Date of Award

2026

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Dimitris Apostolopoulos

Abstract

In this dissertation, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature is also a radical critique of the metaphysical foundations of natural science. This critique leads us to a new ontology for science, grounded in the lifeworld. I focus on how his philosophy offers a detailed critique of both physicalism and mechanism. For Merleau-Ponty, mechanism is not just the strict adherence to classical causality, but any view that asserts that classical causality has any role to play in reality at all. To replace mechanistic causality, Merleau-Ponty argues that we must conceive of nature as grounded in meaningful possibility. Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on possibility, I argue, is an explicit attempt to reestablish augmented versions of concepts from the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, such as form, essence, dunamis (possibility), and real sensible qualities. For Merleau-Ponty, the primacy of perception entails a return to those ontological categories that modernism attempted to remove from scientific consideration. I emphasize Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with modern physics to show that he argues that the facts of quantum physics call us to reground scientific ontology in the perceived world. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy challenges us to radically reinterpret our common conceptions of induction, causation, the meaning of physics, as well as reinterpret the relationship between nature, history, and human existence.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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