An Analysis of US Population Control Policy in the Third World: The Role of Economic and Developmental Aid and Private Interest

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AN ANALYSIS OF US POPULATION CONTROL POLICY
IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL AID AND PRIVATE INTEREST

by

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INTRODUCTION

During the past thirty years, Western industrialized nations increasingly have become involved in the internal dynamics of Third World population control policy and programs. Such involvement draws largely upon a neo-Malthusian ideology, linking poverty and underdevelopment to high fertility rates, and grants to the developed world an implicit right to define optimum population levels, as part of a more general definition of optimum development.

For the United States, involvement in foreign population control has resulted in more than two decades of policy initiatives grounded in a model linking the Malthusian rationale for limiting growth to a concept of "modernization" evolving from Western post-industrial experience. The importance of this ideological perspective becomes evident when both organizational and policy analysis indicate the strength of the bureaucracy emerging from the initial concern over the effect of prodigious numbers, within the developing world, on its potential as a recipient of US corporate investment. What has not been adequately explained, however, is that, despite the politicization of the rhetoric surrounding issues of fertility regulation and concomitant changes in public debate, the bureaucracy of lobbyists, administrators and funding sources for population regulation remains relatively solid and seemingly impervious to rhetorical vagaries.

Needed, as a supplement to existing demographic and develop-
mental literature, is a perspective which goes beyond the theoretical tensions informing the debate over the relationship between population size and resource distribution. Such a perspective would redefine present and past involvement in population control as an aspect of bureaucratic inertia, thus indicating in a very real manner the tendency for organizations to assume a life of their own, often resilient to environmental change.
BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT SITUATION

The United States involvement in international population control is relatively recent, dating back only to the mid-1960s and evolving out of a post-World War II expansion by government and business into the internal dynamics of developing nations. Although a recent phenomenon, interest in population control has become a significant factor in the government's foreign aid program and has grown into a multi-billion dollar budget item. Government and quasi-governmental institutions, multinational corporations, universities and research centers, private nonprofit agencies and, of course, the recipient populations and governments are all involved in the implementation, administration and practice of regulating fertility within the nations of the Third World.

Recently, what appears to be a more conservative stance, advocated by the White House and certain segments of the general public, has led to interest in implementing major policy change in US population programs and a reduction in federal funding earmarked for multilateral support of fertility regulation. Those supporting a more conservative governmental role in overseas family planning express strong ideological objections to the perceived immorality of "artificial" methods of birth control or the use of abortion as a viable alternative for limiting the number of children born (cf., Ellen Goodman, Chicago Tribune, September 5, 1985). Critics of this position, as well as the existing political
climate, contend that such a shift will prove devastating to the "gains" made in regulating fertility in the developing world and to future population control programs, viewed as essential to the continued economic and social development of these nations. However, while this ideological shift portends a somewhat altered role for the United States in its dealings with growth and development in the Third World, evidence suggests that the core of interest groups, identified in population and development literature as the "population establishment" (cf., Demerath 1976), is so firmly entrenched in the affairs of developing nations that its withdrawal is unlikely.

At a time of concerted effort to change the nature and degree of US participation in international population policies, it is important to examine the linkages between population control and economic and developmental aid. Such linkages are significant because they facilitate an implicit form of control over personal and public decisions, made possible through the articulation of population programs with other forms of US foreign policy.

Since the 1950s, when such well-known philanthropists as the Fords and Rockefellers expressed concern over the relationship between fertility rates and economic development, the United States position, informed by neo-Malthusian ideology, has located population control within a range of foreign economic and development policies. The issue of controlling numbers within the Third World has become part of the much larger developmental perspective in which social and economic advancement requires a reduction in the birth rate in the
Third World. If the United States began to move away from its established practice of integrating population control into other forms of developmental aid, this would then require a redefining of the essential components of "modernization" and of alternatives available for legitimating continued US presence within the developing world.

Central to an informed assessment of population control policy and its implementation is an understanding of the apparent resilience of the core of interest groups, commonly referred to as the "population establishment," to the vagaries of domestic ideological and political rhetoric. Although the literature on US foreign aid and Third World demographics frequently addresses linkages between capitalist interests and population control, little attempt has been made to trace systematically the emerging strength of the population establishment. In order to fully comprehend the importance and pervasiveness of its role at multiple levels, the population establishment must be seen as something more than a group of "hungry" imperialists; rather, its power and foothold can be explained more appropriately as an aspect of bureaucratic inertia, emanating from the tightly woven network of interest groups and representing a multiplicity of corporate capitalism's goals and strategies.

Thus, an informed understanding of the relationship between population programs, foreign aid and corporate capitalism requires a "mapping" of the interconnections within the network of public and private agencies/organizations involved in the funding, administering and dispensing of the goods and services of population control. By
locating this network within the various manifestations of public policy and its debate, it is possible to demonstrate how specific corporate/industrial interests combine with government at the decision-making level. Such interests are then exerted bilaterally and multilaterally and assume a bureaucratic structure of their own, resilient to variation in domestic politics.

Two important features emerge when the issue of population control is located historically and when the corresponding link between the enactment of relevant legislation and dominant interests is analyzed. On the one hand, efforts to reduce fertility rates are shown to be an important element in the struggle of Western capitalism to maintain a secure position in the Third World. On the other hand, specific legislation regarding birth control and family planning often obscures, or is obscured by, issues of foreign economic development to which the funding and implementation of population control programs frequently attaches itself.

It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine the tensions between public policy, private interest and perceived need to formulate a model of the role of corporate capitalism in the emergence of official population policy. It is also necessary to understand how the nature of the issues muddies the impact of specific policy measures and obscures linkages between the public and private domain.

Both the application and the analysis of US population control policy have been criticized for defining the needs and composition of developing nations as uniform (Segal, 1973) and for failing to acknowledg...
ledge the differential effect of indigenous culture and ideology on
the acceptance of our population policies. However, this very failure
to recognize variability among and within developing nations is, in
fact, a critical element of US policy, reflecting the use of population
control to ensure a range of goals of political and economic expedience.
The government's failure to acknowledge variation simplifies the passage
of relevant legislation, supports a uniform categorical definition for
all developing nations, allows greater external control and promulgates
the ideology that "...prolific numbers were responsible for their (the
Third World's) inability to share in the imperialist pie" (Mass, 1976: 50).

The focus of this thesis is to formulate a framework for the
analysis of US population control policy, using as a central integrat­
ing factor the pervasiveness of the population establishment, while
incorporating into the discussion a number of problematics posed by
such an analysis. In particular, the steady growth in dollars invested
in overseas population control will be contrasted to rhetorical shifts
in the ideology surrounding fertility and its regulation. It is posit­
ed that the issues encompassing rapid population growth provide a means
for a significant level of explicit and implicit control over numerous
other Third World issues. Control is exerted, among other ways,
through the apparatus of foreign policy. Its benefits accrue to both
the public and private sector, offering one possible explanation to
continued involvement in fertility practices within the Third World.

