Instead of Contempt: Philosophical Complementarity

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INSTEAD OF CONTEMPT: PHILOSOPHICAL COMPLEMENTARITY

by

Christopher John Broniak

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VITA

Christopher John Broniak is the sixth of Leonard Robert and Esther (nee Kallas) Broniak's ten children, the fifth of seven sons. He was born April 5, 1957, in Detroit, Michigan.

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INTRODUCTION

It is no secret analytical and continental philosophies regard one another's enterprises with mild indifference, fueled occasionally by bouts of fierce contempt. Each believes what it does is philosophy, and what "they" do is not. How do two so radically different philosophical schools overcome their professional disdain for each other without compromising their own positions?

While there are many different reasons for this situation, one assumption encouraging it which the philosophical tradition reinforces must be rejected. Both camps embrace a presupposition of methodological economy, that some single philosophical method, theory, or position must account for experience more successfully than those methods, theories, or positions which account for it by means of depending upon one another. This application of Ockham's razor at the level of method hinders theories from uniting forces for attempting a more successful management of experience.

As theoretical reflection upon concrete experience, philosophical theories can manage experience more successfully than they previously have by seeing how several different positions and methods complement one another than by trying to dismiss and undermine one another. In view of the theorizing revolutions of early twentieth century science, the assumption of what Karl-Otto Apel calls methodological solipsism¹
blocks philosophical theories from adequately accounting for concrete experience. The first chapter argues this presupposition is not a necessary condition for successfully dealing with experience. The second chapter proposes philosophical positions, analogously to Bohr's and Heisenberg's complementarity thesis of the relationship between classical and quantum theories of physics, be recognized as attempts to meet the shortcomings of the tradition in order to bring it to completion.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. CONFRONTING METHODLOGICAL SOLIPSISM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinctions are Introduced into Experience</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinking: Acting upon Experience</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling: Reacting to Experience</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Management Failures</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PROPOSING METHODLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARITY</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heisenberg's &quot;Lesson of Quantum Physics&quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementarity and Contemporary Philosophy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Possibility of Meaning</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
CONFRONTING METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM

Distinctions are introduced into Experience. Analytical and continental philosophers balk at the suggestion that more similarities than differences exist between their methods. Phenomenology, by means of intuitions, and analytic philosophy, by means of concepts, share an affinity with respect to how each operates in the process of inquiry. In both camps, reason has an unrelenting need to secure what it deems to be clear and distinct knowledge.

Loosely speaking, a concept is a general representation enabling knowers to organize their world, mediating the differences between subjects, objects, and one another. Kant's pure principles of the understanding, the categories, means for the experience of nature, are concepts. Intuitions, on the other hand, are what is known immediately, without representation, by someone of something nonpropositional, i.e. unrepresentable experiences, such as knowledge of oneself, the external world, universals, and values.

Martin Heidegger illustrates the difference between concepts and intuitions with the "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandsein, intuitions) and the "present-at-hand" (Vorhandsein, concepts). But his illustration defines both concepts and intuitions only by reference to the activity (or the
lack of activity) of subjects. Not all experience is initiated by a knower. No conscious activity produces intuitions in experience. What produces them is phenomenal activity. Mathematical intuitions are realized by consciousness: their certainty springs from feelings of obviousness phenomena produce in consciousness. Attention to things does not produce them, William James writes; they "come to us by their own laws . . . [T]he feeling of attending need no more fix and retain the ideas than it need bring them."

For example, the distinction between between interpretation and explanation comes out of experiencing resistance, having attraction as is its necessary condition. Attraction denotes a relationship between "things" either naturally or involuntarily drawn toward each other. While physics takes this relation to be natural, other world-views regard the same relation as involuntary. It is as if one needs to distinguish an "attraction_1" from an "attraction_2," the pull (positively) referring to nature vs. the pull (negatively) referring to will. Experiences of resistance in dealing with life convincingly shows those experiences do not open up the world; it is because the world can and does open up that such experiences are possible. This implies distinctions like nature/will, subject/object, and so forth, are introduced into experience for the sake of arranging and controlling it. What fuels the fires of philosophical exploration and interpretation is interest, involvement, engagement, concern.

Philosophy reflects on experience in order to handle life as clearly and as completely as possible. The history of philosophy has
assumed all possible experience can and should be managed by some single philosophical theory or position. The following two sections are an overview of the methods of reflection presupposed by theoretical distinctions introduced into experience, viz., thinking vs. feeling.

