalate in a new and more frightening nuclear dimension, Barnett spoke frankly in an address before the D.C. League of Republican Women on April 5, 1976.

Barnett spoke of Kissinger's "historical dream" of Washington, Moscow, and Peking forging a "Twentieth Century equivalent of the Holy Alliance" to settle questions such as strategic arms, the prevention of nuclear war, and closer ties through trade and technology. But a perusal of Kissinger's actions have led to disappointments, and the di-

31. Ibid., p.146.
32. Ibid., p.146.
chotomy that exists between Soviet and American perceptions of detente. To the Soviets, detente has been regarded as another political instrument to acquire advanced Western technology, "and a strategy-through-time by which the Soviets hope to change the correlation of world forces." 34

Barnett notes the Soviets' preference for using peaceful coexistence instead of detente. Although the Soviets do wish to avoid a nuclear war, they will continue to wage "ideological war, class war, economic war and propaganda war as usual." 35 They will, true to their Marxist faith and past practices, continue to provide support for "liberation movements" wherever they feel it is politically wise. The Soviets will continue to have a dialogue with the United States to avoid a nuclear showdown, but this will not - and has not - hindered them from acting in a provocative manner by supplying the North Vietnamese with the equipment and technology to conquer South Viet Nam; failure to warn Washington of the impending Arab attack in the 1973 Middle East War; the Soviets and their Cuban "Gurkhas" supporting "wars of national liberation," as in Angola; and the large-scale Soviet financing of Marxist elements to take power in Portugal. As for Secretary Kissinger's concern for the after-effects of a failed detente, Barnett stated that the Cold War never

34. Ibid., p.5.
35. Ibid., p.7.
turned nuclear, and that "there is a middle ground between shipping grain on credit (plus turning our back on Solzhenit-syn) and shooting missiles." 36

James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of Defense under President Ford, until he resigned because of disagreements over defense and detente policy, has been one of the more critical opponents of detente. Worried over the rapid Soviet military build-up, he sees detente as having offered some type of relaxant to cure the nation's frustration and anxiety over Viet Nam, and notes that the Soviets have not failed to extract advantages from these debilitations. Part and parcel of these qualms about Soviet intentions is what Schlesinger views as an unmistakable Soviet urge to utilize their ideological, political, and military tools as weapons in the search for "marginal advantages." In stating the American desire that the Soviets would continue to exhibit a more permanent attitude in realigning their foreign policy, Schlesinger states that American policy-makers had hoped the Soviets would share the American concern for stability, and that many of the political issues that separated the two rivals could be resolved by linkage. Schlesinger echoes the opinions of Morgenthau, Barnett, Ball, and Schwab, in stating that the Soviets have not abandoned, or even diminished, the

36. Ibid., p. 7.
ideological conflict, using detente as another political weapon that will benefit them in "wrenching from the West economic, political, or military advantages - marginal or otherwise."[^37] The outcome of these Soviet actions and policies has been the disappearance of linkage as an American concept, reducing detente to the concerns of avoiding nuclear war, and containing Soviet political and military objectives.

Professor Eugene V. Rostow of Yale, former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969, believes that Soviet strategy was responsible for the military defeat of South Vietnam after the 1972 Basic Principles were signed. He saw Soviet designs to knock out China, and the Soviet policy to convince the Arabs to starve Western Europe and America with an oil embargo as a result of the Middle East War. How close the Soviets came to accomplishing the totality of these ambitions is frightening to Rostow.

The Soviets have used detente to strengthen their political and military positions in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Rostow believes that the Soviets were adept at correctly assessing the mood of the American public - and government - in not wishing to become embroiled in foreign involvements because of Korea and Vietnam. The Soviets have shunned rash and dramatic actions, having opted to portray

themselves as the party which is favorably inclined toward detente, while nevertheless acting in a manner to encourage conflict by supporting groups and nations which injure American and Western interests. With this dual policy, Rostow states, the Soviet "program of war was therefore dressed in the costume of conciliation."^38

Rostow is particularly harsh on Nixon and Kissinger for attempting to save what he views as the last remnants of their failed detente after the 1973 War. The Soviet failure to inform the United States of the Arab plan to attack Israel, and the view held by Rostow of actual Soviet complicity in the affair, was contrary to all the public utterances about the new state of cooperation between the two superpowers. To continue with the detente policy, Rostow says, Nixon and Kissinger were forced to conceal from the American public the actual role of Soviet policy in the October War. It was too fine a line of distinction for Nixon and Kissinger to explain that the Soviets were only an accessory, and not a principal, in urging the Arabs to fight, than to boycott oil to the West. Calling into question only the degree of Soviet involvement would nevertheless force Nixon and Kissinger to admit a failed detente.

Rostow criticizes Kissinger for stating that Soviet conduct was "not unreasonable" and that detente "contributed

^38. Ibid., p.61.
to an agreed settlement. This, too, is from the theater of the absurd." 39 And what would our policy be if the Soviets successfully implemented their strategy to accomplish their ambitions to become the predominant power in the Mediterranean, to Finlandize Western Europe, and have China and Japan accommodate to them?

Rostow questions whether the United States would prepare to strenuously oppose any of these actions. Perhaps, he ponders, the American policy would opt not to oppose Soviet adventures, and in so doing, accept the Soviet notion of detente. The latter choice would relegate the United States and Europe to a mere supplier of food and technology to the Soviet Union, "and leave the serious business of world politics to Moscow." 40

So far we have seen some of the political criticisms of detente by a number of observers and participants in the foreign policy field. Many of these same critics have likewise voiced their concerns as to the military dimension of détente. Political goals and ambitions demand an appraisal of what tactics and strategy should be employed. Of particular concern is the assemblage of military might a given nation can muster to fulfill foreign policy goals. In this nuclear age,

39. Ibid., p.61.
40. Ibid., p.63.
the question of political objectives and the resultant military dispositions of power further complicate a global condition that pits against each other two superpowers of particular competitive ideological views, each concerned about the need for national security. Detente in the Kissingerian School was thought to provide safeguards by which the use of military strength would be diminished as a result of progress in the political dimension. But, as with the political criticisms that were directed at detente, concerns were also lodged regarding the military dimension, particularly the SALT Talks.

Professor Richard Pipes, former Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, and Chairman of President Carter's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to decipher Soviet strategic objectives, wrote in an article entitled "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight And Win A Nuclear War," in the July, 1977 issue of Commentary, that the American and Soviet nuclear doctrines share few similarities. The American view focuses on the theory that nuclear war would be so insanely destructive, that neither side could realistically contemplate its use, let alone fathom the thought that a victor could emerge. Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD as it is commonly known, was the principle by which American strategic doctrine has approached the question of nuclear deterrence since the middle of the 1960's. The Soviet view, as Pipes points out, is a strictly adhered "Clausewitzian prin-
ciple that warfare is always an extension of politics," and that political considerations are the focal point by which strategy is conceived.

The political dynamics reflect the application of the various military components in the Soviet arsenal. MAD and mutual deterrence are schools of American thought that have little value in the realm of Soviet strategic planning. What counts is the calculation of forces, the strategy to be pursued, and in what fashion to directly approach or outflank an adversary. As Pipes points out, "Soviet military theorists reject the notion that technology (i.e., weapons) decides strategy." Rather, the opposite is more likely the case. Political considerations, and the strategic possibilities that exist to attain objectives, determine the military force and type of weapons needed to effectuate a strategic design. Whatever suspicions may be directed at the theories of warfare from a Nineteenth Century political and military thinker, Pipes believes that the Soviets continue to adhere to the validity of the "Clausewitzian principle."

Part and parcel of these Soviet principles are two terms which are constantly mentioned in the literature of nuclear strategy: countervalue and counterforce. Countervalue refers to the destruction of an enemy's population cen-

42. Ibid., p.30.
ters, and is conceived as the deterrent against any undue nuclear provocations. This is an overwhelmingly American concept by which the principles of massive retaliation and MAD have revolved. A nuclear exchange would be too costly to contemplate because of the vast destruction to the civilian centers, and with it the very political structure of the nation. The Soviets hold to the principle of counterforce.

As Pipes explains, the destruction of military installations are the primary targets, and large population centers are of secondary importance. The first priority is to destroy the other side's command, communications, and military emplacements. If this is done, the capability to resist is, to say the least, appreciably diminished. The Soviets accept this view, and reject "the whole basis on which U.S. strategy has come to rest: thermonuclear war is not suicidal, it can be fought and won, and thus resort to war must not be ruled out." 43

What the above purports to show is not only the varying outlooks in nuclear strategy between the American and Soviet sides, but also the political importance placed by critics of detente on these strategic theories. The nuclear dimension is not the sole criterion that is analyzed by these critics. The conventional deployment of forces and their

43. Ibid., p.30.
political usefulness is likewise deemed of significant value. In such a light, the SALT Talks and MBFR have come under increasing criticism, the concern being the possibility that the Soviets could replace a weakened America as the predominant military power. Paul Nitze wrote that Kissinger's policy of detente with the Soviet Union focused American military strength as a positive factor to make detente possible, rather than the continuing American policy to defend self and allies from Soviet military power.44

General Daniel Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated the view that the policy of containment provided the opportunity for detente to seem possible. Graham considers the strategy of containment as "the first and the last strategy to be devised by the United States or NATO as a whole in the post-World War II period."45 Because of the success of containment in keeping the Soviets at bay, an accommodation to the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence was made. This policy became detente, and as Graham states, it was "destined to destroy the strategy of containment and leave NATO with no strategy at all."46

General Graham believes that an American accommodation to the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence was of greater

46. Ibid., p.20
significance in moving toward a detente than the need to reduce nuclear tensions. Even though the Soviets continued to strengthen their Warsaw Pact allies with even greater numbers of men and material, to pursue an impressive program of nuclear weaponry, and to support national liberation efforts, General Graham states that by "1970 onward, the inevitable policy conflicts between containment and detente were decided in favor of detente. The dismissal of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was a case in point." 47

As to the SALT negotiations, General Graham is equally critical of the discrepancy between American and Soviet philosophies of strategic thought, and the agreements arrived at through SALT. Graham states that the Soviets have taken full advantage of the opportunities to strengthen their nuclear forces, particularly in the category of throwweight. It is clear that the Soviets have received the "best of the deal in SALT negotiations on intercontinental systems," Graham believes, "and in their terms the results look even better." 48

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations during the Nixon years, and a controversial figure in his own right, has criticized the totality of the detente process, and the individuals that have pursued this policy. Appalled by the lack of civic-mindedness in the Nixon-Kissinger conduct of

47. Ibid., p.25.
48. Ibid., p.40.
domestic and foreign policy (he resigned in protest to Watergate), Zumwalt believes that the military dimensions of detente were predicated upon domestic electoral considerations, and a misplaced trust in the Soviet compliance with the entire nature of detente. In his book, On Watch, Zumwalt leaves little doubt of where he stood with the Nixon administration and Henry Kissinger regarding SALT and detente. Although Zumwalt was an active participant in the American preparations for the SALT negotiations, he accepted certain provisions of the various agreements with qualifications. Once a supporter of Nixon-Kissinger, Zumwalt became increasingly disillusioned with the SALT negotiations, and the machinations emanating from the White House (including Kissinger). In a conversation with Henry Kissinger, in November of 1970, that had a bombshell effect upon Zumwalt, Kissinger's prophecy of future history prompted Zumwalt to reveal these notes:

K. does not agree with the President that American people can be turned around. He states strongly that President misjudges the people. K. feels that U.S. has passed its historic high point like so many earlier civilizations. He believes that U.S. is on downhill and cannot be roused by political challenge. He states that his job is to persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can get, recognizing that the historical forces favor them. He says that he realized that in the light of history he will be recognized as one of those who negotiated terms favorable to the Soviets, but that the American people have only themselves to blame because they lack stamina to stay the course against the Russians who are 'Sparta to our Athens.'

