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Cooptation, Strategy and Resource in Local Politics

Sheryl L. Knight
Loyola University Chicago

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COOPTATION: STRATEGY AND
RESOURCE IN LOCAL POLITICS

by
Sheryl L. Knight

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
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I also wish to thank anonymous members of the Evanston Police Department and the Residential Crime Prevention Committee for their cooperation in implementing this study. In describing and documenting the processual development of the RCPC, I have attempted to investigate the potential for coopticive strategies as an assuasive method for handling community protest. The description and analysis of the operation of coopticive processes with regard to the RCPC's activities is in no way intended to foreclose the existence of basic organizational goals of cooperation. Neither is it intended to color the intentions of the police department and citizens groups in developing closer police/community relations.
VITA

The author, Sheryl Lynn Knight, is the daughter of Chester Vernon Pollock and Mary Katherine (Kinney) Pollock. She was born July 4, 1954, in Danville, Illinois.

Her elementary education was obtained in the public schools of various midwestern cities, including Elgin, Illinois, Springfield, Illinois, and Grand Forks, North Dakota. She obtained her secondary education at Larkin High School, Elgin, Illinois, where she graduated in 1972.

In August, 1974, she entered Elgin Community College and in May, 1976, received the Associate Arts Degree. In January, 1976, she entered Loyola University of Chicago and in January, 1978, received the degree of Bachelor of Science, Cum Laude, with majors in both Psychology and Sociology.

In August, 1979, she was granted an assistantship in Sociology at Loyola University of Chicago and again in August, 1981. The author is also a member of the American Sociological Association.

In 1979, she co-authored a report entitled National Evaluation Program, Phase I Assessment of Shoplifting and Employee Theft Programs, Final Report—Programs and Strategies, Volumes I and II.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to analyze the social processes leading to the formation of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC), the social relations which developed within this committee and those relations developing between the committee members and city officials. It is seen as a contribution to the understanding of cooptation and the situations and circumstances in which it might occur. This study seeks to place the evolution of the RCPC within a historical and political situation where cooptation appears to be a viable social process.

The Residential Crime Prevention Committee was first conceptualized in a grant proposal written by the Evanston Police Department in 1979. This proposal was submitted to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) along with a request for funding for a three year period. While the study and analysis of crime prevention programs represents an important area for sociological research, it is not the intention of this study to either evaluate the crime prevention program developed by the RCPC or compare it to other programs across the nation.

As it was originally conceived, the RCPC was an overt attempt by the city police department to develop a working relationship between the police department and the larger community. Like the majority
of contemporary urban areas, Evanston had experienced an increasing crime rate which traditional methods of policing had been relatively ineffective in combating. This crime prevention grant called for the concerted efforts of citizens and police to develop a crime prevention program which met the needs and concerns of Evanston residents.

In the Fall of 1979, a new community group was formed which made the rising crime rate their issue of central concern. This community organization chose to place the responsibility for this crime problem squarely on the police department and on the chief of police as the administrator of this department. This group initially voiced its concern through legitimately recognized channels such as communication through the appropriate alderpersons or communication with the city manager's office. However, as the concerns of this group gained in intensity, protests were communicated directly to the city manager's office and the city council. As the issues and demands were developed and presented to city officials, these efforts were publicized and legitimized by the local community newspaper. Local mass media served to add "fuel" to a small scale conflict between a community organization and city officials.

This conflictive situation eventually led to a highly publicized controversy surrounding the competency of the police chief and the police organization as a whole. This controversy drew sufficient public attention so that city officials felt a need to respond to the charges and allegations against the department. Responses by the city administration took a variety of directions. Three general modes of
reaction can be delineated which are based on specific objects of criticism. The criticisms directed towards the Evanston Police Department (EPD) were aimed at the administrative, the organizational and the community levels.

While the original basis of the RCPC was a genuine desire to develop cooperation between residents and police in the prevention and solution of crime, it came to have a new meaning with the development of the police controversy. This study hypothesizes that as the police controversy gained in intensity, the RCPC became the object of cooptive efforts by both city and police administration. At the height of this controversy in 1980, the RCPC was cited by city and police officials as an example of the city's efforts to alleviate the crime problem. This study seeks to investigate the possibility that the RCPC was as a means whereby community leaders (including the leaders of the conflictive community group) would be "absorbed" into a committee charged with the responsibility of developing a residential crime prevention program which could be implemented on a city wide basis. This committee involvement would, in all probability, direct attention away from public criticism, and into a collaborative effort by citizens and police.

Research Methods

The information presented in this study has been gathered by a variety of research methods. Information on the historical situation in which the RCPC will be placed was gathered in two ways. Initial input and interest in the potential "cooptability" of the RCPC was the
result of the author's full time employment in the police department involved and as a member of the larger social network of which this organization was a part. Recognition of the RCPC as a potential source of cooptation came to light as city and police officials took an increasing interest in the development of the RCPC. The author was involved in an official capacity in the planning and data collection of a residential burglary study conducted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program (CCPP). This direct involvement with the crime prevention grant coupled with interviews and discussions with other organizational members provided much of the detail of the broader situational context of which the RCPC was part. This information was supplemented by a content analysis of local newspaper coverage of the crime controversy and its consequences.

The actual data concerning the social processes which both shaped the RCPC and developed within the RCPC was gathered by three overlapping methods. First, the author's role as a participant observer in the RCPC from the outset provided a cumulative analysis of the social evolution of this committee. The author was introduced as a researcher interested in studying community groups in the first meeting. This was accepted without question. This natural acceptance was partially due to the fact that Evanston is comprised of a highly educated citizenry and a larger number of people associated professionally with Northwestern University. Observations and notes were made at all RCPC meetings which provided valuable insight into the interactions between members and the Resource Committee. These observations provided a point of comparison over time.
Field observations were supplemented by in depth interviews with community group leaders which comprise the committee and also with representatives of the police department which comprise the Resource Committee. These interviews were conducted with a preconceived set of questions which were open ended in nature. As relevant issues or points were discovered in each interview, these were incorporated into subsequent interviews. Appendix A represents the topical format utilized in these interviews. These interviews provided a rich source of insight into the social processes operating between committee members and between community group leaders and their constituencies. These interviews were invaluable in assessing committee member's perceptions of the degree of influence and control exerted by members of the Resource Committee in the formation of RCPC policy.

A questionnaire was also administered to community leaders. The questionnaire, which is presented in Appendix B, had three functions. First, it sought information on the background of the particular community groups represented on the RCPC. Second, it was designed to ascertain information regarding the usual channels of "protest" employed by these groups in the resolution of specific community problems. Third, the identification of a pre-existing cooperative network between community groups or between community groups and the police department was also a major goal behind the administration of these questionnaires.

The analysis of documents distributed by the municipal government, the police department and the RCPC were also included in researching this problem. These included such things as interoffice memo-
orandums (both from the city manager's office and the chief of police),
the Management Study of the police department and documents distributed
to and by the RCPC.

One last point concerning the collection of data with regard to
the RCPC is necessary here. The author's role as a paid employee of
the police department was a valuable asset in collecting the necessary
data for this study. Members of the Evanston Police Department and the
Residential Crime Prevention Committee have been most cooperative in
assisting my efforts in this collection and I wish to acknowledge that
cooperation.
Cooptation was first introduced as a sociological process in Philip Selznick's seminal work, *TVA and the Grassroots* (1949). This study is regarded as a classic study in both the formal and informal processes developed within a complex organizational setting. Having intellectual roots in both Parsons and Michels, Selznick produced a study done in the classic tradition of the structural-functionalist school with the social and political critiques characteristic of Michels.

Parsons' theoretical approach to the study of complex organizations represents an equilibrium model which treats the organization as a natural system. As social systems, organizations must meet functional imperatives in order to survive. These functional imperatives become tangible through the formal statement and the actual process of goal attainment. Thus organizations develop subsystems in order to solve problems of adaption, achieve organizational goals, to coordinate and integrate members' activities within the system and finally to maintain consensus on legitimized values. Within the natural system framework, goal attainment is achieved by controlling the utilization of resources and the processes by which these resources are mobilized.
In Political Parties (1962) Michels focuses attention on the internal processes of the organization, specifically with the process of goal displacement. For Michels, power is a major organizational factor in the displacement of goals. Bureaucratic structure within the organization is a necessary element in the mobilization and distribution of resources. However, for Michels this bureaucratic structures represents a system of political domination which arises from a shift of power from the legitimate source of authority to the leaders. Bureaucracy ceases to be merely an instrument of organization and becomes a tool whereby officials come to attain more power than necessary for the performance of their legitimate tasks. Michels' expectation is that this will inevitably result in an abuse of power. Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy" assumes that organizational power will centralize in the hands of a few and will ultimately result in the dislocation of organizational goals.

Selznick was concerned with the actual process of goal attainment pursued by the TVA, and the political and practical means employed to survive a potentially hostile local environment. Also, basic to this process were the TVA's efforts to retain its new found degree of autonomy from the federal government. Selznick was guided by two basic questions: "How were the abstractions of the "grassroots" doctrine specified operationally, this is, how did they show up in the actual course of decision-making"?(Selznick, 1949: xii). In the true Michelian approach, how did the TVA take an abstract ideology and combine it with practical means aimed at achieving its goals? "What effect did this operative conduct have on the moral posture and com-
petency of the TVA as a government agency?" (Selznick, 1949: xii). In other words, did the adaptive processes the TVA underwent in dealing with both its proximate environment and its position as an experimental governmental agency, and the process by which abstract ideals were transferred into workable goals, compromise the democratic ideals under which the TVA claimed to operate? Selznick sought to show that through its grassroots commitments, the TVA came to be restricted in its efforts to reach goal objectives.

Selznick was interested in the informal, even "pathological" mechanisms of organizational survival. In this pursuit, he was more concerned with the informal interactions between the agency, its members, the federal government and other institutions in its area of operation.

For Selznick the formal structures of an organization failed to deal with and control the nonrational dimensions of organizational behavior. Selznick believed the informal structures which both the leadership and membership created to closer approximate unmet needs, were critically important in understanding goal attainment or lack of goal attainment in organizations. These informal structures were of three basic kinds: informal relationships (i.e. friendships, etc.) ideologies, and cooptation. It is the informal mechanism of cooptation which is the concern of the present discussion.

In studying the informal mechanisms of organizational behavior, Selznick was the first to introduce the sociological concept known as cooptation. Selznick's use of the term was unique in that his def-
inition of this "process" came to have negative political overtones which is lacking in the strict dictionary definition of the word. Webster defines coopt as "choosing or electing into a body or committee by the votes of its own membership". (Webster's Dictionary, 1977: 87).

Selznick defined cooptation as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence". (Selznick, 1949: 13). In studying the TVA, Selznick found that in order to utilize existing local channels of communication and ensure legitimacy in the local community, already existing organizations in the valley were approached for inclusion in the TVA's programs. Selznick documents this process of assimilation and the consequences of this cooptation in terms of the TVA's loss of total control over the decision making and the diverson of future programs from organizational goals because of specific interest groups.

Selznick further delimited cooptation into two basic types. Formal cooptation was employed when an organization needed to visibly absorb new elements into its ranks. This is often accomplished by appointment of representatives of the perceived adversary to the board of directors or an actual contractual agreement between two organizations. Selznick identifies two conditions under which formal cooptation becomes a viable choice. The first pertains to a lack of legitimacy of the coopting agency or the perceived lack of legitimacy. The second condition exists when a "self-governing" body finds it necessary to develop reliable channels of communication such as that between trade unions
and the industrial business sector. Informal cooptation is an option appropriate as a response to specific centers of power in a community and is characterized by an informal reciprocal relationships whereby these informal demands go into shaping the structure and policy of the institution under question.

While these two types of cooptation cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive, their separation is useful in terms of analyzing the actual or perceived "sharing of power" and the actual or perceived "loss of power" on the part of formal authority. Approached from either end, cooptation represents a "tension between formal authority and social power" (Selznick, 1949: 15) whereby formal authority strives to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its public and the social power to make decisions.

In an attempt to generalize this adaptive process, the remainder of this chapter will examine the way in which subsequent writers have dealt with the operationalization of cooptation, its generalizability to other organizations or institutions and the way in which cooptation has been distinguished from "participation" dominant in democratic ideology. The discussion will then proceed to a conceptualization of a recent "power" struggle between a local municipal government and a coalition of concerned citizens.

Economic/Market Structural Model

In reviewing other research dealing with the concept of cooptation, three separate areas of organizational domain can be identified.
These models consist of the following: the economic/market structural model, the large scale social movement perspective and cooptation within the local community power structure.

The economic/market structural model has been concerned with the employment of cooptive techniques to lessen the "market constraints" imposed both intra-organizationally and extra-organizationally. This type of research is typified by Burt (1980a;1980b). Mathematical models have been developed for use in predicting situations where cooptive strategies will be more prevalent.

Burt (1980a) provides a unique measurement of structural autonomy by a combination of two aspects of autonomy which have been treated separately in the literature—autonomy via oligopoly and autonomy via group-affiliation. Burt essentially introduces a network concept of autonomy where oligopoly is seen as "focusing on the relations among structurally equivalent actors occupying a status" (Burt, 1980a: 900). Burt thus defines high structural autonomy as being composed of three characteristics: 1) in jointly occupying a particular position, there is high centralization of this group of actors such that they form an oligopoly 2) their relations to actors of other statuses are varied and these other actors do not form oligopolies themselves and 3) the interaction effect of these two conditions. Structural autonomy is then used to hypothesize relationships where cooptive relations will appear and not appear and where cooptation will lead to an actual increase in autonomy.
In an attempt to empirically demonstrate cooptive strategies, Burt treated manufacturing industries in the American economy in 1967 as structurally equivalent actors. The profits of each industry as a whole were used as a measure of the relative autonomy of firms in separate industries. High profits in turn were deemed an indication of structural autonomy. From these relations, Burt hypothesized that cooptive strategies would be apparent in the merger patterns of firms—specifically that firms in an industry will purchase other firms in attempts to "coopt" constraints placed on the industry's structural autonomy.

Methodologically, Burt steps between two units of analysis. It is not clear whether the industry or the firm is his unit of analysis or whether his hypothesis of cooptive strategies is believed to hold true across firms in the same industry, across different industries or both.

Conceptually, he relies on merger patterns as a cooptive strategy, however, his assumption is that such a merger is a one way strategy designed to enhance the position of the coopting firm. This precludes the possibility that the coopted firm has a vested interest in the merger or for that matter that a "coopted" or "coopting" firm can even be identified. In essence, Burt has equated structural autonomy with power itself, an assumption empirically unjustified. Further, Burt reduced the generalizability of the concept of structural autonomy to be "most promising in a system where there is a clear separation of formal from informal potentially cooptive relations" (Burt, 198Ca:923)—
a situation highly unlikely in most complex organizational relation-
ship networks. This again raises the issue of separating coaptive
strategies from mutually beneficial contractual agreements (collabora-
tion).

In a second article exploring the use of corporate coaptive
strategies, Burt et al (1980b) focuses on directorate ties between
organizations as a coptive strategy aimed at reducing market constraints
on profits. Here the focus is on "establishment" as the unit of
analysis and this is consistently maintained throughout the entire
study. The underlying assumption of this study is that interorganiza-
tional directoral ties is synonymous with cooptation. Burt, et al
state that "cooptation is a rationalization for action without a
specification of parameters for action" (Burt, 1980b: 823). This is
as close as the authors came to a working definition of cooptation.
This statement leaves us no closer to either an understanding of
cooptation nor a means for distinguishing it from other social processes
such as cooperation and negotiation.

Large Scale Social Movements

A second focus of cooptation research has been the cooptation
of specific social movements in the political arena on a broader
macro-level. Eckstein (1976, 1977) re-conceptualizes Selznick's
definition of cooptation to account for the relative ineffectiveness
of various poor people's organizations in urban Mexico. Eckstein
attempts to demonstrate use use of cooptation as a means of regulating
the poor and just what processes impede these coopted groups from
utilizing their formal power to benefit their own ends. Eckstein establishes a conceptual distinction between "cooptation" as an individual (adaptive) process (this term referring basically to organizational leadership) and "incorporation" as a process of absorbing whole groups of people. She further maintains that these two processes do not necessarily occur together nor do they necessarily take the same form.

In her study of organizations designed for the benefit of poor urban Mexicans, Eckstein found that such groups had come increasingly under the control of the ruling political party and had gradually ceased to provide services independently of the government. These groups, many of which had originally been concerned only with particular social issues, came to have the "general welfare" of these poor people as an overarching ideological commitment. These groups came to be formally associated with the prevailing political party and ruling class because of the delivery of material benefits which they needed. However, because of the absorption of these groups into the formal political structure and subsequent threat of collective demands reduced, these material gains were short-lived. Formal absorption into the dominant political arena imposed tactical restrictions on the forms which their requests and demands for social justice could take. "Demands" were no longer tolerated. "Requests" came to be presented on individual terms rather than on a collective basis. Further, group leaders became less and less willing to engage in political demands because of their interests in advancing their own political careers.
In their classic study of *Poor People's Movements* (1979), Piven and Cloward state similar conclusions in their analyses of the unemployment worker's movements of the 30's and 40's, the industrial worker's movement and the civil rights and welfare rights movements of the 60's. Piven and Cloward do not deal with a formally stated theory of cooptation, however, the process which this concept represents plays a major role in their theory of why poor people's movements usually fail. Their theory revolves around the tendency of movement leadership to become more concerned with the day to day organization and maintenance of the movement (including their own positions) and less with the long range goals. This deflection of energy from political action or pressure (in their terms insurgency) and subsequent preoccupation for organization building, greatly reduces the material and political gains which the threat of insurgency might elicit. Piven and Cloward criticize movement leaders (most particularly the radical leaders of the left) for not taking full advantage of the demands to be won by the full blown militancy or threat of militancy which a class or sector of people possess. Piven and Cloward attempt to distinguish the social-historical conditions which shape a movement's course of action and the organizational forms which develop within a movement which either promulgate or thwart movement gains. Admittedly in the tradition of Michels, Piven and Cloward maintain that the "imperatives of mass-membership organizational maintenance" (1979: xvi) characteristically create an elite leadership which is prone to the process of cooptation either by efforts to secure financial/political stability for the organization or by efforts to secure these gains for themselves.
Dealing exclusively with social movements seeking both immediate and long term social changes, Piven and Cloward maintain that intensive efforts at organization enable the political elite to absorb leaders either by offering them paid positions or by neutralizing the political clout of their "insurgency". By making demands/negotiations a rational, organized procedure-- the ruling class is then in a position to predict the behavior of movement members.

