Adolescent Liberals' and Conservatives' Visions of Morality

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ADOLESCENT LIBERALS' AND CONSERVATIVES' VISIONS OF MORALITY

by

Charles M. Shelton

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

1984
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Dan P. McAdams and Dr. Jeanne M. Foley for their encouragement, assistance and support in the writing of this research. I also wish to thank the administration and faculty of both St. Scholastica Academy and Loyola Academy for their cooperation and assistance in gathering the data for this study.
VITA

The author, Charles M. Shelton, is the son of June Shelton, and the late Walter Shelton and was born in Berea, Kentucky.

He obtained his secondary education at Mater Dei High School in Evansville, Indiana where he graduated in June, 1968.

In September, 1968 he entered St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri and in June, 1972, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude, with a major in political science. While attending St. Louis University he was elected to three honor societies; Phi Beta Kappa, Alpha Sigma Nu, and Pi Sigma Alpha.

In September, 1972, he entered the Missouri Province of the Society of Jesus' Novitiate in Kansas City, Missouri. In September, 1974, he began his Master of Arts degree in political science at St. Louis University and received the degree in January, 1976. While at the university he also completed all requirements from the state of Missouri for life certification in social studies at the secondary school level. From September, 1976, until June, 1979, he was an instructor in social studies and a counselor at Regis Jesuit High School in Denver, Colorado. He also taught in the summer session at Regis College as an instructor in social science (psychology and political science).

In September, 1979, he began his theological studies at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, California. He was ordained to the
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He has published twenty articles and book reviews as well as one book. The topical areas for these publications include: pastoral counseling, educational issues, religious formation, and adolescent development.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

While teaching adolescents at the secondary school level, I became intrigued at how adolescents attempted to develop consistent patterns of moral behavior. A discernible quality in the adolescent's moral response was its variability; that is, the adolescent often varied his or her behavior according to a personal moral code, a set of behaviors appropriate for peer relationships, or a moral stance which was consistent with the adolescent's social or political philosophy.

Moreover, current thrusts in contemporary educational theorizing (e.g., Grant, 1981; Kagan, 1981) have come to view a minimum level of prosocial behavior as vital both for the educational mission of the American school and for the character development of individual students. In this study, the linkage of morality and prosocial behavior is termed "everyday morality." In addition, this everyday morality consists of three levels (or what is herein labeled visions). That is, a private morality incorporates one's own personal values and ethical code; an interpersonal morality is sensitive to the needs of others; and a social morality is concerned with social justice and humanitarian themes.

Until recently, a psychological perspective of morality has been dominated by the structural-developmental view of Lawrence Kohlberg. Among the numerous criticisms of Kohlberg's approach is his tendency to
focus on the reasoning rather than the behavior of the moral agent. Thus, a focus on everyday morality, how humans respond prosocially to everyday situations, offers an alternative to Kohlberg's structural approach.

Studies dealing with prosocial behavior invariably have been faced with the task of explaining the origins of this prosocial response. Many theorists have framed this discussion in terms of a cognitive and affective component innate to the human organism. Characteristically, this human capacity has been labeled empathy. Martin Hoffman has provided the most complete description of both this empathic component and its relationship to human tendencies to respond prosocially. Accordingly, focusing on the linkage between empathy and prosocial responding offers a distinctive perspective for understanding the meaning of morality which heretofore has been dominated by Kohlberg's structural view.

At the same time, discussion has arisen concerning variations in group differences for both empathic and prosocial responding. Two frequently mentioned areas in which differences occur are sex differences and partisan political orientation. Accordingly, the current study attempted to measure male-female differences among three factors: empathy, morality, and political orientation. In addition, this study explored the relationships existing among the factors with an eye towards developing a theory of morality based on empathic responding.

Empathic responding was examined by utilizing a four-dimensional view of empathy. These dimensions are: fantasy, perspective-taking,
concern, and distress. Morality is explored by using a three-vision level of morality which incorporates private, interpersonal, and social concerns. Political orientation is assessed along a liberal-conservative continuum. Consequently, this study utilized three instruments. Empathy was measured by Davis' Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Morality is examined by means of the Visions of Morality Scale developed by the author. Finally, political orientation was explored through an instrument developed by researchers at the University of California, Berkeley.

The findings of this study will aid educators and other professionals interested in youth concerns in addressing the moral development of adolescents. In addition, these findings will aid educators who probe the impact of political orientation on how adolescents respond morally. With the advent of social justice themes in many educational institutions, it is not unlikely that many educators will increasingly turn to approaches which attempt to assess the similarities and contrasts of students who profess partisan political leanings, thus hoping to lessen the impact of potentially divisive issues. Finally, an examination of sex differences among empathy, morality, and political orientation measures provides insight into such current political events as the "gender gap" as well as augmenting the growing body of literature on sex role differences and the issue of feminine morality (Gilligan, 1982).
CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

In an analysis of the current state of the relationship between morality and social science, Norma Haan (1982) has maintained that the positivistic interpretation of social science as value-free is no longer tenable. She has noted that there does not exist a unifying consensus among social scientists as to what constitutes morality, even though morality "is central to life" (p. 1096). Highlighting the need to re-focus and rethink morality's meaning, Haan (1982) has stated that "little is known in a systematic sense about everyday morality and how it functions and develops across time and place" (p. 1096). She has argued (1982, 1983) that for social science in general, and for psychology in particular, a reconsideration of morality must begin with an adequate conceptualization of "everyday morality."

The present study gives serious attention to Haan's urgings by examining the feasibility of a morality for everyday life. It is argued that everyday morality encompasses three distinct dimensions. First, it incorporates empathy as a foundational component for morality. Second, it delineates a three-tier level of morality--private, interpersonal, and social--which is supported by philosophical, ethical, and psychological theorizing. Third, it links political thinking and pro-social behavior in order to specify behaviors which are appropriate for a social morality.
The Current State of Moral Thinking

The most ambitious attempt at delineating a theory of morality is Lawrence Kohlberg's developmental-structuralist approach. Kohlberg (1969, 1974, 1975, 1980; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) has posited a three level-six stage theory of morality that is invariant, sequential, and cross-cultural.

In developing his theory, Kohlberg has acknowledged a large indebtedness to the earlier work of Piaget. Specifically, Kohlberg, like Piaget, has adopted a stage sequence for his theory. An individual, in other words, reasons morally at a particular stage of moral development. The stages are hierarchically integrated, that is, a person reasoning at a higher stage incorporates and comprehends all stages of reasoning below his or her stage. Individuals tend to prefer the highest stage in which they can reason. These moral stages have been empirically validated in longitudinal studies by Kohlberg and his associates.

Kohlberg has maintained that reasoning is separate from the content of moral judgment. In other words, the actual behavior or choice which an individual prefers is not the focus for Kohlberg; rather, he is interested in the structure of reasoning which an individual utilizes in choosing a particular value or in favoring one behavior over another.

The three levels and six stages which make up Kohlberg's theory are presented below:
I. Preconventional Level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences.

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others.

II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior.

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 671).

The central, underlying principle that is the basis for each stage is an individual's understanding of justice. Kohlberg (1974) has stated that "there is a natural sense of justice intuitively known by the child" (p. 5). Accordingly, an individual reasons morally about values, life dilemmas, and personal choices in the context of an understanding of justice which is appropriate for his or her stage. For example, an individual at stage one would define a value in terms of power and avoiding punishment whereas an individual at stage four would reason that a value is preferable because of the value's importance for societal functioning and the maintenance of the social order. Within Kohlberg's conceptualization, each stage represents a more developed application of the justice principle.

Kohlberg (1975) has stated that although moral reasoning is only one factor in determining an individual's moral behavior, it "is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral be-
behavior" (p. 672). For this reason Kohlberg has advocated a moral reasoning approach to moral education for public schools. Practical applications of Kohlberg's approach (Kohlberg, 1980; Kohlberg & Wasserman, 1980) based on student and staff responses have reported a greater level of fairness and sense of community among school members.

Other research has supported the importance of Kohlberg's approach. Rowe and Marcia (1980) have found that moral reasoning parallels cognitive development and the achievement of identity. Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1975) have cited a number of research studies which relate growth in Kohlberg's stages with a greater resistance to cheating as well as an increase in prosocial behaviors. Finally, the internalization of moral principles (Kohlberg's principled level) has been related to socially responsive behaviors and altruistic values (Rushton, 1981).

Moreover, Kohlberg's approach reveals a gradual movement from self-centered or hedonistic morality (preconventional morality, stages one and two) to a status quo or rule-oriented morality (conventional morality, stages three and four). Finally, there emerges an internalized set of moral principles that are concerned with recognizing every human's freedom and treating everyone with equal respect (postconventional morality, stages five and six). An individual's development through Kohlberg's stages shows a movement away from self-absorption (level one) toward an awareness of the thinking and feeling of others (level two). Finally, at level three, attention is given to universal moral principles that respect the rights of all human beings. In effect, Kohlberg's cognitive-structuralist position envisions a widening and
expansive social network for the making of moral decisions (Shelton, 1983).

In order to assess the limits of Kohlberg's theory of morality, it is essential that the deontological nature of his thinking is understood. Kohlberg's argument for a principled morality acknowledges his acceptance of a deontological ethical position. Basically, this position argues that morality is not based on rules (e.g., the Ten Commandments), but rather on principles that are universally binding on all human beings. Conventional morality is grounded on rules and regulations and subject to laws that are accepted by a particular culture. Principled morality, on the other hand, is universally appealing. The foundation for this universal appeal resides in the priority given the principle of justice. At every moral stage, says Kohlberg, individuals reason about the meaning of justice. However, it is only at stage six that justice embraces the attributes of fairness, equality, and reciprocity. Only at this stage does justice become universally acceptable because only stage six morality incorporates attributes which all rational persons, regardless of cultural background or existential situation, could agree upon. Thus an individual at stage six respects the freedom of others while at the same time behaving in a fashion that respects the equality of every human being. In effect, by adopting a principled morality, Kohlberg clearly situates his own moral theory in the ethical tradition dominant since the writings of Kant; thinking that enshrines the primacy of the autonomous self as well as the sufficiency of rational categories of thought.
The adequacy of Kohlberg's principled morality, however, have met with numerous criticisms. From a psychological vantage point, Gilligan (1982) has criticized Kohlberg's reliance on a male dominated moral perspective which excludes the feminine vision characterized by themes of care and intimacy. A further criticism of Kohlberg is the charge that his theory, although claiming to be culturally-free, actually reflects a liberal ideological position (Hogan & Emler, 1978; Shweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977). Finally, additional criticism center on the faulty empirical basis for Kohlberg's claims; in other words, the data do not support Kohlberg's contention that a sixth stage of morality in fact exists (Wonderly & Kupfersmid, 1980). More recently, Kohlberg (1980), too, has questioned his own assertions of stage six's existence.

Empirical research between 1968 and 1976 did not confirm my theoretical statements about a sixth and highest stage (Kohlberg, 1979). My longitudinal subjects, still adolescents in 1968, had come to adulthood by 1976, but none had reached the sixth stage. Perhaps all the sixth stage persons of the 1960s had been wiped out, perhaps they had regressed, or maybe it was all my imagination in the first place (p. 457).

Other theorists have also questioned the adequacy of Kohlberg's claims. Hoffman (1980), while praising the insightfulness and synthetic nature of the Kohlbergian format, has stated that "the research, by and large, provides little support for the main tenets of the theory" (p. 299). Wonderly and Kupfersmid (1980), in an exhaustive review of the literature, found little merit to either the philosophical adequacy or empirical evidence surrounding Kohlberg's claims. And Shweder's (1982) review of the first of an expected three volume series by Kohlberg on the latter's theoretical positions, has questioned the adequacy of
Kohlberg's claims.