Just prior to Zumwalt's early retirement from the Navy, and the troubled experiences of working "under a wrecked president and an unprincipled Secretary of State," he voiced his disgust at the maneuvers to isolate Paul Nitze and James Schlesinger, who were likewise perplexed with the White House's insistence on a SALT agreement that Zumwalt says was impermissible. The Nixon-Kissinger administration was taking too lightly the Soviet suggestions that were designed "like most SALT proposals, aimed to freeze Soviet superiority." In a letter to President Nixon dated June 17, 1974, Zumwalt expressed his concern about the course the SALT Talks were taking, and the future conduct of the detente process as a whole. Zumwalt stated that the SALT I agreements were possible because the United States felt it was strong enough to allow the Soviets to approach strategic parity. This situation was extremely ambiguous, since it would be difficult to ascertain not only when the Soviets reached strategic parity, particularly in view of the stagnation of American strategic weaponry when compared to the Soviet effort, but also to know when and if the Soviets would opt to progress beyond that phase and into an attempt at superiority. At this juncture, as Zumwalt points out, the strategic balance would have shifted to the Soviet side. Such a situation to a member of

50. Ibid., p.492.
51. Ibid., p.496.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff - as Zumwalt wrote Nixon - would be intolerable. Zumwalt believed that the Soviets did indeed progress beyond parity, and that "each day shifts the balance further to their advantage." It was necessary to correct this Soviet progression in strategic weaponry, but it would not be possible, so Zumwalt thought, by continuing on the same road in the "narrow context of arms control negotiations." Zumwalt strongly advised Nixon to place future SALT negotiations into the total "framework of the entire detente relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."

Zumwalt, like so many other critics of the arms negotiations, believes the United States should exercise its option to continue to develop qualitative improvements in weapons systems and, thusly, prevent the Soviets from acquiring the strategic means to become militarily superior. If the United States fails to improve its strategic posture, Zumwalt believes, the ultimate result will be a political and military plus for the Soviet Union on a global basis. With this strategic advantage, the Soviet Union will threaten the very security of the United States. Zumwalt states the Soviets will not be reluctant to use their superior power, particularly a Soviet Union becoming bolder with each passing year.

R. J. Rummel, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, Director of the non-profit PATH Institute of Research on International Problems and Vice-President of Political-Economic Risk Consultants, Ltd., is also outspokenly critical of detente and its SALT negotiations. He, too, believes the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to Soviet-American relations has led to an obviously inferior conventional and strategic position for the United States. Detente, and its reliance on the good will and trust of the Soviets to comply with the spirit and intent of detente can only afford the Soviets the opportunity to increase their already burgeoning military superiority.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have assured the public that detente has not weakened us, that we maintain the edge over the Soviet Union. The evidence does not support them. Detente has not meant simply a restraint of American military power consistent with mutual U.S. - Soviet arms control, nor American superiority. It has not even meant parity. It has meant dangerous inferiority.55

The concern for American strategic inferiority is derived from the fear that the Soviets have not modified their ideological and political competition with the United States and the West, as it should have as the detente process assumes. Rummel sees American policy as an attempt toward finding security and order, but in pursuing this goal becoming increasingly weakened as a result of misinterpreting Soviet intentions.

Rummel believes that the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to detente has been a "defensive interpretation of American power,"\textsuperscript{56} and that it has led to a drastic reduction in American military and political might. Strongly critical of this approach, Rummel opines that the Soviets are managing detente to subvert the West, and in so doing, preparing themselves for a military confrontation with the United States. Soon - very soon, Rummel states, the United States will find itself the victim of "nuclear blackmail,"\textsuperscript{57} and thus have no alternative but to fight or surrender. This, to Rummel, is the prime danger of détente: two choices, either one a frightening selection.

Paul Nitze is equally critical of the dangerous course that was being pursued by the Nixon-Kissinger administration. Nitze was the Secretary of Defense's representative on the U.S. SALT delegation from 1969-1974, but he resigned from his position on May 28, 1974 because of current U.S. policy in the arms negotiations, personality clashes with Henry Kissinger that were outgrowths of policy differences, and the domestic political climate that infected the Nixon White House. Nitze's resignation from the SALT delegation was a great blow to the Nixon-Kissinger team amongst aware observers, who recognized that a great gulf in opinions must have existed for the SALT delegation to lose the services of

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., Pp.148-149.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., Pp.148-149.
such an important member. Before Nitze left Washington, he stated in a press release that for five years he partook in negotiations to reach agreement on balanced force reductions which would, in effect, strengthen the security of the United States and the Soviet Union. This would be accomplished by "maintaining crisis stability and providing a basis for lessening the strategic arms competition between them." Nitze saw little chance that this goal could be realized.

In 1976, Nitze would write of his suspicions that the SALT agreements and U.S. policy in that direction were providing the Soviets with the opportunity to gain a strategic superiority, not only in the quantitative sense, but also in the achievement of a "theoretical war-winning capability." Nitze believes that if the Soviets gained such a position, detente would crumble, nuclear confrontation would once again seem dangerously probable, and Soviet expansion and political pressure would greatly increase to further jeopardize Western interests. With the Soviet Union becoming strategically more powerful, they would become politically bolder.

The one thread that binds the critics of detente, especially in the military context, is that the United States surrendered too much of its nuclear superiority to the Soviets in the acceptance of parity. The differences in

Soviet and American strategic theories have led the detente critics to charge that a dangerous misinterpretation of Soviet intentions was made, which is a nuclear war-winning capability. Inevitably, the detente critics charge, the Soviets may achieve a first-strike capability to destroy the American nuclear force in the near future, and thus cripple any American military response. The Soviets would then have achieved their most cherished political victory: to become the world's dominant power, and most certainly control the destiny of America and Western Europe. This occurrence for all intents and purposes would spell the end of American and European sovereignty.

Few of the critics were diametrically opposed to the initiation of the SALT Talks and the requirements of limiting nuclear arms. On the contrary, many of the critics were actively involved in the formulation of policies that were the mark of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to detente and SALT. As the policy unfolded, particularly the Soviet example of still seeking a nuclear superiority and its refusal to adopt the American view of strategic weaponry, the perception that America had conceded too much to the Soviets in the field of strategic weapons, the Interim Agreement and the limitation of nuclear arms as signed in Moscow in 1972, began to show that somewhere a policy that had commenced with great expectations was now the victim of mistaken notions.
The détente critics would state that the Vladivostok Accords of 1974 were an American attempt to salvage at least part of what had been relinquished at Moscow two years before. The military dimension of détente spurred a furious debate because of the massive force nuclear weapons engender. What likewise cannot be dismissed was the behavior of Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and their staffs. The more secretive they became, the more isolated they became from those that would offer dissenting information and opinions on current political and military strategy. This mentality would carry forward into the Ford administration, but to a diminished extent. It is no coincidence that in the area of the greatest debate, that of strategic arms, individuals suffered most. The early retirement of Admiral Zumwalt, the resignation of Paul Nitze, and the firing of James Schlesinger are prime examples of the casualty list due to the question of formulating the military dimension of détente. As each participant left government service, the prior stature that détente had enjoyed was being whittled down. Each individual criticized détente and the military dimension as being a mistake that has endangered the nation's security and survival. These criticisms found ready ears, especially amongst those who never did trust the Soviets, believing they would never abide in good faith, and never would renounce their real intent of achieving nuclear superiority.
The year 1974 would see the attack on détente and its three dimensions by the realists as steadily progressing. President Ford had come under increasing attack not only from a number of quarters, but more importantly to him from the conservative wing of the Republican Party, who were supporting in ever greater numbers his opponent, Ronald Reagan. When one aspect of détente was attacked, the entire policy seemed to suffer a setback. The whole of the policy could not survive an attack when directed even at one issue. Détente came to encompass the totality of Soviet-American relations, and thusly when one dimension was criticized, such as the military dimension, the economic and political dimensions were brought into disrepute. Ironically, when détente came under suspicion, and then subject to attack as a policy of providing too much to the Soviets, this recent importation of a French word conjured up all the remembrances of the Cold War, and visions of what the future could portent to a lax America.

The critics, as stated on previous pages, adhered to many political views, from conservatives to liberals. These critics would speak at various seminars, or were well known personalities in politics and military affairs. Most spoke basically to groups that were active observers in foreign affairs. No one group was formed that could appeal to the broad mass of the American public save one: the American
labor movement. It was the only group well organized enough through its infrastructure and history to launch such a campaign. Launch it they did.

Before an analysis of labor's position vis-a-vis detente is examined, a brief statement of the American labor movement is in order, for to understand why labor so vehemently attacked detente in all its dimensions, one must note some of labor's basic philosophies and attitudes.

The American labor movement has had a long history of active involvement in foreign affairs. It has been the philosophy of labor that the organization of workers into units of collective bargaining and in the area of what labor calls "economic democracy," is not an isolated phenomenon that exists only for these purposes. A larger arena of affairs exists outside the concerns of wages and benefits. Economic policy and politics go hand in hand. Labor realized long ago that to limit itself only to economic affairs would spell the death of labor and its potentially great political powers.

Labor's philosophy has been that the trade union movement and labor's independent power can only be exercised in a society where political freedoms exist as basic rights. These basic civic and political rights are the right to organize, the right to strike, and the right of unions to elect their own representatives. Only in a society where political freedoms are guaranteed and protected can labor survive as an
Independent organization, unencumbered by governmental restrictions and control. No independent and free labor movement exists in an authoritarian or totalitarian society. Once the means of production have been seized by a government that seeks total control—political and economic—the labor movement as an effective organization is for all intents and purposes fractured, then eliminated and destroyed. It is no small wonder that whenever an authoritarian government seizes power, among the first to be repressed, jailed, or even murdered are labor leaders. It is in this context that labor's rights are interwoven, and dependent upon, the fabric of human and political rights. Consequently, labor has voiced strong sentiments in opposition to Communist regimes, and authoritarian governments where state power permeates to a great degree fields of life where such interference would not be tolerated in democratic societies.

On October 1, 1974, AFL-CIO President George Meany testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the detente hearings. His opening statement was frank and outspoken, and in view of George Meany's indomitable personality and lengthy stay as labor's president, his statements on detente are the views and sentiments of the AFL-CIO. There can be no doubt that George Meany was, and as we shall see, the AFL-CIO is categorically opposed to any type of detente as expressed during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years.
Mr. Meany began his testimony by asking what is the definition of detente. He stated that detente was difficult to define because it was becoming increasingly ambiguous. What was once thought to be a "great idea - this 'conceptual breakthrough,'" to use one of Secretary Kissinger's favorite phrases,"60 was proving to be a policy that was all show and no substance. The public expectations that were raised in hoping the Cold War had ended have fallen victim to a policy that was incapable of acquiring the hoped for results. So Meany asks, what is the difference between detente and Cold War?