Thinking: Acting upon Experience. Conceptuality is categorial, and categorial thinking separates some things from other things, arranging reality according to some determinations held to be more significant than others. Ideas about how categorial thinking works have changed over time, because ideas about what categorial thinking acts upon, namely experience, have shifted from those of stability to those of fluctuation. In Kant's time, it was supposed nature fit into separate, neat, clear-cut categories, like a pigeonhole. Instances of nature not fitting were, in principle, impossible. Today concepts hang woven together like a fishing net, catching from experience whatever does not slip through its weave. Experiences of novelty, spontaneity, and possibility support the image of nature's dynamis.

Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein initially sought a neutral conceptual framework in which all other operational frameworks could be grounded. Heidegger's aim in Being and Time was to discover and make explicit a fundamental ontology, a doctrine of categories to act as a foundation supporting each and every theory of existents. The Tractatus Wittgenstein had believed standards of meaning were merely the logical forms of the language to be understood. Later on, however, he explicitly rejects this. In its place he posited a plurality of rules of possible language-games, guided by the situational context and "forms of
Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's turn to language were attempts to move from the conceptual to the preconceptual or intuitive level of knowledge.

Language is used with an indefinite, unlimited number of terms (both actual and possible), and each of any number of terms may perform several different functions. Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger believed examining the context of a term and its use shows the various roles it plays within language. Linguistic analysis is divided between continental and Anglo-American philosophy with respect to the intuition/concept distinction, with the emphases falling on language's content vs. its logical form. Whether one begins with particular words and aims for general conclusions about language or with language and seeks the content of words, one learns linguistic investigation, instead of providing a neutral framework for pseudo-objective examination, only forces the investigator to recognize language itself as a part of the subject matter under investigation.

Stephen Erickson rightly notes "the notion of an entity existing independently of human agency and awareness" is highly suspect. Being and language are two theoretical determinations drawn out from a distinction-free "primeval pool," which James names pure experiences. The diversity of interests bearing upon this hypothetical construct yields ordinary, everyday, "lived" (immediate) experiences. "The interest . . . makes experience more than it [interest] is made by it [experience]." Nothing appears to get outside of interests once and for all; even "purely" theoretical constructs (like James's "pure experienc-
es") still serve a purpose. Interests perform in contexts of purpose, at work before any separation between subject and object, between freedom and nature, between science and art, between thinking and feeling. Successful philosophical strategies have the ability to apply different determinations for managing different situations in experience.

Feeling: Reacting to Experience. Where analytic critiques of knowledge concentrate on the construction of concepts, phenomenology takes up the intuition side of the coin of experience, in order to guard against unnecessary reductions of experience.

Heidegger's notion of logos is more or less identical with James's notion of "pure experiences," the theoretically primordial source of distinctions. Now Heidegger's approach toward this distinction-free construct comes from the side of feeling. His strategy is to refrain from acting, to resist the urge to draw distinctions out of it, to allow the distinctions to make themselves felt. Pure experiences (i.e., purely theoretical experience) can never become ordinary experience without persons to experience them.9 Feeling indicates the direction of activity between the object/subject poles. Where thinking is the activity of consciousness upon phenomena, feeling is the activity of phenomena upon consciousness. Heidegger conveys this with his "Being" expression: where traditional metaphysics (synonymous with categorial thinking) tried to represent this, overcoming metaphysics is a matter of overcoming the urge to represent, to express the "idea" of Being in such a way without mediating the difference between it and beings.10
Heidegger uses this background with his discussion of moods. Critiques of knowledge have been unaware of the intuitive side of inquiry, always leaving the questioning under the inquirer's thumb. Moods, though, are beyond conscious control, something one finds oneself in, not in oneself. The philosophical tradition relied too often on its ability to cut its object of study to pieces. Most recently, and especially in Continental philosophy, the discipline has overreacted by creating the opposite reliance of unbounded invention, neither giving nor subjecting itself to show some warrant of its authority.

