Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-1-2017
Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence on the different impacts of principal-agent relationships on risk-taking behavior and performance of Islamic banks, compared to conventional ones, for a sample of 105 banks in 8 Arab countries during the period (2005 – 2009). It distinguishes between two aspects of shareholder structure; namely, ownership concentration and shareholders rights. Empirical evidence showed that principal-agent conflicts were proved prominent in Islamic, as well as conventional banks due to the inverse and statistically significant effect of shareholder rights on risk-taking behavior. Moreover, it was found that principal-agent conflicts are more inherent in conventional banks, with regard to their impact on performance. The results were robust to including different bank specific and country specific variables.
Journal Title
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies
ISSN
2334-282X
Publisher
Middle East Economic Association and Loyola University Chicago
Volume
19
Issue
2
Recommended Citation
Fayed, Mona and Ezzat, Asmaa, "Do principal-agent conflicts impact performance and risk-taking behavior of Islamic banks?". Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies, electronic journal, 19, 2, Middle East Economic Association and Loyola University Chicago, 2017, http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/
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Copyright Statement
© 2017 The Authors
Comments
Presentation of the articles in the Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies was made possible by a limited license granted to Loyola University Chicago and Middle East Economics Association from the authors who have retained all copyrights in the articles.