Now a common thread runs through all these definitions of detente. They all boil down to the same thing; detente is the avoidance of nuclear war. Detente is the imposition of restraints so that the two superpowers don't blow each other up. If this is the meaning of detente, then I have a question. What is the difference between detente and Cold War? Isn't Cold War also an avoidance of hot war?61

Throughout Meany's testimony, which was reprinted in the leaflets, booklets, and newspapers of the entire trade union movement, his blunt and oft-times comical rendition of some of the contradictory aspects of detente paralleled to a close degree the academic criticisms from far more scholarly men. The presentation was different; the substance the same. To George Meany, the Russians cannot be trusted, and

60. Meany calls the public disillusionment with detente a "revolution of falling expectations." This description places him firmly in the company of critics that have been mentioned in previous pages. Detente Hearings, p.373.
61. Ibid., p.374.
the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente is nothing more than "phrase-mongering" to convince the American people that the Cold War is over, when in fact nothing is further from the truth. Soviet conduct in the Middle East, to George Meany, is the example par excellence of Soviet disregard for the Basic Principles as signed in Moscow in 1972. Also prominently mentioned is the grain deal that was a financial burden to the American taxpayer; Soviet statements on the need to continue the ideological and political competition, particularly statements by Secretary Brezhnev, "one of the all-time experts" in the "high art of diplomatic hypocrisy;" and Soviet intransigence in not allowing their people even the most fundamental of political freedoms and human rights. To Meany, as with so many other critics, a dichotomy exists between the Soviet and American view of detente. In this regard, George Meany stated:

Clearly, something is wrong here. I think most Americans have a pretty good understanding of what our side means by detente, what we want out of it. But do we understand what the Russians want? I think we need to look at detente from their perspective. They mean something different - and that is the source of the problems.63

George Meany ended his testimony by stating that a real detente, a true detente, would end the ideological and political conflicts on both sides. This we do not have, and will

62. Ibid., p.376.
63. Ibid., p.376.
not have as long as the Soviets continue their policy of confrontation.\textsuperscript{64}

Jay Lovestone, former Director of the AFL-CIO Department of International Affairs, states that detente has been used by the Euro-Communist parties in their march for national power in Europe, particularly in France, Italy, and Spain. Lovestone sees this as part of the Communist strategy to further isolate the West. As the Soviets have extracted concessions from the West and used their enhanced power to gain advantage, the Euro-Communist parties in Western Europe have likewise taken advantage of detente to further their electoral endeavors to gain domestic power.\textsuperscript{65}

Sidney Hook, philosopher and author, and now a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, is a close friend and intellectual ally of the American labor movement. As a member of the Social Democrats, U.S.A., his views make him particularly attractive to labor and its allies. In the keynote address to the National Convention of Social Democrats, U.S.A. in July 1976, Hook placed in perspective what the American labor leadership believes and its supporters accept. Addressing the delegates Hook

\textsuperscript{64}. Meany sees little chance for detente as long as the Soviets oppose the political freedoms enjoyed by the West. This, to Meany, is the "greatest threats to peace today," along with the "delusion we call detente." \textit{Défense Hearsings}, p.386.

stated that detente's political objectives have not been realized because of the "imbalance in United States and Soviet objectives in detente..." Detente could be a successful policy from an American point of view only if the United States would stand firm in its opposition to totalitarianism.

Hook also views the Soviets as an imperialist power that disguises its primary objectives through detente. The policy of detente, under Nixon-Ford-Kissinger, placed an undue emphasis upon achieving political compromise, and disregarding the issue of democracy. In this regard, the issue of human rights has been dismissed because the Communists refuse to voluntarily accept and abide by any such notions. Without some measure to demand that human rights issues are complied with in an affirmative manner, the Soviets will continue to remain recalcitrant. Hook suggests one possible option: "tying economic cooperation from the West to progress in the human rights field is one such measure that should be used."  

On June 30, 1975, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, under the sponsorship of the AFL-CIO, delivered his first formal address since he was expelled from the Soviet Union in February, 1974. The fact that President Ford decided to accept Kissinger's

67. Ibid.
advice not to grant Solzhenitsyn an audience for fear of embarrassing the Soviets was a decision that George Meany would never forgive. Their refusal to meet Solzhenitsyn only provided Meany a soapbox and greater ammunition to launch into further criticisms of detente. But what was said by Solzhenitsyn was much more important than the squabble between Meany and Ford-Kissinger. Solzhenitsyn was presented by the AFL-CIO as the number one dissenter from Russian repression.

Detente, Solzhenitsyn would repeat again and again, was the Communist strategy to lull the West into a period of complacency and naive security. For this, the West has only itself to blame, for it has become morally and spiritually bankrupt, while decaying into military and political has-beens. This state of political and military impotence, and moral decadence, has resulted in the unwillingness to sacrifice for an ideal. To Solzhenitsyn, the West has existed too comfortably for too long. If the West is lethargic and napping now, detente will surely put it to sleep. So, Solzhenitsyn asks, is detente needed?

Not only is it needed, it is as necessary as air. It's the only way of saving the earth - instead of a world war to have detente, but a true detente, and if it has already been ruined by the bad word which we use for it, 'detente' - then we should find another word for it.68

Solzhenitsyn spoke of three characteristics of a true detente. The first would be disarmament - "not only disarmament from the use of war, but also from the use of violence." The second characteristic would be that both parties could guarantee that the commitment to peaceful relations would not be interrupted. To ensure this promise, the Soviet Union would have to radically modify its internal political structure to allow for the free debate and expression by the press and public opinion, and for free elections and a parliament. Such an eventuality seems, to say the least, highly unlikely. But, until such a situation occurs, Solzhenitsyn sees little likelihood that the Soviets will seriously follow a course to end conflict. Part and parcel with the second characteristic is the third and final condition that Solzhenitsyn mentioned: an end to the "sort of inhumane propaganda which is proudly called in the Soviet Union 'ideological warfare.'"

Solzhenitsyn is not optimistic by any means that these events will transpire in the near future. What is needed at the present moment is the resolve of the West to resist the encroachments of the Communists, and to form a policy that will present the Communists with a united front that will not falter. And what of the advocates of detente?

But the principal argument of the advocates of detente is well-known: all of this must be done to avoid a nuclear war. But after all that has happened in recent years, I think I can set their minds at ease, and your minds at ease as well: there will not be any nuclear war. What for? Why should there be a nuclear war if for the last thirty years they have been breaking off as much of the West as they wanted - piece after piece, country after country, and the process keeps going on.71

Solzhenitsyn's two speeches in Washington and New York, and the subsequent snub by President Ford, would add a tremendous impetus to the forces of the detente opposition. To critics of his speech, saying that he was reviving the Cold War, Solzhenitsyn would counter by saying that the Cold War had never ended, and that the forces of Communism continued to threaten the freedom and security of a West that is weak and indecisive.

The critics of detente would point to a number of factors and events, each with its own importance, to dispel the notion that a change in atmosphere by the Soviets hardly meant a radical deviation from their past practices. Even a change in the political atmosphere, the critics would point out, was only temporary, and the Soviets could not resist the inevitable temptation to return to their old ways. The Middle East War of 1973 and the Soviet complicity in that attack; the victory of the North over the South in Viet Nam; Soviet involvement in Portugal, Africa, and Angola in particular; the signing by the Soviets of the Helsinki Final Act,

71. Ibid., p.40.
and their refusal to honor the stipulations of Basket III; all these events stirred the detente critics into pointing out one common theme: the Soviets had never intended to abide by the detente of America's interpretation.

The dynamics of international politics, the critics would say, still dictated the need to meet force with force, and be militarily prepared. And possibly most important of all, the Soviet Union still remained a revolutionary power, still in pursuit of overthrowing the established balance of power, and seeking "marginal advantages," and nuclear superiority. Detente seemed, to the critics, a one-way street, with the Soviets having everything to gain and the West precious little. As the political spokesmen, particularly Senator Henry Jackson, expressed their misgivings of detente, and the military spokesmen, specifically individuals like Admiral Zumwalt, Paul Nitze, and James Schlesinger warned of the impending downslide of American military preparedness, the critics of the economic aspects of detente likewise found the same fault. Little would be gained by providing the Soviets with loans and credits, selling them technology and heavy industrial products that they require. That prospect was already foreclosed, and with it detente's linkage aspect, when the Soviets refused to partake in the 1972 Trade Agreement because of the emigration issue attached to it through the Jackson Amendment. The Soviets would not reform their politi-
cal behavior for promises of economic assistance from the United States.

With the detente debate in full force, the supporters of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger endeavors attempted to defend their position. The next chapter will show how their argument was presented: that detente was not only desirable, but that it was the best political approach to the superpower competition and the avoidance of nuclear war.
CHAPTER VI

DETENTE ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS: 
THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL OF DETENTE

In the waning months of 1973, the supporters of detente found their policy increasingly under the attack from opponents, who recognized an opportunity to at least partially scuttle a good deal of what had been initiated through the efforts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The basis for this upsurge in dissenting opinion was the Soviet complicity in the October War, and the threat to militarily intervene to rescue their unfortunate clients - Egypt and Syria. Opposition to detente had always existed, but mostly as an undercurrent of opinion. As George Kennan remarked, the prestige of the White House, bolstered primarily through Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow, and his overwhelming victory over George McGovern, had stifled the administration's foreign policy opponents. Nevertheless, plenty of potential opposition existed, waiting for an incident to occur that would show exactly how the Soviets would interpret the "Basic Principles." That incident was the October War.

Added to this Soviet-American confrontation was the eroding of the administration's authority and prestige because of Watergate.

The supporters of detente clearly recognized that a political contest over issues of international importance was brewing. If detente was to be given a chance to succeed, it had to be vigorously defended. Before one delves into the defense of their positions, one must seek some answers to why detente was pursued by those labeled the "orthodox" school of detente.

As stated on previous occasions, this orthodox school of detente was in command of American foreign policy from Richard Nixon's tenure as President until Gerald Ford's defeat at the hands of Jimmy Carter. Throughout this paper, some generalizations have been utilized to paint a larger picture. Labels are in many instances subject to change. But one can look back and search for positions which various individuals and groups adhered to, and at least decipher where they stood at the moment. What stance they take today may be completely different, or at least a shift from a prior stance. Professor Gibert has noted that during the early stages of the Nixon administration, one school of thought on the conduct of Soviet-American relations eventually assumed command of the foreign policy-making apparatus.
Inevitably, the contention that the Cold War had run its course and a new, more cooperative mode of superpower interactions had begun was challenged by some Americans and ardently defended by others. Basically, three schools of thought emerged during the Nixon administration. The first - officially adopted by President Nixon and his national security adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and later by President Ford - could be called the 'orthodox' school of detente.  

The American view, propagated prominently by Nixon and Kissinger, was that since the Soviet Union was now on an equal nuclear footing with the United States, there were opportunities for a rapprochement and a new political relationship. The possibility of lessening the intensity of the Soviet-American competition was thought to be available because of the strategic balance of power, the easing of ideological competition, and the willingness to cooperate in solving common problems. If difficulties could be solved in these areas, then the vitally important political questions of power, what Kissinger would note as the "search for marginal advantages," could be reconciled in some type of orderly framework to reduce the threat of nuclear war. This is what detente was all about.

To the orthodox detentists political lessons could be learned from the initial stages of the First World War that held some meaning for the nuclear world: that larger and more powerful states such as the United States and the Soviet Un-

ion could become so involved in the regional affairs of smaller and weaker states, that at some future point it was inevitable that in a time of crisis the two superpowers would be brought to the brink of a nuclear exchange. The lessening of tensions and the need for stability predicated on the political and military balance of power, was the goal many thought could initiate a new era in Soviet-American relations. What cannot be dismissed by any means was the futile American effort in Viet Nam, and the attendant disappointments and national disgust that venture produced. The American failure in Viet Nam was probably the greatest impetus to the American pursuit for détente, and to seek repose from further immediate conflict.

Former Ambassador George F. Kennan, the architect of containment, while not impressed with the Nixon-Kissinger dramas in their policy approach, nevertheless supports the basic premise of détente: the avoidance of nuclear war. Kennan states that the greatest threat in this contemporary period comes not from the danger of an open confrontation between the two superpowers because of political circumstances, but rather from the continuation of the nuclear arms race that "will become wholly uncontrollable, and will, either through proliferation or by accident, carry us all to destruction." 3

To begin to control this situation, Kennan suggests, the United States should start by reconsidering our political and military thinking.

In the 1974 Senate Hearings, Kennan expressed his dismay at the style of conduct of the detente policy as pursued by Nixon-Kissinger, in some instances resembling the criticisms of George Ball. But as to the goals of the policy of détente, and his disgust at those who oppose them, Kennan is explicit: he states that the pursuit of détente was possible because of a number of changes in the international climate, and that "due credit [should be given] to those who perceive and took advantage of these changes and pursued with such imagination and patience the possibilities they created." ⁴

The pressures against détente continued to be vibrant even during its height in 1972 and 1973, but, Kennan says, these pressures were effectively checked by the "momentary prestige and authority of the White House." ⁵ As Richard Nixon's administration slowly, but steadily, began to lose confidence and crumble amidst the controversy of Watergate, the opponents of détente launched an offensive that would eventually show results. Kennan opposed such measures as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which "dealt a bitter blow to any hopes for retaining the very considerable momentum that had

⁴ Detente Hearings., p.61.
been obtained in the development of Soviet-American relations.⁶

Kennan vigorously defends detente from critics that believe it is a policy bound to fail because of past Soviet actions. Rather, present difficulties have been the products of thirty years of conflict and rivalry, and not the result of the present detente. Close and careful cooperation with the Soviet Union across a broad range of issues could provide the incentive needed to avoid nuclear war, and hinder any rash conduct in the pursuit of "marginal advantages." Perhaps over time, even the pursuit of "marginal advantages" will have been channeled into a more orderly and peaceful display of power. George Kennan was perhaps thinking of these difficulties when he noted that the conflicts that engage the United States and the Soviet Union - "the intractable elements of this problem"⁷ - will not quickly recede, but rather remain as challenges to both superpowers to search for areas where cooperation can lead to a diminishing of the nuclear threat.

