Positive Freedom: Past, Present, and Future
Cambridge University Press
This chapter explores what, if any, contributions a Hegelian ethics of recognition makes towards enriching our understanding of the intersubjective foundations of freedom. Against Berlin, I argue that recognition is wrongly construed as a form of solidarity with society that threatens individual freedom. Drawing from recent work by Honneth, I submit that distinct recognition regimes correspond to distinct social action spheres in a way that that facilitates critical reflection and freedom to resist over-reaching action spheres. I conclude that reconciling these action spheres on both individual and social levels by means of a meta-level form of social recognition in the way the Hegel postulated runs up against the Marx's critique of capitalism and Weber's and Durkheim's critique of modern liberal legal systems.
Ingram, David. Recognition and Positive Freedom. Positive Freedom: Past, Present, and Future, , : 83-101, 2021. Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works,
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