In careless hands, phenomenology's strength easily becomes its most dangerous enemy. Herbert Spiegelberg recognizes this danger as he defends the epistemological rights of hermeneutics by maintaining it "is a matter not of mere constructive inference but . . . at most [one] of an intuitive verification of anticipations about the less accessible layers of the phenomena." Hermeneutics appears to border on mysticism; it commits philosophical fraud if it foregoes verifying felt intuitions only to celebrate sublime feelings. It is necessary and important for philosophy to recognize the value of feelings, but it is not sufficient.

Experience Management Failures. The desire to control all possible realms of experience by means of a single theory has blocked an adequate way of dealing with life. If thinking dominates the attempt to manage experience, the gains of formal clarity are negated by the losses of content and completeness. Conversely, if feeling overrides thinking in directing life, chaos results, without definition or delimitation. Both of these moves are unsatisfactory. Left to their own methodologi-
cal values, unaware of one another, neither feeling nor thinking alone successfully manages experience.

**Scientism.** Intellect, emotion, and will can be theoretically discriminated from one another. Any attempt at isolating them from each other in concrete investigation ought to be highly suspect. Science's ability to effectively manage its subject matter has greatly tempted philosophy to adopt and adapt a scientific attitude toward its objects of inquiry. Carried to the extreme of scientism, philosophy tacitly accepts certain determinations, namely, those most directly linked to mathematical frameworks, as more valid and valuable to their concerns while simultaneously suppressing other determinations and aspects of the situation. Suspicion should force a re-examination of the motivation for wanting to keep some aspects of the human questioner suppressed while allowing others to dominate the approach.

By using a mathematical framework as the ultimately legitimate referential context, nature appears in pure objectivity. Stepping back from this context, and viewing the framework within a wider context of life, one realizes its objective "truths" are functions of science's specific interests in knowledge. From this different viewpoint, the outer relations marked by science are not so much experience as they are the results of experience subjected to an elimination process. James argues this is the modus operandi of mathematical sciences such as mechanics, physics, and chemistry. In spite of nature's contradictory and defiant appearances, science comes up with the principle of its uniformity. Outside of science's narrow context, a belief about the truth of this principle is one of convenience, not necessity.
By adding imagination to explanation for the sake of a coherent order of information, one no longer deals with a simple, clean, and direct opposition between subject and object, questioner and questioned. An objectivistic bent in examination allows the illusion of a single object of investigation: what is covers over its possibilities. The move to interpretation inverts this; possibilities are constantly breaking through attempts to decisively conclude the study. An interpreter needs help to avoid scientistic interpretation.

**Historicism.** The opposite extreme of scientism is historicism, the view that the values of anything can be accounted for through the discovery of its origins and an account of its development. Like scientism, it fails to adequately manage experience, though it fails for different reasons. The determinations historicism values (temporality, change, differences and contingencies) tend to overshadow and suppress others (timelessness, stability, similarities and necessities).

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Rorty characterizes the scientism and historicism of the philosophical tradition with his distinction between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophers. In his efforts to show philosophizing that values only determinations of thought, Rorty makes the same kind of mistake, albeit in a different way. He tries to do to the philosophy of the history of philosophy what Kuhn did to the philosophy of science. Unfortunately, an historicistic understanding of experience, in and of itself, is no better than a scientistic one: both insist upon a select group of determinations at the expense of others, and by doing so, each manages only a part of
experience. With respect to experience as a whole (a totality of all possible experience), each theory is inadequate.

Instead of claiming the values of both science and history are needed, Rorty argues philosophy ought to give up one set of determinations for another: "cultural anthropology (in a large sense which includes intellectual history) is all we need." ¹⁷ But it is not all we need. If one has cancer, do they seek a cultural anthropologist? Can the intellectual historian get a person from Chicago to Los Angeles in four hours? Needs are the results of a process acting upon wants. Various wants compete with one another, and those seeking first satisfaction are named needs. Once they are satisfied, however, other wants become "new" needs to be satisfied. Humans are temporal beings with a view to the eternal. They want and need both science and history, because both are ways of organizing experience. More importantly, having both science and history reminds one there is more than one way of dealing with experience. Unaware of this, believing present management strategies are the only or best way of dealing with it, makes one less likely to invent new management strategies if old ones break down.

This first part has tried to show people reflect upon experience in order to manage it as clearly and as completely as possible. The Western philosophical tradition has only recently recognized it has presupposed all possible experience can be controlled by some single, all-encompassing super-theory. No such position has been invented or discovered. Philosophy's two predominant means of reflection, thinking and feeling, when working independently and exclusively of one another,
have been only marginally effective in dealing with experience. Left to their own devices, each method ends in failure.