Whereas psychological critiques of Kohlberg's position have centered on methodological and developmental issues, normative challenges have focused on the questions of prescriptive values and the necessity for prescribed behaviors. Religious educators have expressed serious reservations about Kohlberg's principled morality as a basis for moral decision-making (Ellrod, 1980; Philibert, 1975; Shelton, 1980, 1983; Vitz, 1981). Briefly stated, a summary of these criticisms includes four salient points. These reservations are: (a) a lack of priority in regards to discrete values; (b) a diminution of the role of affect in moral reasoning; (c) the absence of concrete, situational realities which are experienced by moral agents in everyday life; (d) the failure to link behavior with moral reasoning.

Although not intending to address the objections of religious educators, Eisenberg-Berg's (1977) introduction of prosocial dilemmas provided one corrective to Kohlberg's approach. Eisenberg-Berg has stated that Kohlberg's dilemmas, fashioned in part by, and contingent upon the structures of governmental laws and societal norms, fail to appreciate the prosocial experiences human beings are socialized to and encounter when they make moral choices. Consequently, her research focused on prosocial moral reasoning rather than rule oriented moral reasoning. Still, this prosocial emendation fails to resolve the fundamental objection raised by religious educators regarding the separation of personal behavior from moral reasoning. That is, Eisenberg-Berg's use of dilemmas which, like Kohlberg's, are presented as hypo-
theoretical situations, are predicaments rarely experienced in everyday life. Furthermore, her stress on reasoning rather than behavior leaves unanswered normative critiques which require the linkage of moral thought and moral behavior. Only when these as well as other questions are responded to, can Haan's call for the study of "everyday morality" be adequately addressed.

**Empathy, Moral Thinking, and Prosocial Behavior**


Kohlberg valued empathy as a vital factor in the development of moral reasoning. Through the use of perspective-taking, an individual, says Kohlberg, realizes the inadequacy of his or her present level of moral reasoning and comes to understand the value of reasoning at the next higher stage. In other words, Kohlberg views empathy as a cognitively oriented experience which acts as a catalyst to stimulate moral growth. Hoffman, on the other hand, views empathy as both a cognitive and affective experience. Furthermore, he believes empathy is the foundation for moral development.

According to Hoffman, empathic development fosters a growing understanding of a personal self that is distinct from others. As the child continually develops, a cognitive sense of the plight and distress of others merges with an affective response to their suffering. By the time the child reaches adolescence, this response to the misfortune of others includes care and concern not only for another individual, but
for wider social groupings such as races or classes of people. Several points of Hoffman's theory need further explanation in order to ascertain the import of his theory for moral theorizing.

First, empathy, defined as "a vicarious emotional response to another person" (1980, p. 307), is construed by Hoffman as an experience which incorporates three integrated factors. These three components are: (a) a cognitive component which comprehends the suffering and plight of another person; (b) an affective element which is aroused by the other person's suffering and responds with inner distress and turmoil; and (c) a motivational component which induces action to alleviate another person's misfortune. This elaboration of an innate and universally human capacity to empathize provides the psychological substratum for a morality that is fundamentally distinct from Kohlberg's conceptualization.

Second, Hoffman has stated that growth in empathy parallels cognitive maturation. He has noted that "the experience of empathy depends on the level at which one cognizes others" (1979, p. 962). Thus cognitive growth allows for an empathic response to move from a diffuse, generalized reaction to another's distress to a highly focused emotional reaction to another's plight. The interplay of cognition and affect is a sequential process involving four levels. Empathy first appears as a global response to another person's distress. Lacking person permanence, the child, before the age of one, is incapable of determining the source of personal distress and responds in an undifferentiated, distressful manner. Hoffman (1981) recounts the personal experience of
an 11 month old child who, when viewing the distress of another child, responded as if she herself had experienced the distress. The second level of empathy is termed egocentric. At this level the child is capable of comprehending another's distress, yet the child is still incapable of differentiating between the victim's inner state and his or her own personal feelings. At the third stage, the child's cognitive transformations not only allow for distinguishing among the sources of distress, but enable the child to respond to the inner distress of another person. At the highest level, the early adolescent, sustained by growing self-identity and a continuous life-history, is capable of comprehending the distress of others even when they are absent from the immediate situation. "To summarize, empathy is the coalescence of vicariously aroused affect and a mental representation of the other, at whatever level the observer is capable" (1981, p. 50). This maturing empathic experience, it will be argued later, has critical significance for the formulation of the adolescent's social morality.

Third, the engendering of prosocial behavior as the natural response to empathic arousal furnishes an alternative view to Kohlberg's position which separates moral behavior from moral reasoning. It appears that Hoffman himself has considered this third point to be the essential reason for his rejection of previous moral theoretical positions. He has stated:

The crucial question that is begged here is, What makes the person utilize his ego capacities for moral ends rather than egoistic ends? In short, what seems to be missing in the psychoanalytic account, as in the cognitive-disequilibrium view, is a concept of a mature motive force [underlining added] that may underlie moral action (1980, p. 307).
Moreover, the linkage of prosocial behavior and empathic experiencing supplies the consensual basis for morality as well as the bridging theme between autonomous moral beliefs and the diversity of human behaviors. In other words, although individuals morally reason to conflictual moral views and subsequently engage in contradictory if not opposing behaviors, all individuals are endowed with an empathic sense (Hoffman, 1975, 1977) and all individuals admit the importance of a minimal level of prosocial behavior as requisite for both personal and societal functioning (Rushton, 1980).

Based on extant research, considerable evidence sustains Hoffman's assertion that empathy is a basis for prosocial behavior. Staub (1978), in a comprehensive review of positive social behavior, has stated that although "it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly the mediating influence of empathy on helping" (p. 146), a cumulative review of the research does "suggest that empathy is a likely determinant of helping" (p. 148). Hoffman (1981, 1982) has summarized his own developmental model through a compilation of numerous prosocial studies and has concluded that for both children and adults, empathy emerges as an integral factor in fostering of prosocial behaviors. Rushton (1980, 1981) has maintained that empathy is a critical ingredient in the formation of the "altruistic personality" and has cited numerous studies to substantiate this claim. Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1978) have discovered that empathy is positively related to helping behaviors in male adolescents. Finally, Buckley, Siegel, and Ness (1979) found that children who were altruistic scored significantly highly on empathy measures than their peers while
Ornum, Foley, Burns, DeWolfe, & Kennedy (1981) noted that this same relationship held true for college students.

At the same time, although numerous researchers have linked empathic development and prosocial tendencies, no theorist has maintained that empathy alone is sufficient to bring about prosocial behaviors. In this regard, Eisenberg (1982) has noted that by adolescence, the adolescent can justify his or her personal behaviors (or lack thereof) by a diverse array of reasons ranging from hedonistic desires to internalized moral principles and that "in real life, situations that call for prosocial actions vary across many dimensions" (p. 241). And Hoffman (1982) has stated that "although one's empathic proclivities may make one more receptive to certain moral values, empathy alone cannot explain how people formulate complex moral ideologies and apply them in situations" (p. 310).

Visions of Morality

As an alternative to a morality based on moral reasoning, morality is herein defined as a prosocial disposition which incorporates one of three discrete visions—the private, the interpersonal, or the social spheres of human living. The argument for three discrete visions of morality offers a maximally useful strategy for understanding the "specificity versus generality" controversy regarding moral human behavior. Reanalyzing the massive Hartshorne and May studies in the 1920s, Rushton (1980, 1981) has stated the original conclusions that morality was situationally specific and, consequently, that moral consistency in personal behavior was limited, were in error. Rushton has contended
that his reanalysis of the data demonstrates a high level of consistency across situations; these findings have led him to posit that there exists an "altruistic personality." Yet it is questionable whether even these individuals apply the same level of consistency to social forms of moral thinking. It is unlikely, moreover, that individuals act uniformly across all situations particularly when the individual's actions are occasioned by a vast array of interpersonal complexities, situational cues, and diverse if not contradictory informational data.

From another perspective, philosophical and ethical writings support the argument that individuals encounter moral concerns across the private, interpersonal, and social life areas. The following brief delineation of ethical and philosophical writing is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive, of these writings. A considerable body of philosophical, ethical, and psychological writing has viewed the individual's moral self as inherently linked to the capacity to make private moral decisions based on personally meaningful values systems (e.g., Conn, 1981; Nelson, 1973). However, the integration of the self with personal values (the private moral self) does not point to an atomized existence apart from others; on the contrary, theorists maintain (e.g., Conn, 1981) that the growth of the private moral self requires the experiences of interpersonal encounters. Albeit philosophical and ethical discussions on conscience are controverted, there exists general consensus that a privately held and internalized value system is an essential factor for healthy and growthful human experiencing.

For example, Rokeach and Regan (1980) have argued that successful thera-
peutic outcomes can be facilitated by focusing on the client's contradictory behaviors which create "a state of self-dissatisfaction"; in other words, the client's realization of the failure to live up to a private moral ideal creates an ensuing dissatisfaction which in turn fosters changes in behaviors or values thus making "them all more integrated with the person's self-conception as a basically moral and competent person" (p. 580). The American Psychological Association, likewise, explicitly mentions "conscience" as an important ethical guide for the psychologist when conducting research (American Psychological Association, 1981). Finally, research on the mature personality supports the importance of a private moral self. Heath (1965, 1980) has stated that an autonomous and stable value system is integral to healthy and mature functioning. After reviewing several developmental and personality theorists, Blocher (1974) has pointed out that commitment to personal values is an essential component of the "effective personality."

In summary, the thread that weaves consistently through these findings is the relationship of self to value and the corresponding influence of personal value on behavior. From a philosophical and ethical perspective, this privately valued self can be labeled conscience. For purposes of this current study, it is labeled private morality.

The argument for an interpersonal morality needs little introduction. Historically, ethical guidelines (e.g., the Ten Commandments) have insisted upon the intrinsic unity of ethical ideals and interpersonal behaviors. From another standpoint, social psychological literature, particularly research on prosocial behavior (Rushton, 1980, 1981; Staub,
1978, 1979) has highlighted the importance of prosocial behaviors for the proper functioning and maintenance of human societies. McClelland, Constantian, Regalado, and Stone (1978) have argued that there is a relationship between psychosocial maturity and tendencies to act prosocially. Conn (1981) has interpreted the developmental theories of Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg as exemplifying the foundational components of human authenticity. His schema envisions these developmental theorists as documenting the human striving for self-transcendence which is realized through human care and concern for others. Finally, two recent critiques of academic psychology have raised the possibility for an interpersonal morality that is prosocial in nature. Bergin (1980) has challenged what he terms the clinical-humanistic bias of contemporary psychotherapeutic theorizing and argues that consideration must be given a theistic value system that embraces prosocial actions. More recently, Wallach and Wallach (1983) have viewed psychology in general and psychotherapy in particular, as dominated by an egoistic frame of reference; they offer as an alternative a psychological view of the human person which values a distinctly prosocial dimension.

Unlike private and interpersonal morality, the viewing of a social morality is a more recent phenomenon. Philosophical and ethical theorizing, particularly since 1970, has established the need to consider a social morality. In philosophical writings, two seminal works have appeared which argue to this position. John Rawls (1971) has developed a theory of justice which gives priority to the social fabric and the needs of the disadvantaged. From a totally different perspective,
MacIntyre (1981) has maintained that the contemporary debate regarding what is moral cannot be divorced from the role of social context and communal goals and purposes. Interestingly, it is in the context of a prosocial moral position that these disparate if not antiethical moral theories are reconciled. Likewise, theological theorizing has endorsed a distinctly social character. Groome (1980) has fashioned a view of religious education which takes on a distinctly social character whereas Hauerwas (1981) has argued for a normative social ethic that is sensitive to the social needs of society, and situates this ethic in the context of symbolic and story forms of social theorizing.

Finally, psychology is not immune from the implications of social morality. Current questioning of psychotherapeutic practices and social values reflects the need for mental health professionals to address the concerns of social morality. For example, Eldridge (1983) has argued that professionals can integrate social action strategies into their professional practices. Butcher (1983) has reviewed the literature concerning the mental health practitioner as a change agent and argues that change agentry is a necessary and inevitable role for the psychological professional in today's complex society. Perhaps the most enlightening statement on the role of prosocial behavior and social morality's relation to psychology comes from Bandura (1974) who has stated "if psychologists are to have a significant impact on common problems of life, they must apply their corrective measures to detrimental societal practices rather than limit themselves to treating the casualties of these practices" (p. 86). A theme implied throughout the above writings is
the essential importance and social consequences of prosocial behaviors.