Equally important, are the dynamics of those influencing policy
and appropriations. Those most integral to the evolution of the US position consistently have represented an influential sector within corporate capitalism. Many advocating a continued US presence in foreign population programs today were among the early advocates of government support for Third World population programs or represent corporate boards or foundations first active in the issue of controlling "overpopulation." The continued importance of the population establishment can be shown by identifying its presence at the decision-making level of both federal policy and the agencies involved in funding or implementing family planning programs. By examining testimony, various types of government documents, newspapers, periodicals and other secondary data which indicate the type of pressure exerted on behalf of those supporting some type of population control effort, the thesis will demonstrate the strength of a bureaucracy initiated by corporate capitalism and its eventual ability to withstand significant change at the administrative level of government.
Theoretical Perspectives of Population Control

Any interpretation of existing policy and its relationship to corporate capitalism requires first locating the significant ideologies informing fertility practices within the historical context in which they evolved and then examining the way in which these historically specific ideological developments continue to exert an influence on contemporary practices. In addition, it must be remembered that the theoretical perspectives informing critical policy evaluation reflect the tensions inherent in ideologies embedded in issues of poverty, population size and resource distribution, thus appearing to encourage at times a rather schismatic approach to policy analysis.

The theoretical dichotomy found in the literature dealing with US participation in the regulation of Third World populations evidences the above mentioned tension. Such dichotomy or schism indicates the lack of consensus over a causal model relating class, fertility and distribution of scarce resources. Consequently, rapidly growing populations tend to be characterized in one of two ways: as either a cause of sustained underdevelopment and general levels of deprivation or as a consequence of impoverishment, indeed a rational response to the exigencies of a peasant economy.

Traditionally, the official view of the US government has been that excessive population among the poor of Third World nations inhibits necessary social reform and economic development. Such a
view was reflected in the initial stages of the US population policy debate, apparent in Lyndon Johnson's 1966 speech: "Our new element in today's world is the threat of mass hunger and starvation. Populations are exploding under the impact in sharp cuts in the death rate" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1966: 1243).

Countering the proscription against sustained high fertility, is the position held by much of the Third World itself (Michaelson, 1981), as well as Western critics of existing policy and practice, many of whom espouse a Marxist perspective. This position contends that Western intervention in controlling population merely acts as a "diversion from the real problems of disease, illiteracy and unjust distribution of resources" (Mass, 1976: 67). Critics of US policy maintain that for peasant populations in developing nations, large numbers of children still represent the best chance of the long-term survival for a family, as well as a source of much needed human resources. Families, therefore, continue to represent a variety of resources and failure to recognize this indicates the inability of the United States to acknowledge the role of ideology as an important determinant of eventual declines in birth rates (Savara, 1983).

Although the theoretical basis of existing literature is broadly informed by perspectives ranging from Malthus to Marx, none of it accounts adequately for the complex integration of public and private interests manifest in US population policy. It is too simple to see the issue only in terms of corporate expansion or as a technical debate over appropriate strategy. Present day practice can only be
understood through an understanding of the importance of the population establishment, as an entity unto itself, which reflects the vested interest of corporate capitalism but, more importantly, which has achieved a size and international role, that ensure its continuation.

****

The debate over optimal population size and economic development has its origins in two perspectives emerging during the nineteenth century which continue to exert significant influence. Indeed, it is surprising how little the parameters encompassing the issues concerning fertility have changed during the past century and a half.

Early in the nineteenth century Thomas Malthus produced his widely publicized treatise, relating population growth to the potential "to produce subsistence for man" (Mass, 1976 16). Malthus' work became the basis for the contention that the rapidly expanding class of industrial poor would prove to be a disproportionate drain on the resources available to society as a whole. From this perspective evolved the ideological agenda of most of the twentieth century Western population policy which advocates strong measures to limit the growth of the poor and/or peasant populations, in order to ensure the continued availability of necessary goods and resources.

In the early twentieth century, neo-Malthusians adopted the eugenicist tenets of social Darwinism. Largely in response to the influx of Southern blacks and foreign immigrants into the labor force of the urban North, the US eugenicists condoned practices limiting the
expansion of groups they labelled biologically inferior, whose uncheck-
ed birthrate was believed to contribute to an "overall deterioration of the human genetic stock" (Michaelson, 1981: 14). As a result, there evolved an ideology supporting fertility regulation within the colonized world, on the grounds that the rapidly expanding number of indigenous poor would only inhibit "necessary" economic and social development. Implicit in such an ideological commitment to population control was the eugenic conception of the inherent inferiority of those groups whose growth rates were of concern. This position integrated easily into the attitude that colonialization legitimated the right to influence personal choice in the interest of modernization and was consistent with the paternalistic attitude of Western colonial powers.

The alignment of Planned Parenthood with the eugenicist movement during the 1920s reflected an increasingly racially motivated ideological basis to the early family planning movement. The eugenic bias has continued to influence attitudes which look to lowered fertility as a means of eradicating poverty. This was particularly so during the 1960s, the formative period of US family planning policy. Both at home and abroad, the War on Poverty era marked a time in which it was assumed that unchecked fertility was a major cause of the poverty and deprivation recently "discovered" by the state.

A counter view, linking population growth, poverty and economic development to the expansion of capitalism emerged in the nineteenth century writings of Marx and Engels. In response to the uncritical acceptance of Malthusian theory, Marxism argued that an impoverished
working class was endemic to the need of capitalism to maintain a "surplus" of cheap and submissive labor. From this perspective, the source of societal ills of poverty and oppression was located within the structure of capitalism itself, not, as argued by Malthus and his followers, in the unchecked growth of the poor or inferior segments of society.

(A surplus of labor) forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter bred it at its own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual increase of population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation. (Marx, 1978: 430)

Marx encouraged high fertility among the working class as a means of ensuring their emergent strength (cf., Tucker, 1978). This view has been retained and is articulated by a number of those within the Third World critical of Western intervention in their fertility practices.

As would many of his successors, Marx tended to view Malthusian rhetoric as legitimation for the unequal distribution of available resources. The problem was simply not too many people nor an inadequate food supply; rather, it was the control over necessities exerted by the capitalists and the subsequent maldistribution of the means for existence. By focusing on the fertility patterns of the poor, capitalism absolved itself of any responsibility for the social reorganization necessary to alleviate poverty. Furthermore, it placed the blame for the impoverished living condition of the poor, on the poor themselves.

Twentieth century neo-Marxists have integrated theories of
population into their perspectives on dependency and imperialism. The more radical contend that high fertility and population growth are not a negative factor in the level of social and economic development experienced by the urban poor and Third World peasant populations. Large families reflect a particular kind of response to economic demands and to longstanding norms valuing many children for a number of reasons (Mamdani, 1981; Michaelson, 1981). The poor continue to experience high fertility rates because they lack access to more conventional avenues for "getting ahead" or for economic security. High fertility, therefore, is not a cause of poverty, but a rational response to it (Michaelson, 1981). For those adhering to this position, all attempts of the West to regulate population within the developing world are suspect, seen largely as an extension of imperialism in controlling the lives of indigenous populations for the purpose of fostering a particular type of economic growth.