On a somewhat smaller scale, similar conditions were reached in a study of the Umoja Federation, a women's group formed during the colonial era in Western Kenya. Staudt (1980) found that the local autocratic chief (male) and his administrative staff were instrumental in organizing and legitimizing a local women's group. The chief was responsible for reducing soil erosion and land consolidation for subsequent land registration. Since women were traditionally responsible for agriculture and boundaries were to be maintained by euphorkin bushes, the chief actively sought the mobilization of women in these efforts. Leaders were "coopted" from women already recognized and respected in the community. These female leaders were given the added responsibility of judging the behavior of their constituencies. Staudt thus attributes the "cooptation" of the female leaders into the male power structure, as a major factor in the subsequent demise of the organization and disaffection of the membership base.

Finally, a recent article by Bielasiak (1980) explored the change in the recruitment of leaders in the communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe (1954-1971). Bielasiak documented an unprecedented
increase in the recruitment of "expert knowledge" as opposed to the recruitments of young people into "career" lines within the communist party. Typically, the cooptation of experts into the existing communist regime, occurred at later stages in these experts' careers, indicating this as the communist government's solution to a pressing need for expert technical, economic or political knowledge not possessed by party members in power. In other words, these experts were coopted into providing the regime with the technology it needed to survive in a highly complex "post-industrial" society without the dissemination of power characteristic of a "career" party member. The Soviet Union was found to have "coopted" a significantly larger percentage of officials than had other communist bloc countries such as Poland or Rumania. Bielasiak attributes this to the greater stability of the communist regime in the Soviet Union and the resultant "greater pool of trustworthy non-political elite" groups. Bielasiak's study represents an interesting application of the cooptive process to a national political regime and the implications of this cooptation for political survival of the ruling elite.

As can be seen by the variety of environmental situations cited in the above section, cooptation has been utilized at the societal level in a number of ways. In Eckstein's study of poor urban Mexicans, cooptive measures were employed by the national political party to limit the strong influence of the Catholic Church and the individual power of local officials in both the political and economical arenas. Piven and Cloward have attributed the diffusion of political power of the power classes in the United States to the inclination of movement lead-
ers to concentrate too many resources on organizing rather than on incidents of insurgency. The political elite subsequently take advantage of the survival needs of these organizers/organizations by coopting the leadership of such movements.

Bielasiak demonstrated the use of cooptive strategies employed by communist bloc countries in order to incorporate certain levels of expertise and knowledge into the party framework without relinquishing any actual power. Studies in the social movement perspective are indicative of the innumerable ways that cooptation can be utilized as a source of power and influence in reinforcing the dominate ideology and maintaining the social control of the ruling class.

Local Power Structure Model

The third area which the cooptive process has been documented has been in the realm of local community power struggles. Seiler, et al (1979) accumulated reputational leadership data to identify persons having the greatest impact on community life following the location of a major steel mill in that community. Seiler, et al found that reputationally, the steel mill officials were not seen as playing a major role in effecting community decisions or developments. However, the authors maintain that the steel mill actually had a great deal of impact on community affairs by using a combination of three strategies. The three types of corporate strategies were unilateral action, cooptation, and intervention. Unilateral techniques involved direct but subtle action on the part of the corporation. This technique was typified by the fact that the corporate officers of the steel mill kept
their intentions of locating the steel mill within the community from public knowledge until significant portions of community land had been acquired. The company also actively prevented a population explosion from occurring (a situation which would have significantly raised their taxes to provide the additional community services required by such an influx of people) by actively seeking job applicants from surrounding communities within a 50 mile radius.

The use of cooptation was exemplified by the procurement of services from at least five of the most prominent reputational and positional leaders in the county for the steel mill. While the corporation was adamant about keeping the steel mill personnel out of active participation in the community, it made members of the community a part of the steel mill. "Thus, cooptation was a "one-way street" and were conflicts of interest to occur, community residents would be in the middle, not J & L executives" (Seiler, 1979: 381).

Intervention was a third technique utilized by the corporation in looking out for its "economic interests" in the community. This technique was typified by J & L's retention of a consulting firm to design a new high school for the community when it became apparent that the elaborate design proposed by citizens would significantly raise the tax needs of the county.

The lack of inclusion of J & L executives in the reputational community leadership data indicated that the corporation was successful, through a combination of techniques, of concealing its own involvement in guiding community affairs. In this case, as in many of the
previous studies, it appears that it is organizationally more efficient to manipulate the environment than rearrange the organization itself.

Research in this theoretical model has also approached the process of cooptation as a political strategy of local citizen groups in their attempt to realize concessions from local officials. Galaskiewicz (1981) attempted a study in the pluralist tradition by testing two basic models of citizen participation. These models are 1) the cooptation model and 2) the intimidation model. This study attempted to distinguish the variables which made either strategy more successful or more desirable for the interest group. Three main independent variables were used: 1) size of the interest group 2) the previous experience of interest group in political affairs and 3) socioeconomic status of interest group. The intervening variable was access—the degree of interpersonal contact with city officials. Galaskiewicz's conclusions appear to support Piven and Cloward's assertion that lower class movements tend to lose their political "clout" when the threat of insurgency is less, and negotiation is a more dominant strategy. He found that larger, less experienced and lower socioeconomic status groups had better access to city officials, but it was the larger, more experienced and higher status groups which had more success in pursuing their group interests.

The three focal points of recent research on the process of cooptation represent the diverse way in which cooptive strategies may be utilized, the unique way individual researchers have of conceptual-
izing and measuring cooptation and perhaps even the pervasiveness of the process as a strategy in everyday life. The one element which many of these studies has in common, is their view of cooptation as an aggressive strategy of both interest groups and organizations in dealing with stability issues such as resource acquisition and allocation, the use of expert knowledge and increased political clout. None of the above cited studies deals with the other possibility raised by Selznick—cooptive strategies as a response aimed at diverting public attention away from specific community concerns. Previous research has primarily been concerned with "preventing" legitimitimacy or power crises from occurring.

The potentially cooptive situation investigated in the present study differs from the three basic models in several ways. The economic/market structure model represents a quantifiable model which attempts to predict when a cooptive strategy will be employed. This model deals exclusively with cooptation in the corporate business setting. Burt's (1980a; 1980b) corporate model is not one which can be easily transferred to other social situations. His measurement of structural autonomy and merger patterns do not allow the prediction of cooptation outside the corporate structure. While it is useful to study situations where cooptation is utilized as a social process and attempt to predict from such a model, it must be emphasized here that cooptation is not always the result of an intention strategy. Evanston represents a case where the RCPC was conceptualized without the intention of cooptation but may have been the object of cooptive strategies as a consequence of the police controversy.
Piven and Cloward's study of *Poor People's Movements* (1979), provides a helpful analysis of particular resources available to social movements. Their emphasis on insurgency or the threat of insurgency is a helpful way of analyzing the main resource available to the Marywood Neighbors Association in Evanston. While the Evanston group can in no way be considered a poor people's movement, the vocalization of their concerns and demands in both the media and council meetings, placed the reform government in a defensive position.

Bielasiak's study (1980) of the communist party's cooptation of "experts" into their government was helpful in pointing out a broader situation where cooptive strategies might be utilized. However, this particular situation differs from the case at hand because the "coopted" individuals possess expertise needed by the "coopting" group. In the case of Evanston, the Resource Committee as representatives of the police/city administration, were the ones with the expert knowledge. They were therefore charged with the responsibility of passing this knowledge on to the RCPC.

The local power structure model is the basic model from which the Evanston case will be analyzed, however, studies in this framework have differed in terms of the specific object of cooptation. Seiler (1979) identified cooptation as a strategy employed by a steel mill which was attempting to "ease" into a new community and exert some control over the community development which might effect company profits or policy. In this case the steel mill's addition to the community represented a similar situation to Selznick's (1949) study.
of the TVA. The steel mill "anticipated" certain problems which might arise in the community because of their arrival and attempted to alleviate them by a variety of methods, one of which was cooptation. However, unlike the TVA, the steel mill was careful to exert their influence in a manner which could not be visibly traced. This strategy prevented the "compromise" of basic organizational principles which Selznick identifies with the TVA.

The "object" of cooptation in Galaskiewicz's (1981) study, represents a reversal of most other studies. This study attempts to identify situations where a citizen's interest group might utilize cooptation to exert influence on a municipal government. Generally, research in cooptation has assumed that the "average" citizens or citizen's group is the most likely object of cooptation. The particular approach could provide an alternative way of studying the police controversy in Evanston. Could the Marywood groups be viewed as the "coopting" group and city officials as the coopted"?

The present study will focus on the use of cooptation as a strategy of a city government aimed at controlling groups with interests contrary to municipal policy and as a response to the challenge of their support of the police chief despite opposition in the community. This approach will be utilized in view of the fact that Marywood did not receive any real, tangible concessions in this controversy. While this thesis represents a case study of political opposition at the local level, it attempts to place the grassroots community movement behind this controversy in the socio-political context of the 1970's
and 1980's. Concern with crime and crime related issues is just one among many issues which urban social movements have embraced. Urban residents are becoming increasingly active in the local political arena.

This increased involvement in community affairs can be attributed to two general societal conditions. First, the revitalization of urban neighborhoods and communities has become a pervasive phenomena in contemporary social life. Some theorists maintain that in order to mobilize and maintain the political participation of citizens, the issues at hand must have some relevance to their everyday lives (Flacks, 1976; Boyte, 1980). Community concern over an escalating crime rate is such an issue.

A second factor contributing to the resurgence of local political behavior is related to the political, social and particularly the economic conditions which are impinging on an increasing proportion of the American population. Community protest can be placed within a Neo-Marxist framework which views the dominant institutions as propagating the ideology and values of society as a whole. When analyzing community protest at the local level, the impact of the dominant values of the society at large must be taken into consideration. Local power structures themselves represent "mini versions" of these dominant institutions. When situations arise such as the crime controversy in Evanston, community protestors can represent basic threats to these dominant values. Community group leaders represent "mediators" between community residents and city administration. This study is
concerned with the link between community leaders and the city administration and the strategies employed by city administration to neutralize community opposition and protest through these community leaders.
CHAPTER III

A CASE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS: PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

Evanston is a North Shore suburb of Chicago composed of a population of approximately 73,000 people. It shares many characteristics of other suburban areas (largely residential in composition. Large sectors of middle and upper class residents, high median incomes, etc). Evanston is a stable, attractive city which offers a reputable community atmosphere for middle income families. As such, it represents the comparable life style of such North Shore communities as Wilmette and Kenilworth at more affordable prices. Evanston has the particular attribute of sharing its Southern border with Chicago. This provides Evanstonians with all the conveniences of a large city, without the rapid pace and congestion of Chicago. Sharing a border with Chicago also disconcerts some residents because of the fear that Chicago street gangs and criminals will also take advantage of this easy access.

Evanston also represents a community which has a solid reform government and a good financial rating in the bond market. City administration is carried out largely through the combined efforts of the city council, the mayor and the city manager. Evanstonians are active in civic affairs and frequently make use of alderpersons when they are in need of community problem resolution. Alderpersons in
turn are responsive to the needs of residents and make every effort to solve problems brought to their attention. Evanston offers residents the opportunity and satisfaction of participating in community affairs which shape their everyday lives but at the same time offers the cosmopolitan attraction of being located near a major city.

During the past decade Evanston has changed with regards to several basic population characteristics. The last ten years has seen a population decrease of approximately 8%. As would be expected this decrease in population represents a decline in the overall tax base. The tax base provided by the industrial and commercial sectors has also declined dramatically. As a result, city officials have concentrated on making the downtown area of Evanston more attractive and on urging Evanston merchants to remain in Evanston.

Another population change in the past ten years which deserves attention is the racial composition of Evanston. The non-white population has increased by 10%, while the white population has decreased by a full 15%. The black community has increased by 22% while the Spanish speaking community has increased by 23%. These changes represent major shifts for a relatively stable community and have caused some concern among residents. These shifts become even more dramatic if one were to look closely at the particular areas of the city effected by these changes.

Inspite of the many positive characteristics which Evanston possesses, residents have become increasingly self-conscious of their communities. This is partially due to the population changes noted
above. Since a large sector of Evanston's population is young middle class families, these families have a vested interest in maintaining or improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods. One of the issues which this increasing concern has centered around is that of crime and crime related activities. Evanston has been the site of a growing problem with burglaries and thefts, as have many urban areas. While the crime rate has steadily been climbing since the 1960's, in 1979 a dramatic increase occurred in the crime categories of burglary and theft. Evanston represents an area which contains a concentration of families that can afford items which can be easily dispensed with in the black market. While other areas such as Wilmette and Kenilworth have much higher concentrations of wealth, these areas also commonly invest in elaborate protective devices. This is generally not the case in Evanston. In addition to the increasing rates of reported crime drawing community attention, the quality and quantity of services provided by the Evanston Police Department also has become a controversial issue.

In the Fall of 1979 residents in the community surrounding the Evanston Civic Center became concerned about what they perceived as the rising rate of crime in their immediate area, as well as the rest of Evanston. These residents formed a new community group called the Marywood Neighbors Association. The concern this group voiced about burglary in particular was based on crime reports in the Evanston Review, interaction with neighbors who had actually been victims of burglary and vicarious information gleaned through third parties. Marywood began to voice its concerns at city council meetings. These con-
cerned were in turn echoed by several alderpersons who claimed to have been concerned about police service and effectiveness for some time.

In the early part of 1980 the concerns of these residents began to center around the Evanston Police Department. They began to question why there had been such a dramatic increase in burglary (and crime in general) during the year 1979. They concluded that the responsibility for the rising burglary rate rested on the EPD—they simply were not efficiently and effectively doing their job. Ultimately the blame came to rest on Chief William McHugh's shoulders. The chief was thought to be incompetent—specifically, it was claimed that he had lost his effectiveness as a leader after eleven years on the job; he was out of touch with modern police technology; he had become increasingly removed and inaccessible to the rank and file of the department; had suffered severe health problems several years previously, and he was seen to exhibit socially inappropriate behavior in the public arena.

Through the presentation of community demands and concerns voiced in council meetings and the coverage of these issues by the Suburban Tribune and the Evanston Review, crime, the effectiveness of the police department and the competency of the chief became major issues of debate in the community.

This study will trace the resources available and the courses of action chosen by the four major organizations involved in this expression of social protest. These four organizations are the municipal city government, the city police department, the media, and the principle community group involved—the Marywood Neighbors Association.
Following this historical presentation, this study will then concentrate on the evolution and analysis of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC) and its hypothesized use in a cooptive strategy employed by city administration.

**Community Groups**

Despite claims of the *Evanston Review* in its coverage of this controversy that various community groups were challenging the administrative competency of the chief and the organizational effectiveness of the police department, only one community group was ever identified by name as being behind this opposition. This group was known as the Marywood Neighbors Association. The neighborhood which this group represents is located around the 2100 block of Ridge Avenue in central Evanston which involves the area surrounding the Civic Center itself. This area had seen a dramatic increase in crime, particularly burglary.

The concern of this group appears to have at least three sources. First, there were the actual experiences of persons who had been burglarized. The city as a whole had seen a dramatic increase in burglary and theft during the year of 1979 and the Marywood area was no exception.

The second source of concern about crime came from persons who knew other persons who had been victimized. A third source was vicarious information gleaned in the form of rumor. This source of fear represents a much more difficult source of influence to trace, but yet has a distinct impact on the perceptions of citizens.
Marywood had two prominent leaders who came to the forefront in the crime controversy. These leaders were Daniel Garrison and Daniel Whitemore. Garrison proved to be the more aggressive and articulate leader of the group. It was Garrison who began to frequent city council meetings and began to raise concern about the escalating crime rate and subsequently the competency of the chief of police and the organizational effectiveness of the police department as a functional department of the city administration. Whitemore directed efforts towards writing editorials and letters for the Evanston Review and attempts to mobilize larger portions of the Evanston community.

Resources

In analyzing the number and strength of the resources available to the Marywood community group, several resources can be identified in their presentation of demands to the city administration. The first and probably most common method of citizen involvement in Evanston is general access to individual alderpersons. Citizens would contact the appropriate alderperson when they had an issue or concern which needed the intervention or attention of the city administration. This is a widely used technique of involvement. As an employee at EPD, the author frequently received communications from the Assistant City Manager, Joe Asprooth, which had been referred to him by an alderperson. It would then be expected that action be taken on these situations by either investigating or rectifying the situation. The city manager's office was conscientious about forwarding such problems to the appropriate departments and requesting feedback for the citizen involved.
A second resource open to a community group involved direct access to the city council itself or indirect access to the council through an alderperson. This process then would bypass the city manager's office. The city manager's office typically did not approve of this tactic because it left that office in the defensive position of explaining the situation to the council or having to investigate the situation when first hand knowledge of the complaint was not possessed.

The third resource which a community group has in a "reform" type of government (Galaskiewicz, 1981) is the fact that the city manager, unlike the mayor of Chicago, has no political "machine" or apparatus to support him. In the case of Evanston, the city manager played a very prominent role investigating and presenting options that the council might take to solve specific problems. Since the city manager's job involves full time efforts geared towards the administration of city resources, a great deal of the responsibility for decisions rests on his shoulders.

In the case of Evanston, the media represented perhaps the greatest resource open to the community group. The media often become a source of legitimation and mobilization of larger public sentiments concerning specific issues (Molotch, 1979). In this particular case, the Evanston Review proved to be a valuable resource to the Marywood Neighbors in publicizing their concerns and demands and in creating enough controversy that the city administration was forced to respond to their charges. The role of the media shall be discussed in a later section.
Related to the fourth resource available to the community is the fact that the city manager had previously been criticized for performing his role in an extremely autocratic manager. The stage was thus set for an attack on the city manager as utilizing "undemocratic" tactics in administering the resources of "their" city.

Options/Alternatives for Action

Conceptually, the resources available to a group of actors can be separated from the options or alternative courses of action available to attain organizational goals. However, in the case of the Evanston community groups, the alternative courses of action closely approximate the resources available to the groups and the separation of these two concepts becomes difficult in practice since the community group was presenting a criticism of a city administrative department. Since the city manager/council is legitimately responsible for overseeing the effective functioning of this department, the community group can be viewed as a force of opposition to city administration. Opposition to what is termed the "ruling elite" greatly reduces the resources available to the community group mainly because of the city government's possession of both the coercive and ideological means of social control. The city administration/police department is also in possession of vital information which could either refute or substantiate the charges and demands of the community group. Only the police department and to some extent the city manager, has the information which could substantiate the community claims of escalating crime problems and the organizational effectiveness of the police department itself.
In effectively combating the city's own possession of critical resources, it was necessary for the community group to expand their own patterns of influence in the community. This could effectively be done by mobilizing the sentiments or interests of the larger Evanston community. This type of mobilization could be accomplished in two ways. First, the community group could go out into the community and attempt to involve other residents in the controversy. However, in terms of cost-effectiveness this tactic could prove impractical since a large social base was necessary to exert pressure on the city manager/city council it was unlikely that this strategy alone could mobilize a substantial portion of the population quickly enough to keep the issue alive.