Social Morality and the Adolescent

Shelton (1980, 1983) has maintained that the adolescent years represent the optimum time for the development of a personal morality that is social in nature. During this age period, a socially moral sense arises from: (a) the complex interplay of developmental issues; (b) the arousal of empathic urges; (c) the comprehension of political stimuli; and (d) the internalization of allocentric and normative values.

From a developmental perspective, the capacity for a socially moral sense resides in the adolescent's experience of formal thinking and the struggle for identity. Formal thinking allows the adolescent to comprehend complex forms of social stimuli as well as intricate understandings of abstractions, e.g., "justice" and "peace". Thus, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) have noted that "the notions of humanity, social justice...freedom of conscience, civic or intellectual courage...are ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent's affective life" (p. 349). Understanding these concepts necessitates a capacity for abstraction, deductive thinking, and reflective thought which only emerges during the adolescent years. Consequently, when experiencing formal thinking, "the adolescent goes injecting himself into adult society. He does so by means of projects, life plans, theoretical systems, and ideas of political or social reform" (Piaget, 1968, p. 67). With respect to the foregoing, however, attention must be given to the question of whether a social morality is universally obtainable; that is, a considerable body of research has noted that the experience of formal thinking is not
a universal phenomenon during the adolescent years (Dulit, 1972; Elkind, 1975; Keating & Clark, 1980). This objection is answered by the definitional understanding of social morality defined herein. Although it is highly unlikely that all adolescents will achieve a high level of formal thinking, the experience of empathic urges and the encounter with numerous prosocial situations in both home and school environments allows virtually all adolescents to consider the possibility of making socially moral choices.

It is unlikely, however, that this awakening of the concerns of social morality can exist as isolated from the larger developmental needs of identity which are salient issues for adolescent maturation (Miller, 1978; Marcia, 1980). Further, the linkage of psychosocial development and formal operational thought most likely is mediated by idiosyncratic factors unique to the adolescent period (Rowe & Marcia, 1980).

Erikson (1963, 1968) has offered the dominant theory for understanding the adolescent's identity quest. This identity search, framed in the context of crises and commitment, has received operationalized success through the use of the identity status paradigm developed by Marcia (1966). Central to the adolescent's achievement of identity is the experience of an ideological crisis which necessitates the adolescent's successful negotiation of newly acquired ideas and values with formerly sacrosanct and unquestioned childhood beliefs. This potentially traumatic experience entails a fundamental reexamination of political, religious, and social values.
Although the secondary school years represent a time when identity issues are initially considered, the extant research has focused almost exclusively on college age young adults (Marcia, 1980). Recently, attempts have been made to apply identity paradigms to secondary school adolescents (Mielman, 1979). Raphael and Xelowski (1980) have questioned the validity of such an approach. Characteristically, secondary school students are unlikely and are not expected to have experienced the developmental concerns or the environmental situations which are requisite for the crisis and commitment struggles which may preoccupy the college age adolescent. They argue that a more profitable approach to identity measurement during the high school years is to assess the adolescent's familiarity with salient issues as well as the openness the adolescent evinces towards new experiences. In this regard, a morality framed in terms of prosocial behaviors appreciates the age-appropriate level of the secondary school student's identity search. The fashioning of morality in the context of everyday prosocial situations provides a universal experience that is appropriate for the high school adolescent's initial exploration of social issues and questions.

Thus the adolescent's awareness of the political world, engendered by cognitive maturation and developmental strivings, sets the stage for the initial yet tentative steps toward ideological commitment; on the other hand, the failure to confront ideological demands relegates the adolescent to a confused and ambiguous value state (Erikson, 1968). The presence of formal thinking prepares the adolescent to attend to complex political stimuli whereas the capacity to reflect on a personal
life history allows the adolescent to encounter a world that is both complex and changing.

It is only with increasing maturity that the adolescent becomes able to form generalized concepts, to understand the role of history and the impact of the present on the future, to get some feeling for social change and the possibility that man and social institutions may alter and be altered, to weigh up the wider costs and benefits of actions and decisions, and to develop principles and frameworks for judging particular events. (Feather, 1980, p. 281).

The acquisition of formal thinking also makes available to the adolescent a higher level of empathic experience. Hoffman (1979, 1980) has tied the adolescent's greater cognitive sophistication to the ability to imagine the distresses and hurts of wider social grouping such as the poor, the retarded, and the oppressed. He has stated that "empathic affect combined with the perceived plight of an unfortunate group may be the most advanced form of empathic distress" (1979, p. 963). Clark (1980) has echoed Hoffman's assertion. While criticizing the dearth of research on the topic of empathy, he has stated that "the highest and probably the least frequent form of empathy is that in which the individual is compelled to embrace all human beings" (p. 189). In a particularly forceful passage he goes on to state:

It is the level of empathy that when real and functional can not be used to justify the naked use of power, tyranny, flagrant or subtle injustices, cruelties, sustained terrorism, killings, wars, and eventual extinction...This lack of simple expanded empathy is in the eyes of this observer the basis of social tensions, conflicts, violence, terrorism, and war (pp. 189-190).

The point made by both theorists is that empathy has a specifically social focus that is inextricably tied to questions of social injustice,
political decision-making, and cultural values—indeed, the same issues which are generated by a theory of social morality. This level of empathy is dependent upon cognitive maturation and expresses itself in a universal sensitivity towards the culturally disadvantaged.

Moreover, Hoffman (1980) has hypothesized that many middle class and affluent adolescents often undergo a sense of existential alienation as a result of their empathic experience. Their growing awareness of others in contrast to their own advantaged state creates a sense of guilt and a subsequent distancing or disavowal from their own cultural milieu. Their empathic stirrings also create a personal perplexity as they must successfully negotiate their earlier socialization experiences which prided the conventional values of a competitive and success-oriented society with their newly experienced feelings of care and concern for the socially oppressed.

Formal thinking also is considered a necessary prerequisite for advanced levels of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1974, 1975; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) has consistently held that formal thought is necessary but not sufficient for principled moral reasoning. Originally, Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) had hypothesized that the adolescent years represented the optimum time for the adolescent's initial acceptance of principled moral reasoning. Subsequent analysis of his data called into question this assertion. Kohlberg (1980) has modified his theory and now maintains that the secondary school years represent a time for intensive civic education in the context of stage four morality. In this revised schema, Kohlberg gives great weight to the concept of
experiential learning and the adolescent's inclusion in a school based form of participatory democracy. However, methodological flaws are not the only consideration for dissatisfaction with Kohlberg's version of adolescent morality. The social consequences of Kohlberg's position has left him open to the charge of liberal bias (Hogan & Emler, 1978; Sullivan, 1977). It is in response to this criticism that the current vision of morality is appropriate. The framing of morality in terms of prosocial choices specifically associated with social issues represents an effort to disassociate social moralizing from ideological bias from social issues, it can be argued that the construction of a socially moral sense in terms of prosocial behaviors attenuates the discord that accompanies ideological discussions and creates, if not a rapprochment, at least a common ground for dialogue among both liberal and conservative political orientations. If the adolescent undergoes the encounter with moral questions and their social significance as a result of developmental experiences and tasks, then the young person faces concrete choices in an environment interspersed with political decisions and ideological values.

In the secondary school years, adolescents begin to develop both a deepening understanding of political realities and the capacity to think critically about social phenomena. In the early high school years, these evaluation are elementary and simplistic. Through the later high school years and during the undergraduate years of college, however, adolescents are capable of developing a rudimentary ideology and philosophy of life that aids them as they evaluate political and social
institutions. At the same time, the ideological groundings for most adolescents are unstructured; that is, the overwhelming number of adolescents display thought patterns in which complex and hierarchally ordered belief structures are lacking (Adelson, 1971, 1975; Gallatin, 1980).

The adolescent's disinclination to form an ideologically structured belief system arises from several factors. Adolescents, like children, form political thinking patterns which reflect adult values; therefore, because most adult Americans are non-ideological in their belief structures, it stands to reason that adolescents, too, will reflect weak ideological commitments (Adelson, 1979; Conger, 1976). Furthermore, the adolescent's awakening to serious political issues is influenced by numerous socializing influences which include parents, teachers, peers, and the media (Jennings & Niemi, 1974). It is highly likely that these numerous influences offer at times contradictory and opposing interpretations of political realities which attenuate the adolescent's attempt at forming political commitments. Finally, the nature of political reality itself is often complex and variable. Adelson (1975) has captured the essence of political events and their accompanying ambiguity. He has noted:

We have gone from a one-on-one collision of values to far more complicated issues; the relation of variable means to variable ends; the relation of uncertain means to uncertain ends; the relation between short- and long-term ends; the relation between individualistic and collective goods; the distinction between particularistic and universalistic orientations; the collision between values, and also the collision between interests, and between interests and values (p. 76).
Consequently, the adolescent must attempt to make sense of a vast array of information and in the midst of this complexity construct a personally meaningful value system. No doubt this venture is often frustrating and for some adolescents leads to adoption of an unreflected ideological position whereas for other adolescents this confusion leads to the abandonment of any attempt at political commitment. It is likely that most adolescents fall between these extremes. Unlike the privately encountered moral choices which adolescents face concerning questions of personal ethics—should I lie? Should I steal?—questions of political morality are inherently complex and often lack moral clarity. Furthermore, the certitude and moral simplicity of the past, which can no longer suffice as a moral reference point, renders the adolescent vulnerable to the confusion and questionings which characterizes the political worlds of the adult (Shelton, 1980, 1983, 1984).

The framing of morality in a prosocial context offers the adolescent a respite from the moral confusion emanating from political controversies. Although adolescents might evince uncertainty as to which of several political choices are moral, their familiarity and socialization to prosocial behaviors provide a resourceful means for creating interest in and commitment to socially important issues.

Morality Defined

It is the purpose of this study to answer Haan's challenge to psychology to rethink the meaning of morality and to conceptualize a morality appropriate for "everyday" life. Based on the research previously cited, three focuses are essential for constructing such a
morality. First, Hoffman's research on the universalizing experience of empathy pinpoints the need for an awareness and vicarious experience of another's needs. Second, the unanimity accorded the need for prosocial behaviors for both relational and social functioning as well as the necessity for a behavioral component highlights the need to incorporate prosocial behavior as an integral factor in any definition of morality. Third, the fact that moral agents must strive to find meaning and value as they encounter a complex array of realities and situations necessitates a multivisioned approach to morality that is sensitive to the private, interpersonal, and social dimensions of human experience.

Bearing the above in mind, morality is defined as the realization of another's need(s), that is, in the context of the individual's particular situation, engaging in appropriate behaviors to benefit the distressed person. In addition, this moral response is carried out within the context of one of three dimensions--the private, the interpersonal, or the social. Specifically, private morality is defined as an anonymous prosocial response or a response that benefits a person(s) unknown to the moral agent. Interpersonal morality is defined as a prosocial response directed towards a person known by the moral agent. Social morality is defined as a prosocial response directed towards a person(s) who are disadvantaged, powerless, or who suffer from social injustice.

The value of this approach to morality is twofold. First, this understanding of morality allows for the inclusion of cognitive,
affective, and behavioral factors. The cognitive and affective factors are experienced by empathic arousal whereas the behavioral factors are accounted for by the presence of prosocial behaviors. Second, this approach to morality affords numerous research opportunities for studying the cognitive, affective, behavioral and situational factors which influence how individuals come to experience themselves as moral persons.
CHAPTER III

THE HYPOTHESES

If empathy is an essential component of morality, then serious attention must be given to how individuals experience empathy. Of particular interest is the question of whether males and females differ in their empathic experiences.