W. Averell Harriman, who - like George Kennan - has had a long and active career in diplomacy, is cognizant of the continued dangers that are prevalent between the two

⁶ Ibid., p.688.
⁷ Discussion sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, "American Foreign Policy," Center Magazine IX (March-April 1976), p.16.
superpowers. But to continue down the identical path that
has marked the antagonistic relationship between the two
parties from the end of the Second World War until the Nix-
on-Kissinger initiatives will only add further dangerous
patterns of conflict. Harriman is clearly in favor of de-
tente, and at odds with those who believe that detente should
be a comprehensive settlement of past grievances. Rather,
detente has encompassed issues that are "specific and so are
strictly limited." 8 This is the understanding that Harriman
states he shares along with Secretary Brezhnev, who Harriman
believes has "committed himself unequivocally to detente." 9
If the United States should decide to reconsider its detente
policy, such actions would only prove to Brezhnev and the
Soviets that the Americans are not willing to partake in a
new diplomacy. Harriman is concerned that there are those
who would wish to see such a shift in American policy occur,
and with that shift, a return to the Cold War.

I decry those who contend that any relaxation of ten-
sions must inevitably benefit the Russians, to our dis-
advantage. It seems to me we have no choice... Our
military strength, essential as it is, should be basi-
cally defensive.10

In the Senate Hearings, Harriman spoke for the need of
a detente that would provide the Soviets with Most-Favored-

8. W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Church-
ill and Stalin 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975),
10. Detente Hearings, p.11.
Nation treatment, a commitment to continue the negotiations on SALT, and to perfect the linkage between trade and arms limitation. In the June 28, 1974 edition of the New York Times, Harriman stated his support for President Nixon in his upcoming talks with Secretary Brezhnev, and urged support for the President "in his endeavors to reach agreements designed to reduce the possibility of nuclear disaster." 11

Professor Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, expressed the opinion during his testimony at the Senate Hearings that the United States should continue its dialogue with the Soviet Union. While quite aware of Soviet intransigence in a number of areas, he nevertheless endorsed efforts to ease tension, and held an optimistic forecast for improved relations if both sides are serious in their efforts. Shulman concurs with other detente advocates such as Harriman, Kennan, and Kissinger, in proposing a modest policy that will produce steady results over the long run. In favoring a limited rather than a comprehensive detente, Shulman is critical of those who expect detente to initiate imminent and radical alterations of Soviet domestic and international conduct. Likewise, Shulman argues, proposing a detente that unduly infringes on Soviet domestic power displaces a policy that should account for the factors of international power and

questions of the politico-military balance, with one that is primarily concerned with overhauling Soviet society and its political structure. Such expectations are politically unrealistic, Shulman believes, since to urge and sometimes threaten the Soviets into making vast concessions on internal policy matters would present "conditions which the present Soviet regime cannot but regard as terms of surrender and self-liquidation... It appears to me to be a clear case of 'the best being the enemy of the good.'"

A participant in the Senate Hearings who may have surprised many in his views on detente was former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. While a doubtful adherent of the "orthodox" school of detente, he nevertheless defended the initiatives and undertakings of Nixon and Kissinger. Rusk stated to the Committee that his definition of detente was in line with that of Kissinger's - that detente was "a process, not a final condition." He then gave credit to the Nixon administration's efforts to resolve long-standing difficulties, and to find areas where agreement was possible, particularly in strategic arms, trade, and a general reduction in global tension.

In matters of trade, Rusk doubts that its possible linking of Soviet political concessions would have met with Moscow's approval. But beyond this opinion, Rusk questions

the wisdom of injecting into trade discussions other issues on which we hope to see movement on the part of the Soviet Union," such as negotiations in the political, military and economic areas that could not have materialized if they had been linked to changes in Soviet domestic conditions.

Individual members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also expressed approval of the administration's detente policy. Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat from Rhode Island, stated that the initial stages of detente that exhibited progress commanded a great amount of support in the United States. However, in light of recent events such as the Middle East War, public approval of detente had dwindled, and with it the political support within the government that is necessary for the policy to remain intact.

Senator Pell then mentioned the opposition emanating from organized labor, the American Jewish community, the military, industry that relies upon Pentagon contracts, and conservative groups in general.

Each of these segments of our society has some measure of legitimacy for its concern. However, in combination, these segments form a very formidable alliance encompassing a major part of the most articulate and influential opinion-forming groups in the nation. And there is a very real possibility that, in combination, this alliance could turn our country from the path of detente.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho, also expressed his support for detente, and remarked that detente

13. Ibid., p.213.
worked in the Middle East War of 1973 because the Russians did not unilaterally transport troops to the battle areas. Senator Church further stated that he believed detente was still possible, except for those who wish to perpetuate the Cold War. "Those" are identified by Senator Church as "old-time cold warriors and ranking military figures," who continue to adhere to the view that the Soviets are still bent on a political and military "drive for world domination." 15

Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the Detente Hearings, stated in his opening remarks before the Committee on the first day of testimony, that the United States must proceed with detente at all costs. He also castigated those "cold warriors" who would have us return to the days of conflict and possible hot war.

The heart and the core of the policy of detente - and the central purpose of our current policy, as I understand it - is the lessening of danger of nuclear war. With an objective so basic and essential, it is hardly possible for us to give up on arms control or trade, no matter how discouraging the prospects may seem at any given time. 16

Fulbright argued that there is no alternative to detente, except a return to the days of confrontation and the threat of nuclear war. He stated that he was at a loss to explain why liberals and conservatives could both oppose

15. Detente Hearings, p. 89.
detente. This was possible because conservatives oppose detente because of their suspicious view of Soviet motives, and the liberals have misgivings about detente because of human rights violations. Liberal opposition to detente was especially perplexing to Fulbright, particularly in view of the "abatement of tyranny under Khruschev and Brezhnev." Fulbright believes, like other supporters of detente that have been mentioned, that with increased contacts between the Soviet Union and the West, even greater trends toward liberalization will occur in the East.

Senator Hugh Scott, who traveled to the Soviet Union in April, 1974, on the Dartmouth VIII Conference, wrote in a report to Senator Fulbright and the Committee his impressions of the Soviet attitude toward detente. Senator Scott, resembling other supporters of the administration's efforts, stated that the United States and the Soviet Union have conflicting objectives and differences in ideology that spell disagreement. Such differences should not be an obstacle to seeking reduced tensions. In a two-hour meeting with Secretary Brezhnev, Scott reported that the progress made by Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon toward normalizing relations was diminishing the threat of nuclear war, and that further improvements in relations would be a "positive influence on the process of all international diplomacy of

17. Ibid., p.2.
either a bilateral or multilateral nature."  

In regard to the prospects of reducing the level of nuclear arms, Scott stated:

Both [Nixon and Brezhnev] are resolved to make every effort to strengthen the process of detente in order to free the peoples of both countries from the overwhelming burdens of the arms race.  

In a conclusion to the report, Scott penned some of his impressions:

1. The American-Soviet summit talks have provided a powerful impetus for the development of collaboration between the two countries, not only in the political field, but also in the spheres of science, technology and economics.

2. Both in Moscow and Tbilisi I found that the USSR has accepted detente as a new political doctrine set down by the very highest councils of the state and to be espoused and fostered by all of its elements.

Senator Edward Kennedy supported the goals of detente in much the same manner as his Congressional colleagues, Senators Scott and Fulbright. In a 1974 article in the Fall edition of Foreign Policy entitled "Beyond Detente," Kennedy expressed his opinions on how to improve relations. He also focused on the issue of trade as an incentive to further the goals of detente. In a conclusion to the article, Kennedy pointed to five areas of importance in furthering Soviet-American detente.

19. Ibid., p.3.
Kennedy singled out the involvement of a broader base of people and institutions in discussing the public debate of U.S. - Soviet relations; a public viewing of the agreements and debates between political leaders; an end to the concealing of nuclear programs by the Soviets; a consistent policy toward "institutionalizing" the process of detente; the impact of policies on the domestic level in each nation; and the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to end their conflicts, and focus toward the greater problems that afflict the international community, particularly in the Third World. 21

In an article in the April, 1975 issue of the Center Report (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), Kennedy wrote of his approval of the recently negotiated Vladivostok Accords, and the Senate Vladivostok Resolution, stating that Vladivostok was a step in the right direction, and should not be viewed as an encouragement to construct more missiles and advance technology toward further improving qualitative delivery systems. A substantial proof of good faith by the United States in the area of arms control was required, Kennedy elaborated, to show the Soviets the continued American intention to pursue detente. Thus, Vladivostok was a necessary step toward an improvement in So-

The factors of trade, of decreasing the nuclear arms race, and of the general lessening of political tensions are the possibilities that those that find détente desirable inevitably point out as within reach. The very language and approach to these political questions differ markedly from those of détente's opponents, in that those that take a dim view of détente perceive a different view of Soviet intentions. Those that give their approval toward this Soviet-American rapprochement see a number of areas where cooperation is possible. The détentists believe that the Soviets have shown a proclivity, doubtless a cautious one, to proceed ahead. But beyond these agreements and exchanges in the fields of science, culture, trade and environmental matters lies the world of nuclear weaponry. Without the agreed intentions of containing the development of strategic weaponry, the détentists note, the two sides are nearing Armageddon. The opponents of détente, or at least those that became disenchanted with Soviet actions in global areas of conflict, note that Armageddon will surely ensue if America does not


23. With regard to the strategic arms race, the views of such détente supporters as George Kennan, Averell Harriman and Senator Fulbright are examples of the great concern advocates of the Kissinger policy placed on limiting weapons development. Such détente proponents believe that a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is certain if SALT and détente fail.
quicken its resolve to progress in the development of future deterrents. Even with the levels of trade and in the transfer of technology, the Soviets will breech their "sacred" word, and will not resist the temptation to apply these technical advancements to their military arsenal. The defenders of detente take an alternate view, and see a number of areas where Soviet and American perceptions run parallel to each other, with progress leading to further improvement in East-West relations.

Samuel Pisar, an attorney and commentator in Paris, and Washington, notes these differences, and throws his lot on the side of detente. Pisar notes that the United States and the Soviet Union are faced with only two alternatives because of their nuclear rivalry: "Apocalypse" and "Detente." Since detente is the only alternative to avoid a nuclear war, Pisar is concerned why certain elements in the West continue to exhibit a purposeful opposition to improved relations, particularly in the fields of trade, agriculture and technology. Such opposition, Pisar states, is founded on the faulty notion that such increased contacts will only strengthen the Soviet power structure. Viewing such prognosticating by detente's opponents as a misinterpretation of Soviet in-

24. Detente opponents, particularly those from the military, such as Zumwalt and Graham, also believe that nuclear war is a certainty if the U.S. continues to participate in the SALT Talks as presently constructed. They believe the Soviets will always take advantage of such agreements.
tentions, Pisar believes that such contacts will strengthen the chance for a real detente, and further the possibility for the Soviet Union to liberalize its "domestic system and the moderation of its foreign policy." 25

Former Senator Eugene McCarthy, an outspoken critic of American foreign policy and its military dimension, believes that progress in the areas of arms limitation, trade, and cultural agreements can aid in the process of detente, and begin the reassessment of American foreign policy that he believes necessary. Cooperation in fields outside the scope of political and military concerns can contribute to lessening the prospects of nuclear war, which is the aim of detente.