A second option which the community group had open to it was the use of the media in publicizing their group interests and eliciting enough support to apply pressure on the city administration. In the course of their opposition, the Marywood Neighbors were successful in pressuring the city council to appropriate $20,000 for a study to be done within the police department to determine organizational and administrative effectiveness.

Once the community group was successful in having funds appropriated for the Police Management Study, Daniel Garrison was appointed to the ad hoc committee responsible for drawing the guidelines and awarding the research grant. This accomplishment seems unlikely without the legitimization of interest group demands by the Evanston Review. In essence, members of Marywood exerted influence on this pro-
cess in two ways. First, they applied direct pressure on the city council, placing the city manager in a defensive position with the council. Previous criticisms of Martin's administrative techniques coupled with the fact that several alderpersons already had concerns regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the police department made the possibility of simply ignoring the charges a politically unwise decision. Secondly, by making the issue a city wide controversy in the media, indirect pressure was applied to the city manager.

The Media

The question must now be asked -- how did the concerns and demands of a relatively small community (interest) group become a matter of broader public concern? Or did they? It is fairly common for specific interest groups to approach the city council (especially in a suburban community such as Evanston), with issues they consider salient to the community. The question here is why did the interest of the group become so well publicized and how did they come to move the city manager's office to respond. To answer this question, discussion will now turn to the role which the media (specifically the Evanston Review) played in this process.

The Evanston Review is a weekly community newspaper published by Pioneer Press, a subsidiary of Time-Life, Inc. Pioneer Press is based in Wilmette and publishes community newspapers in a number of north shore communities. The Evanston Review is the only local newspaper published explicitly for Evanston residents.
In the Fall of 1979, the **Evanston Review** began to publish articles "documenting the development of the Marywood Neighbors group and the concerns which they had begun to articulate". The author of these articles was Frank Santos, who was at this time municipal reporter for the paper. In article after article, Santos emphasized that "community groups" in Evanston were becoming agitated by the rising crime rate and were presenting their demands for increased manpower and the removal of McHugh as chief of police. Santos always used the plural term groups when reporting this process, however, not once did he mention the names of any other community group except Marywood Neighbors. The pluralization of "community groups" served to give legitimacy to the concerns of the Marywood group.

It is hypothesized that the **Evanston Review** and Frank Santos as the reporter/writer of these articles, played a very prominent role in publicizing Marywood's concerns with crime and the community's perceptions about the extent of the problem and where the focus of responsibility for these problems lies.

In the early part of 1981 Santos received a promotion and transfer to be editor of the Wilmette paper. It appears as though his pursuit and exploitation of the controversy over EPD had "paid off." Lt. MacMillan (Santos inside source at EPD) firmly believed that the city manager's office had a great deal to do with Santos' transfer to Wil-

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1 Santos was promoted to city editor in June 1980. He was later transferred to the **Wilmette Life** and named editor in November 1980.
mette, the purpose being to take the "heat" off the police chief and subsequently the heat off the city manager as a supporter of the chief.

The purusal of two years worth of Evanston Review articles on this issue supports the hypothesis that the crime rate and the competency of the police chief would not have been issues of great import in the community without the coverage of the Evanston Review. A comparison in the content and number of articles about EPD and McHugh during Santos' employment at the Evanston Review and in the period since his transfer indicate a change in reporting style. If this controversy was as heated as Santos would portray, why didn't any remaining reporters at the Evanston Review pick up on this after Santos' transfer? It seems clear that in this case, the media had a great deal to do with giving legitimacy to the newly formed Marywood Neighbors Association as the "voice" of the Evanston community and in making the city council take some investigating action on the matter. In essence, the Evanston Review transformed a "mini social movement" into a situation where a citizen's group was in a position to threaten the city administration.

In investigating the possibility that the Evanston Review played a prominent role in transforming the concerns of a small percentage of the population into a city wide controversy, we must ask what the Evanston Review stood to gain from such coverage. First, since Evanston is a relatively small community (in the shadow of Chicago), it does not have many local stories to choose from in creating eye catching headlines. Since reporters are constantly under pressure to produce
articles, the "creation" of a community controversy surrounding crime gave a relatively low key community newspaper sensationalism and a long running feature story. It also served to create a "dialogue" between different members of the community. Numerous articles/letters in the "Letters to the Editor" column involved the expression of different points of view about the police department and the escalating crime rate. Two main actors in the Marywood Neighbors Association frequently had letters published in the column. On several occasions, letters commending actions of the Evanston Police Department were also published, one even accused Marywood of political muckraking. However, the number of articles or letters condemning the Evanston Police Department, the chief and the city manager for the crime problem far outnumbered the positive letters.

Another consideration in looking at the Evanston Review's role in the crime issue was the personal interests of the reporter Frank Santos. Several persons at EPD voiced the opinion that Santos was interested in stirring up trouble to further his own career. Santos came in on a daily basis to read and take notes on the daily police bulletin which was produced in the Record Section. The crimes which were typed on the bulletin were first selected on a priority basis by the Record Section—all crimes were not placed on the bulletin. The most serious crimes were placed on there with special restrictions being applied to crimes such as murder, rape and arson. Santos went through his own selection process when he published these reports in the Evanston Review. He would frequently attempt to get more detailed information about particular crimes from the Detective Section.
It was common knowledge at EPD that Lt. Kip MacMillan, who had just been moved from commander of the detective section to commander of the youth section, was Santos' "inside source" for the articles he wrote on the internal problems and dissension at the Evanston Police Department. MacMillan himself admitted in an indirect way on one occasion, that this was the case. MacMillan hoped to instigate a mild "internal insurrection" which could feed on the external conflict generated in the community. MacMillan proposed the appointment of Captain William Logan, the only black ranking officer at EPD, as the new chief with the new position of Deputy Chief created for himself. As previously pointed out, the black community in Evanston comprises 22% of the total population. When McHugh was appointed chief in 1969, the black community had clamored for the appointment of a black police chief. MacMillan (and indeed many others in the city) felt that the time was now ripe for such an appointment to occur. As a Lieutenant MacMillan had very little chance of ever being appointed chief through normal promotional procedures. Four captains were above him in rank and he shared the rank of lieutenant with approximately ten other officers.

MacMillan's ploy for insurgency was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, he did not have sufficient support within the organization. In fact MacMillan was not liked by many officers within the organization (among the ranking officers as well as the rank and file). Secondly, his strategy was unsuccessful because in January of 1981, a black fire chief had been appointed by the city manager. This appointment followed the dismissal of a white fire chief. The former fire chief had been
fired because he refused to promote black officers within the fire department.

During this period, Alderman Jack Korshak began to voice strong opposition to Chief McHugh and EPD in general. Korshak used this controversy as a springboard for subsequent challenges of Martin's authority and decision making. He later entered in the 1981 mayoral race against the incumbent mayor, Jay Lytle but was defeated. Korshak made the crime rate, the police chief and the EPD crucial issues in his mayoral campaign. This served to keep the controversy going for an additional period of time. Korshak's campaign also presented a possible threat to Martin's position for Korshak posed the threat of being a strong adversary of Martin's. If Korshak were elected mayor, Martin's authoritarian control would loosen and if Korshak were successful in gaining council support, Martin could conceivably be ousted from his job. Martin therefore had a vested interest in placating the concerns being voice about the EPD. Martin responded to this situation in a variety of ways. This will be discussed in detail in the subsection entitled "Municipal City Government".

**Municipal Police Department**

In discussing the Evanston Police Department, two levels of analysis will be utilized. These levels will be the organization, as a whole and the discussion of individual members as they pertain or play a role in the community controversy at hand. This section will focus on the role of the police department as an organization in this controversy. The role of individual members will be discussed later.
The EPD has a history of providing outstanding service to the community. This history is presented on one entire wall of the lobby where commendations and achievement awards from various nationally recognized law enforcement agencies are displayed. The EPD has been a department of national acclaim for both its service and level of technology during the 1960's. It was the contention of some members of the community, the media and members of EPD itself, that both the quality of the service provided and organizational effectiveness had greatly declined in the twenty year interim. As the police controversy gained in intensity, the organizational problems attributed to EPD were more clearly stated.

A content analysis of a two year span of Evanston Review newspaper articles yielded three types of issues involved in this instance of social protest. These are community related issues, issues pertaining to the competency of the chief and organizational problems of the police department itself. Responses from the city administration will also be analyzed on these same three levels. Community related issues consisted of a general community concern over the escalating crime rate, increasing incidents of burglary and of the general perception that neither the police chief or city administration were inherently interested in the problems or issues of the community at large.

The second general category of issues involved questions as to the actual competency of the administrative staff of EPD, specifically the chief of police. The following list summarizes the general attributes at question here: Does the chief have an acceptable level of "expert
knowledge" in terms of record keeping, crime prevention and apprehension technologies? Is the chief an effective leader in both the police department and the community as a whole? Does the chief have the ability and capacity to make effective decisions with regards to the organization of the department, the setting of departmental policy and the implementation of these procedures? Does the chief exhibit behavior which would be considered socially inappropriate for a city official in public places—specifically in the form of public drunkeness or public outbursts of anger? Lastly, is the chief physically capable of holding the office of police chief?

The third type of criticism leveled at the EPD surrounded specific organizational problems. This category was comprised of the problems considered most crucial by community leaders, the media, and members of EPD itself. This category of criticism can be further delineated into three main types. These types may be described as organizational problems involving the chief's interaction with the rank and file and other members of the organization, problems involving the appropriation of adequate resources (manpower and material) and the chief's perceived lack of independence from the city manager.

With regard to the interactions between the chief and other organizational members the following points were raised: the chief failed to communicate effectively with the rank and file, hold the

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The chief had suffered a massive stroke from which he had not been expected to recover and had undergone heart surgery to repair a blockage following this.
rank and file accountable for departmental procedures, allow appropriate rank and file input into the decision making of his administration, the increasing separation of the administrative staff from the "cop" on the street and the existence of a select group of personal "favorites" on the part of the chief. Criticisms surrounding the acquisition and allocation of resources were aimed more at the level of city administration rather than aimed specifically at the chief of police. This category of criticism was based on the perception that the police department did not possess adequate manpower, financial and technological resources. Having briefly outlined the community, administrative, and organizational problems which were attributed to the police department, in the following section the resources available to the police department in reaction to these charges will be discussed.

Organizational Resources in Combating Controversy

In analyzing the resources available to the police department the discussion shall center around the resources available to the chief of police as the administrator of the police department. The primary resource available to the chief was his direct access to the city manager. The chief, as a departmental head was in a position to interact and communicate on a regular basis with the city manager. Internally, the chief was believed to do just what the city manager told him to do—a situation not considered proper by many sworn personnel believing that civilians were not in a position to understand nor make decisions on police matters. The chief was regarded as a rather "powerless" department head by both insiders and outsiders. This was mainly
in terms of his interaction with the city manager and other department heads in the vying for distribution of city resources.

Direct access to the city manager provided the chief with a means for presenting his point of view and influencing the course of action taken by the city manager. This also meant that the chief was in a position to present as much or as little relevant information to the city manager as he considered proper in arguing his case. It was well known at EPD that the chief did not want the city manager to know about the organizational problems plaguing the department. The chief frequently withheld information that could be damaging either to the department or to his ability to run it.

A second resource available to the chief was his control over the formal organizational contacts of the department with the media and the public at large. He could and did limit the crime statistical information released to both the public and the media. Contributing to this limitation, however, was the fact that the Record Section could not effectively and efficiently produce the type of information frequently requested. This formal control of public contacts with departmental personnel made many organizational members apprehensive in voicing any opinions or in releasing any information concerning departmental procedures.

The main aspect of this resource which the chief failed to exploit was the role of the community in reducing both the fear of crime and in preventing crime. Access to the community was an avenue that he chose not to deal with in responding to the controversy. He might
have been in a better position to counteract the media and community group efforts to replace him, had he used the same strategy that the community had in mobilizing public opinion.

The third resource available to the chief is closely tied to the above mentioned resource. The chief had formal control over the dissemination of departmental information. This included crime statistics, procedures, goals, and future plans. The chief chose the strategy of cutting off all information emanating from the department to the public or the media. He chose instead to present a hostile attitude towards reporters from the Evanston Review and community groups when they requested specific crime information about their areas. He regarded these requests as personal afronts to his integrity and the department's. If the chief had been more willing to cooperate with concerned citizens and enlist their help in combating the crime problem and the fear of crime, much of the fervor of the controversy might have been drained off.

A fourth resource which became available to the chief in the early stages of the controversy was the inception of "expert knowledge" in the form of a new Director of Planning and Research. While this Director did have considerable influence on the chief, he would have been used more effectively as a buffer between the chief and the community. Since the Director had considerable experience in research concerning community participation, the phenomena of fear of crime, and the crime analysis, his skills could have been better utilized in the direction of community relations.
Options/Alternative Courses of Action

Having been placed in the center of a political controversy, the chief had two main alternatives open to him. First, he could make an effort to involve the community in solving organizational and community related police problems. Secondly, he could choose to deny the existence of these problems and deal with the community groups as an adversary. He chose the second alternative in dealing with the controversy.

The chief was openly hostile to community groups requesting information from his office and adopted a defensive posture when the press attempted to gather information for its feature stories. Having chosen to view the community groups openly as adversaries, he precluded the possibility of neutralizing the criticisms of the police department by working with the community to alleviate its concerns and fears.

Municipal City Government

In discussing the role the city government played in the crime/police department controversy, analysis shall be restricted to the office of the city manager and how his responses served to neutralize the protest of the community. The municipal government in Evanston represents what is termed a "reform" government (Galaskiewicz, 1981). As opposed to a city like Chicago where governmental affairs are controlled by a federation of politicians elected by neighborhood constituencies (or more precisely the democratic machine), Evanston's affairs are administered by a small core of experts. The office of mayor is an elected
office but possesses very little real power. This office serves as the official spokesperson for the city. It is not clear whether this lack of mayoral influence is due to the constitution of the reform government or the result of the dominant influence of the City Manager, Edward Martin. It could be speculated that it is a combination of both influences. Galaskiewcz (1981) maintains that "because reform politicians do not have a political organization to shield them they are more vulnerable to outside influence" (Galaskiewcz, 1981: 265). In the same vein other writers (Bonfield and Wilson, 1963; Smith, 1979; Lowi, 1964; Dye and Garcia, 1978), contend that these reform governments secure the support of their constituencies by exchanging public goods and services for acquiescence, synthesizing these compromises in terms of dominant societal values. It is from this point of view that discussions of the city manager's responses will be approached.

Among city employees Martin has a reputation for being a competent authoritarian manager. At the time the controversy began he had been manager for nine and one half years, and had been credited with balancing the city's fiscal budget.

Martin typically was able to sway the city council his way on issues that required their approval. When the charges against Chief McHugh were made public, Martin issued a strong statement in support of the chief, however, the council was not willing to accept Martin's assurances without some investigation of the EPD. The resources available to the city will now be discussed with a detailed discussion of responses following.
Martin's greatest resource in dealing with the criticisms of Marywood was his direct access to the city council. Even in light of the concern expressed by some council members, Martin was still in a position to present evidence and information to influence the decisions and sympathies of council members. In a reform government such as that exemplified in Evanston, the city manager's position is a full time professional job requiring specific skills. City council members and the mayor are part time employees of the city who spread their energies between full time employment elsewhere and their community concerns as alderpersons. Martin devotes all of his energy and time to the business of administering the city resources. It therefore can be concluded that he is in a better position to present information which would support his recommendations to the council. He also is more likely to anticipate the broader implications of actions taken by the council for the city as a whole.

A second resource of Martin's was his authority to fire or force a resignation from the police chief. This was not a resource he chose to exercise but it was an alternative available. Closely related to this resource is Martin's ability to formally and informally effect the chief's decisions in administering the police department and in reacting to the controversy surrounding him. During this time period it was very apparent that the chief made few moves without the explicit approval or sanction of the city manager. It can be hypothesized that the city manager had a great deal to do with the chief's choice
of strategies in dealing with the charges lodged against him. This
strong influence which Martin had over the chief's decisions effective-
ly gave him control over the police department itself.

A third resource available to the city manager pertains to the
access of information relative to the organizational problems and the
crime information at the police department. The city manager had the
advantage of being able to peruse city information which the community
groups did not have access to. This put him in a better position to
respond to charges. In Pfeffer's (1978) terms, Martin effectively
reduced the uncertainty factor for the city administration, while in-
creasing the uncertainty factor expressed by the community groups.

In addition to having access to more information, Martin also had
the added resource of having control over how that information was dis-
seminated to other city employees, the city council, and the public.
Control of this information could be crucial in building a case which
refutes the charges made by the community group. Martin could effect-
ively "pick and choose" information which would be released to direct
attention away from legitimate problems which could be a source of
embarrassment for him and his administration.

The authority of the city manager as administrator for the city
also placed formal means of social control at his disposal. Coercive
tactics could have been employed with such things as disruptive in-
stances occurring at council meetings, etc. As city manager, Martin
also had access to funds to be used to "stifle" social protest.
Options/Alternative Courses of Action

The reader will recall, this controversy grew out of the Marywood Neighbors Association's concern about the escalating crime rate in Evanston and the media coverage of these concerns and the actions of this group in presenting these issues to the city council. As the strength of these concerns became intensified by the media, the city manager was the object of pressure from various sources. First, he was under pressure from the community at large to make some response and take some action to investigate charges that had been made against the police department. Secondly, he was being pressured by the city council to provide evidence that the charges made against the police department were not true and that measures were being taken to rectify any problems found in this investigation. Thirdly, with the mayoral elections coming up in the Spring of 1981, Martin had a vested interest in assuring both the community and the city council that such organizational and administrative problems did not exist in the police department.

Discussion will now proceed to a delineation of the three directions which Martin's responses to the police controversy took. These directions are depicted in Figure 1. These responses correspond to the three types of issues which the community and the media addressed as being characteristic of EPD.

First of all the city manager had the option of supporting or opposing the chief of police under the attack of the community and media. Martin openly supported the chief in reaction to the charges
made by the media, community groups and the personnel in the police department itself. In the initial furor of these charges, Martin stated that "I've no thoughts of asking the chief to resign. As far as I'm concerned, he is doing the job" (Evanston Review, February 7, 1980: 14). Throughout the whole debate about the police department which ensued over the next year and brought the subsequent retirement of McHugh, Martin never relinquished his initial support of the chief.

In April of 1980 a series of articles (three) appeared in the Suburban Tribune which posed serious charges against the Evanston Police Department, its management by Chief McHugh and the ultimate responsibility of Martin as city manager (and the powerful decision maker believed to be behind many of McHugh's moves as chief). These charges included many of those previously mentioned in the discussion of the police department earlier in this chapter. Among these were charges of low morale among the rank and file which was purported to be the basis of another charge against the effectiveness and efficiency of the patrol section. Other charges were geared towards the absence of investigative procedures for the large volume of burglary cases and the lack of adequate departmental resources.