Sex Differences in Empathy

Maccoby & Jacklin (1974), in an extensive review of the literature on empathy have reported no significant differences exist between the empathic experiences of males and females. Hoffman (1977b) has labeled this conclusion "premature" (p. 713). Examining closely the specific studies reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin, Hoffman has stated that only six of their studies can be classified as true measures of vicarious affective arousal to another's experience (Hoffman's definition of empathy). In all six of these studies, says Hoffman, females obtained greater levels of empathy than males. Hoffman has noted that combining other studies which recognized another's distress "masked" the true differences that do exist between males and females.

Hoffman's (1977b) own review of the literature has led him to conclude that differences between males and females do exist. He has stated "what is most striking about the empathy findings...is the fact that in every case, regardless of the age of the subjects or the measures
used, the females obtained higher scores than did the males" (p. 715).
In an examination of 16 recent articles, Hoffman has found that in all
16 studies females reported higher empathy scores than males. The
chances of such a uniform confirmation on 16 independent samples, says
Hoffman, is 1 in 64,000. He has concluded that "although the magnitude
of the difference may not have been great, the findings overall clearly
provide a stronger case for the proposition that females are more em­
pathic through the life cycle than that no sex differences exists"
(p. 715).
Feshbach's (1982) extensive analysis of empathy differences in
children has supported Hoffman's conclusion that differences do exist.
She adds, however, that in children numerous and complex factors ac­
count for male and female differences.
Scales to measure empathy have also supported differences between
males and females. Mehrabian and Epstein's (1972) scale for empathy
measurement differentiated between males and females at a significant
level. These findings were supported by Davis' (1980) multidimensional
approach to empathy wherein among all four dimensions (empathic concern,
perspective-taking, personal distress, and fantasy) females scored sig­
nificantly higher than males (p< .001).
Further, it is noteworthy that an analysis of Davis' findings
supports Hoffman's argument for empathic differences. Hoffman (1977b)
has stated that although there is clear evidence for differences be­
tween male and females regarding the level of affective arousal (meas­
ured by the empathic concern subscale), no such consistency can be found
with more cognitively oriented measures, such as perspective-taking. Davis (1980) has noted that his own research results show that although perspective-taking is highly significant, male and female differences are lowest for this subscale thus lending support to Hoffman's conclusion that perspective-taking is a less discriminant measure of male-female differences.

Besides the cognitive dimension (perspective-taking subscale) and affective dimension (empathic concern subscale), Davis' multi-dimensional approach identifies two other subscales—personal distress and fantasy.

The personal-distress subscale measures extreme emotional arousal to another's distress. In other words, this scale appears to be a more extreme dimension of affective arousal to another's plight. This dimension is important because Hoffman (1981, 1982) has noted that affected overall-arousal can attenuate helping behavior in individuals who are exposed to another's distress.

Davis' (1980) findings that females experience significantly more distress at another's plight is the result of several factors. First, the affective arousal evinced by women on the empathic concern subscale and supported by Hoffman's (1977b) findings might carry over to a more extreme response leading to affective over-arousal. Second, Hoffman has suggested that males are oriented to a more "instrumental" role which implies an active mastery of the world and social competence. Extending this thinking to the present question, if females are less socialized to initiate behaviors to relieve the distress of another, then it is
plausible that their affective arousal to another might well lead to personal distress.

Davis' fantasy subscale measures an individual's tendency to imaginatively take the role of another. Several items on this subscale were taken from an earlier scale developed by Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, and Richardson (1978). Unfortunately, Stotland et al., reported no findings from their data regarding sex differences for their scale. Staub (1978) has reported that a difficulty with fantasy research that relates to empathy and helping behaviors is the question of external validity; in other words, real life situations are often inherently more complex than the "imagine" conditions developed in experimental settings.

Hoffman (1977b) has suggested that females are more apt to imagine themselves as another. This predisposition is the result of affective arousal, socialization experiences, and an inner sense of self which seeks interaction with others. Staub (1978) gives indirect support to this conclusion; he has noted that females are more inclined to attend to the feelings of others and place greater value on being considerate of others. Gilligan (1982), moreover, has argued that females place greater emphasis than males on the values of care and intimacy.

In addition, the statements on Davis' subscale have a distinctly empathic focus which emphasize consideration and awareness of others. In light of the above, his findings of a high statistical significance ($p < .001$) between males and females are most likely the result of the sensitivity of the measure to the value females place on personal at-
tentiveness towards others. Thus, in this study, it is hypothesized that females will score higher than males on all empathy scales.

Social Morality and the Liberal Adolescent

Political socialization studies have noted that ideological belief systems reflect a variety of discrete personality characteristics, moral beliefs, and socialization experiences (Bluhm, 1974).

The question of ideological beliefs and moral thinking has received widespread attention, although research has generally focused on the college age adolescent (Flacks, 1967; Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Keniston, 1968). The dominant thrust of this research appeared to show that radical college students typify a higher degree of moral thinking and behavior than do their conservative peers. Gallatin (1980), in a summary review of the extant research, has concluded that in fact such assertions were often misleading and that more recent findings have provided an "important corrective" to the uncritically accepted portrait of the student activist portrayed in previous research.

Mussen, Sullivan, and Eisenberg-Berg (1977) have noted that the transition from early to late adolescence involves a shift in ideological values. Late adolescents are significantly more likely than early adolescents to adopt liberal positions on political and economic issues. Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1980) have noted that politically oriented conservative and liberal adolescents evince distinctive personality characteristics as well as distinguishing socialization experiences. In general, the results supported the commonly held assumption that conservatives are more traditional, success-oriented, and organized whereas
the distinguishing traits for liberal were their independence and rebelliousness. The two researchers also found that liberal adolescents scored higher on an empathy measure than their conservative counterparts and described themselves as having qualities highly similar to attributes associated with prosocial behaviors. It should be noted, however, that their study measured attributes of altruism rather than subjects' self-reports of prosocial behaviors which is the focus of the current study. Mussen (1982) has supported these findings, yet he has taken the analysis of personality factors one step further. He has maintained that there exists an intrinsic unity between liberal ideological values and a prosocial commitment towards others. Thus "comparisons between factors found to be associated with political liberalism and the antecedents of prosocial behaviors reveal many similarities and parallels, thus providing convincing support for the notion that liberalism and prosocial behavior are indeed conceptually linked" (p. 374). At the same time, he has called for further studies to explore the characteristics which might differentiate the prosocially oriented conservative from a liberal peer. A valuable feature of all the above studies is their focus on secondary school adolescents rather than the college age late adolescent.

In addition to measures of personality characteristics and partisan political views, attention has also been given to the relationship of morality to ideological preference. Basically, this research has supported the conclusion that when ideological orientation is taken into consideration, adolescents differ on their level of moral thinking.
That is, liberally oriented adolescents embrace higher stages of moral thinking (principled morality) whereas their conservative peers are inclined a more conventional level of moral reasoning (Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Elmer, Renwick, & Malone, 1983; Nassi, Abramowitz, & Youmans, 1983). In regards to secondary school students, Eisenberg-Berg (1979) has found that a liberal political orientation was positively related to prosocial moral reasoning for females but not for males. It should be noted, however, that her version of moral reasoning, with the inclusion of the prosocial dimension, is distinct from Kohlberg's rule oriented approach.

A result of the above research has been to associate Kohlberg's moral stages with ideological beliefs. In other words, the findings of the above research have led to the conclusion that moral structure is related to partisan political thinking. In terms of the focus for this study, this means that higher stage of moral reasoning (the structure) relates to an adolescent's belief system (the content). Consequently, the liberal adolescent's political views are associated with his or her higher moral stage whereas conventional moral reasoning is associated with conservative political views.

Recently, research has been reported which takes issue with this prevailing assumption. In a particularly illuminating study, Elmer et al., (1983) have reported evidence that challenges the relationship between moral structure and ideological content. These researchers discovered that although left-wing students scored significantly higher on a moral reasoning measure than their conservative or moderate peers,
the latter two groups were, upon instruction, able to increase significantly their own moral reasoning scores when told to respond as a radical. As a consequence, there was no significant differences reported between the moral reasoning levels of left-wing students and conservatives and moderates when the latter two groups were asked to replicate the views of their left-wing peers. The structural position of Kohlberg, on the other hand, would have predicted that conservatives are unable to comprehend the principled moral reasoning level of liberally inclined students. A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these data is that individuals professing partisan political preferences simply believe their own position is correct and that they do not ascribe a higher level of morality to those that reason differently than they do.

Moreover, it does appear that some differences do exist among liberals and conservatives regarding the content of their thinking. The research which has accumulated with the Liberalism Scale used in this study (Mussen, 1982; Mussen et al., 1977) has shown that liberals favor positions that attend to the rights and needs of socially disadvantaged groups (social morality). Given the findings of Elmer et al., it is plausible that conservatives are not opposed to prosocial behaviors which benefit these groups. They might simply prefer a moral position which favors personal investment in private and interpersonal moral concerns. No research evidence is available, however, to ascertain how liberals and conservatives might differ in regards to everyday private and interpersonal prosocial behaviors.
Hypotheses Defined

Due to the nature of social morality, that is, its focus on questions of social injustice and social issues, it is hypothesized that liberal adolescents will demonstrate a significantly higher level of social morality than conservative adolescents. Concomitant with previous research on empathy, it is also hypothesized that females will score significantly higher on all empathy measures than males.

An important feature of the present research is the development of a new measure for measuring moral development. In order to obtain construct validity for the Visions of Morality Scale, the measure was administered to two groups of students. Fifteen students who voluntarily engaged in social service projects both at their school and in their community were matched with a control group of students who were not involved in socially oriented service projects. Both groups were administered the Visions of Morality Scale. A high degree of statistical significance, \( t(28) = -3.56, p < .001 \), was found between the two groups. In other words, students who engaged in prosocially oriented projects scored significantly higher on the morality measure than did students who were not active in social service activities. Thus the Visions of Morality Scale appears capable of successfully identifying those adolescents who are inclined to act prosocially.

The Visions of Morality Scale provides an opportunity to envision morality as a prosocial phenomenon and at the same time offers an efficient way to measure the level of the adolescent's prosocial response in a variety of everyday situations. Consequently, this measure offers
researchers the possibility of addressing the issue of everyday moral­ity from a prosocial perspective. A significant feature of the present study is the development of this scale and the three subscales of pri­vate, interpersonal, and social morality.
CHAPTER IV

METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were 82 male and 99 female adolescents attending an all male or all female Catholic college preparatory secondary school in the Chicago area. All students were first semester seniors; consequently, the students were adolescents in the 17 to 19 years of age range.

No personal data sheet was utilized in this survey; still, several general characteristics could be attributed to this subject population. The overwhelming majority of students attending both schools were middle or upper middle class. In addition, over 90% of the students at both schools were Catholic. Finally, over 80% of the students at both schools were Caucasian. There was no reason to believe that the population surveyed differed in any significant way from the overall student body population. As a consequence, the "typical" student surveyed could be described as: Caucasian, Catholic, and middle class.

Measures

Three instruments were used in this survey: The Visions of Morality Scale (VMS); The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI); and the Political Orientation Scale (POS).

The Visions of Morality Scale, devised by the author, measured
the subject's response to 45 everyday prosocial situations. The criteria used for constructing the situations were the following: The author had observed the particular situation occurring among adolescents he had either taught or counseled, or he had been informed about the situation through personal contact with an adolescent who had experienced the situation. The opportunity for this contact with adolescents occurred while the author was an instructor and counselor at a Catholic college preparatory school in Denver, Colorado during the late seventies. These two criteria insured the construction of prosocial situations which are commonly experienced by adolescents in everyday life.

The subjects responded to the instrument by completing a 1 to 7 point Likert scale for each item. The Likert scale ranged from "I would DEFINITELY do what the statement says I do" to "I DEFINITELY WOULD NOT do what the statement says I do." As a consequence, the possible range for a total morality score for each student was from 45 to 315.

In addition to the total score, the instrument allowed for the measurement of three subscale scores. Morality was perceived not as unidimensional, but rather as an individual's moral response constituted within one of three distinct visions: the private, the interpersonal, or the social. Thus, utilizing the 7 point Likert scale format, the range of scores for each vision ranged from 15 (a 1 point response to each prosocial situation) to 105 (a 7-point response to each situation). In order to account for response set, 30 of the
situations were scored in the positive direction and 15 (5 for each vision) were scored in the negative direction.

