Austrian Journal of Political Science
Kelsen’s critique of absolute sovereignty famously appeals to a basic norm of international recognition. However, in his discussion of legal obligation, generally speaking, he notoriously rejects mutual recognition as having any normative consequence. I argue that this apparent contradiction in Kelsen's estimate regarding the normative force of recognition is resolved in his dynamic account of the democratic generation of law. Democracy is embedded within a modern political ethos that obligates legal subjects to recognize each other along four dimensions: as contractors whose mutually beneficial cooperation measures esteem by fair standards of contribution; as autonomous agents endowed with equal rights; as friends who altruistically care for each others’ welfare, and as fallible agents of diverse experiences and worldviews.
Ingram, David. The Role of Recognition in Kelsen's Account of Legal Obligation and Political Duty. Austrian Journal of Political Science, 51, 3: 52-61, 2022. Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works, http://dx.doi.org/10.15203/ozp.3657.vol51iss3
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Author Posting. © 2022, OZP. This article is posted here by permission of OZP for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Austrian Journal Of Political Science Vol 51, issue 3 (2022). https://doi.org/10.15203/ozp.3657.vol51iss3