Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-17-2019

Publication Title

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volume

20

Issue

1

Publisher Name

Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Abstract

To punish an agent, the principal often incurs costs. I study a principal’s least costly reward and punishment scheme for an agent whose effort the principal cannot observe. I find the principal’s cost is sometimes minimized by using both costly rewards and costly punishments because (1) the agent has an outside option, or (2) a principal without commitment ability repeatedly interacts with the agent. I also find that when an agent’s effort is better at increasing the probability of a good outcome for the principal, the agent’s payoff may decrease, because the principal replaces rewards with punishments.

Identifier

Online ISSN: 1935-1704

Comments

Author Posting © Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston, 2019. This article is posted here by permission of Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston for personal use, not for redistribution. The article was published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1, September 2019, https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0131

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

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