McCarthy strongly suggests that the United States must initiate nuclear weapons reductions, unilaterally if necessary, because of our overabundance of nuclear weapons that no longer serve any political or military purpose. Such prodigious amounts of nuclear weapons, McCarthy asserts, only force the Soviets to develop further weapons systems. As far as McCarthy is concerned, the Soviets can go right on producing more weapons. The United States should not. 26

Paul Warnke, former General Counsel at the Defense Department, key adviser to Senator George McGovern's presi-

idential campaign, and chief arms negotiator in the SALT Talks for the Carter administration, focused upon the need for detente to end global political conflicts, and the necessity for arms control. During a November, 1973 "Symposium" sponsored by the "Coalition for a Democratic Majority," Warnke expressed an opinion to which many detentists subscribe: there is no alternative to detente. Included in this view is Warnke's tolerance of Soviet behavior. Detente, to Warnke, is a chance worth taking. Since there is no alternative to detente, the United States must excuse certain actions on the part of the Soviet Union which the United States does not approve, but nevertheless must accept. Such a view of Soviet-American relations places Warnke firmly in favor of detente policy. The opponents of detente would remark that it is precisely because of Soviet behavior and its history of "bad manners" that makes any real detente improbable. 27

In discussing the Soviet potential for "risk-taking" during the Middle East War of 1973, for example, Warnke saw no violation of detente by the Soviets, but did view the American alert as ill-advised.

The reaction of the United States at that point was very mixed. We brandished a very big stick but at the same time we spoke softly. The worldwide nuclear alert was a meaningless and dangerous charade. 28

28. Ibid., p.2.
Commenting on the Soviet threat to rescue the encircled Egyptian Third Army, and to give assistance to the Syrians, Warnke believed the United States also exerted pressure upon Israel not to proceed with the decimation of the Third Army, and to acquiesce in a cease-fire.

It is an instance not of a failure of detente, but of the exercise of detente. You may question whether or not it was a paper exercise, but it seems to me it demonstrates that detente lives.29

Warnke, like so many others that approve of detente, notices the fact that the Soviets probably will continue to seek areas where their political and military power can penetrate to their advantage. In these instances, provocative actions on the part of the Soviet Union must be forcefully discouraged.

If we are going to pursue detente with the Soviet Union we must make clear to them that we cannot tolerate intervention by them that will bring new areas under their exclusive control.30

Perhaps Kissinger, the architect of detente, would remind Warnke that detente commenced with the need to eliminate the "search for marginal advantages." If the Soviets continue to maneuver in the game of power politics, seeking to exert control in spheres that will provide the Soviets "new areas under their exclusive control," then the realists may be justified in asking what is the difference between detente and Cold War?

29. Ibid., p.2.
30. Ibid., p.2.
The military dimension of détente has also spurred a debate that is as controversial and far-reaching as the political questions. In this matter, the detentists do not accept the proposition of the opponents that the Soviet Union is preparing itself for a potential first-strike capability. The probability that the Soviet Union would entertain such thoughts of a nuclear war-winning capability is dismissed as Cold War rhetoric, as is the notion that the Soviets can achieve a strategic superiority. Little can be discovered in pro-détente literature that recognizes a serious alternative to the present parity as agreed to by both sides.

Gene R. LaRocque, Rear Admiral (Retired), and presently Director, Center for Defense Information, is confident that the armed forces of the United States and NATO can withstand any type of Soviet attack, and in a nuclear exchange the United States can obliterate the Soviet Union. Admiral LaRocque, in testimony before the Senate Detente Hearings, stated his unqualified support for détente. Detente, LaRocque argued, is advantageous for the United States, since it is based on American nuclear strength which can withstand any Soviet attack. LaRocque believes the Soviet Union could not win or survive a nuclear war, and would fail if it attempted to "intimidate the U.S. militarily and achieve an advantage" because of American nuclear strength. Other

high-ranking military leaders, such as Admiral Zumwalt and General Graham strongly disagree with LaRocque's contention that the United States possesses preponderant military strength, or that the Soviet Union lacks the capability to militarily challenge the United States in areas of political concern.

In a pointed reference to those that support a much stronger military posture because of the presumed danger of an encroaching Soviet military superiority, LaRocque states that an analysis of Soviet military strength does not warrant such a conclusion. LaRocque believes that such warnings are the same "old rhetoric" that the cold warriors have repeated over the years, and only enable the "hardliners in the Soviet Union" to strengthen their position.32

In a 1975 analysis of the fiscal year 1976 Pentagon budget, LaRocque and two staff members of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, staff member David Johnson, and Herbert York, a nuclear physicist and a one-time top Defense Department adviser to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, offered a list of counter-proposals. What their propositions encompassed was to radically slow the American nuclear program, and conventional weaponry, with the result that the Soviets would soon follow suit. Their recommendations were:

32. Ibid., p.464.
1) Cancel the B-I Bomber.
2) Stop spending on new ICBM's.
3) Stop development of new strategic cruise missiles.
4) Stop ABM spending.
5) Slow Trident Program to one a year.
6) Place a ceiling of 10,000 on strategic weapons.
7) Reduce overseas tactical nuclear weapons.
8) Terminate obsolete military treaties.
9) Cut marginal overseas forces.
10) Don't increase army divisions.
11) Cancel airborne warning and control system.
12) Cancel SAM (surface to air missile) system.
13) Cancel XM-I tank program.
14) Reduce Operations and Maintenance.
15) Cut unnecessary military aid and arms sales.  

The existence of modern nuclear weapons and their gigantic cost and destructiveness has been at the center of the debate on détente in more than just a military sense. What is perplexing in this debate is the substantial absence of concern by the détentists about the possible political advantages that can be gained if one side commands even a nominal superiority. The détentists are primarily concerned with nuclear parity and the avoidance of further qualitative and quantitative improvements. As détente began as a policy to equalize the nuclear arsenals of both sides so as to control a spiraling arms race, it also sought to lessen the dangerous political consequences that the arms race has engendered. The 1973 Middle East War, and Soviet policies in Africa and Portugal, brought about a surge of anti-détente opinion that feared the political consequences of growing Soviet nuclear

power. It is remarkable that the detentists - unlike their opponents - have seemingly neglected the political opportunities that can conceivably follow military power. Rather, a policy that was initiated to end the "search for marginal advantages" between the two rivals, but which at least took into account the politics of the post-war world, retreated into a simple fear of nuclear war, where, paradoxically, the opportunity to use power politics to one's advantage is dismissed as either Cold War rhetoric, or paranoia over Soviet intentions. In this matter, the detentists are not as concerned over Soviet political pursuits as they are in regard to avoiding nuclear war.

Still another school of detente exists, a minority one to be sure: the "revisionists." The realists and the orthodox detentists have oft times in the past shared the same fundamental approach to political analysis. The differences in the context of the past decade are primarily over how power can best be used. The revisionists, who have attempted to revise and rewrite the history of the post-war world, stand out as a school of political opinion that in large measure expresses dissatisfaction with the entire course of post-war American foreign policy.

The revisionists garnered the greatest of their support during the civil protests of the 1960's and early 1970's. A variety of groups - many no longer in existence, but at one time having enjoyed a considerable popular following - con-
tributed to the strength of the revisionist school. The New Left, which became a sort of all inclusive description of protest groups, such as the SDS, The New Democratic Coalition, The Committee to End the War, and a variety of civil rights groups and campus activists, lent a varied assortment of opinions to the popularity and attractiveness of revisionism. Such movements and radical critiques of American foreign policy and domestic affairs often reflect many diverse opinions, by such individuals as Marxists Herbert Marcuse and Angela Davis, and non-Marxian "establishment" spokesmen like Senators McCarthy, McGovern and Fulbright.

The loose alignment of assorted groups and their diverging shades of beliefs gave revisionism its greatest strength. It has also been responsible for its rapid decline in recent years. As such, revisionist political thought could hardly survive amongst ideas that ranged from isolating America from further foreign involvements because of Viet Nam, to the opposite extreme of assisting "peoples liberation movements" around the globe. When the American involvement in Viet Nam began to scale down, and the civil rights movement entered a new stage, the appeal of revisionism receded with those issues and causes. Yet, the revisionist school continues to exist, primarily as a small academic community that continues to criticize American foreign poli-
Fred Warner Neal, Chairman of the International Relations faculty of the Claremont Graduate School and Chairman of the American Committee on U.S. - Soviet Relations, presents the type of revisionist analysis that harshly judges post-war American foreign policy. In an October, 1972 article, for example, Neal characterized the 1972 Basic Principles as a policy shift in the positions of both sides, but a particularly greater modification of policy for the United States. This alteration of policy for the United States was difficult because of Washington's past preoccupation and incorrect analysis of the Soviet Union's commitment to military expansion; the belief that Soviet ideological concerns would block any meaningful type of peaceful relations; and the "denial of Soviet core interest...and a reluctance to consider the neutralization of other areas" because of American containment policy. The result of all this, Neal states, has been a consistent American policy to rely on

34. The revisionist school of political thought holds to a number of minority viewpoints: American aggressiveness and rabid anti-Communism was responsible for the Cold War; American political and military power is used to protect "Wall Street" interests; and business and governmental elites from the "military-industrial" complex commands the predominant power in American government. This business-governmental alliance, the revisionists note, is unwilling to pursue a moral and idealistic foreign policy.

military superiority over the Soviet Union, which has made peaceful relations impossible. With the signing of the Basic Principles this American policy can no longer be supported.

Neal further asserts that if the Basic Principles are adhered to the Cold War has ended. For the first time, the United States made a "verbal...commitment to the idea of peaceful coexistence, as enunciated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956." Consequently, Neal believes, it will be particularly challenging for the United States to follow the Basic Principles because of past American attitudes. This will not be a hindrance for Soviet leaders, however, since "they are inclined to put more faith in such documents than we do."

As we shall see in quoting a few more statements from Neal, the revisionists saw in detente the end of an era of confrontation and crisis, made so prevalent in those years after the Second World War because of American refusal to realistically deal with legitimate Soviet concerns, and of a policy of confrontation that could have no other effect but to make the Soviet Union more militarily prepared to protect itself. All of America's errors, the revisionists mentioned could be pointed to in two terrible occurrences: the tragedy of Viet Nam, and the burning of America's cities,

36. Ibid., p.27.  
37. Ibid., p.27.
caused by the frustrations of an oppressed minority. New Left, or revisionist approaches, place a heavy emphasis upon domestic policies and attitudes in the formulation of foreign policy.

Detente, to the revisionists, was an American attempt to do what was right after the tragedy of Viet Nam. Since anti-Communism would no longer hold the national polity together, a radical shift in policy toward accommodation with the Communist world was necessitated, partially because of the "youth revolt" of the 1960's. American youth simply would not fight for a "guilty nation," particularly one which expended so little effort to erase domestic injustices. With problems at home, why should America expend so much effort abroad to hinder the threats of Communism? George F. Kennan, who has revised some of his earlier propositions, has on occasion agreed with the attitudes of the revisionists.

When I see the complacency in the face of the evils we have in our own civilization - the crime, the drugs, the pornography, the cynicism, the disillusionment - I wonder why these same people are so worried about an attack from the outside. I wish I could say to them, 'Look, show me an America in which these things have been overcome and then I will talk to you about how we are going to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union.' There is no use concentrating on the fancied danger outside the door when we have not mastered the greater danger inside.38

To the revisionists, the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente, particularly in its infancy, was one of the great turning points in American foreign policy. Of all people, Richard Nixon, the archetypal Cold Warrior, was attempting to end the conflicts between the two superpowers, and re-direct American policy toward accommodation. Detente had to be pursued and preserved, and nothing should stand in its way. The greatest danger that could befall detente, the revisionists believed, was not the actions of the Soviet Union, but the American domestic critics who would not foresake the psychology and politics of the Cold War. Professor Neal wrote:

This cold war psychology is still deep, and it is reflected in repeated exaggerations about Soviet strength and its aims and in the assertion that only the Russians get something out of detente, that we get nothing from it. I don't think we should say, 'Let the Russians prove they are worthy of detente.' Let us prove also that we are worthy of detente.39

To the revisionists, the vestiges of containment, anti-Communism, nuclear superiority, and the failure to recognize legitimate Soviet national interests were still alive, and could deliver a death blow to the new Soviet-American detente. Another danger was that of interference in Soviet internal affairs, especially the issue of tying trade and emigration. This is an unpardonable intrusion into the So-

39. Ibid., p.19.
viet domestic process, and America certainly has no right to demand of other states what we ourselves have failed at home.