Following the Suburban Tribune series, the city manager and the chief declined comment on the issues raised and stated that they would carry out separate investigations to determine if there was any truth to the allegations. However, both community groups and members of the city council requested that the Police Management Study include an investigation of the charges made in these articles. Martin called a
special meeting of the city council to discuss the series and promised to submit a report in response to the charges and stated that he expected the management audit to pursue those charges also.

Public Responses

Responses from the city council were varied. Some council members felt the problems at EPD to be symptomatic of the city management (Martin) rather than the sole blame of the chief. One alderperson stated that she "was glad to see it written. I have long felt that the Evanston Police Department needed some looking into. Ed (Martin) always has been very defensive of the police department as though it were his private domain" (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980). Others were not confident the Tribune series had reliable sources but also felt that some attention should be paid to the matter. Members of the Marywood Association had strong reactions to these articles. Garrison stated that the series "provided a very clear background against which any (management study) investigator is going to have to work (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980). Whitmore, also a member of the same group, stated that he was "disappointed, very depressed" by the series and that he "didn't realize that the problems were that severe. It's just like we're helpless" (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980).

On May 5, 1980, Ed Martin issued his response to the series of articles in the Suburban Tribune concerning the police department. Martin's response grouped the issues raised by the series into five main categories. These consisted of: Police activity, manpower issues,
the adequacy and behavior of the support systems, equipment questions, and morale.

**Internal Responses**

A second response initiated by Martin pertained to the internal dynamics of EPD. Both the *Suburban Tribune* and Santos had expounded on the internal problems of EPD based on information from an unnamed "inside source". Numerous reports appeared in the *Suburban Tribune* and *Evanston Review* citing dissension between ranking officers, the rank and file and the chief. The chief was accused of being authoritarian in his method of administration and being so far removed from the rank and file that he had no awareness of the problems faced by officers on the street nor did they have any input into policy making. The chief was directly accused of running the department staff meetings in a purely autocratic manner leaving no room for comment or questioning. It had been remarked to the author on several occasions that supervisors had learned a lesson when asking questions or making comments during these meetings. Officers had been the object of extremely angry verbal attacks until it got to the point that there was no input from supervisors during these meetings at all.

Following the publication of these newspaper articles, the city manager held a special staff meeting with the chief and his ranking staff where internal problems were to be brought to light. These events took place prior to the author's employment at EPD. From the time the author started attending these meetings, the tone was different than what had been described as taking place in earlier meetings.
Interviews with officers who attended this meeting indicated that Ed Martin was concerned with the charges lodged in these newspaper articles and believed that these problems could be "worked" out. It was obvious that Martin took the internal complaints about EPD and the chief serious enough to make an overt attempt at a solution.

Also during this time period, plans to "reorganize" the police department were made public. The Detective Section had been the brunt of much criticism in the handling of burglary cases. The commander of this section was moved to the Youth Section (Lt. MacMillan--Santos' "secret" source) and a captain was moved up from patrol to head the Investigative Section. This was the major change among a series of minor changes instituted by the chief.

Martin had originally proposed allocating additional funds to expand the police force in the fiscal year to begin in March 1980. However, constraints placed on the municipal budget in the form of a decreasing tax base (both a decrease in local businesses and population) and spiraling demands for public services forced him to withdraw this budgetary proposal. It is spoken here as though Martin has exclusive and final authority over the city budget. Formally, the budget is subject to the formal consent of the mayor and aldermanic vote, however, Martin was thorough in many proposals put before the council and was usually quite successful in getting what he wanted from the council. A portion of the money originally to be allocated for increased manpower ($20,000) was set aside for the Police Management Study requested by Marywood.
The final budget included a plan to "civilianize" several supervisory positions held by ranking police personnel. The division between sworn personnel and civilian personnel at EPD (and from the literature this is true in other police departments and military organizations) is a schism of great magnitude--sworn personnel consist of all police personnel who have taken the oath to serve and protect the public and who are vested with the power to arrest. Civilian staff consisted basically of clerical positions prior to 1980. They were not organized in a military ranking system although they were bound by the General Orders put forth by the chief and were expected to abide by the "chain of command" in formal departmental matters.

At the time of the departmental controversy, three positions were scheduled to become civilian posts. These positions were 1) the Director of Planning and Research 2) the Property Officer and 3) the Supervisor of Records. Three main objectives were met by this process. First, it "freed" three ranking officers from desk jobs to return to street duty--the city manager's office and the chief then maintained that this in fact represented an "increase" in manpower. It also brought "new blood" to EPD in the form of new civilians. Lastly, it would eventually result in a salary savings because these sworn positions would be eliminated eventually by attrition.

The above actions represent Martin's efforts to alleviate the "internal" pressures within the police department. Martin faced a double challenge with the police controversy because he had to deal with internal conflict as well as the external conflicts within the
the community. It is obvious from the number of strategies which were geared towards involvement or placating of the community, that Martin considered the external sources of conflict the greater threat to the stability of his administration.

The Police Management Study

Both Marywood's demand for an independent study of EPD and the doubts being voiced in the council chambers led to the appropriation of $20,000 for a management study of the police department. Marywood had originally demanded that the chief be demoted and assigned to a less stressful position at EPD. The management study was Martin's way of acknowledging the charges made against the chief without taking direct action. On February 23, 1980 the Police Services Committee named an ad hoc committee to formulate specific guidelines for both the content and selection of a research group to conduct the audit.

The proponents of the management study encountered delays in the award of the study because of objections raised by Alderman Korshak. Korshak felt that the guidelines proposed by the ad hoc committee would not resolve the serious management problems which he believed to exist in the department. Korshak maintained that there was "pervasive evidence of a lack of discipline" and that "the command of Evanston is inadequate". Korshak called for "a good street wise cop" to investigate the Evanston Police. He maintained that in order to restore confidence in the EPD by the citizenry, the city council must be ready to take a more searching review of the command of the depart-
ment. Korshak was successful in delaying the study for two months pending his submission of an alternative proposal. Korshak's proposal placed a stronger emphasis on studying the top command of the department. Upon rejection of his proposal, Korshak was urged to join a subcommittee assigned to review bid submissions. The reader will recall that Korshak became a serious opponent of the incumbent mayoral candidate in the 1981 city elections, however, he was not successful in his candidacy.

One June 26, 1980 an RFP for the management study was submitted by Alderperson Sherry Laycock, Chair of the Police Services Committee. The research grant was awarded to Research Management Associates, Inc., an independent research firm from Herndon, Virginia. The report was released in August 1981. The two person research team used a combination of several techniques for assessing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of EPD. The report was a surprisingly low key analysis (or perhaps not so surprisingly). The report was suppose to be an assessment of the administration of top ranking personnel (most particularly the chief) and was also suppose to make recommendations for improvement. While this statement on the report will be relatively general in nature, it should be pointed out that very little of the detailed information gathered throughout the project was included in the final report. Even more interesting is the fact that the report had only positive things to say about McHugh when it was public knowledge within EPD that there was open hostility and disagreement between the research team and the chief of police. It is speculated
at this time, that the concept of the management study was viewed by
the city manager as a means to placate community dissension while the
chief instituted plans to retire at his 29th year service anniversary
date (most probably a plan suggested and instituted by Martin to save
face for both himself and the chief and let time and the furor pass
so that it would not appear as though the chief was retiring under
pressure but under his own volition.)

Chief McHugh announced his retirement in May 1981 (to become
effective September 30, 1981). This was mentioned in the management
report along with a statement about the fact that McHugh's tenure as
chief in Evanston was approximately three times the average tenure of
police chiefs across the nation and that while he had done an admirable
job, "new blood" was always a good thing for an organization.

We can then identify this response (the management study) as a
coopticive tactic employed by the city manager. For all appearances, a
thorough organization analysis was being conducted of EPD along with
an assessment of the management competency of the chief as requested
by Marywood and the city council, with Martin in total control of the
outcome or more specifically with the release of this information.
The leaders of Marywood Neighbors had been "absorbed" into a steering
committee in terms of producing the research proposal and their demands
for the demotion or removal of the chief had effectively been neutralized.
The Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program

In the early part of 1980 EPD had applied for a three year grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) which was entitled the Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention Program. The program was funded for one year with subsequent funding contingent upon the submission of a summary report at the end of the first year. This grant was composed of several parts. First, one portion of research was geared towards an understanding and assessment of community groups in Evanston and the issues for which these groups had the greatest concern.

Another section of the grant was devoted to the commercial sector and its crime problems. Westinghouse Evaluation Institute conducted a survey of Evanston merchants to determine both the rate of victimization (apart from the reported crime rate), the major concerns of businesses and what they would like to see done in conjunction with the police department to reduce or prevent crime in the future. There is currently a commercial crime prevention program operating separately from the residential crime program which is the focus of this study.

The third major subdivision of the grant pertains to education in the schools. Efforts are being made to incorporate this program into the curriculum to educate children as to the effects and responsibilities of such criminal activities as vandalism, theft, and even curfew violation. This aspect of the program is also conducting a survey of juvenile delinquency where juveniles are asked (anonymously)
whether they had ever participated in such activities as smoking marijuana, stealing, graffiti, vandalism, etc. While this program constitutes a major area of research, it too is not the subject of the present field work. This aspect of the project was co-directed by the Director of Planning and Research and Officer Kaminski of the Planning and Training Section.

The Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention grant combines four separate research projects with three corresponding community based groups. Two of the four research projects were subcontracted out to independent research teams. The first project involved two surveys. One survey consisted of a random digit dialing of Evanston residents to determine the major issues of concern among city residents. The second aspect of this project involved the composition of a comprehensive list of community organizations and the selection of a representative sample for a survey on issues and objectives of these groups. The purpose of this two fold project was to determine the salient issues and concerns of Evanston residents in general and of community organizations in particular. One clear objective of the study was to ascertain just how pervasive the fear of crime was in Evanston.

The second research project involved a survey of commercial businesses designed to measure the pervasiveness of crime concerns in the commercial sector and the extent to which these commercial establishments were victimized by crime.

A third research project was designed and implemented by the author in the record section. Burglary rates had risen dramatically
in 1970 and appeared to be increasing in 1980. Since burglary was a major issue of the police department controversy, the Director of Planning and Research (Rosenbaum) and the author, decided to focus this part of the grant on investigating three aspects of the burglary problem in Evanston—the environment/social characteristics, the victim and the offender. Data were coded from the original police reports for one half of all residential burglaries and a total sample of commercial and other miscellaneous classified burglaries for the year 1980. The entire sample consisted of approximately 1400 cases. The results are expected to be released in May 1982. These results are to be made available to the Residential Crime Prevention Committee and are expected to have some input on the future direction of this committee's crime prevention program.

A fourth research project is to be carried out in the summer of 1982. Data for this study are to be gleaned from an experimental dissemination of a community crime prevention newsletter. Newsletters containing community news, crime prevention tips and crime information are not new to crime prevention programs. This study seeks to empirically measure the impact of a crime prevention letter on the behaviors of individual citizens exposed to specific crime information in their area (actual crime rates) and its possible indirect effects in reducing crime and increasing apprehension.

This project is the prime responsibility of Rosenbaum (Director of Planning and Research and also a psychologist), and Lavrakas. While this project was initiated by the Residential Crime Prevention Commit-
tee as a whole, interviews with members of this committee and the author's observations revealed that this newsletter was not a high priority in their own goals for the committee and that Rosenbaum had succeeded in "pushing" the newsletter through the committee as the first project to be tackled.

The three organizations to come out of the crime prevention grant pertain to three sectors of influence--a commercial crime prevention committee, a residential crime preventative committee and an educational program instituted in the schools. The Residential Crime Prevention Committee is the prime focus of this paper because it represents a juncture of cooperation by the police department, city administration and concerned citizens groups.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Cooptation as a Survival Mechanism of Local Power Structure

The original inclusion of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee in the grant application was a process independent of the media debate regarding the police chief and the police department. The grant was written six months to a year prior to the formation of the Marywood Neighbors Association and their subsequent activities with the city council. In contrast to Selznick's study of the coop­tive process, it cannot therefore be stated that the conception of the crime prevention committee was a strategy employed to neutralize potential forces of resistance in the community. The committee was designed to facilitate better community relations with police and to increase feelings of personal safety in the community at large. However, as the police controversy became full blown and the management capabilities of the police chief and ultimately the city manager came into question, the formation of this committee was cited as evidence of city efforts to deal with the crime issue.

In his response made to the city council concerning the allegations made in the Suburban Tribune articles, Martin stated that:
As I re-read the articles, I was concerned and obviously angered at some of the innuendo and points raised and the overall impression given by the articles that Evanston is an antiquated, unprofessional Police Department with men who don't care and with no directions or tools to use. I do think it important to spend some time reminding the City Council and others of the leadership efforts our Department has been involved in....In the very current climate you have the first major arrest of a terrorist group in the nation, the development of the Bicycle Enforcement Program Grant; the Crime Prevention Grant Program which is pending now before I.L.E.C.; the naming, just recently, of two Evanston Police Officers by the Combined Counties Police Association as the "Officers of the Year," an award given by their peers throughout the entire organization; and the continuation of our existing programs; the recent civilianization effort, which we all believe will make the operation more effective, as well as the utilization of Park Patrol Officers and the like. (City Memorandum, May 5, 1980).

In his 1980 statement of departmental objectives, McHugh stated that the "Endorsement of a grant application to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission" was one of the five parts of his program to strengthen the police department for the fiscal year 1981 (Evanston Review, February 7, 1980).

In his presentation of the guidelines for the Police Management Study, Assistant City Manager, Joel Asprooth, again cited the Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention Program (CCCPP) as a part of the city's efforts at strengthening the police department. Accusations were made at the meeting by members of Marywood, that these guidelines were "vague" and "lacking specifics to determine the actual extent of criminal activity including victimization and the study of the public safety by other city departments" (Evanston Review, June 5, 1980: 6). Asprooth responded to these reservations by pointing out that CCCPP would contain many of the answers to Marywood's questions.
Upon the actual awarding of the CCCPP, McHugh again stressed the fact to the *Evanston Review*, that the "focus of this program is to develop a stable partnership between the police department and many public and private organizations." Specifically, the programs expected to:

- Develop and implement crime prevention strategies.
- Reduce crime and juvenile delinquency.
- Improve crime prevention skills of criminal justice personnel.
- Develop community awareness and involvement in combatting crime and neighborhood security.

The CCCPP was also cited by the Director of Planning and Research as a crucial component of the development of good police-community relations and in making Evanston "an example to other cities throughout the country that are facing the same crime problems" (*Evanston Review*, April 30, 1981: 20A)

As the above citations indicate, the actual conceptualization of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC) was not initiated as a response to the demands of citizen concerns. Rather, it was envisioned as part of a comprehensive effort to plan a workable program by developing "a stable partnership between the police department and other public and private groups to reduce crime and the fear of crime in Evanston" (*Evanston Review*, July 24, 1980: 20A). It can therefore be concluded that the original intent of this program was not the cooptation or absorption of leaders of the community as a means of neutralizing social protest. However, as the community dialogue concerning the police department, the police chief and crime intensified,
the development of the RCPC became an increasingly important adjunct of the city administration's efforts to appease citizen protest.

Rosenbaum (the Director of Planning and Research) had been involved in the grant application submitted in the early part of 1980. Prior to the first closed meeting of the RCPC, Rosenbaum was asked by this author, whether city hall or the city manager had been involved in these meetings in any way. He stated that the city manager's office had "expressed an interest in what would take place at these meetings and what their objectives would be". When asked whose idea the organization of these meetings was, he stated that it was his own and that it had been written into the crime prevention grant two years previously.

The degree of importance which all involved organizations attributed to the RCPC, has fluctuated in intensity at several points along the continuum of its conceptualization, evolution, and organization. The original inclusion of the committee in the grant application was based on crime prevention programs developed in other municipalities as evidence by much of the crime prevention literature. At this point it was merely a neutral abstraction from both an academically and practically designed prevention program. However, as both the city administration and the police department felt compelled to "react"

This prior to his second employment at EPD. It was apparent at this point that Rosenbaum had a vested interest in the development and implementation of these results as he was then an employee of Westinghouse Evaluation Institute, which was to be the recipient of one of the subcontracts of the research proposal.
to the concerns and demands of community residents, the idea of a community police based crime prevention committee took on new importance. As previously mentioned, the formation of this committee was offered by various city officials as a positive action geared towards the resolution of citizens' concerns. These events all took place prior to the announcement of McHugh's retirement in May of 1981.

Following the chief's announcement that he would retire in September 1981, the administrators of the police department in particular and the city in general became less interested in the particular functions of this committee. By the time the RCPC held its first closed door meeting in September of 1981, neither the chief nor the city manager were interested in this committee for the same reasons for which they had previously shown an interest. The political pressure for the chief's resignation or replacement had disappeared because the chief had voluntarily forfeited his role by the fact of his retirement. As previously discussed, this action was timed so as not to appear as an admission of "guilt" nor as a response to community pressure. Also at this time, the Police Management Study was in full swing and thus another of the community demands had been realized (however superficial). At this point in time the RCPC might be regarded as a "back up" political strategy which had not been fully exploited but nevertheless remained should the need to use it arise.

The relative lack of attention which characterized both the city and the police administration's attitude towards the RCPC can be demonstrated in two ways. First, the chief had less than two months
before his retirement from the department. The political conflict surrounding both his competency and the efficiency and effectiveness of the police department had slowly been appeased by the variety of methods discussed earlier. Once the chief announced his impending retirement, the protesting group no longer had the resource of public indignation on their side. Arousing public sentiments empowered them when the demand for McHugh's resignation or termination was a possibility. Having chosen retirement, McHugh no longer had a vested interest in cultivating community opinion. Therefore when the RCPC was in its formative stages, the police chief took no active interest or part in the process. He literally stood to gain nothing from the involvement. The Resource Committee's inability to get formal statement of support from police administration when questioned by the RCPC, made this situation very apparent.

Early in the development of the committee, several members had questioned the amount and kind of official support their activities and programs would glean from the police department. The Resource Committee was vague in responding to these questions, often making statements such as "this has yet to be determined by the new police chief when the selection process has been completed." The Resource Committee actually commented on one occasion that they had to be very careful in their representation of the police department because they did not have the authority to officially commit the police department nor the City of Evanston to the continuation of the crime prevention program beyond the period covered by the grant. Resource Committee
members were obviously uncomfortable when these citizen concerns were voiced. Their main concern at this time was not with the eminent future of the RCPC but with the immediate implementation of goals which they had written into the crime prevention grant.