The next chapter proposes to show how thinking and feeling, each with their own particular strengths in guiding experience, can offset and overcome each's particular shortcomings and limitations. The precedent for such a proposal is Werner Heisenberg's account of how science uses two totally incompatible theories of physics, viz. the classical Newtonian theory vs. modern science's quantum theory of physics, to understand and explain nature. Ultimately, what governs the revolution in modern scientific theorizing, purposes, can direct a reformulation among contemporary philosophical reflection.
CHAPTER II

PROPOSING METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARITY

The pertinent methodological task is not to decide between thinking and feeling, to appeal to one over the other. Distinctions like subject/object and intellect/will satisfy theoretical, aesthetic interests. Returning reflection to concrete experience seeks to meet practical, ethical concerns. Yet as returning reflection, the oppositions invented at the theoretical level in order to gain a foothold in experience are transformed into kinships at the practical level in order to act upon and change experience. In this way the strengths peculiar to the opposing means reinforce one another by complementing each other in their common contest to gain mastery over life.

Heisenberg's "Lesson of Quantum Physics." Part of the problem of getting linguistic analysts and phenomenologists to discuss their strengths and weaknesses lies in both camps' ignorance of contemporary science's program of methodology. A variety of ways of looking at things can be employed in accordance with a variety of interests. By exploring various interests, one avoids both dogmatism and relativism.

Modern science has significantly revised both man's understanding of the universe as well as how to explain that understanding. With classical Newtonian concepts, physicists believed experimental findings
were fundamentally dependent upon and explained by an unalterable theory of nature. This belief eventually gave way with the theorizing revisions needed from the confrontation of classical concepts with modern scientific theoretic breakthroughs, such as Bohr's conceptual model of the atom and Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty.

Together Bohr and Heisenberg developed what they have called the concept of complementarity. Primarily, it underlines how, in the measurement process, the scientist interacts with the object; the object is not revealed as it is in itself but as limited to and affected by the nature of measurement. Technological advances gave access to realms of experience unavailable to "ordinary" experience. Bohr and Heisenberg's complementarity concept aimed to illustrate how two totally incompatible theories, such as the classical one based upon ordinary intuitions of space vs. the quantum theory based upon previously unobservable observations. The impact of their concept upon modern science was to encourage scientists "to apply alternatively different classical concepts which would lead to contradictions if used simultaneously." Heisenberg felt active observation reveals an "impure" datum, affected by both theory and situational context.

This attitude toward theorizing highlights Heidegger's claim of thinking bringing something before us, i.e., thinking is representational. Representation generalizes from particulars, selecting only those determinations they have in common. For example, the concept "leaf" has to be general enough to be able to account for the different sizes and shapes among its various kinds. Heisenberg's indeterminacy
principle supports a view of reality as a matter of degree instead of one of kind. The indeterminacy principle makes it possible for science to account for reality in terms of its factuality and also its possibilities. While the phenomena of atomic events are as real as any other more ordinary appearances, the entities postulated of them (atoms, electrons, quarks) are less real because they are meant to refer to "a world of potentialities . . . rather than one of things."  

Heisenberg's complementarity thesis is philosophically significant because it claims the relation between observed and observer works in two directions. Experience is the result of consciousness organizing appearances and of appearances acting upon consciousness. The inability to see the whole picture is due to both mind and world, as each attempts to secure the other once and for all. Given this, the old image of nature as passively yielding to scientific inquiry has been replaced by one of nature revealing itself as it, as well as the observer, chooses. Where thinking gives consciousness a degree of control over things, feeling gives things some control over their presence to consciousness. In thinking, consciousness pursues phenomena. In feeling, phenomena pursue consciousness.

Wittgenstein suggests it is unreasonable to insist upon an idea of completeness of language. Language has evolved, retaining what survives through time while adding to itself new discoveries (e.g. chemistry or calculus). Heisenberg also opposed the postulate of complete logical transparency of concepts. By attempting to extend the investigation of nature to its most remote parts, he argues, one cannot really
know ahead of time how to qualify their use of particular concepts. In some instances concepts will be used in unwarranted and meaningless ways. Accumulation over time has made both language and meaning grow ever more subtle and complex. The progress of theoretical constructs depends upon seeing old problems in new ways, upon taking experience not as a collection of "brute facts" but as having a focus of reality enframed by the background of its possibilities.