In 1975, Professor Neal led an unofficial delegation of the American Committee on U.S. - Soviet relations to Moscow to assess the "damage" done by the Soviet reaction to the Congressional passage of the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Trade Act, which tied the emigration of Soviet Jews to the American granting of Most-Favored Nation status. Neal's observations of his Moscow visit, and his disappointment in the course that the detente critics had embarked upon, was incorporated in a letter he wrote, "Can the Soviet-American Detente be Salvaged?" His opening salvo was directed at the Congressional action, which "was contrary to all norms of international conduct." Neal believes that this action had not only a damaging effect upon the successful pursuance of a new relationship, but was an unnecessary provocation toward an already tenuous beginning.

Neal states that in his conversations with leading Soviet officials he was convinced they are truly interested in a new relationship - detente - even though the Trade Act was interpreted as a terrible stumbling block in that regard.

While stating that the Soviets can live without trade with the United States, the

primary interest of the Soviet Union in detente, it was insisted, is not in obtaining American credits and technology, but in being able to work out political and diplomatic agreements to prevent war, curtail nuclear armaments, and reduce international tensions.\textsuperscript{41}

In a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, Neal quotes him as stating:

'We are prepared to go very far in cooperation if you will only go along with us. We would be stupid not to see that peace and reduction of tensions, and therefore our welfare as well as yours, depends on American-Soviet detente. The Soviet Union is not stupid.' The American Committee on U.S. - U.S.S.R. Relations...hopes that the United States is 'not stupid.'\textsuperscript{42}

The supporters of the Nixon-Kissinger detente came from a many and varied lot. Having spent years in study, or decades as experienced diplomats, they perceived of detente as a policy process to draw the United States and the Soviet Union into some type of arrangement to lessen the dangers of nuclear war. The Nixon-Kissinger approach to foreign policy always kept the Soviet Union as the center of attention. The stakes being as high and dangerous as they are, the U.S. - Soviet global interaction could never be shoved to the sidelines. For too long, the detente supporters would explain, the Soviet-American rivalry had kept the world teetering on the brink of a massive nuclear holocaust. The political, military and ideological competition that pitted the two superpowers against each other had to be reduced to diminish

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.10.  
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.12.
the threats of a terrible conflagration. The history of the names, places and events of these conflicts are fresh in the memory of many - sketched from the end of World War II to the present, a history that unfolded rapidly and with great energy, a history of conflict, but, nevertheless, one with some degree of cooperation in specific instances.

The ideological imperatives that each side adhered to, each feared by the other, is a struggle of ideas and power. Buy beyond all of these political, military and ideological vicissitudes lay the spectre of nuclear war, where one mistake, one miscalculation, could bring unbelievable horror and havoc upon each side. As each event led to another, like chips being stacked in a poker game, sooner or later one side would feel fortified and confident enough to call the other's bluff. Sooner or later, one side would attempt to cash in all the chips.

The political events that led to this monumental struggle would have to be redirected to avoid an almost certain catastrophe, the detente supporters would argue. After it became apparent that the Soviets had a different interpretation of detente and the Basic Principles than the United States, the detentists would state that to expect a quarter century of direct conflict to wither away was unrealistic, and that only through the pointed determination of both sides to cooperate, find areas of accommodation, and search for
further arms limitations, could the world avoid a nuclear nightmare. The opposition that was attempting to redirect this recent accommodation - said the detentists - were the "Cold Warriors," or those who would accept the benefits of detente accruing only to the American side; those that continued to see the world through the spectacles of an obsolete Cold War psychology. In conjunction with these attitudes was the perception of the detentists that the Soviet Union and the United States were still competitors on a global scale, with conflicts that would continue to plague both sides, but, nevertheless, conflicts of a more traditional political nature, less subject to the irrationalities of a military and ideological kind.

When the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente reached its apex, with all the dramatics that attended it, the opponents of detente were silent. Here was an administration that was ending the active American involvement in Viet Nam; had journeyed to China in a historic gesture; and had negotiated a number of far-reaching agreements with the Soviets. The prospects of a new future blocked any possibility of a great attack on detente. But when the Nixon administration began to feel the political effects of Watergate, and the Soviet action in the Middle East called into question what detente was all about, the opponents spoke forcefully, and not just on the prior issues of the Cold War, but on the issue of de-
tente itself. The detentists tried desperately to salvage what they could in this regard, and at least stay some type of course to avoid repeating what they perceived as errors of the past. No matter what political, military and economic agreements would be reached, one matter would continue to burden the detentists in this debate: the question of human rights.
CHAPTER VII

DETENTE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's approach to foreign policy questions invoked the traditional balance of power concept. Both men preferred to analyze the world political and military condition in terms of power. Quite naturally, they sought to devise strategies whose central point would be the maximum use of power to resolve some of the outstanding issues that embroiled the Soviet-American competition. Part of their preference for this reliance on power was the interpretation by many foreign policy experts that the ideological competition between the two superpowers was rapidly receding amidst more vital questions. Specifically, certain analysts noted a decreasing Soviet reliance on ideology, and a growing desire to negotiate conflicting issues with the West in terms of power and self-interest. An ancillary notion of this interpretation entertained the belief that the age of ideology was over, and that the Soviets had also accepted this "reality." This was considered a new and positive atmosphere in which to resolve some aspects of the political and military rivalry. Instead of an ideological fight, which is always difficult to resolve,
questions of war and peace could now be approached and negotiated in a more "practical" environment. This was especially appealing to the American side. Nixon and Kissinger could engage in a strategy that took into account power for power.

It is important to recognize the value which the Nixon administration placed in its preference for the use of power, and what this spelled for the question of human rights. The administration perceived the issue of human rights as an element within the ideological spectrum, an element that should be avoided. This judgment was necessitated, the administration reasoned, because of two influences. One, if the administration was to negotiate successfully with Communist states, specifically the Soviet Union, touchy and embarrassing issues such as human rights had to be avoided. To incorporate concern for human rights on the negotiating level with strategic arms talks, and political questions over Berlin, the Middle East, Viet Nam, and what was beginning to unfold as the administration's stated détente relationship, any hope for a modification of views on specific issues could be jeopardized. These were questions of political and military power, and they should not be burdened by emotionally charged moral concerns.

The second influence which the administration perceived as cautioning against any human rights element actively involved in direct American foreign policy, was the domestic environment affected by the war in Viet Nam.
Asia conflict sparked a debate which called into question many of the tenets thought basic to American foreign policy. Many of the domestic critics of the Viet Nam involvement charged that excessive anti-Communism had led the United States into the Viet Nam misadventure, and that the American position on human rights was just another element in that excessive preoccupation. So the Nixon administration, which had chosen a foreign policy that would concern itself primarily with the elements of power that accrued from the political and military foundations of each superpower's strength, found support for silently disregarding human rights because of the Viet Nam War. The best policy to follow, the administration believed, was to avoid the issue of human rights.

The Nixon administration thought, quite correctly, that if the issue of human rights was actively invoked as a "pillar" of American foreign policy, it would inevitably point to the Soviet Union as one of the most consistent abusers. If such a situation were allowed to occur, it would be inevitable that the human rights concern would progress from identification to intervention. Once a state was identified as having a dismal record in human rights, some type of intervention into that nation's internal affairs would ultimately ensue. The administration was cognizant of Soviet sensitivity in such matters. The Soviets know from past experience that they will be so identified, and that human rights will be engaged as a weapon to interfere in their
domestic environment.

The Nixon, and eventually Gerald Ford administration, therefore purposefully attempted to downplay the issues of human rights because of the provocative effect this issue would have concerning negotiation on strategic arms, trade, and other political questions. Both administrations believed that it would not be possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union within the broad context of détente if issues such as human rights were being directed at Moscow. Moscow would—and eventually did—retort to Washington that the human rights movement was resulting in peace being threatened. Two events can show how the issue of human rights affected the political dimensions of détente.

The first such instance was the concern over Soviet Jews, and their right to emigrate to Israel and the West. Senator Henry Jackson, one of the most outspoken critics of détente, sponsored legislation in 1972, along with Congressman Vanik, to link emigration of Soviet Jewry to American granting of Most-Favored-Nation status. This proposal met with considerable opposition from Henry Kissinger, who felt that this type of linkage would adversely affect political and economic negotiations. An ideological linkage could only strain a most sensitive beginning in the détente process. Eventually, Kissinger was able to extract from the Soviets a higher number of Soviet citizens that would be allowed to emigrate. But in 1975 the Soviets informed Washington that
they could not accept the provisions imposed on the 1972 trade agreement.

A second incident was the refusal of President Ford to meet with Alexander Solzhenitsyn. This decision was urged upon Ford by Secretary Kissinger, who felt that such a symbolic gathering would embarrass the Soviet Union and Secretary Brezhnev. This act was a major mistake on the part of the administration, for it aroused the indignation of many concerned observers, who now felt that the detente relationship had completely abandoned any type of moral concerns in the international arena.

At the Senate Detente Hearings in 1974, Secretary Kissinger spoke of the difficulty of injecting issues of human rights into the political relationship between the two superpowers.

Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace - not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values too.¹

This attitude on the part of Secretary Kissinger, and the Nixon and Ford administrations, found a number of important and influential allies, who believed that the possibilities to reduce tension outweighed the admittedly moral goals

¹ Detente Hearings, p.239.
of the human rights movement. These observers speculated that if human rights were to be made an integral part of American foreign policy, demanding of the Soviets a modified domestic behavior, then the Soviets could justifiably claim that such policies were an unwarranted intrusion into their internal affairs, and a weapon to attack the very foundations of their regime. Knowing how the Soviets react to such political forays into their domestic affairs, the supporters of Kissinger's policy were cognizant of the Soviet response: interference into Soviet domestic affairs is a direct attack on Moscow's power, and future agreements in economic, cultural, political and military spheres will be exceedingly more difficult to negotiate.

Former Ambassador George Kennan was critical of the Congress for interjecting human rights requests, such as the emigration of Soviet Jews, into negotiations on economic matters, particularly Most-Favored-Nation status and other commercial agreements. Kennan felt that Kissinger's policy of neglecting the human rights issue as a specific foreign policy weapon was wise, especially in view of the effect of basing our commercial relationship with the Soviet Union on the granting of exit visas for Soviet Jews. Kennan felt that the executive branch was much more capable of using the issue of Most-Favored-Nation status as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets, rather than allowing the Congress
to attach too many conditions to its use by way of legisla-

tion.\textsuperscript{2}

In the 1974 Senate Detente Hearings, Kennan was expli-

citly critical of those who wished to attach, or link, the

emigration of Soviet Jews to commercial matters. Kennan felt

that it was improper to single out one religious or racial


group to benefit from the Congressional legislation, while

other groups in the Soviet Union would not. But beyond this

objection is Kennan's belief that the United States should

not interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, par-

ticularly those in the Soviet Union, actions that we would

not tolerate if directed at Washington. Kennan stated:

Why only the Soviet Union? Are we sure there are no

other countries where citizens would have difficulty in

obtaining permission to leave the country at will? And

do we really wish to convey the impression that we object

to such restrictive policies only when they are pursued

by the Soviet authorities, but condone it in other in-

stances?\textsuperscript{3}

Kennan does not believe that the issue of human rights

should be completely dismissed from the totality of American

foreign policy. Rather, human rights has a most important

part to play in expressing the American desire that govern-

ments do have a moral responsibility to treat their citizens

"more closely to the universal ideals of tolerance and re-

spect for what have now come to be known as human rights."\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p.62.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p.63.

\textsuperscript{4} George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little,

Kennan states that the overwhelming issue is the political question of how the United States and the Soviet Union can coexist together without resorting to war, and not the issue of human rights. The Soviet Union "asked for trouble, of course, when it signed the Helsinki declarations on human rights,"\(^5\) Kennan says, and American policy must be to remind the Soviets of their obligations, delicately placing pressure on the Soviets to abide by these agreements, but not in a publicly forceful manner that most always forces the Soviets to toughen-up on their political dissidents.