A more moderate view recognizes that family planning can be one aspect to the alleviation of Third World poverty; however, this position also calls for active participation on the part of the West in the redistribution of needed resources and for increased local autonomy in matters of family planning and population control. The 1974 statement of the World Population Conference reflects the developing nations' recognition of the complexities linking population growth and diminishing resources. Conference members rejected the US position that overpopulation was the major contributor to the world's developmental problems, identifying instead "the unequal process of
socio-economic development (and) the lack of equity in international economic relations" (Pajaeska 1974: 155). Moderate neo-Marxists, therefore, advocate greater local decision-making and increased recognition of the complex interrelationship between population size and the level of economic development. The social relations of particular classes or groups, as important determinants of fertility practices, must be located historically and within a context in which the significance of the relations of production, the distribution of resources and class oppression is clarified (Mamdani, 1981).

Indeed, Michaelson (1981) notes the limited success of the developing world in redefining an acceptable balance between population control and other forms of assistance following the 1974 Bucharest Conference. At this time there were indications of both greater local autonomy in decisions regarding population programs and some change in US attitude and policy. Nevertheless, changes which significantly threatened established practices and vested corporate interests received little, if any, serious consideration. Despite the fact, the possibility remains for developing nations to benefit from Western technology made available for family planning; if receipt of such technology can be monitored in a way to insure local power and decision-making.

As shall be shown, the US approach to economic and technical assistance to the Third World originated during a period of intense corporate expansion into new markets and sources of raw materials; therefore, appropriations and program design have tended to reflect
the interests of a highly visible and powerful segment of the private sector. The Malthusian model, linking population size to economic potential, integrated easily into the evolving model of development espoused by the United States and most of the Western world. Despite changes in the Third World and in domestic ideology, the rationale for population control among the poor continues to emanate from a perspective in which an inevitable consequence of "overpopulation" continues to be the sustained underdevelopment of peasant populations.

Recently, literature in the area of policy analysis has begun to integrate these diverse perspectives, calling for a recognition of the reciprocal relationship between population, distribution of resources and potential for social and economic development in the Third World (Clinton, 1973; Sewell, 1980). By limiting fertility, while simultaneously addressing the need for greater equality in the distribution of goods and resources, it is argued that the standard of living of many of the Third World poor might rise significantly. This literature does acknowledge the role of capitalist expansion in the oppression of developing nations and the inability of existing policy to address the multitude of causes of deprivation facing developing nations. However, it remains to be seen whether new policies will emerge and whether they will continue to obscure, albeit in different ways, the need for structural reorganization and the numerous ways the consumption needs of capitalism are realized through seemingly benevolent policy.

As later comments will indicate, Reagan's emphasis on develop-
ment within the private sector and his attitude that population is an "inherently neutral" factor in development (Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84: 214) seem more in keeping with tenets of twentieth century Marxism than with the Malthusian model historically providing the framework for the US family planning policy.

The previous discussion centers around the appropriateness of Western population control programs within the developing world and hinges on the tension between population and resource distribution. This perspective is only one aspect of the complexity linking US interests to Third World problems and is not, for the purposes of this thesis, the critical issue for understanding the continued US commitment in the area of family planning. Studies such as that of Demerath (1976) and Mass (1976), point to the impact of the vested interests of a corporate elite on the evolutions of US foreign population policy. From this perspective, population control efforts work to ensure a stable environment for Western investment and industrial expansion and provide a means for the needs of corporate capitalism to be reflected in the policies of the West and East. Piotrow's 1973 study of the pressure for federal intervention, exerted by influential representatives of corporate capitalism, affirms the tendency towards a "paternalistic philanthropy of corporate capitalism" (Knox, Bohland and Shumsky, 1984: 161), implemented to secure corporate viability at home and abroad, as a post-war scepticism over the endurance of competitive markets became more pervasive (cf, John Kenneth Galbraith, 1985; The New Industrial State, 4th edition, for a discussion of the
changing power structure of corporate capitalism).

It is, in fact, the magnitude of the financial interests growing out of such "paternalistic philanthropy" which has been of major importance to the establishment and continuation of the population establishment. The critical importance of the developing world, as a market for corporate America, has led to more than the expansion of multinational firms abroad and to various efforts to protect investments; it also has led to the growth of a complex network of public and private support organizations whose existence facilitates the continued presence of corporate capitalism in the Third World and the flow of relevant information. The population establishment is one dimension of this network.¹

These theoretical constructs provide a necessary element to an understanding of the actual policy and practice of US population control interests. However, a fully informed understanding also requires locating involvement in foreign population control historically and then turning to specifics in its development, as an aspect of the more generalized area of foreign economic and developmental aid. Such a perspective necessarily will incorporate the role of the population establishment network into a final picture of the place of fertility regulation within the politics of foreign policy.

¹. Also included would be the World Bank, The World Health Organization and other such organizations whose funding, administration and activities are in some way tied to the interests of major corporations and financial institutions.
Federal involvement in world population issues evolved from growing private sector interest in the post-World War II population expansion, as advancements in public health, sanitation and standards of living significantly lowered mortality in developing nations, without a subsequent decline in fertility. In contrast to similar advances experienced a century earlier in the Western world, where better health care and improved living conditions accompanied industrialization and preceded both declining fertility and mortality rates, "...in the poor nations of the twentieth century, death rates have been lowered with little or no industrialization" (Demerath, 1976: 4). Consequently, indigenous attitudes and practices continue to reflect the needs and structural constraints of a rural, peasant economy. For much of the Western world, the reality of Third World demographics became more focused with the expansion of corporate interests into the newly available markets of developing nations.

During the 1950s, in particular, United States' interest in the internal affairs of underdeveloped nations was spurred by a burgeoning post-war economy and by an increasingly unstable international climate, marked by nationalist movements among European colonies, numerous indigenous revolutions and the ramifications of a "Cold War" mentality. Industrial and corporate interests manifested themselves in international expansion through the establishment of an extensive network of foreign markets; acquisition of rights to natural resources; involve-
ment in foreign monetary systems and demand for an adequate supply of inexpensive labor. Such interests required security and stability in areas of foreign expansion and investment, and one way in which security might be ensured was through participation in economic and social development. A significant impediment to this development was perceived to be the rapid expansion of Third World populations, especially among the peasant underclass.

Because of a perception of unstable political and social conditions in many of the developing nations, a neo-Malthusian ideology regarding population expansion was integrated easily into policy directives, based on requirements of international stability and market expandability. The perceived threat of rapidly expanding lower classes, already shared by many involved in domestic population control efforts, came to inform an assessment of an appropriate mode of involvement in the internal dynamics of the changing Third World. Control over the masses would guarantee greater internal stability and control implied, among other things, limiting the number of potential participants in riots or civil unrest. Exemplifying this was the extensive research originating in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s used to support the Puerto Rican government's efforts to establish an official family planning policy for the island (Wessman, 1981). Population reports such as those of Hatt (1952) and Perloff (1950) were the later basis of the Hernandez-Colon administration's call for government family planning programs. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University, Puerto Rican Governor Hernandez-Colon expressed the joint con-
cern of the United States and his administration that escalating population growth in the developing world necessitated "more energy to the maintenance of order" (quoted in Wessman, 1981: 198).