The notion of complementarity, along with Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, emphasizes the irreducible connection between an investigation's process and its conclusions. Neither of these can be what it is without the other. Fields of experience opened up by technological advances are clearly known once they are enclosed within theoretically constructed limits and distinctions. These limits are not completely a matter of rationality. Though one can give reasons for choosing some determinations instead of others, the reasons themselves do not make the choices. Decisions contain an element of irrationality necessary to the task of rational deliberation. Reality is a combination of the relations an enquirer thinks into as well as feels from experience.

Consciousness structures experience in conjunction with phenomena. Some ten years before Heisenberg was born, James proposed "reality" to be a function of two conscious determinants.

That we can at any moment think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual constitution. But when we now think of it incompatibly with our other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way to stand by, for we cannot continue to think in two contradictory ways at once. The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psycholo-
of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard.25

Reality is a matter of thinking and choosing; they mutually affect one another. Deliberation and decision belong to consciousness together.

Complementarity and Contemporary Philosophy. The distinction between thinking and feeling, like other distinctions, serves its purpose by separating experience into two parts, in this instance, distinguishing two modes of consciousness. Consciousness is itself only a part of experience, as opposed to the phenomenal. Heidegger, by contrasting the ready-to-hand with the present-at-hand, outlines a distinction of two "elements" yet shows those two elements are still fundamentally connected.26 As connections, relations bridge the phenomena/consciousness distinction. Thinking and feeling differ with respect to both sides of this distinction. Usually thinking and feeling are ascribed only to consciousness. Instead, thinking is the activity of consciousness dealing with phenomena, and feeling is the passivity of consciousness as it is dealt with by phenomena. When consciousness thinks, phenomena feel, and when phenomena think, consciousness feels. It sounds animistic to describe thinking and feeling as activities of both phenomena and consciousness, but it reminds one that thinking and feeling are not exclusively conscious activities.

As universal deception is impossible because the meaning of deception depends upon the meaning of truth, so also all possible investi-
gations must begin from something rather than nothing. As a term, "nothing" only makes sense by means of its relation to the term "something." Take away something, and there is nothing; take away "something," i.e., the logico-grammatical structure presupposed by the term, and communicative activity is no longer possible. Erickson points out how the philosophical tradition, especially German idealism, has argued how something is something and avoids being nothing by virtue of having at least one determinate characteristic, a mark or evidence of some source conditioning the possibility of beings.

Relations are not purely conceptual entities. Concepts are consciousness's way of dominating phenomenal experience. Relations are both thought into and felt within experience. The prejudice of the philosophical tradition to value thinking over feeling is not enough to demonstrate feeling is not as significant as thinking. And though the opposite bias of feeling over thinking seems a plausible response, it is only a different way of committing the same mistake. Whether feeling or thinking is more important is an irrelevant and ultimately self-defeating question for philosophical methodology.

The opposition between thinking and feeling serves a knowledge-interest at the level of subject/object. Ways of living are reviewed at a self/others level. The opposition between thinking and feeling is subsumed at this level, because self-reflection requires the combination of their strengths. Jurgen Habermas claims "what unites the identity of mind and nature with their non-identity can itself be conceived according to that type of synthesis through which the identity of an ego comes
Being determinate is not Being's only kind of Being. A composite of creative imagination and critical discernment, of feeling and thinking acting in concert in order to survive, ought to be the model for philosophical methodology.

Clear knowledge can be had only with "closed theories," theories applied to already clearly delimited realms of experience. Drawing limits means some possibilities attract more attention than others. Possibilities keep realities alive, dynamic, and vigorous by attempting to "overthrow" the reigning determinations. On the positive side, forgetting possibilities secures experience. If forgotten too long, ordinary experience becomes boring. Conflict and competition can be an advantage for opposing philosophical theories. Think of how much has been learned by the two camps refutations of one another. The complementarity of theories need not suggest all conflict and strife will disappear. Philosophical examinations which realize social as well as metaphysical or epistemological connections with the world know both analysis and intuitions occupy every turn of a spiraling process of investigation.