The author was concerned especially about the subjects' responding in a socially desirable manner inasmuch as self-report inventories are particularly prone to deception and faked responses (Anastasi, 1976). As a way to counter a socially desirable response set the following measures were employed: First, all subjects were guaranteed anonymity. Second, subjects were instructed that there were no right or wrong answers. Third, the vast majority of the situations were everyday events which adolescents typically encounter; many of these responses, therefore, lacked the discernible character of socially desirable behaviors. Fourth, as a preliminary step in the formulation of the final instrument, a sample of 20 young adult seminarians responded to the questionnaire. Their responses to the VMS demonstrated a wide distribution of responses both for the total score as well as the three subscale scores. These ranges were: total morality score, 149-263 ($M = 202$, $SD = 37.0$); private morality subscale score, 31-88 ($M = 67.2$, $SD = 14.2$); interpersonal morality subscore, 48-91 ($M = 73.7$, $SD = 11.6$); social morality subscore, 31-91 ($M = 61.8$, $SD = 18.0$). Finally, research supports the efficacy of paper and pencil measures in predicting prosocial behaviors (Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Rushton, 1981).

The Interpersonal Reactivity Index was developed by Davis (1980) to examine multidimensional aspects of empathy. This scale consists of 28 self-report statements that ask an individual to describe how he or
she would react to a variety of empathically eliciting items.

Other measures of empathy (Hogan, 1969; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) have utilized statements that assess both the cognitive and affective components of empathy thereupon combining them into a single score. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index is an improvement on this approach. A factor analytic study (Davis, 1980) revealed four distinct groupings of items. These four dimensions were labeled: fantasy, perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress. The final instrument was constructed by incorporating only those items which loaded most heavily for both sexes on their respective factors. The final instrument consisted of four-seven item subscales; these items were randomly ordered on the final empathy measure. This measure utilized a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "never" to "always."

Consequently, a total empathy score ranged from 28 to 140 whereas subscale scores ranged from 7 to 35. Nineteen items were scored in a positive direction, 17 in the negative direction.

Davis (1980) has noted that although significant intercorrelations do exist for males (fantasy and empathic concern, .30; fantasy and personal distress, .16; perspective-taking and empathic concern; .33; personal distress and empathic concern, .11; personal distress and perspective-taking, -.16) and for females (fantasy and perspective-taking, .12; fantasy and empathic concern, .31; perspective-taking and empathic concern, .30; perspective-taking and personal distress, -.29) all at the p < .01 level, the intercorrelations among the four dimensions are not of sufficient magnitude to suggest that they are measuring the same
In the light of the foregoing, the intercorrelations among the three subscales—perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress—give support to Hoffman's developmental conceptualization of empathic development. In other words, the child's growing capacity to recognize distinctions between self and a distressed other and the ability to develop a sense of compassionate understanding towards the distressed individual most likely involves some linkage of empathic concern, perspective-taking, and personal distress. Furthermore, the negative association between personal distress and perspective-taking supports a salient assertion of Hoffman's (1980)—that empathic over-arousal can inhibit prosocial behaviors.

Test-retest reliability coefficients among the four subscales (fantasy, perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress) were for males: .79; .61; .72; and, .68. For females these same subscales were: .81, .62; .70; and, .76.

All in all, Davis (1981) has concluded that:

The new measure, then, may be said to have the following characteristics. First, it has excellent psychometric properties. The factor structure remains constant for both sexes across independent samples and across repeated administrations. In addition, the internal reliability of the four scales is quite acceptable. Second, the pattern of sex differences found for the four scales is consistent with the general pattern found in empathy research. Females score substantially higher than males on the measures of emotional reactivity (including the fantasy scale), and less strongly so on the scale most clearly measuring perspective-taking ability. Finally the relationships found to exist among these subscales also support previous theorizing about the development of empathic tendencies (pp. 14-15).

The Political Orientation Scale was an instrument developed by Mussen et al., (1977) to assess the political orientation of high school age adolescents. Subsequently, the instrument has been used extensively for measuring ideological orientations of secondary school students (Eisenberg-Berg, 1977; 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1980; Mussen, 1982; Mussen et al., 1977). The original instrument contained 41 agree-disagree items which assessed adolescent ideological values regarding partisan issues including: foreign policy issues, labor-management relations, criminal rights, personal freedoms, welfare concerns, and so forth.

The items were based on the responses of adolescents to informal interviews and the items were worded in such a way as to be easily comprehended by secondary school students. Factor analysis revealed 32 of the 41 items to be loaded on a liberalism-conservatism dimension. These 32 items were used to construct the political orientation questionnaire. Thus individuals scoring high on the measure are viewed as endorsing a liberal political orientation whereas low scores are perceived as adopting a conservative orientation. Due to the high correlations existing between high scores on this scale and the prosocial empathy measures, this scale will be labeled the Liberalism Scale. Middle range scores are interpreted as individuals who are non-partisan in their political thinking. It is not possible to discriminate between individuals who are moderate in political orientation and those who are apolitical; however, it can be presumed that extreme scores reflect a more pronounced ideological commitment toward either liberalism or
conservatism.

In order to insure a wide distribution of scores, the response scoring was altered from a dichotomous forced choice format to an 8-point Likert scale which ranged from "I very strongly agree with this statement" to "I very strongly disagree with this statement." Thus the range of possible scores was from 32 to 256, or from an extreme conservative response to an extreme liberal response. Sixteen of the statements were scored in the positive direction and 16 were scored in the negative direction.

In addition, this new scoring format more realistically reflected the function of ideological and partisan value positions. In other words, the complexity of socio-political issues do not lend themselves to simple agree-disagree responses, but rather are responses to a broad spectrum of commitments ranging from minimal interest to passionate involvement. Moreover, extreme ideological commitments represent not only political interest, but most likely complex reactions which include cognitive and affective components. Utilizing a larger range of responses allows for a more precise measurement of the intensity of the partisan response.

Procedure

All three instruments were administered on 2 separate days (1 week apart) to students at each school. Most students were able to complete the 105 question instrument in the allotted time of one class period (either 45 or 50 minutes). The investigator was present at all administrations to insure uniform procedures were adhered to.
Seventeen students were unable to complete the instrument in the allotted time or their protocols were unusable. All subjects remained anonymous.
CHAPTER V

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 summarizes the ranges, means, and standard deviations for the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS), the Liberalism Scale (LS), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).

A Summary of Sex Differences

Table 2 summarizes male-female differences on all three measures. It is evident from the data that there exist large differences between males and females in terms of empathy, liberalism, and morality scores. The consistency of the findings over all measures supports the conclusion that in terms of experience of empathy, the political self, and the moral self there do exist differences between males and females.

Sex Differences in Empathy

It was hypothesized that females would score higher than males on all empathy measures; these hypotheses were for the most part confirmed. Females scored significantly higher than males on four of the empathy variables. All differences, except for the fantasy subscale score, were at a statistically significant level; the fantasy subscale score approached statistical significance.

The higher females score on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index showed the following levels of significance: fantasy (p< .058); perspective-taking (p< .01); concern (p< .01); distress (p< .001); total (p< .001).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>73-190</td>
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<td>4.10</td>
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<td>17.61</td>
<td>3.03</td>
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<td>4.18</td>
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<td>37-86</td>
<td>60.28</td>
<td>9.84</td>
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Table 2

Sex Differences on Measures of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Sex</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td>9.97</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>62.67</td>
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<td>4.52**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>47.75</td>
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<td>12.16</td>
<td></td>
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<td>168.91</td>
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<td>5.69**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>145.88</td>
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<td>19.00</td>
<td>4.79**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>122.36</td>
<td>18.32</td>
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<td>Empathy (Fantasy)</td>
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<td>4.28</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>16.87</td>
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<td>4.08</td>
<td>4.53**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (Total)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>63.37</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>4.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56.54</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p< .01
p<.001
The findings support Hoffman's review of the literature regarding sex differences for empathy. The smaller differences between males and females for perspective-taking demonstrates that recognition of another's need is less a discriminating factor for males and females regarding empathy than is reaction to the plight of another (measured by distress which is highly significant). The higher female distress score might well be a consequence of affective arousal and learned socialization responses which downplay female competence in stressful situations.

A more difficult interpretation concerns the marginal difference between male and female fantasy subscale scores. Davis (1980) reported differences between females and males to be significant at the .001 level. The current findings suggest a much smaller difference exists. Two factors might account for this disparity. First, Davis' population was a much larger sample. As a consequence, a lesser value was needed to obtain a higher level of significance. Second, the current sample was drawn from a secondary Catholic school. Greeley (1981) has stated that good instruction techniques and amicable teacher-student relationships tend to foster warm imagery among Catholic adolescents who attend Catholic secondary school. Since the Catholic boy's school sampled in the present study is noted to have large financial resources and an excellent faculty, it might well be that these factors have influenced the imaginations of the students and contributed towards a high level of fantasy for males.
Sex Differences in Liberalism

The large male-female differences regarding partisan political orientation reflects the larger national political climate wherein there exists a "gender gap"; that is, according to national survey sampling (e.g., Gallup Poll), females are inclined to support liberal candidates. Although research does report a gradual liberalization among adolescents occurring with age (Mussen et al., 1977), the research does not report whether significance differences exist between males and females. On the other hand, an examination of the Liberalism Scale lends support to the greater preference by females to endorse liberal political positions. Many of the issues and choices on the scale are indicative of prosocial tendencies which reflect caring behaviors and the desire to alleviate conflicts by peaceful means. In comparison with the conservative position on the scale, these themes are decidedly weighed on the side of liberalism. Given the female proclivity to endorse prosocial positions (discussed in the next section), it is reasonable to conclude that females are more inclined to endorse liberal attitudes.

Sex Differences in Morality

Highly significant differences on the Visions of Morality Scale were consistently found between males and females. For the VMS these differences were: private \( p < .001 \); interpersonal \( p < .001 \); social \( p < .001 \); and total \( p < .001 \).

Because morality is herein defined as prosocial behavior—actions which benefit others—a plausible interpretation of the morality
differences is that females, as opposed to males, are more apt to favor behaviors which aid others.

The present findings lend support to other studies as well as more theoretical speculations which maintain that females act more prosocially than males. Behaviors which benefit others have generally been defined in the literature as generosity (giving material aid to another person), being helpful (aiding another when he or she needs help), and bystander rescue (intervening when another individual is in an emergency situation) (Staub, 1978). Underwood and Moore (1982) have noted that the results of these studies are mixed. In terms of generosity and helpfulness, the consistent finding is that females demonstrate more positive behavior than males. The researchers state that there does exist a sex difference, albeit small, in the prosocial responses of males and females; yet, this prosocial tendency does not always occur. For example, there does exist evidence to suggest that in some emergency situations, males are more likely to intervene and aid the distressed person than are females. Staub (1978) has suggested that perhaps the male-female differences exist because males are more concerned with equity and keeping their personal freedom; these tendencies, consequently, might lead them to be less helpful than females. Thus an individual in need might elicit a negative reaction from the male who values independence and is dependent upon a high level of status. He notes, however, that interpretations of male-female differences regarding prosocial acts are complex due to the limitations of the experimental studies and the numerous and at times
contradictory interpretations which can be given the research findings.

In addition, Staub (1978) has questioned Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) conclusion that there exist no differences in the helping behaviors of males and females. This lack of differences, says Staub, might be due to the types of studies, they examined. For example, in their discussion of rescue studies, the researchers failed to note male tendencies towards competence which might have led them to intervene as much as females. Staub has noted that under certain circumstances females may be more helpful than males, because they are competent in a particular areas, because being helpful is more socially appropriate for them, or because certain characteristics they acquired (or tend to possess by heredity) make them more likely to be helpful (p. 254).

