Date of Award

2021

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Political Science

Abstract

Paul R. Olander

Loyola University Chicago

PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY CORPORATIONS IN CIVIL CONFLICTS

Why do states fighting civil conflicts hire Private Military and Security Corporations (PMSCs)? Does doing so hasten state victory? Many states have turned to PMSCs for help defeating rebels, yet we lack a broad understanding of the causes and outcomes of this choice. I build upon insights from principal-agent theory and utilize statistical analyses to explain when states delegate tasks to PMSCs during civil conflicts, and what conditions affect when PMSCs help states achieve victory. I also examine the Nigerian government’s decision to hire the PMSC STTEP in 2015, in order to identify factors that cause states fighting civil conflicts to hire PMSCs that my statistical analysis cannot detect. The results from both types of analyses suggest that the reasons states hire PMSCs vary depending on what types of tasks PMSCs perform, but factors associated with threat levels from rebels and state capacity appear to be the most important. In addition, the results suggest that working with PMSCs tends to delays state victory. Overall, my analyses suggest that states fighting civil conflicts tend to hire PMSCs after their own forces have shown that they cannot stand up to rebel forces, which is when PMSCs find it easiest to exploit states and prolong conflicts in pursuit of their own interests.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Download

Share

COinS