Instead of linking limitation solely with consciousness, it has to be seen as effecting the whole of experience. The categorizing and schematizing the world reflected in the history of the tradition is evidence of consciousness's drive to dominate appearances. While not all of consciousness's attempts to control phenomena succeed, those failures have been attributed to the weakness of consciousness rather than to the strength of appearances. This is a difficult habit to break. Thanks to the genius of people like Heisenberg, science has been able to recognize
experience's capacity to arrange and re-arrange itself. It takes a crisis of consciousness (for example, an infinite regress) for its reflection to move to a level over and above its "ordinary" referential contexts. The infinite regress experience tempts consciousness to ground its examination objectively at a "language-game" level. Reflection can operate on something other than itself, yet when the other denies it satisfaction, it reflects upon itself, i.e., it performs self-reflection. Moving from the level of subject/object frameworks to a level of the examination of frameworks, the self/others level, the move to a transcendental-pragmatic level of intersubjective argumentation, makes the conditions of critical discussion non-objectifiable. The "object" of the discussion is the structure proposed by consciousness.

Recognizing possibilities as possibilities is a primary task of self-reflection. Experience itself is the result of the complementarity of thinking and feeling. Consciousness explicitly conscious of appearances is simultaneously implicitly conscious of itself. By rising above the subject/object difference, complementary theoretical frameworks turn an essentially bipolar relation into a triadic one, consisting of three "elements" with three identifiable connections between the elements. Object, subject, and other subjects interact on two levels. At one level are connections between original subject, the object, and other subjects. The other level is the relationship between the original subject and other subjects. At the first level, what individuals believe to be unbiased, interest-free accounts of their surroundings are brought to bear upon one another at the second level in order to see how the presence of the interpreter influences the interpretation.
Habermas supports Apel's two orders' distinction by claiming the addition of interpretation to explanation changes the relation of observing subject and observed object to "that of a participant subject and partner." \( ^{10} \) Because interpretation depends upon a subject, anyone using the subject/object distinction as the key support of their frame of reference cannot reach a meaningful interpretation. This structure must be annexed by the further distinction of a self vs. others. \( ^{31} \) The individual's interpretation (who, it is assumed, has some procedural [though not necessarily "rational"] manner) is weighed in light of the procedures others hold to be valuable in assessing the interpretation. An individual interpretation's degree of meaningfulness and viability is affirmed or rejected by those standing outside of it.

Psychoanalysis is Habermas's example of how the opposition between thinking and feeling is placed within a more comprehensive context in order to challenge connections which are "not anchored in the invariance of nature . . . [but] in the spontaneously generated invariances of life history," connections altered or "dissolved by the power of reflection." \( ^{32} \) The movement from the subject/object to the self/others level Habermas explains as the coming into being of an ego-identity. The shift takes up the opposition of the first level and employs it within the second. Philosophical theorizing needs to recognize inquiry finds significance in both space and time, and privileging either space (traditional empiricism, analytic philosophy) or time (traditional rationalism, phenomenology) over the other is a self-defeating project. The theoretical distinction between space and time must remain theoretical,
for the same reason one wants to preserve the difference between actuality and possibility, or between foreground and background: the content of the terms lies in their relation to one another.

Habermas claims one can describe a psychologically "unhealthy" individual to be experiencing a disturbance between life and language. Though repressed, a neurotic can meet the requirements of communal understanding and conform with its social amenities in everyday living. The price a person pays for this pleasant, charming facade are the feelings of a hollow, gutted interior lying beneath it. The appearance of undisturbed communication with others may only mask the individual's disturbed self-communication. While the "language without" flourishes, the "language within" is abandoned, made inaccessible to the neurotic by the neurotic. In a parallel fashion, a good philosophical methodology, by undertaking the activity of understanding, can help itself come to grips with itself. The myopia of an exclusively intuitive or exclusively conceptual philosophical approach is similar to the privatized portion of the excommunicated language of the neurotic: according to only a single framework, each pretends to the appearance of being the definitive expression of an appropriate method. In confrontation with other systems, "unhealthy" philosophical methods deny considering other appearing conditions.