Professor Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, has supported Nixon and Kissinger's détente efforts. He agrees with Kennan that political and military considerations are of the utmost priority, and not issues which unrealistically aim to disrupt the Soviet domestic system. A lengthy period of reduced tension is the most realistic avenue of which to change a substantial amount of the repressiveness of the Soviet regime, Shulman states. Like Kennan and Kissinger, Shulman believes that human rights does have a role to play, but primarily outside the bounds of concerted governmental policy, and by "avoiding frontal public confrontations of the Soviet leadership by demands from our government for concessions in their system which exceed a reasonable scale of feasibility."\(^6\)

Rather, Shulman stated before the Senate Detente Hearings, human rights issues should be directed by individuals and groups to call attention to Soviet violations of human rights, an effort that Shulman believes will have the most effect on Moscow.

Adam Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, echoes the same concerns about human rights as his colleague Professor Shulman. While somewhat more supportive of human rights as a political policy directed at the Soviet Union to end governmental repression, he nevertheless cautions against any publicly directed governmental policy to attach human rights issues to political questions. While stating that his sympathies lie with those who support the aims of the Jackson Amendment, he views such Congressional actions as counterproductive. 7

What eventually transpired from detente's heyday in 1972 to the 1974 Senate Detente Hearings, was a clear identification of the groups and issues that divided the supporters and opponents of detente. What this meant for human rights became even more clearly represented after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Those individuals and groups that supported Nixon and Kissinger's efforts in the political-military arena tended to follow that policy in the human rights field. Progress in areas of direct political and

7. Ibid., p.114.
military concern should not be burdened by a governmental policy that attached human rights as a negotiating issue. Although this view on what importance should be attributed to human rights had a significant following, it too began to recede amidst other events that were eroding the political-military aspects of détente. Still, significant elements of the political establishment continued to voice their support for a policy that they believed would reduce Cold War tensions. In their approach to a Soviet-American détente, such influential political leaders as Senators Fulbright, McGovern, Church, Pell, and former Ambassador Averell Harriman, spoke in favor of approaching the Cold War conflict in a typical Kissingerian manner: negotiate the most significant political-military issues that divide the two superpowers (and in so doing, hoping the Soviets will accept a truce), and refrain from creating additional conflicts because of Soviet human rights violations.

The opponents of détente had always thought it a mistake to relegate the human rights issue to a compassionate silence. Of course the Soviet Union would be singled out, the critics responded, because of its massive power. But on the human rights subject, the West held an ideal trump card: when it came to preserving and defending basic human and political rights, the Soviets could not compete.

The opponents of détente did not accept the Nixon-Kissinger view that ideology had succumbed to power and self-
interest between the two superpowers. Ideological questions were still important, and were bound to continue, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. This view took the form of perceiving the superpower rivalry as a contest between the totalitarian Communism of the Soviet variety, and the democratic nations of the West. Implicit in this contest that knows no detente is the human rights subject that should be utilized as a weapon in negotiations with the Soviets. What the detente opponents were stating was a simple tit-for-tat: If the Soviets can justifiably continue to spread their Marxist creed globally, and in a bellicose manner, then why should the West discard its most powerful ideological weapon because it will upset Soviet sensitivities. And if the Soviets can aid "national liberation movements" wherever they wish, then why can't the West assist the Soviet dissidents?

The political question of human rights was brought to its fullest light during the 1976 Presidential campaign, and afterward by President Carter, who would not follow President Ford's decision of refusing to grant an audience with Soviet dissidents. Domestic political benefits notwithstanding, the nature of human rights in a political context was fraught with important symbolisms. Prior to Solzhenitsyn's snub by President Ford, and Jimmy Carter's human rights campaign, a number of groups, intellectuals, and foreign policy activists believed that the issue of human rights should be used as a
political weapon against the Soviet Union. Once again the American labor movement was in the forefront of those who strenuously spoke and lobbied for insistence on basic human rights.

Daniel P. Moynihan, in describing the destruction of the once potent anti-war coalition of the poor and the college-educated, and the generational conflicts between the young and the older generation, remarked that this generational divisiveness was not all inclusive. The American labor movement's leaders, in part because they have not encountered such generational conflicts, have not wavered in their support of the libertarian commitment implicit in our post-war policy. Were President Kennedy to return, they - many of them - would wish him to sound that very trumpet once again. 8

In George Meany's detente testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he pointedly described in what manner organized labor views detente. The American labor movement, Meany stated, was not limited to the bread-and-butter issues of wages and other economic matters. A concern for questions of freedom throughout the world was something that organized labor was compelled to maintain because of tradition and policy. The aspects of power politics and military affairs in American foreign policy have always interested organized labor. But at the heart of their overview of foreign policy is the question of the degree of freedom

in the global community. Where a state deems it necessary to restrict the freedom of its citizens in the political sphere, the abrogation of freedom in the economic sector is a logical corollary. Thus, the AFL-CIO recognizes that trade union independence is dependent upon the political structure of a state that tolerates its existence. The Soviet Union is singled out by organized labor as the prime example of intolerance because it is the most powerful of the totalitarian nations. In describing labor's "score card" of detente, it is this philosophy that has prompted George Meany to state:

So, in appearing before this committee, the AFL-CIO is not departing from the best traditions of the labor movement, but rather continuing a long tradition of involvement and concern - a tradition of caring about working people everywhere, about the cause of freedom everywhere. And this is the vantage point from which we look at this thing called detente.9

Professor Roy Godson of the Political Science Department at Georgetown University, who has been active in labor union affairs as an international relations adviser, points to labor's dual focus on the political questions involved in U.S. - Soviet relations, as well as on the human rights issue.

American labor contends that if in the future there is to be peace and genuine detente, the Soviet leadership must not only make concessions to match those already made by the West in arms control negotiations, but must improve the political and social conditions of the people living

under its control. Only under these circumstances can
the West 'stand down.' Meanwhile, the United States and
its allies must maintain and even increase their strength
as well as keep their commitments, particularly to
NATO.10

Another issue that American labor is particularly con-
cerned about is the so-called alliance between American in-
dustrialists and the Soviet leadership. Ever since the poli-
cy of détente began, American industry has perceived the So-
viet Union as a great market that offered undreamed-of prof-
its and materials. The Soviets themselves helped further
this notion as another reason for détente, along with their
more pragmatic need for Western technology, loans and cred-
its. American labor views these capitalists as furthering
only their pursuit for greater profits as a paramount inter-
est of their corporations, while the Soviet leadership can
continue their policy of denying greater freedom to their
people. In a 1977 issue of American Federationist, Lane
Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, voiced his con-
cern over the "private group composed of American free enter-
prisers and Soviet commissars," the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Trade
and Economic Council, "who meet with some frequency in the
spirit of fraternity."11

10. Roy Godson, "American Labor's Continuing Involvement in

11. Lane Kirkland, "Labor's Voice in World Affairs," Ameri-
can Federationist, (Jan. 1977), p.3.
Kirkland believes that the motive for this association, particularly on the American part, is simply to explore means for greater economic investment and markets in the Soviet Union, while acquiesing in the Soviet desire to see less emphasis placed by the Congress on the "tiresome insistence on the freer movement of people or on the contents of the Third Basket of the Helsinki Agreement."  

The AFL-CIO has made its position known on the question of human rights in resolution form at its Executive Council conventions. One of the more recent examples is the February, 1977 session, when the Human Rights Resolution was unanimously passed. It stated:

The AFL-CIO Executive Council strongly endorses and commends the position and actions of President Carter in support of human rights as a basic tenet of American foreign policy. By speaking out unequivocally on specific cases of oppression, as well as in general terms, he has established for his entire administration the principle that human rights constitutes the line at which diplomatic expediency must stop.

This concern of American labor with human rights versus the political dynamics of detente can be reduced to one common denominator which has had a spill-over effect, and has found allies which have sprung from other sources as well: the politics of ideas. One basic reality exists today that distinguishes the whole panoply of life, society, and poli-

12. Ibid., p.3.
tics of East and West, and that basic idea is the fundamental question of freedom. Particularly in recent years, the AFL-CIO has perceived the world condition in terms of the totalitarians versus the democracies of Western Europe, India, Israel, the United States and others, what has been called in some quarters "the West." With so many nations of the Third World preferring left-wing ideologies, American labor believes that this type of preference for states such as the Soviet Union and Cuba will inevitably breed totalitarianism, the destruction or abrogation of free trade unionism, military and economic support from the Soviet Union, and the support of "national liberation" movements on a global basis, which are directed against the West in general. Such an assault upon the libertarian ideals of freedom and representative democracy no longer are confined to an esoteric debate amongst scholars and the political leadership. To many observers, the politics of totalitarianism seem to have bred a force of its own.

Former United Nation's Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, voiced such concerns in a 1975 speech before the AFL-CIO National Convention. Carl Gershman, Executive Director of the Social Democrats, U.S.A., and a trade union activist, described Moynihan's speech as a warning to Western democracy that it is under assault from totalitarian nations, and that this "major crisis" is not "merely economic and military, but
more fundamentally, political and ideological."\textsuperscript{14} Ideas in politics do matter, Moynihan believes, especially in view of the ideological battle raging between the totalitarians and the democracies. To Moynihan, the totalitarians "will seek whatever opportunities come to hand to destroy that which threatens them most, which is democracy."\textsuperscript{15}

The Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted the encroachments by the human rights activists in the West by responding that their appeals are provocative in nature, and will imperil detente. They also object to their being singled-out as the primary target, particularly by those who envision the issue of human rights in the context of a political weapon, not just a humanitarian gesture without teeth. Daniel Moynihan responded to such Soviet objections by stating that the Soviets know very well why they are singled out by the human rights activists: they are the most powerful of totalitarian nations, and "their ideology which, since the passing of Nazism and the eclipse of fascism as a school of political thought, remains the only major political doctrine that challenges human rights in principle."\textsuperscript{16}

Another area where human rights and detente joined in a political-ideological controversy was in the situation in

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.1.
Portugal in 1975. After the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had ended, Western European concern over Soviet conduct, brought about by the events in Portugal in which the Soviets were actively supporting Communist military and political forces, heightened fears and suspicions that the Soviets were reneging on their promises made at the Security Conference. One week after the conclusion of the Conference, a meeting of West European Socialist Prime Ministers and Party Chairmen gathered in Stockholm. C. L. Sluzberger reported for the New York Times:

With considerably more gumption than the Helsinki affair, the ideologically unified Stockholm meeting voted to back Democratic Socialism in Portugal, including guarantees of a free press, free parties and free labor unions.17

Present at the meeting when a plan was formulated to actively oppose the Portuguese Communists and Soviet intervention in Portugal, were Mario Soares, Chairman of the Portuguese Social-Democratic Party; Premiers Olaf Palme of Sweden, Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, Harold Wilson of Great Britain, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, Bruno Kreisky of Austria, and Socialist statesmen such as Willy Brandt of West Germany and Francois Mitterrand of France. These leaders and spokesmen were concerned with what they observed as a mounting Soviet drive to "detach" Portugal from Western Europe. James Reston, writing for the New York Times on August 13, 1975,

reported:

We are beginning to see already how the Soviet Union intends to interpret the principles of the Helsinki Conference to promote its own revolutionary objectives even in Western Europe. At the end of the conference...the Soviet Union signed a document in support of the most fundamental human rights, and it should be noted, as a symbol of the cynicism of the age, that the first to invoke the Helsinki principles were the Soviets, of all peoples, and in Portugal, of all places... There is not a single principle in this catalogue that is not being violated and brutalized by the alliance now running Portugal with recent financial aid from Moscow... This is the weakness of the Helsinki Agreement, for there is no agreement on what detente means.18

The question of human rights versus the dynamics of politics in this nuclear world will continue to breed conflict and debate. It is understandable that in the nuclear age, where two great competing giants must continually caution themselves, the struggle for human rights would be pushed into the background. Where the interplay of powerful political, economic and military forces manifest themselves, the formidable problems over the fate of one's fellows cannot remain neglected, despite such forces that possess such tremendous power. Such is what has transpired in the debate over detente. Can the dynamics of politics leave aside or fail to meet the demands for human respectability by powerful modern governments? The human rights debate has proved that it cannot. To those in the West that have wrangled over this problem, both sides have held to legitimate positions that bear a truth in each segment. The detentists are rightly concerned

when they caution against a human rights campaign directed primarily at the Soviet Union as an undue interference in Soviet domestic affairs, and injurious to a process of rapprochement where the survival of civilization is at stake. Contrariwise, those who speak for human rights, specifically as a political weapon, are correct when they state that a nation that fails to guarantee its citizens basic political rights is hardly a trustworthy partner in the process to secure some sort of decrease in international tension. Somewhere the two positions must meet if the United States is to develop a foreign policy that takes into account the elements of calculated power, and the respect for basic political human rights that our Western traditions demand, and rightly refuse to foresake.
EPILOGUE

The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found peace or security, and that we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those we have surmounted.¹

- Winston Spencer Churchill
March, 1948

Winston Spencer Churchill, that great captain of war and politics, was unquestionably correct in his evaluation of the world condition only three years after the last of the Great Wars had ended. It is no less true today. The defeat of Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan at the hands of the Allies had raised hopes that conflict and war on a global scale would cease, and that the most powerful nations would find that their interests could best be served by living peacefully with each other without resorting to violence and bloodshed. Such aspirations were dashed amidst the territorial and political ambitions of Stalin in Central and Eastern Europe, and by the proliferation and popularity of Marxism among significant and determined nationalistic

forces globally. Perhaps it would have been wise for Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and the foreign policy establishment in power in this country during the last ten years, to recall Churchill's perceptive and prophetic warnings. A terrible political miscalculation was made, and it is called 'detente.'