Once the uncertainty of official support from police administration became apparent to the committee, attention turned to questioning the official recognition and support from the city manager's office. The Resource Committee was questioned as to whether the city manager and the city council were aware of their existence, their activities, and whether the city would support their programs both officially and financially following the expiration of the federal grant. Again, answers were vague indicating the uncertainty under which the police department was operating at the time. Resource Committee members did not have the authority to commit either the police department nor the city to the future of the RCPC. However, they were very much aware of the political ramifications of this uncertainty. Their own political power (and indeed the security of their jobs) was contingent upon remaining vaguely noncommittal until a new police chief was selected and subsequently announced his own stand on crime prevention and police/community relations.

The Resource Committee was also very much aware of the RCPC's need for assurance that their efforts were to be taken seriously and that they would ultimately have some impact in the community at large. On several occasions Rosenbaum brought up the organizational problem of keeping community leaders interested and involved in a committee.
He stressed several times the importance of developing multiple issues which would help to ensure the continuation of the committee above and beyond the life of the crime prevention grant.

Rosenbaum is familiar with research regarding the mobilization of citizens in to community activities. Since the attendance of some committee members had been rather sporadic, this was a concern to the Resource Committee. This is typically not a characteristic of a group which poses a threat to the city/police administration. This would preclude the process of cooptation from two perspectives. First, since there is the need to motivate community involvement, the RCPC does not represent an organization which the Resource Committee needs to coopt. Secondly, the Resource Committee's interest in alleviating this organizational problem is indicative of a genuine concern for the success of the committee which goes beyond the immediate concern for implementing the feasibility tests. Although operating at a disadvantage because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in the continuation and official direction of the committee, the resource committee itself has exercised a high degree of control over the goal setting of the organization and the implementation of the programs which it has developed. We shall discuss this control in greater detail in a later section.

A third variation in the degree of importance attributed to the RCPC occurred in December 1981. The city manager, after twelve years as the chief city administrator, announced his resignation from his post to take the same position in Corpus Christi, Texas. This city
administrator now no longer had a vested interest in perpetuating and legitimizing the RCPC. This evaluation in no way intends to completely discount the possibility that either the city administration or the city council had a sincere interest in the community welfare being addressed by this committee. The intention is merely to point out that this issue was no longer politically volatile because the direction of public sentiment no longer served as a powerful resource because two of the principle actors in the controversy had exited the city.

The importance of the RCPC recently took on a new dimension of importance. Howard L. Rogers assumed the position of Chief of Police on January 4, 1982. Rogers is the former assistant Chief of Police of Cincinnati, Ohio. Organizationally Rogers suffers a disadvantage not previously encountered by McHugh. McHugh had the advantage of sharing an organizational history with the officers and the rank and file under his command. While as previously discussed this shared history can cause problems of "cronyism" and organization inefficiency, it does offer the chief a social base on which to build his administration and authority. Rogers as an outsider, does not have this history to form a social basis of support within the organization.

Rogers has attempted to establish himself with the police department in two ways. First, Rogers has extensively interviewed and discussed departmental procedures and needs with top ranking personnel as well as the rank and file. He has reinstituted the importance given to rank and organizational experience as prerequisites for division heads and section heads. This hierarchy had become less
important during the year prior to McHugh's retirement. Following the transformation of several top ranking positions to civilian positions, there had been an accompanying increase in the chief's reliance on civilian "expertise". Rosenbaum, as a newly employed civilian with "expert knowledge", maintained considerable influence over McHugh's decisions. In his efforts to modernize Evanston Police Department and make crucial changes in organizational policy, McHugh frequently chose the more theoretical advise of Rosenbaum over the experiential advice of his sworn personnel. Such a change of policy created a visible rift between the majority of sworn personnel (both officers and the rank and file) and Rosenbaum as the implementer of departmental policy and programs. It appears that Rogers had very astutely analyzed this situation and has taken steps to decrease the power and influence of Rosenbaum in departmental matters by returning the division formerly under Rosenbaum's control back to the supervision of sworn personnel. Essentially, Rosenbaum has formally and to a greater degree been informally stripped of much of his power and influence and Rogers has made concrete steps forward in gaining both the respect and support of the department.

Secondly, being disadvantaged by the initial lack of a social base in his organization, Rogers has gone beyond the police department in seeking support. Rogers has a history of close community involvement in his former role in Cincinnati. Since his appointment in January, Rogers has taken an active interest in the activities of the RCPC. The design, printing, and distribution of the crime prevention newsletter by the committee has had the official approval of his office. He had
made a point of addressing the committee itself at which time he stressed the need for the police department to work closely with the community to make the city a better place to live. Rogers has also responded very positively to individual committee members requests for police involvement in their community areas. The credibility of the RCPC has taken on renewed importance during the past three months. The new chief has both a genuine interest in productive police/community relations and an interest in facilitating his entry into a relatively closed organization and the community at large. While the exact outcome of this renewed interest in the RCPC remains to be determined, the committee itself feels its future to be less uncertain in nature.

A general discussion of the process of cooptation has been presented above, as it applies to the formation of the RCPC. This discussion has attempted to outline the discontinuous manner in which the cooptic process has been utilized, as political circumstances and realities have changed in the city as well as within the police organization itself. The outset of this study began with the hypothesis that the city government/police department viewed the formation of this committee as a means of appeasing public demands for the reduction of crime in the city and the assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the former police chief and the organization in general. As has been demonstrated above, this cooptic process vacilated in the intention, intensity and consequences in response to uncertain environmental conditions. As the control over the factors of uncertainty changed, so did the use of cooptic strategies. Once the former chief had announced his retirement and the Police Management Study
was underway, the pooling of public sentiments and the threat of disruptive social protest in the form of presentations to the council, was lessened. The RCPC became a relatively neutral body in the eyes of city/police administration and therefore official attention was withdrawn from its operations. With the inception of the new police chief, the RCPC has become the object of renewed attention as a means of developing and broadening a community social base in the face of intraorganizational uncertainty. As previously mentioned, this community social base was one alternative action or resource which McHugh chose not to develop in the face of controversy. While the selection of the new chief was very much geared towards a candidate with a strong community background, the development of close police/community relations provides Rogers with a visible sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the police organization as well as the city in general. The strategy to be chosen by the new city manager (as of yet not selected) towards the RCPC as a city wide organization remains to be seen.

Residential Crime Prevention Committee

Evolution of Organization

The Residential Crime Prevention Committee developed as part of the Comprehensive Crime Prevention grant. As previously mentioned, community organizations were selected from a list of 800 community groups listed at the public library as being based in Evanston. The Urban Affairs Department at Northwestern University had been contracted to research the activities and concerns of both community groups and
private citizens. These results were then submitted to the police department and letters were sent out to community groups on file at the library. Individual citizens were also notified via the Evanston Review that such a committee was being formed.

Three open meetings were held in the summer of 1981. In September the police department attempted to bring some closure to the formation of the committee by designating those attending the September 22, 1981 meeting as the "official" crime prevention committee. According to members of the resource committee, this was done because the same people were not attending the meetings regularly and thus the organizational structure and goals of the committee could not be formulated in an orderly manner. Thirteen community organization leaders and three individual residents comprised the committee in addition to a four member Resource Committee selected by the police department. Three of these four persons on the Resource Committee were members of the police department. Two were police officers and one was the Director of Planning and Research (a civilian position). The fourth member was a Professor of Sociology and Journalism at Northwestern University. Although as an employee of the police department the author had been aware of the general content of the grant, involvement had been exclusively with the planning and collection of data for a burglary study as another part of the grant.

There was no personal involvement with the conception or organization of the RCPC prior to the formation of the committee on Sept. 22, 1981. The first four months the RCPC was in existence, the meetings
were chaired by Frank Kaminski, one of the officers on the Resource Committee. Kaminski attempted to get the committee to elect a chairperson and secretary in the first meeting, however, the uncertainty surrounding the goals and objectives of the committee, made community leaders unwilling to make this decision immediately. Also, none of the committee members knew each other prior to involvement with the RCPC. This fact coupled with the lack of clarity surrounding their role in this committee made members prefer to sit back and observe the flow of events before committing themselves to the selection of officers. The Resource Committee outlined and distributed an agenda at the outset of each meeting. They were also responsible for taking minutes, having them typed up and distributed to members prior to the next meeting.

In January, 1982, the RCPC finally elected a chairperson and a co-chairperson. Since that time, this chairperson has presided over these meetings and has been responsible for moving things forward in terms of working through proposed agenda items. The Resource Committee still maintains tight control over the committee structure and agenda items. This is partially due to the fact that the chairperson (and indeed the committee in general) still depends a great deal on the Resource Committee for guidance and direction. The uncertain future of the committee and the uncertainty of organizational goals which plagues the RCPC, makes members unwilling or unable to maintain a more marked independence from the Resource Committee.
Secondly, this dependence is partially due to the fact that the police chief has the sole responsibility of authorizing all documents or issuances of this committee. Since there has been no direct communication with the new police chief until the middle of March (1982), committee members have had to rely on the Resource Committee as an intermediary entity.

Lastly, this dependence may be attributed to the Resource Committee's vested interest in fulfilling the objective of designing, distributing and measuring the effects of a community crime prevention newsletter. This objective has been the major motivating force behind the educational process initiated by the Resource Committee. Although overtly stressing at each meeting that the objectives of the RCPC were to be established by the community leaders themselves, the Resource Committee had been successful in "coopting" these leaders into establishing the newsletter as a top priority. A detailed discussion of this process is presented below in the section entitled "Establishing Organizational Goals".

At the present time, the committee's role in the development of the newsletter is nearly at a close. The format and the tone of these meetings will be expected to shift somewhat now that the Resource Committee has been successful in achieving its major objective. In an interview with the committee chairperson, a personal interest in the development of a neighborhood watch network was very prominent. There have already been signs that this will be the next program objective as the chairperson has requested that a package be presented to the
committee by resource personnel for consideration. It remains to be seen whether interaction patterns will change now that the time constraints and structure imposed by the Resource Committee have produced the outcome they intended. It may be that the RCPC will now take more initiative in developing the individual interests of community leaders. This situation could lead to an interesting process of negotiation on the future goals and objectives of the committee. It also holds the possibility of cooptation by the more powerful members of the committee. The distribution of power among committee members will be discussed in the section on interaction patterns. Discussion will now turn to a descriptive analysis of individual community leaders and the organizations/area they represent.

Figure 2 represents a map of the municipality in question depicting the community areas represented by the RCPC. As Figure 2 indicates, many areas of Evanston are not represented on the committee. As explained in an earlier section, this committee was formed by a process of self selection. While those groups represented on the committee do not represent the only community groups concerned with the issue of crime and fear of crime, there do appear to be similarities in the type of areas which most of these groups represent. While many areas in Evanston contain a characteristic mix of housing stock (single family homes versus apartments), income levels and race, the majority of community areas represented on the RCPC, are white middle class areas. The community leaders themselves are characteristically between the ages of 25 and 40. Many are young professionals with a
vested interest in improving or maintaining the current quality of life in the neighborhood as an acceptable "family" atmosphere. This is consistent with previous research on citizen involvement in community organizations and issues within the community as a whole (Lavrakus, 1981).

Ten of the community leaders are male, three are female. Two individual residents are female and one is male. While the majority of committee members are clearly male, the female members have been very prominent in the proceedings of this committee. This will be discussed further in the following section. Many of the committee members represent relatively small geographical areas. This is not surprising once community leaders' emphases and interest in the mobilization of neighbors is understood. The members of the RCPC are very much concerned with eradicating the anonymity in their own neighborhoods. They view their involvement in the RCPC and the development of neighborhood crime prevention programs as one method of accomplishing this goal. Several leaders have successfully combined the development of the crime prevention newsletter with other neighborhood concerns (traffic and street lighting, as well as the exchange of informal information such as recipes and tips) and attracted a variety of people to their neighborhood meetings. This development is another reason why committee members have not been included to protest the structure and objectives imposed by the Resource Committee—the outcome of the newsletter has not been entirely to their disadvantage. Discussion will now proceed to the patterns of interaction which have
developed between individual committee members, between members of the larger committee and the Resource Committee and between various subgroups within the committee itself.

Patterns of Interaction

In the initial meetings of the RCPC there were no defined patterns of interaction other than random discussions between committee members and the Resource Committee. The basic reason for this was the fact that none of the committee members previously knew each other nor had any of their organizations worked together on previous projects. With the exception of one committee member, none of the committee members had previously worked with the police department or members of the Resource Committee. As previously discussed, this situation was a major reason for the committee's initial reluctance to elect a chairperson or secretary and their heavy reliance on the Resource Committee for direction.

As the Resource Committee continued the education process on crime prevention strategies and committee members began to formulate their own interests in crime prevention, more specific patterns of interaction began to emerge. Area interests and problems specific to certain organizations began to appear. During the initial stages of development committee members participated on a somewhat equal basis. However, as specific interests began to surface, two changes in their patterns of interaction were observed.
First, committee members representing community organizations began to be more vocal and more influential in discussions and decision making. The Resource Committee itself, while recognizing the individual resident's right to be a part of the RCPC, did not have as great an interest in either the ideas or opinions of these individuals. The general aim of the RCPC was *community involvement*, and while these individual residents were part of the larger Evanston community, they did not have one basic resource to offer the Resource Committee or the committee at large—a social base or membership constituency. The Resource Committee was in need of a community network for the distribution and testing of the crime prevention newsletter. Since this was their main initial objective, these individual residents were not in a position to offer a valuable resource to the police representatives.

Within the functioning of the RCPC itself, these individual members gradually participated less and less in discussion or in the generating of ideas. Other members, as representatives of groups, could voice the concerns or even demands of their constituencies more readily because they had the implication of "numbers" behind them. These individual members themselves appeared to view themselves as less and less able to add anything of value to the proceedings. The general disengagement of these individuals was the result of two processes. First, they were constantly reminded that they were "different" from the rest of the committee members by inevitable references to the geographical areas represented by other members. Issues such as the distribution of the newsletters by community group members and
the many discussions on how to mobilize community members to actively participate in community affairs and how to maintain a high level of participation further reinforced this separation. Other committee members reinforced this exclusion by dismissing the comments made by these individual members as unimportant in such ways as not commenting or reacting to their contributions, or stating outright that individual committee members' topics were not the immediate concern of the committee as a whole.

As a result, one individual resident has withdrawn completely from participation in the committee and two others have reverted to intermittent attendance in the last two months. Two of these three are female and it might be speculated that sex is probably an intervening variable in this process. The remaining individual resident participant is a black male who comes from a lower income area of Evanston. On the occasions when this man has interjected comments or concerns, he has had difficulty articulating his ideas in an understandable way. This appears to be due to a level of education somewhat lower than the general education levels of the RCPC as a whole.

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the influence of these individual residents in the activities of the RCPC have decreased as the influence of other members has increased. This general decline appears to be the result of a general lack of resources which these individual residents are able to offer the committee. This deficiency in resources is due in part to the lack of a social base
behind these members and also to the social characteristics these members bring with them.

The second change which has occurred in terms of interaction patterns has been the emergence of a selected core of individuals who are more powerful in committee policy making. There are four members who comprise this influential core. Richard Clark was elected by an unanimous vote as chairperson of the RCPC. Clark represents the community designated as Area 1 on Figure 2. Clark is approximately thirty-five years of age and holds a college degree and a professional job. He and his wife are relatively new homeowners in this area. Clark's basic responsibility is presiding over the actual meetings and seeing to it that discussions are limited to the issues on the agenda and in organizing new agenda items for future meetings. Prior to his election, Clark had voiced dissatisfaction (in a personal interview) with the direction the committee had taken in the initial stages of development. His personal view was that the committee had been influenced by the "hidden agenda" of Rosenbaum which had resulted in the selection of the newsletter as the committee's first priority. Clark's own interest lies with the development of a neighborhood crime watch program. This interest has since come to the forefront now that the basic project of the newsletter has been accomplished. Clark was not part of the newsletter subcommittee.

Camille Lee is a single female between the ages of 25 and 30. She represents the Elks Park Neighborhood Association which is designated as Area 3 in Figure 2. Lee resides in an apartment complex
(typical of most of the area she represents) with her seriously ill mother. Lee holds a degree in elementary education with aspirations of studying landscaping and environmental design at Harvard University. She is currently unemployed and has been unable to find a job for approximately one year. Lee is the most powerful person on the RCPC.

Although Lee is not an elected member of the RCPC, she has been a major force behind the writing of the newsletter itself and in getting it printed at a reasonable cost by a friend who is a printer. She has been the prime motivating force behind the design and authorship of the newsletter. She has also developed a strong working relationship with Deputy Chief Logan, who is the division head of the Community Relations division of the police department. Logan is the person responsible for the administration of CCCP but does not attend the RCPC meetings. Therefore Lee has had to go beyond the power structure of the RCPC and the Resource Committee in establishing this relationship.

Jean Nerenberg is a middle aged career woman from an affluent section of the city. Nerenberg's youngest child is in junior high school. She represents Northwestern Neighbors, which is a relatively flexible and fluid organization at this time. This organization evolved from a series of block parties where Nerenberg took the initiative to introduce the "whistle stop" program following the rapes of several young women in the area. This area is designated as Area 4 in Figure 2.
Nerenberg also exerts an influence on activities of the committee. She was the only person who made a formal statement to the committee that she was not in favor of the newsletter as the top priority of the RCPC. She made it clear that she felt that its pursuit had been the decision of the Resource Committee and not the RCPC as a whole. It is significant that when the RCPC subcommittee charged with the responsibility of designing and writing the newsletter was formed, she was suggested by the Resource Committee as a member, elected by the RCPC in general and accepted the assignment.

Jim Freund is the fourth member in this core of influential members. Freund is a young single professional person which has recently moved to the Evanston area. He is the representative from the Marywood Neighbors Association—the key community group behind the original police controversy. The geographical area which he represents is labelled Area 5 on Figure 2. Freund speaks less frequently at RCPC meetings than do any of the other "core members but has an impact on committee decisions. He also was assigned the job of producing the newsletter.

Marilyn Osterkamp represents the Northwestern Neighbors as does Jean Nerenberg. Osterkamp was initially incorporated into the RCPC as an alternative for this organization when Nerenberg was unable to attend meetings. While she does not attend RCPC meetings on a regular basis, she was one of the four members of the subcommittee charged with the responsibility of producing the community newsletter. Osterkamp works full time in a Chicago business. Her husband teaches
at Evanston High School. She has three children, the oldest of which is a senior in high school.

Osterkamp is more caustic in voicing her reservations concerning the leadership and manipulation by the Resource Committee. She would be a more influential member in the RCPC if her attendance was not so intermittent and her other commitments spread over such a broad area.

The next several months should prove to be a time of change for the RCPC. The intellectual interests of the Resource Committee have, for all practical purposes been accomplished. Individual community interests should begin to become more apparent and the formation of new political factions and influence within the RCPC will no doubt occur.