At this point in the history of capitalist-industrial expansion, concern over numbers superceded a concern over the long-range market effect of restricting the fertility of the masses. Peasants and the poor of developing nations were not originally considered important sources of buying power in the precapitalist societies of the Third World. Their value as a source of inexpensive labor power exceeded that of potential participants in Third World markets or "peripheral capitalism" (Alavi, 1982). Possible insurgency was a greater reality to Western capitalists than potential changes in the international economic structure which might one day more fully incorporate the peasant worker into profit realization. Therefore, corporate expansion/philanthropy, backed by neo-Malthusian ideology, tended to perceive population restriction as more effective for internal stabilization than massive resource redistribution.

Expansion, unstable world politics and the tendency toward an increasingly producer-defined market all culminated in a new corporate awareness of the potential value of active intervention in the internal affairs of the rapidly changing less developed nations. Intervention assumed a cooperative posture on the part of potential investors in order to exert a more definitive influence. Hence, as Demerath (1976) notes, during the 1950s, there emerged numerous population "interest groups" which coalesced around common concerns of corporate
expansion into the underdeveloped nations of the world. These groups shared interests and a perspective on international development similar to interests emerging in the area of world banking. They relied heavily on market mechanisms, measured by growth of the per capita GNP, as indicators of prosperity and advancement out of the poverty of underdevelopment. Rapid population expansion continued to be perceived as an inhibitor not only to national security, but to stable capital formation and to rising GNP, prerequisites for US investors (Bondestam, 1982).

At this time, the interest group, or the population establishment, as it has come to be called, consisted mainly of members of large foundations (i.e., the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations), wealthy Eastern families and a growing body of philanthropic/research organizations, all of which had been involved earlier in issues of conservation, demography and population. For the most part, this body perceived the relationship between population and development in a neo-Malthusian context, identifying the poor of the Third World as a major inhibitor to a stable political climate, to the continued availability of natural resources and to the expansion of an educated and capable Third World elite (Bondestams, 1982).

Seven organizations evolved from the early activities of the 1950s. They reflect an intricate network of corporate influence and continue to function as the primary determinants of family planning within the developing world (Demerath, 1976). These organizations are the Population Council, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation and Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Population Crisis Committee, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the US Agency for International Development and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Council on Foreign Relations.

In 1952, under the sponsorship of the National Academy of Sciences, John D. Rockefeller III convened a population conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, from which emerged the Population Council of America. Early efforts of those involved in the population movement received funding from the private sector and mainly involved demographic and biomedical research. Commenting later on the growth of the population establishment and the incorporation of private funding into the research and technology used eventually to influence public policy, John D. Rockefeller III said, "At the time we started work, any government participation would have been politically unthinkable" (Rockefeller, 1969; quoted in Demerath, 1976: 38). Rockefeller's remark reflects the extent to which the issues of reproduction lay outside the public domain, until they could be joined with the less volatile issues of international security and economic development.

The demarcation between public and private interests narrowed as expansion and a heightened awareness of US dependency on the raw materials of the Third World intensified the concern for more permanent, legitimate means to ensure a secure footing for the newly defined needs of corporate capitalism. Although an argument can be made supporting the humanitarian goals of the population establishment (and indeed, so should be made), sufficient evidence exists to
support the contention that concern for conditions of the impoverished Third World emerged only after the need for expanded markets and for raw materials, no longer available locally. For example, John D. Rockefeller III, as chair of the President's International Advisory Board in the 1950s, estimated that almost seventy-five percent of the raw materials used in production in the United States at that time were imported from Asia, Africa and Latin America (Mass, 1976). The need for new sources of materials and penetration of foreign markets corresponded with technological improvements in transportation and communication following World War II which greatly facilitated the ability to locate multinational sites within the developing world. Between 1950 and 1969, US firms expanded their direct foreign investment at an annual rate of ten percent per year, resulting in the doubling of foreign investment within ten years (Hymer, 1982).

As an ever growing segment of the private sector became involved in some aspect of global industrial expansion, the need for stability insured by an official US presence in the Third World became clear. The familiar neo-Malthusian rhetoric served to legitimate a particular form of US intervention. According to Edgar Berman of the Alliance for Progress, high fertility rates were central to the most severe problems being experienced in the developing world. The cycle of social unrest, "capital depletion and resource shrinkage" caused by rapid population growth proved to be extremely threatening to the expectations of corporate profit and growth on the part of US capital (Mass, 1976: 72). To the extent that the rapidly expanding classes of
poor throughout the world were perceived as a major threat to national
security and to domestic and international prosperity, pressure
mounted for official involvement in population control, as part of a
more inclusive model of foreign development policy. The Coale-Hoover
thesis, advanced by two members of Princeton's Department of Interna-
tional and Public Affairs, outlined the impending threat to economic
advancement posed by the mounting population growth rates in developing
countries and later became a basis for justifying governmental aid to
population control programs (Coale-Hoover, 1958; Tapinos and Piotrow,
1978).

Thus, the needs of corporate capital quickly became equated
with the need to insure international security, both of which were
subsumed under the ideology of the need to control the populations of
the Third World for the benefit of the developing nation. The idea
that reducing fertility rates in the Third World was tantamount to
guaranteeing political stability is revealed clearly in a 1969 Rocke-
feller speech broadcast over the Voice of America:

My work with the Population Council has convinced
me more than ever that the population problem is as
important as any problem facing mankind today, including
even peace. In the long run, true and enduring peace
will not be possible without stabilized population growth.
(1969: 5)

The work of the Population Council provided some of the early
academic and scientific backing to issues of population control and
served as an important factor in securing financial and political
approval for this heretofore sensitive subject. The Council came to
typify the integration of public and private interests involved in
foreign population programs and policies. Early board members included not only Rockefeller, but Frank Bourdreau of the Milbank Memorial Fund and Frank Notestein of the Office of Population Research (Mass, 1976).

In 1959, General William Draper, chairman of a presidential committee on military security, testified before a Congressional hearing on the "need" for federal involvement in foreign population control. Commenting later on his experience with the committee, Draper said:

We visited most of the developing countries and concluded that their exploding population was in many cases holding back their economic development. We unanimously agreed that the United States should assist any of them that wanted such help... (to) install birth control programs. (Mass, 1976: 43)

Draper, a former Under-Secretary of the Army, investment banker and Chairman of the Board of the Mexican Light and Power Company, eventually became chairman of the Population Crisis Committee, the chief source of funding for the Washington lobby for private sector population issues. He exemplifies the link between the interest of private industry, the military and the federal government that came to characterize figures central to US population control issues. Draper's speech reflects a position which has been maintained consistently since the early days of population control politics. The federal government continuously has excluded mandatory family planning as part of its stated foreign policy. However, as will be commented upon later, the nature of legislation and appropriation, coupled with the particularly volatile nature of population control, worked to produce conditions in which the receipt of economic assistance was predicated upon the "willingness" of developing nations to adopt US recommendations for
limiting their population growth rates.