On the Possibility of Meaning. Truth-as-correspondence presupposes and depends upon an awareness of meaning. This awareness, Ericksen holds, "is the means by which there first comes to be a cognitive world of experience--something given in a cognitive sense." Wittgen-
stein identifies the correspondence theory of truth as the highest achievement of rationality, yet holds language is an achievement over and beyond "ordinary" reason. The difference between people and animals with respect to language, Wittgenstein says, is not simply a lack of the mental capacity needed for talking. He says, "they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language." By this Wittgenstein means human beings "see" purposes to be met and look for ways to meet those purposes. Truth-as-correspondence presupposes meaning; it is a function of the framework in which it operates. Conditions also exist for the possibility of meaning. While it is a framework of truth, meaning can also be a focus within a wider context, outlined against a background of purposes, a teleological backdrop. Whereas the needs of animals are met through instincts, inherent potencies beyond animal control, human "instincts" can be controlled by will and reason. Animals do not "see" or realize anything like needs to be met as needs-to-be-met because their innate capacities take on concerns without having to "think" about them. Humans, on the other hand, deal with their environment by reason's light. The light which makes a solution to a problem possible is also responsible for the possibility of seeing a problem in the first place.

The "commerce" between language and being is meaning. Physical signs grasped by psychical beings make meaning possible; reflecting upon the experience of knowledge makes knowledge of that experience possible. Wittgenstein's arrow points not solely on account of the "dead line on paper" (the physical sign) nor solely on account of some "psychical
thing." He writes "the arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it." Wittgenstein locates meaning in the use of some thing by some person. His inversion of these biases makes responsible and energetic procedures possible. Instead of identifying understanding as a mental process, he suggests considering processes (mental and otherwise) as aspects of understanding. Understanding, like interests and purposes, precede the separations organizing experience.

Heidegger reflects Wittgenstein's inversion of understanding as he discusses meaning. Meaning is not identical with intelligibility, but entails intelligibility; the intelligible has meaning, but not everything meaningful is intelligible. According to Habermas, intelligibility is a knowledge-constitutive interest, a context guiding other interests. In order to shift intelligibility from framework to focal point, a more general background is needed. Meaning provides a background within which the intelligible is explainable and interpretable.

Apel's critique of ideology tries to reflect meaning's capacity as a context for understanding through a reconstruction of "meaningful" experiences. The intersubjective community considers concrete episodes it regards as influential in its life and, knowing it cannot transport itself to a time prior to any separation, allows its collective experience to act as the parameters of what it means by meaning. Setting a limit allows the critique to preserve and achieve a definite measure of responsibility, while dealing in experiences renews an ideology in vitality and strength.
Functions re-introduce a context of teleology above ordinary everyday "ways of living." Each life-form is tested to see how it satisfies life's demands. The operating purposiveness is like Kant's depiction of living as if the worlds of nature and freedom were one. The teleological background highlights the connection, the interaction, the conflict between freedom and nature. As facts are read into experience, meanings are appropriated from it; as facts are to interpretations, meanings are to purposes.

Unfortunately, function or purpose is taken too narrowly by some, causing them to believe what is advocated is instrumentalism, and efforts to clear functions of this charge lead to subsequent charges of relativism. Now a desirable theoretical position lies between these two -isms, and agrees with concrete experience. Instrumentalism is too narrow a conception of function because one can imagine situations of an other than problem-solving kind, for instance, going out to a movie, where it makes more sense to speak of how the activity "satisfies" one than of how one "uses" it. If someone insists they used the movie, e.g. as an escape or diversion, the person fails to recognize any substantive difference between wants and needs. Instrumentalism, the notion an idea's truth is a function of its utility, addresses what human forms of life require, though not what those forms desire. Both needs and desires are kinds of wants, and it is difficult to determine when the necessity wants imply crosses over from natural inner necessity and regulation (needs) to willed outer "necessity" (desires). Objectors attack instrumentalism by supposing a theory of meaning must ultimately bias nature over and above will.
This objection is incorrect, for two reasons. First, instrumentalism addresses the connections of elements; to suppose it favors either nature or will is merely wrong. Second, though it considers the relation between will and world, instrumentalism is an -ism for giving its account according to a single variable, viz. need or use. In confronting experience, instrumentalism holds one either meets a need or fails to meet a need. Survival depends upon more successes than failures. Consequently, anything like desires is completely neglected by heavy-handed instrumentalism.