From another perspective, the values prized by females might support a greater tendency for females to act prosocially. Rokeach (1973; Rokeach & Regan, 1980) has suggested that values represent ideal end states which serve as evaluative standards for personal actions. Bearing this in mind, Feather (1980), in a discussion of adolescent sex differences in values, noted that females are socialized to place more emphasis on "communal" values and concerns which favor allocentric behaviors whereas men are more likely to adopt values which sustain independence and competitive strivings. Likewise, Stein (1972) found female adolescents more oriented toward caring for others and helping those in need.

The present findings also support Gilligan's (1978, 1982) assertions that females are more inclined to value caring behaviors,
interpersonal concerns, and intimacy. The distinctive prosocial focus of the morality measure utilized in this study blends nicely with the "other voice" of women which esteems "care for and sensitivity to the needs of others" (1978, p. 55).

Indirect support is also given to Hoffman's theory of empathic development. According to Hoffman's conceptualization, empathy is the integral component which orients humans to behave altruistically. Therefore, since the present research substantiates the view that females both obtain a higher level of empathic development than males and are more moral, it is possible to assume that empathy is a mediating experience which explains the higher female inclination to behave prosocially.

All in all, the evidence that argues for females' greater tendency to favor prosocial acts is not incontrovertible. On the other hand, the present findings along with the research cited above set forth a strong argument to support the conclusion that there does exist a female disposition to behave in ways which benefit others in need which is clearly greater than male tendencies to adopt similar behaviors. The morality measures for the current study specifically probe responses which reflect "everyday" life activities. Consequently, it might be that in ordinary life events, particularly in the context of adolescent development, the female's proclivity to be attentive to others interacts with her newly experienced intimacy need as well as the encouraging expectations of societal socialization forces to fashion a moral stance that is distinctly prosocial and separate from her male counterpart.
**Relationship of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy**

It was hypothesized that there exists a positive relationship between social morality and liberalism. In line with this hypothesis, a highly significant positive relationship was found between a liberal political orientation and social morality ($r = .45, p < .001$). In addition to this finding, numerous other highly significant relationships were obtained. Table 3 lists the correlations on the combined male-female population ($N = 181$).

Highly significant relationships were discovered between morality and liberalism ($r = .43, p < .001$) and liberalism and the remaining two subscales of morality (private = .27, $p < .001$; interpersonal = .33, $p < .001$). Other highly significant relationships were found between empathy and liberalism ($r = .32, p < .001$) as well as empathy and morality ($r = .42, p < .001$). Finally, the individual subscales of morality correlated highly with several empathy subscales. Private morality was found to be significantly related to fantasy ($r = .18, p < .01$), perspective-taking ($r = .34, p < .001$), and concern ($r = .37, p < .001$). Interpersonal morality was significantly related to fantasy ($r = .16, p < .05$), perspective-taking ($r = .49, p < .001$), and concern ($r = .36, p < .001$). Social morality was significantly related to perspective-taking ($r = .29, p < .001$) and concern ($r = .28, p < .001$). Unlike the relationship of private and interpersonal morality to distress, a highly significant relationship was found between social morality and distress ($r = .22, p < .001$). Finally, the total empathy score was highly significantly correlated ($p < .001$) with all morality scores and the liberalism score. The total morality score was
Table 3

Intercorrelations Among Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Combined Male-Female Adolescents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. Morality (Private)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td>.88***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.34***</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.79***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Morality (Social)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.85***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>.17*</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Liberalism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.26***</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.71***</td>
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<td>.31***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.62***</td>
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<td>9. Empathy (Distress)</td>
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<td>.32***</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

p< .05  
p< .01  
p< .001

Note: Empathy is defined as a focus on the other person which contains for the empathizer any one or combinations of imaginative, cognitive, affective, or distress components. Liberalism is defined as a political philosophy which stresses rights, equalities and social justice themes. Morality is defined as the endorsement of prosocial behaviors which impact on private, interpersonal, and social concerns.
highly significantly correlated with liberalism (.43, \( p < .001 \)) and most empathy measures (fantasy = .17, \( p < .05 \); perspective-taking = .42, \( p < .001 \); concern = .40, \( p < .001 \)).

Because the data resulted in a large number of statistically significant correlations, a multiple regression analysis was performed on the combined male-female sample as well as on each sex separately in order to ascertain which variables are most apt to predict prosocial moral orientation.

The dependent variable was the total morality score on the Visions of Morality Scale (a sum of private, interpersonal, and social subscale scores). The independent variables evaluated for the predictive strength were: sex, liberalism, and the four empathy dimensions (fantasy, perspective-taking, concern, and distress).

Four of the six variables were found to be significant predictors of morality. The beta weights for the predictor variables were as follows: liberalism = .245 (\( p < .001 \)); perspective-taking = .266, (\( p < .001 \)); sex = .224 (\( p < .001 \)); and concern = .185 (\( p < .01 \)). The multiple \( R \) for these four predictor variables was .615 (significant at the .0001 level) which accounted for approximately 37.8 percent of the variance in the total morality score. The predictive value of the variables is fairly uniform across all variables.

Because morality is a highly complex construct, the obtained multiple \( R \) suggests that political orientation and empathy are valuable dimensions for understanding the development of an everyday morality. These findings provide significant support for theorists who maintain that moral decisions to respond prosocially are highly complex activities.
At the same time, analyses of prosocial responding must also take into consideration the possibility of sex differences.

At the same time, delineating a group of predictor variables enhances the attempts of educational theorists and religious educators who argue for the acquisition of distinctive set of prosocial behaviors as requisite for the proper educational maturation of primary and secondary school youth. Essentially, these findings suggest that a prosocial orientation includes: an affective and cognitive component, an appreciation of sex role differences, and an internalization of socially compassionate and humanitarian themes.

The Relationship of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Males

Table 4 summarizes the relationships of morality, liberalism, and empathy for male adolescents. For male adolescents, private morality was significantly related to perspective-taking (.32, $p < .01$) and concern (.37, $p < .001$). Interpersonal morality was significantly related to perspective-taking (.35, $p < .001$) and concern (.27, $p < .01$). A significant negative relationship was also reported between interpersonal morality and distress (-.26, $p < .05$). Social morality was significantly related to liberalism (.20, $p < .05$), perspective-taking (.28, $p < .01$), and concern (.36, $p < .001$). Liberalism was also related to concern (.28, $p < .01$).

The total morality score was significantly correlated with perspective-taking (.38, $p < .001$) and concern (.41, $p < .001$). The total empathy score was related to all other measures except interpersonal morality. These relationships included: private morality (.31, $p < .01$),
Table 4

Intercorrelations Among Empathy, Liberalism, and Morality for Male Adolescents

<table>
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<td>.62***</td>
<td>.89***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Morality (Interpersonal)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.76***</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>.17</td>
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<td>3. Morality (Social)</td>
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<td>.20*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.38***</td>
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<td>.28**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
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<td>7. Empathy (Perspective-taking)</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>.66***</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Empathy (Concern)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.53***</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Empathy (Distress)</td>
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<td>.46***</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Empathy (Total)</td>
<td>-</td>
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* p< .05
** p< .01
*** p< .001
social morality (.38, p< .001), liberalism (.29, p< .01) and the total morality score (.37, p< .001).

A multiple regression analysis utilizing five variables (liberalism and the four empathy dimensions) was performed on the total morality score for males. This analysis resulted in two empathy dimensions (concern and perspective-taking) as significant predictors for the total morality score. The beta weights for these two predictor variables were found to be, respectively, concern = .325, (p< .01) and perspective-taking .284 (p< .01). The Multiple R was .476 (p< .0001) which was found to account for approximately 22.7 percent of the variance in the total morality score for males.

The Relationships of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Females

Overall, males showed fewer significant relationships than females. Table 5 summarizes the results for females. Highly significant results were obtained by female adolescents on the various measures. Private morality was significantly related to liberalism (.26, p< .01); and most measures of empathy (perspective-taking, .28, p< .01; concern, .28, p< .01). Interpersonal morality was significantly related to liberalism (.30, p< .01) and most empathy measures (fantasy = .18, p< .01; perspective-taking = .47, p< .001; concern = .35, p< .001). The fewest significant relationships were obtained with social morality. This sub-scale correlated with liberalism (.49, p< .001) and perspective-taking (.21, p< .05).

Significant relationships were also discovered between the total morality score and several measures. Morality was related to liberalism
### Table 5

**Intercorrelations Among Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Female Adolescents**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Morality (Private)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.85***</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Morality (Interpersonal)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Morality (Social)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.81***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.17*</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Morality (Total)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Liberalism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Empathy (Fantasy)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.80***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Empathy (Perspective)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Empathy (Concern)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Empathy (Distress)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td></td>
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<td>10. Empathy (Total)</td>
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*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001
(.46, p< .001), perspective-taking (.38, p< .001) and concern (.28, p < .01).

The total empathy score was related to all other measures including private morality (.24, p< .01), interpersonal morality (.35, p< .001), social morality (.17, p< .01), liberalism (.19, p< .01) and the total morality score (.29, p< .01).

Similar to the analyses carried out above, a multiple regression analysis was performed on the total morality score utilizing five predictor variables (liberalism and the four empathy dimensions). Contrary to the findings for males, significant beta weights for predictor variable for females were found to be liberalism (.386, p< .001) and perspective-taking (.291, p< .001). The Multiple R for these two variables was .534 (p< .0001) which accounted for approximately 28.5 percent of the variance in the total morality score.

One of the most striking findings in the present study is the different ways in which female and male adolescents related moral visions to liberalism. Overall, morality is highly significantly related to liberalism for females but not for males. Extremely high significance levels were found among females for all visions of morality with liberalism. In contrast to this finding, only social morality was significantly related to liberalism for male adolescents. Consequently, a large number of male adolescents who view themselves as moral tend to endorse conservative political attitudes. Two possible interpretations exist for this finding. For one, it suggests that the relationship of morality to politics for males is more complex than for females inasmuch
as highly conservative males often classify themselves as moral. Eisenberg-Berg (1977) has noted that socialization to prosocial behaviors is commonly experienced during childhood. Prosocial behaviors are consonant with conventional standards of morality and thus appealing to both conservatives and liberal male adolescents. However, since liberal political ideals are interspersed with numerous prosocial and humanitarian themes, it is plausible that liberal females, who are already inclined more than their male counterparts to behave prosocially, will heavily endorse prosocial themes. On the other hand, females who reject the prosocial themes threaded throughout the liberalism scale, might well be adolescents whose behavioral tendencies are decidedly less prosocial. Their resistance to liberalism's prosocial tendencies might result from their disinclination towards prosocially acceptable behaviors. In other words, the conservative female and conservative male might well represent two distinctively different moral persuasions. For males, then, favoring of prosocial behaviors by the conservative leads to a variety of political persuasions which can claim the title of moral whereas for the female the disinclination to endorse prosocial responses by the conservatives leads to a unidimensional focus which designates the liberal female as the moral individual.

A second plausible explanation for these findings is that males are consistent in their responses. That is, male conservatives respond inconsistently to the Visions of Morality Scale and erroneously endorse a higher level of morality. Research studies examining the prosocial tendencies of secondary school adolescents (Eisenberg-Berg,
& Mussen, 1980; Mussen, 1982) have consistently found that liberals are more inclined to be prosocial than their conservative counterparts. Unfortunately, these studies did not examine the influence of sex on partisan political persuasions; thus, it is not possible to explore discrete differences between male and female conservatives.

Moreover, Mussen (1982) found that conservative adolescents tended to describe themselves as more inclined to worry about making mistakes or doing something bad; likewise, they were less inclined than their liberal peers to engage in self-criticism. Given the male tendency to maintain independence and status (Staub, 1978), it might be that the needs of male adolescents might combine with the conservative tendency to disallow critical self-evaluation and lead male conservatives to be inconsistent in their moral responses. Further research of conservative male and female adolescents is needed in order to examine which of these explanations is accurate.

At the same time, it is important to note that for both sexes social morality is significantly related to liberalism. Thus educational institutions which desire to insure a prosocial stance by their students on social issues need to consider the value preferences and attitudinal endorsements which characterize the liberal political persuasion.