Private sector interest in fertility patterns, family planning and variation in socio-economic well-being continued throughout the fifties. The rhetoric associated with issues of growth and fertility reflected a commitment to an ideology identifying uncontrolled reproductive practices as the most significant impediment to a Western model of development and to the eradication of poverty in the Third World. Typifying the rhetoric of the time was T.O. Greissimer's popular book, *The Population Bomb*. The book described the earth as a "ticking time-bomb which can be set off at any moment, resulting in a population explosion that invites war and communism" (Mass, 1976: 40). *The Population Bomb* was published by the Hugh Moore Fund, a private philanthropic foundation, founded by the Dixie Cup Corporation. Hugh Moore himself was responsible for involving many corporate and financial executives in the activities of population organizations. Later, the Fund sponsored a series of full-page newspaper ads, signed by influential members of population control groups, advocating governmental participation in efforts to check the rapidly expanding populations of impoverished masses. Piotrow (1973) clearly delineates the type of pressure placed on Congress and the executive branch, by an influential segment of the corporate class, advocating a more definitive commitment to family planning endeavors.

Private sector interest and involvement in population control, initiated in the 1950s, continued into the 1960s with growing pressure on the government to become more directly involved in population control programs, both locally and abroad. A number of reports and
testimony appeared assessing the potentially unstable political conditions in Latin America and much of the Third World and calling for the government of the United States to use family planning programs as a means of reducing political and economic situations unfavorable to corporate/industrial growth (cf., Population Reference Bureau, Latin America, What Price Evasion?; Katherine and A.F.K. Organiski, Population and World Power; World Bank President Eugene Black's report to UN Economic and Social Council, 1965).

At this point, it seems appropriate to locate the interest in overseas population programs within the more general framework of resource transfers between nations which escalated in the 1950s and 1960s. Such transfers were informed by a variety of political, economic and moral reasoning and a significant part of the transfer of resources came to be grouped under the rubric of "aid." Differences in type of resource and the manner in which it was administered and delivered often became blurred. "'Aid' was discussed as if it were one kind of resource, administered by one kind of institution called an 'aid agency', within the framework of a single and coherent strategy called 'aid policy'" (White, 1974: 12). Not only did such simplification obscure the real needs of recipient nations, it also worked to obscure the multiplicity of vested interests promoting various aspects of foreign aid. Obfuscation certainly was a factor in the way in which the need for involvement in population control was perceived. From the very first, fertility, development and national security were inexorably intertwined, as the United States moved more solidly into
the position of a major economic power and a primary dispenser of international aid. As reported by Robert Lamson for the Department of the Army, the instability caused by rapid growth necessitated "programs and forces to maintain internal order and to defend against guerilla warfare" (1966: 23). In many ways, involvement in issues of fertility and the regulation of family size legitimated other areas of involvement in the developing world and acted to defuse potential criticism of other, more political, less apparently humane, types of intervention.

The rapid change occurring within much of the Third World by the mid-twentieth century was both advantageous and threatening to US interests and provided a context against which a more complex type of US overseas presence was deemed necessary. The United States was attempting to retain a secure footing in the transition from agriculture to industry experienced by many less developed nations. "Overpopulation" continued to be equated with impediments to industrialization in these countries. World Bank President, Eugene Black stated, "Population growth does not only tend to reduce the flow of investment funds. It also means that the capital invested in industry must be spread increasingly thin..." (Cited in Mudd, 1965: 475). Mass (1976) suggests that the failure of the Alliance for Progress to gain sufficient concessions and positive trade agreements to satisfy the growing body of capitalists interested in investing in the developing world was an important factor in the continued pressure being applied by the population establishment to secure government involvement in
the internal operations of the Third World. The Malthusian admonitions against unchecked population growth in the developing world expanded upon more the traditional strategies attempting to retain influential positions in an ever-changing world situation. By the early 1960s, the link between development, national security and population control had been legitimated for many in the private sector. It remained only to convince those in Congress that economic and political gains could be more easily secured if coupled with government-sponsored family planning programs.

In 1964, the Office of Population was established within the Alliance for Progress and during the first year of its existence the director successfully pursued the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to fund two population studies in Latin America. Shortly thereafter, the Population Crisis Committee was established, chaired by former Senator Kenneth Keating (R-NY). Its legislative mandate was "support of bills and appropriations encouraging wider federal participation in research, training and operational programs to deal with the population crisis" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1963: 313). In the same year, Congress, supported by President Johnson, turned its attention for the first time to the issues of direct federal involvement in foreign and domestic population control. During hearings by the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, a wide range of testimony from people such as John D. Rockefeller III; William Draper; Dr. Frederick Seitz of the National Academy of Sciences; Gladys A. Tillet, US representative to the UN Commission
on the status of Women; Reps. John Conyers (D-Mich) and Morris Udall
(D-AZ) and Committee Chairman Ernest Greuning (D-Alaska) supported
increased federal participation in issues of population control
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965).

Testifying before the 1965 Senate population Crisis Hearings,
Dr. Edgar Berman of the Alliance's Office of Population presented an
equation in support of US involvement in Third World fertility patterns:

The political instability of a developing nation can
be roughly computed...The population's growth rate
divided by a factor representing economic and social
development equals the degree of political instability.

Pop. growth/Econ. & Social Development = Instability
(Cited in Mass, 1976: 45)

The hearings resulted in US AID missions to Latin America being
advised that, "population control programs are to be considered a
priority area" (Piotrow, 1973: 86).

The culmination of intense private sector effort was evidenced
in the next two pieces of legislation that were to shape the direction
of the United States' participation in foreign population control
throughout the coming decade and a half. Two features to the initial
legislation typify US family planning policy. The first appropriations
for population programs came as an amendment to existing foreign policy
legislation and combined funding for family planning with economic
and development aid. In 1966, PL480, the Agricultural Trade and
Development Act (1954) was amended to include the Food for Peace
Program. This amendment changed the scope of the original act, from
a means of dispersing agricultural surplus to that of direct economic
and developmental assistance. Food and Peace included funds to increase foreign food production, both by stimulating agricultural production abroad and by taking measures to control population. In 1968, the Foreign Assistance Act (1961) was also amended to include $35 million in appropriations to US AID for overseas population control activities, a figure which was to triple by 1971. In both instances, funding was made contingent upon "self-help" efforts within the developing nations. "The key to victory is self-help. Aid must be accompanied by a major effort on the part of those who receive it", said President Johnson in his "Food for Peace" speech, February 10, 1966 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1966: 1243). Decisive in the determination of an appropriate indication of self-help was the recipient nation's willingness to accept American funding and technology for family planning.

At this point in the evolution of population policy, as an aspect of development and economic aid, a reduction in the growth rates of the impoverished nations of the world was considered an expedient measure in efforts both to raise general standards of living and to ensure continued expansion of US markets within the developing world. The incorporation of population control into US foreign policy did not weaken the activities of the private sector; rather, federal appropriations to the private sector not only became an important source of funding, but acted to strengthen the link between private interests and public activities. The multitude of agencies, variously associated with population control, health care and economic development, resulted in a complex network of interests and activities through which
larger corporate interests could be realized and which, additionally, stood to benefit from government funding and contracts. Involvement insured the presence of corporate capitalism in other issues of international concern—particularly those issues of greatest potential consequence to the long-range planning of international finance and economic expansion.