What the decades after the close of the Second World War have proven is that a Marxist revolutionary power will not accept stability. The ideology of the Marxian creed knows little compatibility with forces that are opposed to it inside the borders of Communist nation-states, nor even in those neighboring states that refuse to accept its tenets. Of course, this is not always the case. Yugoslavia stands as an exception, but only because Tito's political survival depends on the West to protect him from his Soviet "brethren." Nevertheless, Churchill would have been declared the world's greatest political clairvoyant if his visionary powers could have predicted a Cuban army slugging its way through Africa, while the United States sat on the sidelines, refusing to assist anti-Communist forces. What responsibility Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger share for this political miscalculation called detente is dependent upon a number of global events that have transpired, the forces these events have unleashed, and the culpability the two men share for believing that the Soviet Union would reside as a
responsible member of the global community. Perhaps a review of history is required to find some answers.

The Congress of Vienna has been shown to be a political success because the nations involved in those deliberations were not revolutionary states, concerned with overthrowing the political structures that had existed for centuries. No revolutionary power existed among the victors. Each nation accepted the political legitimacy and sovereignty of its neighbors. Political, national and territorial differences did eventually lead to war, as with Bismarck’s Prussian adventures to unify Germany, but not at the expense of overturning an entire society and ruling elite. Such has not been the case for six decades of the Twentieth Century, where Soviet Russia has opted to spread on a global scale a revolutionary ideology that does not respect legitimacy, sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity, or tolerance for diverging views. Rather, it has only respected power that can oppose it forcefully.

Hitler’s Germany also attempted to change the political boundaries of Europe. The victorious states that met after Hitler’s defeat differed from the Congress of Vienna because a revolutionary state was included in the membership of the victors. The Congress succeeded in establishing and preserving legitimacy and stability for a century because all of the participants agreed that such goals were desirable and
politically beneficial for their own survival. Such was not the case in the atmosphere that existed following Germany's surrender. A Marxist revolutionary state opposed Nazi Germany, and with great pains sealed, along with its Western allies, Berlin's demise. What eventually emerged was simply the case of an ideological state that has no interest in preserving stability and order, victorious over a defeated and vanquished ideological state that hardly respected those attributes either. Has there been any indication since that time that the Soviet Union has altered its policy to anything different, and will accept and abide by a peaceful reciprocity of competing interests? The answer is mostly in the negative, and this has been the source of the political, military, and ideological competition between the two superpowers.

Certain elements in the American political establishment, particularly since the Viet Nam War, have miscalculated the political and military intentions of the Soviet Union. Diverse influences were partially responsible for the political miscalculations, some of which are understandable in their effect upon policy considerations that inevitably dealt with America's strongest rival. These influences have been mentioned at great length in this thesis. The desire to avoid a nuclear war has exerted the most preponderant force in motivating both rivals to understand that while they may
compete, a final resolution of the conflict could result in a nuclear nightmare. But such understandable fears, especially from the American side, should not result in a policy whereby the Soviet Union is thought to be any different than what it is. The goals of détente, of limiting the strategic arms race and attempting to resolve the political conflicts that pit the two superpowers on a global scale, have resulted on the part of the United States in a curious, yet dangerous confusing of humanitarian goals on the one hand, and what are the political ambitions of the Soviet Union on the other.

What cannot be dismissed by any means in causing the malaise in American foreign policy are the still powerful and lasting effects of the Viet Nam War. The American failure in Southeast Asia caused the foreign policy elite such consternation and embarrassment that past policies that had shown strength and success in at least placing formidable roadblocks against Soviet expansionism, were thought to be dreadful and disastrous policies that were no longer honorable. It was as if the foreign policy establishment had been charged with thirty years of malfeasance, and silently plea bargained itself into an admission of guilt rather than publicly and forceably standing up for its past accomplishments. The protracted American effort in Viet Nam caused a national debate that resulted in an attempt to rectify the Viet Nam failure by reassessing the history and conduct of
not only our foreign policy, but a new reassessment of Soviet foreign policy as well. The demands to change American foreign policy unfortunately seemed to take priority over the most important political question that Washington has to face: once again, what are the political ambitions of the Soviet Union? Coupled with this problem is the unique American proclivity to constantly berate itself with guilt complexes, which can only result, and has resulted in, a stymied foreign policy that fails to act. For the purposes of analyzing American foreign policy and détente, the history and events of the Cold War resulted in a demand to control the nuclear arms race, and reassess our global view because of the failure in Viet Nam. It was such a progression of events, the result of the Cold War conflict since 1945, and demands for a reassessment and modification of American foreign policy that challenged the administration of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

It is understandable why two such figures approached the primary question of America's relationship with its first rival, and the ideological forces that it assists, in the manner that was chosen. Powerful domestic forces were clamoring for a scaling down of the Viet Nam imbroglio, and for a new foreign policy less concerned with attempting to influence events such as we had successfully done with the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Berlin blockade, Korea, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Granted, the domestic pressures that flowed from the resentment of a failed foreign adventure were tremendous, enough to bewilder any administration with questions of what to do next. Richard Nixon, as politician, could not escape such conditions. But, nevertheless, were such pressures valid reason to embark on a new foreign policy that redefined our perception of the Cold War and the First Enemy? Not only were such modifications of American policy judged mandatory to avoid future Viet Nam's, but also for scholars such as Henry Kissinger, they resulted in a rethinking of how power can best be exercised in a nuclear and unstable world. This rethinking of past policy, and what future course we should follow to serve our own national interests without tearing asunder alliances with old and needed friends, would be the roots of the debate on detente. But, first and foremost, was the question of power, and how it should be used.

Detente, as presented and explained by Nixon and Kissinger, was a new policy that took into account a number of "realities" that America would have to accept if a truly viable and consistent foreign policy could be developed and sustained. The fragmentation in the Communist Bloc; the emergence of the Soviet Union as a first-class nuclear power that had finally closed the gap with the United States in strategic arms, thereby ending American nuclear superiority; the increasing attractiveness of Marxism in the Third World
nations; and the increasing interdependence between nations to solve various problems, were all thought to have exerted an influence upon Washington to modify American foreign policy toward less combative policies, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and to seek a truce between the two superpowers. These realities as spelled out by Nixon and Kissinger were joined with the view that nations would conduct their foreign affairs less subject to ideology, and more in accord with the traditional needs of power and self-interest. If such interpretations were correct, the opportunities to lessen the Cold War conflict, and solve common problems, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, could be a possible avenue through which to re-direct American foreign policy toward a plan of action that would convince other states to accept some sort of global order and stability, less subject to the rigors of the Cold War and ideological stresses.

By the 1960's it became apparent, Kissinger believed, that the traditional modes of foreign policy as practiced by the superpowers were no longer relevant. With the United States and the Soviet Union on an equal nuclear footing, each strong enough to destroy the other, a reappraisal of each superpower's world position was necessitated because of the equality in force levels, and the dangers attendant to them in conflicts involving weaker states. As such, Kissinger reasoned, the pursuit of "marginal advantages" over an op-
ponent was now obsolete. A gain in strategic military strength did not necessarily mean that one could capitalize on such force to a political advantage.

Perhaps from the relative safety of his Harvard classroom Kissinger could play with such theories, and because of his scholastic reputation and coming to power under Richard Nixon, convince others that his theory was correct. In the entire debate on détente, this view of Henry Kissinger's would provoke the most controversy, since any such application of this view of power would require the active acceptance by the Soviet Union of such an analysis. The Soviets did not accept such a prognosis, and for reasons which Kissinger and Nixon would belatedly understand. This was the major miscalculation of the entire détente process, for to convince the men that inhabit the sources of power in the Kremlin that military strength, and the political advantages that can be gained from it, are no longer pertinent in today's nuclear world is a fiction that would explode in the 1973 Middle East War, in Angola, Portugal, Ethiopia, Somalia, and in Viet Nam. In this regard, Kissinger and the détenteists share the greatest blame for this terrible miscalculation of Soviet intentions. Such fantastic appraisals of future Soviet behavior in a cooperative setting with the United States was totally devoid of sound political judgment.
In appearing before the 1974 Senate Detente Hearings, Kissinger said: "It is equally clear that the substance of detente will disappear in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility." Well, did he really expect the Soviets to act otherwise? The domestic structure of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union is built on "suspicion and hostility." The rulers in Moscow view the world only through their own political experiences. As Stalin's lieutenants, they survived because they were the most adept at doing unto others before others could do unto them. Politics to the commissars is permanent warfare, where power and survival is the prime consideration in any enterprise. Whether Mr. Brezhnev and company believe, as Nixon, Kissinger, and the detentists surmised, that ideology was no longer important and should not be an obstacle toward normalizing relations is not the question. The Communist Party believes that it is, if for no other reason than its own legitimate need to politically govern.

In May, 1972, the Basic Principles were signed in Moscow. The question of unilateral advantage of one superpower over another was of paramount consideration. Both nations expressed the opinion that detente could only be realized when such actions had ceased amidst the foundations of a new

2. Detente Hearings, p.259.
relationship and understanding of the danger of confrontation politics in the nuclear age. How have the Soviets conducted themselves since then? No different that at any other period: they continue to spread their power through violence, arming almost every left-wing "national liberation group" or revolutionary military clique that espouses hatred toward the West. And Moscow will continue to arm such groups because it is in their interest to do so.

The debate on detente did not cease with the passing from power of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Detente is still referred to at times, but no longer does it carry the hope toward a resolution of difficulties between the two superpowers that it once commanded. The international conflicts that embroil the superpowers with weaker states, and the competition for the oil resources in the Middle East, have dashed the idea that "marginal advantages" are no longer decisive. Whether in the area of strategic arms limitations, or in conflicts globally, the Soviet Union will continue to seek additions of power that will enhance Moscow's standing in the world community. Stability and peace will be acceptable to Moscow only when the Soviets are capable of dictating the nature of that stability and peace.

The United States and the West now stand at a crossroad. Do we survive as free and independent people and states, proud of our past, and willing to defend our future? Or do we succumb to the Soviet threat and fail to oppose
power with power because of fears of a cataclysmic disaster? Strategic arms limitations is important. The lessening of tensions is an ideal worth pursuing. But at what price? Not until the Soviet Union exhibits the temperament of a nation concerned with repudiating a violent past, and wishing to coexist as a responsible member of the global community, will a true detente show the possibilities of coming to fruition. That day seems remote.
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