Moreover, the highly significant relationship between morality and liberalism supports Mussen's (1982) assertion that liberals are more disposed to altruistic motivations than their conservative counterparts. However, what still needs to be addressed is the issue of
whether salient characteristics differentiate highly moral conservatives from highly moral liberals. Conversely, the differences between highly moral liberals and conservatives and their counterparts who are decidedly less prosocial in orientation need to be examined.

Of all the empathy measures, distress is clearly the least likely empathic experience to be associated with a prosocial response. For the combined male-female populations, distress is not significantly related to either private or interpersonal morality, but is highly significantly related to social morality. Lifton (1979) has remarked that the human person encounters "anxiety when one feels helpless in the face of the threat despite the impulse to counter it" (p. 129). He concludes that the psychic numbing arising from the foreboding helplessness engendered by the threat of nuclear annihilation leads to stasis, psychopathological states, and death. However, the current study would challenge such thinking and argue that a level of psychic distress (including overwhelming emotional states and a feeling of helplessness) is strongly related to prosocial acts which have a distinctly social dimension. In a recent article Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak (1983), demonstrate that actions to oppose nuclear arms are significantly related to the concreteness of an individual's nuclear image. Blending these two lines of thinking, an optimum strategy for fostering socially just behaviors might be a focus on concrete images with a parallel focus on aspects of affective responses which mirror an incapacity to respond effectively to distress and the plight of others (e.g., helplessness felt when thinking of the magnitude of poverty in one's country).
The inclinations to respond prosocially to social concerns appears to contradict assertions that affective overarousal inhibits prosocial actions. It might be that Hoffman's theory of overarousal applies more to interpersonal situations whereas more socially oriented concerns are influenced by a different dynamic. Thus an individual when exposed to a distress-filled interpersonal situation might fail to respond to another's plight. On the other hand, the overwhelming distress one feels when reflecting on images of nuclear extinction or world hunger might lead one to constructively channel energies into efforts to eradicate such threats and disasters.

Another striking finding of the present research is the centrality of cognitive and affective variables in defining the nature of empathy. The regression analysis found that prosocial responding was consistently related to the presence of perspective-taking on the combined male-female sample and on the separate male and female samples. Equally important, however, is the absence of fantasy and distress as predictor variables for prosocial responding. Although Davis' (1980) argument for a four-dimensional approach to empathy might well be valid for a definitional understanding of the term, it appears, at least in terms of a moral orientation, that the cognitive and affective features are the essential components for a prosocial response. These findings lend strong support to Hoffman's theory of altruistic motivation which views the affective arousal to another's plight, engendered in part by an awareness of the other's suffering, as an inducement for motivating an altruistic response. Moreover, Hoffman's prediction that affective
overarousal (distress) attenuates altruistic responding is strongly confirmed by the present research; that is, all three regression analyses failed to find distress to be a predictive variable for prosocial responding.

The presence of liberalism as a predictive variable corroborates the research of Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1980) which maintains that a liberal political orientation is associated with an altruistic tendencies. Apparently, a liberal political persuasion is capable of eliciting an underlying altruistic response. Accordingly, commonly held liberal values, such as equality and justice, or the focus on the needs of the impoverished might well activate this prosocial tendency among liberals.

At the same time, the present findings point to the need to discriminate between the sources of the prosocial response for males and females. For males, concern and perspective-taking emerge as predictor variables whereas, for females, liberalism and perspective-taking are the predictors. This suggests, as noted in the correlational analysis discussed above, that one plausible interpretation is that a male moral orientation is capable of encompassing a wider spectrum of political persuasions whereas the female moral orientation is more closely linked with liberalism. Accordingly, it appears that the conservative male is more likely to embrace a higher moral stance; in contrast, the female conservative is more apt to endorse a moral orientation which is distinctively non-prosocial. As noted, however, more research is needed to ascertain whether this is indeed the case or if males are simply responding incon-
sistently. Thus it might be that these findings have significant ramifications for educational programs which attempt to instill a sense of social compassion in secondary school youth. For males, techniques and strategies might need to emphasize both affective education which stimulates awareness and sensitivity to personal feelings and role-taking experiences which allow the male adolescent to be cognizant of the needs and hurts of suffering individuals. On the other hand, strategies and techniques which attempt to encourage a social sensitivity for female adolescents need to link the humanitarian and social themes common to liberal thinking with role-taking experiences.

Intercorrelations Among Subscales

On the combined male-female sample as well as on the separate samples, high intercorrelations were obtained for the various subscales. On all three samples the morality subscales correlated at the .001 level. This high level of significance was also held true for the relationship between the total morality score and each of the subscales on all three samples.

The total empathy score, likewise, correlated at the .001 level with each of the empathy subscales. On the other hand, differences were noted among the various subscales. For example, on the combined male-female sample, fantasy was significantly related to perspective-taking (.26, p< .001), concern (.28, p< .001), and distress (.22, p< .01). Perspective-taking was significantly correlated with concern (.31, p< .001). Concern was significantly correlated with distress (.21, p< .01).
Subscale scores on empathy for the separate female and male populations lacked uniformity. For females, fantasy significantly correlated with perspective-taking (.26, \( p < .01 \)), concern (.47, \( p < .001 \)), and distress (.28, \( p < .01 \)). Perspective-taking was significantly related to concern (.31, \( p < .001 \)) but without statistical significance when related to distress (-.10). Concern was significantly related to distress (.20, \( p < .05 \)).

Males reported fewer significant relationships among the empathy subscales. Thus fantasy was related to perspective-taking (.23, \( p < .01 \)) but lacked statistical significance when related to concern (.00) or distress (.05). Perspective-taking was significantly related to concern (.24, \( p < .05 \)) but without statistical significance when related to distress (-.08).

The Visions of Morality Scale

An added dimension of the present study is the possibility of developing for psychological research the first prosocial morality measure.

In addition to the excellent findings regarding score distributions, the criterion of internal consistency was maintained by the high correlation of subscale scores with the total score. In other words, the correlations of the individual morality scores with the total morality score were as follows: private = .88; interpersonal = .79; social = .85. Similar high correlations were found for both the separate male and female samples.

In addition, consistency was found among all three samples on
some scores. All three samples (combined male-female, male, female) obtained their highest mean on the interpersonal score. This finding is expected inasmuch as interpersonal morality is defined as prosocial behavior which benefits someone the agent knows. Characteristically, individuals are most apt to behave favorably towards those individuals who are friends or personal acquaintances. Conversely, the greatest variance in scores occurs with the social morality subscore. This type of morality is the most complicated in terms of issues and most potentially divisive as the result of political and social ideologies which can be interjected as a rationale for deciding what is an appropriate behavior. As expected, both males and females showed the lowest inclination to endorse this morality.

Furthermore, three findings support the construct validity of this measure. First, interpersonal morality correlates most strongly (.45) with perspective-taking. This is a persuasive finding because awareness of another is necessary for any type of appropriate behavior to occur. Second, social morality correlates more strongly than either of the other two subscales with liberalism. This is expected because of the related content covered by these two measures. Finally, the fewest significant relationships found between the morality subscale measures and the empathy measures is distress. This finding is supported by Hoffman's assertion that empathic overarousal inhibits prosocial responding.

The Visions of Morality Scale measure also provides the opportunity to develop similar measures for other populations (e.g., college-age
adolescents, adults). In addition, this measure affords numerous re-
search opportunities. Studies can be undertaken, for example, to as-
certain the relationship of everyday morality to moral reasoning, ego
development, and personality characteristics (e.g., intimacy and
achievement motivations).

Towards an Everyday Morality

In terms of the development of moral theory, the most interesting
finding of the present research is the relationship between everyday
morality and empathy. These results need to be interpreted cautiously
due to the nature of self-report measures and correlational findings.
Consequently, the use of self-report measures rather than a behavioral
criterion mitigates the inferences which can be ascertained from the
data. Furthermore, given that the findings are correlational, the
strong relationship found between morality and empathy must be cautiously
interpreted.

Still, the highly significant relationships reported between
empathy and morality give added weight to other theoretical speculations
that have considered empathy to be a fundamental component for morality
(e.g., Hogan, 1973; Hoffman, 1980). In addition, Hoffman's assertion
that empathy is the core experience required for initiating altruistic
behavior finds confirmatory support in the present findings which esta-
blish a strong relationship between empathy and prosocial responding.

Shelton (in press) has argued that empathy is the human foundation
for ethical behavior. If this is true, then the development of empathic
tendencies provides the concrete experiencing that is requisite for the
implementation of ethical and religious ideals. In other words, pro­
grams and strategies to implement ethical behaviors must take into con­
sideration the experience of empathy. Likewise, if strategies and pro­
grams which foster prosocial behaviors (Staub, 1981) can be tied to empathy, then the effectiveness of such programs might be enhanced.

The implications of an empathically based morality are immense. Moral educators have long sought human dispositions which encourage the ethical and religious ideals of their adherents. An empathically based morality which focuses on everyday life behaviors fulfills this search.

Furthermore, an empathically based morality affords a viable al­
ternative to previous attempts at moral theorizing (e.g., Kohlberg). An empathically based morality resonates with the common, everyday life experiences of human beings as moral agents. Individuals who embrace diverse moral and ideological values can easily relate to behaviors commonly experienced by others. Thus an empathically based morality provides a common basis for dialogue among individuals who otherwise might encounter difficulty in understanding one another's needs and con­
cerns.

At the same time, further research is needed to determine charac­
teristics which might differentiate high and low scoring individuals on the Visions of Morality Scale. Also, research is needed to ascer­
tain whether individuals who are similar in their moral orientations yet hold diverse religious, philosophical, or political beliefs manifest different characteristics (e.g., moral reasoning, personal values).
REFERENCES
REFERENCES


SUBJECT QUESTIONNAIRE INCORPORATING VISIONS OF MORALITY SCALE,
LIBERALISM SCALE, AND INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX

Listed below are some situations. Please answer these statements according to the criteria described below. Note there are NO right or wrong answers. You are simply asked to mark on the answer sheet which answer indicates what YOU would currently do if you were in the situation described. Please mark only one answer for each statement. Please answer ALL statements.

A= When I choose this statement I am saying I would DEFINITELY do what the statement says I do.

B= When I choose this statement I am saying I would PROBABLY do what the statement says I do.

C= When I choose this statement I am saying I MIGHT do what the statement says I do. I am more likely to do than not to do.

D= When I choose this statement I am saying I am not sure whether I would do or would not do what the statement says I do. I am clearly UNSURE as to what I would do.

E= When I choose this statement I am saying I MIGHT NOT do what the statement says I do. I am more likely not to do than to do.

F= When I choose this statement I am saying I PROBABLY WOULD NOT do what the statement says I do.

G= When I choose this statement I am saying I DEFINITELY WOULD NOT do what the statement says I do.

1. A local community group has come to my school and requests students to volunteer to take part in a hunger march. For every mile that is walked a local merchant will contribute one dollar. I agree to take part and I walk five miles.

2. I am walking alone and I find a dollar on the street. I pick it up and continue walking. I pass a group of people who are collecting money for muscular dystrophy. I drop the dollar that I found into the basket.
3. I am a member of the history club at the school which consists of fifteen members. The club invites to the school a guest speaker who will speak on current political events. A three person committee needs some members to come two hours early on the night of the speech in order to set up chairs and fix refreshments. I am asked by a member of the committee to come two hours early. I tell the person that I will come to the talk but I will not come two hours early to set up.

4. I overhear two freshmen talking and saying that no one every goes to their games to watch them play, even when they play at home. I realize I have a free afternoon after school this next Thursday when the freshmen play at home. I show up for their game after school on Thursday and I say at least half the game.

5. I read in a psychology magazine how people who smile actually help other people to feel better about themselves. The next day when I go to work as a checker at the local grocery store I intentionally make the point to smile at each customer who comes to my checkout stand.

6. It is a snowy day and I am off from school. I decide to walk around the block to get some fresh air. As I begin walking I notice a driver and his car are stuck in snow. I keep on walking and do not stop to help.