Additionally, family planning and its components of research and development and direct product sales became a multi-million dollar market for American industry. Much of the research in fertility control culminated in products which came to represent a significant portion of the total profits of large US pharmaceutical companies. Federal funding for population control research also tied universities to the government and corporate interests and to a particular ideological approach to the problems of developing nations. Horowitz, among others, contends that the merging of corporate interests and academic research, as exemplified in population research, "has subverted the modern university into an office of external research for the State Department, the Pentagon and the international corporation" (1969: 37).

The interest of corporate capitalism in population control obviously involved more than the simple correlation between our presence in the Third World and an ability to control markets and ensure profits. The post-war growth of major corporations and industries reflected the already-present tendency towards the monopolization of the market by conglomerates and multinationals. As fewer, but larger conglomerates attempted to control world markets, there
emerged a corresponding tension between the old, competitive or market capitalism and the newer form of capitalist growth, corporate capitalism. In corporate capitalism, market influence no longer determines unit price and the nature of growth, they are instead determined by producers (Galbraith, 1956). Those in the private sector whose concern with the growth rate of Third World countries had initiated involvement, in this area of foreign policy, numbered among those most emeshed in the dynamics of corporate capitalism.

Characteristic of corporate capitalism was a particular view towards "philanthropy", the nature of corporate responsibility for ameliorating conditions of poverty and deprivation, and the linkages between such responsibility and expansion/profit. As early as the first quarter of the twentieth century, the complexities of corporate growth had fostered a new alliance between the corporate class, philanthropic foundations and social intervention. During this period, the wealthy frequently sought to translate newly acquired fortunes into social status and recognition through their philanthropic involvement with health and medicine (Starr, 1982). The Rockefellers, Carnegie and other powerful capitalists were instrumental in the founding of medical schools, in the establishment of the largest charitable hospitals and in much of the early scientific medical research (Brown, 1979; Starr, 1982). This involvement continued throughout the century, legitimating later claims over issues of demography, ecology and population control. The existence of corporate capitalism and its link to Third World philanthropy had a number of consequences: it enhanced
the public image of those contributing; it legitimated their influence over the shaping of both structural and ideological constraints and it continually worked to guarantee profits in a number of ways.

Simple, market competition was no longer adequate for the demands of post-war capitalism. The multiplicity of needs of rapidly expanding corporations required a new composition of support systems, including a more educated labor force, assurance of technological advancement and increased government intervention in mediating conflict in favor of corporate interests. Involvement in foundations and universities and intervention in the lives of potentially dissatisfied poor shaped a new mode of profit realization and led to a particular model of development, clearly articulated in the post-World War II expansionist policies. In international development, corporate capitalism worked to ensure its continuation through a broad-based and comprehensive form of intervention. Brown identified the earlier role of the corporate class in integrating technology, philanthropy and industry to articulate "a strategy for developing a medical system to meet the needs of capitalist society" (1979: 4). In a similar manner, corporate capitalism of the mid-twentieth century initiated a broad range of activity in developing nations, designed to promote a particular form of economic development, creating the opportunity for increased profits for multinational firms, bolstered by control of indigenous social institutions. Central to much of this activity was the work and philosophy of the population establishment.
Funding for population control, first initiated in the private sector and later assumed in the public, continued to escalate during the 1970s. Spurred by US interest, established organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, established internal population divisions and initiated international population programs. Although multilateral programs received a broad base of financial support, a large percentage of the funding was initiated by the same private foundations which had initiated direct US intervention in Third World family planning a decade earlier. As had been true during the 1950s and early 1960s, the names of Rockefeller, Ford, McNamara and others continued to be instrumental in evaluating needs, recommending action and initiating appropriations. The tenor of the times is revealed in the following segment of Richard Nixon's Presidential Message of July 18, 1969.

In all of these international efforts, our programs should give further recognition to the important resources of private organizations and university research centers. As we increase our population and family planning efforts abroad, we also call upon other nations to enlarge their programs in this area....For high rates of population growth....impair individual rights, jeopardize national goals and threaten international stability. (New York Times, July 19, 1969)

Federal expenditures also continued to increase. By 1975, sixty-seven percent of the United States funding for health care under the Foreign Aid Assistance Act was for population planning programs. Encouraged by the availability of federal money, numerous nonprofit organizations looked to population funding as "soft money" which could
be used to develop or expand unrelated programs (Mass, 1976).

Private, nonprofit organizations involved in the business of administering and/or dispensing family planning also prospered. By 1975, the Population Crisis Committee had an annual budget in excess of $500,000 and the International Planned Parenthood Federation more than $17 million (Mass, 1976: 43-45). Coupled with funds either directly or indirectly involved with population planning were the huge amounts going to other areas of economic development, much of which was contingent upon the acceptance of family planning efforts by the recipient nation. Frequently, those active in international population efforts also participated, in some way, in other areas of development. (For example, the so-called "green revolution" initially was introduced by the Rockefeller Foundation.) Enormous profits stood to be gained through such intervention: in direct sales and in more indirect control of foreign products and fiscal policy.

The implications of such bureaucratic growth are self-evident. As population control bureaucracies, both internal and external to government, expanded, they assumed a life of their own, independent of the particular administration in office in Washington. By the 1970s, many of the developing nations had integrated population policy into their overall development plans, compared to a decade earlier when fewer than thirty percent of seventy development plans studied even acknowledged population as a potential internal problem (Simmons, 1984). Integral to most development plans, was a reliance on the external funding provided through the public and private sector. The
acceptance by developing nations of the need for external intervention in reducing fertility greatly enhanced the status and autonomy of the population establishment. Key officials and private funding sources solidified the network linking public and private business interests to benevolence. As indicated in Table 1., by the early 1970s, corporate capitalism's influence extended from the position of primary donors through various multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, staffed by members of the corporate class, into a variety of secondary donors and intermediaries whose membership also strongly reflected corporate interests.
Table 1.

EXTERNAL LINKAGE GROUP NETWORK for LATIN AMERICAN

POPULATION ASSISTANCE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Primary Donors</th>
<th>Primary Intermediaries</th>
<th>Secondary Donors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>Pop. Council</td>
<td>PRB, FEPAFEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation</td>
<td>Pop. Council</td>
<td>CELADE, PAHO, IUSSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foundations</td>
<td>Pop. Council</td>
<td>IPPF, PRB,</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Religious Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Governments</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>UN Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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Satisfaction with much of US foreign policy showed a marked decline during the latter half of the 1970s. In particular, there was dissatisfaction with what had come to be known as the "new directions" foreign policy which had been widely received by the development community a decade earlier, at its inception. The underlying assumption of "new directions" policy was that development must focus on the poorest of the poor, on the most needy in the underdeveloped nations. In other words, those benefitting from US assistance should be "the poor majority in developing countries, not the wealthy elite" (National Journal, 5/29/82: 961).