**Establishing Organizational Goals**

During the first meeting of the RCPC, Rosenbaum introduced the experimental approach to the crime prevention program. He outlined several basic issues which he felt "would have to be considered by the group". "We have an approach to suggest" but as we go along we are still faced with the question of whether it (the program to be developed) will work in Evanston. For his experimental approach he indicated the group would take previous local research coupled with available national research on crime prevention techniques and decide what approaches were appropriate for Evanston. He stated that they would take this research and combine it with the experience of the committee members to decide what crimes were of major concern to Evanstonians.
He further stated that they would have to determine what neighborhoods required special attention. The final step would be to test whether the program they had developed actually work.

The first two months of RCPC meetings consisted basically of educational sessions. Lavrakus (the Professor from Northwestern) presented data from the community group study to the group to emphasize what things were issues to Evanston residents. Throughout these first months various members kept asking questions about formal support from the city and police department and whether this committee would have any "clout" in producing needed changes. One of the main thrusts of this concern centered on member's unwillingness to expend time and energy on projects which would not have the official support of the city nor result in any positive programmatic changes.

During these meetings Rosenbaum talked frequently of "the need to test these things out." Recommendations had been drawn up by Lavrakus and Rosenbaum which were based on the Northwestern study. Members were asked at the second meeting to prioritize these recommendations. Several recommendations pertaining to the activities of a crime prevention unit at the police department were given high priority but the actual recommendation stating that the crime prevention unit at Evanston Police Department should be expanded was rated as a low priority.

One member actually pointed this out at a later meeting. This situation indicated that the Resource Committee was asking them to vote on recommendations which they did not understand at that time.
Various members continued to voice their particular interests and goals in terms of committee activities. One community group was particularly interested in reducing the fear of crime (represented by a female member). Several members were very interested in activities which neighbors would be involved in (developing a block watch was of particular interest).

The Resource Committee allowed these first few meetings to be relatively fluid in nature. While they did have a pre-arranged agenda, there were no strenuous efforts to structure discussion to particular issues. This situation did not occur until the third meeting. Both Kaminski and Rosenbaum began to subtly guide the discussions to particular issues on the agenda. When members would bring up a topic or go off on a tangent not pertinent to the immediate topic at hand, one of the Resource Committee members would interject after the member finished speaking to prevent responses from other members on what had just been said.

At the outset, RCPC members were very concerned about the objectives/goals of the committee and the particular role which they were expected to play. Questions such as "what is the objective of this committee" and "what is the role of the police vis a vis the citizenry?" were expressed by all members. The RCPC is composed of an educated citizenry which is very much concerned with their neighborhoods. They have consistently shown themselves to be a group requiring specific goals be outlined as a part of their involvement. While the majority of them did not have solidly formulated objectives when the
committee was initiated, they have made it clear that they needed concrete projects and objectives to ensure their continued involvement in the RCPC.

In contrast to community leaders, the Resource Committee had very specific goals in mind when this committee was formed. As previously mentioned, the RCPC was written into the crime prevention grant two years earlier. Also written into the grant was an "experiment" designed to evaluate the effectiveness of programs to be designed by the RCPC. There are three ways in which a crime prevention program can be evaluated. These measures consist of 1) measurement of compliance and/or participation of citizens 2) measure of whether people feel safer or not and 3) whether crime is numerically reduced or not. Since the EPD received funding for only one and one half years of the originally projected three year grant and the RCPC was not scheduled to begin until the second year, a numerical measurement of crime was not a feasible short term assessment of the impact of the crime prevention programs developed by the RCPC. To measure participation and feelings of safety would require the rapid development and implementation of a crime prevention program which could be evaluated before the grant expired in June of 1982. The design of such a research project in such a short period of time was virtually impossible.

Designing a community crime prevention newsletter appeared to be a solution to the time constraints. The newsletter would be a concrete program which could be designed and distributed in a relative-
ly short period of time. Distribution could be made via RCPC com-
munity leaders according to a pattern determined by the Resource
Committee. The Resource Committee determined that 3,000 newsletter
would be distributed each month for three months, with 1,500 of these
containing actual crime information. These same households would
receive this letter each month. At the end of the three month period,
a random digit dialing survey would be conducted to determine whether
citizens receiving the specific crime information had altered their
protective behaviors or changed in their attitudes towards crime in
Evanston.

As previously mentioned, the first three meetings of the RCPC
were relatively fluid in terms of setting objectives and policy. How-
ever, in the fourth meeting, the Resource Committee coopted the RCPC
members into making the development and distribution of the newsletter
the first priority of the committee. This was not a "sudden" show of
force by the Resource Committee but was a gradual process which cul-
minated at this particular meeting.

Rosenbaum had vaguely outlined the experimental method to be
employed in the "feasibility" test. However, no mention was made of
this feasibility test in conjunction with a particular crime preven-
tion program. In the second meeting the choice of producing the news-
letter was introduced by the Resource Committee. Many RCPC members
regarded the Resource Committee's initial role as one of educating the
community leaders. This was a necessary part of the proceedings
because the majority of the committee members involved had no previous experience in crime prevention nor were they even aware of previous programs existent in other cities. The Resource Committee distributed a summary of crime prevention strategies published by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission.

Lavrakus summarized information which had been collected on which particular issues were of concern to the majority of Evanstonians and assured committee members that crime was a major concern of most people. Lavrakus provided this information broken down by area of the city. He compared people's perceptions of the severity of crime in their area with the actual incidents of crime to demonstrate the importance of educating the citizenry. Kaminski presented findings from a study of EPD personnel concerning attitudes towards crime prevention in conjunction with a participative citizenry.

The contention here is not that this dissemination of information was unimportant but rather this was a necessary step for the committee as a whole to begin to participate in the development of any crime prevention program. However, the skillful way in which this education process was carried out and the selection of the newsletter as a top priority at the fourth meeting, were results of a pre-conceived set of objectives on the part of the Resource Committee. The newsletter project was introduced as a motion by the Resource Committee and carried through by a majority vote. Several members had made comments that they believed that a newsletter was not a bad idea but a concrete, expanded prevention program was needed to involve people
in the neighborhoods. This was a major concern of most members—they were seeking ways to mobilize and involve citizens in their areas in a neighborhood effort. The week following the passing of this motion, the meeting minutes stated that the motion had been carried through unanimously. One female member objected to this statement, expressing that she was not in support of the newsletter as the first priority of the committee and wanted to be recorded as such. Rosenbaum responded to her objection with the statement that since she had failed to attend the previous meeting and had failed to send an alternative, the vote had been based only on those present.

Indepth interviews with committee members indicated in all but one case, that the development of the newsletter had not been their main objective. The majority of committee members were interested in developing a block/neighborhood watch program which would involve their organizational membership—not in generating "more paper which won't even be read". Committee members were confused as to how they "had become committed to the newsletter". It was unanimously felt that the police department had "ulterior motives" involved in the selection of the newsletter as a major project. Committee members were more willing to attribute these motives to a particular member of the Resource Committee rather than to the committee as a whole. This member was Rosenbaum. Rosenbaum was believed to be operating from a "hidden agenda" in his involvement in the RCPC. All but one RCPC member interviewed voiced a distrust of Rosenbaum's motives and felt that they were manipulating the committee. However, each member felt
that they were gleaning sufficient rewards from their participation to warrant their cooperation in carrying out the newsletter project and felt that once this project was out of the way, they could begin to work on projects more pertinent to the interests of their community areas. At this point it must be concluded that a second level of cooptation has taken place.

The RCPC was initiated with statements that decisions on goals, objectives and the role of citizens in these programs was entirely at their discretion. The first few meetings were conducted with an aura of "fluidity" with a subtle thread of educational bias interwoven. Had committee members been more educated in terms of crime prevention strategies, tactics and programs, it is doubtful that the Resource Committee would have been so successful in initiating the newsletter as the first objective. The introduction of this motion at a later point in time would have found itself up against a less naive and a more educated committee and would probably have had a more difficult time being passed.

Secondly, time was a crucial factor for the resource committee in terms of producing a measurable program in an extremely short period of time (seven months). As Rosenbaum stated at the first meeting, "the Evanston Police Department has an interest in moving things along. If we don't move along, we will be in touch with the chairperson to discuss it" (the chairperson to be elected by the committee itself).
CHAPTER V

MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES

In the previous chapter the use of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee as a cooptive strategy of the city government was discussed. Results indicate that the RCPC was not conceived as a cooptive strategy but did take on varying degrees of importance as the police controversy gained intensity and ebbed with the retirement of the former police chief and the resignation of the city manager. It has been hypothesized that the new police chief will maintain an active interest in the future of the RCPC as a means of establishing a solid social base within the community.

The RCPC itself has also been discussed in detail. It has been demonstrated that the evolution of the RCPC was the result of a self selection process among Evanston community groups. This self selection process indicated that the police department/city government did not utilize a direct method of "absorbing" the protesting community group (Marywood) but rather used an indirect method of absorbing an "conflict" on the issue of crime within the Evanston community as a whole. In essence the police department did not reduce the dissension from Marywood but prevented an informal network from developing which could enlist the support of large portions of the Evanston population.

Modern social movement theories, most notably the Resource
Mobilization perspective, have emphasized the organizational problem of maintaining a high level of participation of members throughout the life of the movement itself. In light of the previous discussion concerning the strong "influence" of the Resource Committee on the setting of RCPC goals, it seems appropriate at this time to discuss the various factors which motivated individual members to continue participation even when they were in opposition to the newsletter as a major goal. In order to adequately understand this process, three specific periods of social unrest in the history of the United States will be briefly discussed. These are the Progressive Era of the early 1900's, the welfare movement of the 1930's and 1940's, and the social movements of the 1960's. Broadly speaking, the Progressive Era characterized a period of middle class reform which did not aim to change the basic institutions of the democratic society. This movement encompassed a number of basic goals. Among these goals were such issues as: the Americanization of non-WASP immigrants, an improved quality of life for the working class, improved consumer goods and public services, the end of corruption and corporate rapaciousness, and the streamlining and professionalization of the government.

A second broad based era in the history of U.S. social protest is characterized by the welfare rights and industrial workers movements of the 1930's and 1940's. Piven and Cloward (1977) provide a detailed discussion of the goals of these movements. It is the contention of these authors that the movements themselves were relatively ineffective in realizing major movement goals because of inherent inequalities.
A third period of pervasive social protest can be identified as the social movements of the 1960's. Like the movements of the 1930's and 1940's, these movements were concerned with affecting major structural changes in American society. The 1970's and 1980's have seen the relative failure of the American Left in the movements of the 60's being transformed into more workable goals of social change which are aimed at the community level. These community movements are viewed by the left as a first step to developing national networks geared towards changing major social institutions.

Crime is just one among many social issues which has surfaced with this pervasive concern over community life. It is an issue which is capable of eliciting strong emotional reactions from citizens through a type of snowballing effect. The magnitude of social protest which this snowball effect is capable of eliciting from a community is considerable. The response of the Evanston police/city administration can thus be viewed as a "anticipatory" response aimed at alleviating such a movement before it can gain momentum. This the context from which the RCPC must be viewed. Discussion will next center around the placement of individual RCPC members and their motivations for continued participation in the RCPC. The remainder of this chapter will thus seek to place the police controversy and the RCPC within this social climate and attempt to explain the continued participation of RCPC members in the fact of conflicting RCPC and Resource Committee goals.
Citizen Participation: Motivating Factors

In contrast to the macro-structural issues of social movements in the 1960's, the 1970's and the 1980's have produced an abundance of grassroot associations aimed at issues at the micro-level. In an article on the American Left, Richard Flacks summarizes the distinction between the social movements of the 60's as opposed to the movements of the 70's and 80's by distinguishing two types of action—action geared towards making history and action geared towards making life. The movements of the 60's were concerned with affecting the shape of society by directing social change at the most basic level of our democratic institutions. However, for the majority of people, this type of action is too abstract and removed from their real everyday lives.

The urban social movements which characterize the 70's and 80's represent a shift of focus from basic democratic principles at the national level to the actual application of participatory democracy at the local level. It is not surprising that the cities are becoming the focus of such movements, especially the older U.S. cities, because these cities represent the most concentrated examples of the political, economical and social problems facing the people of this country.

The changing urban milieu for the people who have either chosen or are forced by necessity to remain in the cities has mobilized many citizens into action to prevent any more drastic changes from affecting the quality of their lives. These issues range from such things
as redlining to rent control, real estate speculation, stabilizing changing neighborhoods, as well as crime prevention and reduction. Various factors have been cited as precluding increased citizen involvement in political affairs. Among these are:

- The hard economic reality facing the majority of American citizens today (a reality, until recently, whose greatest impact was felt exclusively by the lower classes).
- The increasing domination of "big business" in all aspects of social and political life.
- The increase in social problems such as crime, poverty, and social services due to a declining tax base and rising proportion of the needy.

The factors above represent only a partial list of structural factors which contribute to the increase in citizen's involvement in political and community affairs. Through the grassroots movements people actually began to defend their established ways of life. People have a vested interest in maintaining their community or neighborhood because their culture is rooted there. Many people are seeking to recapture some control over their lives by rebuilding a sense of community and some democratic control over their lives. It is from this perspective that the general level of citizen involvement in crime prevention shall be analyzed.

The above shift in political focus has occurred in the area of crime. While crime has been a focus of concern since the 1960's, the mode in which this concern has been expressed has changed. In the 1960's concern about crime was expressed on the national level. The
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was created during this period. This federal agency was endowed with large sums of money which it contracted out to independent research teams across the country. The many research projects funded by the LEAA were designed to provide a better understanding of crime as a national problem and recommendations for reducing the crime rate in general. LEAA was also prominent in funding police departments in their efforts to improve such areas as information retrieval systems, communications and crisis intervention. While the broad based political interests of the 60's did not preclude the existence of community politics, these interests did tend to be submerged by such concerns as the Free Speech Movement, the Anti-War Movement and the Civil Rights Movement.

As the 1970's and 1980's saw a shift of interest from the macro-issues to micro-issues, a comparable shift in concern over crime occurred. In 1973 LEAA first made funding available to individual communities or community groups in the area of crime prevention. Since that time a wide array of crime prevention programs and strategies have been implemented across the country.

In placing Evanston within this context, it is important to understand the general political atmosphere of Evanston itself. Evanston has a tradition of active citizen involvement in political affairs, whether it be in local issues or national interests such as those advocated by the Peace and Freedom Party. This tradition is one factor which makes the city administration very sensitive and
aware of community opinion. This traditionally active citizenry coupled with the general shift from national to community issues is partially responsible for the emergence of crime as community issue in Evanston in 1980. Another contributing factor to this emergence is the dramatic increase in burglary and theft which occurred in Evanston in 1979.

The initial development of Marywood Neighbors Association can be seen as an attempt at "participatory democracy". Two issues are of importance here. First, the city administration, most notably the city manager, had long been criticized for exerting too much control and influence over the city council in developing city policy. There were factions within the Evanston community who believed him to be very effective and efficient when it came to controlling financial functions of the city administration. However, it was felt that when citizen concerns pertaining to issues which affected the quality of their community and neighborhood lives were voiced, they fell on deaf ears.

Marywood formed around the interests of neighborhood people attempting to regain a "quality of life" within the neighborhood which felt had been lost. The perceived increase in crime (particularly burglary) must be seen as a reaction of people who felt they no longer had this control. Crime was no longer an "unreal" phenomena which happened to other people or which they heard about on the news. It had become a reality because it was happening to many of them and their neighbors. Their homes were no longer immune to being
burglarized. Burglary had in fact become a very real possibility in certain areas of the city. Some residents had found themselves burglarized repeatedly.

The issue of crime happened to become the focus of these regenerative efforts largely because of these circumstances. There had been this dramatic increase in the number of burglaries in Evanston (not just the perceptions of citizens). Citizens coming into contact with other citizens and sharing their own experiences served to mobilize an already growing community concern for the neighborhood.

Participation in voluntary organizations such as community groups can also be analyzed on the level of individual participant's motivation. Wilson (1975) has provided a typology for investigating citizen incentives for participation. He distinguishes between material, solidary (expressive) and purposive (instrumental) incentives. Material incentives are clearly not pertinent to the particular issue at hand because they refer to tangible rewards such as money or goods. However, expressive and instrumental incentives, as well as a combination of the two, provide a good framework for analyzing the personal motivation of RCPC committee members in being involved in the development of the crime prevention program.

First glance may indicate that there should be no concern with personal motivations for participation since we are dealing with a social group and a social process. However, research has shown that these personal motivating factors must be taken into consideration
attempting to account for the emergence of a "social movement" on whatever scale and the continued participation of citizens in the social movement, committee or whatever the social entity. In other words, what is of concern here, is what social exchanges RCPC members are getting out of their continued involvement in the crime prevention program, even when they are aware of the cooptive nature of committee goals up to the present point in time. This study will attempt to account for this continued involvement by an analysis of individual committee members' goals and personal motivations for involvement.

Two methods were employed to identify motivating factors behind RCPC members' participation in the committee. The interview method provided the most useful data concerning individual members, their organization and the relationships of these groups to the larger community. A questionnaire was also utilized in this endeavor, however, it did not prove to be as useful as the interview method. The thirteen questionnaires were mailed out with only five of the questionnaires returned. Of those five questionnaires returned, certain difficulties with both the content and format of questions became apparent. Several community groups constituted ad hoc assemblies which were attempting to organize and mobilize community residents. They therefore did not possess a "social history" from which to draw answers on problem resolution tactics. The activities of other groups were geared more towards the social interactions of community residents than the solutions to particular community problems. In this sense, the questionnaire was very useful in identifying motivation and organizational
differences between community group leaders and their organizations. Some of these differences did not become apparent in the interviews.

Clark, the elected chairperson of the RCPC, stated in an interview, that his interest in crime and crime prevention was spurred by a two-fold concern. First, there was the perception of an increased danger to the personal welfare of his wife in his absence. He was no longer comfortable with her coming and going after dark or in particular areas of Evanston when he was not with her. Secondly, he and his wife had recently invested in the purchase of a home and had begun to view the neighborhood where this home was located as the neighborhood where they would raise their future family. This observation is congruent with other research (Lavrakus, 1980) which indicates that people who are homeowners, married, and have children are more likely to be involved in activities geared towards the preservation or improvement of community life. Clark has been very outspoken in his own interest in developing neighborhood crime watch programs. These programs are based on a shared sense of responsibility and concern among members of the same geographical area (usually a block). They typically serve a two fold purpose of developing a network of people watching out for each other and protecting each other's property, and in removing the anonymity common among residents in urban areas today.

