Title of Poster or Presentation
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Submission Type
Oral/Paper Presentation
Degree Type
PhD
Discipline
Humanities
Department
Philosophy
Access Type
Open Access
Abstract or Description
The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper I will outline a novel epistemology of political disagreement that departs from these majority viewpoints. Drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.
Author Posting © Jay Carlson, 2020. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of Jay Carlson for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in TRAMES, Volume 24, Issue 3, 2020. https//doi.org/10.3176/tr.2020.3.05
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
A Novel Epistemology of Political Disagreement
The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper I will outline a novel epistemology of political disagreement that departs from these majority viewpoints. Drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.
Author Posting © Jay Carlson, 2020. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of Jay Carlson for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in TRAMES, Volume 24, Issue 3, 2020. https//doi.org/10.3176/tr.2020.3.05
