Title of Poster or Presentation

A Novel Epistemology of Political Disagreement

Presenter Information

Jay CarlsonFollow

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Submission Type

Oral/Paper Presentation

Degree Type

PhD

Discipline

Humanities

Department

Philosophy

Access Type

Open Access

Abstract or Description

The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper I will outline a novel epistemology of political disagreement that departs from these majority viewpoints. Drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.

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Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

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Jun 6th, 11:15 AM Jun 6th, 12:15 PM

A Novel Epistemology of Political Disagreement

The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper I will outline a novel epistemology of political disagreement that departs from these majority viewpoints. Drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.