The depressed US economic climate of the 1970s, coupled with the Iranian hostage situation, served as the foci of criticism and source of promised reform during the 1980 presidential campaign. Foreign policy was a major target of criticism at both an economic and security level. Offered as an alternative to a "new directions" philosophy was an emphasis on private sector business expansion, and national and military security, as the primary foci of foreign assistance. The Reagan administration's attempt to re-establish a more market-oriented economy has expanded upon this philosophy in shaping foreign policy, seeking to build up foreign military aid and to strengthen the private business sector of the nations of the Third World.

The administration's involvement in strengthening the private sector of the Third World reflects an important departure from the
earlier interest in developing nations in which corporate capitalism sought to influence development and insure profit through a strategy of integrated levels of economic planning. The present thrust is toward a more entrepreneurial approach, relying on what Reagan describes as old, \textit{Laissez-faire} economics to promote both Third World and United States business interests. The ensuing tension between the established interests of corporate capitalism and the recent introduction of a more market-based capitalism within the Third World provides an important dynamic against which the issue of population control policy, and other forms of foreign policy, are articulated.

Critical to the change in foreign policy direction was the administration's decision to foster private-sector initiative through the implementation of such programs as the Caribbean Basin initiative and US AID's Bureau for Private Enterprise. The goal of the Bureau is to provide financial assistance to the private sector of developing nations in order to promote "...productive, self-sustaining income and job-producing private sectors...using the financial, technological and management expertise of the US private sector..." (National Journal, 5/29/82: 961). Established in July, 1982, the Bureau for Private Enterprise was headed by Elise R.W. duPont, Philadelphia lawyer and wife of the governor of Delaware, with no previous experience in development or foreign affairs.

Change in directives indicated a philosophical change regarding development -- US AID, as one of the most important sources of our activities in the internal dynamics of foreign nations, now was
charged with eradicating Third World poverty through the private enterprise system. The present administration's implicit reluctance to participate in population control and policy setting through multilateral organizations, accompanied by an expressed desire to exert a more direct form of control over American activities in developing nations, is an extension of a belief in the importance of the market and the private enterprise system as a means of effecting social change. In the area of family planning, this has evolved into what James Buckley, chief US delegate to the 1984 UN Conference on Population, describes as "market-oriented population theory" (New York Times, 8/8/84). Such a position stresses the primacy of free market economics in improving human conditions and views them as a "natural mechanism for slowing population growth" (New York Times, 8/8/84).

Although the rhetoric of the Reagan administration appears to portend a shift in commitment towards existing foreign population control policy, to date, actual change is not as significant as some had feared it might be. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan appeared to align himself quite explicitly with the strong anti-abortion stance of the Right, and the abortion debate continued to color much of Reagan's first term domestic policy. The 1980 Supreme Court decision restricting the use of Medicaid funds for abortion has a number of political implications for population control. Not only does it have a direct bearing on the number of poor women able to obtain abortions, it also appeals to that constituency concerned with curtailing federal spending, thereby broadening the apparent base of support for a more
conservative approach to family planning.

Internationally, the administration also has supported a population policy reflecting the interests of the politically vocal Right. Of issue have been such matters as continued US support of programs offering "artificial" methods of birth control; organizations or governments endorsing coercive abortions and, of course, the debate over the level of US support to private-sector growth in the developing world. In 1985, the Administration announced its intention to restrict US AID funding to those agencies offering only "natural" methods of birth control (Chicago Tribune, 9/5/85). Congress, however, failed to support the restriction or any other attempt to lower significantly the total dollar amount appropriated for family planning within the Third World. The administration's position on appropriate forms of birth control and other related issues appears to be more of a political vehicle for the implementation, funding or support of other issues and programs than a hard line against existing practice in developing nations.

In matters of foreign policy, potential funding and pressure from groups such as the American Life Lobby appear to have influenced Reagan's public stance in opposition to abortion as a method of family planning. A critical issue has been the question of continued support to countries or international agencies which include coerced abortions as part of official family planning programs. Just prior to the 1984 World Population Conference in Mexico City which immediately preceded the Republican Convention, the White House issued a policy
statement, to be read at the conference, denying federal money to international organizations condoning abortions. At the same conference World Bank President, A.W. Clausen urged the attending nations to intensify their financial commitment to population regulation by quadrupling the existing level of funding available for family planning programs within the Third World (New York Times, 8/8/84). The contrasting positions represent the tensions emerging between rhetorical changes at the administrative level and the consistency of the population establishment.

In 1985, US appropriations for foreign aid (HJ Res 648-PL98-473) did exclude aid for population programs supporting coerced abortion and, in September, 1985, US AID Director McPherson announced the withdrawal of $10 million originally allocated for United Nations sponsored population programs, because of the inclusion of Chinese programs where coercive abortion is endorsed as part of the national effort to limit population growth (New York Times, 9/26/85). The withdrawal of American funding from United Nations population programs will have a significant impact on those nations relying exclusively on multilateral support; however, it will have little effect on the actual dollar amount of United States funding designated for population control. The $10 million has been earmarked for bilateral family planning, under more direct US control and for private, American agencies that provide international family planning services. Therefore, the decision seems to be more indicative of Reagan's attempt to placate the extreme pro-life movement and to exert direct control over
funding and programs, than actual commitment to an anti-birth control practice. More importantly, the fact that the actual appropriation amount was maintained indicates the pervasive influence of those wishing to continue foreign population programs, in some form, at the congressional level.

Both domestically and in the area of foreign policy, the anti-abortion position has been accompanied by periodic criticisms of federal sponsorship of anything other than "natural" methods of birth control. This position advocates family planning programs as centers of information and education concerning fertility cycles and the responsibility of each partner in controlling pregnancy. It implicitly advocates a Western, middle-class model of delayed fertility, in a two parent household, in which the presence and desirability of children is assumed. The exclusion of pharmaceutical products from accepted methods of birth control is an extension of the pro-life position. Although the merits of such programs have been debated in Congress, they appear to have little political importance, beyond the cumulative effect of conservative population politics on other, more significant legislation. The withdrawal of federal participation in medical/technological support of family planning would incure the hostility of the American Medical Association, major pharmaceutical corporations and other of the most influential lobbying groups in existence today.

Likewise, when aspects of the combined impact of the Reagan administration and ideological shifts are evaluated, change is evident, but not of the type that significantly alters the level of involvement
of the population establishment. Although Reagan has contended that population is "an inherently 'neutral' factor that 'is not necessarily good or ill' in development" (Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84: 2145), for the past four year Congress has appropriated in excess of Reagan's recommendations for overseas family planning program. US foreign aid for population control has grown by thirty percent since fiscal 1981 (Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84).
THE SUSTAINING POWER OF BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA

By 1984, the activities of what had come to be known as the population establishment had changed little from the days of its inception, some twenty years earlier. Those advocating continued high level participation in family planning in the Third World represented the same groups and organizations whose staff and boards reflected the same linkages between corporate interests and government, as had existed earlier. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of multinational corporate interests exerts a far stronger influence in the shaping of foreign policy than that of a collectivity of business looking to government to provide a "free market" for the realization of greater profit and economic stability.

Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Security Economics (March 20, 1984), included that of Paul Demeny, Vice President of the Population Council, who spoke of the need for continued funding and commitment to population control, since the rapid growth of cheap labor in the Third World would put a strain on efforts to maintain free trade and could force the United States to retreat to a protectionist position. "Developed countries...cannot be expected passively to accept that the speed of structural transformation in their economies is determined by the reproductive decisions of hundreds of millions of couples in developing nations." Included also in testimony were the statements of the vice president of the Population Crisis Committee and the faculty from three universities, all of whom
spoke in favor of increased funding for family planning programs.

A congressional conference on the New Economy held on June 6, 1984, provided an opportunity for panelists, such as the vice president of international planning of Goldman and Sachs and the president of an international futures firm, to present a spectrum of concern over the continued threat of Third World population growth to US economic interests, both foreign and domestic. Jay Forrester of MIT's Sloan School of Management commented that the increase in agricultural productivity in some developing nations might actually enhance population growth, until a situation is reached in which the social stress is "high enough to trigger atomic war. Atomic war is the ultimate limit to population growth" (Joint Economic Committee, Conference on the New Economy, 6/6/84: 46). In his introductory comments, Senator John Heinz (R-Penn), addressed the potential threat of unchecked subsidized foreign exports and "the total lack of assumed responsibility on the part of the less developed countries in this regard" (6/6/84: 5).

The above comments reflect a form of paternalism reminiscent of the early involvement of the population establishment, as an extension of corporate capitalism's interest in expansion into the Third World. The situation facing the developing world continues to be defined from a neo-Malthusian perspective -- a perspective which denies the potential of substantial structural reorganization and best legitimizes both the public and private sector's presence in this area.

In 1984, Congress appropriated $240 million for overseas family planning -- $28 million more than requested by Reagan for that fiscal
year (Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84: 2145). Thus, despite the rhetoric of those supporting or those opposing family planning in developing nations, it would appear that the efforts of the agencies and organizations committed to reducing fertility and stabilizing population in the Third World will continue, in some form, into the foreseeable future. Ideology and practice link development and population growth to the interests of multinational firms, in a form of "corporate benevolence" fostered by influential foundations, research sites and think tanks and to the every-day reality of those involved in the business of limiting the growth rates of the Third World. In a plea for continued support by governments for world-wide birth control efforts, World Bank President A.W. Clausen reiterated the accepted perspective, linking development and population, and the continued influence of the population establishment on public policy in the following statement:

Poverty and rapid population growth reinforce each other. Therefore the international community has no alternative but to cooperate with a sense of urgency, in an effort to slow population growth if development is to be achieved.
(Quoted in the Chicago Tribune, 7/11/84: 1:1)

The strength of this influence combines with a pragmatic realization of the impact of an annual growth rate of more than two percent within much of the Third World, to produce a collectivity of interest spanning public and private sectors and impervious to most political variability.
In drawing together an assessment of the role corporate capitalism has played in the evolution of foreign population policy, an attempt must be made to evaluate the effectiveness of the various policies in question. Evaluation of foreign population policy, however, is particularly problematic because quantitative analysis alone is inadequate. Looking at demographic projections or charts and graphs of past fertility/mortality rates provides only one aspect of the needed data for informed evaluation. A number of critical issues must be raised in assessing existing policy, not the least of which is the lack of specificity of policy goals, based in part on the blurring of the demarcation between population and development. This particular issue is succinctly described by an opponent of continued funding for US AID in the following statement:

Aid is always coming up each year with a new approach and that is one of the reasons why it is very difficult for your committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to understand the bill...In 1961 AID was sold on the basis of communism...this year for two reasons...'our needs compel it' and 'our self-interest requires it'. (Statement of William Paddock, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, June 26, 1973)

Just as the language and motivation for US AID reflect the variability in the international and domestic situation, so too, does the evolution of the legitimation of foreign population policy reflect significant variability. The stated goals of population control have ranged from that of national security, to improvement in the lives
of the poor, to the prevention of a return to protectionism -- all making it extremely difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the policy.

Although statistics indicate that the average annual population growth rate in the Third World has dropped from 2.3 to 2.2 percent during the past ten years, the decrease in itself does not produce a significant impact on population numbers (Sewell, 1980). However, when these figures combine with the fact that eighty percent of the developing nations now have an official policy to reduce population growth, proponents of existing US policy can contend that the impact of our foreign policy is a positive realization of goals to reduce excessive fertility. Others, however, debate the absolute benefit of birth control programs to the Third World, when weighed against costs and alternative development programs, citing what development language has labelled the "bread vs loop" clash (Segal, 1973). This argument recalls a statement made earlier in the paper pointing to the criticism that policy rarely takes into consideration variability in belief system and culture within and between the countries of the Third World. Failure to change ideology supporting large families has been cited as a major failure of existing programs in family planning.

The ethics of the debate emanate from an ambiguity in determining whether development and population must necessarily be part of the same general policy and whether the good of many precludes considerations of individual rights and decision-making. Regardless of such ambiguity, corporate capitalism has retained an interest in a broadly supported level of involvement in the internal affairs of developing
nations and through the efforts of the population establishment this interest is partially realized.

More relevant to the present discussion is another set of indicators for assessing the effectiveness of US participation in population programs in the Third World. When considering who has benefitted from existing policy and which interests have shaped its dimensions, the role of corporate capitalism is evident. Since the inception of organized population control, a number of significant benefits have accrued to corporate interests in a variety of ways. The ability to turn "benevolence to power" through involvement in fertility regulation has enhanced what Starr (1982) identifies as the "cultural authority" of big business. Such authority goes beyond the ability of multinationals to direct and shape policy and the course of development within the Third World. It reaffirms the legitimacy of the multinationals themselves, reinforcing an acceptance of their means of production and reproduction. The network of those involved in the various aspects of Third World population control strongly reflects the presence of corporate capitalism. The numerous organizations mentioned previously: the universities and research centers; foundations and other philanthropic organizations; industry and business, to varying degrees, all look to, or are, the site of corporate interests. All have benefitted from a form of affiliative power centered in the dynamics of population control. All have benefitted from funds generated directly and indirectly through foreign population policy. In addition, business and industry have benefitted from
the economic and development aid made contingent upon acceptance of the conditions of US population policy and from the access to materials and markets ensured by continued efforts to help developing nations replicate the economic and political models of the West.

More importantly, however, the Third World has provided an arena in which social institutions and relations can be constrained and shaped to serve Western corporate interests, through a complex system of aid, investment and attempted control over the process of personal decision making. The network necessary to support the interests of corporate capitalism is, in part, reflected in the bureaucratic structuration of the population establishment network. Encompassing both the public and private sector -- academics, medicine, research and development, industry and government -- the population establishment epitomizes the tendency of bureaucracy to assume a life of its own, often impervious to environmental changes. The dollar amount of its operations, the number of staff present at all levels and the significant amount of decision-making capability provided by its existence all contribute to the need for the population establishment to retain its form, regardless of the match between stated goals and actual conditions. This bureaucratic inertia, couple with the sustained dominance of corporate capitalism, provides a framework for analysis of US population control policy, permitting a more inclusive understanding of the relationship of population control to other foreign policy and to public support of private interests.
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