7. I have tickets to a local rock concert with some friends (classmates). The concern is sold out. One of my friends who is going with me has to back out because he forgot that he/she has to help his/her family this weekend. Although I have several friends in school who would like to buy the ticket, I offer it to a new transfer student in hopes that this will give him/her a chance to meet some people.

8. In our town there is a referendum to raise local taxes 3%. Supporters of this tax measure say it is necessary in order to continue providing necessary social welfare services for the needy. Opponents of the measure say that taxes are high enough already and that people are paying all that they should in taxes. On election day I vote against the 3% tax increase.

9. I work in a movie theater as an usher with several people my own age. The head of the theater is making out the schedule for the Christmas holidays. I know that one of the ushers wants to go with his family to visit his grandmother for Christmas but he has been put down to work Christmas Day whereas I am off that day. I go to the usher and tell him to switch me with this other usher which, in effect, makes me work Christmas Day and allows the other usher to get off. I tell the manager not to tell the other usher I did this.
10. A fellow student that I know casually asks if I have an hour this Saturday to help him/her with some math problems (I am very good at math). I am free on Saturday so I tell the student that I would be happy to help him/her.

11. When cleaning up my room I collect several pieces of clothing that I no longer use. I can dispose of them or drive five miles to the Salvation Army and drop them in their drop-off box. I dispose of them and do not drive the five miles.

12. I am asked to write in class an essay on why I want to go into a particular career and what influences me to choose this career. When I write my essay I say that the most important influence on any career I choose is the desire to help people.

13. My entire class is going on a weekend outing to the amusement park. One of my classmates who I know casually loses his/her money at the park. Several students chip in and give the student $5 each. I am one of the students who gives this person five dollars.

14. A classmate from my homeroom who I know casually has been in an accident and there is an announcement that students can give blood if they wish. I am in good health and can give blood and not afraid of needles or blood. I do not volunteer.

15. A report is published in the paper which rates how local companies have attempted to help alleviate minority unemployment. These ratings are not a factor when I decide which stores I will shop in.

16. Several friends of mine are going to a movie this weekend which has gotten good reviews. The movie has also been depicted by several reviewers "as unfortunately supporting and reinforcing sexist and violent attitudes." I go to the film.

17. I win $50 in the state lottery. I find this out in the morning and in the afternoon a volunteer for the annual cerebral palsey drive stops by and requests that I make a contribution if I can afford it. I do not make a contribution.

18. I have a personality clash and simply do not get along with one of my teachers. I hear from a family friend that this teacher's father has been quite sick recently. Over the next few weeks I make a conscious effort to be respectful in class and I go out of my way to say "hello" to him when I pass him in the halls.

19. A neighbor on my block asks me to take her shopping twice a week while her husband is recuperating from a hear attack. She does not drive. She asks me and I agree to take her twice a week for the next three weeks.
20. I read in the paper about a family who has lost all their belongings in a fire. I anonymously send a ten dollar check to a fund set up for the family by the town newspaper.

21. I am walking downtown fairly rapidly with a friend so that we can make a movie on time. As I am walking I notice a person standing by a car next to a parking meter. He is holding some change in his hands and looks frustrated. I interrupt my walk to the movies and go over to ask him if he needs correct change for the parking meter. I exchange currency with him so that he will have correct change.

22. A local civic group has requested over the radio that volunteers are needed to sign up to help prepare and serve a free meal on Christmas Day for the needy. I sign up and work four hours on Christmas Day.

23. I receive a visit from a member of a fraternity/sorority located at the college that I plan to attend in the fall. After a discussion about the fraternity/sorority's lifestyle and procedures, I bring up the question about racial feelings in the organization and inquire about feelings toward minorities. I state that I would not be interested in a group that is not open to having minority members.

24. In the upcoming primary election there are several candidates who have distributed various pieces of literature on issues such as world hunger, peace, military spending, and aid to certain foreign governments. In evaluating the candidates and deciding who to vote for, I use the above issue position as the primary determining factor for my vote.

25. I read an article in a popular magazine urging readers to write letters to foreign governments who are keeping political prisoners to protest their imprisonment (e.g., Central America, Communist countries). I do not write any letters.

26. I hear on a local radio station that the city orphanage is having a paper drive and is requesting residents to bring in their papers. The proceeds received from the paper drive will be used to buy recreation equipment at the orphanage. I have the afternoon off so I gather my papers at home and drive the five miles to the orphanage to drop them off.

27. An eighth grade classmate who I have not seen in several years calls me up and requests my help for a 5 year 8th grade reunion that is being planned by this former classmate along with two others from the class. The classmate asks me if I could spare several hours contacting people at my high school and also help to set up for the party. I tell the classmate I'll probably come to the reunion but I say I will not be able to help with the details.
28. I am reading the paper one morning and I come across an article entitled: "How to Become a Better Citizen." Since it is an election year I memorize the main points and use them as criteria for evaluating candidates who are running for office.

29. In order to make people aware of world hunger, students at my school are requested to restrict their food intake at lunch during the month of March and donate the money they save to a world hunger drive. I take the pledge to be part of this drive and donate my lunch money during the month of March to this drive.

30. I am involved in a heated argument with a classmate about a historical date. I read a few days later in a library book that my classmate is right. I apologize to my classmate for the argument and admit to the classmate that he/she is right.

31. It is the end of the semester and everyone seems tired and looking forward to the upcoming vacation. A few of my classmates seem particularly tired of school and start to complain quite regularly about school. I make an effort not to complain and say to them when they do complain that things aren't that bad and point out the good things that are going on in the school.

32. A local restaurant has discriminated against a racial minority. I am out one night with a group of friends. We are all hungry and my three friends in the car voice a desire to eat at this restaurant. I speak up and say I do not want to eat at this restaurant because of its discriminatory policies.

33. There is a blood drive at school. I am in good health, can give blood and not afraid of the sight of blood or needles. I do not volunteer to give a pint of blood.

34. As I walk down the street, I notice a blind lady is walking down the other side of the street with a cane and appears confused. I cross the street and ask her if she needs assistance. When I discover her problem, I walk her the two blocks to the store that she wishes to go to.

35. While riding to school with several classmates there is a discussion about some violent crimes reported in the newspaper the night before. Several of my classmates say that "tougher laws are needed" and that "criminals are getting away with too much." I respond that criminals must be punished but the real problem, for the most part, are the inhuman social conditions such as poverty and unemployment that encourage crime and I plan to work to help alleviate these conditions.
36. I am able to get a part time job after school. My new employer tells me that he can use one other person on a part time basis. I know that several of my friends would like to have this job. I also know that a student who I know casually belongs to a family that is experiencing some difficult financial problems and would like to have the job too. I mention to one of my friends who I would enjoy working with that there is a job opening.

37. I work part time as a checker at the local grocery store in my neighborhood. When I receive my next paycheck I also receive a request in my pay envelope to contribute to a local charitable organization. I do not check the box on the request form which says I will contribute ten dollars of my next paycheck to the fund.

38. I read where a large company's policies overseas have victimized the lower class of the country. This company makes one of my favorite snack foods. As a means of protest, I give up eating this snack.

39. The administrator of the schools asks all upper class students (juniors and seniors) to give some serious thought to ways to improve the school for future students. Each junior and senior is requested to spend some time seriously reflecting on their years at the school and then to fill out a questionnaire (anonymously) and to send the form to the school. I take this request seriously and over the next few weeks think of ways to improve the school. I fill out the form and send it in.

40. I am going to drive this weekend with two friends to a university I hope to attend when I graduate from high school. The school is roughly 100 miles away. We are leaving on Friday afternoon after school and returning late Sunday evening. Another student who I don't know too well asks me if he can come along (I am driving my car). He wants to be dropped off at another school which is on the way. We would have to detour 20 miles off the main highway, however. He/she says "just drop me off on the way and pick me up Sunday evening on the way back." This student volunteers to chip in some gas money. I agree to take the student along.

41. I am walking home and I pass a woman who I barely know (she lives at the other end of the block from me). She is carrying with some difficulty a large and medium bag of groceries. I continue walking towards my home.

42. The school I attend needs volunteers who will come two hours early on an evening next week to be greeters and parking attendants for the annual freshman parents' night. I volunteer and come two hours early.
43. In order to conserve energy and adopt a similar lifestyle, I limit myself to only necessary driving. Thus, in good weather, I walk the five blocks to the local shopping center when I need something.

44. A local resident of our township has been critically injured in an accident. A woman calls our home asking my family to volunteer some time to either make posters for a booth or sit at a booth in the local shopping center this Saturday collecting money to help pay for the huge hospital costs. My family agrees to help, I do not volunteer.

45. In order to make better use of natural resources, I have our family save cans. I take responsibility for this aluminum can saving and I donate the money (a few dollars a month) to a needy charitable cause.

For statements 45-77 you are asked to respond to the extent that you agree or disagree with the statement. Please read each statement very carefully and decide how you feel about it. Then mark one of the answers for each statement. Please make only one mark for each statement. Please answer ALL statements. Please note there are NO right or wrong answers.

A = I very strongly agree with this statement.
B = I strongly agree with this statement.
C = I agree with this statement.
D = I agree with this statement more than disagree with it.
E = I disagree with this statement more than agree with it.
F = I disagree with this statement.
G = I strongly disagree with this statement.
H = I very strongly disagree with this statement.

46. Our government is elected by the majority of the people, so there is no excuse for protesting against it.

47. No matter what they think, teachers should not speak against our government in their classrooms.

48. The government should take over some businesses in this country and run them to benefit everyone.

49. Anyone who works hard can succeed in the U.S.

50. It is alright to protest against the government by going on peaceful marches.
51. Wealthy people should pay a lot more taxes to the government than poorer people.

52. There is so much poverty in this country because poor people are too lazy to work hard.

53. Labor unions are a bad thing because they cause too many strikes.

54. Most criminals will never be able to live right no matter how much we do for them.

55. Whether you are rich or poor, you can get the same good education in this country.

56. America should spend less money on the military and more money helping poor people.

57. The way to stop poverty is for the government to help poor people get a good job and more education.

58. If a man murders somebody he deserves to be killed himself.

59. The United States does not need to have the most powerful military forces in the world.

60. Labor unions do a lot more good than harm.

61. Communist countries like China and Russia are our enemies and we should treat them as enemies.

62. Communists who disagree with the American system should be allowed to make speeches against our country.

63. The way to prevent crime in this country is to find more jobs for people.

64. The United States should stop world communism by force, if necessary.

65. Crime is more often the fault of our society than the fault of the criminal.

66. Even if newspapers say things against the government, they should be able to print whatever they want.

67. People in minority groups have less chance of getting good jobs than white people even if they are qualified for the work.
68. Poor people and people in minority groups in this country get fair treatment from the police.

69. The government is spending too much money on welfare.

70. We need tougher laws against crime in this country.

71. Poor people in this country should not have to take care of themselves without help.

72. Big companies already pay their fair share of taxes and shouldn't have to pay more.

73. If a man loses an election, he should speak up if he is against what the winner does.

74. If a man can't get a job there is no reason for the government to help him.

75. Judges and courts do not give fair and equal treatment to everyone in this country.

76. Congressmen and Senators should have more say about what the President does because they are supposed to represent ideas of all the people.

77. I would never protest against the government.

Listed below are some statements (78-105). Please use the criteria listed below to answer these statements. Please mark only one answer for each statement. Please answer ALL questions. Again, there are NO right or wrong answers.

A = This statement always describes me.
B = This statement frequently describes me.
C = This statement sometimes describes me.
D = This statement rarely describes me.
E = This statement never describes me.

78. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.

79. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.

80. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" perspective.
81. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.

82. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.

83. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.

84. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely caught up in it.

85. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

86. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.

87. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.

88. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

89. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.

90. When I see someone get hurt I tend to remain calm.

91. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

92. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

93. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.

94. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.

95. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.

96. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.

97. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.

98. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at both of them.

99. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
100. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character.

101. I tend to lose control during emergencies.

102. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.

103. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me.

104. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.

105. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
The thesis submitted by Charles M. Shelton has been read and approved by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date: 11/15/54

Director's Signature