Satisfying desires, on the other hand, need not be as successful, because the possibility of their satisfaction is enough to keep desires alive. Finding connections between nature and will do achieve some concrete results, meeting the needs of managing life adequately. More importantly, looking for connections in experience is an activity for its own sake, as a way of exercising the desire to master more of life than life deems necessary. In this way, the process of inquiry in and of itself determines the ultimate standards of meaningfulness. The struggle to manage life conditions what it means to manage it.
CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to show that various positions throughout the philosophical tradition, especially as exemplified in contemporary philosophy by the rival factions of analytical and continental schools of thought, have attempted to achieve both transparency of form and quality of content by means of some single theory or method. This drive for methodological economy has only created extreme positions that fail to meet the double aim. Two of these extremes are scientism, the sacrifice of content to the demands of mathematical clarity, and historicism, which seeks the completeness of accounts without concern for the compatibility of those accounts.

The opposition between science and history concretely manifested itself in the revolutions of theorizing experienced by early twentieth century scientists. Bohr and Heisenberg accounted for the dichotomy between history and science by developing a concept of complementarity.

The pull between science and history has also been experienced within contemporary philosophy. If several purposes reveal that different positions, in conjunction with one another, offer an acceptable, adequate way of guiding experience, why insist on one and only one theory? Philosophical reflection looks for connections in experience. In addition to the metaphysical and epistemological connections it has made and felt, it needs now to look for social connections of experience as well.
This realm of connections opens up another layer of meaning. Nor can these connections be reduced to any simple pattern of use of an object by a subject. Needs are the focal points of a background of desires, and desires are responsible for the possibility of meaning.

Philosophies that dismiss one another weaken the already fragile connection between life and reflection upon it. For Socrates, at least, life without this connection was not worth living.
NOTES


2 Also, Heidegger's contrast between Zuhandsein and Vorhandsein implies intuitions are epistemologically prior to concepts.

3 "Attention creates no idea; an idea must already be there before we can attend to it. . . . [I]t is only to the effort to attend, not to the mere attending, that we are seriously tempted to ascribe spontaneous power." William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt et al.; three volumes; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), I, p. 426.


5 Apel, p. 7. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (cited below), § 65, p. 31e.


7 Ibid., p. 155.

8 "Only those items which I notice shape my mind--without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos." James, I, pp. 380-81.

9 "By responding [to logos], man gives voice . . . to world as well as to things and, thus, to Being and beings in their difference, which is nonetheless equally a belonging together." Joseph J. Kockelmanns, "Ontological Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language," in On Heidegger and Language (ed. and trans. by Joseph J. Kockelmanns; Evanston, IL: 1972; pp. 195-234), p. 216.

Although he may give them more credit than they deserve: "[T]he possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods." Being and Time, § 29, p. 173 [134].

For example, see the section titled "Phenomenology of Reproduction" in Alison M. Jaggar's and William L. McBride's article, "'Reproduction' as Male Ideology," in Women's Studies International Forum, vol. 8, no. 3 [1985], pp. 185-196.


For example, "our conviction of [the principle of uniformity's] truth is far more like a religious faith than like assent to a demonstration." James, II, p. 1233.


"[T]here is no point in trying to find a general synoptic way of 'analyzing' the 'functions knowledge has in universal contexts of practical life.'" Rorty, pp. 380-381.

Apel, pp. 147-48.

Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 179. Nor does Heisenberg restrict this concept to the realm of science: "we meet it when we reflect about a decision and the motives for our decision or when we have the choice between enjoying music and analyzing its structure." Ibid.


Heisenberg, p. 186.

"[A]sk yourself whether our language is complete;--whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; third edition; New York: Macmillan; Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), § 18, p. 8e.

Heisenberg, pp. 85-86.

"The decision may be the result of deliberation, but . . . at the
same time . . . it excludes deliberation." Ibid., p. 205.

25 James, II, p. 920.

26 Being and Time, § 44b, p. 267 [224].

27 Erickson, p. 31.


29 Apel, p. 264.

30 Habermas, pp. 180-81.

31 This is evidenced in Heisenberg's remarks about how the human attitude toward nature has changed from one of contemplation to one of pragmatics. See Heisenberg, pp. 196-197.

32 Habermas, p. 271.

33 Ibid., pp. 227-28.

34 Erickson, p. 113. He also cites Being and Time, § 32, p. 192 ff. [151 ff.].

35 Wittgenstein, § 25, p. 12e.

36 Ibid., § 454, p. 132e.

37 Ibid., § 154, p. 61e.

38 Being and Time, § 32, pp. 192-93 [151].

39 Apel, pp. 167-68.
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The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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