A Signal Injection Attack Against Zero Involvement Pairing and Authentication for the Internet of Things
Document Type
Conference Proceeding
Publication Date
5-13-2024
Publication Title
6th Workshop on Design Automation for CPS and IoT (DESTION 2024)
Abstract
Zero Involvement Pairing and Authentication (ZIPA) is a promising technique for auto-provisioning large networks of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. In this work, we present the first successful signal injection attack on a ZIPA system. Most existing ZIPA systems assume there is a negligible amount of influence from the unsecured outside space on the secured inside space. In reality, environmental signals do leak from adjacent unsecured spaces and influence the environment of the secured space. Our attack takes advantage of this fact to perform a signal injection attack on the popular Schurmann & Sigg algorithm. The keys generated by the adversary with a signal injection attack at 95 dBA is within the standard error of the legitimate device.
Identifier
arXiv:2311.04433v1
Recommended Citation
Ahlgren, I., West, J., Lee, K., Thiruvathukal, G.K., & Klingensmith, N. (2023). SyncBleed: A Realistic Threat Model and Mitigation Strategy for Zero-Involvement Pairing and Authentication (ZIPA). In Proceedings of 6th Workshop on Design Automation for CPS and IoT (DESTION 2024). arXiv:2311.04433v1.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Comments
Accepted for publication at 6th Workshop on Design Automation for CPS and IoT (DESTION 2024).