Lee is probably the most up front about both her communal and personal reasons for involvement in the RCPC. She too, is very interested in developing shared interest and values among community resi-
dents. She uses the meetings where she reports the activities and progress of the RCPC to her organizational members as an opportunity to develop other organizational issues. She is very much concerned with mobilizing her constituency and in keeping them actively involved in the neighborhood. She is a single, career person committed to alleviating the anonymity of urban life which she feels is aggravated by the fact that a larger portion of the housing stock in her area is apartment dwellings.

In an interview, Lee has stated that she does not object to the "manipulative" tactics employed by the Resource Committee in producing the newsletter, because it has facilitated some of her own goals in the community. She also stated that it would be dishonest not to admit that she achieves a certain level of personal satisfaction from being involved in a city-wide project (keeping in mind she was a key figure in the designing, writing and printing of the newsletter itself), and in being able to educate fellow community residents.

Nerenberg came to the RCPC as a resident who had become increasingly alarmed with the vulnerability of being female in an urban community and in the perceived threat to the personal safety of females. From the start she was against the development of a community crime prevention newsletter as it only served to generate more paper" in a world already plagued with an abundance of written material. Nerenberg maintained that the community was in need of concrete, direct action crime prevention programs such as whistle stop and block watches. In contrast to the majority of RCPC members
her main concern was with personal protection from violent crimes rather than home protective behaviors. Despite her integral involvement in the RCPC subcommittee charged with the production of the newsletter, Nerenberg has stated that she will terminate her involvement in the RCPC if it does not now move on to the development of concrete crime prevention strategies. Her identity as a female forms a distinct basis for her involvement in the RCPC and her interest in crime prevention in general. Research has shown that females are typically more concerned about the possibility of violent crime and score higher in measurements of fear of crime (Baumer, 1979; Baumer and Rosenbaum, 1980).

Ivan Lippiz is the only organizational leader who does not represent a specific geographical area. Lippitz is the representative from a four member committee titled the Evanston Youth Commission. This is an officially sponsored arm of the Human Relations Commission. The commission is concerned with all aspects of the community relating to youth, be it gangs or safety in the schools. Lippitz has been a less influential member in the RCPC than has the three previously described members. He has continually attempted to get the "role of youth in crime prevention" as an agenda item for discussion for the last six months. He claims that he has continually been embarrassed when the youth commission has inquired as to what they can do to contribute to the activities and program objectives of the RCPC, because he has no answer for them.
Lippitz became involved in several community organizations geared towards youth problems during the past two years. This he attributed to the death of his sixteen year old son in a pedestrian crosswalk in front of Evanston High School. Lippitz is a licensed clinical psychologist and claims that community involvement and specifically involvement in the activities pertaining to the youth of Evanston, have been very therapeutic for him. He attributes his involvement in RCPC as having both an intellectual and emotional interest.

The above situational discussions have been presented as examples of both the community and personal factors motivating RCPC members' involvement in crime prevention. More examples could easily be cited. However, the purpose here is not to give a personal account of each RCPC member, but to illustrate the broad spectrum of factors involved in the participation of these citizens in the RCPC and some of the issues involved in their continued participation.

The second purpose for including this section on motivational factors is to show why a group of residents continue to participate in a committee which they felt has been manipulated and guided by forces other than themselves from the start. Despite the fact that most RCPC members were against the pursuit of the newsletter as a major goal, the satisfaction of several community and personal goals has occurred at the same time. Another factor accounting for continued involvement has been the anticipation that since the Resource Committee's major goal has now been achieved, the RCPC can now move
along to a pursuit of goals which are of more particular interest to themselves and their organizations.

Resource Committee

As previously stated, the Resource Committee consists of a four member team possessing various levels of expertise considered salient to the objectives of the RCPC as a part of the CCCPP. A brief discussion of each member will follow.

Hank White has been the Crime Prevention Officer for EPD for approximately ten years. He has constituted what might be called the crime prevention unit of the department single handedly, prior to the police department being awarded the CCCPP grant. White represents the person at EPD which has the most knowledge and experience concerning both crime prevention strategies and crime victims in Evanston. He has attended several intense training sessions sponsored by both federal and state law enforcement agencies on the issue of crime prevention.

From the outset, White has played a low profile in the RCPC meetings. He has been most helpful when asked specific questions by RCPC members but exhibits no overt inclination to influence either the proceedings or objectives of this committee.

In the early meetings, White served as the committee secretary taking minutes and supervising their typing and distribution to members. He presented a fifteen-minute program on the Home Security Checks.
These surveys are a service EPD provides to victims of burglary and to other residents who request them. White has been the only person from EPD conducting these surveys and he gives this as the reason the service has not been advertised more in the media. He also showed two crime prevention movies which he used when lecturing to community organizations requesting his services. White's role in the RCPC is basically just a continuation of his professional role at EPD. He has not capitalized on the RCPC as an opportunity to gain community support for an expanded crime prevention unit which is badly needed. He also has not advocated any specific crime prevention strategies in the course of the meetings. Members of the RCPC have indicated in interviews that they hold him in the highest regard and do not feel that he is part of the "cooptive" process operating in the RCPC. This can be attributed to the fact that White has not exploited or attempted to influence RCPC policy in any way that would benefit him. In fact recently White was named Crime Prevention Officer of the Year by a regional law enforcement board, but did not even mention this to the RCPC. White's supervisor made a casual reference to this during an RCPC meeting.

Frank Kaminski is a police officer at EPD who has been assigned a desk job in the Training Section and subsequently was assigned an academic role in the CCCPP. Kaminski holds a Masters Degree in Public Administration and has conducted and authored a number of departmental studies in his seven years as a police officer. He was formerly assigned to the Youth Section.
Kaminski's role has basically been the role of coordinator in the RCPC meetings. As previously stated, he chaired the RCPC meetings for the first four months. He still is responsible for seeing that the minutes are typed and distributed to all members. He is also responsible for working with the elected chairperson in coordinating agenda items for future meetings (although there exists other sources of input) and in contacting RCPC members who fail to attend meetings. The financial resources of the CCCPP also fall under this jurisdiction (although formal approval must be obtained from the chief). Kaminski's basic function in the RCPC has been to see that the discussions and decision making sessions "flow" according to plan.

Lavrakus, holds a joint appointment in the Journalism and Urban Affairs Departments at Northwestern University. He has also been an Evanston resident for eleven years. At the first meeting he cited this along with the fact that he has a wife and son, and therefore has a vested interest in his own community. Lavrakus also has had considerable research experience in crime and crime related issues such as fear of crime, victimization, and citizen participation in crime prevention programs. Lavrakus therefore has both an intellectual and personal interest in the RCPC. As described in a previous section, he headed another research project included in the CCCPP grant. The aim of this project was to ascertain the concerns of residents and community organizations in both their immediate community and the community of Evanston at large.
Historically, Lavrakus has had an intellectual affiliation with Rosenbaum. They have worked on joint research projects previously at a private research firm and both were members of the ad hoc committee which wrote the RFP for the Police Management Study of EPD. Rosenbaum was also instrumental in Lavrakus being awarded the community subcontract in the RCPC. Both Rosenbaum and Lavrakus have an academic interest in the "feasibility test" of the community crime prevention newsletter.

Rosenbaum represents the key figure in the Resource Committee responsible for the introduction and pursuit of the newsletter as a major committee goal. The general role of the Resource Committee in the cooptation of the RCPC in this area has been discussed earlier.

A background sketch of Rosenbaum will therefore be necessary to illustrate his role in this cooptive process. This will be accomplished in terms of his participation in three roles: 1) his role within the police organization 2) his role within the city power structure and 3) his role in the RCPC. All three levels are basic for an understanding of both the motivation and impact Rosenbaum has had on the RCPC.

Rosenbaum was hired in June of 1980 as the Director of Planning and Research at EPD, a position previously held by a lieutenant. His hiring was the initial stage of the civilianization process outlined by both the chief and the city manager as efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPD. The conversion of this
position was opposed by many top ranking sworn personnel. Therefore a degree of resentment existed prior to Rosenbaum's employment. However, as Rosenbaum began to unfold his own academic and personal objectives in his new position, this initial resentment developed into full-blown hostility. A presentation of the basis of this resentment is necessary in order to understand Rosenbaum's precarious position in the hierarchy and the ensuing importance of his role in the RCPC.

Rosenbaum entered the organization at the management level. His employment was resented for a number of reasons. First, the position was advertised at a much lower salary than he was hired at. Several lieutenants were rumored to have been interested in retiring as sworn personnel to take the position as a civilian had the salary been advertised at a higher rate. It was felt by several ranking officers that Rosenbaum had pull with the city manager--that he represented an "in" at city hall. He was resented particularly because of his salary and position reflected a level in the organization which police officers worked for years to move themselves up through the rank into management positions.

He was also resented because he was a civilian and civilians lacked the experience of being a "cop". This issue was a particularly salient issue because he was hired as the planner for the entire police department. It was reasoned that such a role had to be filled by someone with police experience, by someone who understood what it was like to be a "cop on the street". Education was also an issue which was not greatly respected within this particular organization.
The Record Section was officially under the direct supervision of Captain Bennett. Since one of Rosenbaum's major goals and responsibilities was the automation of the record keeping system, it was necessary to work directly with Bennett unless a "go between" could be found as a substitute. It might be hypothesized that Rosenbaum's support and backing of this author as the Supervisor of Records (the second management position to be converted to a civilian position) was part of his plan to influence this section without a direct relationship or confrontation with Bennett himself.

Bennett was one of the individuals whom Rosenbaum frequently commented about being "threatened" and angry about him being hired and the influence that he had begun to have on the chief. Rosenbaum also maintained that it was the plan at city hall to gradually squeeze Bennett out of responsibilities and make him angry enough to retire. Bennett was only one of many "enemies" which Rosenbaum had within the organization. All of these conflictive situations are important for understanding the background of Rosenbaum's role in the police department.

With the coming of Chief Rogers in January, Rosenbaum was stripped of his position as the division head of the Record Section. Rogers informed Rosenbaum that he was doing this to "put him in his place" and give him a chance to prove himself. This has had a major

Rosenbaum had been promoted in May 1981 by the retiring chief against the protests of other staff who felt they better deserved the promotion because of their years of experience on the job.
impact on Rosenbaum's role within the police department. He has always been the object of much criticism and open hostility, however, he always had the backing of the former chief and the influence on the chief's decision making. Rosenbaum repeatedly stated that he did not need to "fraternize" with either the rank and file or ranking officers to establish a power base within the organization because "knowledge was power". His power and influence depended exclusively on his relationship with the chief and to a certain extent, his influence on the city manager who had played a prominent role in hiring him. As previously mentioned, both these individuals have left employment in Evanston. Rosenbaum is faced with a situation where he formed his "power base" exclusively on personal relationships with individuals. Once these individuals are replaced, his patterns of influence no longer exist.

This situation has had a observable effect on his behavior in the RCPC meetings. He frequently misses meetings or comes in late. He also speaks less frequently than he did in earlier sessions. This power situation may have profound effects on his future involvement in the RCPC. Chief Rogers, when attending one meeting of the RCPC, actually verbally reprimanded Rosenbaum for one of his statements in front of the entire committee. Rosenbaum confided in the author that he was looking for employment elsewhere. The next few months many reveal some interesting changes in terms of the power structure and direction the activities of the RCPC take.

The feasibility test as written into the CCCPP. represented an
area where Rosenbaum could exert influence on departmental and community policy. However, more importantly, the feasibility test represented an opportunity to achieve an academic goal in an applied setting which would prove to be the first of its kind. An astounding variety of crime prevention strategies have been implemented across the country. These strategies have been developed by citizens, sworn personnel, academians, and a combination of all three. However, none of these strategies has ever been scientifically controlled and measured as to effectiveness. Rosenbaum envisioned the feasibility test in Evanston as a major academic breakthrough for the field and as a significant boost for his own academic career and credentials. It was through Rosenbaum's personal interest in this feasibility test that the crime prevention newsletter was introduced to the committee. The reason for the selection of the newsletter as the "experimental condition" to be administered has already been traced to the time and measurement constraints of the crime prevention grant. It can therefore be asserted that the process of producing the newsletter was also the result of still another level of cooptation.

Summary

It has been the main hypothesis of this study that the Residential Crime Prevention Committee has been the object of cooptive processes from various persons and levels of authority within the power structure of city administration. First, the RCPC was analyzed as the object of the intermittent process of cooptation by the city manager and the police chief. It was found that the RCPC took on varying de-
grees of importance as political circumstances changed. What had been initiated as one small part of a grant in developing a comprehensive crime prevention program for Evanston, took on new political significance when the police chief, the police department, and the city manager came under criticism for the escalating crime problem. City and police officials pointed to the formation of the RCPC as a city effort to alleviate the crime problem and develop a working relationships between the police and the community.

Community fervor subsided, partially because of the city's contracting of the Police Management Study and later because of the chief's announcement of his forthcoming retirement. As a result, the RCPC became less significant in the eyes of the police department. Subsequently, the city manager left the city to manage another city and thus his interest in the RCPC subsided.

Renewed interest in the RCPC has developed through the appointment of a new police chief. This interest has been analyzed as a factor congruent with the chief's previous involvement in community/police relations in another city. It has also been attributed to the new chief's lack of a social base in the police organization itself and his subsequent need to develop a social base within the community.

Cooptation has also been analyzed as a process employed by the Resource Committee on behalf of the police department. Time and measurement constraints imposed by the grant made the need for a rapid deliverable product to ILEC a major concern. By educating and struc-
uring the RCPC in a specific way, the Resource Committee has been successful in developing and implementing an experimental design which will given them the needed data. This process occurred inspite of protests by RCPC members. It was demonstrated that this occurred because RCPC members were still accomplishing some of the personal goals which had motivated their original involvement.

The results of this study indicate that cooptive processes may operate in many aspects of social life and at many levels. The fact that cooptive processes are often employed in combination with other aspects of power, influence, and goal attainment is an interesting phenomena worth investigating.

The education, guidance and influences of the Resource Committee on the developing RCPC have been analyzed in terms of the operation of cooptation. However, it must also be pointed out that these forces brought organization and direction to these meetings. It is very likely that without this guidance, the Residential Crime Prevention Committee would not be in existence today.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Actual Versus Potential Social Protest

The preliminary chapters of this thesis have dealt with the historical background which precipitated the formation of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee. These chapters attempted to outline the general sequence of events surrounding the police controversy and responses made by both city and police administrators. A careful analysis of newspaper articles covering this controversy indicated that only one community organization was actually involved in voicing opposition to the police chief specifically and the police department in general. As previously discussed, the local newspaper played a prominent role in "legitimizing" the concerns and demands of this community group. On the basis of this historical analysis, the actual threat which this community group represented to the police department and the city administration appears to have been negligible. Indications are that the fervor created by the Evanston Review in this situation would have had relatively little impact, had city officials chosen not to respond to the charges. Responses by city officials merely served as additional sources of information for future newspaper articles. Reactions by the city government provided further legitimation for Marywood Neighbors Association as "the" voice of the
community and provided the Evanston Review with material to carry on a "community dialogue" and the production of "sensational copy".

**Evanston as a Cooptive Case**

In Selznick's study of the TVA (1949), the 'coopted' group of voluntary organizations possessed a basic level of knowledge concerning agriculture and the education of local farmers. This knowledge was one of the various reasons why the TVA felt the support of these voluntary organizations was important. In a study of cooptation in the communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe, Bielasiak (1980) effectively demonstrated the community party's cooptation of much needed "expert knowledge".

The unique characteristic of the RCPC in Evanston was the fact that this group had **no** knowledge base on which to structure their participation in crime prevention. This relative ignorance of crime prevention strategies made the education of this committee a major task of the Resource Committee. In today's complex urban milieu a protest group, whether it be a community group or a large scale social movement, cannot effectively formulate policy or have an impact on administrative decision making without a certain expertise in the issues involved. This has become increasingly apparent in such areas as environmental control and nuclear power, where citizen groups have had to achieve a specific level of understanding of complicated technical issues in order to lobby effectively with large corporate businesses or the government. In the area of crim preven-
tion, citizens who are relatively unfamiliar with the shift of modern policing and preventative strategies, often view increased manpower as the solution to reducing the crime rate.

In recent years, approaches to policing have begun to focus on the interaction of the police and the community in both the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminal offenders. Studies such as Dentinger (1979), Vardalis (1979), Kelly (1981), and Auten (1981) discuss four issues which have lead to the emphasis on the interaction of police and the community in preventing crime. The first issue points to the fact that traditional preventive patrol does not prevent crime. Preventive patrol is based on the theory of omnipresence which assumes that random movements of highly visible patrol officers can eliminate or substantially reduce the opportunity for the criminal act to occur. Studies such as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (President's Commision on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1967) or Wilson (1975) indicate that substantial increases in random preventive patrol by police have no effect on the actual crime rate.

A second issue involved is the fact that the crime rate is continually rising—an indication that police alone cannot control crime. Thirdly, the fiscal state of many cities has necessitated an actual decrease in police manpower allocation, which further reinforces the contention that citizens must become involved in crime prevention. A fourth issue raised with regard to traditional policing philosophy pertains to whether crime prevention can even by considered a legitimate goal of a police department. Thus in reality, it may not be
an attainable goal by police alone because they cannot attack the causes of crime.

The traditional mode of policing has been in the form of reacting to reported crimes with efforts directed specifically on apprehension rather than prevention. However, if one were to measure police productivity in terms of apprehension or clearance rates, these low rates (only 12% nation wide) indicate that police are relatively ineffective in clearing criminal cases also. The above considerations lead to the contention that there is a distinct need for a re-definition of the role of police in the community. Such a shift in policing philosophy necessitates the re-education of the community at large. This is another aspect of the educational process involved in the RCPC.

It is therefore the contention of this study that neither the RCPC itself or the Marywood social movement organization which precipitated the RCPC, posed actual threats to the power structure in Evanston. However, as the RCPC is now considerably more in tune with crime prevention strategies and the Resource Committee has accomplished its major objective, the RCPC is thus expected to exert considerably more influence on future policy.

The increased level of expertise among RCPC members at the present point may be a precipitating factor to this committee becoming independent of the Resource Committee and the city/police administration as a whole. The RCPC could conceivably institute
its own crime prevention programs independently or the committee itself could disband and take their newly acquired knowledge back to their own communities or neighborhoods and institute a program at that level.

The possibility of the RCPC becoming an independent body would seem unlikely from the simple level of resources. RCPC members have thus far not invested any money from their organizations into RCPC activities. All expenses have been paid by the police department with funds from the crime prevention grant. Up to this point there has been no need for RCPC participating organizations to contribute monetarily nor has the police department asked for any contributions. However, official funding for this committee will expire in June 1982. It has already been indicated by a member of the Resource Committee that the police chief expects the RCPC organizations to put up funding for the continuation of the program. The events of the next few months will be crucial to the future of this committee. It is speculated that RCPC members and the organizations which they represent, are going to have to benefit more directly from the activities of the RCPC before they might be willing to invest money into the maintenance of the committee. In light of the fact that the newsletter was not an overwhelming priority of all RCPC members, the development of specific programs more pertinent to members interests and needs during the next three months, appears to be a crucial factor in the future of the RCPC.

A second factor which lessens the possibility of the RCPC choosing to function as an independent entity is the fact that the approval and legitimation of the police chief and the city admini-
stratification has been a central issue since the formation of the committee. The official backing of the police department gives members a certain amount of prestige in both their eyes and the eyes of the communities which they represent. Crime prevention programs and strategies are unlikely to continue without recognition and support from the police department.

The interaction of the police department and the community is a crucial factor underlying modern policing philosophy. It seems unlikely that either the RCPC or the police department will opt for this separation once funding is eliminated. It seems appropriate to question just what the police department will do if RCPC members refuse or are unable to finance the future of the RCPC. The police department has invested considerable amounts of time and money into the formation of this committee. It has been publicized in the Evanston Review so community members are aware of its existence. Also, as previously discussed, the new police chief has a vested interest in developing a strong rapport with the community. In light of these issues it appears unlikely that EPD will let the RCPC simply fall by the wayside.

As has been stated previously, none of the RCPC members were involved in the original police controversy itself. Once RCPC member does represent Marywood Neighbors Association, however, he was not personally involved in the controversy. Interviews with RCPC members indicated that the coverage which this controversy received in the
Evanston Review had little if any influence on their interest in the
RCPC. This further supports the contention that the RCPC did not re-
represent a threat to either the police or city administration. The per-
sonal and organizational motives of RCPC members was discussed earlier.
Challenging the city or police administration was not an objective
stated by any committee members. All stated goals pertained to the
advancement of their own participation in the community as well as the
mobilization of residents within their community.

The thesis of this paper has been concerned with the use of
cooptive strategies by a local government/police department as a
means of neutralizing community protest. The conception, evolution,
and organization of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee has been
examined in detail to determine whether this committee was the result
of a cooptive strategy. In the previous chapter it has been demonstrat-
ed that the importance attributed by city and police administrators
to the RCPC has varied over time and circumstances.

This study has not found sufficient data to support the hypothe-
sis that the RCPC was first proposed as a means of alleviating community
dissension. However, it cannot be dismissed that the RCPC was cited
on several occasions by city/police administrators to be evidence
that the city was attempting solutions to the "problems" raised by
community leaders. While evidence for the cooptation of the RCPC by
the police/city administration has not been found, the initial concep-
tion of the RCPC in the crime prevention grant and the particular
timing of that conception, might be interpreted as a precipatory move on the part of the police department. In light of the Evanstonian tradition of a highly participative citizenry, and the police department's awareness of a particularly high burglary and theft rates in 1979 (the year the grant proposal was written), it might be concluded that the RCPC was an "anticipatory" move designed to prevent crime from becoming a community issue. Crime has been an issue of varying intensity at both the community and national level since the 60's. It is a particularly volatile issue because it has had a direct impact on many people's lives—whether in being an actual victim of a criminal act or simply experiencing the fear of crime. Because of its volatile nature, crime could easily become a major community issue through a "snowballing" effect.

If the "anticipation" of such a potential controversy was behind the conceptualization of the RCPC in 1979, it would appear to be an astute analysis on the part of police and/or city officials. As it is, the RCPC served as a conciliatory response when the Marvwood group did in fact attempt to make crime a city-wide issue among citizens in 1980.

Whatever the motivation behind the inclusion of the RCPC in the grant, it served to placate citizens in two ways. In the initial stages of the 1980 police controversy it served as an adjunct to the various other responses by police and city officials. This aspect has been discussed previously. Following the formation of the RCPC, Daniel
Whitmore (one of the two major actors in the original Marvwood group) attended a meeting as an alternate for Jim Freund. During this meeting Whitmore attempted to activate RCPC members to act as a group and press the city manager to make organizational and policy changes at EPD prior to the selection of a new police chief. The RCPC was not very receptive to Whitmore's ideas. One committee member actually voiced the opinion that Whitmore had political motivations behind his issues which the RCPC did not want to be involved in.

Following this meeting, Whitmore wrote an article for the Evanston Review, in which he called for Evanston citizens to actively pursue this line of action. He summed up his discussion with the statement that the "CCCPP is every bit the sociologist's paradise that its five-barreled name suggest." and the "only noticeable instrument against residential burglary which has been created by the CCCPP in two years is an advisory council of neighborhood groups that is thinking about putting out a newsletter sometime soon" (Evanston Review, November 5, 1981: 21).

Members of the RCPC were extremely angry at Whitmore's implication that the RCPC was doing nothing about the crime problem. Richard Clark wrote a rebuttal to Whitmore's letter where he stated "Mr Whitmore, while you are running about clamoring for your concerns and denigrating anyone who isn't right behind you, I. and many other concerned citizens and police, are patiently doing something positive and proactive about rising crime" (Evanston Review, December 10, 1981: 17).
The reader will recall that Whitmore had been a major actor in the original police controversy. In light of the RCPC's reaction and interpretation of Whitmore's attempts to mobilize citizens to demand certain concessions from the city administration, it appears that the city was successful in "draining off" any inclinations for public community protest.

In analyzing a second source of cooptation emanating from the Resource Committee, it has been demonstrated that the Resource Committee did have a vested interest in the RCPC's choice of crime prevention policy and strategies. The Resource Committee was in need of a "quick" evaluative study of a crime prevention strategy implemented in Evanston. It was pointed out that the community newsletter provided such a study. At this point it seems pertinent to discuss whether this "influence" exerted by the Resource Committee and the subsequent adoption of the newsletter proposal by the RCPC, can in fact be considered "cooptation" as opposed to "collaboration".

**Cooptation Versus Collaboration**

Inherent characteristics and specific circumstances would indicate that the RCPC as an organization, would be an easy target for cooptive strategies. The first characteristic which RCPC members shared was their relative ignorance in the area of crime prevention. As previously discussed, the first two months of RCPC meetings were devoted to an educational process by the Resource Committee. Three subcommittee members were charged with the primary responsibility
of reviewing the massive amount of crime prevention literature which the police department had accumulated and in providing a summary of these strategies to the whole committee. A committee composed largely of members who have no "expert knowledge" on the subject for which they are to develop program policy represents a group which can easily fall prey to the influences of the Resource Committee.

Having relatively little previous experience in crime prevention, the RCPC was not in a position to formulate its own policy. Therefore RCPC members actually represented no threat to the Resource Committee in this area. It might be concluded that the Resource Committee did not actually "coopt" the RCPC but rather served as a steering committee or as a resource panel of experts which resulted in the domination of the RCPC in choosing the first item of priority. This domination or influence is grounded in the initial lack of knowledge of RCPC members.

In general, the RCPC was willing to allow the Resource Committee to structure meetings and to take the initial in setting organizational objectives. The original intent behind the Resource Committee is just what its name would imply—a resource for the RCPC to draw upon in the formation of preventive strategies. It seems appropriate at this time to make a conceptual distinction between cooptation as an intended strategy and cooptation as a strategy consequence.

Selznick (1949) makes this distinction in his study of the TVA. TVA officials fully intended to coopt local voluntary associations
by absorbing them into the TVA network. This was done in anticipation of overlapping and possibly antithetical goals and as a means of securing a social base which would justify its independence from the federal government. The consequence of this cooptive process was a marked decrease in the TVA's control over policy and what Selznick terms a "compromise" of democratic principles.

In the case of Evanston, the conceptualization and formation of the RCPC has already been analyzed as an "anticipatory" strategy. Since the conceptualization had no specific body of leaders selected for inclusion, it would appear that a case cannot be made for analyzing the proposed RCPC as an intentional cooptive strategy.

It is further argued that neither can the RCPC be considered coptive in its consequences. Lack of expertise or knowledge has already been cited as a major factor which precludes the existence of cooptation. Three additional factors will be discussed below.

A second RCPC characteristic which would call the use of cooptation into question is the fact that none of the RCPC members knew each other prior to the formation of this committee. Nor were any of the RCPC members familiar with members of the Resource Committee (with the exception of one member). Unfamiliarity among committee members makes the initial formation of committee policy difficult. The needs and concerns of each community group were not known by the group as a whole, nor were any needs which they might share in common. As a result committee members were essentially strangers lacking a
common base by which to make decisions. Again, this would seem to
dismiss cooptation as a consequence. The lack of a personal or
organizational network between RCPC members would appear to negate
the necessity of cooptation. If organizational members had no prior
knowledge of crime prevention strategies and no history of working to­
gether, it would seem natural that the Resource Committee would greatly influence the direction of the RCPC. The Resource Committee had
one major resource—expertise. The RCPC possessed the other major
resource needed for policy formation—access to community residents.

The Resource Committee represented common ground to all committee
members. Again, it might be concluded that the Resource Committee pro­
vided guidance and structure to an organization which would have other­
wise floundered for focus in its initial stages.

Thirdly, RCPC community leaders did not come to the committee
with well-formulated goals or objectives. RCPC members were not aware
of the various crime prevention strategies available nor did they
have any well formulated ideas on the need for prevention strategies
in their particular geographical areas. A committee which does not
have well formulated goals is in need of a general sense of purpose
and direction. This was clearly stated by a number of members at the
very first meeting. The Resource Committee was available to provide
such direction and organization.

A fourth characteristic particular to the RCPC was a community
view which the majority of members shared. They were generally of
the opinion that the RCPC would have little purpose or impact without the express support of the city/police administrators. Thus in their view, it was of utmost importance that the city government legitimize the existence of their committee and any programs which they might put forth. The RCPC sought this legitimization through the Resource Committee. Such a relationship would more closely approach collaboration where a certain level of reciprocity exists between the Resource Committee and the RCPC. This would be in opposition to cooptation which implies that a dominant organization takes the initiative to incorporate a group which it considers to be in opposition to them.

The above discussion has centered on characteristics of the RCPC which placed them in an initially dependent role. This dependency then is basically due to a lack of knowledge, lack of a communication network, lack of clear cut goals and a perceived lack of legitimation by the larger community and the city administration. In addition, there were the personal and organizational motives of RCPC members which were discussed earlier. As pointed out, these committee members had varying reasons for being involved in the RCPC. A large proportion of these individual goals have been met already with the introduction of crime prevention as a community issue, in spite of the fact that many RCPC members were not in favor of the community newsletter as the first priority. In sum then, it has been determined that the Resource Committee (as representatives of the police/city administration) possess three main resources needed by the RCPC. These are funding, legitimacy and knowledge.
It can thus be concluded that the RCPC represented an organization where the interests of a variety of people (including the Resource Committee) came together in the same arena. This wide spectrum of individual and group motives is prevalent in most organizations. The Resource Committee's initially strong influence might therefore be attributed to the fact that these four members were in possession of the major resources needed by the RCPC—namely, the knowledge, the finances, and an interorganizational network of communication and support.

In light of the above discussion, it might be concluded that the social processes which governed the formation of the RCPC and which guided the establishment of formal objectives, were not cooptive in nature. Rather, they represent the negotiation of organizational and policy issues by a committee which possesses a wide variety of social and personal interests. Negotiation is a process inherent in any organization and in any cooperative effort. The variety of interests held by RCPC members contributes to the "richness" of the committee as a whole. Such a variety of goals and interests is not to be interpreted as a pluralist analysis of the RCPC. Even though the personal and organizational interests of individual members is so varied, RCPC members share the common goal of improving or maintaining the quality of life in their neighborhoods. While each member's individual needs or interest may not be entirely satisfied at a particular moment in the life of the committee, each member has thus far approached the fulfillment of some goals at least partially.
It has been asserted that the Resource Committee had specific organizational objectives from the start. They possessed the most crucial resources which the RCPC needed to develop and stay alive. These specific goals do not preclude the general goal which the Resource Committee holds with the RCPC as a whole. This is the basic interest in building a solid working relationship between the citizenry and the police department. While the ways in which this goal is to be carried out in practice may vary, the negotiation process which results from such a variety of ideas is central to the work of any committee charged with a common goal.

The influence exerted by the Resource Committee in the initial stages of committee formation is typical of a situation where one faction within an organization possesses more resources and more alternatives. It is therefore hypothesized that the RCPC will be less susceptible to the influence of the Resource Committee, as RCPC members become more "educated" with regard to crime prevention strategies and they are able to more clearly articulate their own goals and objectives.

This study set out to determine whether cooptation was utilized as a social process in the evolution, formation, and development of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee. The results of this study indicate that the process of collaboration more closely approximates the Evanston situation. In analyzing this case study, certain theoretical and methodological problems have surfaced.
In reviewing the various ways cooptation has been studied and identified earlier in this paper, it appears that the concept of cooptation has taken on a more general meaning than the meaning which Selznick first imparted on it. Its use has become so general, that it becomes difficult at times to distinguish it from collaboration or cooperation. For example, in the case of Bielasiak's study (1981) why should an organization specifically seeking a certain level of expertise which it needs, be classified as cooptation (be it the communist party or otherwise)? How does this process differ from a business which hires people who possess certain skills or characteristics which they are in need of? Bielasiak may have very specific and valid reasons for why believes cooptation has been employed in his study, but never conceptually or methodologically distinguishes cooptation from other processes which might be operating.

Burt (1980a; 1980b) has attempted to measure cooptation mathematically. However, he assumes that merger patterns and structural autonomy are empirical indicators for cooptation. They might very well be but they are indicators for many other processes as well. Burt has taken a general term (cooptation) and attempted to measure it in a very specific business setting. This makes the goal of generalizing such findings difficult in other settings.

No one study has been able to offer an operationalization of cooptation which adequately encompasses the entire meaning of the term nor has the same meaning been transferrable from situation to
situation. Since two of the basic goals of sociology involve the identification of social processes such as cooptation and the generalizability of these concepts across groups, it would appear that the conceptualization and operationalization of cooptation in a distinguishable manner from other processes is greatly needed.

The resent discussion represents a case study which examines the possibility of cooptation in a community organization. The case study approach is a slow and sometimes not easily generalizable body of data. At the most basic level, cooptation is a method of power acquisition and allocation. At the present time the case study of specific power relations appears to be the most comprehensive method of studying this process. However, future efforts in the area should attempt to develop more general, comprehensive empirical indicators of cooptation so that the measurement of this concept can proceed from an indepth case study to a more generalizable theoretical framework.
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Santos, Frank


APPENDIX A

1. What community organization do you represent?

2. What geographical area does this organization cover?

3. How many total members would you estimate your organization has?

4. How many active members does your organization have during any given period of time?

5. Do you belong to other community based organizations? (i.e., church, block, business, professional).

6. Has your organization worked with any other organizations represented on the Residential Crime Prevention Committee previously? Which groups and on what type of projects?

7. Has your organization previously or is your organization presently working with the Evanston Police Department?

8. What other community issues has your organization been involved in? (presently and in the past).

9. If your group has a community problem or concern which requires the attention of the Evanston City Administration, what public office or official (s) does your organization contact or approach?

10. If this official/office is unresponsive or unable to solve your specific community problem, what alternative action (s) does your organization take?

11. Have you sought help from persons or departments in the city in the past which you have felt to be uncooperative or unresponsive to community needs? Please specify.

12. Are there persons or departments within the city administration which you feel are very responsive to citizen needs?

13. In general, how responsive do you think the Evanston city administration is to community needs or concerns? Give examples if possible.

14. In general, how responsive do you think the Evanston Police Department to citizen needs?

15. What skills or qualities do you think are important in the hiring of a new city manager?
16. What changes should be made in the way the city manager's office deals with the public and the city council with the hiring of the new city manager? Please compare these proposed changes with the way the former city manager interacted with the public and city council.

17. Are you an officer in your organization?

18. How would you divide the proportions of male and female members in your organization? (i.e. males 40%; females 60%) or give numerical estimates if possible.

19. How would you divide your organizational members in terms of income? What percentage would you estimate to fall in each of these income categories?

Under $10,000  
$10,000-$15,000  
$15,100-$20,000  
$20,100-$30,000  
$30,100-$40,000  
$40,100-$50,000  
Over $50,000

20. What proportion of your members has:

Less than 12 years of schooling  
High School Diploma  
Some College  
College Degree  
Some Graduate Credit  
Graduate Degree

21. How would you classify the age group of the majority of the members belonging to your organization? Please check one.

Under 20  
21-35  
36-50  
51-60  
61-70  
Over 71
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B

A. Crime Prevention

1. What do you hope to accomplish by your organizations' involvement in the development of this program?

2. How did your organization become interested in this program?

3. What kinds of crime prevention activities is your organization currently involved in?

4. What is your opinion of the crime situation in Evanston?

5. What is your opinion of the crime situation in your area?

6. How much of a problem do you think crime is in Evanston?

B. Police/Community Relations

1. Does your organization feel that the prevention of crime is:
   a. more the responsibility of citizens and community groups
   b. more the responsibility of the police department
   c. a shared responsibility of both the police department and the citizenry.

2. What do you expect the police department's role to be in the development of this program?

3. What do you expect the city administration's role to be in the development of this program?

4. How closely has your community organization worked with the police department in the past? Have you:
   a. invited them to talk to your organization
   b. attended presentations held by police department
   c. reported area problems or reported suspicious events.

5. How would you rate the overall quality of service provided by the police department?

6. What things would you change in the way police approach crime prevention and the solving of crime?
7. How does your organization feel about working with the police department to develop a crime prevention program?

8. Do they see this as a beneficial possibility?

9. Does your organization feel that most crime is committed by persons outside your area or by people residing inside your community area?

10. Are there any particular areas in your community which your organization considers unsafe?

C. Community Organization in General

1. What other types of programs is your organization involved in?

2. How old is the organization?

3. Why did the organization form?

4. How many members comprise your organization?

5. How many are active members?

6. How often do you meet?

7. How many "officers" represent your organization?

8. Do you have an executive board?

9. How many are on it?

D. Residential Crime Prevention Committee

1. How helpful has the Resource Committee been to the committee as a whole?

2. What individual members of the Resource Committee contributed to the goals and programs of this committee?

3. Which committee members do you find to be most informative or productive in terms of ideas or practical suggestions?

4. Research on other community organizations has found that in order for citizens to remain involved in a committee such as Residential Crime Prevention Committee, the participants must be "getting" something out of it. What are you getting out of your involvement in this committee?

5. Has your organization worked previously with any of the other organizations involved in this committee? With any of the Resource Committee?
The thesis submitted by Sheryl L. Knight has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. William Bates, Director
Professor, Sociology, Loyola

Dr. Kirsten A. Grønbjerg
Associate Professor, Sociology, Loyola

Dr. Philip Nyden
Assistant Professor, Sociology, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date

Director's Signature